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diff --git a/39746.txt b/39746.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8328cc --- /dev/null +++ b/39746.txt @@ -0,0 +1,24550 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. +by George Berkeley + + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no +restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under +the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or +online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license + + + +Title: The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. + +Author: George Berkeley + +Release Date: May 20, 2012 [Ebook #39746] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: US-ASCII + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY. VOL. 1 OF 4.*** + + + + + + The Works of George Berkeley D.D. + + Formerly Bishop of Cloyne + + Including his Posthumous Works + + With Prefaces, Annotations, Appendices, and An Account of his Life, by + + Alexander Campbell Fraser + + Hon. D.C.L., Oxford + + Hon. LL.D. Glasgow and Edinburgh; Emeritus Professor of Logic and + Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh + + In Four Volumes + + Vol. 1: Philosophical Works, 1705-21 + + Oxford + + At the Clarendon Press + + 1901 + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +Preface +George Berkeley, By The Editor +Errata +Commonplace Book. Mathematical, Ethical, Physical, And Metaphysical + Editor's Preface To The Commonplace Book + Commonplace Book +An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision + Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision + Dedication + An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision + An Appendix To The Essay On Vision +A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge + Editor's Preface To The Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human + Knowledge + Dedication + The Preface + Introduction + Part First +Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous The Design Of Which Is Plainly +To Demonstrate The Reality And Perfection Of Human Knowledge, The +Incorporeal Nature Of The Soul, And The Immediate Providence Of A Deity, +In Opposition To Sceptics And Atheists, Also To Open A Method For +Rendering The Sciences More Easy, Useful, And Compendious + Editor's Preface + Dedication + The Preface + The First Dialogue + The Second Dialogue + The Third Dialogue +De Motu: Sive; De Motus Principio Et Natura, Et De Causa Communicationis +Motuum + Editor's Preface To De Motu + De Motu +Footnotes + + + + + + +PREFACE + + + [Frontispiece] + +More than thirty years ago I was honoured by a request to prepare a +complete edition of the Works of Bishop Berkeley, with Notes, for the +Clarendon Press, Oxford. That edition, which contains many of his writings +previously unpublished, appeared in 1871. It was followed in 1874 by a +volume of annotated Selections from his philosophical works; and in 1881 I +prepared a small volume on "Berkeley" for Blackwood's "Philosophical +Classics." + +The 1871 edition of the Works originated, I believe, in an essay on "The +Real World of Berkeley," which I gave to _Macmillan's Magazine_ in 1862, +followed by another in 1864, in the _North British Review_. These essays +suggested advantages to contemporary thought which might be gained by a +consideration of final questions about man and the universe, in the form +in which they are presented by a philosopher who has suffered more from +misunderstanding than almost any other modern thinker. During a part of +his lifetime, he was the foremost metaphysician in Europe in an +unmetaphysical generation. And in this country, after a revival of +philosophy in the later part of the eighteenth century, _idea_, _matter_, +_substance_, _cause_, and other terms which play an important part in his +writings, had lost the meaning that he intended; while in Germany the +sceptical speculations of David Hume gave rise to a reconstructive +criticism, on the part of Kant and his successors, which seemed at the +time to have little concern with the _a posteriori_ methods and the +principles of Berkeley. + +The success of the attempt to recall attention to Berkeley has far +exceeded expectation. Nearly twenty thousand copies of the three +publications mentioned above have found their way into the hands of +readers in Europe and America; and the critical estimates of Berkeley, by +eminent writers, which have appeared since 1871, in Britain, France, +Germany, Denmark, Holland, Italy, America, and India, confirm the opinion +that his Works contain a word in season, even for the twentieth century. +Among others who have delivered appreciative criticisms of Berkeley within +the last thirty years are J.S. Mill, Mansel, Huxley, T.H. Green, Maguire, +Collyns Simon, the Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, Mr. Leslie Stephen, Dr. +Hutchison Stirling, Professor T.K. Abbott, Professor Van der Wyck, M. +Penjon, Ueberweg, Frederichs, Ulrici, Janitsch, Eugen Meyer, Spicker, +Loewy, Professor Hoeffding of Copenhagen, Dr. Lorenz, Noah Porter, and +Krauth, besides essays in the chief British, Continental, and American +reviews. The text of those Works of Berkeley which were published during +his lifetime, enriched with a biographical Introduction by Mr. A.J. +Balfour, carefully edited by Mr. George Sampson, appeared in 1897. In 1900 +Dr. R. Richter, of the University of Leipsic, produced a new translation +into German of the _Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_, with an +excellent Introduction and notes. These estimates form a remarkable +contrast to the denunciations, founded on misconception, by Warburton and +Beattie in the eighteenth century. + + ------------------------------------- + +In 1899 I was unexpectedly again asked by the Delegates of the Oxford +University Press to prepare a New Edition of Berkeley's Works, with some +account of his life, as the edition of 1871 was out of print; a +circumstance which I had not expected to occur in my lifetime. It seemed +presumptuous to undertake what might have been entrusted to some one +probably more in touch with living thought; and in one's eighty-second +year, time and strength are wanting for remote research. But the +recollection that I was attracted to philosophy largely by Berkeley, in +the morning of life more than sixty years ago, combined with the pleasure +derived from association in this way with the great University in which he +found an academic home in his old age, moved me in the late evening of +life to make the attempt. And now, at the beginning of the twentieth +century, I offer these volumes, which still imperfectly realise my ideal +of a final Oxford edition of the philosopher who spent his last days in +Oxford, and whose mortal remains rest in its Cathedral. + +Since 1871 materials of biographical and philosophical interest have been +discovered, in addition to the invaluable collection of MSS. which +Archdeacon Rose then placed at my disposal, and which were included in the +supplementary volume of _Life and Letters_. Through the kindness of the +late Earl of Egmont I had access, some years ago, to a large number of +letters which passed between his ancestor, Sir John (afterwards Lord) +Percival, and Berkeley, between 1709 and 1730. I have availed myself +freely of this correspondence. + +Some interesting letters from and concerning Berkeley, addressed to his +friend Dr. Samuel Johnson of Stratford in Connecticut, afterwards +President of King's College in New York, appeared in 1874, in Dr. +Beardsley's _Life of Johnson_, illustrating Berkeley's history from 1729 +till his death. For these and for further information I am indebted to Dr. +Beardsley. + + ------------------------------------- + +In the present edition of Berkeley's Works, the Introductions and the +annotations have been mostly re-written. A short account of his romantic +life is prefixed, intended to trace its progress in the gradual +development and application of his initial Principle; and also the +external incidents of his life in their continuity, with the help of the +new material in the Percival MSS. and the correspondence with Johnson. It +forms a key to the whole. This biography is not intended to supersede the +_Life and Letters_ of Berkeley that accompanied the 1871 edition, which +remains as a magazine of facts for reference. + +The rearrangement of the Works is a feature in the present edition. Much +of the new material that was included in the 1871 edition reached me when +the book was far advanced in the press, and thus the chronological +arrangement, strictly followed in the present edition, was not possible. A +chronological arrangement is suggested by Berkeley himself. "I could wish +that all the things I have published on these philosophical subjects were +read in the order wherein I published them," are his words in one of his +letters to Johnson; "and a second time with a critical eye, adding your +own thought and observation upon every part as you went along." + +The first three volumes in this edition contain the Philosophical Works +exclusively; arranged in chronological order, under the three periods of +Berkeley's life. The First Volume includes those of his early life; the +Second those produced in middle life; and the Third those of his later +years. The Miscellaneous Works are presented in like manner in the Fourth +Volume. + +The four little treatises in which Berkeley in early life unfolded his new +thought about the universe, along with his college _Commonplace Book_ +published in 1871, which prepared the way for them, form, along with the +Life, the contents of the First Volume. It is of them that the author +writes thus, in another of his letters to Johnson:--"I do not indeed wonder +that on first reading what I have written men are not thoroughly +convinced. On the contrary, I should very much wonder if prejudices which +have been many years taking root should be extirpated in a few hours' +reading. I had no inclination to trouble the world with large volumes. +What I have done was rather with a view of giving hints to thinking men, +who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue +them in their own minds. Two or three times reading these small tracts, +and making what is read the occasion of thinking, would, I believe, render +the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off that shocking +appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative truths." +Except Johnson, none of Berkeley's eighteenth-century critics seem to have +observed this rule. + +_Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher_, with its supplement in the _Theory +of Visual Language Vindicated_, being the philosophical works of his +middle life, associated with its American enterprise, form the Second +Volume. In them the conception of the universe that was unfolded in the +early writings is applied, in vindication of religious morality and +Christianity, against the Atheism attributed to those who called +themselves Free-thinkers; who were treated by Berkeley as, at least by +implication, atheistic. + +The Third Volume contains the _Analyst_ and _Siris_, which belong to his +later life, _Siris_ being especially characteristic of its serene quiet. +In both there is a deepened sense of the mystery of the universe, and in +_Siris_ especially a more comprehensive conception of the final problem +suggested by human life. But the metaphysics of the one is lost in +mathematical controversy; that of the other in medical controversy, and in +undigested ancient and mediaeval learning. The metaphysical importance of +_Siris_ was long unrecognised, although in it Berkeley's thought +culminates, not in a paradox about Matter, but in the conception of God as +the concatenating principle of the universe; yet this reached through the +conception of Matter as real only in and through living Mind. + +The Miscellaneous Works, after the two juvenile Latin tracts in +mathematics, deal with observations of nature and man gathered in his +travels, questions of social economy, and lessons in religious life. +Several are posthumous, and were first published in the 1871 edition. Of +these, perhaps the most interesting is the _Journal in Italy_. The +_Discourse on Passive Obedience_ is the nearest approach to ethical theory +which Berkeley has given to us, and as such it might have taken its place +in the First Volume; but on the whole it seemed more appropriately placed +in the Fourth, where it is easily accessible for those who prefer to read +it immediately after the book of _Principles_. + +I have introduced, in an Appendix to the Third Volume, some matter of +philosophical interest for which there was no place in the editorial +Prefaces or in the annotations. The historical significance of Samuel +Johnson and Jonathan Edwards, as pioneers of American philosophy, and also +advocates of the new conception of the material world that is associated +with Berkeley, is recognised in Appendix C. Illustrations of the +misinterpretation of Berkeley by his early critics are presented in +Appendix D. A lately discovered tractate by Berkeley forms Appendix E. In +the Fourth Volume, numerous queries contained in the first edition of the +_Querist_, and omitted in the later editions, are given in an Appendix, +which enables the reader to reconstruct that interesting tract in the form +in which it originally appeared. + +The present edition is thus really a new work, which possesses, I hope, a +certain philosophical unity, as well as pervading biographical interest. + + ------------------------------------- + +As Berkeley is the immediate successor of Locke, and as he was educated by +collision with the _Essay __ on Human Understanding_, perhaps Locke ought +to have had more prominence in the editorial portion of this book. +Limitation of space partly accounts for the omission; and I venture +instead to refer the reader to the Prolegomena and notes in my edition of +Locke's _Essay_, which was published by the Clarendon Press in 1894. I may +add that an expansion of thoughts which run through the Life and many of +the annotations, in this edition of Berkeley, may be found in my +_Philosophy of Theism_(1). + + ------------------------------------- + +The reader need not come to Berkeley in the expectation of finding in his +Works an all-comprehensive speculative system like Spinoza's, or a +reasoned articulation of the universe of reality such as Hegel is supposed +to offer. But no one in the succession of great English philosophers has, +I think, proposed in a way more apt to invite reflexion, the final +alternative between Unreason, on the one hand, and Moral Reason expressed +in Universal Divine Providence, on the other hand, as the root of the +unbeginning and endless evolution in which we find ourselves involved; as +well as the further question, Whether this tremendous practical +alternative _can_ be settled by any means that are within the reach of +man? His Philosophical Works, taken collectively, may encourage those who +see in a reasonable _via media_ between Omniscience and Nescience the true +path of progress, under man's inevitable venture of reasonable Faith. + +One is therefore not without hope that a fresh impulse may be given to +philosophy and religious thought by this reappearance of George Berkeley, +under the auspices of the University of Oxford, at the beginning of the +twentieth century. His readers will at any rate find themselves in the +company of one of the most attractive personalities of English philosophy, +who is also among the foremost of those thinkers who are masters in +English literature--Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, George Berkeley and +David Hume. + +A. Campbell Fraser. + +GORTON, HAWTHORNDEN, MIDLOTHIAN, +_March, 1901_. + + + + + +GEORGE BERKELEY, BY THE EDITOR + + + + +I. Early Life (1685-1721). + + +Towards the end of the reign of Charles the Second a certain William +Berkeley, according to credible tradition, occupied a cottage attached to +the ancient Castle of Dysert, in that part of the county of Kilkenny which +is watered by the Nore. Little is known about this William Berkeley except +that he was Irish by birth and English by descent. It is said that his +father went over to Ireland soon after the Restoration, in the suite of +his reputed kinsman, Lord Berkeley of Stratton, when he was Lord +Lieutenant. William Berkeley's wife seems to have been of Irish blood, and +in some remote way related to the family of Wolfe, the hero of Quebec. It +was in the modest abode in the valley of the Nore that George, the eldest +of their six sons, was born, on March 12, 1685. + +There is nothing in the recorded family history of these Dysert Berkeleys +that helps to explain the singular personality and career of the eldest +son. The parents have left no mark, and make no appearance in any extant +records of the family. They probably made their way to the valley of the +Nore among families of English connexion who, in the quarter of a century +preceding the birth of George Berkeley, were finding settlements in +Ireland. The family, as it appears, was not wealthy, but was recognised as +of gentle blood. Robert, the fifth son, became rector of Middleton and +vicar-general of Cloyne; and another son, William, held a commission in +the army. According to the Register of Trinity College, one of the sons +was born "near Thurles," in 1699, and Thomas, the youngest, was born in +Tipperary, in 1703, so that the family may have removed from Dysert after +the birth of George. In what can be gleaned of the younger sons, one finds +little appearance of sympathy with the religious and philosophical genius +of the eldest. + +Regarding this famous eldest son in those early days, we have this +significant autobiographical fragment in his _Commonplace Book_: "I was +distrustful at eight years old, and consequently by nature disposed for +the new doctrines." In his twelfth year we find the boy in Kilkenny +School. The register records his entrance there in the summer of 1696, +when he was placed at once in the second class, which seems to imply +precocity, for it is almost a solitary instance. He spent the four +following years in Kilkenny. The School was in high repute for learned +masters and famous pupils; among former pupils were the poet Congreve and +Swift, nearly twenty years earlier than George Berkeley; among his +school-fellows was Thomas Prior, his life-long friend and correspondent. +In the days of Berkeley and Prior the head master was Dr. Hinton, and the +School was still suffering from the consequences of "the warre in Ireland" +which followed the Revolution. + +Berkeley in Kilkenny School is hardly visible, and we have no means of +estimating his mental state when he left it. Tradition says that in his +school-days he was wont to feed his imagination with airy visions and +romance, a tradition which perhaps originated long after in popular +misconceptions of his idealism. Dimly discernible at Kilkenny, only a few +years later he was a conspicuous figure in an island that was then +beginning to share in the intellectual movement of the modern world, +taking his place as a classic in English literature, and as the most +subtle and ardent of contemporary English-speaking thinkers. + + ------------------------------------- + +In March, 1700, at the age of fifteen, George Berkeley entered Trinity +College, Dublin. This was his home for more than twenty years. He was at +first a mystery to the ordinary undergraduate. Some, we are told, +pronounced him the greatest dunce, others the greatest genius in the +College. To hasty judges he seemed an idle dreamer; the thoughtful admired +his subtle intelligence and the beauty of his character. In his +undergraduate years, a mild and ingenuous youth, inexperienced in the ways +of men, vivacious, humorous, satirical, in unexpected ways inquisitive, +often paradoxical, through misunderstandings he persisted in his own way, +full of simplicity and enthusiasm. In 1704 (the year in which Locke died) +he passed Bachelor of Arts, and became Master in 1707, when he was +admitted to a Fellowship, "the only reward of learning which that kingdom +had to bestow." + +In Trinity College the youth found himself on the tide of modern thought, +for the "new philosophy" of Newton and Locke was then invading the +University. Locke's _Essay_, published in 1690, was already in vogue. This +early recognition of Locke in Dublin was chiefly due to William Molyneux, +Locke's devoted friend, a lawyer and member of the Irish Parliament, much +given to the experimental methods. Descartes, too, with his sceptical +criticism of human beliefs, yet disposed to spiritualise powers commonly +attributed to matter, was another accepted authority in Trinity College; +and Malebranche was not unknown. Hobbes was the familiar representative of +a finally materialistic conception of existence, reproducing in modern +forms the atomism of Democritus and the ethics of Epicurus. Above all, +Newton was acknowledged master in physics, whose _Principia_, issued three +years sooner than Locke's _Essay_, was transforming the conceptions of +educated men regarding their surroundings, like the still more +comprehensive law of physical evolution in the nineteenth century. + +John Toland, an Irishman, one of the earliest and ablest of the new sect +of Free-thinkers, made his appearance at Dublin in 1696, as the author of +_Christianity not Mysterious_. The book was condemned by College +dignitaries and dignified clergy with even more than Irish fervour. It was +the opening of a controversy that lasted over half of the eighteenth +century in England, in which Berkeley soon became prominent; and it was +resumed later on, with greater intellectual force and in finer literary +form, by David Hume and Voltaire. The collision with Toland about the time +of Berkeley's matriculation may have awakened his interest. Toland was +supposed to teach that matter is eternal, and that motion is its essential +property, into which all changes presented in the outer and inner +experience of man may at last be resolved. Berkeley's life was a continual +protest against these dogmas. The Provost of Trinity College in 1700 was +Dr. Peter Browne, who had already entered the lists against Toland; long +after, when Bishop of Cork, he was in controversy with Berkeley about the +nature of man's knowledge of God. The Archbishop of Dublin in the early +years of the eighteenth century was William King, still remembered as a +philosophical theologian, whose book on the _Origin of Evil_, published in +1702, was criticised by Boyle and Leibniz. + +Dublin in those years was thus a place in which a studious youth, who had +been "distrustful at eight years old," might be disposed to entertain +grave questions about the ultimate meaning of his visible environment, and +of the self-conscious life to which he was becoming awake. Is the universe +of existence confined to the visible world, and is matter the really +active power in existence? Is God the root and centre of all that is real, +and if so, what is meant by God? Can God be good if the world is a mixture +of good and evil? Questions like these were ready to meet the inquisitive +Kilkenny youth in his first years at Dublin. + +One of his earliest interests at College was mathematical. His first +appearance in print was as the anonymous author of two Latin tracts, +_Arithmetica_ and _Miscellanea Mathematica_, published in 1707. They are +interesting as an index of his intellectual inclination when he was hardly +twenty; for he says they were prepared three years before they were given +to the world. His disposition to curious questions in geometry and algebra +is further shewn in his College _Commonplace Book_. + +This lately discovered _Commonplace Book_ throws a flood of light upon +Berkeley's state of mind between his twentieth and twenty-fourth year. It +is a wonderful revelation; a record under his own hand of his thoughts and +feelings when he first came under the inspiration of a new conception of +the nature and office of the material world. It was then struggling to +find adequate expression, and in it the sanguine youth seemed to find a +spiritual panacea for the errors and confusions of philosophy. It was able +to make short work, he believed, with atheistic materialism, and could +dispense with arguments against sceptics in vindication of the reality of +experience. The mind-dependent existence of the material world, and its +true function in the universe of concrete reality, were to be disclosed +under the light of a new transforming self-evident Principle. "I wonder +not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious and amazing truth. I rather +wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before--'tis no +witchcraft to see." The pages of the _Commonplace Book_ give vent to +rapidly forming thoughts about the things of sense and the "ambient space" +of a youth entering into reflective life, in company with Descartes and +Malebranche, Bacon and Hobbes, above all, Locke and Newton; who was trying +to translate into reasonableness his faith in the reality of the material +world and God. Under the influence of this new conception, he sees the +world like one awakening from a confused dream. The revolution which he +wanted to inaugurate he foresaw would be resisted. Men like to think and +speak about things as they have been accustomed to do: they are offended +when they are asked to exchange this for what appears to them absurdity, +or at least when the change seems useless. But in spite of the ridicule +and dislike of a world long accustomed to put empty words in place of +living thoughts, he resolves to deliver himself of his burden, with the +politic conciliation of a skilful advocate however; for he +characteristically reminds himself that one who "desires to bring another +over to his own opinions must seem to harmonize with him at first, and +humour him in his own way of talking." + + ------------------------------------- + +In 1709, when he was twenty-four years old, Berkeley presented himself to +the world of empty verbal reasoners as the author of what he calls +modestly _An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_. It was dedicated to +Sir John Percival, his correspondent afterwards for more than twenty +years; but I have not discovered the origin of their friendship. The +_Essay_ was a pioneer, meant to open the way for the disclosure of the +Secret with which he was burdened, lest the world might be shocked by an +abrupt disclosure. In this prelude he tries to make the reader recognise +that in ordinary seeing we are always interpreting visual signs; so that +we have daily presented to our eyes what is virtually an intelligible +natural language; so that in all our intercourse with the visible world we +are in intercourse with all-pervading active Intelligence. We are reading +absent data of touch and of the other senses in the language of their +visual signs. And the visual signs themselves, which are the immediate +objects of sight, are necessarily dependent on sentient and percipient +mind; whatever may be the case with the tangible realities which the +visual data signify, a fact evident by our experience when we make use of +a looking-glass. The material world, so far at least as it presents itself +visibly, is _real_ only in being _realised_ by living and seeing beings. +The mind-dependent _visual_ signs of which we are conscious are +continually speaking to us of an invisible and distant world of _tangible_ +realities; and through the natural connexion of the visual signs with +their tactual meanings, we are able in seeing practically to perceive, not +only what is distant in space, but also to anticipate the future. The Book +of Vision is in literal truth a Book of Prophecy. The chief lesson of the +tentative _Essay on Vision_ is thus summed up:-- + +"Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of +Vision constitute the Universal Language of Nature; whereby we are +instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things +that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as +also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. And the +manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at +a distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human +appointment; which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or +identity of nature, but only by an habitual connexion that experience has +made us to observe between them. Suppose one who had always continued +blind be told by his guide that after he has advanced so many steps he +shall come to the brink of a precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must not +this to him seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot conceive how it +is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these, which to him +would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophecy does to others. Even +they who are blessed with the visive faculty may (though familiarity make +it less observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration. The +wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and +purposes for which it was apparently designed; the vast extent, number, +and variety of objects that are at once, with so much ease and quickness +and pleasure, suggested by it--all these afford subject for much and +pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us some glimmering +analogous praenotion of things that are placed beyond the certain discovery +and comprehension of our present state(2)." + +Berkeley took orders in the year in which his _Essay on Vision_ was +published. On February 1, 1709, he was ordained as deacon, in the chapel +of Trinity College, by Dr. George Ashe, Bishop of Clogher. Origen and +Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, Malebranche, Fenelon, and Pascal, Cudworth, +Butler, Jonathan Edwards, and Schleiermacher, along with Berkeley, are +among those who are illustrious at once in the history of philosophy and +of the Christian Church. The Church, it has been said, has been for nearly +two thousand years the great Ethical Society of the world, and if under +its restrictions it has been less conspicuous on the field of +philosophical criticism and free inquiry, these names remind us of the +immense service it has rendered to meditative thought. + +The light of the Percival correspondence first falls on Berkeley's life in +1709. The earliest extant letters from Berkeley to Sir John Percival are +in September, October, and December of that year, dated at Trinity +College. In one of them he pronounces Socrates "the best and most +admirable man that the heathen world has produced." Another letter, in +March, 1710, accompanies a copy of the second edition of the _Essay on +Vision_. "I have made some alterations and additions in the body of the +treatise," he says, "and in the appendix have endeavoured to meet the +objections of the Archbishop of Dublin;" whose sermon he proceeds to +deprecate, for "denying that goodness and understanding are more to be +affirmed of God than feet or hands," although all these may, in a +metaphorical sense. How far, or whether at all, God is knowable by man, +was, as we shall see, matter of discussion and controversy with Berkeley +in later life; but this shews that the subject was already in his +thoughts. Returning to the _Essay on Vision_, he tells Sir John that +"there remains one objection, that with regard to the uselessness of that +book of mine; but in a little time I hope to make what is there laid down +appear subservient to the ends of morality and religion, in a _Treatise_ I +have in the press, the design of which is to demonstrate the existence and +attributes of God, the immortality of the soul, the reconciliation of +God's foreknowledge and the freedom of man; and by shewing the emptiness +and falsehood of several parts of the speculative sciences, to induce men +to the study of religion and things useful. How far my endeavours will +prove successful, and whether I have been all this time in a dream or no, +time will shew. I do not see how it is possible to demonstrate the being +of a God on the principles of the Archbishop--that strictly goodness and +understanding can no more be assumed of God than that He has feet or +hands; there being no argument that I know for God's existence which does +not prove Him at the same time to be an understanding and benevolent +being, in the strict, literal, and proper meaning of these words." He +adds, "I have written to Mr. Clarke to give me his thoughts on the subject +of God's existence, but have got no answer." + +The work foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the summer of 1710, as +the "First part" of a _Treatise concerning the Principles of Human +Knowledge, wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the +Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are +inquired into_. In this fragment of a larger work, never finished, +Berkeley's spiritual conception of matter and cosmos is unfolded, +defended, and applied. According to the _Essay on Vision_, the world, as +far as it is visible, is dependent on living mind. According to this book +of _Principles_ the whole material world, as far as it can have any +practical concern with the knowings and doings of men, is real only by +being realised in like manner in the percipient experience of some living +mind. The concrete world, with which alone we have to do, could not exist +in its concrete reality if there were no living percipient being in +existence to actualise it. To suppose that it could would be to submit to +the illusion of a metaphysical abstraction. Matter unrealised in its +necessary subordination to some one's percipient experience is the chief +among the illusions which philosophers have been too ready to encourage, +and which the mass of mankind, who accept words without reflecting on +their legitimate meanings, are ready to accept blindly. But we have only +to reflect in order to see the absurdity of a material world such as we +have experience of existing without ever being realised or made concrete +in any sentient life. Try to conceive an eternally dead universe, empty +for ever of God and all finite spirits, and you find you cannot. Reality +can be real only in a living form. Percipient life underlies or +constitutes all that is real. The _esse_ of the concrete material world is +_percipi_. This was the "New Principle" with which the young Dublin Fellow +was burdened--the Secret of the universe which he had been longing to +discharge upon mankind for their benefit, yet without sign of desire to +gain fame for himself as the discoverer. It is thus that he unfolds it:-- + +"Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need +only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. +that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all +those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any +subsistence without a Mind; that their _being_ is to be perceived or +known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, +or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must +either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some +Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the +absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an +existence independent of a Spirit(3)." + +This does not mean denial of the existence of the world that is daily +presented to our senses and which includes our own bodies. On the +contrary, it affirms, as intuitively true, the existence of the only real +matter which our senses present to us. The only material world of which we +have any experience consists of the appearances (misleadingly called +_ideas_ of sense by Berkeley) which are continually rising as real objects +in a passive procession of interpretable signs, through means of which +each finite person realises his own individual personality; also the +existence of other finite persons; and the sense-symbolism that is more or +less interpreted in the natural sciences; all significant of God. So the +material world of concrete experience is presented to us as mind-dependent +and in itself powerless: the deepest and truest reality must always be +spiritual. Yet this mind-dependent material world is the occasion of +innumerable pleasures and pains to human percipients, in so far as they +conform to or contradict its customary laws, commonly called the laws of +nature. So the sense-symbolism in which we live is found to play an +important part in the experience of percipient beings. But it makes us +sceptics and atheists when, in its name, we put a supposed dead abstract +matter in room of the Divine Active Reason of which all natural order is +the continuous providential expression. + +Accordingly, God must exist, because the material world, in order to be a +real world, needs to be continually realised and regulated by living +Providence; and we have all the certainty of sense and sanity that there +_is_ a (mind-dependent) material world, a boundless and endlessly evolving +sense-symbolism. + + ------------------------------------- + +In the two years after the disclosure of his New Principle we see Berkeley +chiefly through his correspondence with Percival. He was eager to hear the +voice of criticism; but the critics were slow to speak, and when they did +speak they misconceived the question, and of course his answer to it. "If +when you receive my book," he writes from Dublin, in July, 1710, to Sir +John, who was then in London, "you can procure me the opinion of some of +your acquaintances who are thinking men, addicted to the study of natural +philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely obliged to you." He also +asks Percival to present the book of _Principles_ to Lord Pembroke, to +whom he had ventured to dedicate it, as Locke had done his _Essay_. The +reply was discouraging. + +"I did but name the subject-matter of your book of _Principles_ to some +ingenuous friends of mine," Percival says, "and they immediately treated +it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to read it; which I have not +yet got one to do. A physician of my acquaintance undertook to describe +your person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to take +remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire and vanity of starting +something new should put you upon such an undertaking; and when I +justified you in that part of your character, and added other deserving +qualities you have, he could not tell what to think of you. Another told +me an ingenious man ought not to be discouraged from exerting his wit, and +said Erasmus was not worse thought of for writing in praise of folly; but +that you are not gone as far as a gentleman in town, who asserts not only +that there is no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being +at all." + +It is not surprising that a book which was supposed to deny the existence +of all that we see and touch should be ridiculed, and its author called a +madman. What vexed the author was, "that men who had never considered my +book should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the existence of +sensible things, and are not positive of any one thing, not even of their +own being. But whoever reads my book with attention will see that I +question not the existence of anything we perceive by our senses. Fine +spun metaphysics are what on all occasions I declaim against, and if any +one shall shew anything of that sort in my _Treatise_ I will willingly +correct it." A material world that was real enough to yield physical +science, to make known to us the existence of other persons and of God, +and which signified in very practical ways happiness or misery to sentient +beings, seemed to him sufficiently real for human science and all other +purposes. Nevertheless, in the ardour of youth Berkeley had hardly +fathomed the depths into which his New Principle led, and which he hoped +to escape by avoiding the abstractions of "fine-spun metaphysics." + +In December Percival writes from London that he has "given the book to +Lord Pembroke," who "thought the author an ingenious man, and to be +encouraged"; but for himself he "cannot believe in the non-existence of +Matter"; and he had tried in vain to induce Samuel Clarke, the great +English metaphysician, either to refute or to accept the New Principle. In +February Berkeley sends an explanatory letter for Lord Pembroke to +Percival's care. In a letter in June he turns to social questions, and +suggests that if "some Irish gentlemen of good fortune and generous +inclinations would constantly reside in England, there to watch for the +interests of Ireland, they might bring far greater advantage than they +could by spending their incomes at home." And so 1711 passes, with +responses of ignorant critics; vain endeavours to draw worthy criticism +from Samuel Clarke; the author all the while doing work as a Tutor in +Trinity College on a modest income; now and then on holidays in Meath or +elsewhere in Ireland. Three discourses on _Passive Obedience_ in the +College Chapel in 1712, misinterpreted, brought on him the reproach of +Jacobitism. Yet they were designed to shew that society rests on a deeper +foundation than force and calculations of utility, and is at last rooted +in principles of an immutable morality. Locke's favourite opinion, that +morality is a demonstrable, seems to weigh with him in these _Discourses_. + +But Berkeley was not yet done with the exposition and vindication of his +new thought, for it seemed to him charged with supreme practical issues +for mankind. In the two years which followed the publication of the +_Principles_ he was preparing to reproduce his spiritual conception of the +universe, in the dramatic form of dialogue, convenient for dealing +popularly with plausible objections. The issue was the _Three Dialogues +between Hylas and Philonous_, in which Philonous argues for the absurdity +of an abstract matter that is unrealised in the experience of living +beings, as against Hylas, who is put forward to justify belief in this +abstract reality. The design of the _Dialogues_ is to present in a +familiar form "such principles as, by an easy solution of the perplexities +of philosophers, together with their own native evidence, may at once +recommend themselves as genuine to the mind, and rescue philosophy from +the endless pursuits it is engaged in; which, with a plain demonstration +of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, should seem the readiest +preparation, as well as the strongest motive to the study and practice of +virtue(4)." + +When the _Dialogues_ were completed, at the end of 1712, Berkeley resolved +to visit London, as he told Percival, "in order to print my new book of +Dialogues, and to make acquaintance with men of merit." He got leave of +absence from his College "for the recovery of his health," which had +suffered from study, and perhaps too he remembered that Bacon commends +travel as "to the younger sort a part of education." + + ------------------------------------- + +Berkeley made his appearance in London in January, 1713. On the 26th of +that month he writes to Percival that he "had crossed the Channel from +Dublin a few days before," describes adventures on the road, and enlarges +on the beauty of rural England, which he liked more than anything he had +seen in London. "Mr. Clarke" had already introduced him to Lord Pembroke. +He had also called on his countryman Richard Steele, "who desired to be +acquainted with him. Somebody had given him my _Treatise on the Principles +of Human Knowledge_, and that was the ground of his inclination to my +acquaintance." He anticipates "much satisfaction in the conversation of +Steele and his friends," adding that "there is lately published a bold and +pernicious book, a _Discourse on Free-thinking_(5)." In February he "dines +often with Steele in his house in Bloomsbury Square," and tells in March +"that you will soon hear of Mr. Steele under the character of the +_Guardian_; he designs his paper shall come out every day as the +_Spectator_." The night before "a very ingenious new poem upon 'Windsor +Forest' had been given to him by the author, Mr. Pope. The gentleman is a +Papist, but a man of excellent wit and learning, one of those Mr. Steele +mentions in his last paper as having writ some of the _Spectator_." A few +days later he has met "Mr. Addison, who has the same talents as Steele in +a high degree, and is likewise a great philosopher, having applied himself +to the speculative studies more than any of the wits I know. I breakfasted +with him at Dr. Swift's lodgings. His coming in while I was there, and the +good temper he showed, was construed by me as a sign of the approaching +coalition of parties. A play of Mr. Steele's, which was expected, he has +now put off till next winter. But _Cato_, a most noble play of Mr. +Addison, is to be acted in Easter week." Accordingly, on April 18, he +writes that "on Tuesday last _Cato_ was acted for the first time. I was +present with Mr. Addison and two or three more friends in a side box, +where we had a talk and two or three flasks of Burgundy and Champagne, +which the author (who is a very sober man) thought necessary to support +his spirits, and indeed it was a pleasant refreshment to us all between +the Acts. Some parts of the prologue, written by Mr. Pope, a Tory and even +a Papist, were hissed, being thought to savour of Whiggism; but the clap +got much the better of the hiss. Lord Harley, who sat in the next box to +us, was observed to clap as loud as any in the house all the time of the +play." Swift and Pope have described this famous first night of _Cato_; +now for the first time we have Berkeley's report. He adds, "This day I +dined at Dr. Arbuthnot's lodging in the Queen's Palace." + +His countryman, Swift, was among the first to welcome him to London, where +Swift had himself been for four years, "lodging in Bury Street," and +sending the daily journal to Stella, which records so many incidents of +that memorable London life. Mrs. Vanhomrigh and her daughter, the unhappy +Vanessa, were living in rooms in the same street as Swift, and there he +"loitered, hot and lazy, after his morning's work," and "often dined out +of mere listlessness." Berkeley was a frequent visitor at Swift's house, +and this Vanhomrigh connexion with Swift had an influence on Berkeley's +fortune long afterwards. On a Sunday in April we find him at Kensington, +at the Court of Queen Anne, in the company of Swift. "I went to Court +to-day," Swift's journal records, "on purpose to present Mr. Berkeley, one +of the Fellows of Trinity. College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. That Mr. +Berkeley is a very ingenious man, and a great philosopher, and I have +mentioned him to all the ministers, and have given them some of his +writings, and I will favour him as much as I can." In this, Swift was as +good as his word. "Dr. Swift," he adds, "is admired both by Steele and +Addison, and I think Addison one of the best natured and most agreeable +men in the world." + +One day about this time, at the instance of Addison, it seems that a +meeting was arranged between Berkeley and Samuel Clarke, the metaphysical +rector of St. James's in Piccadilly, whose opinion he had in vain tried to +draw forth two years before through Sir John Percival. Berkeley's personal +charm was felt wherever he went, and even "the fastidious and turbulent +Atterbury," after intercourse with him, is reported to have said: "So much +understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I +did not think had been the portion of any but angels till I saw this +gentleman." Much was expected from the meeting with Clarke, but Berkeley +had again to complain that although Clarke had neither refuted his +arguments nor disproved his premisses, he had not the candour to accept +his conclusion. + +It was thus that Berkeley became known to "men of merit" in that brilliant +society. He was also brought among persons on whom he would hardly have +conferred this title. He tells Percival that he had attended several +free-thinking clubs, in the pretended character of a learner, and that he +there heard Anthony Collins, author of "the bold and pernicious book on +free-thinking," boast "that he was able to demonstrate that the existence +of God is an impossible supposition." The promised "demonstration" seems +to have been Collins' _Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty_, which appeared +two years later, according to which all that happens in mind and matter is +the issue of natural necessity. Steele invited Berkeley to contribute to +the _Guardian_ during its short-lived existence between March and +September, 1713. He took the _Discourse_ of Collins for the subject of his +first essay. Three other essays are concerned with man's hope of a future +life, and are among the few passages in his writings in which his +philosophy is a meditation upon Death. + +In May, Percival writes to him from Dublin that he hears the "new book of +Dialogues is printed, though not yet published, and that your opinion has +gained ground among the learned; that Mr. Addison has come over to your +view; and that what at first seemed shocking is become so familiar that +others envy you the discovery, and make it their own." In his reply in +June, Berkeley mentions that "a clergyman in Wiltshire has lately +published a treatise wherein he advances something published three years +ago in my _Principles of Human Knowledge_." The clergyman was Arthur +Collier, author of the _Clavis Universalis_, or demonstration of the +impossibility of an external world(6). + +Berkeley's _Three Dialogues_ were published in June. In the middle of that +same month he was in Oxford, "a most delightful place," where he spent two +months, "witnessed the Act and grand performances at the theatre, and a +great concourse from London and the country, amongst whom were several +foreigners." The Drury Lane Company had gone down to Oxford, and _Cato_ +was on the stage for several nights. The Percival correspondence now first +discloses this prolonged visit to Oxford in the summer of 1713, that ideal +home from whence, forty years after, he departed on a more mysterious +journey than any on this planet. In a letter from thence to Percival, he +had claimed Arbuthnot as one of the converts to the "new Principle." +Percival replied that Swift demurred to this, on which Berkeley rejoins: +"As to what you say of Dr. Arbuthnot not being of my opinion, it is true +there has been some difference between us concerning some notions relating +to the necessity of the laws of nature; but this does not touch the main +points of the non-existence of what philosophers call material substance; +against which he acknowledges he can assert nothing." One would gladly +have got more than this from Berkeley, about what touched his favourite +conception of the "arbitrariness" of law in nature, as distinguished from +the "necessity" which some modern physicists are ready vaguely to take for +granted. + + ------------------------------------- + +The scene now changes. On October 15 Berkeley suddenly writes from London: +"I am on the eve of going to Sicily, as chaplain to Lord Peterborough, who +is Ambassador Extraordinary on the coronation of the new king." He had +been recommended by Swift to the Ambassador, one of the most extraordinary +characters then in Europe, who a few years before had astonished the world +in the war of the Succession in Spain, and afterwards by his genius as a +diplomatist: in Holland, nearly a quarter of a century before, he had +formed an intimate friendship with John Locke. Ten months in France and +Italy in the suite of Lord Peterborough brought the young Irish +metaphysician, who had lately been introduced to the wits of London and +the dons of Oxford, into a new world. It was to him the beginning of a +career of wandering and social activity, which lasted, with little +interruption, for nearly twenty years, during which metaphysics and +authorship were in the background. On November 25 we find him in Paris, +writing letters to Percival and Prior. "From London to Calais", he tells +Prior, "I came in company of a Flamand, a Spaniard, a Frenchman, and three +English servants of my Lord. The three gentlemen, being of three different +nations, obliged me to speak the French language (which is now familiar), +and gave me the opportunity of seeing much of the world in little +compass.... On November 1 (O.S.) I embarked in the stage-coach, with a +company that were all perfect strangers to me. There were two Scotch, and +one English gentleman. One of the former happened to be the author of the +_Voyage to St. Kilda_ and the _Account of the Western Isles_(7). We were +good company on the road; and that day se'ennight came to Paris. I have +since been taken up in viewing churches, convents, palaces, colleges, &c., +which are very numerous and magnificent in this town. The splendour and +riches of these things surpasses belief; but it were endless to descend to +particulars. I was present at a disputation in the Sorbonne, which indeed +had much of the French fire in it. I saw the Irish and the English +Colleges. In the latter I saw, enclosed in a coffin, the body of the late +King James.... To-morrow I intend to visit Father Malebranche, and +discourse him on certain points." + +The Abbe D'Aubigne, as he informs Percival, was to introduce him to +Malebranche, then the chief philosopher of France, whose Vision of the +world in God had some affinity with Berkeley's own thought. Unfortunately +we have no record of the intended interview with the French idealist, who +fourteen years before had been visited by Addison, also on his way to +Italy, when Malebranche expressed great regard for the English nation, and +admiration for Newton; but he shook his head when Hobbes was mentioned, +whom he ventured to disparage as a "poor silly creature." Malebranche died +nearly two years after Berkeley's proposed interview; and according to a +story countenanced by Dugald Stewart, Berkeley was the "occasional cause" +of his death. He found the venerable Father, we are told, in a cell, +cooking, in a pipkin, a medicine for a disorder with which he was +troubled. The conversation naturally turned on Berkeley's system, of which +Malebranche had received some knowledge from a translation. The issue of +the debate proved tragical to poor Malebranche. In the heat of disputation +he raised his voice so high, and gave way so freely to the natural +impetuosity of a man of genius and a Frenchman, that he brought on a +violent increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few days +after(8). This romantic tale is, I suspect, mythical. The Percival +correspondence shews that Berkeley was living in London in October, 1715, +the month in which Malebranche died, and I find no trace of a short sudden +visit to Paris at that time. + +After a month spent in Paris, another fortnight carried Berkeley and two +travelling companions to Italy through Savoy. They crossed Mont Cenis on +New Year's Day in 1714--"one of the most difficult and formidable parts of +the Alps which is ever passed over by mortal man," as he tells Prior in a +letter from Turin. "We were carried in open chairs by men used to scale +these rocks and precipices, which at this season are more slippery and +dangerous than at other times, and at the best are high, craggy, and steep +enough to cause the heart of the most valiant man to melt within him." At +the end of other six weeks we find him at Leghorn, where he spent three +months, "while my lord was in Sicily." He "prefers England or Ireland to +Italy: the only advantage is in point of air." From Leghorn he writes in +May a complimentary letter to Pope, on the occasion of the _Rape of the +Lock_: "Style, painting, judgment, spirit, I had already admired in your +other writings; but in this I am charmed with the magic of your invention, +with all those images, allusions, and inexplicable beauties which you +raise so surprisingly, and at the same time so naturally, out of a +trifle.... I remember to have heard you mention some half-formed design of +coming to Italy. What might we not expect from a muse that sings so well +in the bleak climate of England, if she felt the same warm sun and +breathed the same air with Virgil and Horace." In July we find Berkeley in +Paris on his way back to England. He had "parted from Lord Peterborough at +Genoa, where my lord took post for Turin, and thence designed passing over +the Alps, and so through Savoy, on his way to England." In August they are +in London, where the aspect of English politics was changed by the death +of the Queen in that month. He seems to have had a fever soon after his +return. In October, Arbuthnot, in one of his chatty letters to Swift, +writes thus: "Poor philosopher Berkeley has now the _idea_ of health, +which was very hard to produce in him, for he had an _idea_ of a strange +fever upon him, so strange that it was very hard to destroy it by +introducing a contrary one." + +Our record of the two following years is a long blank, first broken by a +letter to Percival in July, 1715, dated at London. Whether he spent any +time at Fulham with Lord Peterborough after their return from Italy does +not appear, nor whether he visited Ireland in those years, which is not +likely. We have no glimpses of brilliant London society as in the +preceding year. Steele was now in Parliament. Swift had returned to +Dublin, and Addison was the Irish chief secretary. But Pope was still at +Binfield, among the glades of Windsor, and Berkeley congratulated him +after receiving the first volume of his _Homer_. Of his own literary +pursuits we hear nothing. Perhaps the Second Part of the _Principles_, +which was lost afterwards in his travels, engaged him. In the end of July +he wrote to Lord Percival(9) from Flaxley(10) on the Severn; and in +August, September, October, and November he wrote from London, chiefly +interested in reports about "the rebels in Scotland," and "the forces +under Lord Mar, which no doubt will languish and disperse in a little +time. The Bishop of Bristol assured me the other day that the Court expect +that the Duke of Orleans would, in case of need, supply them with forces +against the Pretender." Our next glimpse of him is in May, 1716, when he +writes to Lord Percival that he is "like soon to go to Ireland, the Prince +of Wales having recommended him to the Lords Justices for the living of +St. Paul's in Dublin." This opening was soon closed, and the visit to +Ireland was abandoned. A groundless suspicion of Jacobitism was not +overcome by the interest of Caroline, Princess of Wales. In June, 1716, +Charles Dering wrote from Dublin, that "the Lords Justices have made a +strong representation against him." He had to look elsewhere for the +immediate future. + +We find him at Turin in November, 1716, with a fresh leave of absence for +two years from his College. It seems that Ashe, Bishop of Clogher, had +engaged him as travelling tutor to his son, a means not then uncommon for +enabling young authors of moderate fortune to see new countries and mix +with society. Addison had visited Italy in this way sixteen years before, +and Adam Smith long afterwards travelled with the young Duke of Buccleuch. +With young Ashe, Berkeley crossed Mont Cenis a second time. They reached +Rome at the beginning of 1717. His _Journal in Italy_ in that year, and +occasional letters to Percival, Pope, and Arbuthnot, shew ardent interest +in nature and art. With the widest views, "this very great though singular +sort of man descended into a minute detail, and begrudged neither pains +nor expense for the means of information. He travelled through a great +part of Sicily on foot; clambered over the mountains and crept into the +caverns, to investigate its natural history and discover the causes of its +volcanoes; and I have known him sit for hours in forges and foundries to +inspect their successive operations(11)." If the _Journal_ had been +transformed by his own hand into a book, his letter to Pope from Inarime +shews that the book might have rivalled Addison's _Remarks on Parts of +Italy_ in grace of style and large human interest. + +In the summer of 1720 we find the travellers at Florence, afterwards for +some time at Lyons, and in London at the beginning of the next year. On +the way home his metaphysical inspiration was revived. The "Cause of +Motion" had been proposed by the French Academy as the subject of a prize +dissertation. The subject gave an opportunity for further unfolding his +early thought. In the _Principles_ and the _Dialogues_ he had argued for +the necessary dependence of matter, for its concrete substantial reality, +upon living percipient mind. He would now shew its powerlessness as it is +presented to us in sense. The material world, chiefly under the category +of substance, inspired the _Principles_. The material world, under the +category of cause or power, inspired the _De Motu_. This Latin Essay sums +up the distinctive thought of Berkeley, as it appears in the authorship of +his early life. _Moles evolvit et agitat mentes_ might be taken as the +formula of the materialism which he sought to dissolve. _Mens percipit et +agitat molem significantem, cujus esse est percipi_ expresses what +Berkeley would substitute for the materialistic formula. + +The end of the summer of 1721 found Berkeley still in London. England was +in the social agitation and misery consequent upon the failure of the +South Sea Company, a gigantic commercial speculation connected with +British trade in America. A new inspiration took possession of him. He +thought he saw in this catastrophe signs of a decline in public morals +worse than that which followed the Restoration. "Political corruption", +"decay of religion," "growth of atheism," were descriptive words used by +the thoughtful. Berkeley's eager imagination was apt to exaggerate the +evil. He became inspired by social idealism, and found vent for his +fervour in _An Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain_, which, +as well as the _De Motu_, made its appearance in 1721. This _Essay_ is a +significant factor in his career. It was the Cassandra wail of a sorrowful +and indignant prophet, prepared to shake the dust from his feet, and to +transfer his eye of hope to other regions, in which a nearer approach to +Utopia might be realised. The true personality of the individual is +unrealisable in selfish isolation. His favourite _non sibi, sed toti +mundo_ was henceforward more than ever the ruling maxim of his life. + + + + +II. Middle Life (1722-34). + + +In October, 1721, Berkeley was in Dublin. The register of the College +shews that "on November 14, 1721, Mr. Berkeley had the grace of the House +for the Degree of Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity." There is no ground for +the report that he returned to Ireland at this time as Chaplain to the +Duke of Grafton, the Lord Lieutenant(12). But preferment in the Church +seemed within his reach. "I had no sooner set foot on shore," he wrote to +Percival in that October, "than I heard that the Deanery of Dromore was +vacant." Percival used his influence with the Lord Lieutenant, and in +February, 1722, Berkeley's patent was "passing the Seals for the Deanery +of Dromore." But the Bishop of Dromore claimed the patronage, and this led +to a protracted and ineffectual lawsuit, which took Berkeley to London in +the following winter, "to see friends and inform himself of points of +law," and he tells that "on the way he was nearly drowned in crossing to +Holyhead(13)." + +Berkeley's interest in church preferment was not personal. He saw in it +only means to an end. In March, 1723, he surprised Lord Percival by +announcing, in a letter from London, a project which it seems for some +time had occupied his thoughts. "It is now about ten months," he says, +"since I have determined to spend the residue of my days in Bermuda, where +I trust in Providence I may be the mean instrument of doing great good to +mankind. Whatever happens, go I am resolved, if I live. Half a dozen of +the most ingenious and agreeable men in our College are with me in this +project, and since I came hither I have got together about a dozen +Englishmen of quality, who intend to retire to those islands." He then +explains the project, opening a vision of Christian civilisation radiating +from those fair islands of the West, whose idyllic bliss poets had sung, +diffused over the New World, with its magnificent possibilities in the +future history of mankind. + +I find no further record of the origin of this bright vision. As it had +become a practical determination "ten months" before March, 1723, one is +carried back to the first months after his return to Dublin and to the +_Essay_ that was called forth by the South Sea catastrophe. One may +conjecture that despair of England and the Old World--"such as Europe +breeds in her decay"--led him to look westward for the hopeful future of +mankind, moved, perhaps, by the connexion of the catastrophe with America. +His active imagination pictured a better Republic than Plato's, and a +grander Utopia than More's, emanating from a College in the isles of which +Waller had sung. + +In the meantime a curious fortune unexpectedly favoured him. Swift's +unhappy Vanessa, associated with Bury Street in 1713, had settled on her +property at Marley Abbey near Dublin; and Swift had privately married +Stella, as she confessed to Vanessa, who thereafter revoked the bequest of +her fortune to Swift, and left it to be divided between Berkeley and +Marshal, afterwards an Irish judge. Vanessa died in May, 1723. A few days +after Berkeley wrote thus to Lord Percival: "Here is something that will +surprise your lordship as it doth me. Mrs. Hester Vanhomrigh, a lady to +whom I was a perfect stranger, having never in the whole course of my life +exchanged a word with her, died on Sunday. Yesterday her Will was opened, +by which it appears that I am constituted executor, the advantage whereof +is computed by those who understand her affairs to be worth L3000.... My +Bermuda scheme is now stronger in my mind than ever; this providential +event having made many things easy which were otherwise before." Lord +Percival in reply concludes that he would "persist more than ever in that +noble scheme, which may in some time exalt your name beyond that of St. +Xavier and the most famous missionaries abroad." But he warns him that, +"without the protection of Government," he would encounter insurmountable +difficulties. The Vanessa legacy, and the obstructions in the way of the +Deanery of Dromore, were the subjects of a tedious correspondence with his +friend and business factotum, "Tom Prior," in 1724 and the three following +years. In the end, the debts of Vanessa absorbed most of the legacy. And +as to the Deanery of Dromore, he tells Percival, on September 19, 1723: "I +despair of seeing it end to my advantage. The truth is, my fixed purpose +of going to Bermuda sets me above soliciting anything with earnestness in +this part of the world. It can be of no use to me, but as it may enable me +the better to prosecute that design; and it must be owned that the present +possession of something in the Church would make my application for an +establishment in those islands more considered." + +Nevertheless, he got a Deanery at last. In May, 1724, he informs Lord +Percival from Trinity College: "Yesterday I received my patent for the +best Deanery in the kingdom, that of Derry. It is said to be worth L1500 +per annum. But as I do not consider it with an eye to enriching myself, so +I shall be perfectly contented if it facilitates and recommends my scheme +of Bermuda, which I am in hopes will meet with a better reception if it +comes from one possessed of so great a Deanery." In September he is on his +way, not to Derry, but to London, "to raise funds and obtain a Charter for +the Bermuda College from George the First," fortified by a remarkable +letter from Swift to Lord Carteret, the new Lord Lieutenant, who was then +in Bath(14). As Swift predicted in this letter, Berkeley's conquests +spread far and fast in England, where he organised his resources during +the four following years. Nothing shews more signally the magic of his +personality than the story of his life in London in those years of +negotiation and endeavour. The proposal met with a response wonderful in a +generation represented by Walpole. The subscriptions soon reached five +thousand pounds, and Walpole was among the subscribers. The Scriblerus +Club, meeting at Lord Bathurst's, agreed to rally Berkeley, who was among +them, on his Bermuda scheme. He asked to be heard in defence, and +presented the case with such force of enthusiasm that the company "were +struck dumb, and after a pause simultaneously rose and asked leave to +accompany him." Bermuda for a time inspired London. + +Berkeley was not satisfied with this. He remembered what Lord Percival had +said about failure without help from Government. Accordingly he obtained a +Charter from George the First early in 1726, and after canvassing the +House of Commons, secured a grant of L20,000, with only two dissentient +votes, in May of that year. This was the beginning of his difficulties. +Payment was indefinitely delayed, and he was kept negotiating; besides, +with the help of Prior, he was unravelling legal perplexities in which the +Vanessa legacy was involved. It was in these years that he was seen at the +receptions of Caroline at Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of +Wales, and afterwards at St. James's or at Kensington, when she became +Queen in 1727; not, he says, because he loved Courts, but because he loved +America. Clarke was still rector of St. James's, and Butler had not yet +migrated to his parsonage at Stanhope; so their society was open to him. +The Queen liked to listen to a philosophical discussion. Ten years before, +as Princess of Wales, she had been a royal go-between in the famous +correspondence between Clarke and Leibniz. And now, Berkeley being in +London, he too was asked to her weekly reunions, when she loved to hear +Clarke arguing with Berkeley, or Berkeley arguing with Hoadley. Also in +1726 Voltaire made his lengthened visit to England, a familiar figure in +the circle of Pope's friends, attracted to the philosophy of Locke and +Newton; and Voltaire mentions that he met "the discoverer of the true +theory of vision" during his stay in London. + +From the summer of 1727 until the spring of 1728 there is no extant +correspondence either with Percival or "Tom Prior" to throw light on his +movements. In February, 1728, he was still in London, but he "hoped to set +out for Dublin in March, and to America in May." There is a mystery about +this visit to Dublin. "I propose to set out for Dublin about a month +hence," he writes to "dear Tom," "but of this you must not give the least +intimation to anybody. It is of all things my earnest desire (and for very +good reasons) not to have it known that I am in Dublin. Speak not, +therefore, one syllable of it to any mortal whatsoever. When I formerly +desired you to take a place for me near the town, you gave out that you +were looking for a retired lodging for a friend of yours; upon which +everybody surmised me to be the person. I must beg you not to act in the +like manner now, but to take for me an entire house in your own name, and +as for yourself; for, all things considered, I am determined upon a whole +house, with no mortal in it but a maid of your own putting, who is to look +on herself as your servant. Let there be two bed-chambers: one for you, +another for me; and, as you like, you may ever and anon lie there. I would +have the house, with necessary furniture, taken by the month (or +otherwise, as you can), for I propose staying not beyond that time; and +yet perhaps I may. Take it as soon as possible.... Let me entreat you to +say nothing of this to anybody, but to do the thing directly.... I would +of all things ... have a proper place in a retired situation, where I may +have access to fields and sweet air provided against the moment I arrive. +I am inclined to think one may be better concealed in the outermost skirt +of the suburbs, than in the country or within the town.... A house quite +detached in the country I should have no objection to, provided you judge +that I shall not be liable to discovery in it. The place called Bermuda I +am utterly against. Dear Tom, do this matter cleanly and cleverly, without +waiting for further advice.... To the person from whom you hire it (whom +alone I would have you speak of it to) it will not seem strange you should +at this time of the year be desirous, for your own convenience or health, +to have a place in a free and open air." This mysterious letter was +written in April. From April till September Berkeley again disappears. +There is in all this a curious secretiveness of which one has repeated +examples in his life. Whether he went to Dublin in that spring, or why he +wanted to go, does not appear. + +But in September he emerges unexpectedly at Gravesend, newly married, and +ready to sail for Rhode Island, "in a ship of 250 tons which he had +hired." The marriage, according to Stock, took place on August 1, whether +in Ireland or in England I cannot tell. The lady was Anne, daughter of +John Forster, late Chief Justice, and then Speaker of the Irish House of +Commons. She shared his fortune when he was about to engage in the most +romantic, and ideally the grandest, Christian mission of the eighteenth +century. According to tradition she was a devoutly religious mystic: +Fenelon and Madame Guyon were among her favourites. "I chose her," he +tells Lord Percival, "for her qualities of mind and her unaffected +inclination to books. She goes with great thankfulness, to live a plain +farmer's life, and wear stuff of her own spinning. I have presented her +with a spinning-wheel." A letter to Prior, dated "Gravesend September 5, +1728," thus describes the little party on the eve of their +departure:--"To-morrow, with God's blessing, I set sail for Rhode Island, +with my wife and a friend of hers, my Lady Handcock's daughter, who bears +us company. I am married since I saw you to Miss Forster, whose humour and +turn of mind pleases me beyond anything that I know in her whole sex. Mr. +James(15), Mr. Dalton, and Mr. Smibert(16) go with us on this voyage. We +are now all together at Gravesend, and are engaged in one view." We are +further told(17) that they carried stores and goods to a great value, and +that the Dean "embarked 20,000 books, besides what the two gentlemen +carried. They sailed in September for Rhode Island, where the Dean intends +to winter, and to purchase an estate, in order to settle a correspondence +and trade between that island and Bermudas." Berkeley was in his +forty-fourth year, when, full of glowing visions of Christian Empire in +the West, "Time's noblest offspring," he left England, on his way to +Bermuda, with the promise of Sir Robert Walpole that he should receive the +promised grant after he had made an investment. He bought land in America, +but he never reached Bermuda. + +Towards the end of January, in 1729, the little party, in the "hired ship +of 250 tons," made their appearance in Narragansett Bay, on the western +side of Rhode Island. "Blundering about the ocean," they had touched at +Virginia on the way, whence a correspondent, sceptical of the enterprise, +informs Lord Percival that the Dean "had dined with the Governor, and +visited our College," but thinks that "when the Dean comes to put his +visionary scheme into practice, he will find it no better than a religious +frenzy," and that "he is as much a Don Quixote in zeal as that renowned +knight was in chivalry. I wish the good Dean may not find out at last that +Waller really kidnapt him over to Bermuda, and that the project he has +been drawn into may not prove in every point of it poetical." + +We have a picture of the landing at Newport, on a winter day early in +1729. "Yesterday arrived here Dean Berkeley of Londonderry, in a pretty +large ship. He is a gentleman of middle stature, of an agreeable, +pleasant, and erect aspect. He was ushered into the town with a great +number of gentlemen, to whom he behaved himself after a very complaisant +manner. 'Tis said he proposes to tarry here with his family about three +months(18)." Newport was then a flourishing town, nearly a century old, an +emporium of American commerce, in those days the rival of Boston and New +York. He was "never more agreeably surprised," he says, than "at the size +of the town and harbour." Around him was some of the softest rural and +grandest ocean scenery in the world, which had fresh charms even for one +whose boyhood was spent in the valley of the Nore, who had lingered in the +Bay of Naples, and wandered in Inarime and among the mountains of Sicily. +He was seventy miles from Boston, and about as far from Newhaven and Yale +College. A range of hills crosses the centre of the island, whence meadows +slope to the rocky shore. The Gulf Stream tempers the surrounding sea. +"The people," he tells Percival, "are industrious; and though less +orthodox have not less virtue, and I am sure they have more regularity, +than those I left in Europe. They are indeed a strange medley of different +persuasions." The gentry retained the customs of the squires in England: +tradition tells of a cheerful society: the fox chase, with hounds and +horses, was a favourite recreation. The society, for so remote a region, +was well informed. The family libraries and pictures which remain argue +culture and refinement. Smibert, the artist of the missionary party, who +had moved to Boston, soon found employment in America, and his pictures +still adorn houses in Rhode Island(19). + +The Dean and his young wife lived in Newport for some months after their +arrival. Mr. Honeyman, a missionary of the English Society, had been +placed there, in Trinity Church, in 1704. The church is still a +conspicuous object from the harbour. Berkeley preached in it three days +after his arrival, and occasionally afterwards. Notes of his sermons are +included in this edition among his Miscellaneous Works. + +In the summer of 1729 he moved from Newport to a quiet valley in the +interior of the island, where he bought a farm, and built a house. In this +island-home, named Whitehall, he lived for more than two years--years of +domestic happiness, and of resumed study, much interrupted since he left +Dublin in 1713. The house may still be seen, a little aside from the road +that runs eastward from Newport, about three miles from the town. It is +built of wood. The south-west room was probably the library. The ocean is +seen in the distance, while orchards and groves offer the shade and +silence which soothed the thinker in his recluse life. No invitations of +the three companions of his voyage(20), who had migrated to Boston, could +allure him from this retreat, where he diverted his anxieties about +Bermuda by the thoughts which found expression in the dialogues of +_Alciphron_, redolent of Rhode Island and the invigorating breezes of its +ocean shore. Tradition tells that much of _Alciphron_ was the issue of +meditation in the open air, at a favourite retreat, beneath the Hanging +Rocks, which commands an extensive view of the beach and the ocean; and +the chair in which he sat in this alcove is still preserved with +veneration. + +While Berkeley loved domestic quiet at Whitehall(21) and the "still air of +delightful studies," he mixed occasionally in the society of Newport. He +found it not uncongenial, and soon after he was settled at Whitehall he +led the way in forming a club, which held occasional meetings, the germ of +the Redwood Library, still a useful Newport institution. His own house was +a place of meeting for the New England missionaries. + + [Illustration] + + Whitehall, Berkeley's Residence in Rhode Island + + +Soon after his arrival in Rhode Island, Berkeley was visited by the +Reverend Samuel Johnson, missionary at Stratford, an acute and independent +thinker, one of the two contemporary representatives of philosophy in +America. The other was Jonathan Edwards, at that time Congregational +minister at Northampton on the Connecticut river. They had both adopted a +conception of the meaning and office of the material world in the economy +of existence that was in many respects similar to Berkeley's(22). It seems +that Berkeley's book of _Principles_ had before this fallen into Johnson's +hands. He hastened to visit the author when he heard of his arrival. A +succession of visits and a life-long correspondence followed. The +"non-existence of Matter," interpreted as a whimsical and even insane +paradox, was found by Johnson to mean the absence of unrealisable +Substance behind the real material world that is presented to our senses, +and of unrealisable Power in the successive sense-presented appearances of +which alone we are percipient. He came to see the real existence of the +things of sense in the constant order of the data of sense, through which +we gain our knowledge of the existence of our fellow men, and of the +omnipresent constant Providence of God; whose Ideas are the true +archetypes of the visible world. He adopted and applied this conception +with a lucidity and force which give him a high place among American +thinkers. + + ------------------------------------- + +All the while a cloud darkened the recluse life at Whitehall. In June, +1729, Berkeley explains to Percival the circumstances and secrecy of his +departure from England:-- + +"Before I left England I was reduced to a difficult situation. Had I +continued there, the report would have obtained (which I had found +beginning to spread) that I had dropped the design, after it had cost me +and my friends so much trouble and expense. On the other hand, if I had +taken leave of my friends, even those who assisted and approved my +undertaking would have condemned my coming abroad before the King's bounty +was received. This obliged me to come away in the private manner that I +did, and to run the risque of a tedious winter voyage. Nothing less would +have convinced the world that I was in earnest, after the report I knew +was growing to the contrary." + +Months passed, and Walpole's promise was still unfulfilled. "I wait here," +he tells Lord Percival in March, 1730, "with all the anxiety that attends +suspense, until I know what I can depend upon, or what course I am to +take. On the one hand I have no notion that the Court would put what men +call a _bite_ upon a poor clergyman, who depended upon charters, grants, +votes, and the like engagements. On the other hand, I see nothing done +towards payment of the money." Later on he writes--"As for the raillery of +European wits, I should not mind it, if I saw my College go on and +prosper; but I must own the disappointments I have met with in this +particular have nearly touched me, not without affecting my health and +spirits. If the founding a College for the spread of religion and learning +in America had been a foolish project, it cannot be supposed the Court, +the Ministers, and the Parliament would have given such public +encouragement to it; and if, after all that encouragement, they who +engaged to endow and protect it let it drop, the disappointment indeed may +be to me, but the censure, I think, will light elsewhere." + +The suspense was at last ended. Gibson, the Bishop of London, pressed +Walpole for a final answer. "If," he replied, "you put this question to me +as a Minister, I must, and can, assure you that the money shall most +undoubtedly be paid, as soon as suits with public convenience; but if you +ask me as a friend, whether Dean Berkeley should continue in America +expecting the payment of twenty thousand pounds, I advise him by all means +to return home to Europe, and to give up his present expectations." It was +thus that in 1731 the Prime Minister of England crushed the project +conceived ten years before, and to which the intervening period had, under +his encouragement, been devoted by the projector with a singular +enthusiasm. + + [Illustration] + + Berkeley's Alcove, Rhode Island + + +A few months after this heavy blow, Berkeley, with his wife, and Henry +their infant child, bade farewell to the island home. They sailed from +Boston in the late autumn of 1731, and in the following February we find +them in London. Thus ended the romantic episode of Rhode Island, with its +ideal of Christian civilisation, which so moves the heart and touches the +imagination in our retrospect of the eighteenth century. Of all who have +ever landed on the American shore, none was ever moved by a purer and more +self-sacrificing spirit. America still acknowledges that by Berkeley's +visit on this mission it has been invested with the halo of an illustrious +name, and associated with religious devotion to a magnificent ideal, even +if it was sought to be realised by impracticable means. To reform the New +World, and mankind at last, by a College on an island in the Atlantic, six +hundred miles from America, the Indians whom it was intended to civilise +being mostly in the interior of the continent, and none in Bermuda, was +not unnaturally considered Quixotic; and that it was at first supported by +the British Court and Parliament is a wonderful tribute to the persuasive +genius of the projector. Perhaps he was too much influenced by Lord +Percival's idea, that it could not be realised by private benevolence, +without the intervention of the Crown. But the indirect influence of +Berkeley's American inspiration is apparent in many ways in the +intellectual and spiritual life of that great continent, during the last +century and a half, especially by the impulse given to academical +education. It is the testimony of an American author that, "by methods +different from those intended by Berkeley, and in ways more manifold than +even he could have dreamed, he has since accomplished, and through all +coming time, by a thousand ineffaceable influences, he will continue to +accomplish, some portion at least of the results which he had aimed at in +the founding of his university. It is the old story over again; the +tragedy of a Providence wiser than man's foresight; God giving the victory +to His faithful servant even through the bitterness of overruling him and +defeating him(23)." American Empire, as we now see it with its boundless +beneficent influence, is at least an imperfect realisation of Berkeley's +dream. + + ------------------------------------- + +Berkeley's head quarters were in London, in Green Street, for more than +two years after the return to England in the beginning of 1732. Extant +correspondence with Lord Percival ends in Rhode Island, and our picture of +the two years in London is faintly formed by letters to Prior and Johnson. +These speak of ill-health, and breathe a less sanguine spirit. The +brilliant social life of former visits was less attractive now, even if +old friends had remained. But Swift had quitted England for ever, and +Steele had followed Addison to the grave. Gay, the common friend of +Berkeley and Pope, died soon after the return from Rhode Island, and +Arbuthnot was approaching his end at Hampstead. Samuel Clarke had passed +away when Berkeley was at Whitehall; but Seeker now held the rectory of +St. James's, and Butler was in studious retirement on the Wear; while Pope +was at Twickenham, publishing his _Essay on Man_, receiving visits from +Bolingbroke, or visiting Lord Bathurst at Cirencester Park. Queen +Caroline, too, was holding her receptions at Kensington; but "those who +imagine (as you write)," he tells Prior in January, 1734, "that I have +been making my court here all this time, would never believe (what is most +true) that I have not been at the Court or at the Minister's but once +these seven years. The care of my health and the love of retirement have +prevailed over whatsoever ambition might have come to my share." There is +a hint of a visit to Oxford, at Commemoration in 1733, when his friend +Seeker received the honorary degree. + + ------------------------------------- + +Soon after he had settled in London, the fruit of his studies in Rhode +Island was given to the world in the Seven Dialogues of _Alciphron, or The +Minute Philosopher_. Here the philosophical inspiration of his early years +is directed to sustain faith in Divine Moral Order, and in the Christian +Revelation. _Alciphron_ is the longest, and in literary form perhaps the +most finished of his works, unsurpassed in lively strokes of irony and +satire. Yet if it is to be regarded as a philosophical justification of +religion, as against modern agnosticism, one may incline to the judgment +of Mr. Leslie Stephen, that it is "the least admirable of all its author's +admirable works." As we have seen, the sect of free-thinkers was early the +object of Berkeley's ridicule and sarcasm. They claimed for themselves +wide intellectual vision, yet they were blind to the deep realities of the +universe; they took exclusive credit for freedom of thought, although +their thinking was confined within the narrow compass of our data in +sense. The book of _Principles_, the _Dialogues_, and the _De Motu_ of his +early years, were designed to bring into clear light the absolute +dependence of the world that is presented to our senses on Omnipresent +Spirit; and the necessary subjection of all changes in our surroundings to +the immediate agency or providence of God. Boasted "free-thinking" was +really a narrow atheism, so he believed, in which meaningless Matter +usurped the place that belonged in reason to God, and he employed reason +to disclose Omnipotent Intelligence in and behind the phenomena that are +presented to the senses in impotent natural sequence. + +The causes of the widespread moral corruption of the Old World, which had +moved Berkeley so profoundly, seem to have been pondered anew during his +recluse life in Rhode Island. The decline of morals was explained by the +deification of Matter: consequent life of sensuous pleasure accounted for +decay of religion. That vice is hurtful was argued by free-thinkers like +Mandeville to be a vulgar error, and a fallacious demonstration was +offered of its utility. That virtue is intrinsically beautiful was taught +by Shaftesbury; but Berkeley judged the abstract beauty, with which +"minute philosophers" were contented, unfit to move ordinary human beings +to self-sacrificing action; for this involves devotion to a Perfect Person +by whom goodness is finally distributed. Religion alone inspires the +larger and higher life, in presenting distributive justice personified on +the throne of the universe, instead of abstract virtue. + +The turning-point in _Alciphron_ is in man's vision of God. This is +pressed in the Fourth Dialogue. The free-thinker asserts that "the notion +of a Deity, or some invisible power, is of all prejudices the most +unconquerable; the most signal example of belief without reason for +believing." He demands proof--"such proof as every man of sense requires of +a matter of fact.... Should a man ask, why I believe there is a king of +Great Britain? I might answer, Because I had seen him. Or a king of Spain? +Because I had seen those who saw him. But as for this King of kings, I +neither saw Him myself, nor any one else that ever did see Him." To which +Euphranor replies, "What if it should appear that God really speaks to +man; would this content you? What if it shall appear plainly that God +speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary, outward, sensible +signs, having no resemblance or necessary connexion with the things they +stand for and suggest; if it shall appear that, by innumerable +combinations of these signs, an endless variety of things is discovered +and made known to us; and that we are thereby instructed or informed in +their different natures; that we are taught and admonished what to shun +and what to pursue; and are directed how to regulate our motions, and how +to act with respect to things distant from us, as well in time as place: +will this content you?" Euphranor accordingly proceeds to shew that +Visible Nature is a Language, in which the Universal Power that is +continually at work is speaking to us all, in a way similar to that in +which our fellow men speak to us; so that we have as much (even more) +reason to believe in the existence of the Universal Person who is the +Speaker, as we have to believe in the existence of persons around us; who +become known to us, when they too employ sense-symbols, in the words and +actions by which we discover that we are not alone in the universe. For +men are really living spirits: their _bodies_ are only the sign of their +spiritual personality. And it is so with God, who is also revealed in the +visible world as a Spirit. "In a strict sense," says Euphranor, "I do not +see Alciphron, but only such visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer +the being of that invisible thinking principle or soul. Even so, in the +self-same manner, it seems to me that, though I cannot with eyes of flesh +behold the invisible God, yet I do, in the strictest sense, behold and +perceive, by all my senses, such signs and tokens ... as suggest, +indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God as certainly, and with the same +evidence, at least, as any other signs, perceived by sense, do suggest to +me the existence of _your_ soul, spirit, or thinking principle; which I am +convinced of only by a few signs or effects, and the motions of one small +organised body; whereas I do, at all times, and in all places, perceive +sensible signs which evince the being of God." In short, God is the living +Soul of the Universe; as you and I are the living souls that keep our +bodies and their organs in significant motion. We can interpret the +character of God in the history of the universe, even as we can interpret +the character of our neighbour by observing his words and outward actions. + +This overwhelmed Alciphron. "You stare to find that God is not far from +any one of us, and that in Him we live and move and have our being," +rejoins Euphranor. "You who, in the beginning of this conference, thought +it strange that God should leave Himself without a witness, do now think +it strange the witness should be so full and clear." "I must own I do," +was the reply. "I never imagined it could be pretended that we saw God +with our fleshly eyes, as plain as we see any human person whatsoever, and +that He daily speaks to our senses in a manifest and clear dialect." + +Although this reasoning satisfied Alciphron, others may think it +inconclusive. How one is able to discover the existence of other persons, +and even the meaning of finite personality, are themselves questions full +of speculative difficulty. But, waiving this, the analogy between the +relation of a human spirit to its body, and that of the Omnipresent and +Omnipotent Spirit to the Universe of things and persons, fails in several +respects. God is supposed to be continually creating the world by constant +and continuous Providence, and His Omniscience is supposed to comprehend +all its concrete relations: a man's body is not absolutely dependent on +the man's own power and providence; and even his scientific knowledge of +it, in itself and in its relations, is scanty and imperfect, as his power +over it is limited and conditioned. Then the little that a man gradually +learns of what is going on in the surrounding universe is dependent on his +senses: Omniscience comprehends Immensity and Eternity (so we suppose) in +a single intuition. Our bodies, moreover, are visible things: the +universe, this organism of God, is crowded with _persons_, to whom there +is nothing corresponding within the organism which reveals one man to +another. + +But this is not all. After Euphranor has found that the Universal Power is +Universal Spirit, this is still an inadequate God; for what we want to +know is what _sort_ of Spirit God is. Is God omnipotent or of limited +power, regarded ethically, fair or unfair in His treatment of persons; +good or evil, according to the highest yet attained conception of +goodness; a God of love, or a devil omnipotent? I infer the _character_ of +my neighbour from his words and actions, patent to sense in the gradual +outward evolution of his life. I am asked to infer the _character_ of the +Omnipresent Spirit from _His_ words and actions, manifested in the +universe of things and persons. But we must not attribute to the Cause +more than it reveals of itself in its effects. God and men alike are known +by the effects they produce. The Universal Power is, on this condition, +righteous, fair, and loving to the degree in which those conceptions are +implied in His visible embodiment: to affirm more or other than this, on +the basis of analogy _alone_, is either to indulge in baseless conjecture, +or to submit blindly to dogma and authority. + +Now the universe, as far as it comes within the range of human experience +on this planet, is full of suffering and moral disorder. The "religious +hypothesis" of a perfectly righteous and benevolent God is here offered to +account for the appearances which the universe presents to us. But do +these signify exact distributive justice? Is not visible nature apparently +cruel and unrelenting? If we infer cruelty in the character of a man, +because his bodily actions cause undeserved suffering, must we not, by +this analogy, infer in like manner regarding the character of the Supreme +Spirit, manifested in the progressive evolution of the universal organism? + +We find it impossible to determine with absolute certainty the character +even of our fellow men, from their imperfectly interpreted words and +actions, so that each man is more or less a mystery to his fellows. The +mystery deepens when we try to read the character of animals,--to interpret +the motives which determine the overt acts of dogs or horses. And if we +were able to communicate by visible signs with the inhabitants of other +planets, with how much greater difficulty should we draw conclusions from +their visible acts regarding _their_ character? But if this is so when we +use the data of sense for reading the character of finite persons, how +infinite must be the difficulty of reading the character of the Eternal +Spirit, in and through the gradual evolution of the universe of things and +persons, which in this reasoning is supposed to be His body; and the +history of that universe the facts of His biography, in and by which He is +eternally revealing Himself! For we know nothing about the unbeginning and +unending. The universe of persons is assumed to have no _end_; and I know +not why its evolution must be supposed to have had a _beginning_, or that +there ever was a time in which God was unmanifested, to finite persons. + +Shall we in these circumstances turn with Euphranor, in the Fifth and +Sixth Dialogues, to professed revelation of the character of the Universal +Mind presented in miraculous revelation, by inspired prophets and +apostles, who are brought forward as authorities able to speak infallibly +to the _character_ of God? If the whole course of nature, or endless +evolution of events, is the Divine Spirit revealed in omnipresent +activity, what room is there for any other less regular revelation? The +universe of common experience, it is implied by Berkeley, is essentially +miraculous, and therefore absolutely perfect. Is it consistent with +fairness, and benevolence, and love of goodness in all moral agents for +its own sake, that the Christian revelation should have been so long +delayed, and be still so incompletely made known? Is not the existence of +wicked persons on this or any other planet, wicked men or devils, a dark +spot in the visible life of God? Does not perfect goodness in God mean +restoration of goodness in men, for its own sake, apart from their merit; +and must not Omnipotent Goodness, infinitely opposite to all evil, either +convert to goodness all beings in the universe who have made themselves +bad, or else relieve the universe of their perpetual presence in +ever-increasing wickedness? + +Sceptical criticism of this sort has found expression in the searching +minute philosophy of a later day than Berkeley's and Alciphron's; as in +David Hume and Voltaire, and in the agnosticism of the nineteenth century. +Was not Euphranor too ready to yield to the demand for a visible God, +whose character had accordingly to be determined by what appears in nature +and man, under the conditions of our limited and contingent experience? Do +we not need to look below data of sensuous experience, and among the +presuppositions which must consciously or unconsciously be taken for +granted in all man's dealings with the environment in which he finds +himself, for the root of _trustworthy_ experience? On merely physical +reasoning, like that of Euphranor, the righteous love of God is an +unwarranted inference, and it even seems to be contradicted by visible +facts presented in the history of the world. But if Omnipotent Goodness +must _a priori_ be attributed to the Universal Mind, as an indispensable +condition for man's having reliable intercourse of any sort with nature; +if this is the primary postulate necessary to the existence of truth of +any kind--then the "religious hypothesis" that God is Good, according to +the highest conception of goodness, is no groundless fancy, but the +fundamental faith-venture in which man has to live. It _must_ stand in +reason; unless it can be _demonstrated_ that the mixture of good and evil +which the universe presents, necessarily contradicts this fundamental +presupposition: and if so, man is lost in pessimistic Pyrrhonism, and can +assert nothing about anything(24). + +The religious altruism, however inadequate, which Berkeley offered in +_Alciphron_ made some noise at the time of its appearance, although its +theistic argument was too subtle to be popular. The conception of the +visible world as Divine Visual Language was "received with ridicule by +those who make ridicule the test of truth," although it has made way +since. "I have not seen Dean Berkeley," Gay the poet writes to Swift in +the May following the Dean's return, and very soon after the appearance of +_Alciphron_, "but I have been reading his book, and like many parts of it; +but in general think with you that it is too speculative." Warburton, with +admiration for Berkeley, cannot comprehend his philosophy, and Hoadley +shewed a less friendly spirit. _A Letter from a Country Clergyman_, +attributed to Lord Hervey, the "Sporus" of Pope, was one of several +ephemeral attacks which the _Minute Philosopher_ encountered in the year +after its appearance. Three other critics, more worthy of consideration, +are mentioned in one of Berkeley's letters from London to his American +friend Johnson at Stratford: "As to the Bishop of Cork's book, and the +other book you allude to, the author of which is one Baxter, they are both +very little considered here; for which reason I have taken no public +notice of them. To answer objections already answered, and repeat the same +things, is a needless as well as disagreeable task. Nor should I have +taken notice of that Letter about Vision, had it not been printed in a +newspaper, which gave it course, and spread it through the kingdom. +Besides, the theory of Vision I found was somewhat obscure to most people; +for which reason I was not displeased at an opportunity to explain +it(25)." The explanation was given in _The Theory of Visual Language +Vindicated_, in January, 1733, as a supplement to _Alciphron_. Its blot is +a tone of polemical bitterness directed against Shaftesbury(26). + +Although Berkeley "took no public notice" of "the Bishop of Cork's +book(27)" it touched a great question, which periodically has awakened +controversy, and been the occasion of mutual misunderstanding among the +controversialists in past ages. "Is God knowable by man; or must religion +be devotion to an object that is unknowable?" In one of his first letters +to Lord Percival, as we saw, Berkeley animadverted on a sermon by the +Archbishop of Dublin, which seemed to deny that there was goodness, or +understanding God, any more than feet or hands. An opinion somewhat +similar had been attributed to Bishop Browne, in his answer to Toland, and +afterwards in 1728, in his _Procedure and Limits of Human Understanding_. + +This touched to the quick Berkeley's ultimate conception of the universe, +as realisable only in, and therefore necessarily dependent on, living +mind. We are reminded of the famous analogy of Spinoza(28). If the +omnipresent and omnipotent Mind, on which Euphranor rested, can be called +"mind" only metaphorically, and can be called "good" only when the term is +used without human meaning, it may seem to be a matter of indifference +whether we have unknowable Matter or unknowable Mind at the root of things +and persons. Both are empty words. The Power universally at work is +equally unintelligible, equally unfit to be the object of worship in the +final venture of faith, whether we use the term Matter or the term Mind. +The universe is neither explained nor sustained by a "mind" that is mind +only metaphorically. To call this "God" is to console us with an empty +abstraction. The minutest philosopher is ready to grant with Alciphron +that "there is a God in this indefinite sense"; since nothing can be +inferred from such an account of God about conduct or religion. + +The Bishop of Cork replied to the strictures of Euphranor in the _Minute +Philosopher_. He qualified and explained his former utterances in some two +hundred dull pages of his _Divine Analogy_, which hardly touch the root of +the matter. The question at issue is the one which underlies modern +agnosticism. It was raised again in Britain in the nineteenth century, +with deeper insight, by Sir William Hamilton; followed by Dean Mansel, in +controversy with F. D. Maurice, at the point of view of Archbishop King +and Bishop Browne, in philosophical vindication of the mysteries of +Christian faith; by Mr. Herbert Spencer and by Huxley in a minute +philosophy that has been deepened by Hume's criticism of the rationale of +theism in Berkeley(29). + +Andrew Baxter's _Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul_, referred to +in Berkeley's letter to Johnson, appeared in 1733. It has a chapter on +"Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the existence of Matter and a Material +World," which is worthy of mention because it is the earliest elaborate +criticism of the New Principle, although it had then been before the world +for more than twenty years. The title of the chapter shews Baxter's +imperfect comprehension of the proposition which he attempts to refute. It +suggests that Berkeley argued for the non-existence of the things we see +and touch, instead of for their necessary dependence on, or subordination +to, realising percipient Mind, so far as they are concrete realities. +Baxter, moreover, was a Scot; and his criticism is interesting as a +foretaste of the protracted discussion of the "ideal theory" by Reid and +his friends, and later on by Hamilton. But Baxter's book was not the first +sign of Berkeley's influence in Scotland. We are told by Dugald Stewart, +that "the novelty of Berkeley's paradox attracted very powerfully the +attention of a set of young men who were then prosecuting their studies at +Edinburgh, who formed themselves into a Society for the express purpose of +soliciting from him an explanation of some parts of his theory which +seemed to them obscurely or equivocally expressed. To this correspondence +the amiable and excellent prelate seems to have given every encouragement; +and I have been told on the best authority that he was accustomed to say +that his reasoning had been nowhere better understood than by this club of +young Scotsmen(30)." Thus, and afterwards through Hume and Reid, Berkeley +is at the root of philosophy in Scotland. + + ------------------------------------- + +The two years of indifferent health and authorship in London sum up what +may be called the American period of Berkeley's life. Early in 1734 +letters to Prior open a new vista in his history. He was nominated to the +bishopric of Cloyne in the south of Ireland, and we have now to follow him +to the remote region which was his home for eighteen years. The interest +of the philosophic Queen, and perhaps some compensation for the Bermuda +disappointment, may explain the appearance of the metaphysical and social +idealist in the place where he shone as a star of the first magnitude in +the Irish Church of the eighteenth century. + + + + +III. Later Years (1734-53). + + +In May, 1734, Berkeley was consecrated as Bishop of Cloyne, in St. Paul's +Church, Dublin. Except occasional visits, he had been absent from Ireland +for more than twenty years. He returned to spend eighteen years of almost +unbroken seclusion in his remote diocese. It suited a growing inclination +to a recluse, meditative life, which had been encouraged by circumstances +in Rhode Island. The eastern and northern part in the county of Cork +formed his diocese, bounded on the west by Cork harbour, and on the east +by the beautiful Blackwater and the mountains of Waterford; the sea, which +was its southern boundary, approached within two miles of the episcopal +residence in the village of Cloyne. + +As soon as he was settled, he resumed study "with unabated attention," but +still with indifferent health. Travelling had become irksome to him, and +at Cloyne he was almost as much removed as he had been in Rhode Island +from the thinking world. Cork took the place of Newport; but Cork was +twenty miles from Cloyne, while Newport was only three miles from +Whitehall. His episcopal neighbour at Cork was Bishop Browne, the critic +of _Alciphron_. Isaac Gervais, afterwards Dean of Tuam, often enlivened +the "manse-house" at Cloyne by his wit and intercourse with the great +world. Secker, the Bishop of Bristol, and Benson, the Bishop of +Gloucester, now and then exchanged letters with him, and correspondence +was kept up as of old with Prior at Dublin and Johnson at Stratford. But +there is no trace of intercourse with Swift, who was wearing out an +unhappy old age, or with Pope, almost the only survivor of the brilliant +society of other years. We are told, indeed, that the beauty of Cloyne was +so described to the bard of Twickenham, by the pen which in former days +had described Ischia, that Pope was almost moved to visit it. And a letter +from Secker in February, 1735(31), contains this scrap: "Your friend Mr. +Pope is publishing small poems every now and then, full of much wit and +not a little keenness(32)." "Our common friend, Dr. Butler," he adds, +"hath almost completed a set of speculations upon the credibility of +religion from its analogy to the constitution and course of nature, which +I believe in due time you will read with pleasure." Butler's _Analogy_ +appeared in the following year. But I have found no remains of +correspondence between Berkeley and their "common friend"; the two most +illustrious religious thinkers of the Anglican communion. + +When he left London in 1734 Berkeley was on the eve of what sounded like a +mathematical controversy, although it was in his intention metaphysical, +and was suggested by the Seventh Dialogue in _Alciphron_. In one of his +letters to Prior, early in that year, he told him that though he "could +not read, owing to ill health," yet his thought was as distinct as ever, +and that for amusement "he passed his early hours in thinking of certain +mathematical matters which may possibly produce something(33)." This +turned, it seems, upon a form of scepticism among contemporary +mathematicians, occasioned by the presence of mysteries of religion. The +_Analyst_ was the issue. It was followed by a controversy in which some of +the most eminent mathematicians took part. _Mathematica exeunt in +mysteria_ might have been the motto of the _Analyst_. The assumptions in +mathematics, it is argued, are as mysterious as those of theologians and +metaphysicians. Mathematicians cannot translate into perfectly +intelligible thought their own doctrines in fluxions. If man's knowledge +of God is rooted in mystery, so too is mathematical analysis. Pure science +at last loses itself in propositions which usefully regulate action, but +which cannot be comprehended. This is the drift of the argument in the +_Analyst_; but perhaps Berkeley's inclination to extreme conclusions, and +to what is verbally paradoxical, led him into doubtful positions in the +controversy to which the _Analyst_ gave rise. Instead of ultimate +imperfect comprehensibility, he seems to attribute absolute contradiction +to the Newtonian fluxions. Baxter, in his _Inquiry_, had asserted that +things in Berkeley's book of _Principles_ forced the author "to suspect +that even mathematics may not be very sound knowledge at the bottom." The +metaphysical argument of the _Analyst_ was obscured in a cloud of +mathematics. + + ------------------------------------- + +The social condition of Ireland attracted Berkeley almost as soon as he +was settled in Cloyne. He was surrounded by a large native Irish +population and a small group of English colonists. The natives, long +governed in the interest of the stranger, had never learned to exert and +govern themselves. The self-reliance which Berkeley preached fifteen years +before, as a mean for "preventing the ruin of Great Britain," was more +wanting in Ireland, where the simplest maxims of social economy were +neglected. It was a state of things fitted to move one who was too +independent to permit his aspirations to be confined to the ordinary +routine of the Irish episcopate, and who could not forget the favourite +moral maxim of his life. + +The social chaos of Ireland was the occasion of what to some may be the +most interesting of Berkeley's writings. His thoughts found vent +characteristically in a series of penetrating practical queries. The First +Part of the _Querist_ appeared in 1735, anonymously, edited by Dr. Madden +of Dublin, who along with Prior had lately founded a Society for promoting +industrial arts in Ireland. The Second and Third Parts were published in +the two following years. _A Discourse to Magistrates occasioned by the +Enormous Licence and Irreligion of the Times_, which appeared in 1736, was +another endeavour, with like philanthropic intention. And the only +important break in his secluded life at Cloyne, in eighteen years of +residence, was when he went for some months to Dublin in 1737, to render +social service to Ireland in the Irish House of Lords. + + ------------------------------------- + +His metaphysic, at first encountered by ridicule, was now beginning to +receive more serious treatment. A Scotsman had already recognised it. In +1739 another and more famous Scotsman, David Hume, refers thus to Berkeley +in one of the opening sections of his _Treatise of Human Nature_: "A very +material question has been started concerning abstract or general +ideas--whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of +them. A great philosopher, Dr. Berkeley, has disputed the received opinion +in this particular, and has asserted that all general ideas are nothing +but particular ones, annexed to a certain term which gives them a more +extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other +individuals which are similar to them. I look upon this to be one of the +greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in +the republic of letters." It does not appear that Berkeley heard of Hume. + + ------------------------------------- + +A curious interest began to engage him about this time. The years +following 1739 were years of suffering in the Irish diocese. It was a time +of famine followed by widespread disease. His correspondence is full of +allusions to this. It had consequences of lasting importance. Surrounded +by disease, he pondered remedies. Experience in Rhode Island and among +American Indians suggested the healing properties of tar. Further +experiments in tar, combined with meditation and much curious reading, +deepened and expanded his metaphysical philosophy. Tar seemed to grow +under his experiments, and in his thoughts, into a Panacea for giving +health to the organism on which living mind in man is meanwhile dependent. +This natural dependence of health upon tar introduced thoughts of the +interdependence of all things, and then of the _immediate_ dependence of +all in nature upon Omnipresent and Omnipotent Mind. The living Mind that +underlies the phenomena of the universe began to be conceived under a new +light. Since his return to the life of thought in Rhode Island, he had +been immersed in Platonic and Neoplatonic literature, and in books of +mystical Divinity, encouraged perhaps by the mystical disposition +attributed to his wife. An eccentric ingenuity connected the scientific +experiments and prescriptions with the Idealism of Plato and Plotinus. The +natural law according to which tar-water was universally restorative set +his mind to work about the immanence of living Mind. He mused about a +medicine thus universally beneficial, and the thought occurred that it +must be naturally charged with 'pure invisible fire, the most subtle and +elastic of bodies, and the vital element in the universe'; and water might +be the natural cause which enables this elementary fire to be drawn out of +tar and transferred to vegetable and animal organisms. But the vital fire +could be only a natural cause; which in truth is no efficient cause at +all, but only a sign of divine efficiency transmitted through the world of +sense: the true cause of this and all other natural effects must be the +immanent Mind or Reason in which we all participate; for in God we live +and move and have our being. + +It is thus that Berkeley's thought culminates in _Siris_, that _Chain of +Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of +Tar-water, and divers other subjects connected together and arising one +from another_, which appeared in 1744. This little book made more noise at +the time of its appearance than any of his books; but not because of its +philosophy, which was lost in its medicinal promise to mankind of immunity +from disease. Yet it was Berkeley's last attempt to express his ultimate +conception of the universe in its human and divine relations. When _Siris_ +is compared with the book of _Principles_, the immense difference in tone +and manner of thought shews the change wrought in the intervening years. +The sanguine argumentative gladiatorship of the _Principles_ is exchanged +for pensive speculation, which acknowledges the weakness of human +understanding, when it is face to face with the Immensities and +Eternities. Compare the opening sections of the Introduction to the +_Principles_ with the closing sections of _Siris_. The contingent data of +our experience are now felt to be insufficient, and there is a more or +less conscious grounding of the Whole in the eternal and immutable Ideas +of Reason. "Strictly, the sense knows nothing. We perceive, indeed, sounds +by hearing and characters by sight. But we are not therefore said to +understand them.... Sense and experience acquaint us with the course and +analogy of appearances and natural effects: thought, reason, intellect, +introduce us into the knowledge of their causes.... The principles of +science are neither objects of sense nor imagination: intellect and reason +are alone the sure guides to truth." So the shifting basis of the earlier +thought is found to need support in the intellectual and moral faith that +must be involved in all reasonable human intercourse with the phenomena +presented in the universe. + +The inadequate thought of God, as only a Spirit or Person supreme among +the spirits or persons, in and through whom the material world is +realised, a thought which pervades _Alciphron_, makes way in _Siris_ for +the thought of God as the infinite omnipresent Ground, or final sustaining +Power, immanent in Nature and Man, to which Berkeley had become accustomed +in Neoplatonic and Alexandrian metaphysics. "Comprehending God and the +creatures in One general notion, we may _say_ that all things together +(God and the universe of Space and Time) make One Universe, or {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. But +if we should say that all things make One God, this would be an erroneous +notion of God; but would not amount to atheism, as long as Mind or +Intellect was admitted to be {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or the governing part.... It +will not seem just to fix the imputation of atheism upon those +philosophers who hold the doctrine of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}." It is thus that he now +regards God. Metaphysics and theology are accordingly one. + +No attempt is made in _Siris_ to articulate the universe in the light of +unifying Mind or Reason. And we are still apt to ask what the truth and +goodness at the heart of all really mean; seeing that, as conceived in +human minds, they vary in the gradual evolution of intellect and +conscience in men. _Omnia exeunt in mysteria_ is the tone of _Siris_ at +the end. The universe of reality is too much for our articulate +intellectual digestion: it must be left for omniscience; it transcends +finite intelligence and the _via media_ of human understanding. Man must +be satisfied to pass life, in the infinitesimal interval between birth and +death, as a faith-venture, which he may convert into a growing insight, as +the generations roll on, but which can never be converted into complete +knowledge. "In this state we must be satisfied to make the best of those +glimpses within our reach. It is Plato's remark in his _Theaetetus_, that +while we sit still we are never the wiser; but going into the river, and +moving up and down, is the way to discover its depths and shallows. If we +exercise and bestir ourselves, we may even here discover something. The +eye by long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern; and there is no +subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring +on it. Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly where it +is the chief passion it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor +is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life: a time +perhaps to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make +a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as his youth, +the later growth as well as the first-fruits, at the altar of Truth." Such +was Berkeley, and such were his last words in philosophy. They may suggest +the attitude of Bacon when, at a different view-point, he disclaims +exhaustive system: "I have made a beginning of the work: the fortune of +the human race will give the issue. For the matter in hand is no mere +felicity of speculation, but the real business and fortunes of the human +race(34)." + + ------------------------------------- + +While Berkeley's central thought throughout his life is concerned with God +as the one omnipresent and omnipotent Providential Agent in the universe, +he says little about the other final question, of more exclusively human +interest, which concerns the destiny of men. That men are born into a +universe which, as the visible expression of Moral Providence, must be +scientifically and ethically trustworthy; certain not to put man to +confusion intellectually or morally, seeing that it could not otherwise be +trusted for such in our ultimate venture of faith--this is one thing. That +all persons born into it are certain to continue living self-consciously +for ever, is another thing. This is not obviously implied in the former +presupposition, whether or not it can be deduced from it, or else +discovered by other means. Although man's environment is essentially +Divine, and wholly in its smallest details Providential, may not his body, +in its living organisation from physical birth until physical death, be +the measure of the continuance of his self-conscious personality? Is each +man's immortal existence, like God's, indispensable? + +Doubt about the destiny of men after they die is, at the end of the +nineteenth century, probably more prevalent than doubt about the +underlying Providence of God, and His constant creative activity; more +perhaps than it was in the days of Toland, and Collins, and Tindal. Future +life had been made so familiar to the imagination by the early and +mediaeval Church, and afterwards by the Puritans, as in Milton, Bunyan, +and Jonathan Edwards, that it then seemed to the religious mind more real +than anything that is seen and touched. The habit wholly formed by natural +science is apt to dissipate this and to make a human life lived under +conditions wholly strange to its "minute philosophy" appear illusory. + +A section in the book of _Principles_(35) in which the common argument for +the "natural immortality" of the human soul is reproduced, strengthened by +his new conception of what the reality of body means, is Berkeley's +metaphysical contribution for determining between the awful alternatives +of annihilation or continued self-conscious life after physical death. The +subject is touched, in a less recondite way, in two of his papers in the +_Guardian_, and in the _Discourse_ delivered in Trinity College Chapel in +1708, in which a revelation of the immortality of men is presented as the +special gospel of Jesus Christ. To argue, as Berkeley does in the +_Principles_, that men cannot be annihilated at death, because they are +spiritual substances having powers independent of the sequences of nature, +implies assumptions regarding finite persons which are open to criticism. +The justification in reason for our venture of faith that Omnipotent +Goodness is at the heart of the universe is--that without this +presupposition we can have no reasonable intercourse, scientific or +otherwise, with the world of things and persons in which we find +ourselves; for reason and will are then alike paralysed by universal +distrust. But it can hardly be maintained _a priori_ that men, or other +spiritual beings in the universe, are equally with God indispensable to +its natural order; so that when they have once entered on conscious +existence they must _always_ continue to exist consciously. Is not the +philosophical justification of man's hope of endless life ethical rather +than metaphysical; founded on that faith in the justice and goodness of +the Universal Mind which has to be taken for granted in every attempt to +interpret experience, with its mixture of good and evil, in this +evanescent embodied life? Can a life such as this is be _all_ for men, in +a universe that, because it is essentially Divine, must operate towards +the extinction of the wickedness which now makes it a mystery of +Omnipotent Goodness? + +A cheerful optimism appears in Berkeley's habit of thought about death, as +we have it in his essays in the _Guardian_: a sanguine apprehension of a +present preponderance of good, and consequent anticipation of greater good +after death; unlike those whose pessimistic temperament induces a lurid +picture of eternal moral disorder. But his otherwise active imagination +seldom makes philosophy a meditation upon death. He does not seem to have +exercised himself in the way those do who find in the prospect of being in +the twenty-first century as they were in the first, what makes them +appalled that they have ever come at all into transitory percipient life; +or as those others who recoil from an unbodied life after physical death, +as infinitely more appalling than the thought of being transported _in +this body_ into another planet, or even to a material world outside our +solar system. In one of his letters to Johnson(36) he does approach the +unbodied life, and in a characteristic way:-- + +"I see no difficulty in conceiving a change of state, such as is vulgarly +called _death_, as well without as with material substance. It is +sufficient for that purpose that we allow sensible bodies, i.e. such as +are immediately perceived by sight and touch; the existence of which I am +so far from questioning, as philosophers are used to do, that I establish +it, I think, upon evident principles. Now it seems very easy to conceive +the _soul_ to exist in a separate state (i.e. divested from those limits +and laws of motion and perception with which she is embarrassed here) and +to exercise herself on new ideas, without the intervention of these +tangible things we call _bodies_. It is even very possible to apprehend +how the soul may have ideas of colour without an eye, or of sounds without +an ear(37)." + +But while we may thus be supposed to have all our present sensuous +experience in an unbodied state, this does not enable one to conceive how +unbodied persons can communicate with one another in the absence of _all_ +sense signs; whether of the sort derived from our present senses, or from +other senses of whose data we can in this life have no imagination. + + ------------------------------------- + +Berkeley's tar-water enthusiasm lasted throughout the rest of his life, +and found vent in letters and pamphlets in support of his Panacea, from +1744 till 1752. Notwithstanding this, he was not forgetful of other +interests--ecclesiastical, and the social ones which he included in his +large meaning of "ecclesiastical." The Rising under Charles Edward in 1745 +was the occasion of a _Letter to the Roman Catholics of Cloyne_, +characteristically humane and liberal. It was followed in 1749 by an +_Exhortation to the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland_ in a similar spirit; +and this unwonted courtesy of an Irish Protestant bishop was received by +those to whom it was addressed in a corresponding temper. + +It is difficult to determine Berkeley's relation to rival schools or +parties in Church and State. His disposition was too singular and +independent for a partisan. Some of his early writings, as we have seen, +were suspected of high Tory and Jacobite leanings; but his arguments in +the suspected _Discourse_ were such as ordinary Tories and Jacobites +failed to understand, and the tenor of his words and actions was in the +best sense liberal. In religious thought _Siris_ might place him among +latitudinarians; perhaps in affinity with the Cambridge Platonists. His +true place is foremost among the religious philosophers of the Anglican +Church; the first to prepare the religious problem for the light in which +we are invited to look at the universe by modern agnostics, and under the +modern conception of natural evolution. He is the most picturesque figure +in that Anglican succession which, in the seventeenth century, includes +Hooker and Cudworth; in the eighteenth, Clarke and Butler; and in the +nineteenth, may we say Coleridge, in lack of a representative in orders; +although Mansel, Maurice, Mozley, and Jowett are not to be forgotten, nor +Isaac Taylor among laymen(38): Newman and Arnold, illustrious otherwise, +are hardly representatives of metaphysical philosophy. + + ------------------------------------- + +A more pensive tone runs through the closing years at Cloyne. Attempts +were made in vain to withdraw him from the "remote corner" to which he had +been so long confined. His friends urged his claims for the Irish Primacy. +"I am no man's rival or competitor in this matter," were his words to +Prior. "I am not in love with feasts, and crowds, and visits, and late +hours, and strange faces, and a hurry of affairs often insignificant. For +my own private satisfaction, I had rather be master of my time than wear a +diadem." Letters to his American friends, Johnson and Clap, shew him still +moved by the inspiration which carried him over the Atlantic, and record +his influence in the development of American colleges(39). The home +education of his three sons was another interest. We are told by his widow +that "he would not trust his sons to mercenary hands. Though old and +sickly, he performed the constant tedious task himself." Of the fruit of +this home education there is little to tell. The death of William, his +favourite boy, in 1751, "was thought to have struck too close to his +father's heart." "I am a man," so he writes, "retired from the amusements, +politics, visits, and what the world calls pleasure. I had a little +friend, educated always under mine own eye, whose painting delighted me, +whose music ravished me, and whose lively gay spirit was a continual +feast. It has pleased God to take him hence." The eldest son, Henry, born +in Rhode Island, did not long survive his father. George, the third son, +was destined for Oxford, and this destiny was connected with a new +project. The "life academico-philosophical," which he sought in vain to +realise in Bermuda, he now hoped to find for himself in the city of +colleges on the Isis. "The truth is," he wrote to Prior as early as +September 1746, "I have a scheme of my own for this long time past, in +which I propose more satisfaction and enjoyment to myself than I could in +that high station(40), which I neither solicited, nor so much as wished +for. A greater income would not tempt me to remove from Cloyne, and set +aside my Oxford scheme; which, though delayed by the illness of my +son(41), yet I am as intent upon it and as much resolved as ever." + +The last of Berkeley's letters which we have is to Dean Gervais. It +expresses the feeling with which in April, 1752, he was contemplating +life, on the eve of his departure from Cloyne. + +"I submit to years and infirmities. My views in this world are mean and +narrow; it is a thing in which I have small share, and which ought to give +me small concern. I abhor business, and especially to have to do with +great persons and great affairs. The evening of life I choose to pass in a +quiet retreat. Ambitious projects, intrigues and quarrels of statesmen, +are things I have formerly been amused with, but they now seem to be a +vain, fugitive dream." + + ------------------------------------- + +Four months after this, Berkeley saw Cloyne for the last time. In August +he quitted it for Oxford, which he had long pictured in imagination as the +ideal home of his old age. When he left Cork in the vessel which carried +his wife, his daughter, and himself to Bristol, he was prostrated by +weakness, and had to be taken from Bristol to Oxford on a horse-litter. It +was late in August when they arrived there(42). + +Our picture of Berkeley at Oxford is dim. According to tradition he +occupied a house in Holywell Street, near the gardens of New College and +not far from the cloisters of Magdalen. It was a changed world to him. +While he was exchanging Ireland for England, death was removing old +English friends. Before he left Cloyne he must have heard of the death of +Butler in June, at Bath, where Benson, at the request of Secker, +affectionately watched the last hours of the author of the _Analogy_. +Benson followed Butler in August. + +We hear of study resumed in improved health in the home in Holy well +Street. In October a _Miscellany, containing several Tracts on various +Subjects_, "by the Bishop of Cloyne," appeared simultaneously in London +and Dublin. The Tracts were reprints, with the exception of _Further +Thoughts on Tar-water_, which may have been written before he left +Ireland. The third edition of _Alciphron_ also appeared in this autumn. +But _Siris_ is the latest record of his philosophical thought. A +comparison of the _Commonplace Book_ and the _Principles_ with the +_Analyst_ and _Siris_ gives the measure of his advancement. After the +sanguine beginning perhaps the comparison leaves a sense of +disappointment, when we find metaphysics mixed up with mathematics in the +_Analyst_, and metaphysics obscurely mixed up with medicine in _Siris_. + +It is curious that, although in 1752 David Hume's _Treatise of Human +Nature_ had been before the world for thirteen years and his _Inquiry +concerning Human Understanding_ for four years, there is no allusion to +Hume by Berkeley. He was Berkeley's immediate successor in the +eighteenth-century evolution of European thought. The sceptical criticism +of Hume was applied to the dogmatic religious philosophy of Berkeley, to +be followed in its turn by the abstractly rational and the moral +reconstructive criticism of Kant. _Alciphron_ is, however, expressly +referred to by Hume; indirectly, too, throughout the religious agnosticism +of his _Inquiry_, also afterwards in the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, +in a vindication of minute philosophy by profounder reasonings than those +which satisfied Lysicles and Alciphron. Berkeley, Hume, and Kant are the +three significant philosophical figures of their century, each holding the +supreme place successively in its beginning, middle, and later years. +Perhaps Reid in Scotland did more than any other in his generation to make +Berkeley known; not, however, for his true work in constructive religious +thought, but for his supposed denial of the reality of the things we see +and touch.(43) + +The ideal life in Oxford did not last long. On the evening of Sunday, +January 14, 1753, Berkeley was suddenly confronted by the mystery of +death. "As he was sitting with my mother, my sister, and myself," so his +son wrote to Johnson at Stratford, in October, "suddenly, and without the +least previous notice or pain, he was removed to the enjoyment of eternal +rewards; and although all possible means were instantly used, no symptom +of life ever appeared after; nor could the physicians assign any cause for +his death. He arrived at Oxford on August 25, and had received great +benefit from the change of air, and by God's blessing on tar-water, +insomuch that for some years he had not been in better health than he was +the instant before he left us(44)." + +Six days later he was buried in Oxford, in the Cathedral of Christ +Church(45), where his tomb bears an appropriate inscription by Dr. +Markham, afterwards Archbishop of York. + + + + + +ERRATA + + + + +Vol. I + + +Page 99, line 3 _for_ 149-80 _read_ 149-60. + +Page 99, line 22 _for_--and to be "suggested," not signified _read_--instead +of being only suggested. + +Page 100, line 10 _for_ hearing _read_ seeing. + +Page 103, note, lines 5, 6 _for_ pp. 111, 112 _read_ p. 210. + +Page 200, note, line 14 _for_ Adam _read_ Robert. + +Page 364, line 8 from foot _for_ and _read_ which. + +Page 512, note 6, line 3 _for_ imminent _read_ immanent. + + + + +Vol. II + + +Page 194, note, line 3 _for_ Tyndal _read_ Tindal. + +Page 207, line 1, insert 13. before _Alc._. + +Page 377, line 6 _for_ antethesis _read_ antithesis. + + + + +Vol. IV + + +Page 285, lines 4, 5 _for_ Thisus Alus Cujus, &c. _read_ Ursus. Alus. +Cuius. &c. The inscription, strictly speaking, appears on the Palace of +the Counts Orsini, and is dated MD. + + + + + +COMMONPLACE BOOK. MATHEMATICAL, ETHICAL, PHYSICAL, AND METAPHYSICAL + + +Written At Trinity College, Dublin, In 1705-8 + +_First published in 1871_ + + + + +Editor's Preface To The Commonplace Book + + +Berkeley's juvenile _Commonplace Book_ is a small quarto volume, in his +handwriting, found among the Berkeley manuscripts in possession of the +late Archdeacon Rose. It was first published in 1871, in my edition of +Berkeley's Works. It consists of occasional thoughts, mathematical, +physical, ethical, and metaphysical, set down in miscellaneous fashion, +for private use, as they arose in the course of his studies at Trinity +College, Dublin. They are full of the fervid enthusiasm that was natural +to him, and of sanguine expectations of the issue of the prospective +authorship for which they record preparations. On the title-page is +written, "G. B. Trin. Dub. alum.," with the date 1705, when he was twenty +years of age. The entries are the gradual accumulation of the next three +years, in one of which the _Arithmetica_ and the _Miscellanea Mathematica_ +made their appearance. The _New Theory of Vision_, given to the world in +1709, was evidently much in his mind, as well as the sublime conception of +the material world in its necessary subordination to the spiritual world, +of which he delivered himself in his book of _Principles_, in 1710. + +This disclosure of Berkeley's thoughts about things, in the years +preceding the publication of his first essays, is indeed a precious record +of the initial struggles of ardent philosophical genius. It places the +reader in intimate companionship with him when he was beginning to awake +into intellectual and spiritual life. We hear him soliloquising. We see +him trying to translate into reasonableness our crude inherited beliefs +about the material world and the natural order of the universe, +self-conscious personality, and the Universal Power or Providence--all +under the sway of a new determining Principle which was taking profound +possession of his soul. He finds that he has only to look at the concrete +things of sense in the light of this great discovery to see the +artificially induced perplexities of the old philosophers disappear, along +with their imposing abstractions, which turn out empty words. The thinking +is throughout fresh and sincere; sometimes impetuous and one-sided; the +outcome of a mind indisposed to take things upon trust, resolved to +inquire freely, a rebel against the tyranny of language, morally burdened +with the consciousness of a new world-transforming conception, which duty +to mankind obliged him to reveal, although his message was sure to offend. +Men like to regard things as they have been wont. This new conception of +the surrounding world--the impotence of Matter, and its subordinate office +in the Supreme Economy must, he foresees, disturb those accustomed to +treat outward things as the only realities, and who do not care to ask +what constitutes reality. Notwithstanding the ridicule and ill-will that +his transformed material world was sure to meet with, amongst the many who +accept empty words instead of genuine insight, he was resolved to deliver +himself of his thoughts through the press, but with the politic +conciliation of a persuasive Irish pleader. + +The _Commonplace Book_ steadily recognises the adverse influence of one +insidious foe. Its world-transforming-Principle has been obscured by "the +mist and veil of words." The abstractions of metaphysicians, which poison +human language, had to be driven out of the author's mind before he could +see the light, and must be driven out of the minds of others before they +could be got to see it along with him: the concrete world as realisable +only in percipient mind is with difficulty introduced into the vacant +place. "The chief thing I pretend to is only to remove the mist and veil +of words." He exults in the transformed mental scene that then +spontaneously rises before him. "My speculations have had the same effect +upon me as visiting foreign countries,--in the end I return where I was +before, get my heart at ease, and enjoy myself with more satisfaction. The +philosophers lose their abstract matter; the materialists lose their +abstract extension; the profane lose their extended deity. Pray what do +the rest of mankind lose?" This beneficent revolution seemed to be the +issue of a simple recognition of the fact, that the true way of regarding +the world we see and touch is to regard it as consisting of ideas or +phenomena that are presented to human senses, somehow regularly ordered, +and the occasions of pleasure or pain to us as we conform to or rebel +against their natural order. This is the surrounding universe--at least in +its relations to us, and that is all in it that we have to do with. "I +know not," he says, "what is meant by things considered in themselves, +i.e. in abstraction. This is nonsense. Thing and idea are words of much +about the same extent and meaning. Existence is not conceivable without +perception and volition. I only declare the meaning of the word +_existence_, as far as I can comprehend it." + +In the _Commonplace Book_ we see the youth at Trinity College forging the +weapons which he was soon to direct against the materialism and scepticism +of the generation into which he was born. Here are rough drafts, crude +hints of intended arguments, probing of unphilosophical +mathematicians--even Newton and Descartes, memoranda of facts, more or less +relevant, on their way into the _Essay on Vision_ and the treatise on +_Principles_--seeds of the philosophy that was to be gradually unfolded in +his life and in his books. We watch the intrepid thinker, notwithstanding +the inexperience of youth, more disposed to give battle to mathematicians +and metaphysicians than to submit even provisionally to any human +authority. It does not seem that his scholarship or philosophical learning +was extensive. Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke were his intimates; +Hobbes and Spinoza were not unknown to him; Newton and some lesser lights +among the mathematicians are often confronted. He is more rarely in +company with the ancients or the mediaevalists. No deep study of Aristotle +appears, and there is even a disposition to disparage Plato. He seeks for +his home in the "new philosophy" of experience; without anticipations of +Kant, as the critic of what is presupposed in the scientific reliability +of any experience, against whom his almost blind zeal against abstractions +would have set him at this early stage. "Pure intellect I understand not +at all," is one of his entries. He asks himself, "What becomes of the +_aeternae veritates_?" and his reply is, "They vanish." When he tells +himself that "we must with the mob place certainty in the senses," the +words are apt to suggest that the senses are our only source of knowledge, +but I suppose his meaning is that the senses must be trustworthy, as 'the +mob' assume. Yet occasionally he uses language which looks like an +anticipation of David Hume, as when he calls mind "a congeries of +perceptions. Take away perceptions," he adds, "and you take away mind. Put +the perceptions and you put the mind. The understanding seemeth not to +differ from its perceptions and ideas." He seems unconscious of the total +scepticism which such expressions, when strictly interpreted, are found to +involve. But after all, the reader must not apply rigorous rules of +interpretation to random entries or provisional memoranda, meant only for +private use, by an enthusiastic student who was preparing to produce +books. + + ------------------------------------- + +I have followed the manuscript of the _Commonplace Book_, omitting a few +repetitions of thought in the same words. Here and there Berkeley's +writing is almost obliterated and difficult to decipher, apparently +through accident by water in the course of his travels, when, as he +mentions long after in one of his letters, several of his manuscripts were +lost and others were injured. + +The letters of the alphabet which are interpreted on the first page, and +prefixed on the margin to some of the entries, may so far help to bring +the apparent chaos of entries under a few articulate heads. + +I have added some annotations here and there as they happened to occur, +and these might have been multiplied indefinitely had space permitted. + + + + +Commonplace Book + + +I. = Introduction. +M. = Matter. +P. = Primary and Secondary qualities. +E. = Existence. +T. = Time. +S. = Soul--Spirit. +G. = God. +Mo. = Moral Philosophy. +N. = Natural Philosophy. + +Qu. If there be not two kinds of visible extension--one perceiv'd by a +confus'd view, the other by a distinct successive direction of the optique +axis to each point? + +(M1) No general ideas(46). The contrary a cause of mistake or confusion in +mathematiques, &c. This to be intimated in ye Introduction(47). + +The Principle may be apply'd to the difficulties of conservation, +co-operation, &c. + +(M2) Trifling for the [natural] philosophers to enquire the cause of +magnetical attractions, &c. They onely search after co-existing ideas(48). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M3) Quaecunque in Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum, militant pro me. + +(M4) All things in the Scripture wch side with the vulgar against the +learned, side with me also. I side in all things with the mob. + +(M5) I know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me, but yet I may +expect to be supported by those whose minds are not so far overgrown wth +madness. These are far the greatest part of mankind--especially Moralists, +Divines, Politicians; in a word, all but Mathematicians and Natural +Philosophers. I mean only the hypothetical gentlemen. Experimental +philosophers have nothing whereat to be offended in me. + +Newton begs his Principles; I demonstrate mine(49). + +(M6) I must be very particular in explaining wt is meant by things +existing--in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.--wn not perceiv'd as well +as wn perceived; and shew how the vulgar notion agrees with mine, when we +narrowly inspect into the meaning and definition of the word _existence_, +wh is no simple idea, distinct from perceiving and being perceived(50). + +The Schoolmen have noble subjects, but handle them ill. The mathematicians +have trifling subjects, but reason admirably about them. Certainly their +method and arguing are excellent. + +God knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings may be enlarg'd +from the Principles. + +(M7) The reverse of the Principle I take to have been the chief source of +all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions and inextricable +puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a reproach to human +reason, as well as of that idolatry, whether of images or of gold, that +blinds the greatest part of the world, and that shamefull immorality that +turns us into beasts. + +(M8) {~HEBREW LETTER HE~}{~HEBREW LETTER YOD~}{~HEBREW LETTER HE~} Vixit & fuit. + +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, the name for substance, used by Aristotle, the Fathers, &c. + + ------------------------------------- + +If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques much more easie and +much more accurate, wt can be objected to us(51)? + +We need not force our imagination to conceive such very small lines for +infinitesimals. They may every whit as well be imagin'd big as little, +since that the integer must be infinite. + +Evident that wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite. + +We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great--therefore absurd to +talk or make propositions about it. + +We cannot imagine a line, space, &c., quovis lato majus. Since yt what we +imagine must be datum aliquod; a thing can't be greater than itself. + +If you call infinite that wch is greater than any assignable by another, +then I say, in that sense there may be an infinite square, sphere, or any +other figure, wch is absurd. + +Qu. if extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of? + +No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas(52); therefore no +reasoning about infinitesimals. + +No word to be used without an idea. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M9) If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. how shall we +will in heaven? + +Bayle's, Malbranch's, &c. arguments do not seem to prove against Space, +but onely against Bodies. + +(M10) I agree in nothing wth the Cartesians as to ye existence of Bodies & +Qualities(53). + +Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed to have been +mistaken. + +Lines not proper for demonstration. + +(M11) We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea and +nothing more. The house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e. an +object--immediate object--of thought(54). + +Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry. + +(M12) Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere(55)]. The +horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before. + +(M13) In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but have +not leisure. + +(M14) Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine. + +Angle not well defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by Harris, &c. This one +ground of trifling. + +(M15) One idea not the cause of another--one power not the cause of +another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to +enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of +the Divinity(56). + +(M16) Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as +speculative sciences. + +(M17) The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for me. + +How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies created before +man(57). + +(M18) Impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is thought on should +exist(58). + + ------------------------------------- + +That wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things. + +M.S. is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable sensible +parts. Now how can that wch hath not sensible parts be divided into +sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into insensible parts, I say +these are nothings. + +Extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, I grant; but +then there is no such idea, as any one may try(59). There is onely a +considering the number of points without the sort of them, & this makes +more for me, since it must be in a considering thing. + +Mem. Before I have shewn the distinction between visible & tangible +extension, I must not mention them as distinct. I must not mention M. T. & +M. V., but in general M. S., &c.(60) + +Qu. whether a M. V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any tangible quality? + +If visible extension be the object of geometry, 'tis that which is +survey'd by the optique axis. + +(M19) I may say the pain is _in_ my finger, &c., according to my +doctrine(61). + + ------------------------------------- + +Mem. Nicely to discuss wt is meant when we say a line consists of a +certain number of inches or points, &c.; a circle of a certain number of +square inches, points, &c. Certainly we may think of a circle, or have its +idea in our mind, without thinking of points or square inches, &c.; +whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up of the ideas of +points, square inches, &c. + +Qu. Is any more than this meant by the foregoing expressions, viz. that +squares or points may be perceived in or made out of a circle, &c., or +that squares, points, &c. are actually in it, i.e. are perceivable in it? + +A line in abstract, or Distance, is the number of points between two +points. There is also distance between a slave & an emperor, between a +peasant & philosopher, between a drachm & a pound, a farthing & a crown, +&c.; in all which Distance signifies the number of intermediate ideas. + +Halley's doctrine about the proportion between infinitely great quantities +vanishes. When men speak of infinite quantities, either they mean finite +quantities, or else talk of [that whereof they have(62)] no idea; both +which are absurd. + +If the disputations of the Schoolmen are blam'd for intricacy, +triflingness, & confusion, yet it must be acknowledg'd that in the main +they treated of great & important subjects. If we admire the method & +acuteness of the Math[ematicians]--the length, the subtilty, the exactness +of their demonstrations--we must nevertheless be forced to grant that they +are for the most part about trifling subjects, and perhaps mean nothing at +all. + +Motion on 2d thoughts seems to be a simple idea. + +(M20) Motion distinct from ye thing moved is not conceivable. + +(M21) Mem. To take notice of Newton for defining it [motion]; also of +Locke's wisdom in leaving it undefin'd(63). + +Ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo partium spatii. +Moveantur hae de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Truly +number is immensurable. That we will allow with Newton. + +(M22) Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his globules without +colour. Pellucidness is a colour. The colour of ordinary light of the sun +is white. Newton in the right in assigning colours to the rays of light. + +A man born blind would not imagine Space as we do. We give it always some +dilute, or duskish, or dark colour--in short, we imagine it as visible, or +intromitted by the eye, wch he would not do. + +(M23) Proinde vim inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce (v. tempus, +spatium, motus) de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi interpretantur. Newton, p. +10. + +(M24) I differ from Newton, in that I think the recession ab axe motus is +not the effect, or index, or measure of motion, but of the vis impressa. +It sheweth not wt is truly moved, but wt has the force impressed on it, or +rather that wch hath an impressed force. + +_D_ and _P_ are not proportional in all circles. _d d_ is to 1/4_d p_ as +_d_ to _p_/4; but _d_ and _p_/4 are not in the same proportion in all +circles. Hence 'tis nonsense to seek the terms of one general proportion +whereby to rectify all peripheries, or of another whereby to square all +circles. + +N. B. If the circle be squar'd arithmetically, 'tis squar'd geometrically, +arithmetic or numbers being nothing but lines & proportions of lines when +apply'd to geometry. + +Mem. To remark Cheyne(64) & his doctrine of infinites. + +Extension, motion, time, do each of them include the idea of succession, & +so far forth they seem to be of mathematical consideration. Number +consisting in succession & distinct perception, wch also consists in +succession; for things at once perceiv'd are jumbled and mixt together in +the mind. Time and motion cannot be conceiv'd without succession; and +extension, qua mathemat., cannot be conceiv'd but as consisting of parts +wch may be distinctly & successively perceiv'd. Extension perceived at +once & _in confuso_ does not belong to math. + + ------------------------------------- + +The simple idea call'd Power seems obscure, or rather none at all, but +onely the relation 'twixt Cause and Effect. When I ask whether A can move +B, if A be an intelligent thing, I mean no more than whether the volition +of A that B move be attended with the motion of B? If A be senseless, +whether the impulse of A against B be followed by ye motion of B(65)? + + ------------------------------------- + +Barrow's arguing against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is a petitio +principii, for the Demonstration of Archimedes supposeth the circumference +to consist of more than 24 points. Moreover it may perhaps be necessary to +suppose the divisibility _ad infinitum_, in order to demonstrate that the +radius is equal to the side of the hexagon. + +Shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not go on some false +supposition. + +A great number of insensibles--or thus, two invisibles, say you, put +together become visible; therefore that M. V. contains or is made up of +invisibles. I answer, the M. V. does not comprise, is not composed of, +invisibles. All the matter amounts to this, viz. whereas I had no idea +awhile agoe, I have an idea now. It remains for you to prove that I came +by the present idea because there were two invisibles added together. I +say the invisibles are nothings, cannot exist, include a +contradiction(66). + +I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am vain. Very well. I +shall endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening, vilifying +appellations the pride & rage of man can devise. But one thing I know I am +not guilty of. I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great man. I act +not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do not adhere to any opinion +because it is an old one, a reviv'd one, a fashionable one, or one that I +have spent much time in the study and cultivation of. + + ------------------------------------- + +Sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be employed about lines +and figures, these being things sensible; for as for those you call +insensible, we have proved them to be nonsense, nothing(67). + +(M25) If in some things I differ from a philosopher I profess to admire, +'tis for that very thing on account whereof I admire him, namely, the love +of truth. This &c. + +(M26) Whenever my reader finds me talk very positively, I desire he'd not +take it ill. I see no reason why certainty should be confined to the +mathematicians. + +I say there are no incommensurables, no surds. I say the side of any +square may be assign'd in numbers. Say you assign unto me the side of the +square 10. I ask wt 10--10 feet, inches, &c., or 10 points? If the later, I +deny there is any such square, 'tis impossible 10 points should compose a +square. If the former, resolve yr 10 square inches, feet, &c. into points, +& the number of points must necessarily be a square number whose side is +easily assignable. + +A mean proportional cannot be found betwixt any two given lines. It can +onely be found betwixt those the numbers of whose points multiply'd +together produce a square number. Thus betwixt a line of 2 inches & a line +of 5 inches a mean geometrical cannot be found, except the number of +points contained in 2 inches multiply'd by ye number of points contained +in 5 inches make a square number. + +If the wit and industry of the Nihilarians were employ'd about the usefull +& practical mathematiques, what advantage had it brought to mankind! + + ------------------------------------- + +(M27) You ask me whether the books are in the study now, when no one is +there to see them? I answer, Yes. You ask me, Are we not in the wrong for +imagining things to exist when they are not actually perceiv'd by the +senses? I answer, No. The existence of our ideas consists in being +perceiv'd, imagin'd, thought on. Whenever they are imagin'd or thought on +they do exist. Whenever they are mentioned or discours'd of they are +imagin'd & thought on. Therefore you can at no time ask me whether they +exist or no, but by reason of yt very question they must necessarily +exist. + +(M28) But, say you, then a chimaera does exist? I answer, it doth in one +sense, i.e. it is imagin'd. But it must be well noted that existence is +vulgarly restrain'd to actuall perception, and that I use the word +existence in a larger sense than ordinary.(68) + +N. B.--According to my doctrine all things are _entia rationis_, i.e. solum +habent esse in intellectum. + +(M29) [(69)According to my doctrine all are not _entia rationis_. The +distinction between _ens rationis_ and _ens reale_ is kept up by it as +well as any other doctrine.] + +You ask me whether there can be an infinite idea? I answer, in one sense +there may. Thus the visual sphere, tho' ever so small, is infinite, i.e. +has no end. But if by infinite you mean an extension consisting of +innumerable points, then I ask yr pardon. Points, tho' never so many, may +be numbered. The multitude of points, or feet, inches, &c., hinders not +their numbrableness (i.e. hinders not their being numerable) in the least. +Many or most are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, if by infinite +idea you mean an _idea_ too great to be comprehended or perceiv'd all at +once, you must excuse me. I think such an infinite is no less than a +contradiction(70). + +(M30) The sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me. They +commonly suppose a material world--figures, motions, bulks of various +sizes, &c.--according to their own confession to no purpose. All our +sensations may be, and sometimes actually are, without them; nor can men +so much as conceive it possible they should concur in any wise to the +production of them. + +(M31) Ask a man, I mean a philosopher, why he supposes this vast +structure, this compages of bodies? he shall be at a stand; he'll not have +one word to say. Wch sufficiently shews the folly of the hypothesis. + +(M32) Or rather why he supposes all ys Matter? For bodies and their +qualities I do allow to exist independently of _our_ mind. + +(M33) Qu. How is the soul distinguish'd from its ideas? Certainly if there +were no sensible ideas there could be no soul, no perception, remembrance, +love, fear, &c.; no faculty could be exerted(71). + +(M34) The soul is the Will, properly speaking, and as it is distinct from +ideas. + +(M35) The grand puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake, easily solv'd. + + ------------------------------------- + +Qu. Whether minima or meer minima may not be compar'd by their sooner or +later evanescence, as well as by more or less points, so that one sensible +may be greater than another, though it exceeds it not by one point? + +Circles on several radius's are not similar figures, they having neither +all nor any an infinite number of sides. Hence in vain to enquire after 2 +terms of one and ye same proportion that should constantly express the +reason of the _d_ to the _p_ in all circles. + +Mem. To remark Wallis's harangue, that the aforesaid proportion can +neither be expressed by rational numbers nor surds. + +We can no more have an idea of length without breadth or visibility, than +of a general figure. + + ------------------------------------- + +One idea may be like another idea, tho' they contain no common simple +idea(72). Thus the simple idea red is in some sense like the simple idea +blue; 'tis liker it than sweet or shrill. But then those ideas wch are so +said to be alike, agree both in their connexion with another simple idea, +viz. extension, & in their being receiv'd by one & the same sense. But, +after all, nothing can be like an idea but an idea. + + ------------------------------------- + +No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine. + +(M36) Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the +attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other +the like absurditys. + + ------------------------------------- + +Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of +Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine. + +The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so +many noughts or nothings. + +Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether +they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wch seems to be +compounded of yellow and blue. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M37) Qu. Whether it were not better _not_ to call the operations of the +mind ideas--confining this term to things sensible(73)? + +(M38) Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient +philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of +motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. +This sprung from their not knowing wt Existence was, and wherein it +consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of +the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This +puts a wide difference betwixt the sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly +new. I am sure this is new to me(74). + +We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, +several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount +to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We +may apply it to the Mathematicians. + +Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for +a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have +not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without +extension. + +Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating +& the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for +recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations(75). + +No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be +connected with one & the same 3d simple idea, or be intromitted by one & +the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, +and consequently no likeness. + +Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily +as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I +can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to +abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another +thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind(76). + +(M39) Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy. + +(M40) What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being +wch wills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen +from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause +of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us(77). + +(M41) [(78)It should be said, nothing but a Will--a Being which wills being +unintelligible.] + + ------------------------------------- + +One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is +false. + +Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of +the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye. + +Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may +help to prove the composition of green. + +There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & +yellow. Therefore green is compounded. + +A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all +compounded that we see. + +Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green. + +N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the +Royall Society. 'Tis wt their meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's +History S. R.(79) + +Mem. To premise a definition of idea(80). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M42) The 2 great principles of Morality--the being of a God & the freedom +of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book(81). + +Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa. + +Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with +circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference +contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against +indivisibles. V. Barrow. + +Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with +their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an +inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M43) Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be any more than +the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the +substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure(82). Of +general abstract body we can have no idea. + +(M44) Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring +to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man +into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction(83). + + ------------------------------------- + +Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this +axiom: Quae sibi mutuo congruunt aequalia sunt. + +Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to +their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a +right line? + +If wth me you call those lines equal wch contain an equal number of +points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right +line wch contains the same points as the right one doth. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M45) I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding +substance out of the reasonable world(84). I onely reject the philosophic +sense (wch in effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not +tainted with their jargon wt he means by corporeal substance, or the +substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible +qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec +quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard +that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or +conceiv'd. + +(M46) In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or +chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so +wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it +for me. I'll never deprive you of it. + +N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers(85). They make a +thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the +direct contrary. + + ------------------------------------- + +A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident +in that there are curve lines. + +Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow +points. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M47) If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so +sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game +lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & +dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and +knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to +be found. + +(M48) All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1. + +(M49) It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person +stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas. + +(M50) Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake. + +Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They +nowhere define wt they mean by that word when apply'd to lines. + +Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are +counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. +What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved. + + ------------------------------------- + +Wt do the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either +they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the +name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat +them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons +in their stead. Wt is this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a +name that belongs not to it but to a different idea? + +The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quae congruunt sunt aequalia. +I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The +under triangle is no triangle--nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I +ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all +lines seen under the same angle are equal, wch they will not acknowledge. +Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, +such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much +less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or +triangle. + +Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both +take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal +spaces? If you mean _spatia congruentia_, answer the above difficulty +truly. + +I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles +containing equal numbers of points. + +I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch 'tis indifferent whether +of them I take, lines in wch I observe by my senses no difference, & wch +therefore have the same name. + +Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then +imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect +must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the +mind. + + ------------------------------------- + +If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of +which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think +before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. +I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & +submission to better judgments. Wt I lay before you are undoubted +theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of +other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. +Let them stand or fall by their own evidence. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M51) When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect +on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer +colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion. + +(M52) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one +particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke. + +(M53) Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer +idea--there is nothing wch is not an _ens rationis_. I answer, things are +as real, and exist _in rerum natura_, as much as ever. The difference +between _entia realia_ & _entia rationis_ may be made as properly now as +ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my +meaning, and you'll agree with me in this. + +(M54) Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences. + +We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, +existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are +frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them +in our understandings. This must be well inculcated. + +(M55) Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world(86). +V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful +than this. + +(M56) Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for + +(M57) them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of +introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these +could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are +manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness +of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. +The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind +no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest. + +The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not +consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves--fix, settle, +and determine them,--we regarding them with relation to each other only. In +short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we +study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the +relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without +endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in +themselves. This we think is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I +mistake not 'tis of the last importance, + +(M58) I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and +pleasure. + +(M59) I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that +acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of +ill consequence in morality. + +My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced +with "It seems to me," "I suppose," &c.; since I declare, once for all, +that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. +It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. +This in the Preface. + +(M60) Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with +another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from +sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some +latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a +determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being +understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the +understanding. + +Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All +number consists in relations(87). + +Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen. + +(M61) We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things +besides ourselves & order, praecedaneous(88). To the knowledge of our own +existence--in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think. + +(M62) We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein +I differ from Malbranch(89). + +(M63) Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke(90). + +(M64) Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the +reality of things, rerum natura, &c. + +(M65) Wt I say is demonstration--perfect demonstration. Wherever men have +fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to their words they can hardly be +mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration +yt colours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other +things. This to be heartily insisted on. + +(M66) The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the +vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas. + +(M67) I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause +of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for +retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, +and settle the meaning of their words. + +(M68) I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the +joining and separating of signs. + +(M69) Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of +words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. +Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M70) Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone +a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that +side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by +me. A vast field for invention. + + ------------------------------------- + +Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly +conceive a foot who never thought of an inch. + +A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. +they contain both the same number of points. + +[Forasmuch as] to be used. + +Mem. To mention somewhat wch may encourage the study of politiques, and +testify of me yt I am well dispos'd toward them. + +(M71) If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of +abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general +ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide +Locke(91), lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9. + +A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. +This demonstrable from the definition of a cause; which way of +demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end +definitions often praemis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's +doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M72) I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an +intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. +This is wt Locke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend +to(92). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M73) Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the +sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language. + +Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst +the uses and not the abuses of language. + +(M74) Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the +world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he +would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and +species or abstract general ideas. + +(M75) Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years, see at all +thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. +This more to be admir'd than yt he did not see farther. + +Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or +excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c. + +(M76) I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. +than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the +happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine +must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative +good, discuss'd with French, Madden(93), &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of +mistake in judging of moral matters. + +Mem. To observe (wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and +complex) that there may be another cause of the undefinableness of certain +ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names. + +(M77) Mem. To begin the First Book(94) not with mention of sensation and +reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in +general. + +(M78) I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or +an idea without perception. + +(M79) Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before +thought is absurd--includes a manifest contradiction. + +Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to +nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians. + +They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wt mean +they by this? Wt would they signify by the word points? Do they stick to +the definition of Euclid? + +(M80) We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or +sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice. + +(M81) Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what +we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our +knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction. + +The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul(95). + +(M82) Consciousness(96), perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all +one. + +Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wt find you there besides several +perceptions or thoughts? Wt mean you by the word mind? You must mean +something that you perceive, or yt you do not perceive. A thing not +perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive +is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words. + +Mind is a congeries of perceptions(97). Take away perceptions and you take +away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind. + +Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I +answer, you are abused by the words "that a thing." These are vague and +empty words with us. + +(M83) The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may +have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth +perception. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M84) That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see +an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third +Book(98). + +There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed +Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may +be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate +demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the +words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard +matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established _jure +Divino_ to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to +demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an +implicit faith becomes us. + +(M85) Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of +reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, +black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white +differ from white men.... + +I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be +set forth and insisted on in the Introduction(99). In that I must needs +differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about +abstract ideas, wch I say we have not nor can have. + +(M86) The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or +ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions? + +(M87) A good proof that Existence is nothing without or distinct from +perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without +company(100). + +(M88) There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see +that common speech confirms my doctrine. + +(M89) No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are +nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas. + +(M90) We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and +determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine +words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable. + +(M91) "A stone is a stone." This a nonsensical proposition, and such as +the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever +think on this: "The whole is equal to its parts," &c. + +(M92) Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the +meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it. + +(M93) If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I +answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less. + +Wt means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something +different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing. + +(M94) N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language(101). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M95) But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may +exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof +we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wn I +come to treat more particularly of Existence. + + ------------------------------------- + +Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke--it seeming to superadd +nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or +non-existence. + +(M96) Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, viz. How it is +that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wn +nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wn they have no +perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the +present? + +(M97) 'Tis not to be imagin'd wt a marvellous emptiness & scarcity of +ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his +meditations. + +(M98) Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see +substances with. + +(M99) Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming. + +(M100) The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by +angles(102), strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things +without and distant from their mind. + +(M101) I am persuaded, would men but examine wt they mean by the word +existence, they wou'd agree with me. + +c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians. + +(M102) The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all +real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our +knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas(103). + +(M103) Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make +use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at +least in writing--without which he could scarce retain his knowledge. + +We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges +of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited +and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, +Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute. + +(M104) The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has +been one great cause of imagining material substances(104). + +(M105) That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument +against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, +without a previous uneasiness. + +(M106) The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that +uneasiness may be without volition. + +(M107) Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason. + +(M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together. + +The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas. + +The Will not distinct from particular volitions. + +(M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may +be without all volition or act. + +The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will. + +This allow'd hereafter. + +(M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, +for the word _can_ presupposes volition. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic +vertue, Hylaschic principle--all these vanish(105). + +(M112) Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think +that's all(106). + +Qu. whether it be the vis inertiae that makes it difficult to move a stone, +or the vis attractivae, or both, or neither? + + ------------------------------------- + +Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may +be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections(107). + +(M113) To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is +idem per idem. + +Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the +essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from +thought, and to exist in unthinking substance. + +An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions. + +There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the +greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the.... + +(M114) Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not +Matter(108). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M115) Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but +settle the signification of the word _free_--if we had an idea annext to +the word free, and would but contemplate that idea. + +(M116) We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, +&c. + +(M117) Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience. + +(M118) Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its +ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint +you with its nature. + +(M119) Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth +& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness. + +(M120) You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, +tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you(109). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M121) Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I +say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body +that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were +improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now +seem to touch. + +Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty--to confute the +mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them +Nihilarians, &c. + +N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature. + +Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wt cannot +be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the +clear and determinate meaning of my words. + +Say you, there might be a thinking Substance--something unknown--wch +perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas(110). Say I, make it +appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to +take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist. + +I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd--no excuse in the world can be given why a +man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that +wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to +have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we +take it in, must be compleatly known. + +'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should +exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with +words. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, +power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and +God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater(112) difference. + +(M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may +imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number +of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and +number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am +embrangled(113) in words--'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise. + + ------------------------------------- + +The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil +of words(114). This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined +the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, +is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the +vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of +our ideas; whereas in truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. +'Tis _toto caelo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our +ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, +there is an homonymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply'd to ideas and +volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive(116). + +(M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. +Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of +greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. +Now these are no ideas(117). + +(M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be +volition without perception? + +(M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition--not +distinguish'd therefrom. + +(M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at +once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in +other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity +of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it +seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time--or +_is_ time itself. + +Wt would the solitary man think of number? + +(M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to +the mind(119). + +(M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this +too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_--there is no time, no +succession of ideas(120). + +(M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, +nonsense, nothing. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, +therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine +the Will(121). + +(M134) Again, wt mean you by determine? + +(M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, +&c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light +moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time. + +(M137) 'Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd, or before +perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different +from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the +thing perceiv'd was an idea of sensation. I say, 'twas this made 'em think +the understanding took it in, receiv'd it from without; wch could never be +did not they think it existed without(123). + +(M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination's making. +This is ye likeness of, and refer'd to the real idea, or (if you will) +thing(124). + +(M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea +can resemble nothing but an idea. + +(M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by +the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, 'tis no thing at +all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a +certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c. + +(M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say +nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills. + +(M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term +"idea of(126)," is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so +also in this. + +(M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, +will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas. + +(M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those +exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the +intermediate ones, may be formed by composition. + +(M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any +other intelligence; for that were a contradiction. + +N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of +composition, tho' it must be granted they are not made up of +distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are +wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover +the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical +principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the +dissolution of the bodies--wch were not, could not, be discerned in the +bodies whilst remaining entire. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M146) All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke. +All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we +make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them? + +(M147) 'Tis allow'd that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are +not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for +operations of the mind, i.e. volitions. + +(M148) Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt +is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? "Omnis homo est +animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit." It amounts (if you +annex particular ideas to the words "animal" and "vivit") to no more than +this: "Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est +homo." A mere sport and trifling with sounds. + +(M149) We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral +actions(127). Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are capable of +arriving at demonstration about them(128), the morality consisting in the +volition chiefly. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M150) Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of +Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is +brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection(129), +methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it. + +(M151) This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence(130), or annext to the +word Existence. And if others have that's nothing to me; they can never +make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language. + +(M152) Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something +whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can +have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you +will think absurd. + +(M153) There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue +upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes +toward the sun: I open them. All this is active. + +(M154) Things are twofold--active or inactive. The existence of active +things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv'd. + +(M155) Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore +neither is there existence without perception. + +(M156) God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & +unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we +ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or +uneasiness at all. + +(M157) Truth, three sorts thereof--natural, mathematical, & moral. + +(M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of +co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality. + +(M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be acknowledged. +Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon'd stronger than Locke than a +pigmy should be reckon'd stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off +the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove +the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface. + +(M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull +contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the +Introduction in a modest way(132). + +(M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read +out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or +Introduction(133). + +(M162) Doctrine of identity best explain'd by taking the Will for +volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of +wt are never acted surely solv'd thereby. + +(M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have +gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not +always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho' they attained +not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and +sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. +Preface or Introduction. + +(M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render'd +the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them. + +(M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of +an active thing. + +(M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_, +viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution must be added. + +Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to +these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be +questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be +found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter. + +(M167) On second thoughts I am on t'other extream. I am certain of that +wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136). + +(M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of +abstraction to bring Locke's general triangle in the last(137). + +(M169) They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do not always +observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the +same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I'll [instance] in +Locke's opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met +with. + +Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he +alive(138), he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that +even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see +with my own eyes, & not with another's. Introduction. + +(M170) The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, +usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind(139), +mischievous and useless. + +(M171) To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of +words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part +and bulk of the work. + +(M172) Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, according to +his own rule, trifling propositions. + +(M173) Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow'd by all to +be onely in the mind(140), and others as generally taken to be without the +mind(141), if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind? +Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended +with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now +volition is by all granted to be in spirit. + +(M174) If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible they +should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems +impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in +truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So +far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have +certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be +slips of memory. + +(M175) From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be +praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural +abilitys are not consequences of our volitions. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M176) Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous +opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility +of Matter's thinking(142). + +(M177) Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the +fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible +empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let +him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into +his mind determin'd significations. So far as they fail of this they are +gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him +not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind. +Wtever I see myself 'tis impossible I can paint it out in words. + +(M178) N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith +concerning algebra--that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a +method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in +mathematiques. + +(M179) _Homo_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate +idea. I don't fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in +finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the +use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging +demonstrative knowledge. + +(M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be +volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power +implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects +following the volition(143). + +(M181) We have assuredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd of Locke(144) +to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to +the Stillingfleetians. + +(M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do +not know--it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_. + +(M183) Words have ruin'd and overrun all the sciences--law, physique, +chymistry, astrology, &c. + +(M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never +think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera +& species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them. + +(M185) Locke's out(146)--the case is different. We can have an idea of body +without motion, but not of soul without thought. + +(M186) God ought to be worship'd. This easily demonstrated when once we +ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought. + +(M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no +perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is +altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will. + +(M188) I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho' at the +same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that +volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the +want of it. + +(M189) The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct +beings. + +(M190) Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, +Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum. + +You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. +[minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv'd, and next +door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like +unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv'd. + + ------------------------------------- + +Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality +according as it is seen or felt. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M191) The spirit--the active thing--that wch is soul, & God--is the Will +alone. The ideas are effects--impotent things. + +(M192) The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not +person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, +or making much mention of it. + +(M193) You ask, do these volitions make _one_ Will? Wt you ask is meerly +about a word--unity being no more(147). + + ------------------------------------- + +N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the +Church or Churchmen. + +(M194) Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that +they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd. + +Locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third +book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the +2d & 4th books don't agree wth wt he says in ye 3d(148). + +(M195) If Matter(149) is once allow'd to exist, clippings of weeds and +parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho' he seems +positive of the contrary. + +Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things +demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise +will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth +I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it +all for such. Introd. + +(M196) When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully +and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, +this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of +matters of Reason and Philosophy--not Revelation. In this I think an +humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand +the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears +at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, +irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to +dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about +things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I +shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall +yield an explicit belief. Introd. + +Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas. + +Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the +breadth wt it will. + +(M197) I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man--there being +other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created(150). + +(M198) There is a philosopher(151) who says we can get an idea of +substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we +want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give +us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, +is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in +his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common +vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance. + +(M199) N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word +Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea. + + ------------------------------------- + +Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of +magnitudes and distances. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M200) 'Tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak, the +words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex +ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wt +he had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he +cannot have it after he is taught to speak. + +(M201) "Homo est homo," &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, +if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will +not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about +sounds and terms. + +(M202) Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by +intermediate ideas, comes to nothing(152). + +(M203) We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other +ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to +be used indifferently. + +(M204) It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only +about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There +are no mental propositions form'd answering to these words, & in simple +perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and +consequently no certainty(153). + +(M205) The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they +are perfectly arbitrary & in our power--made at pleasure. + +(M206) The obscure ambiguous term _relation_, which is said to be the +largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us. + +(M207) Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not +depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, +which is ye effect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be +changed. + +(M208) Qu. What becomes of the _aeternae veritates_? Ans. They vanish(154). + +(M209) But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and +uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book +the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out. + +(M210) To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it. + +(M211) "Cogito ergo sum." Tautology. No mental proposition answering +thereto. + +(M212) Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas--as to +identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, +becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this +latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real +knowledge seemeth to be found(155). + +(M213) We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses(156). + +'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his +friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wt I do. + +(M214) A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my +shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter--'twill make +me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd. + +(M215) Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of _judicium intellectus_ preceding the +volition: I think _judicium_ includes volition. I can by no means +distinguish these--_judicium_, _intellectus_, _indifferentia_, uneasiness +to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the +motion of my hand. + +(M216) Qu. Wt mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the +perceptions I perceive or conceive(157), &c. are mine; all the volitions I +am conscious to are mine. + +(M217) Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by _homo_ and _agens_ in +this place? + +(M218) Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I +believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis +strange they should want them(158). + +(M219) It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more +time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much +the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They +discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never +spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many +inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they +touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides +much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived, & at length turn +scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. +Exord. Introd.(159) + +(M220) These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single +information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis +well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & +air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas. + +It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects +see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest. + +Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead +of being (wn duly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the +advancement of knowledge, or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there +could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration. + + ------------------------------------- + +Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to +Common Sense(160). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M221) We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many +selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth such & such thoughts & such and +such sensations(161). + +(M222) Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly +serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or +can imagine a blue horse or chimera. + +Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to +enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions. + +(M223) Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics. + +(M224) Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore +there can be no idea of volition. + +Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore +Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra. + +2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers. + +Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature +of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd. + +I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, +than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of +the bargain you'd have me make wn you tell me how much (i.e. the name of +ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without +naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear +the nature of numbers. + +Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress +in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the +senses. + +Numbers are nothing but names--never words. + +Mem. Imaginary roots--to unravel that mystery. + +Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers. + +In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a +denomination. This is all can be of use to them. + +Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wt remains? + +These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in +societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in +them(162). + +Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt +mathematics--Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. +entirely nominal--Geometry being an application of these to points(163)? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M225) Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & +con over that chapter. + +(M226) Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are +words, unknown and useless to the vulgar. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M227) Sensual pleasure is the _summum bonum_. This the great principle of +morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the +severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated. + +(M228) Sensual pleasure, qua pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise +man(164). But if it be contemptible, 'tis not qua pleasure but qua pain, +or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater +pleasure. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M229) Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant +they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of +them near. + +(M230) By _idea_ I mean any sensible or imaginable thing(165). + +(M231) To be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive(166) (I say +perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether passive; there must be a +disposition to act; there must be assent, wch is active. Nay, what do I +talk; there must be actual volition. + +What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? +i.e. may not be called by the same name(167). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M232) I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, "Nihil est in intellectu +quod non prius fuit in sensu."(168) I wish they had stuck to it. It had +never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas. + +(M233) "Nihil dat quod non habet," or, the effect is contained in the +cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M234) Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new +philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, +Will, &c. + +(M235) Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea +of God. 'Tis impossible(169). + +(M236) Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant +by Reality(170). + +(M237) Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is +less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little +before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these +general conceptions are usually confused. + +(M238) Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a +stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that +they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode +of substance. + +(M239) 'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man +were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. +This I do not understand. + +(M240) Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which +surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others. + +(M241) We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between +their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act--distinguished by the effects. This +Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No +mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party. + +(M242) Locke in his 4th Book(171), and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same +argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, +&c. against our will. + +(M243) While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; +my acquiescing in the present state is willing. + +(M244) The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from +imagination or perception(172). Volition or Will, Wch is not imaginable, +regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book. + +(M245) There are four sorts of propositions:--"Gold is a metal;" "Gold is +yellow;" "Gold is fixt;" "Gold is not a stone"--of which the first, second, +and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering +them. + +(M246) Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des +Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses +oftener inform him falsely than truely--that sense of pain tells me not my +foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two +ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do +erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature--as if +Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God(173). + +(M247) Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but +by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2d +objection of Hobbs. + +(M248) Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the +mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object. + +(M249) Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of the +scholastiques--"the will wills," &c. So does Locke. I am of another +mind(174). + +(M250) Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct +from thought as a thing from its modus or manner. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M251) Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible +consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c. + +(M252) Malbranch in his illustration(175) differs widely from me. He +doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this. + +(M253) I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to +exist really in bodies independent of our mind(176). All ye carefully and +lucidly to be set forth. + +(M254) Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the +things--the effects themselves--do really exist, even wn not actually +perceived; but still with relation to perception(177). + + ------------------------------------- + +The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be +about signs, not ideas--or at least not ideas different from the characters +themselves(178). + +(M255) Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but +demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c. + +(M256) Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can +neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from +any other idea, even of his own making. + +(M257) The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake +with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas(179). + +(M258) Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea--mere phantasm. I +answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it +not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, +and not mentioned the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a +good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book(180). + +(M259) Idea is the object of thought. Yt I think on, whatever it be, I +call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act--i.e. +volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects--the Will. + +(M260) Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental +propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of +abstract ideas. Ye idea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet +in saying the "horse is white" I form a mental proposition with ease. But +when I say "fortitude is a virtue" I shall find a mental proposition hard, +or not at all to be come at. + +(M261) Pure intellect I understand not(181). + +Locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs from ye +Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to +their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas. + +(M262) The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity +Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind +agent is a contradiction(182). + +(M263) I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him--have no +intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wt is meant +by certainty. + +(M264) It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, +incorruptible. + +(M265) Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition? + +(M266) Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I +understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this. + +(M267) Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the +Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things. + +(M268) Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations +to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that bodies do exist. Pray wt +mean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are +images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot +be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves +proceeding from, being like unto--I know not wt(183). + +(M269) Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in +intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo. + +(M270) Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will? + +(M271) Understanding is in some sort an action. + +(M272) Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with +which it has no likeness. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M273) Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of +imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M274) My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, +Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to +the ground. + +(M275) Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the +same(184). + +(M276) Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. +76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of +the original of all universals--Homo, Canis, &c. + +(M277) Spinosa (vid. Praef. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be "omnium +rerum causa immanens," and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul, +"in Him we live," &c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine +as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's(185), &c. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M278) The Will is _purus actus_, or rather pure spirit not imaginable, +not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the +understanding, no wise perceivable. + +(M279) Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or +if you please (to avoid the quibble yt may be made of the word "it") to +act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an +idea. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M280) Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of +nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine. + +(M281) "Ex nihilo nihil fit." This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) +and the like are called _veritates aeternae_, because "nullam fidem habent +extra mentem." To make this axiom have a positive signification, one +should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a +Will(186). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M282) The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & +relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the +same things considered with respect to us. I know not wt they mean by +"things considered in themselves." This is nonsense, jargon. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M283) It seems there can be no perception--no idea--without Will, seeing +there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than +annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal +balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; +there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wt are +preferable to annihilation. + +Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non +literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis. + +'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a +great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we +can only see a point(187). + +Mem. Wn I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt +Hobbes and Wallis. + +(M284) Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the +general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my +will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal +spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M285) I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that we _see_ solids. I reject +his "solid philosophy"--solidity being only perceived by touch(188). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M286) It seems to me that will and understanding--volitions and +ideas--cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the +other. + +(M287) Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no +one idea or sort of ideas being essential(189). + +(M288) The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise +conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, +imagination--the other of sense and the constant laws of nature. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M289) Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam +dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2a ad Oldenburgium. + +(M290) My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of +Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz. "Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum," or +"Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est +infinitum(190)." + + ------------------------------------- + +'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that +deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M291) But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by "we," or +"selves," or "mind," &c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are +distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit(191). + +(M292) I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or part of the +mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit--by which I +mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not +from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions. + +(M293) The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea. + +(M294) I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, +nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only +annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not +others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another +which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into +many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to +disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M295) In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own. + +(M296) There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or +incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination +thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former +sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those +not but in order to their end. + +(M297) Three sorts of useful knowledge--that of Coexistence, to be treated +of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in +Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps +differs not from that of relation), in Morality(192). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M298) Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are +acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their +objects, circumstances, &c. + +(M299) We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes--physical +& spiritual. + +(M300) The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) +we may call them causes--but then we must mean causes yt do nothing. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M301) According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness so long as +we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even +the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a +volition, & this an uneasiness. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M302) I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell +all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of +expectation in my friend. + +(M303) If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at +all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by +the reflex light of a mirrour. + +(M304) Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the +reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases. + +(M305) What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with +nothing else--a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour. + +(M306) Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be +smelt, a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M307) Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct +from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom(193). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M308) Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of +colours. + +(M309) Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be +conceived by itself. + +(M310) Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer +objections drawn from consequences. Introd. + +(M311) The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned +are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas. + +Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to +unty them again. + +Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wch +is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it. + +(M312) I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name "pure act," +but rather pure spirit, or active being. + +(M313) I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they +are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all--they not being even _ratione_ +different from the Spirit, _qua_ faculties, or active. + +(M314) Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible(194). That were +the way to prove spirits are nothing. + +(M315) Qu. whether _veritas_ stands not for an abstract idea? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M316) 'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are +no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M317) Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any +knowledge? + +(M318) If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. +There could be no variety of appearance. + +According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some +smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it. + +(M319) Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of +the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. +But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the +Soul and Body or extended being. + +(M320) 'Tis an absurd question wch Locke puts, whether man be free to +will? + +Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in +Algebra. + +It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more +necessary use than in numbering. + +(M321) I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be +without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and +as distinct from the mind. + +(M322) Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the +knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory +and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science +doth not altogether depend upon words or names(195). + +(M323) I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no +two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all +voluntary(196). + +(M324) If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & +firmament, you will not say _he_ or _his mind_ is the sun, or is extended, +tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind. + +(M325) 'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they +have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De +Vries(197), _De Ideis Innatis_, p. 64. + +(M326) De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not +by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain +distinction. + +August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?]. + +It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & +fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, +literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & +all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in +quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for +all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7. + + ------------------------------------- + +One eternity greater than another of the same kind. + +In what sense eternity may be limited. + +(M327) Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect? + +(M328) Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other. + +Duration not distinguish'd from existence. + +Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering. + +Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure? + +Duration infinitely divisible, time not so. + +(M329) The same {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} not common to all intelligences. + +Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure. + +Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense. + +Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration. + +(M330) Time a sensation; therefore onely in ye mind. + +Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of +ye soul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of +ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see. + +Swiftness of ideas compar'd with yt of motions shews the wisdom of God. + +Wt if succession of ideas were swifter, wt if slower? + +(M331) Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute +about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances. + +Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind. + +(M332) In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c. + +Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner yt +secondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein. + +Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length +without breadth, or invisible length, wch is absurd. + +(M333) World wthout thought is _nec quid_, _nec quantum_, _nec quale_, &c. + +(M334) 'Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty'd of all intelligences. + +Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other +things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of +persons(198). + +Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known? + + ------------------------------------- + +Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of +extension; but the later is false, ergo ye former also. + +Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1st sight? + +Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are different from +those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name. + +Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quaere how this can be in my +doctrine? + +(M335) Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine? + +Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable _per se_. + +Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or +extended at first sight(199). + +Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt 'tis impossible it should +exist without thought. + +(M336) Extension itself or anything extended cannot think--these being meer +ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know. + +No extension but surface perceivable by sight. + +(M337) Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a +person affected with these sensations. + +(M338) Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing +void of perception--thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction. + +Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion? + +(M339) In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times. + +(M340) If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a +particular bigness & figure, but &c. + +Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct +& brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on +whom we depend. + +The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation +of ye story of the German Count. + +Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all +languages? + + ------------------------------------- + +Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise +thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and +adequate definition of the soul? + +(M341) Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible +for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest, since that supposing +ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be +apparently at rest? + +(M342) Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation? + +Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he +should compare them to these, and make these like unto them? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M343) The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a +man(200). + + ------------------------------------- + +Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 +several ways:-- + +1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, +thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what +distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible +inch? + +2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he +touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if +tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea--sed falsum id, ergo et +hoc. + +3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke +and him(201). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M344) Nothing but ideas perceivable(202). + +A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, +he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea. + +Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived--they being powers in the active +being(203). + + ------------------------------------- + +Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an +inconceivable idea,] Locke says(204). + + ------------------------------------- + +Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] +encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same. + +If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or +visible, or both? + +Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense. + +Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wth pleasure & +pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd +common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em]. + +Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor +even whether it be wthout him or in his eye(205). Qu. Would he not think +the later? + +Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had +seen and touched some one self-same thing--not knowing how _minimum +tangibile_ would look in vision. + +(M345) Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the +objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals. + +In every bodie two infinite series of extension--the one of tangible, the +other of visible. + +All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point. + +Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies. + +(M346) Homogeneous portions of matter--useful to contemplate them. + +Extension if in matter changes its relation wth _minimum visibile_, wch +seems to be fixt. + +Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd? + +(M347) Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or +have an infinite series of extension. + +(M348) If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives +it beauty and proportion. + +Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all +men between a visible & tangible inch. + +Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common +measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are +specifically different, viz. _punctum visibile & tangibile_. N. B. The +former seems to be no good reason. + +(M349) By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the +dispute ceases. + +Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither +infinitely small or great. + +Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180 +degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension. + +(M350) Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, +'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even +according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon +its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions(206). + +Unity _in abstracto_ not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or +with Barrow nothing at all; _in concreto_ not divisible _ad infinitum_, +there being no one idea demonstrable _ad infinitum_. + +(M351) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one +particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15. + +Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of +their relations? + +(M352) Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt +solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. +Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is +continuity of unsolid, &c. + +Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, +tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M353) Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics, +Fardella(207), &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they +doubt of. + +(M354) I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr. +Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge(208), +whereas I think I have demonstrative knowledge of their existence--by them +meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum(209). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M355) Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and +extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, +those not so. + +'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube +will appear broad to an acute sense. + + ------------------------------------- + +Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M356) Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely? + + ------------------------------------- + +Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect +in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from +extension. + +Every position alters the line. + +Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a +foot made up of general ideas of an inch? + +The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the +reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which +purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of +extension by position. + +No stated ideas of length without a minimum. + +(M357) Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19. + +(M358) In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease(210). + +Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at +all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & +visible extension and figure? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M359) Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does +not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day? + + ------------------------------------- + +But one only colour & its degrees. + +Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the +cause of microscopes magnifying objects. + +Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of +distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt +that he had perceived by _touch_ to be something existing without his +mind, but he would certainly think that nothing _seen_ was without his +mind(211)? + +(M360) Space without any bodies existing _in rerum natura_ would not be +extended, as not having parts--in that parts are assigned to it wth respect +to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without +either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything +beside one uniform Nothing? + +Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw +to be without his mind, or not in a point--the one from microscopic eyes, +the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M361) The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I +imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes +by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them. + + ------------------------------------- + +By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his +touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that +perception; wch power is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he +could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd. + +Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & +motion--and not visible(212). + +A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it +yields be less than wt it was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension +of the body is different from the visible extension. + +Extension or space no simple idea--length, breadth, & solidity being three +several ideas. + +Depth or solidity _now_ perceived by sight(213). + + ------------------------------------- + +Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; +he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these +having no power at all(214). + + ------------------------------------- + +Length perceivable by hearing--length & breadth by sight--length, breadth, & +depth by touch. + +(M362) Wt affects us must be a thinking thing, for wt thinks not cannot +subsist. + +Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending +entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind +pleases(215). + +Mem. Quaere whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob +use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools. + +(M363) Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body +is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8. + +Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section. + +Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours +felt by the German Count. + +(M364) "Of" and "thing" causes of mistake. + +The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or +less than mine. + +Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of +them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind? + +(M365) Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. +19. + +Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those +conceiv'd absolutely. + +Every position alters a line. + +(M366) Blind man at 1st would not take colours to be without his mind; but +colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: +therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind. + +All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are +absolutely equal. + +Infinite number--why absurd--not rightly solv'd by Locke(216). + +Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines? + +Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon(217)? + +Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted(218)? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M367) Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M368) Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head. + +Motion is proportionable to space described in given time. + +Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M369) No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, +affects us not(219). + + ------------------------------------- + +Magnitude when barely taken for the _ratio partium extra partes_, or +rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts +co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at +all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But +definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of +points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are determin'd, are +resoluble into those points. + +Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all +divisible, but is one simple idea. + +Simple ideas include no parts nor relations--hardly separated and +considered in themselves--nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance +in power, red, extension, &c. + +(M370) Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight--not imaginable +without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of +infinite space)--for wt the body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated. + +(M371) Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, +soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain? + +Qu. Why not taste & smell extension? + +Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous +extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought +heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & +red? + +Moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at +other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal +angles &c. cease. + + ------------------------------------- + +All _potentiae_ alike indifferent. + +A. B. Wt does he mean by his _potentia_? Is it the will, desire, person, +or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other? + +No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure. + +_We_ do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make +objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that. + +(M372) A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the +place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present +existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will. + +(M373) Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls. + + ------------------------------------- + +Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen +through an inverting glass? + +All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an +easy experiment); therefore they are equal. + +We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except +perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light. + +Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, +perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays +of light one particular colour. + +Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but +because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, +or because we want names for their component ideas. + +(M374) By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, +willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may +be defined. + +We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will. + +(M375) In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this +freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is +consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties(220). + +Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that +not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, +whether good or bad. + +This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring. + +If anything is meant by the _potentia_ of A. B. it must be desire; but I +appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the +purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires +till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of +desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are. + +Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will +will them. + +Qu. concerning the procession of Wills _in infinitum_. + +Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. +Their definitions, being of words not yet known to ye learner, are not +disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to +all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted. + +(M376) The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques +& ethiques: for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, +no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on +such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must +[there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against +scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, +strigose(221), rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & +copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down +with most. + +Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing +without mixture. + +Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the +mind. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M377) Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative +faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is determin'd by some uneasiness; +ergo &c. Suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to +desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, +this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the +suppositions of A. B. are insignificant. + +Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include +succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea. + +Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c. + +The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the +open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the +radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; +3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other. + +In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright. + +Why the horizontal moon greater? + +Why objects seen erect? + +(M378) To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other +perceptions? + +Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1st could +not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of +connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. +Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension. + +Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once +more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the _punctum visibile_ +below 30 minutes? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M379) Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & +their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words +borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes. + +(M380) The grand mistake is that we think we have _ideas_ of the +operations of our minds(222). Certainly this metaphorical dress is an +argument we have not. + +Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is +simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35(223). + +(M381) The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things +proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from +obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand +my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them(224). + +(M382) The substance _wood_ a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. +c. 26. s. 1. + + ------------------------------------- + +Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular +lattice. + +Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with +greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible +extensions,--there seeming to be no _necessary_ connexion between those +thoughts? + +Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique +angle, but by altering the apparent distance. + +Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd +by concaves? + +(M383) Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once. + +(M384) Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not +thinking, &c.--but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's +mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into +their souls insensibly(225). + +(M385) Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as +soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and +that whether we will or no. + +How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass? + +Convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses. + +Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses? + +The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully +assign'd by any writer I know. + +Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a +convex lens? + +Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by +altering the distance without altering the angle? + + ------------------------------------- + +No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides +persons(226). + +(M386) As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all +thoughts move wth local motion as immaterial spirit. + +On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist +in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time +& place of beginning to exist--the existence of our thoughts (which being +combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having +divers beginnings & endings. + +(M387) Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will? + + ------------------------------------- + +No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or +little extension. + +Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is +extension perceiv'd by sight? + +Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but +directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. +the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). +Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. +Moly[neux], p. 182. + +Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the +optique angle, but to no purpose. + +Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex +speculum as another? + + ------------------------------------- + +Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for +then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think +of wt I then did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, +for ought we know. + +Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt. + +Two sorts of potential consciousness--natural & praeternatural. In the last +§ but one, I mean the latter. + + ------------------------------------- + +If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined +tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be +properly & _per se_ perceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible +inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of +seeing--abstracted from experience, &c. + +The greatness _per se_ perceivable by the sight is onely the proportion +any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or +(which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the +visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any +more than a plain, but by reasoning. + +This is all the greatness the pictures have _per se_. + +Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it +not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphaerical surface +except we also know the greatness of the sphaerical surface; for a point +may subtend the same angle wth a mile, & so create as great an image in +the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb. + +Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and +confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles. + +Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness +might have been connected wth smallness, and vice versa: there being no +necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without +straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, +vigorousness, and confusion(227). + +My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic +way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how +they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.(228) + +Qu. Whether _per se_ proportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by +sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of +perception seeming to be as great in viewing any point of the visual orb +distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly. + +Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as +possible--to avoid giving handle. + +If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, +they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same +optic angle remaining. + +The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; +for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other +objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye. + +Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and +manner of demonstrating, &c. + +Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly +and _toto caelo_ different--the one the proportion that any one appearance +has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wth it, wch is +proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphaerical +surfaces;--the other is tangible bigness. + +Qu. wt would happen if the sphaerae of the retina were enlarged or +diminish'd? + +We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do +not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of +things seen under the same angle, yet we do not. + +Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do +not. + +Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear. + +As long as the same angle determines the _minimum visibile_ to two +persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different +appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try +the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears +differently big to two persons on account of their eyes. + +If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; +hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the +proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion +to the M. V. + +Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children +speak it naturally as soon as born, and were it not in the power of men to +conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an +inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so yt _posito uno, ponitur +alterum_ by the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard +thoughts as much as that they see extension(229)? + + ------------------------------------- + +All our ideas are adaequate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not +perfect & adaequate(230). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M388) Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the +things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as +figure, motion, time, &c. + + ------------------------------------- + +We know many things wch we want words to express. Great things +discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wch divers men +have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge +by sounds; wch foundering them, they thought the defect was in their +knowledge, while in truth it was in their language. + +Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the +sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs? + +Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely +different that makes me judge them the same? + +Wt I see is onely variety of colours & light. Wt I feel is hard or soft, +hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wt resemblance have these thoughts with +those? + +A picture painted wth great variety of colours affects the touch in one +uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall +feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or +inequalities. How therefore can I--before experience teaches me--know that +the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wth the tangible ones, or the +visible head (because one) connected wth the tangible head(231)? + +(M389) All things by us conceivable are-- + +1st, thoughts; + +2ndly, powers to receive thoughts; + +3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wch can possibly exist in +an inert, senseless thing. + + ------------------------------------- + +An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wth a +glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle. + +(M390) Absurd that men should know the soul by idea--ideas being inert, +thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted(232). + +I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or +distance. + +Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd? + +Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we +therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, +further distant, and greaterness? + +(M391) My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians. + +Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether +perfect or no), but in the mind. + +Lines thought divisible _ad infinitum_, because they are suppos'd to exist +without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked +eye, & wn view'd thro' magnifying glasses. + +They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibility +_ad infinitum_. + +No idea of circle, &c. in abstract. + +Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to +be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not +so many prejudices in ethiques. + +Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. +Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended. + +Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the +smell--seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas? + +Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their +extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct +sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd. + +Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of +tangible--tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence +heterogeneous extension. + +Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in +proportion to the faintness(233)? + +Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c. + +That wch seems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite +otherwise. Hence no _necessary_ connexion betwixt visible ideas and +tangible ones. + +In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisible _ad infinitum_. + +Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, +for these are not divisible _ad infinitum_. + +Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a +diameter may be found betwixt wch & the true there is not any perceivable +difference. Therefore there is no difference--extension being a perception; +& a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain +to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in yt +case there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same +ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom(234). + +Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the +common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see +he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wt +makes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men +are perhaps apt to think. + +The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of +accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown +away. + +Mem. To press wt last precedes more homely, & so think on't again. + +A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does not exist, cannot +be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,--no more than meer colour +without extension(235). + +Mem. A great difference between _considering_ length wthout breadth, & +having an _idea_ of, or _imagining_, length without breadth(236). + +Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6. + +'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we +may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no +necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. +great relation to _sphaera visualis_, or to the m. v. (wch is all that I +would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly +have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the +greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view +little objects near the eye. + +Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men +in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6. + +Diagonal of particular square commensurable wth its side, they both +containing a certain number of m. v. + +I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence +perhaps may be solid that sophism wch would prove the oblique line equal +to the perpendicular between 2 parallels. + +Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 +of ye mile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' +nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. +1/1000 of a mile. + +Particular determin'd lines are not divisible _ad infinitum_, but lines as +us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular +finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very +readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisible _ad infinitum_. + +A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, +and without experience. There is ('tis true) a successive change of +ideas,--it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible +change of place. + +Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of +diagonale & side--whether it does not go on the supposition of units being +divisible _ad infinitum_, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being +divisible _ad infinitum_ (unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. +Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is a _petitio +principii_? + +The diagonal is commensurable with the side. + +(M392) From Malbranch, Locke, & my first arguings it can't be prov'd that +extension is not in matter. From Locke's arguings it can't be proved that +colours are not in bodies. + + ------------------------------------- + +Mem. That I was distrustful at 8 years old; and consequently by nature +disposed for these new doctrines(237). + + ------------------------------------- + +Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of points be divisible +[_ad infinitum_] in two equals? + +Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see the pictures. + +(M393) Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know even their +proportions--contrary to Malbranch. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M394) I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as that extension +cannot exist without a thinking substance. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M395) Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This prov'd either +by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or diminishers. + +Yr m. v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3rd person have perfect ideas +of both our m. vs. His idea of my m. v. contains his idea of yours, & +somewhat more. Therefore 'tis made up of parts: therefore his idea of my +m. v. is not perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis. + +Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended? + +Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pictures. We think them +small because should a man be suppos'd to see them their pictures would +take up but little room in the fund of his eye. + +It seems all lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts. Mem. To examine +how the geometers prove the contrary. + +'Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine. If there be, mine +may become equal to it (because they are homogeneous) by detraction of +some part or parts. But it consists not of parts, ergo &c. + +Suppose inverting perspectives bound to ye eyes of a child, & continu'd to +the years of manhood--when he looks up, or turns up his head, he shall +behold wt we call _under_. Qu. What would he think of _up_ and +_down_(238)? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M396) I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious tho' amazing +truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out +before--'tis no witchcraft to see. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M397) Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or perceptions; a +perception cannot exist without a thing to perceive it, or any longer than +it is perceiv'd; a thought cannot be in an unthinking thing; one uniform +simple thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple thought. +Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assemblage of simple ideas, and can +be the image of nothing, or like unto nothing, but another assemblage of +simple ideas, &c. + +(M398) The Cartesian opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox enough +even in their eyes who think the Scripture expression may favour the +common opinion. Why may not mine also? But there is nothing in Scripture +that can possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps, many things +for me. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M399) Bodies &c. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken +in a twofold sense-- + + + 1. Collections of thoughts. + + 2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts. + + +These later exist; tho' perhaps _a parte rei_ it may be one simple perfect +power. + + ------------------------------------- + +Qu. whether the extension of a plain, look'd at straight and slantingly, +survey'd minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk and confusedly at once, be +the same? N. B. The plain is suppos'd to keep the same distance. + +The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of ye minute parts +of a plain do not seem to make up the extension of that plain view'd & +consider'd all together. + + ------------------------------------- + +Ignorance in some sort requisite in ye person that should disown the +Principle. + +Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken for the interior +operations of the mind, wherein the mind is active. Those yt obey not the +acts of volition, and in wch the mind is passive, are more properly call'd +sensations or perceptions. But yt is all a case of words. + + ------------------------------------- + +Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e. +of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv'd +without a perceiving substance. + +(M400) Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist not +when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be +prov'd on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and +onely in the mind. + +(M401) The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an +unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from or +without all tangible or visible quality. + +(M402) Tho' matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet the mind +makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving them, & even now +they are not without the mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho' indefinitely +extended matter do exist, are not without the mind. + +(M403) The great danger of making extension exist without the mind is, +that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite, immutable, eternal, +&c.;--wch will be to make either God extended (wch I think dangerous), or +an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside God. + +(M404) Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M405) The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments _ad absurdum_. + + ------------------------------------- + +The twofold signification of Bodies, viz. + + + 1. Combinations of thoughts(239); + + 2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts. + + +These, I say, in conjunction with homogeneous particles, may solve much +better the objections from the creation than the supposition that Matter +does exist. Upon wch supposition I think they cannot be solv'd. + +Bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv'd; but this existence is +not actual(240). Wn I say a power exists, no more is meant than that if in +the light I open my eyes, and look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the +body, &c. + + ------------------------------------- + +Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours & +visible extension, after the same manner as we perceive them wth eyes +shut, or in the dark--not imagining, but seeing after a sort? + +Visible extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible extension. Visible +and tangible points can't make one sum. Therefore these extensions are +heterogeneous. + +A probable method propos'd whereby one may judge whether in near vision +there is a greater distance between the crystalline & fund than usual, or +whether the crystalline be onely render'd more convex. If the former, then +the v. s. is enlarg'd, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or +wtever it us'd to correspond to. + +Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible extensions. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M406) Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended. 'Tis +nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension out of our idea of +God, & put a power in its place. It seems dangerous to suppose extension, +wch is manifestly inert, in God. + +(M407) But, say you, The thought or perception I call extension is not +itself in an unthinking thing or Matter--but it is like something wch is in +Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend or conceive wt you say extension is +like unto, or do you not? If the later, how know you they are alike? How +can you compare any things besides your own ideas? If the former, it must +be an idea, i.e. perception, thought, or sensation--wch to be in an +unperceiving thing is a contradiction(241). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M408) I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures, using a +great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft found it difficult to +understand those that use the lofty & Platonic, or subtil & scholastique +strain(242). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M409) Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive; it being that +very having, that passive recognition of ideas, that denominates the mind +perceiving--that being the very essence of perception, or that wherein +perception consists. + + ------------------------------------- + +The faintness wch alters the appearance of the horizontal moon, rather +proceeds from the quantity or grossness of the intermediate atmosphere, +than from any change of distance, wch is perhaps not considerable enough +to be a total cause, but may be a partial of the phenomenon. N. B. The +visual angle is less in cause the horizon. + +We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things, so also by the +situation of their pictures in the eye, or (wch is the same thing) +according as they appear higher or lower. Those wch seem higher are +farther off. + +Qu. why we see objects greater in ye dark? whether this can be solv'd by +any but my Principles? + + ------------------------------------- + +(M410) The reverse of ye Principle introduced scepticism. + +(M411) N. B. On my Principles there is a reality: there are things: there +is a _rerum natura_. + +Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c. + +We think that if just made to see we should judge of the distance & +magnitude of things as we do now; but this is false. So also wt we think +so positively of the situation of objects. + +Hays's, Keill's(243), &c. method of proving the infinitesimals of the 3d +order absurd, & perfectly contradictions. + +Angles of contact, & verily all angles comprehended by a right line & a +curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches intercepted not being similar. + + ------------------------------------- + +The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extension. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M412) Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem'd the +true one rather than that seen at a farther distance? Why should the sun +be thought many 1000 miles rather than one foot in diameter--both being +equally apparent diameters? Certainly men judg'd of the sun not in +himself, but wth relation to themselves. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M413) 4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz. + + + 1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by us. + + 2. There is a law or course of nature. + + 3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words stand for + nothing else. + + 4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction that + bears equally hard upon the other(244). + + + ------------------------------------- + +What shall I say? Dare I pronounce the admired {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} mathematica, that +darling of the age, a trifle? + +Most certainly no finite extension divisible _ad infinitum_. + +(M414) Difficulties about concentric circles. + +(M415) Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8th +definition of Mr. Newton's(245) Principia. + +Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense. + +Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas? + +All ideas come from without. They are all particular. The mind, 'tis true, +can consider one thing wthout another; but then, considered asunder, they +make not 2 ideas. Both together can make but one, as for instance colour & +visible extension(246). + +The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke's argument that the end +of his pen is black or white concludes nothing here. + +Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension, for fear of the +geometers. + +Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we are not used to +take notice of 'em singly; they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt +us, thereby to deserve our regard. + +Mem. To prove against Keill yt the infinite divisibility of matter makes +the half have an equal number of equal parts with the whole. + +Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as +a plea. + +Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the extensions below the M. +as well as the dd, &c., wch are allowed to be something, & consequently +may be magnify'd by glasses into inches, feet, &c., as well as the +quantities next below the M.? + +Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How therefore can ye +extension you suppose in Matter be big or little? How can it consist of +any number of points? + +(M416) Mem. Strictly to remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8. + +Schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians. + +Extension is blended wth tangible or visible ideas, & by the mind +praescinded therefrom. + +Mathematiques made easy--the scale does almost all. The scale can tell us +the subtangent in ye parabola is double the abscisse. + +Wt need of the utmost accuracy wn the mathematicians own _in rerum natura_ +they cannot find anything corresponding wth their nice ideas. + +One should endeavour to find a progression by trying wth the scale. + +Newton's fluxions needless. Anything below an M might serve for Leibnitz's +Differential Calculus. + +How can they hang together so well, since there are in them (I mean the +mathematiques) so many _contradictoriae argutiae_. V. Barrow, Lect. + +A man may read a book of Conics with ease, knowing how to try if they are +right. He may take 'em on the credit of the author. + +Where's the need of certainty in such trifles? The thing that makes it so +much esteem'd in them is that we are thought not capable of getting it +elsewhere. But we may in ethiques and metaphysiques. + +The not leading men into mistakes no argument for the truth of the +infinitesimals. They being nothings may perhaps do neither good nor harm, +except wn they are taken for something, & then the contradiction begets a +contradiction. + +a + 500 nothings = a + 50 nothings--an innocent silly truth. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M417) My doctrine excellently corresponds wth the creation. I suppose no +matter, no stars, sun, &c. to have existed before(247). + + ------------------------------------- + +It seems all circles are not similar figures, there not being the same +proportion betwixt all circumferences & their diameters. + +When a small line upon paper represents a mile, the mathematicians do not +calculate the 1/10000 of the paper line, they calculate the 1/10000 of the +mile. 'Tis to this they have regard, 'tis of this they think; if they +think or have any idea at all. The inch perhaps might represent to their +imaginations the mile, but ye 1/10000 of the inch cannot be made to +represent anything, it not being imaginable. + +But the 1/10000 of a mile being somewhat, they think the 1/10000 inch is +somewhat: wn they think of yt they imagine they think on this. + +3 faults occur in the arguments of the mathematicians for divisibility _ad +infinitum_-- + + + 1. They suppose extension to exist without the mind, or not + perceived. + + 2. They suppose that we have an idea of length without + breadth(248), or that length without breadth does exist. + + 3. That unity is divisible _ad infinitum_. + + +To suppose a M. S. divisible is to say there are distinguishable ideas +where there are no distinguishable ideas. + +The M. S. is not near so inconceivable as the _signum in magnitudine +individuum_. + +Mem. To examine the math, about their _point_--what it is--something or +nothing; and how it differs from the M. S. + +All might be demonstrated by a new method of indivisibles, easier perhaps +and juster than that of Cavalierius(249). + + ------------------------------------- + +(M418) Unperceivable perception a contradiction. + +(M419) Proprietates reales rerum omnium in Deo, tam corporum quum +spirituum continentur. Clerici, Log. cap. 8. + +Let my adversaries answer any one of mine, I'll yield. If I don't answer +every one of theirs, I'll yield. + +The loss of the excuse(250) may hurt Transubstantiation, but not the +Trinity. + + ------------------------------------- + +We need not strain our imaginations to conceive such little things. Bigger +may do as well for infinitesimals, since the integer must be an infinite. + +Evident yt wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite. + +Qu. Whether extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of? + +Nor can it be objected that we reason about numbers, wch are only words & +not ideas(251); for these infinitesimals are words of no use, if not +supposed to stand for ideas. + +Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no +reasoning about infinitesimals. + +Much less infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c. + +Axiom. No word to be used without an idea. + + ------------------------------------- + +(M420) Our eyes and senses inform us not of the existence of matter or +ideas existing without the mind(252). They are not to be blam'd for the +mistake. + +I defy any man to assign a right line equal to a paraboloid, but wn look'd +at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall. + +(M421) Newton's harangue amounts to no more than that gravity is +proportional to gravity. + +One can't imagine an extended thing without colour. V. Barrow, L. G. + +(M422) Men allow colours, sounds, &c.(253) not to exist without the mind, +tho' they have no demonstration they do not. Why may they not allow my +Principle with a demonstration? + +(M423) Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the +mind; taking the mind for the active thing wch I call "I," "myself"--yt +seems to be distinct from the understanding(254)? + +(M424) The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & +visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be +without the mind. + + ------------------------------------- + +I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere +Nihilarians. + +The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their +senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses. + +(M425) Keill's filling the world with a mite(255). This follows from the +divisibility of extension _ad infinitum_. + +Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number +of points that lie betwixt any 2 points(256). It seems to consist in meer +proportion--meer reference of the mind. + +To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically? + +Sir Isaac(257) owns his book could have been demonstrated on the +supposition of indivisibles. + +(M426) Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne. + +I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wt any one of common sense might +attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of +human sense, and I &c. + +Mathematicians have some of them good parts--the more is the pity. Had they +not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such +fools they knew not how to employ their parts. + +The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty +consisted, till Locke told 'em(258). I see the best of 'em talk of light +and colours as if wthout the mind. + +By _thing_ I either mean ideas or that wch has ideas(259). + +Nullum praeclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger(260). + +A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they +consider. + + ------------------------------------- + +1. (261)All significant words stand for ideas(262). + +2. All knowledge about our ideas. + +3. All ideas come from without or from within. + +4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd +sensations(263). + +5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called +thoughts. + +6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing. + +7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing. + +8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts(264), by 3, 4, 5. + +9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wch is both thoughtless & +senseless(265), by 6, 7, 8. + +10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception. + +11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert +no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10. + +12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas. + +13. That thing wch is like unto another thing must agree wth it in one or +more simple ideas. + +14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of +the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13. + +15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another +demonstration of the same thing. + +16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been +compar'd. + +17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wt they agree +in and wt they disagree in. + +18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17. + +19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18. + + ------------------------------------- + +N. B. Other arguments innumerable, both _a priori_ & _a posteriori_, drawn +from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, +whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor +anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing(266). + +N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable, _a +priori_ or _a posteriori_, from any art or science, from either sense or +reason, against it. + + ------------------------------------- + +Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact +wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisible _ad infinitum_. + +We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences. + +We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon +truer principles than himself(267). + +Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue +it--so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But +for _the nothings_, I'll leave them to their admirers. + +I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the +time that another will. + +Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians. + +(M427) Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves +nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion. + +I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wch goes on the best +principles? + + ------------------------------------- + +The Billys(268) use a finite visible line for an 1/m. + +(M428) Marsilius Ficinus--his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my +idea of time(269). + +(M429) The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The +mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their +extended Deity. Pray wt do the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., +we have them still(270). + +N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain(271). + +(M430) There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are +others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen +cannot attain to these truths. + +The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they +harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisible _ad +infinitum_. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines. + +The mathematicians talk of wt they call a point. This, they say, is not +altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt +to think something(272) & nothing are next neighbours. + +Engagements to P.(273) on account of ye Treatise that grew up under his +eye; on account also of his approving my harangue. Glorious for P. to be +the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths. + +How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of +use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they +suited other men's ideas? + +I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men +have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd +as to my own particular. + + ------------------------------------- + +My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the +end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life +with new satisfaction. + +Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it +gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth. + + ------------------------------------- + +He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize +with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking(274). + +From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way. + + ------------------------------------- + +It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because +he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles +beneath a mountain. + + ------------------------------------- + +The whole directed to practise and morality--as appears 1st, from making +manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the +useless labour of sciences, and so forth. + + + + + +AN ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION + + +_First published in 1709_ + + + + +Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision + + +Berkeley's _Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_ was meant to prepare the +way for the exposition and defence of the new theory of the material +world, its natural order, and its relation to Spirit, that is contained in +his book of _Principles_ and in the relative _Dialogues_, which speedily +followed. The _Essay_ was the firstfruits of his early philosophical +studies at Dublin. It was also the first attempt to show that our +apparently immediate Vision of Space and of bodies extended in +three-dimensioned space, is either tacit or conscious inference, +occasioned by constant association of the phenomena of which alone we are +visually percipient with assumed realities of our tactual and locomotive +experience. + +The first edition of the _Essay_ appeared early in 1709, when its author +was about twenty-four years of age. A second edition, with a few verbal +changes and an Appendix, followed before the end of that year. Both were +issued in Dublin, "printed by Aaron Rhames, at the back of Dick's +Coffeehouse, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row." In March, +1732, a third edition, without the Appendix, was annexed to _Alciphron,_ +on account of its relation to the Fourth Dialogue in that book. This was +the author's last revision. + +In the present edition the text of this last edition is adopted, after +collation with those preceding. The Appendix has been restored, and also +the Dedication to Sir John Percival, which appeared only in the first +edition. + + ------------------------------------- + +A due appreciation of Berkeley's theory of seeing, and his conception of +the visible world, involves a study, not merely of this tentative juvenile +_Essay_, but also of its fuller development and application in his more +matured works. This has been commonly forgotten by his critics. + +Various circumstances contribute to perplex and even repel the reader of +the _Essay_, making it less fit to be an easy avenue of approach to +Berkeley's _Principles_. + +Its occasion and design, and its connexion with his spiritual conception +of the material world, are suggested in Sections 43 and 44 of the +_Principles_. Those sections are a key to the _Essay_. They inform us that +in the _Essay_ the author intentionally uses language which seems to +attribute a reality independent of all percipient spirit to the ideas or +phenomena presented in Touch; it being beside his purpose, he says, to +"examine and refute" that "vulgar error" in "a work on Vision." This +studied reticence of a verbally paradoxical conception of Matter, in +reasonings about vision which are fully intelligible only under that +conception, is one cause of a want of philosophical lucidity in the +_Essay_. + +Another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of those who approach the +_Principles_ and the three _Dialogues_ through the _Essay on Vision_. The +_Essay_ offers no exception to the lax employment of equivocal words +familiar in the early literature of English philosophy, but which is +particularly inconvenient in the subtle discussions to which we are here +introduced. At the present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precision +and uniformity in the philosophical use of language; at any rate we +connect other meanings than those here intended with some of the leading +words. It is enough to refer to such terms as _idea_, _notion_, +_sensation_, _perception_, _touch_, _externality_, _distance_, and their +conjugates. It is difficult for the modern reader to revive and remember +the meanings which Berkeley intends by _idea_ and _notion_--so significant +in his vocabulary; and _touch_ with him connotes muscular and locomotive +experience as well as the pure sense of contact. Interchange of the terms +_outward_, _outness_, _externality_, _without the mind_, and _without the +eye_ is confusing, if we forget that Berkeley implies that percipient mind +is virtually coextensive with our bodily organism, so that being "without" +or "at a distance from" our bodies is being at a distance from the +percipient mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some of these +ambiguities, of which Berkeley himself warns us (cf. sect. 120). + +The _Essay_ moreover abounds in repetitions, and interpolations of +antiquated optics and physiology, so that its logical structure and even +its supreme generalisation are not easily apprehended. I will try to +disentangle them. + + ------------------------------------- + +The reader must remember that this _Essay on Vision_ is professedly an +introspective appeal to human consciousness. It is an analysis of what +human beings are conscious of when they see, the results being here and +there applied, partly by way of verification, to solve some famous optical +or physiological puzzle. The aim is to present the facts, the whole facts, +and nothing but the facts of our internal visual experience, as +distinguished from supposed facts and empty abstractions, which an +irregular exercise of imagination, or abuse of words, had put in their +place. The investigation, moreover, is not concerned with Space in its +metaphysical infinity, but with finite sections of Space and their +relations, which concern the sciences, physical and mathematical, and with +real or tangible Distance, Magnitude, and Place, in their relation to +seeing. + +From the second section onwards the _Essay_ naturally falls into six +Parts, devoted successively to the proof of the six following theses +regarding the relation of Sight to finite spaces and to things extended:-- + +I. (Sect. 2-51.) Distance, or outness from the eye in the line of vision, +is not seen: it is only suggested to the mind by visible phenomena and by +sensations felt in the eye, all which are somehow its arbitrarily +constituted and non-resembling Signs. + +II. (Sect. 52-87.) Magnitude, or the amount of space that objects of sense +occupy, is really invisible: we only see a greater or less quantity of +colour, and colour depends upon percipient mind: our supposed visual +perceptions of real magnitude are only our own interpretations of the +tactual meaning of the colours we see, and of sensations felt in the eye, +which are its Signs. + +III. (Sect. 88-120.) Situation of objects of sense, or their real relation +to one another in ambient space, is invisible: what we see is variety in +the relations of colours to one another: our supposed vision of real +tangible locality is only our interpretation of its visual non-resembling +Signs. + +IV. (Sect. 121-46.) There is no object that is presented in common to +Sight and Touch: space or extension, which has the best claim to be their +common object, is specifically as well as numerically different in Sight +and in Touch. + +V. (Sect. 147-48.) The explanation of the tactual significance of the +visible and visual Signs, upon which human experience proceeds, is offered +in the Theory that all visible phenomena are arbitrary signs in what is +virtually the Language of Nature, addressed by God to the senses and +intelligence of Man. + +VI. (Sect. 149-60.) The true object studied in Geometry is the kind of +Extension given in Touch, not that given in Sight: real Extension in all +its phases is tangible, not visible: colour is the only immediate object +of Sight, and colour being mind-dependent sensation, cannot be realised +without percipient mind. These concluding sections are supplementary to +the main argument. + + ------------------------------------- + +The fact that distance or outness is invisible is sometimes regarded as +Berkeley's contribution to the theory of seeing. It is rather the +assumption on which the _Essay_ proceeds (sect. 2). The _Essay_ does not +prove this invisibility, but seeks to shew how, notwithstanding, we learn +to find outness through seeing. That the relation between the visual signs +of outness, on the one hand, and the real distance which they signify, on +the other, is in all cases arbitrary, and discovered through experience, +is the burden of sect. 2-40. The previously recognised signs of +"considerably remote" distances, are mentioned (sect. 3). But _near_ +distance was supposed to be inferred by a visual geometry--and to be +"suggested," not signified by arbitrary signs. The determination of the +visual signs which suggest outness, near and remote, is Berkeley's +professed discovery regarding vision. + +An induction of the visual signs which "suggest" distance, is followed +(sect. 43) by an assertion of the wholly sensuous reality of _colour_, +which is acknowledged to be the only immediate object of sight. Hence +_visible_ extension, consisting in colour, must be dependent for its +realisation upon sentient or percipient mind. It is then argued (sect. 44) +that this mind-dependent visible outness has no resemblance to the +tangible reality (sect. 45). This is the first passage in the _Essay_ in +which Touch and its data are formally brought into view. Tactual or +locomotive experience, it is implied, is needed to infuse true reality +into our conceptions of distance or outness. This cannot be got from +seeing any more than from hearing, or tasting, or smelling. It is as +impossible to see and touch the same object as it is to hear and touch the +same object. Visible objects and ocular sensations can only be _ideal +signs_ of _real things_. + +The sections in which Touch is thus introduced are among the most +important in the _Essay_. They represent the outness given in hearing as +wholly sensuous, ideal, or mind-dependent: they recognise as more truly +real that got by contact and locomotion. But if this is all that man can +see, it follows that his _visible_ world, at any rate, becomes real only +in and through percipient mind. The problem of an _Essay on Vision_ is +thus, to explain _how_ the visible world of extended colour can inform us +of tangible realities, which it does not in the least resemble, and with +which it has no _necessary_ connexion. That visible phenomena, or else +certain organic sensations involved in seeing (sect. 3, 16, 21, 27), +gradually _suggest_ the real or tangible outness with which they are +connected in the divinely constituted system of nature, is the explanation +which now begins to dawn upon us. + +Here an ambiguity in the _Essay_ appears. It concludes that the _visible_ +world cannot be real without percipient realising mind, i.e. not otherwise +than ideally: yet the argument seems to take for granted that we are +percipient of a _tangible_ world that is independent of percipient +realising mind. The reader is apt to say that the tangible world must be +as dependent on percipient mind for its reality as the visible world is +concluded to be, and for the same reason. This difficulty was soon +afterwards encountered in the book of _Principles_, where the worlds of +sight and touch are put on the same level; and the possibility of +unperceived reality in both cases is denied; on the ground that a material +world cannot be realised in the total absence of Spirit--human and divine. +The term "external" may still be applied to tactual and locomotive +phenomena alone, if men choose; but this not because of the ideal +character of what is seen, and the unideal reality of what is touched, but +only because tactual perceptions are found to be more firm and steady than +visual. Berkeley preferred in this way to _insinuate_ his new conception +of the material world by degrees, at the risk of exposing this juvenile +and tentative _Essay on Vision_ to a charge of incoherence. + + ------------------------------------- + +The way in which visual ideas or phenomena "suggest" the outness or +distance of things from the organ of sight having been thus explained, in +what I call the First Part of the _Essay_, the Second and Third Parts +(sect. 52-120) argue for the invisibility of real extension in two other +relations, viz. magnitude and locality or situation. An induction of the +visual signs of tangible size and situation is given in those sections. +The result is applied to solve two problems then notable in optics, viz. +(1) the reason for the greater visible size of the horizontal moon than of +the moon in its meridian (sect. 67-87); and (2) the fact that objects are +placed erect in vision only on condition that their images on the retina +are inverted (sect. 88-120). Here the antithesis between the ideal world +of coloured extension, and the real world of resistant extension is +pressed with vigour. The "high" and "low" of the visible world is not the +"high" and "low" of the tangible world (sect. 91-106). There is no +resemblance and no necessary relation, between those two so-called +extensions; not even when the number of visible objects happen to coincide +with the number of tangible objects of which they are the visual signs, +e.g. the visible and tangible fingers on the hand: for the born-blind, on +first receiving sight, could not parcel out the visible phenomena in +correspondence with the tangible. + +The next Part of the _Essay_ (sect. 121-45) argues for a specific as well +as a numerical difference between the original data of sight and the data +of touch and locomotion. Sight and touch perceive nothing in common. +Extension in its various relations differs in sight from extension in +touch. Coloured extension, which alone is visible, is found to be +different in kind from resistant extension, which alone is tangible. And +if actually perceived or concrete extensions differ thus, the question is +determined. For all extension with which man can be concerned must be +concrete (sect. 23). Extension in the abstract is meaningless (sect. +124-25). What remains is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to guard +the foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted in +sections 128-46. + + ------------------------------------- + +The enunciation of the summary generalisation, which forms the "New Theory +of Vision" (sect. 147-8), may be taken as the Fifth and culminating Part +of the _Essay_. + + ------------------------------------- + +The closing sections (149-60), as I have said, are supplementary, and +profess to determine the sort of extension--visible or tangible--with which +Geometry is concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries to +picture the mental state of Idominians, or unbodied spirits, endowed with +visual perceptions _only_, and asks what _their_ conception of outness and +solid extension must be. Here further refinements in the interpretation of +visual perception, and its organic conditions, which have not escaped the +attention of latter psychologists and biologists, are hinted at. + + ------------------------------------- + +Whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling arbitrary Signs of the +tactual distances, sizes, and situations of things, is a question which +some might prefer to deal with experimentally--by trial of the experience +of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer. Of this sort would +be the experience of the born-blind, immediately after their sight has +been restored; the conception of extension and its relations found in +persons who continue from birth unable to see; the experience (if it could +be got) of persons always destitute of all tactual and locomotive +perceptions, but familiar with vision; and the facts of seeing observed in +infants of the human species, and in the lower animals. + +Berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this way. Here and there +(sect. 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, 110, 128, 132-37), he conjectures what +the first visual experience of those rescued from born-blindness is likely +to be; he also speculates, as we have seen, about the experience of +unbodied spirits supposed to be able to see, but unable to touch or move +(sect. 153-59); and in the Appendix he refers, in confirmation of his New +Theory, to a reported case of one born blind who had obtained sight. But +he forms his Theory independently of those delicate and difficult +investigations. His testing facts were sought introspectively. Indeed +those physiologists and mental philosophers who have since tried to +determine what vision in its purity is, by cases either of communicated +sight or of continued born-blindness, have illustrated the truth of +Diderot's remark--"preparer et interroger un aveugle-ne n'eut point ete une +occupation indigne des talens reunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke, et +Leibniz(275)." + + ------------------------------------- + +Berkeley's _New Theory_ has been quoted as a signal example of discovery +in metaphysics. The subtle analysis which distinguishes _seeing_ strictly +so called, from judgments about extended things, suggested by what we see, +appears to have been imperfectly known to the ancient philosophers. +Aristotle, indeed, speaks of colour as the only proper object of sight; +but, in passages of the _De Anima_(276) where he names properties peculiar +to particular senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, figure, and +magnitude, which belong to all the senses in common. His distinction of +Proper and Common Sensibles appears at first to contradict Berkeley's +doctrine of the heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible +worlds. Aristotle, however, seems to question the immediate perceptibility +of Common Sensibles, and to regard them as realised through the activity +of intelligence(277). + +Some writers in Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early modern +philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining the relation of our +matured notion of distance to what we originally perceive in seeing, and +in the fifteenth century it was discovered by Maurolyco that the rays of +light from the object converge to a focus in the eye; but I have not been +able to trace even the germ of the _New Theory_ in these speculations. + +Excepting some hints by Descartes, Malebranche was among the first dimly +to anticipate Berkeley, in resolving our supposed power of seeing outness +into an interpretation of visual signs which we learn by experience to +understand. The most important part of Malebranche's account of seeing is +contained in the _Recherche de la Verite_ (Liv. I. ch. 9), in one of those +chapters in which he discusses the frequent fallaciousness of the senses, +and in particular of our visual perceptions of extension. He accounts for +their inevitable uncertainty by assigning them not to sense but to +misinterpretation of what is seen. He also enumerates various visual signs +of distance. + +That the _Recherche_ of Malebranche, published more than thirty years +before the _Essay_, was familiar to Berkeley before the publication of his +_New Theory_, is proved by internal evidence, and by his juvenile +_Commonplace Book_. I am not able to discover signs of a similar connexion +between the _New Theory_ and the chapter on the mystery of sensation in +Glanvill's _Scepsis Scientifica_ (ch. 5), published some years before the +_Recherche_ of Malebranche, where Glanvill refers to "a secret deduction," +through which--from motions, &c., of which we are immediately percipient--we +"spell out" figures, distances, magnitudes, and colours, which have no +resemblance to them. + +An approach to the _New Theory_ is found in a passage which first appeared +in the second edition of Locke's _Essay_, published in 1694, to which +Berkeley refers in his own _Essay_ (sect. 132-35), and which, on account +of its relative importance, I shall here transcribe at length:-- + +"We are further to consider concerning Perception that the ideas we +receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, +without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe +of any uniform colour, e.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that +the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously +shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. +But, we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance +convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the +reflection of light by the difference in the sensible figures of +bodies--the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the +appearances into their causes; so that, from that which is truly variety +of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of +figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an +uniform colour, when the idea we receive from them is only a plane +variously coloured, as is evident in painting. + +"To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and +studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molyneux, +which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since, and it is +this:--Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to +distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of +the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other, which +is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and the sphere +placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quere, whether, by +his sight, before he touched them, he could not distinguish and tell, +which is the globe and which the cube? To which the acute and judicious +proposer answers: 'Not.' For, though he has obtained the experience of how +a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has not obtained the +experience that what affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so +and so; so that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand +unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.--I agree with +this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer +to this his problem, and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, +would not be able to say with certainty which was the globe and which the +cube, whilst he only saw them; though he would unerringly name them by his +touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference in their figures +felt. + +"This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an occasion for him to +consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and +acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use of, or help +from them: and the rather because this observing gentleman further adds +that, having, upon the occasion of my book, proposed this problem to +divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave +the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they +were convinced. + +"But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but those received by +sight: because sight, the most comprehensive of the senses, conveying to +our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that +sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the +several varieties of which change the appearance of its proper object, +i.e. light and colours; we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by +the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we +have frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that we +take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea formed by +our judgment; so that one, i.e. that of sensation, serves only to excite +the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or +hears with attention and understanding takes little notice of the +character or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. + +"Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we +consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed; for, as +itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension, so its +actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into +an instant. I speak this in comparison of the actions of the body.... +Secondly, we shall not be much surprised that this is done with us in so +little notice, if we consider how the facility we get of doing things, by +a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without notice. Habits, +especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions +in us which often escape our observation.... And therefore it is not so +strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into +that of its judgment, and make the one serve only to excite the other, +without our taking notice of it." (_Essay concerning Human Understanding_, +Book II. ch. 9. § 8.) + +This remarkable passage anticipates by implication the view of an +interpretation of materials originally given in the visual sense, which, +under the name of "suggestion," is the ruling factor in the _New Theory of +Vision_. + +The following sentences relative to the invisibility of distances, +contained in the _Treatise of Dioptrics_ (published in 1690) of Locke's +friend and correspondent William Molyneux, whose son was Berkeley's pupil, +illustrate Locke's statements, and may be compared with the opening +sections of the _Essay on Vision_:-- + +"In plain vision the estimate we make of the distance of objects +(especially when so far removed that the interval between our two eyes +bears no sensible proportion thereto, or when looked upon with one eye +only) is rather the act of our judgment than of sense; and acquired by +exercise, and a faculty of comparing, rather than natural. For, distance +of itself is not to be perceived; for, 'tis a line (or a length) presented +to our eye with its end toward us, which must therefore be only a point, +and that is invisible. Wherefore distance is chiefly perceived by means of +interjacent bodies, as by the earth, mountains, hills, fields, trees, +houses, &c. Or by the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude of +bodies, or of their faint colours, &c. These I say are the chief means of +apprehending the distance of objects that are considerably remote. But as +to nigh objects--to whose distance the interval of the eyes bears a +sensible proportion--their distance is perceived by the turn of the eyes, +or by the angle of the optic axes (_Gregorii Opt. Promot._ prop. 28). This +was the opinion of the ancients, Alhazen, Vitellio, &c. And though the +ingenious Jesuit Tacquet (_Opt. Lib. I._ prop. 2) disapprove thereof, and +objects against it a new notion of Gassendus (of a man's seeing only with +one eye at a time one and the same object), yet this notion of Gassendus +being absolutely false (as I could demonstrate were it not beside my +present purpose), it makes nothing against this opinion. + +"Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of itself perceivable, if +an object were conveyed to the eye by one single ray only, there were no +other means of judging of its distance but by some of those hinted before. +Therefore when we estimate the distance of nigh objects, either we take +the help of both eyes; or else we consider the pupil of one eye as having +breadth, and receiving a parcel of rays from each radiating point. And, +according to the various inclinations of the rays from one point on the +various parts of the pupil, we make our estimate of the distance of the +object. And therefore (as is said before), by one single eye we can only +judge of the distance of such objects to whose distance the breadth of the +pupil has a sensible proportion.... For, it is observed before (prop. 29, +sec. 2, see also _Gregorii Opt. Promot._ prop. 29) that for viewing +objects remote and nigh, there are requisite various conformations of the +eye--the rays from nigh objects that fall on the eye diverging more than +those from more remote objects." (_Treatise of Dioptrics_, Part I. prop. +31.) + + ------------------------------------- + +All this helps to shew the state of science regarding vision about the +time Berkeley's _Essay_ appeared, especially among those with whose works +he was familiar(278). I shall next refer to illustrations of the change +which the _Essay_ produced. + +The _New Theory_ has occasioned some interesting criticism since its +appearance in 1709. At first it drew little attention. For twenty years +after its publication the allusions to it were few. The account of +Cheselden's experiment upon one born blind, published in 1728, in the +_Philosophical Transactions_, which seemed to bring the Theory to the test +of scientific experiment, recalled attention to Berkeley's reasonings. The +state of religious thought about the same time confirmed the tendency to +discuss a doctrine which represented human vision as interpretation of a +natural yet divine language, thus suggesting Omnipresent Mind. + +Occasional discussions of the _New Theory_ may be found in the +_Gentleman's Magazine_, from 1732 till Berkeley's death in 1753. Some +criticisms may also be found in Smith's _Optics_, published in 1738. + +Essential parts of Berkeley's analysis are explained by Voltaire, in his +_Elemens de la Philosophie de Newton_. The following from that work is +here given on its own account, and also as a prominent recognition of the +new doctrine in France, within thirty years from its first promulgation:-- + + + "Il faut absolument conclure de tout ceci, que les distances, les + grandeurs, les situations, ne sont pas, a proprement parler, des + choses visibles, c'est-a-dire, ne sont pas les objets propres et + immediats de la vue. L'objet propre et immediat de la vue n'est + autre chose que la lumiere coloree: tout le reste, nous ne le + sentons qu'a la longue et par experience. Nous apprenons a voir + precisement comme nous apprenons a parler et a lire. La difference + est, que l'art de voir est plus facile, et que la nature est + egalement a tous notre maitre. + + "Les jugements soudains, presque uniformes, que toutes nos ames, a + un certain age, portent des distances, des grandeurs, des + situations, nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu'a ouvrir les yeux pour + voir la maniere dont nous voyons. On se trompe; il y faut le + secours des autres sens. Si les hommes n'avaient que le sens de la + vue, ils n'auraient aucun moyen pour connaitre l'etendue en + longueur, largeur et profondeur; et un pur esprit ne la + connaitrait pas peutetre, a moins que Dieu ne la lui revelat. Il + est tres difficile de separer dans notre entendement l'extension + d'un objet d'avec les couleurs de cet objet. Nous ne voyons jamais + rien que d'etendu, et de la nous sommes tous portes a croire que + nous voyons en effet l'etendue." (_Elemens de la Philos. de + Newton_, Seconde Partie, ch. 7.) + + +Condillac, in his _Essais sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines_ (Part +I. sect. 6), published in 1746, combats Berkeley's _New Theory_, and +maintains that an extension exterior to the eye is immediately discernible +by sight; the eye being naturally capable of judging at once of figures, +magnitudes, situations, and distances. His reasonings in support of this +"prejudice," as he afterwards allowed it to be, may be found in the +section entitled "De quelques jugemens qu'on a attribues a l'ame sans +fondement, ou solution d'un probleme de metaphysique." Here Locke, +Molyneux, Berkeley, and Voltaire are criticised, and Cheselden's +experiment is referred to. Condillac's subsequent recantation is contained +in his _Traite des Sensations_, published in 1754, and in his _L'Art de +Penser_. In the _Traite des Sensations_ (Troisieme Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, +7, 8, &c.) the whole question is discussed at length, and Condillac +vindicates what he allows must appear a marvellous paradox to the +uninitiated--that we only gradually learn to see, hear, smell, taste, and +touch. He argues in particular that the eye cannot originally perceive an +extension that is beyond itself, and that perception of trinal space is +due to what we experience in touch. + +Voltaire and Condillac gave currency to the _New Theory_ in France, and it +soon became a commonplace with D'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon, and other +French philosophers. In Germany we have allusions to it in the Berlin +Memoirs and elsewhere; but, although known by name, if not in its +distinctive principle and latent idealism, it has not obtained the +consideration which its author's developed theory of the material as well +as the visible world has received. The Kantian _a priori_ criticism of our +cognition of Space, and of our mathematical notions, subsequently +indisposed the German mind to the _a posteriori_ reasoning of Berkeley's +_Essay_. + +Its influence is apparent in British philosophy. The following passages in +Hartley's _Observations on Man_, published in 1749, illustrate the extent +to which some of the distinctive parts of the new doctrine were at that +time received by an eminent English psychologist:-- + +"Distance is judged of by the quantity of motion, and figure by the +relative quantity of distance.... And, as the sense of sight is much more +extensive and expedite than feeling, we judge of tangible qualities +chiefly by sight, which therefore may be considered, agreeably to Bishop +Berkeley's remark, as a philosophical language for the ideas of feeling; +being, for the most part, an adequate representative of them, and a +language common to all mankind, and in which they all agree very nearly, +after a moderate degree of experience. + +"However, if the informations from touch and sight disagree at any time, +we are always to depend upon touch, as that which, according to the usual +ways of speaking upon these subjects, is the true representation of the +essential properties, i.e. as the earnest and presage of what other +tangible impressions the body under consideration will make upon our +feeling in other circumstances; also what changes it will produce in other +bodies; of which again we are to determine by our feeling, if the visual +language should not happen to correspond to it exactly. And it is from +this difference that we call the touch the reality, light the +representative--also that a person born blind may foretell with certainty, +from his present tangible impressions, what others would follow upon +varying the circumstances; whereas, if we could suppose a person to be +born without feeling, and to arrive at man's estate, he could not, from +his present visible impressions, judge what others would follow upon +varying the circumstances. Thus the picture of a knife, drawn so well as +to deceive his eye, would not, when applied to another body, produce the +same change of visible impressions as a real knife does, when it separates +the parts of the body through which it passes. But the touch is not liable +to these deceptions. As it is therefore the fundamental source of +information in respect of the essential properties of matter, it may be +considered as our first and principal key to the knowledge of the external +world." (Prop. 30.) + +In other parts of Hartley's book (e.g. Prop. 58) the relation of our +visual judgments of magnitude, figure, motion, distance, and position to +the laws of association is explained, and the associating circumstances by +which these judgments are formed are enumerated in detail. + +Dr. Porterfield of Edinburgh, in his _Treatise on the Eye, or the Manner +and Phenomena of Vision_ (Edinburgh, 1759), is an exception to the consent +which the doctrine had then widely secured. He maintains, in opposition to +Berkeley, that "the judgments we form of the situation and distance of +visible objects, depend not on custom and experience, but on original +instinct, to which mind is subject in our embodied state(279)." + +Berkeley's Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves our visual +perceptions of distance into interpretation of arbitrary signs, received +the qualified approbation of Reid, in his _Inquiry into the Human Mind on +the Principles of Common Sense_ (1764). He criticises it in the _Inquiry_, +where the doctrine of visual signs, of which Berkeley's whole philosophy +is a development, is accepted, and to some extent applied. With Reid it is +divorced, however, from the Berkeleian conception of the material world, +although the Theory of Vision was the seminal principle of Berkeley's +Theory of Matter(280). + +This Theory of Matter was imperfectly conceived and then rejected by Reid +and his followers, while the New Theory of Vision obtained the general +consent of the Scottish metaphysicians. Adam Smith refers to it in his +_Essays_ (published in 1795) as "one of the finest examples of +philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or in any +other language." Dugald Stewart characterises it in his _Elements_ as "one +of the most beautiful, and at the same time one of the most important +theories of modern philosophy." "The solid additions," he afterwards +remarks in his _Dissertation_, "made by Berkeley to the stock of human +knowledge, were important and brilliant. Among these the first place is +unquestionably due to his _New Theory of Vision_, a work abounding with +ideas so different from those commonly received, and at the same time so +profound and refined, that it was regarded by all but a few accustomed to +deep metaphysical reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical +romance than of a sober inquiry after truth. Such, however, has since been +the progress and diffusion of this sort of knowledge, that the leading and +most abstracted doctrines contained in it form now an essential part of +every elementary treatise on optics, and are adopted by the most +superficial smatterers in science as fundamental articles of their faith." +The _New Theory_ is accepted by Thomas Brown, who proposes (_Lectures_, +29) to extend the scope of its reasonings. With regard to perceptions of +sight, Young, in his _Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy_ (p. 102), says +that "it has been universally admitted, at least since the days of +Berkeley, that many of those which appear to us at present to be +instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn to be acquired; that most of +the adult perceptions of sight are founded on the previous information of +touch; that colour can give us no conception originally of those qualities +of bodies which produce it in us; and that primary vision gives us no +notion of distance, and, as I believe, no notion of magnitude." Sir James +Mackintosh, in his _Dissertation_, characterises the _New Theory of +Vision_ as "a great discovery in Mental Philosophy." "Nothing in the +compass of inductive reasoning," remarks Sir William Hamilton (Reid's +_Works_, p. 182, note), "appears more satisfactory than Berkeley's +demonstration of the necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow +process of observation and comparison alone, the connexion between the +perceptions of vision and touch, and, in general, all that relates to the +distance and magnitude of external things(281)." + +The New Theory of Vision has in short been generally accepted, so far as +it was understood, alike by the followers of Hartley and by the associates +and successors of Reid. Among British psychologists, it has recommended +itself to rationalists and sensationalists, to the advocates of innate +principles, and to those who would explain by accidental association what +their opponents attribute to reason originally latent in man. But this +wide conscious assent is I think chiefly confined to the proposition that +distance is invisible, and hardly reaches the deeper implicates of the +theory, on its extension to all the senses, leading to a perception of the +final unity of the natural and the supernatural, and the ultimate +spirituality of the universe(282). + + + + +Dedication + + +TO THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN PERCIVALE, BART.(283), + +ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL + +IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND. + +Sir, + +I could not, without doing violence to myself, forbear upon this occasion +to give some public testimony of the great and well-grounded esteem I have +conceived for you, ever since I had the honour and happiness of your +acquaintance. The outward advantages of fortune, and the early honours +with which you are adorned, together with the reputation you are known to +have amongst the best and most considerable men, may well imprint +veneration and esteem on the minds of those who behold you from a +distance. But these are not the chief motives that inspire me with the +respect I bear you. A nearer approach has given me the view of something +in your person infinitely beyond the external ornaments of honour and +estate. I mean, an intrinsic stock of virtue and good sense, a true +concern for religion, and disinterested love of your country. Add to these +an uncommon proficiency in the best and most useful parts of knowledge; +together with (what in my mind is a perfection of the first rank) a +surpassing goodness of nature. All which I have collected, not from the +uncertain reports of fame, but from my own experience. Within these few +months that I have the honour to be known unto you, the many delightful +hours I have passed in your agreeable and improving conversation have +afforded me the opportunity of discovering in you many excellent +qualities, which at once fill me with admiration and esteem. That one at +those years, and in those circumstances of wealth and greatness, should +continue proof against the charms of luxury and those criminal pleasures +so fashionable and predominant in the age we live in; that he should +preserve a sweet and modest behaviour, free from that insolent and +assuming air so familiar to those who are placed above the ordinary rank +of men; that he should manage a great fortune with that prudence and +inspection, and at the same time expend it with that generosity and +nobleness of mind, as to shew himself equally remote from a sordid +parsimony and a lavish inconsiderate profusion of the good things he is +intrusted with--this, surely, were admirable and praiseworthy. But, that he +should, moreover, by an impartial exercise of his reason, and constant +perusal of the sacred Scriptures, endeavour to attain a right notion of +the principles of natural and revealed religion; that he should with the +concern of a true patriot have the interest of the public at heart, and +omit no means of informing himself what may be prejudicial or advantageous +to his country, in order to prevent the one and promote the other; in +fine, that, by a constant application to the most severe and useful +studies, by a strict observation of the rules of honour and virtue, by +frequent and serious reflections on the mistaken measures of the world, +and the true end and happiness of mankind, he should in all respects +qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before him, to deserve +the character of great and good in this life, and be ever happy +hereafter--this were amazing and almost incredible. Yet all this, and more +than this, SIR, might I justly say of you, did either your modesty permit, +or your character stand in need of it. I know it might deservedly be +thought a vanity in me to imagine that anything coming from so obscure a +hand as mine could add a lustre to your reputation. But, I am withal +sensible how far I advance the interest of my own, by laying hold on this +opportunity to make it known that I am admitted into some degree of +intimacy with a person of your exquisite judgment. And, with that view, I +have ventured to make you an address of this nature, which the goodness I +have ever experienced in you inclines me to hope will meet with a +favourable reception at your hands. Though I must own I have your pardon +to ask, for touching on what may possibly be offensive to a virtue you are +possessed of in a very distinguishing degree. Excuse me, SIR, if it was +out of my power to mention the name of SIR JOHN PERCIVALE without paying +some tribute to that extraordinary and surprising merit whereof I have so +clear and affecting an idea, and which, I am sure, cannot be exposed in +too full a light for the imitation of others, + +Of late I have been agreeably employed in considering the most noble, +pleasant, and comprehensive of all the senses(284). The fruit of that +(labour shall I call it or) diversion is what I now present you with, in +hopes it may give some entertainment to one who, in the midst of business +and vulgar enjoyments, preserves a relish for the more refined pleasures +of thought and reflexion. My thoughts concerning Vision have led me into +some notions so far out of the common road(285) that it had been improper +to address them to one of a narrow and contracted genius. But, you, SIR, +being master of a large and free understanding, raised above the power of +those prejudices that enslave the far greater part of mankind, may +deservedly be thought a proper patron for an attempt of this kind. Add to +this, that you are no less disposed to forgive than qualified to discern +whatever faults may occur in it. Nor do I think you defective in any one +point necessary to form an exact judgment on the most abstract and +difficult things, so much as in a just confidence of your own abilities. +And, in this one instance, give me leave to say, you shew a manifest +weakness of judgment. With relation to the following _Essay_, I shall only +add that I beg your pardon for laying a trifle of that nature in your way, +at a time when you are engaged in the important affairs of the nation, and +desire you to think that I am, with all sincerity and respect, + +SIR, + +Your most faithful and most humble servant, + +GEORGE BERKELEY. + + + + +An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision + + +1. My design is to shew the manner wherein we perceive by Sight the +Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of objects: also to consider the +difference there is betwixt the ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether +there be any idea common to both senses(286). + + ------------------------------------- + +2. It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and immediately, +cannot be seen(287). For, distance(288) being a line directed endwise to +the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point +remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or +shorter(289). + +3. I find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make of the distance +of objects considerably remote is rather an act of judgment grounded on +experience than of sense. For example, when I perceive a great number of +intermediate objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and the like, which +I have experienced to take up a considerable space, I thence form a +judgment or conclusion, that the object I see beyond them is at a great +distance. Again, when an object appears faint and small which at a near +distance I have experienced to make a vigorous and large appearance, I +instantly conclude it to be far off(290). And this, it is evident, is the +result of experience; without which, from the faintness and littleness, I +should not have inferred anything concerning the distance of objects. + +4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance as that the +interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion to it(291), the +opinion of speculative men is, that the two optic axes (the fancy that we +see only with one eye at once being exploded), concurring at the object, +do there make an angle, by means of which, according as it is greater or +lesser, the object is perceived to be nearer or farther off(292). + +5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating distance there is +this remarkable difference:--that, whereas there was no apparent +_necessary_ connexion between small distance and a large and strong +appearance, or between great distance and a little and faint appearance, +there appears a very _necessary_ connexion between an obtuse angle and +near distance, and an acute angle and farther distance. It does not in the +least depend upon experience, but may be evidently known by any one before +he had experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the optic axes +the greater the angle, and the remoter their concurrence is, the lesser +will be the angle comprehended by them. + +6. There is another way, mentioned by optic writers, whereby they will +have us judge of those distances in respect of which the breadth of the +pupil hath any sensible bigness. And that is the greater or lesser +divergency of the rays which, issuing from the visible point, do fall on +the pupil--that point being judged nearest which is seen by most diverging +rays, and that remoter which is seen by less diverging rays, and so on; +the apparent distance still increasing, as the divergency of the rays +decreases, till at length it becomes infinite, when the rays that fall on +the pupil are to sense parallel. And after this manner it is said we +perceive distance when we look only with one eye. + +7. In this case also it is plain we are not beholden to experience: it +being a certain necessary truth that, the nearer the direct rays falling +on the eye approach to a parallelism, the farther off is the point of +their intersection, or the visible point from whence they flow. + + ------------------------------------- + +8. (293)Now, though the accounts here given of perceiving _near_ distance +by sight are received for true, and accordingly made use of in determining +the apparent places of objects, they do nevertheless seem to me very +unsatisfactory, and that for these following reasons:-- + +9. [_First_(294),] It is evident that, when the mind perceives any idea +not immediately and of itself, it must be by the means of some other idea. +Thus, for instance, the passions which are in the mind of another are of +themselves to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them by sight; +though not immediately, yet by means of the colours they produce in the +countenance. We often see shame or fear in the looks of a man, by +perceiving the changes of his countenance to red or pale. + +10. Moreover, it is evident that no idea which is not itself perceived can +be to me the means of perceiving any other idea. If I do not perceive the +redness or paleness of a man's face themselves, it is impossible I should +perceive by them the passions which are in his mind. + +11. Now, from sect. ii., it is plain that distance is in its own nature +imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight(295). It remains, +therefore, that it be brought into view by means of some other idea, that +is itself immediately perceived in the act of vision. + +12. But those lines and angles, by means whereof some men(296) pretend to +explain the perception(297) of distance, are themselves not at all +perceived; nor are they in truth ever thought of by those unskilful in +optics. I appeal to any one's experience, whether, upon sight of an +object, he computes its distance by the bigness of the angle made by the +meeting of the two optic axes? or whether he ever thinks of the greater or +lesser divergency of the rays which arrive from any point to his pupil? +nay, whether it be not perfectly impossible for him to perceive by sense +the various angles wherewith the rays, according to their greater or +lesser divergence, do fall on the eye? Every one is himself the best judge +of what he perceives, and what not. In vain shall any man(298) tell me, +that I perceive certain lines and angles, which introduce into my mind the +various ideas of distance, so long as I myself am conscious of no such +thing. + +13. Since therefore those angles and lines are not themselves perceived by +sight, it follows, from sect. x., that the mind does not by them judge of +the distance of objects. + +14. [_Secondly_(299),] The truth of this assertion will be yet farther +evident to any one that considers those lines and angles have no real +existence in nature, being only an hypothesis framed by the +mathematicians, and by them introduced into optics, that they might treat +of that science in a geometrical way. + +15. The [_third_ and(300)] last reason I shall give for rejecting that +doctrine is, that though we should grant the real existence of those optic +angles, &c., and that it was possible for the mind to perceive them, yet +these principles would not be found sufficient to explain the phenomena of +distance, as shall be shewn hereafter. + + ------------------------------------- + +16. Now it being already shewn(301) that distance is _suggested_(302) to +the mind, by the mediation of some other idea which is itself perceived in +the act of seeing, it remains that we inquire, what ideas or sensations +there be that attend vision, unto which we may suppose the ideas of +distance are connected, and by which they are introduced into the mind. + +And, _first_, it is certain by experience, that when we look at a near +object with both eyes, according as it approaches or recedes from us, we +alter the disposition of our eyes, by lessening or widening the interval +between the pupils. This disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with +a sensation(303), which seems to me to be that which in this case brings +the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind. + +17. Not that there is any natural or necessary(304) connexion between the +sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes and greater or lesser +distance. But--because the mind has, by constant experience, found the +different sensations corresponding to the different dispositions of the +eyes to be attended each with a different degree of distance in the +object--there has grown an habitual or customary connexion between those +two sorts of ideas: so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation +arising from the different turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the +pupils nearer or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different +idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that sensation. Just +as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is immediately suggested to the +understanding which custom had united with it(305). + +18. Nor do I see how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. I know +evidently that distance is not perceived of itself(306); that, by +consequence, it must be perceived by means of some other idea, which is +immediately perceived, and varies with the different degrees of distance. +I know also that the sensation arising from the turn of the eyes is of +itself immediately perceived; and various degrees thereof are connected +with different distances, which never fail to accompany them into my mind, +when I view an object distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small +that in respect of it the interval between the eyes has any considerable +magnitude. + +19. I know it is a received opinion that, by altering the disposition of +the eyes, the mind perceives whether the angle of the optic axes, or the +lateral angles comprehended between the interval of the eyes or the optic +axes, are made greater or lesser; and that, accordingly, by a kind of +natural geometry, it judges the point of their intersection to be nearer +or farther off. But that this is not true I am convinced by my own +experience; since I am not conscious that I make any such use of the +perception I have by the turn of my eyes. And for me to make those +judgments, and draw those conclusions from it, without knowing that I do +so, seems altogether incomprehensible(307). + +20. From all which it follows, that the judgment we make of the distance +of an object viewed with both eyes is entirely the result of experience. +If we had not constantly found certain sensations, arising from the +various disposition of the eyes, attended with certain degrees of +distance, we should never make those sudden judgments from them concerning +the distance of objects; no more than we would pretend to judge of a man's +thoughts by his pronouncing words we had never heard before. + +21. _Secondly_, an object placed at a certain distance from the eye, to +which the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable proportion, being made +to approach, is seen more confusedly(308). And the nearer it is brought +the more confused appearance it makes. And this being found constantly to +be so, there arises in the mind an habitual connexion between the several +degrees of confusion and distance; the greater confusion still implying +the lesser distance, and the lesser confusion the greater distance of the +object. + +22. This confused appearance of the object doth therefore seem to be the +medium whereby the mind judges of distance, in those cases wherein the +most approved writers of optics will have it judge by the different +divergency with which the rays flowing from the radiating point fall on +the pupil(309). No man, I believe, will pretend to see or feel those +imaginary angles that the rays are supposed to form, according to their +various inclinations on his eye. But he cannot choose seeing whether the +object appear more or less confused. It is therefore a manifest +consequence from what has been demonstrated that, instead of the greater +or lesser divergency of the rays, the mind makes use of the greater or +lesser confusedness of the appearance, thereby to determine the apparent +place of an object. + +23. Nor doth it avail to say there is not any necessary connexion between +confused vision and distance great or small. For I ask any man what +necessary connexion he sees between the redness of a blush and shame? And +yet no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in the face of another +but it brings into his mind the idea of that passion which hath been +observed to accompany it. + +24. What seems to have misled the writers of optics in this matter is, +that they imagine men judge of distance as they do of a conclusion in +mathematics; betwixt which and the premises it is indeed absolutely +requisite there be an apparent necessary connexion. But it is far +otherwise in the sudden judgments men make of distance. We are not to +think that brutes and children, or even grown reasonable men, whenever +they perceive an object to approach or depart from them, do it by virtue +of geometry and demonstration. + +25. That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will suffice that +they have been observed to go together, without any demonstration of the +_necessity_ of their coexistence, or without so much as knowing what it is +that makes them so to coexist. Of this there are innumerable instances, of +which no one can be ignorant(310). + +26. Thus, greater confusion having been constantly attended with nearer +distance, no sooner is the former idea perceived but it suggests the +latter to our thoughts. And, if it had been the ordinary course of nature +that the farther off an object were placed the more confused it should +appear, it is certain the very same perception that now makes us think an +object approaches would then have made us to imagine it went farther off; +that perception, abstracting from custom and experience, being equally +fitted to produce the idea of great distance, or small distance, or no +distance at all. + +27. _Thirdly_, an object being placed at the distance above specified, and +brought nearer to the eye, we may nevertheless prevent, at least for some +time, the appearance's growing more confused, by straining the eye(311). +In which case that sensation supplies the place of confused vision, in +aiding the mind to judge of the distance of the object; it being esteemed +so much the nearer by how much the effort or straining of the eye in order +to distinct vision is greater. + + ------------------------------------- + +28. I have here(312) set down those sensations or ideas(313) that seem to +be the constant and general occasions of introducing into the mind the +different ideas of near distance. It is true, in most cases, that divers +other circumstances contribute to frame our idea of distance, viz. the +particular number, size, kind, &c. of the things seen. Concerning which, +as well as all other the forementioned occasions which suggest distance, I +shall only observe, they have none of them, in their own nature, any +relation or connexion with it: nor is it possible they should ever signify +the various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experience they have +been found to be connected with them. + + ------------------------------------- + +29. I shall proceed upon these principles to account for a phenomenon +which has hitherto strangely puzzled the writers of optics, and is so far +from being accounted for by any of their theories of vision, that it is, +by their own confession, plainly repugnant to them; and of consequence, if +nothing else could be objected, were alone sufficient to bring their +credit in question. The whole difficulty I shall lay before you in the +words of the learned Doctor Barrow, with which he concludes his _Optic +Lectures_(314):-- + + [Illustration] + + + "Haec sunt, quae circa partem opticae praecipue mathematicam dicenda + mihi suggessit meditatio. Circa reliquas (quae {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} sunt, + adeoque saepiuscule pro certis principiis plausibiles conjecturas + venditare necessum habent) nihil fere quicquam admodum verisimile + succurrit, a pervulgatis (ab iis, inquam, quae Keplerus, + Scheinerus(315), Cartesius, et post illos alii tradiderunt) + alienum aut diversum. Atqui tacere malo, quam toties oblatam + cramben reponere. Proinde receptui cano; nee ita tamen ut prorsus + discedam, anteaquam improbam quandam difficultatem (pro + sinceritate quam et vobis et veritati debeo minime dissimulandam) + in medium protulero, quae doctrinae nostrae, hactenus inculcatae, se + objicit adversam, ab ea saltem nullam admittit solutionem. Illa, + breviter, talis est. Lenti vel speculo cavo _EBF_ exponatur + punctum visibile _A_, ita distans, ut radii ex _A_ manantes ex + inflectione versus axem _AB_ cogantur. Sitque radiationis limes + (seu puncti _A_ imago, qualem supra passim statuimus) punctum _Z_. + Inter hoc autem et inflectentis verticem _B_ uspiam positus + concipiatur oculus. Quaeri jam potest, ubi loci debeat punctum _A_ + apparere? Retrorsum ad punctum _Z_ videri non fert natura (cum + omnis impressio sensum afficiens proveniat a partibus _A_) ac + experientia reclamat. Nostris autem e placitis consequi videtur, + ipsum ad partes anticas apparens, ab intervallo longissime dissito + (quod et maximum sensibile quodvis intervallum quodammodo + exsuperet), apparere. Cum enim quo radiis minus divergentibus + attingitur objectum, eo (seclusis utique praenotionibus et + praejudiciis) longius abesse sentiatur; et quod parallelos ad + oculum radios projicit, remotissime positum aestimetur: exigere + ratio videtur, ut quod convergentibus radiis apprehenditur, adhuc + magis, si fieri posset, quoad apparentiam elongetur. Quin et circa + casum hunc generatim inquiri possit, quidnam omnino sit, quod + apparentem puncti _A_ locum determinet, faciatque quod constanti + ratione nunc propius, nunc remotius appareat? Cui itidem dubio + nihil quicquam ex hactenus dictorum analogia responderi posse + videtur, nisi debere punctum _A_ perpetuo longissime semotum + videri. Verum experientia secus attestatur, illud pro diversa + oculi inter puncta _B_, _Z_, positione varie distans, nunquam fere + (si unquam) longinquius ipso _A_ libere spectato, subinde vero + multo propinquius adparere; quinimo, quo oculum appellentes radii + magis convergunt, eo speciem objecti propius accedere. Nempe, si + puncto _B_ admoveatur oculus, suo (ad lentem) fere nativo in loco + conspicitur punctum _A_ (vel aeque distans, ad speculum); ad _O_ + reductus oculus ejusce speciem appropinquantem cernit; ad _P_ + adhuc vicinius ipsum existimat; ac ita sensim, donec alicubi + tandem, velut ad _Q_, constituto oculo, objectum summe propinquum + apparens in meram confusionem incipiat evanescere. Quae sane cuncta + rationibus atque decretis nostris repugnare videntur, aut cum iis + saltem parum amice conspirant. Neque nostram tantum sententiam + pulsat hoc experimentum, at ex aequo caeteras quas norim omnes: + veterem imprimis ac vulgatam, nostrae prae reliquis affinem, ita + convellere videtur, ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus A. Tacquetus + isti principio (cui pene soli totam inaedificaverat _Catoptricam_ + suam) ceu infido ac inconstanti renunciarit, adeoque suam ipse + doctrinam labefactarit? id tamen, opinor, minime facturus, si rem + totam inspexissit penitius, atque difficultatis fundum attigissit. + Apud me vero non ita pollet haec, nec eousque praepollebit ulla + difficultas, ut ab iis quae manifeste rationi consentanea video, + discedam; praesertim quum, ut his accidit, ejusmodi difficultas in + singularis cujuspiam casus disparitate fundetur. Nimirum in + praesente casu peculiare quiddam, naturae subtilitati involutum, + delitescit, aegre fortassis, nisi perfectius explorato videndi + modo, detegendum. Circa quod nil, fateor, hactenus excogitare + potui, quod adblandiretur animo meo, nedum plane satisfaceret. + Vobis itaque nodum hunc, utinam feliciore conatu, resolvendum + committo." + + +_In English as follows_: + + + "I have here delivered what my thoughts have suggested to me + concerning that part of optics which is more properly + mathematical. As for the other parts of that science (which, being + rather physical, do consequently abound with plausible conjectures + instead of certain principles), there has in them scarce anything + occurred to my observation different from what has been already + said by Kepler, Scheinerus, Des Cartes, &c. And methinks I had + better say nothing at all than repeat that which has been so often + said by others. I think it therefore high time to take my leave of + this subject. But, before I quit it for good and all, the fair and + ingenuous dealing that I owe both to you and to truth obliges me + to acquaint you with a certain untoward difficulty, which seems + directly opposite to the doctrine I have been hitherto + inculcating, at least admits of no solution from it. In short it + is this. Before the double convex glass or concave speculum _EBF_, + let the point _A_ be placed at such a distance that the rays + proceeding from _A_, after refraction or reflection, be brought to + unite somewhere in the axis _AB_. And suppose the point of union + (i.e. the image of the point _A_, as hath been already set forth) + to be _Z_; between which and _B_, the vertex of the glass or + speculum, conceive the eye to be anywhere placed. The question now + is, where the point _A_ ought to appear. Experience shews that it + doth not appear behind at the point _Z_; and it were contrary to + nature that it should; since all the impression which affects the + sense comes from towards _A_. But, from our tenets it should seem + to follow that it would appear before the eye at a vast distance + off, so great as should in some sort surpass all sensible + distance. For since, if we exclude all anticipations and + prejudices, every object appears by so much the farther off by how + much the rays it sends to the eye are less diverging; and that + object is thought to be most remote from which parallel rays + proceed unto the eye; reason would make one think that object + should appear at yet a greater distance which is seen by + converging rays. Moreover, it may in general be asked concerning + this case, what it is that determines the apparent place of the + point _A_, and maketh it to appear after a constant manner, + sometimes nearer, at other times farther off? To which doubt I see + nothing that can be answered agreeable to the principles we have + laid down, except only that the point _A_ ought always to appear + extremely remote. But, on the contrary, we are assured by + experience, that the point _A_ appears variously distant, + according to the different situations of the eye between the + points _B_ and _Z_. And that it doth almost never (if at all) seem + farther off than it would if it were beheld by the naked eye; but, + on the contrary, it doth sometimes appear much nearer. Nay, it is + even certain that by how much the rays falling on the eye do more + converge, by so much the nearer does the object seem to approach. + For, the eye being placed close to the point _B_, the object _A_ + appears nearly in its own natural place, if the point _B_ is taken + in the glass, or at the same distance, if in the speculum. The eye + being brought back to _O_, the object seems to draw near; and, + being come to _P_, it beholds it still nearer: and so on by little + and little, till at length the eye being placed somewhere, suppose + at _Q_, the object appearing extremely near begins to vanish into + mere confusion. All which doth seem repugnant to our principles; + at least, not rightly to agree with them. Nor is our tenet alone + struck at by this experiment, but likewise all others that ever + came to my knowledge are every whit as much endangered by it. The + ancient one especially (which is most commonly received, and comes + nearest to mine) seems to be so effectually overthrown thereby + that the most learned Tacquet has been forced to reject that + principle, as false and uncertain, on which alone he had built + almost his whole _Catoptrics_, and consequently, by taking away + the foundation, hath himself pulled down the superstructure he had + raised on it. Which, nevertheless, I do not believe he would have + done, had he but considered the whole matter more thoroughly, and + examined the difficulty to the bottom. But as for me, neither this + nor any other difficulty shall have so great an influence on me, + as to make me renounce that which I know to be manifestly + agreeable to reason. Especially when, as it here falls out, the + difficulty is founded in the peculiar nature of a certain odd and + particular case. For, in the present case something peculiar lies + hid, which, being involved in the subtilty of nature, will perhaps + hardly be discovered till such time as the manner of vision is + more perfectly made known. Concerning which, I must own I have + hitherto been able to find out nothing that has the least show of + probability, not to mention certainty. I shall therefore leave + this knot to be untied by you, wishing you may have better success + in it than I have had." + + + ------------------------------------- + +30. The ancient and received principle, which Dr. Barrow here mentions as +the main foundation of Tacquet's(316) _Catoptrics_, is, that every +"visible point seen by reflection from a speculum shall appear placed at +the intersection of the reflected ray and the perpendicular of incidence." +Which intersection in the present case happening to be behind the eye, it +greatly shakes the authority of that principle whereon the aforementioned +author proceeds throughout his whole _Catoptrics_, in determining the +apparent place of objects seen by reflection from any kind of speculum. + +31. Let us now see how this phenomenon agrees with our tenets(317). The +eye, the nearer it is placed to the point _B_ in the above figures, the +more distinct is the appearance of the object: but, as it recedes to _O_, +the appearance grows more confused; and at _P_ it sees the object yet more +confused; and so on, till the eye, being brought back to _Z_, sees the +object in the greatest confusion of all. Wherefore, by sect. 21, the +object should seem to approach the eye gradually, as it recedes from the +point _B_; that is, at _O_ it should (in consequence of the principle I +have laid down in the aforesaid section) seem nearer than it did at _B_, +and at _P_ nearer than at _O_, and at _Q_ nearer than at _P_, and so on, +till it quite vanishes at _Z_. Which is the very matter of fact, as any +one that pleases may easily satisfy himself by experiment. + +32. This case is much the same as if we should suppose an Englishman to +meet a foreigner who used the same words with the English, but in a direct +contrary signification. The Englishman would not fail to make a wrong +judgment of the ideas annexed to those sounds, in the mind of him that +used them. Just so in the present case, the object speaks (if I may so +say) with words that the eye is well acquainted with, that is, confusions +of appearance; but, whereas heretofore the greatest confusions were always +wont to signify nearer distances, they have in this case a direct contrary +signification, being connected with the greater distances. Whence it +follows that the eye must unavoidably be mistaken, since it will take the +confusions in the sense it has been used to, which is directly opposed to +the true. + +33. This phenomenon, as it entirely subverts the opinion of those who will +have us judge of distance by lines and angles, on which supposition it is +altogether inexplicable, so it seems to me no small confirmation of the +truth of that principle whereby it is explained(318). But, in order to a +more full explication of this point, and to shew how far the hypothesis of +the mind's judging by the various divergency of rays may be of use in +determining the apparent place of an object, it will be necessary to +premise some few things, which are already well known to those who have +any skill in Dioptrics. + +34. _First_, Any radiating point is then distinctly seen when the rays +proceeding from it are, by the refractive power of the crystalline, +accurately reunited in the retina or fund of the eye. But if they are +reunited either before they arrive at the retina, or after they have +passed it, then there is confused vision. + + [Illustration] + + Figure 1 + + + [Illustration] + + Figure 2 + + + [Illustration] + + Figure 3 + + +35. _Secondly_, Suppose, in the adjacent figures, _NP_ represent an eye +duly framed, and retaining its natural figure. In fig. 1 the rays falling +nearly parallel on the eye, are, by the crystalline _AB_, refracted, so as +their focus, or point of union _F_, falls exactly on the retina. But, if +the rays fall sensibly diverging on the eye, as in fig. 2, then their +focus falls beyond the retina; or, if the rays are made to converge by the +lens _QS_, before they come at the eye, as in fig. 3, their focus _F_ will +fall before the retina. In which two last cases it is evident, from the +foregoing section, that the appearance of the point _Z_ is confused. And, +by how much the greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays +falling on the pupil, by so much the farther will the point of their +reunion be from the retina, either before or behind it, and consequently +the point _Z_ will appear by so much the more confused. And this, by the +bye, may shew us the difference between confused and faint vision. +Confused vision is, when the rays proceeding from each distinct point of +the object are not accurately re-collected in one corresponding point on +the retina, but take up some space thereon--so that rays from different +points become mixed and confused together. This is opposed to a distinct +vision, and attends near objects. Faint vision is when, by reason of the +distance of the object, or grossness of the interjacent medium, few rays +arrive from the object to the eye. This is opposed to vigorous or clear +vision, and attends remote objects. But to return. + +36. The eye, or (to speak truly) the mind, perceiving only the confusion +itself, without ever considering the cause from which it proceeds, doth +constantly annex the same degree of distance to the same degree of +confusion. Whether that confusion be occasioned by converging or by +diverging rays it matters not. Whence it follows that the eye, viewing the +object _Z_ through the glass _QS_ (which by refraction causeth the rays +_ZQ_, _ZS_, &c. to converge), should judge it to be at such a nearness, at +which, if it were placed, it would radiate on the eye, with rays diverging +to that degree as would produce the same confusion which is now produced +by converging rays, i.e. would cover a portion of the retina equal to +_DC._ (Vid. fig. 3, _sup._) But then this must be understood (to use Dr. +Barrow's phrase) "seclusis praenotionibus et praejudiciis," in case we +abstract from all other circumstances of vision, such as the figure, size, +faintness, &c. of the visible objects--all which do ordinarily concur to +form our idea of distance, the mind having, by frequent experience, +observed their several sorts or degrees to be connected with various +distances. + +37. It plainly follows from what has been said, that a person perfectly +purblind (i.e. that could not see an object distinctly but when placed +close to his eye) would not make the same wrong judgment that others do in +the forementioned case. For, to him, greater confusions constantly +suggesting greater distances, he must, as he recedes from the glass, and +the object grows more confused, judge it to be at a farther distance; +contrary to what they do who have had the perception of the objects +growing more confused connected with the idea of approach. + +38. Hence also it doth appear, there may be good use of computation, by +lines and angles, in optics(319); not that the mind judges of distance +immediately by them, but because it judges by somewhat which is connected +with them, and to the determination whereof they may be subservient. Thus, +the mind judging of the distance of an object by the confusedness of its +appearance, and this confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked +eye, according as the object is seen by rays more or less diverging, it +follows that a man may make use of the divergency of the rays, in +computing the apparent distance, though not for its own sake, yet on +account of the confusion with which it is connected. But so it is, the +confusion itself is entirely neglected by mathematicians, as having no +necessary relation with distance, such as the greater or lesser angles of +divergency are conceived to have. And these (especially for that they fall +under mathematical computation) are alone regarded, in determining the +apparent places of objects, as though they were the sole and immediate +cause of the judgments the mind makes of distance. Whereas, in truth, they +should not at all be regarded in themselves, or any otherwise than as they +are supposed to be the cause of confused vision. + +39. The not considering of this has been a fundamental and perplexing +oversight. For proof whereof, we need go no farther than the case before +us. It having been observed that the most diverging rays brought into the +mind the idea of nearest distance, and that still as the divergency +decreased the distance increased, and it being thought the connexion +between the various degrees of divergency and distance was immediate--this +naturally leads one to conclude, from an ill-grounded analogy, that +converging rays shall make an object appear at an immense distance, and +that, as the convergency increases, the distance (if it were possible) +should do so likewise. That this was the cause of Dr. Barrow's mistake is +evident from his own words which we have quoted. Whereas had the learned +Doctor observed that diverging and converging rays, how opposite soever +they may seem, do nevertheless agree in producing the same effect, to wit, +confusedness of vision, greater degrees whereof are produced +indifferently, either as the divergency or convergency of the rays +increaseth; and that it is by this effect, which is the same in both, that +either the divergency or convergency is perceived by the eye--I say, had he +but considered this, it is certain he would have made a quite contrary +judgment, and rightly concluded that those rays which fall on the eye with +greater degrees of convergency should make the object from whence they +proceed appear by so much the nearer. But it is plain it was impossible +for any man to attain to a right notion of this matter so long as he had +regard only to lines and angles, and did not apprehend the true nature of +vision, and how far it was of mathematical consideration. + +40. Before we dismiss this subject, it is fit we take notice of a query +relating thereto, proposed by the ingenious Mr. Molyneux, in his _Treatise +of Dioptrics_ (par. i. prop. 31. sect. 9), where, speaking of the +difficulty we have been explaining, he has these words: "And so he (i.e. +Dr. Barrow) leaves this difficulty to the solution of others, which I +(after so great an example) shall do likewise; but with the resolution of +the same admirable author, of not quitting the evident doctrine which we +have before laid down, for determining the _locus objecti_, on account of +being pressed by one difficulty, which seems inexplicable till a more +intimate knowledge of the visive faculty be obtained by mortals. In the +meantime I propose it to the consideration of the ingenious, whether the +_locus apparens_ of an object placed as in this ninth section be not as +much before the eye as the distinct base is behind the eye?" To which +query we may venture to answer in the negative. For, in the present case, +the rule for determining the distance of the distinct base, or respective +focus from the glass is this: _As the difference between the distance of +the object and focus is to the focus or focal length, so the distance of +the object from the glass is to the distance of the respective focus or +distinct base from the glass._ (Molyneux, _Dioptr._, par. i. prop. 5.) Let +us now suppose the object to be placed at the distance of the focal +length, and one-half of the focal length from the glass, and the eye close +to the glass. Hence it will follow, by the rule, that the distance of the +distinct base behind the eye is double the true distance of the object +before the eye. If, therefore, Mr. Molyneux's conjecture held good, it +would follow that the eye should see the object twice as far off as it +really is; and in other cases at three or four times its due distance, or +more. But this manifestly contradicts experience, the object never +appearing, at farthest, beyond its due distance. Whatever, therefore, is +built on this supposition (vid. corol. i. prop. 57. ibid.) comes to the +ground along with it. + + ------------------------------------- + +41. From what hath been premised, it is a manifest consequence, that a man +born blind, being made to see, would at first have no idea of distance by +sight: the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, +would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The objects +intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth they are) no other +than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as near to him +as the perceptions of pain or pleasure, or the most inward passions of his +soul. For, our judging objects perceived by sight to be at any distance, +or without the mind, is (vid. sect, xxviii.) entirely the effect of +experience; which one in those circumstances could not yet have attained +to(320). + +42. It is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition--that men judge of +distance by the angle of the optic axes, just as one in the dark, or a +blind man by the angle comprehended by two sticks, one whereof he held in +each hand(321). For, if this were true, it would follow that one blind +from his birth, being made to see, should stand in need of no new +experience, in order to perceive distance by sight. But that this is false +has, I think, been sufficiently demonstrated. + +43. And perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find that even those +who from their birth have grown up in a continued habit of seeing are +irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side, to wit, in thinking what they +see to be at a distance from them. For, at this time it seems agreed on +all hands, by those who have had any thoughts of that matter, that +colours, which are the proper and immediate object of sight, are not +without the mind.--But then, it will be said, by sight we have also the +ideas of extension, and figure, and motion; all which may well be thought +without and at some distance from the mind, though colour should not. In +answer to this, I appeal to any man's experience, whether the visible +extension of any object do not appear as near to him as the colour of that +object; nay, whether they do not both seem to be in the very same place. +Is not the extension we see coloured, and is it possible for us, so much +as in thought, to separate and abstract colour from extension? Now, where +the extension is, there surely is the figure, and there the motion too. I +speak of those which are perceived by sight(322). + +44. But for a fuller explication of this point, and to shew that the +immediate objects of sight are not so much as the ideas or resemblances of +things placed at a distance, it is requisite that we look nearer into the +matter, and carefully observe what is meant in common discourse when one +says, that which he sees is at a distance from him. Suppose, for example, +that looking at the moon I should say it were fifty or sixty semidiameters +of the earth distant from me. Let us see what moon this is spoken of. It +is plain it cannot be the visible moon, or anything like the visible moon, +or that which I see--which is only a round luminous plain, of about thirty +visible points in diameter. For, in case I am carried from the place where +I stand directly towards the moon, it is manifest the object varies still +as I go on; and, by the time that I am advanced fifty or sixty +semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far from being near a small, +round, luminous flat that I shall perceive nothing like it--this object +having long since disappeared, and, if I would recover it, it must be by +going back to the earth from whence I set out(323). Again, suppose I +perceive by sight the faint and obscure idea of something, which I doubt +whether it be a man, or a tree, or a tower, but judge it to be at the +distance of about a mile. It is plain I cannot mean that what I see is a +mile off, or that it is the image or likeness of anything which is a mile +off; since that every step I take towards it the appearance alters, and +from being obscure, small, and faint, grows clear, large, and vigorous. +And when I come to the mile's end, that which I saw first is quite lost, +neither do I find anything in the likeness of it(324). + +45. In these and the like instances, the truth of the matter, I find, +stands thus:--Having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable +by touch(325)--as distance, tangible figure, and solidity--to have been +connected with certain ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas +of sight, forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted +ordinary course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an object, I +perceive a certain visible figure and colour, with some degree of +faintness and other circumstances, which, from what I have formerly +observed, determine me to think that if I advance forward so many paces, +miles, &c., I shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch. So +that, in truth and strictness of speech, I neither see distance itself, +nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I say, neither distance nor +things placed at a distance are themselves, or their ideas, truly +perceived by sight. This I am persuaded of, as to what concerns myself. +And I believe whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts, and +examine what he means by saying he sees this or that thing at a distance, +will agree with me, that what he sees only suggests to his understanding +that, after having passed a certain distance, to be measured by the motion +of his body, which is perceivable by touch(326), he shall come to perceive +such and such tangible ideas, which have been usually connected with such +and such visible ideas. But, that one might be deceived by these +suggestions of sense, and that there is no necessary connexion between +visible and tangible ideas suggested by them, we need go no farther than +the next looking-glass or picture to be convinced. Note that, when I speak +of tangible ideas, I take the word idea for any the immediate object of +sense, or understanding--in which large signification it is commonly used +by the moderns(327). + +46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest consequence that the ideas +of space, outness(328), and things placed at a distance are not, strictly +speaking, the object of sight(329); they are not otherwise perceived by +the eye than by the ear. Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along +the street; I look through the casement and see it; I walk out and enter +into it. Thus, common speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and +touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain the +ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different, and distinct from +each other; but, having been observed constantly to go together, they are +spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation of the noise, I +perceive the different distances of the coach, and know that it approaches +before I look out. Thus, by the ear I perceive distance just after the +same manner as I do by the eye. + +47. I do not nevertheless say I hear distance, in like manner as I say +that I see it--the ideas perceived by hearing not being so apt to be +confounded with the ideas of touch as those of sight are. So likewise a +man is easily convinced that bodies and external things are not properly +the object of hearing, but only sounds, by the mediation whereof the idea +of this or that body, or distance, is suggested to his thoughts. But then +one is with more difficulty brought to discern the difference there is +betwixt the ideas of sight and touch(330): though it be certain, a man no +more sees and feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the same +thing. + +48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought a great absurdity +to imagine that one and the same thing should have any more than one +extension and one figure. But, the extension and figure of a body being +let into the mind two ways, and that indifferently, either by sight or +touch, it seems to follow that we see the same extension and the same +figure which we feel. + +49. But, if we take a close and accurate view of the matter, it must be +acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object(331). That +which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another. If the +visible figure and extension be not the same with the tangible figure and +extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers +extensions. The true consequence is that the objects of sight and touch +are two distinct things(332). It may perhaps require some thought rightly +to conceive this distinction. And the difficulty seems not a little +increased, because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly the +same name as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is +connected--which doth of necessity arise from the use and end of +language(333). + +50. In order, therefore, to treat accurately and unconfusedly of vision, +we must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects apprehended by +the eye--the one primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by +intervention of the former. Those of the first sort neither are nor appear +to be without the mind, or at any distance off(334). They may, indeed, +grow greater or smaller, more confused, or more clear, or more faint. But +they do not, cannot approach, [or even seem to approach (335)] or recede +from us. Whenever we say an object is at a distance, whenever we say it +draws near, or goes farther off, we must always mean it of the latter +sort, which properly belong to the touch(336), and are not so truly +perceived as suggested by the eye, in like manner as thoughts by the ear. + +51. No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in +our ears but the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our +minds: in the very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the +understanding: so closely are they united that it is not in our power to +keep out the one except we exclude the other also. We even act in all +respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves. So likewise the +secondary objects, or those which are only suggested by sight, do often +more strongly affect us, and are more regarded, than the proper objects of +that sense; along with which they enter into the mind, and with which they +have a far more strict connexion than ideas have with words(337). Hence it +is we find it so difficult to discriminate between the immediate and +mediate objects of sight, and are so prone to attribute to the former what +belongs only to the latter. They are, as it were, most closely twisted, +blended, and incorporated together. And the prejudice is confirmed and +riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language, +and want of reflection. However, I doubt not but anyone that shall +attentively consider what we have already said, and shall say upon this +subject before we have done (especially if he pursue it in his own +thoughts), may be able to deliver himself from that prejudice. Sure I am, +it is worth some attention to whoever would understand the true nature of +vision. + + ------------------------------------- + +52. I have now done with Distance, and proceed to shew how it is that we +perceive by sight the Magnitude of objects(338). It is the opinion of some +that we do it by angles, or by angles in conjunction with distance. But, +neither angles nor distance being perceivable by sight(339), and the +things we see being in truth at no distance from us(340), it follows that, +as we have shewn lines and angles not to be the medium the mind makes use +of in apprehending the apparent place, so neither are they the medium +whereby it apprehends the apparent magnitude of objects. + +53. It is well known that the same extension at a near distance shall +subtend a greater angle, and at a farther distance a lesser angle. And by +this principle (we are told) the mind estimates the magnitude of an +object(341), comparing the angle under which it is seen with its distance, +and thence inferring the magnitude thereof. What inclines men to this +mistake (beside the humour of making one see by geometry) is, that the +same perceptions or ideas which suggest distance do also suggest +magnitude. But, if we examine it, we shall find they suggest the latter as +immediately as the former. I say, they do not first suggest distance and +then leave it to the judgment to use that as a medium whereby to collect +the magnitude; but they have as close and immediate a connexion with the +magnitude as with the distance; and suggest magnitude as independently of +distance, as they do distance independently of magnitude. All which will +be evident to whoever considers what has been already said and what +follows. + +54. It has been shewn there are two sorts of objects apprehended by sight, +each whereof has its distinct magnitude, or extension--the one, properly +tangible, i.e. to be perceived and measured by touch, and not immediately +falling under the sense of seeing; the other, properly and immediately +visible, by mediation of which the former is brought in view. Each of +these magnitudes are greater or lesser, according as they contain in them +more or fewer points, they being made up of points or minimums. For, +whatever may be said of extension in abstract(342), it is certain sensible +extension is not infinitely divisible(343). There is a _minimum +tangibile_, and a _minimum visibile_, beyond which sense cannot perceive. +This every one's experience will inform him. + +55. The magnitude of the object which exists without the mind, and is at a +distance, continues always invariably the same: but, the visible object +still changing as you approach to or recede from the tangible object, it +hath no fixed and determinate greatness. Whenever therefore we speak of +the magnitude of any thing, for instance a tree or a house, we must mean +the tangible magnitude; otherwise there can be nothing steady and free +from ambiguity spoken of it(344). Now, though the tangible and visible +magnitude do in truth belong to two distinct objects(345), I shall +nevertheless (especially since those objects are called by the same name, +and are observed to coexist(346)), to avoid tediousness and singularity of +speech, sometimes speak of them as belonging to one and the same thing. + +56. Now, in order to discover by what means the magnitude of tangible +objects is perceived by sight, I need only reflect on what passes in my +own mind, and observe what those things be which introduce the ideas of +greater or lesser into my thoughts when I look on any object. And these I +find to be, _first_, the magnitude or extension of the visible object, +which, being immediately perceived by sight, is connected with that other +which is tangible and placed at a distance: _secondly_, the confusion or +distinctness: and _thirdly_, the vigorousness or faintness of the +aforesaid visible appearance. _Caeteris paribus_, by how much the greater +or lesser the visible object is, by so much the greater or lesser do I +conclude the tangible object to be. But, be the idea immediately perceived +by sight never so large, yet, if it be withal confused, I judge the +magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it be distinct and clear, I +judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I apprehend it to be yet greater. +What is here meant by confusion and faintness has been explained in sect. +35. + +57. Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do, in like manner as +those of distance, depend on the disposition of the eye; also on the +figure, number, and situation(347) of intermediate objects, and other +circumstances that have been observed to attend great or small tangible +magnitudes. Thus, for instance, the very same quantity of visible +extension which in the figure of a tower doth suggest the idea of great +magnitude shall in the figure of a man suggest the idea of much smaller +magnitude. That this is owing to the experience we have had of the usual +bigness of a tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told. + +58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have no more a +necessary connexion with little or great magnitude than they have with +little or great distance. As they suggest the latter, so they suggest the +former to our minds. And, by consequence, if it were not for experience, +we should no more judge a faint or confused appearance to be connected +with great or little magnitude than we should that it was connected with +great or little distance. + +59. Nor will it be found that great or small visible magnitude hath any +necessary relation to great or small tangible magnitude--so that the one +may certainly and infallibly be inferred from the other. But, before we +come to the proof of this, it is fit we consider the difference there is +betwixt the extension and figure which is the proper object of touch, and +that other which is termed visible; and how the former is principally, +though not immediately, taken notice of when we look at any object. This +has been before mentioned(348), but we shall here inquire into the cause +thereof. We regard the objects that environ us in proportion as they are +adapted to benefit or injure our own bodies, and thereby produce in our +minds the sensations of pleasure or pain. Now, bodies operating on our +organs by an immediate application, and the hurt and advantage arising +therefrom depending altogether on the tangible, and not at all on the +visible, qualities of any object--this is a plain reason why those should +be regarded by us much more than these. And for this end [chiefly(349)] +the visive sense seems to have been bestowed on animals, to wit, that, by +the perception of visible ideas (which in themselves are not capable of +affecting or anywise altering the frame of their bodies), they may be able +to foresee(350) (from the experience they have had what tangible ideas are +connected with such and such visible ideas) the damage or benefit which is +like to ensue upon the application of their own bodies to this or that +body which is at a distance. Which foresight, how necessary it is to the +preservation of an animal, every one's experience can inform him. Hence it +is that, when we look at an object, the tangible figure and extension +thereof are principally attended to; whilst there is small heed taken of +the visible figure and magnitude, which, though more immediately +perceived, do less sensibly affect us, and are not fitted to produce any +alteration in our bodies. + +60. That the matter of fact is true will be evident to any one who +considers that a man placed at ten foot distance is thought as great as if +he were placed at the distance only of five foot; which is true, not with +relation to the visible, but tangible greatness of the object: the visible +magnitude being far greater at one station than it is at the other. + +61. Inches, feet, &c. are settled, stated lengths, whereby we measure +objects and estimate their magnitude. We say, for example, an object +appears to be six inches, or six foot long. Now, that this cannot be meant +of visible inches, &c. is evident, because a visible inch is itself no +constant determinate magnitude(351), and cannot therefore serve to mark +out and determine the magnitude of any other thing. Take an inch marked +upon a ruler; view it successively, at the distance of half a foot, a +foot, a foot and a half, &c. from the eye: at each of which, and at all +the intermediate distances, the inch shall have a different visible +extension, i.e. there shall be more or fewer points discerned in it. Now, +I ask which of all these various extensions is that stated determinate one +that is agreed on for a common measure of other magnitudes? No reason can +be assigned why we should pitch on one more than another. And, except +there be some invariable determinate extension fixed on to be marked by +the word inch, it is plain it can be used to little purpose; and to say a +thing contains this or that number of inches shall imply no more than that +it is extended, without bringing any particular idea of that extension +into the mind. Farther, an inch and a foot, from different distances, +shall both exhibit the same visible magnitude, and yet at the same time +you shall say that one seems several times greater than the other. From +all which it is manifest, that the judgments we make of the magnitude of +objects by sight are altogether in reference to their tangible extension. +Whenever we say an object is great or small, of this or that determinate +measure, I say, it must be meant of the tangible and not the visible +extension(352), which, though immediately perceived, is nevertheless +little taken notice of. + +62. Now, that there is no necessary connexion between these two distinct +extensions is evident from hence--because our eyes might have been framed +in such a manner as to be able to see nothing but what were less than the +_minimum tangibile_. In which case it is not impossible we might have +perceived all the immediate objects of sight the very same that we do now; +but unto those visible appearances there would not be connected those +different tangible magnitudes that are now. Which shews the judgments we +make of the magnitude of things placed at a distance, from the various +greatness of the immediate objects of sight, do not arise from any +essential or necessary, but only a customary, tie which has been observed +betwixt them. + +63. Moreover, it is not only certain that any idea of sight might not have +been connected with this or that idea of touch we now observe to accompany +it, but also that the greater visible magnitudes might have been connected +with and introduced into our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, and the +lesser visible magnitudes greater tangible magnitudes. Nay, that it +actually is so, we have daily experience--that object which makes a strong +and large appearance not seeming near so great as another the visible +magnitude whereof is much less, but more faint,(353) and the appearance +upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower on the retina, which +faintness and situation suggest both greater magnitude and greater +distance. + +64. From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest that, as we do +not perceive the magnitude of objects immediately by sight, so neither do +we perceive them by the mediation of anything which has a necessary +connexion with them. Those ideas that now suggest unto us the various +magnitudes of external objects before we touch them might possibly have +suggested no such thing; or they might have signified them in a direct +contrary manner, so that the very same ideas on the perception whereof we +judge an object to be small might as well have served to make us conclude +it great;--those ideas being in their own nature equally fitted to bring +into our minds the idea of small or great, or no size at all, of outward +objects(354), just as the words of any language are in their own nature +indifferent to signify this or that thing, or nothing at all. + +65. As we see distance so we see magnitude. And we see both in the same +way that we see shame or anger in the looks of a man. Those passions are +themselves invisible; they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with +colours and alterations of countenance which are the immediate object of +vision, and which signify them for no other reason than barely because +they have been observed to accompany them. Without which experience we +should no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than of gladness. + +66. We are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine those things which +are perceived only by the mediation of others to be themselves the +immediate objects of sight, or at least to have in their own nature a +fitness to be suggested by them before ever they had been experienced to +coexist with them. From which prejudice every one perhaps will not find it +easy to emancipate himself, by any the clearest convictions of reason. And +there are some grounds to think that, if there was one only invariable and +universal language in the world, and that men were born with the faculty +of speaking it, it would be the opinion of some, that the ideas in other +men's minds were properly perceived by the ear, or had at least a +necessary and inseparable tie with the sounds that were affixed to them. +All which seems to arise from want of a due application of our discerning +faculty, thereby to discriminate between the ideas that are in our +understandings, and consider them apart from each other; which would +preserve us from confounding those that are different, and make us see +what ideas do, and what do not, include or imply this or that other +idea(355). + + ------------------------------------- + +67. There is a celebrated phenomenon(356) the solution whereof I shall +attempt to give, by the principles that have been laid down, in reference +to the manner wherein we apprehend by sight the magnitude of objects.--The +apparent magnitude of the moon, when placed in the horizon, is much +greater than when it is in the meridian, though the angle under which the +diameter of the moon is seen be not observed greater in the former case +than in the latter; and the horizontal moon doth not constantly appear of +the same bigness, but at some times seemeth far greater than at others. + +68. Now, in order to explain the reason of the moon's appearing greater +than ordinary in the horizon, it must be observed that the particles which +compose our atmosphere do intercept the rays of light proceeding from any +object to the eye; and, by how much the greater is the portion of +atmosphere interjacent between the object and the eye, by so much the more +are the rays intercepted, and, by consequence, the appearance of the +object rendered more faint--every object appearing more vigorous or more +faint in proportion as it sendeth more or fewer rays into the eye. Now, +between the eye and the moon when situated in the horizon there lies a far +greater quantity of atmosphere than there does when the moon is in the +meridian. Whence it comes to pass, that the appearance of the horizontal +moon is fainter, and therefore, by sect. 56, it should be thought bigger +in that situation than in the meridian, or in any other elevation above +the horizon. + +69. Farther, the air being variously impregnated, sometimes more and +sometimes less, with vapours and exhalations fitted to retund and +intercept the rays of light, it follows that the appearance of the +horizontal moon hath not always an equal faintness, and, by consequence, +that luminary, though in the very same situation, is at one time judged +greater than at another. + +70. That we have here given the true account of the phenomena of the +horizontal moon, will, I suppose, be farther evident to any one from the +following considerations:--_First_, it is plain, that which in this case +suggests the idea of greater magnitude, must be something which is itself +perceived; for, that which is unperceived cannot suggest to our perception +any other thing(357). _Secondly_, it must be something that does not +constantly remain the same, but is subject to some change or variation; +since the appearance of the horizontal moon varies, being at one time +greater than at another. [_Thirdly_, it must not lie in the circumjacent +or intermediate objects, such as mountains, houses, fields, &c.; because +that when all those objects are excluded from sight the appearance is as +great as ever(358).] And yet, _thirdly_(359), it cannot be the visible +figure or magnitude; since that remains the same, or is rather lesser, by +how much the moon is nearer to the horizon. It remains therefore, that the +true cause is that affection or alteration of the visible appearance, +which proceeds from the greater paucity of rays arriving at the eye, and +which I term faintness: since this answers all the forementioned +conditions, and I am not conscious of any other perception that does. + +71. Add to this that in misty weather it is a common observation, that the +appearance of the horizontal moon is far larger than usual, which greatly +conspires with and strengthens our opinion. Neither would it prove in the +least irreconcilable with what we have said, if the horizontal moon should +chance sometimes to seem enlarged beyond its usual extent, even in more +serene weather. For, we must not only have regard to the mist which +happens to be in the place where we stand; we ought also to take into our +thoughts the whole sum of vapours and exhalations which lie betwixt the +eye and the moon: all which co-operating to render the appearance of the +moon more faint, and thereby increase its magnitude, it may chance to +appear greater than it usually does even in the horizontal position, at a +time when, though there be no extraordinary fog or haziness just in the +place where we stand, yet the air between the eye and the moon, taken +altogether, may be loaded with a greater quantity of interspersed vapours +and exhalations than at other times(360). + +72. It may be objected that, in consequence of our principles, the +interposition of a body in some degree opaque, which may intercept a great +part of the rays of light, should render the appearance of the moon in the +meridian as large as when it is viewed in the horizon. To which I answer, +it is not faintness anyhow applied that suggests greater magnitude; there +being no necessary, but only an experimental, connexion between those two +things. It follows that the faintness which enlarges the appearance must +be applied in such sort, and with such circumstances, as have been +observed to attend the vision of great magnitudes. When from a distance we +behold great objects, the particles of the intermediate air and vapours, +which are themselves unperceivable, do interrupt the rays of light, and +thereby render the appearance less strong and vivid. Now, faintness of +appearance, caused in this sort, hath been experienced to co-exist with +great magnitude. But when it is caused by the interposition of an opaque +sensible body, this circumstance alters the case; so that a faint +appearance this way caused does not suggest greater magnitude, because it +hath not been experienced to co-exist with it. + +73. Faintness, as well as all other ideas or perceptions which suggest +magnitude or distance, does it in the same way that words suggest the +notions to which they are annexed. Now, it is known a word pronounced with +certain circumstances, or in a certain context with other words, hath not +always the same import and signification that it hath when pronounced in +some other circumstances, or different context of words. The very same +visible appearance, as to faintness and all other respects, if placed on +high, shall not suggest the same magnitude that it would if it were seen +at an equal distance on a level with the eye. The reason whereof is, that +we are rarely accustomed to view objects at a great height; our concerns +lie among things situated rather before than above us; and accordingly our +eyes are not placed on the top of our heads, but in such a position as is +most convenient for us to see distant objects standing in our way. And, +this situation of them being a circumstance which usually attends the +vision of distant objects, we may from hence account for (what is commonly +observed) an object's appearing of different magnitude, even with respect +to its horizontal extension, on the top of a steeple, e.g. a hundred feet +high, to one standing below, from what it would if placed at a hundred +feet distance, on a level with his eye. For, it hath been shewn that the +judgment we make on the magnitude of a thing depends not on the visible +appearance only, but also on divers other circumstances, any one of which +being omitted or varied may suffice to make some alteration in our +judgment. Hence, the circumstance of viewing a distant object in such a +situation as is usual and suits with the ordinary posture of the head and +eyes, being omitted, and instead thereof a different situation of the +object, which requires a different posture of the head, taking place--it is +not to be wondered at if the magnitude be judged different. But it will be +demanded, why a high object should constantly appear less than an +equidistant low object of the same dimensions; for so it is observed to +be. It may indeed be granted that the variation of some circumstances may +vary the judgment made on the magnitude of high objects, which we are less +used to look at; but it does not hence appear why they should be judged +less rather than greater? I answer, that in case the magnitude of distant +objects was suggested by the extent of their visible appearance alone, and +thought proportional thereto, it is certain they would then be judged much +less than now they seem to be. (Vid. sect. 79.) But, several circumstances +concurring to form the judgment we make on the magnitude of distant +objects, by means of which they appear far larger than others whose +visible appearance hath an equal or even greater extension, it follows +that upon the change or omission of any of those circumstances which are +wont to attend the vision of distant objects, and so come to influence the +judgments made on their magnitude, they shall proportionally appear less +than otherwise they would. For, any of those things that caused an object +to be thought greater than in proportion to its visible extension being +either omitted, or applied without the usual circumstances, the judgment +depends more entirely on the visible extension; and consequently the +object must be judged less. Thus, in the present case the situation of the +thing seen being different from what it usually is in those objects we +have occasion to view, and whose magnitude we observe, it follows that the +very same object being a hundred feet high, should seem less than if it +was a hundred feet off, on (or nearly on) a level with the eye. What has +been here set forth seems to me to have no small share in contributing to +magnify the appearance of the horizontal moon, and deserves not to be +passed over in the explication of it. + +74. If we attentively consider the phenomenon before us, we shall find the +not discerning between the mediate and immediate objects of sight to be +the chief cause of the difficulty that occurs in the explication of it. +The magnitude of the visible moon, or that which is the proper and +immediate object of vision(361), is no greater when the moon is in the +horizon than when it is in the meridian. How comes it, therefore, to seem +greater in one situation than the other? What is it can put this cheat on +the understanding? It has no other perception of the moon than what it +gets by sight. And that which is seen is of the same extent--I say, the +visible appearance hath the very same, or rather a less, magnitude, when +the moon is viewed in the horizontal than when in the meridional position. +And yet it is esteemed greater in the former than in the latter. Herein +consists the difficulty; which doth vanish and admit of the most easy +solution, if we consider that as the visible moon is not greater in the +horizon than in the meridian, so neither is it thought to be so. It hath +been already shewn that, in any act of vision, the visible object +absolutely, or in itself, is little taken notice of--the mind still +carrying its view from that to some tangible ideas, which have been +observed to be connected with it, and by that means come to be suggested +by it. So that when a thing is said to appear great or small, or whatever +estimate be made of the magnitude of any thing, this is meant not of the +visible but of the tangible object. This duly considered, it will be no +hard matter to reconcile the seeming contradiction there is, that the moon +should appear of a different bigness, the visible magnitude thereof +remaining still the same. For, by sect. 56, the very same visible +extension, with a different faintness, shall suggest a different tangible +extension. When therefore the horizontal moon is said to appear greater +than the meridional moon, this must be understood, not of a greater +visible extension, but of a greater tangible extension, which, by reason +of the more than ordinary faintness of the visible appearance, is +suggested to the mind along with it. + +75. Many attempts have been made by learned men to account for this +appearance(362). Gassendus(363), Des Cartes(364), Hobbes(365), and several +others have employed their thoughts on that subject; but how fruitless and +unsatisfactory their endeavours have been is sufficiently shewn in the +_Philosophical Transactions_(366) (Numb. 187, p. 314), where you may see +their several opinions at large set forth and confuted, not without some +surprise at the gross blunders that ingenious men have been forced into by +endeavouring to reconcile this appearance with the ordinary principles of +optics(367). Since the writing of which there hath been published in the +_Transactions_ (Numb. 187, p. 323) another paper relating to the same +affair, by the celebrated Dr. Wallis, wherein he attempts to account for +that phenomenon; which, though it seems not to contain anything new, or +different from what had been said before by others, I shall nevertheless +consider in this place. + +76. His opinion, in short, is this:--We judge not of the magnitude of an +object by the optic angle alone, but by the optic angle in conjunction +with the distance. Hence, though the angle remain the same, or even become +less, yet, if withal the distance seem to have been increased, the object +shall appear greater. Now, one way whereby we estimate the distance of +anything is by the number and extent of the intermediate objects. When +therefore the moon is seen in the horizon, the variety of fields, houses, +&c. together with the large prospect of the wide extended land or sea that +lies between the eye and the utmost limb of the horizon, suggest unto the +mind the idea of greater distance, and consequently magnify the +appearance. And this, according to Dr. Wallis, is the true account of the +extraordinary largeness attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon, at +a time when the angle subtended by its diameter is not one jot greater +than it used to be. + +77. With reference to this opinion, not to repeat what has been already +said concerning distance(368), I shall only observe, _first_, that if the +prospect of interjacent objects be that which suggests the idea of farther +distance, and this idea of farther distance be the cause that brings into +the mind the idea of greater magnitude, it should hence follow that if one +looked at the horizontal moon from behind a wall, it would appear no +bigger than ordinary. For, in that case, the wall interposing cuts off all +that prospect of sea and land, &c. which might otherwise increase the +apparent distance, and thereby the apparent magnitude of the moon. Nor +will it suffice to say, the memory doth even then suggest all that extent +of land, &c. which lies within the horizon, which suggestion occasions a +sudden judgment of sense, that the moon is farther off and larger than +usual. For, ask any man who from such a station beholding the horizontal +moon shall think her greater than usual, whether he hath at that time in +his mind any idea of the intermediate objects, or long tract of land that +lies between his eye and the extreme edge of the horizon? and whether it +be that idea which is the cause of his making the aforementioned judgment? +He will, without doubt, reply in the negative, and declare the horizontal +moon shall appear greater than the meridional, though he never thinks of +all or any of those things that lie between him and it. [And as for the +absurdity of any idea's introducing into the mind another, whilst itself +is not perceived, this has already fallen under our observation, and is +too evident to need any farther enlargement on it(369).] _Secondly_, it +seems impossible, by this hypothesis, to account for the moon's appearing, +in the very same situation, at one time greater than at another; which, +nevertheless, has been shewn to be very agreeable to the principles we +have laid down, and receives a most easy and natural explication from +them. [(370)For the further clearing up of this point, it is to be +observed, that what we immediately and properly see are only lights and +colours in sundry situations and shades, and degrees of faintness and +clearness, confusion and distinctness. All which visible objects are only +in the mind; nor do they suggest aught external(371), whether distance or +magnitude, otherwise than by habitual connexion, as words do things. We +are also to remark, that beside the straining of the eyes, and beside the +vivid and faint, the distinct and confused appearances (which, bearing +some proportion to lines and angles, have been substituted instead of them +in the foregoing part of this Treatise), there are other means which +suggest both distance and magnitude--particularly the situation of visible +points or objects, as upper or lower; the former suggesting a farther +distance and greater magnitude, the latter a nearer distance and lesser +magnitude--all which is an effect only of custom and experience, there +being really nothing intermediate in the line of distance between the +uppermost and the lowermost, which are both equidistant, or rather at no +distance from the eye; as there is also nothing in upper or lower which by +necessary connexion should suggest greater or lesser magnitude. Now, as +these customary experimental means of suggesting distance do likewise +suggest magnitude, so they suggest the one as immediately as the other. I +say, they do not (vide sect. 53) first suggest distance, and then leave +the mind from thence to infer or compute magnitude, but suggest magnitude +as immediately and directly as they suggest distance.] + +78. This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear instance of the +insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining the way wherein the mind +perceives and estimates the magnitude of outward objects. There is, +nevertheless, a use of computation by them(372)--in order to determine the +apparent magnitude of things, so far as they have a connexion with and are +proportional to those other ideas or perceptions which are the true and +immediate occasions that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude of +things. But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning +mathematical computation in optics--that it can never(373) be very precise +and exact(374), since the judgments we make of the magnitude of external +things do often depend on several circumstances which are not proportional +to or capable of being defined by lines and angles. + +79. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this consequence, to +wit, that a man born blind, and made to see, would, at first opening of +his eyes, make a very different judgment of the magnitude of objects +intromitted by them from what others do. He would not consider the ideas +of sight with reference to, or as having any connexion with, the ideas of +touch. His view of them being entirely terminated within themselves, he +can no otherwise judge them great or small than as they contain a greater +or lesser number of visible points. Now, it being certain that any visible +point can cover or exclude from view only one other visible point, it +follows that whatever object intercepts the view of another hath an equal +number of visible points with it; and, consequently, they shall both be +thought by him to have the same magnitude. Hence, it is evident one in +those circumstances would judge his thumb, with which he might hide a +tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to that tower; or his hand, the +interposition whereof might conceal the firmament from his view, equal to +the firmament: how great an inequality soever there may, in our +apprehensions, seem to be betwixt those two things, because of the +customary and close connexion that has grown up in our minds between the +objects of sight and touch, whereby the very different and distinct ideas +of those two senses are so blended and confounded together as to be +mistaken for one and the same thing--out of which prejudice we cannot +easily extricate ourselves. + +80. For the better explaining the nature of vision, and setting the manner +wherein we perceive magnitudes in a due light, I shall proceed to make +some observations concerning matters relating thereto, whereof the want of +reflection, and duly separating between tangible and visible ideas, is apt +to create in us mistaken and confused notions. And, _first_, I shall +observe, that the _minimum visibile_ is exactly equal in all beings +whatsoever that are endowed with the visive faculty(375). No exquisite +formation of the eye, no peculiar sharpness of sight, can make it less in +one creature than in another; for, it not being distinguishable into +parts, nor in anywise consisting of them, it must necessarily be the same +to all. For, suppose it otherwise, and that the _minimum visibile_ of a +mite, for instance, be less than the _minimum visibile_ of a man; the +latter therefore may, by detraction of some part, be made equal to the +former. It doth therefore consist of parts, which is inconsistent with the +notion of a _minimum visibile_ or point. + +81. It will, perhaps, be objected, that the _minimum visibile_ of a man +doth really and in itself contain parts whereby it surpasses that of a +mite, though they are not perceivable by the man. To which I answer, the +_minimum visibile_ having (in like manner as all other the proper and +immediate objects of sight) been shewn not to have any existence without +the mind of him who sees it, it follows there cannot be any part of it +that is not actually perceived and therefore visible. Now, for any object +to contain several distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a +_minimum visibile_, is a manifest contradiction. + +82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal number. It is +every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near +objects as when it is extended to larger and remoter ones. For, it being +impossible that one _minimum visibile_ should obscure or keep out of sight +more than one other, it is a plain consequence that, when my view is on +all sides bounded by the walls of my study, I see just as many visible +points as I could in case that, by the removal of the study-walls and all +other obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields, +mountains, sea, and open firmament. For, so long as I am shut up within +the walls, by their interposition every point of the external objects is +covered from my view. But, each point that is seen being able to cover or +exclude from sight one only other corresponding point, it follows that, +whilst my sight is confined to those narrow walls, I see as many points, +or _minima visibilia_, as I should were those walls away, by looking on +all the external objects whose prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever, +therefore, we are said to have a greater prospect at one time than +another, this must be understood with relation, not to the proper and +immediate, but the secondary and mediate objects of vision--which, as hath +been shewn, do properly belong to the touch. + +83. The visive faculty, considered with reference to its immediate +objects, may be found to labour of two defects. _First_, in respect of the +extent or number of visible points that are at once perceivable by it, +which is narrow and limited to a certain degree. It can take in at one +view but a certain determinate number of _minima visibilia_, beyond which +it cannot extend its prospect. _Secondly_, our sight is defective in that +its view is not only narrow, but also for the most part confused. Of those +things that we take in at one prospect, we can see but a few at once +clearly and unconfusedly; and the more we fix our sight on any one object, +by so much the darker and more indistinct shall the rest appear. + +84. Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may imagine as many +perfections, to wit, 1st. That of comprehending in one view a greater +number of visible points; 2dly, of being able to view them all equally and +at once, with the utmost clearness and distinction. That those perfections +are not actually in some intelligences of a different order and capacity +from ours, it is impossible for us to know(376). + +85. In neither of those two ways do microscopes contribute to the +improvement of sight. For, when we look through a microscope, we neither +see more visible points, nor are the collateral points more distinct, than +when we look with the naked eye at objects placed at a due distance. A +microscope brings us, as it were, into a new world. It presents us with a +new scene of visible objects, quite different from what we behold with the +naked eye. But herein consists the most remarkable difference, to wit, +that whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a certain +connexion with tangible objects, whereby we are taught to foresee what +will ensue upon the approach or application of distant objects to the +parts of our own body--which much conduceth to its preservation(377)--there +is not the like connexion between things tangible and those visible +objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope. + +86. Hence, it is evident that, were our eyes turned into the nature of +microscopes, we should not be much benefitted by the change. We should be +deprived of the forementioned advantage we at present receive by the +visive faculty, and have left us only the empty amusement of seeing, +without any other benefit arising from it. But, in that case, it will +perhaps be said, our sight would be endued with a far greater sharpness +and penetration than it now hath. But I would fain know wherein consists +that sharpness which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight. It is +certain, from what we have already shewn(378), that the _minimum visibile_ +is never greater or lesser, but in all cases constantly the same. And in +the case of microscopical eyes, I see only this difference, to wit, that +upon the ceasing of a certain observable connexion betwixt the divers +perceptions of sight and touch, which before enabled us to regulate our +actions by the eye, it would now be rendered utterly unserviceable to that +purpose. + +87. Upon the whole, it seems that if we consider the use and end of sight, +together with the present state and circumstances of our being, we shall +not find any great cause to complain of any defect or imperfection in it, +or easily conceive how it could be mended. With such admirable wisdom is +that faculty contrived, both for the pleasure and convenience of life. + + ------------------------------------- + +88. Having finished what I intended to say concerning the Distance and +Magnitude of objects, I come now to treat of the manner wherein the mind +perceives by sight their Situation(379). Among the discoveries of the last +age, it is reputed none of the least, that the manner of vision has been +more clearly explained than ever it had been before. There is, at this +day, no one ignorant that the pictures of external objects are painted on +the retina or fund of the eye; that we can see nothing which is not so +painted; and that, according as the picture is more distinct or confused, +so also is the perception we have of the object(380). But then, in this +explication of vision, there occurs one mighty difficulty, viz. the +objects are painted in an inverted order on the bottom of the eye: the +upper part of any object being painted on the lower part of the eye, and +the lower part of the object on the upper part of the eye; and so also as +to right and left. Since therefore the pictures are thus inverted, it is +demanded, how it comes to pass that we see the objects erect and in their +natural posture? + + [Illustration] + + Figure 4 + + +89. In answer to this difficulty, we are told that the mind, perceiving an +impulse of a ray of light on the upper part of the eye, considers this ray +as coming in a direct line from the lower part of the object; and, in like +manner, tracing the ray that strikes on the lower part of the eye, it is +directed to the upper part of the object. Thus, in the adjacent figure, +_C_, the lower point of the object _ABC_, is projected on _c_ the upper +part of the eye. So likewise, the highest point _A_ is projected on _a_ +the lowest part of the eye; which makes the representation _cba_ inverted. +But the mind--considering the stroke that is made on _c_ as coming in the +straight line _Cc_ from the lower end of the object; and the stroke or +impulse on _a_, as coming in the line _Aa_ from the upper end of the +object--is directed to make a right judgment of the situation of the object +_ABC_, notwithstanding the picture of it be inverted. Moreover, this is +illustrated by conceiving a blind man, who, holding in his hands two +sticks that cross each other, doth with them touch the extremities of an +object, placed in a perpendicular situation(381). It is certain this man +will judge that to be the upper part of the object which he touches with +the stick held in the undermost hand, and that to be the lower part of the +object which he touches with the stick in his uppermost hand. This is the +common explication of the erect appearance of objects, which is generally +received and acquiesced in, being (as Mr. Molyneux tells us, _Diopt._ part +ii. ch. vii. p. 289) "allowed by all men as satisfactory." + +90. But this account to me does not seem in any degree true. Did I +perceive those impulses, decussations, and directions of the rays of +light, in like manner as hath been set forth, then, indeed, it would not +at first view be altogether void of probability. And there might be some +pretence for the comparison of the blind man and his cross sticks. But the +case is far otherwise. I know very well that I perceive no such thing. +And, of consequence, I cannot thereby make an estimate of the situation of +objects. Moreover, I appeal to any one's experience, whether he be +conscious to himself that he thinks on the intersection made by the radius +pencils, or pursues the impulses they give in right lines, whenever he +perceives by sight the position of any object? To me it seems evident that +crossing and tracing of the rays, &c. is never thought on by children, +idiots, or, in truth, by any other, save only those who have applied +themselves to the study of optics. And for the mind to judge of the +situation of objects by those things without perceiving them, or to +perceive them without knowing it(382), take which you please, it is +perfectly beyond my comprehension. Add to this, that the explaining the +manner of vision by the example of cross sticks, and hunting for the +object along the axes of the radius pencils, doth suppose the proper +objects of sight to be perceived at a distance from us, contrary to what +hath been demonstrated(383). [We may therefore venture to pronounce this +opinion, concerning the way wherein the mind perceives the erect +appearance of objects, to be of a piece with those other tenets of writers +in optics, which in the foregoing parts of this treatise we have had +occasion to examine and refute(384).] + +91. It remains, therefore, that we look for some other explication of this +difficulty. And I believe it not impossible to find one, provided we +examine it to the bottom, and carefully distinguish between the ideas of +sight and touch; which cannot be too oft inculcated in treating of +vision(385). But, more especially throughout the consideration of this +affair, we ought to carry that distinction in our thoughts; for that from +want of a right understanding thereof, the difficulty of explaining erect +vision seems chiefly to arise. + +92. In order to disentangle our minds from whatever prejudices we may +entertain with relation to the subject in hand, nothing seems more +apposite than the taking into our thoughts the case of one born blind, and +afterwards, when grown up, made to see. And--though perhaps it may not be a +task altogether easy and familiar to us, to divest ourselves entirely of +the experiences received from sight, so as to be able to put our thoughts +exactly in the posture of such a one's--we must, nevertheless, as far as +possible, endeavour to frame true conceptions of what might reasonably be +supposed to pass in his mind(386). + +93. It is certain that a man actually blind, and who had continued so from +his birth, would, by the sense of feeling, attain to have ideas of upper +and lower. By the motion of his hand, he might discern the situation of +any tangible object placed within his reach. That part on which he felt +himself supported, or towards which he perceived his body to gravitate, he +would term _lower_, and the contrary to this _upper_; and accordingly +denominate whatsoever objects he touched. + +94. But then, whatever judgments he makes concerning the situation of +objects are confined to those only that are perceivable by touch. All +those things that are intangible, and of a spiritual nature--his thoughts +and desires, his passions, and in general all the modifications of his +soul--to these he would never apply the terms upper and lower, except only +in a metaphorical sense. He may perhaps, by way of allusion, speak of high +or low thoughts: but those terms, in their proper signification, would +never be applied to anything that was not conceived to exist without the +mind. For, a man born blind, and remaining in the same state, could mean +nothing else by the words higher and lower than a greater or lesser +distance from the earth; which distance he would measure by the motion or +application of his hand, or some other part of his body. It is, therefore, +evident that all those things which, in respect of each other, would by +him be thought higher or lower, must be such as were conceived to exist +without his mind, in the ambient space(387). + +95. Whence it plainly follows, that such a one, if we suppose him made to +see, would not at first sight think that anything he saw was high or low, +erect or inverted. For, it hath been already demonstrated, in sect. 41, +that he would not think the things he perceived by sight to be at any +distance from him, or without his mind. The objects to which he had +hitherto been used to apply the terms up and down, high and low, were such +only as affected, or were some way perceived by his touch. But the proper +objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct and +different from the former, and which can in no sort make themselves +perceived by touch. There is, therefore, nothing at all that could induce +him to think those terms applicable to them. Nor would he ever think it, +till such time as he had observed their connexion with tangible objects, +and the same prejudice(388) began to insinuate itself into his +understanding, which, from their infancy, had grown up in the +understandings of other men. + +96. To set this matter in a clearer light, I shall make use of an example. +Suppose the above-mentioned blind person, by his touch, perceives a man to +stand erect. Let us inquire into the manner of this. By the application of +his hand to the several parts of a human body, he had perceived different +tangible ideas; which being collected into sundry complex ones(389) have +distinct names annexed to them. Thus, one combination of a certain +tangible figure, bulk, and consistency of parts is called the head; +another the hand; a third the foot, and so of the rest--all which complex +ideas could, in his understanding, be made up only of ideas perceivable by +touch. He had also, by his touch, obtained an idea of earth or ground, +towards which he perceives the parts of his body to have a natural +tendency. Now--by _erect_ nothing more being meant than that perpendicular +position of a man wherein his feet are nearest to the earth--if the blind +person, by moving his hand over the parts of the man who stands before +him, do perceive the tangible ideas that compose the head to be farthest +from, and those that compose the feet to be nearest to, that other +combination of tangible ideas which he calls earth, he will denominate +that man erect. But, if we suppose him on a sudden to receive his sight, +and that he behold a man standing before him, it is evident, in that case, +he would neither judge the man he sees to be erect nor inverted; for he, +never having known those terms applied to any other save tangible things, +or which existed in the space without him, and what he sees neither being +tangible, nor perceived as existing without, he could not know that, in +propriety of language, they were applicable to it. + +97. Afterwards, when, upon turning his head or eyes up and down to the +right and left, he shall observe the visible objects to change, and shall +also attain to know that they are called by the same names, and connected +with the objects perceived by touch; then, indeed, he will come to speak +of them and their situation in the same terms that he has been used to +apply to tangible things: and those that he perceives by turning up his +eyes he will call upper, and those that by turning down his eyes he will +call lower. + +98. And this seems to me the true reason why he should think those objects +uppermost that are painted on the lower part of his eye. For, by turning +the eye up they shall be distinctly seen; as likewise they that are +painted on the highest part of the eye shall be distinctly seen by turning +the eye down, and are for that reason esteemed lowest. For we have shewn +that to the immediate objects of sight, considered in themselves, he would +not attribute the terms high and low. It must therefore be on account of +some circumstances which are observed to attend them. And these, it is +plain, are the actions of turning the eye up and down, which suggest a +very obvious reason why the mind should denominate the objects of sight +accordingly high or low. And, without this motion of the eye--this turning +it up and down in order to discern different objects--doubtless _erect_, +_inverse_, and other the like terms relating to the position of tangible +objects, would never have been transferred, or in any degree apprehended +to belong to the ideas of sight, the mere act of seeing including nothing +in it to that purpose; whereas the different situations of the eye +naturally direct the mind to make a suitable judgment of the situation of +objects intromitted by it(390). + +99. Farther, when he has by experience learned the connexion there is +between the several ideas of sight and touch, he will be able, by the +perception he has of the situation of visible things in respect of one +another, to make a sudden and true estimate of the situation of outward, +tangible things corresponding to them. And thus it is he shall +perceive(391) by sight the situation of external(392) objects, which do +not properly fall under that sense. + +100. I know we are very prone to think that, if just made to see, we +should judge of the situation of visible things as we do now. But, we are +also as prone to think that, at first sight, we should in the same way +apprehend the distance and magnitude of objects, as we do now; which hath +been shewn to be a false and groundless persuasion. And, for the like +reasons, the same censure may be passed on the positive assurance that +most men, before they have thought sufficiently of the matter, might have +of their being able to determine by the eye, at first view, whether +objects were erect or inverse. + +101. It will perhaps be objected to our opinion, that a man, for instance, +being thought erect when his feet are next the earth, and inverted when +his head is next the earth, it doth hence follow that, by the mere act of +vision, without any experience or altering the situation of the eye, we +should have determined whether he were erect or inverted. For both the +earth itself, and the limbs of the man who stands thereon, being equally +perceived by sight, one cannot choose seeing what part of the man is +nearest the earth, and what part farthest from it, i.e. whether he be +erect or inverted. + +102. To which I answer, the ideas which constitute the tangible earth and +man are entirely different from those which constitute the visible earth +and man. Nor was it possible, by virtue of the visive faculty alone, +without superadding any experience of touch, or altering the position of +the eye, ever to have known, or so much as suspected, there had been any +relation or connexion between them. Hence, a man at first view would not +denominate anything he saw, _earth_, or _head_, or _foot_; and +consequently, he could not tell, by the mere act of vision, whether the +head or feet were nearest the earth. Nor, indeed, would we have thereby +any thought of earth or man, erect or inverse, at all--which will be made +yet more evident, if we nicely observe, and make a particular comparison +between, the ideas of both senses. + +103. That which I see is only variety of light and colours. That which I +feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similitude, what +connexion, have those ideas with these? Or, how is it possible that any +one should see reason to give one and the same name(393) to combinations +of ideas so very different, before he had experienced their co-existence? +We do not find there is any necessary connexion betwixt this or that +tangible quality, and any colour whatsoever. And we may sometimes perceive +colours, where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth make it +manifest that no man, at first receiving of his sight(394), would know +there was any agreement between this or that particular object of his +sight and any object of touch he had been already acquainted with. The +colours therefore of the head would to him no more suggest the idea of +head(395) than they would the idea of feet. + +104. Farther, we have at large shewn (vid. sect. 63 and 64) there is no +discoverable necessary connexion between any given visible magnitude and +any one particular tangible magnitude; but that it is entirely the result +of custom and experience, and depends on foreign and accidental +circumstances, that we can, by the perception of visible extension, inform +ourselves what may be the extension of any tangible object connected with +it. Hence, it is certain, that neither the visible magnitude of head or +foot would bring along with them into the mind, at first opening of the +eyes, the respective tangible magnitudes of those parts. + +105. By the foregoing section, it is plain the visible figure of any part +of the body hath no necessary connexion with the tangible figure thereof, +so as at first sight to suggest it to the mind. For, figure is the +termination of magnitude. Whence it follows that no visible magnitude +having in its own nature an aptness to suggest any one particular tangible +magnitude, so neither can any visible figure be inseparably connected with +its corresponding tangible figure, so as of itself, and in a way prior to +experience, it might suggest it to the understanding. This will be farther +evident, if we consider that what seems smooth and round to the touch may +to sight, if viewed through a microscope, seem quite otherwise. + +106. From all which, laid together and duly considered, we may clearly +deduce this inference:--In the first act of vision, no idea entering by the +eye would have a perceivable connexion with the ideas to which the names +earth, man, head, foot, &c. were annexed in the understanding of a person +blind from his birth; so as in any sort to introduce them into his mind, +or make themselves be called by the same names, and reputed the same +things with them, as afterwards they come to be. + +107. There doth, nevertheless, remain one difficulty, which to some may +seem to press hard on our opinion, and deserve not to be passed over. For, +though it be granted that neither the colour, size, nor figure of the +visible feet have any necessary connexion with the ideas that compose the +tangible feet, so as to bring them at first sight into my mind, or make me +in danger of confounding them, before I had been used to and for some time +experienced their connexion; yet thus much seems undeniable, namely, that +the number of the visible feet being the same with that of the tangible +feet, I may from hence, without any experience of sight, reasonably +conclude that they represent or are connected with the feet rather than +the head. I say, it seems the idea of two visible feet will sooner suggest +to the mind the idea of two tangible feet than of one head--so that the +blind man, upon first reception of the visive faculty, might know which +were the feet or two, and which the head or one. + +108. In order to get clear of this seeming difficulty, we need only +observe that diversity of visible objects does not necessarily infer +diversity of tangible objects corresponding to them. A picture painted +with great variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner; it +is therefore evident that I do not, by any necessary consecution, +independent of experience, judge of the number of things tangible from the +number of things visible. I should not therefore at first opening my eyes +conclude that because I see two I shall feel two. How, therefore, can I, +before experience teaches me, know that the visible legs, because two, are +connected with the tangible legs; or the visible head, because one, is +connected with the tangible head? The truth is, the things I see are so +very different and heterogeneous from the things I feel that the +perception of the one would never have suggested the other to my thoughts, +or enabled me to pass the least judgment thereon, until I had experienced +their connexion(396). + +109. But, for a fuller illustration of this matter, it ought to be +considered, that number (however some may reckon it amongst the primary +qualities(397)) is nothing fixed and settled, really existing in things +themselves. It is entirely the creature of the mind, considering either a +simple idea by itself, or any combination of simple ideas to which it +gives one name, and so makes it pass for a unit. According as the mind +variously combines its ideas, the unit varies; and as the unit, so the +number, which is only a collection of units, doth also vary. We call a +window one, a chimney one; and yet a house, in which there are many +windows and many chimneys, has an equal right to be called one; and many +houses go to the making of one city. In these and the like instances, it +is evident the _unit_ constantly relates to the particular draughts the +mind makes of its ideas, to which it affixes names, and wherein it +includes more or less, as best suits its own ends and purposes. Whatever +therefore the mind considers as one, that is an unit. Every combination of +ideas is considered as one thing by the mind, and in token thereof is +marked by one name. Now, this naming and combining together of ideas is +perfectly arbitrary, and done by the mind in such sort as experience shews +it to be most convenient--without which our ideas had never been collected +into such sundry distinct combinations as they now are. + +110. Hence, it follows that a man born blind, and afterwards, when grown +up, made to see, would not, in the first act of vision, parcel out the +ideas of sight into the same distinct collections that others do who have +experienced which do regularly co-exist and are proper to be bundled up +together under one name. He would not, for example, make into one complex +idea, and thereby esteem and unite all those particular ideas which +constitute the visible head or foot. For, there can be no reason assigned +why he should do so, barely upon his seeing a man stand upright before +him. There crowd into his mind the ideas which compose the visible man, in +company with all the other ideas of sight perceived at the same time. But, +all these ideas offered at once to his view he would not distribute into +sundry distinct combinations, till such time as, by observing the motion +of the parts of the man and other experiences, he comes to know which are +to be separated and which to be collected together(398). + +111. From what hath been premised, it is plain the objects of sight and +touch make, if I may so say, two sets of ideas, which are widely different +from each other. To objects of either kind we indifferently attribute the +terms high and low, right and left, and such like, denoting the position +or situation of things; but then we must well observe that the position of +any object is determined with respect only to objects of the same sense. +We say any object of touch is high or low, according as it is more or less +distant from the tangible earth: and in like manner we denominate any +object of sight high or low, in proportion as it is more or less distant +from the visible earth. But, to define the situation of visible things +with relation to the distance they bear from any tangible thing, or _vice +versa_, this were absurd and perfectly unintelligible. For all visible +things are equally in the mind, and take up no part of the external space; +and consequently are equidistant from any tangible thing which exists +without the mind(399). + +112. Or rather, to speak truly, the proper objects of sight are at no +distance, neither near nor far from any tangible thing. For, if we inquire +narrowly into the matter, we shall find that those things only are +compared together in respect of distance which exist after the same +manner, or appertain unto the same sense. For, by the distance between any +two points, nothing more is meant than the number of intermediate points. +If the given points are visible, the distance between them is marked out +by the number of the interjacent visible points; if they are tangible, the +distance between them is a line consisting of tangible points; but, if +they are one tangible and the other visible, the distance between them +doth neither consist of points perceivable by sight nor by touch, i.e. it +is utterly inconceivable(400). This, perhaps, will not find an easy +admission into all men's understanding. However, I should gladly be +informed whether it be not true, by any one who will be at the pains to +reflect a little, and apply it home to his thoughts. + +113. The not observing what has been delivered in the two last sections, +seems to have occasioned no small part of the difficulty that occurs in +the business of direct appearances. The head, which is painted nearest the +earth, seems to be farthest from it; and on the other hand, the feet, +which are painted farthest from the earth, are thought nearest to it. +Herein lies the difficulty, which vanishes if we express the thing more +clearly and free from ambiguity, thus:--How comes it that, to the eye, the +visible head, which is nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the +earth; and the visible feet, which are farthest from the tangible earth, +seem nearest the earth? The question being thus proposed, who sees not the +difficulty is founded on a supposition that the eye or visive faculty, or +rather the soul by means thereof, should judge of the situation of visible +objects with reference to their distance from the tangible earth? Whereas, +it is evident the tangible earth is not perceived by sight. And it hath +been shewn, in the two last preceding sections, that the location of +visible objects is determined only by the distance they bear from one +another, and that it is nonsense to talk of distance, far or near, between +a visible and tangible thing. + +114. If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight, the whole +is plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from, and the feet nearest +to, the visible earth; and so they appear to be. What is there strange or +unaccountable in this? Let us suppose the pictures in the fund of the eye +to be the immediate objects of sight(401). The consequence is that things +should appear in the same posture they are painted in; and is it not so? +The head which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; and +the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth which is seen. And just +so they are painted. + +115. But, say you, the picture of the man is inverted, and yet the +appearance is erect. I ask, what mean you by the picture of the man, or, +which is the same thing, the visible man's being inverted? You tell me it +is inverted, because the heels are uppermost and the head undermost? +Explain me this. You say that by the head's being undermost, you mean that +it is nearest to the earth; and, by the heels being uppermost, that they +are farthest from the earth. I ask again, what earth you mean? You cannot +mean the earth that is painted on the eye or the visible earth--for the +picture of the head is farthest from the picture of the earth, and the +picture of the feet nearest to the picture of the earth; and accordingly +the visible head is farthest from the visible earth, and the visible feet +nearest to it. It remains, therefore, that you mean the tangible earth; +and so determine the situation of visible things with respect to tangible +things--contrary to what hath been demonstrated in sect. 111 and 112. The +two distinct provinces of sight and touch should be considered apart, and +as though their objects had no intercourse, no manner of relation to one +another, in point of distance or position(402). + +116. Farther, what greatly contributes to make us mistake in this matter +is that, when we think of the pictures in the fund of the eye, we imagine +ourselves looking on the fund of another's eye, or another looking on the +fund of our own eye, and beholding the pictures painted thereon. Suppose +two eyes, _A_ and _B_. _A_ from some distance looking on the pictures in +_B_ sees them inverted, and for that reason concludes they are inverted in +_B_. But this is wrong. There are projected in little on the bottom of _A_ +the images of the pictures of, suppose, man, earth, &c., which are painted +on _B_. And, besides these, the eye _B_ itself, and the objects which +environ it, together with another earth, are projected in a larger size on +_A_. Now, by the eye _A_ these larger images are deemed the true objects, +and the lesser only pictures in miniature. And it is with respect to those +greater images that it determines the situation of the smaller images; so +that, comparing the little man with the great earth, _A_ judges him +inverted, or that the feet are farthest from and the head nearest to the +great earth. Whereas, if _A_ compare the little man with the little earth, +then he will appear erect, i.e. his head shall seem farthest from and his +feet nearest to the little earth. But we must consider that _B_ does not +see two earths as _A_ does. It sees only what is represented by the little +pictures in _A_, and consequently shall judge the man erect. For, in +truth, the man in _B_ is not inverted, for there the feet are next the +earth; but it is the representation of it in _A_ which is inverted, for +there the head of the representation of the picture of the man in _B_ is +next the earth, and the feet farthest from the earth--meaning the earth +which is without the representation of the pictures in _B_. For, if you +take the little linages of the pictures in _B_, and consider them by +themselves, and with respect only to one another, they are all erect and +in their natural posture. + +117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that the pictures of +external(403) objects are painted on the bottom of the eye. It has been +shewn there is no resemblance between the ideas of sight and things +tangible. It hath likewise been demonstrated(404), that the proper objects +of sight do not exist without the mind. Whence it clearly follows that the +pictures painted on the bottom of the eye are not the pictures of external +objects. Let any one consult his own thoughts, and then tell me, what +affinity, what likeness, there is between that certain variety and +disposition of colours which constitute the visible man, or picture of a +man, and that other combination of far different ideas, sensible by touch, +which compose the tangible man. But, if this be the case, how come they to +be accounted pictures or images, since that supposes them to copy or +represent some originals or other? + +118. To which I answer--In the forementioned instance, the eye _A_ takes +the little images, included within the representation of the other eye +_B_, to be pictures or copies, whereof the archetypes are not things +existing without(405), but the larger pictures(406) projected on its own +fund; and which by _A_ are not thought pictures, but the originals or true +things themselves. Though if we suppose a third eye _C_, from a due +distance, to behold the fund of _A_, then indeed the things projected +thereon shall, to _C_, seem pictures or images, in the same sense that +those projected on _B_ do to _A_. + +119. Rightly to conceive the business in hand, we must carefully +distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch, between the visible and +tangible eye; for certainly on the tangible eye nothing either is or seems +to be painted. Again, the visible eye, as well as all other visible +objects, hath been shewn to exist only in the mind(407); which, perceiving +its own ideas, and comparing them together, does call some pictures in +respect to others. What hath been said, being rightly comprehended and +laid together, does, I think, afford a full and genuine explication of the +erect appearance of objects--which phenomenon, I must confess, I do not see +how it can be explained by any theories of vision hitherto made public. + +120. In treating of these things, the use of language is apt to occasion +some obscurity and confusion, and create in us wrong ideas. For, language +being accommodated to the common notions and prejudices of men, it is +scarce possible to deliver the naked and precise truth, without great +circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an unwary reader) seeming +contradictions. I do, therefore, once for all, desire whoever shall think +it worth his while to understand what I have written concerning vision, +that he would not stick in this or that phrase or manner of expression, +but candidly collect my meaning from the whole sum and tenor of my +discourse, and, laying aside the words(408) as much as possible, consider +the bare notions themselves, and then judge whether they are agreeable to +truth and his own experience or no. + + ------------------------------------- + +121. We have shewn the way wherein the mind, by mediation of visible +ideas(409), doth perceive or apprehend the distance, magnitude, and +situation of tangible objects(410). I come now to inquire more +particularly concerning the difference between the ideas of sight and +touch which are called by the same names, and see whether there be any +idea common to both senses(411). From what we have at large set forth and +demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this treatise, it is plain there is +no one self-same numerical extension, perceived both by sight and touch; +but that the particular figures and extensions perceived by sight, however +they may be called by the same names, and reputed the same things with +those perceived by touch, are nevertheless different, and have an +existence very distinct and separate from them. So that the question is +not now concerning the same numerical ideas, but whether there be any one +and the same sort or species of ideas equally perceivable to both senses? +or, in other words, whether extension, figure, and motion perceived by +sight, are not specifically distinct from extension, figure, and motion +perceived by touch? + + ------------------------------------- + +122. But, before I come more particularly to discuss this matter, I find +it proper to take into my thoughts extension in abstract(412). For of this +there is much talk; and I am apt to think that when men speak of extension +as being an idea common to two senses, it is with a secret supposition +that we can single out extension from all other tangible and visible +qualities, and form thereof an abstract idea, which idea they will have +common both to sight and touch. We are therefore to understand by +extension in abstract, an idea(413) of extension--for instance, a line or +surface entirely stripped of all other sensible qualities and +circumstances that might determine it to any particular existence; it is +neither black, nor white, nor red, nor hath it any colour at all, or any +tangible quality whatsoever, and consequently it is of no finite +determinate magnitude(414); for that which bounds or distinguishes one +extension from another is some quality or circumstance wherein they +disagree. + +123. Now, I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or anywise frame in +my mind such an abstract idea as is here spoken of. A line or surface +which is neither black, nor white, nor blue, nor yellow, &c.; nor long, +nor short, nor rough, nor smooth, nor square, nor round, &c. is perfectly +incomprehensible. This I am sure of as to myself; how far the faculties of +other men may reach they best can tell. + +124. It is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract +extension. But geometry contemplates figures: now, figure is the +termination of magnitude(415); but we have shewn that extension in +abstract hath no finite determinate magnitude; whence it clearly follows +that it can have no figure, and consequently is not the object of +geometry. It is indeed a tenet, as well of the modern as the ancient +philosophers, that all general truths are concerning universal abstract +ideas; without which, we are told, there could be no science, no +demonstration of any general proposition in geometry. But it were no hard +matter, did I think it necessary to my present purpose, to shew that +propositions and demonstrations in geometry might be universal, though +they who make them never think of abstract general ideas of triangles or +circles. + +125. After reiterated efforts and pangs of thought(416) to apprehend the +general idea of a triangle(417), I have found it altogether +incomprehensible. And surely, if any one were able to let that idea into +my mind, it must be the author(418) of the _Essay concerning Human +Understanding_: he, who has so far distinguished himself from the +generality of writers, by the clearness and significancy of what he says. +Let us therefore see how this celebrated author(419) describes the general +or [which is the same thing, the(420)] abstract idea of a triangle. "It +must be," says he, "neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, +equicrural, nor scalenum; but all and none of these at once. In effect it +is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; an idea, wherein some parts of +several different and inconsistent ideas are put together." (_Essay on +Human Understanding_, B. iv. ch. 7. s. 9.) This is the idea which he +thinks needful for the enlargement of knowledge, which is the subject of +mathematical demonstration, and without which we could never come to know +any general proposition concerning triangles. [Sure I am, if this be the +case, it is impossible for me to attain to know even the first elements of +geometry: since I have not the faculty to frame in my mind such an idea as +is here described(421).] That author acknowledges it doth "require some +pains and skill to form this general idea of a triangle." (_Ibid._) But, +had he called to mind what he says in another place, to wit, "that ideas +of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent ideas are put together, cannot so +much as exist in the mind, i.e. be conceived," (vid. B. iii. ch. 10. s. +33, _ibid._)--I say, had this occurred to his thoughts, it is not +improbable he would have owned it above all the pains and skill he was +master of, to form the above-mentioned idea of a triangle, which is made +up of manifest staring contradictions. That a man [of such a clear +understanding(422)], who thought so much and so well, and laid so great a +stress on clear and determinate ideas, should nevertheless talk at this +rate, seems very surprising. But the wonder will lessen, if it be +considered that the source whence this opinion [of abstract figures and +extension (423)] flows is the prolific womb which has brought forth +innumerable errors and difficulties, in all parts of philosophy, and in +all the sciences. But this matter, taken in its full extent, were a +subject too vast and comprehensive to be insisted on in this place(424). +[I shall only observe that your metaphysicians and men of speculation seem +to have faculties distinct from those of ordinary men, when they talk of +general or abstracted triangles and circles, &c., and so peremptorily +declare them to be the subject of all the eternal, immutable, universal +truths in geometry(425).] And so much for extension in abstract. + + ------------------------------------- + +126. Some, perhaps, may think pure space, vacuum, or trine dimension, to +be equally the object of sight and touch(426). But, though we have a very +great propension to think the ideas of outness and space to be the +immediate object of sight, yet, if I mistake not, in the foregoing parts +of this _Essay_, that hath been clearly demonstrated to be a mere +delusion, arising from the quick and sudden suggestion of fancy, which so +closely connects the idea of distance with those of sight, that we are apt +to think it is itself a proper and immediate object of that sense, till +reason corrects the mistake(427). + +127. It having been shewn that there are no abstract ideas of figure, and +that it is impossible for us, by any precision of thought, to frame an +idea of extension separate from all other visible and tangible qualities, +which shall be common both to sight and touch--the question now remaining +is(428), whether the particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived +by sight, be of the same kind with the particular extensions, figures, and +motions perceived by touch? In answer to which I shall venture to lay down +the following proposition:--_The extension, figures, and motions perceived +by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch, called by the +same names; nor is there any such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, +common_(429)_ to both senses._ This proposition may, without much +difficulty, be collected from what hath been said in several places of +this Essay. But, because it seems so remote from, and contrary to the +received notions and settled opinion of mankind, I shall attempt to +demonstrate it more particularly and at large by the following arguments:-- + +128. [_First_(430),] When, upon perception of an idea, I range it under +this or that sort, it is because it is perceived after the same manner, or +because it has a likeness or conformity with, or affects me in the same +way as the ideas of the sort I rank it under. In short, it must not be +entirely new, but have something in it old and already perceived by me. It +must, I say, have so much, at least, in common with the ideas I have +before known and named, as to make me give it the same name with them. +But, it has been, if I mistake not, clearly made out(431) that a man born +blind would not, at first reception of his sight, think the things he saw +were of the same nature with the objects of touch, or had anything in +common with them; but that they were a new set of ideas, perceived in a +new manner, and entirely different from all he had ever perceived before. +So that he would not call them by the same name, nor repute them to be of +the same sort, with anything he had hitherto known. [And surely the +judgment of such an unprejudiced person is more to be relied on in this +case than the sentiments of the generality of men; who, in this as in +almost everything else, suffer themselves to be guided by custom, and the +erroneous suggestions of prejudice, rather than reason and sedate +reflection(432).] + +129. _Secondly_, Light and colours are allowed by all to constitute a sort +or species entirely different from the ideas of touch; nor will any man, I +presume, say they can make themselves perceived by that sense. But there +is no other immediate object of sight besides light and colours(433). It +is therefore a direct consequence, that there is no idea common to both +senses. + +130. It is a prevailing opinion, even amongst those who have thought and +writ most accurately concerning our ideas, and the ways whereby they enter +into the understanding, that something more is perceived by sight than +barely light and colours with their variations. [The excellent(434)] Mr. +Locke termeth sight "the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying +to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to +that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and +motion." (_Essay on Human Understanding_, B. iii. ch. 9. s. 9.) Space or +distance(435), we have shewn, is no otherwise the object of sight than of +hearing. (Vid. sect. 46.) And, as for figure and extension, I leave it to +any one that shall calmly attend to his own clear and distinct ideas to +decide whether he has any idea intromitted immediately and properly by +sight save only light and colours: or, whether it be possible for him to +frame in his mind a distinct abstract idea of visible extension, or +figure, exclusive of all colour; and, on the other hand, whether he can +conceive colour without visible extension? For my own part, I must +confess, I am not able to attain so great a nicety of abstraction. I know +very well that, in a strict sense, I see nothing but light and colours, +with their several shades and variations. He who beside these doth also +perceive by sight ideas far different and distinct from them, hath that +faculty in a degree more perfect and comprehensive than I can pretend to. +It must be owned, indeed, that, by the mediation of light and colours, +other far different ideas are suggested to my mind. But so they are by +hearing(436). But then, upon this score, I see no reason why the sight +should be thought more comprehensive than the hearing, which, beside +sounds which are peculiar to that sense, doth, by their mediation, suggest +not only space, figure, and motion, but also all other ideas whatsoever +that can be signified by words. + +131. _Thirdly_, It is, I think, an axiom universally received, that +"quantities of the same kind may be added together and make one entire +sum." Mathematicians add lines together; but they do not add a line to a +solid, or conceive it as making one sum with a surface. These three kinds +of quantity being thought incapable of any such mutual addition, and +consequently of being compared together in the several ways of proportion, +are by them for that reason esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous. +Now let any one try in his thoughts to add a visible line or surface to a +tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them making one continued sum +or whole. He that can do this may think them homogeneous; but he that +cannot must, by the foregoing axiom, think them heterogeneous. [I +acknowledge myself to be of the latter sort(437).] A blue and a red line I +can conceive added together into one sum and making one continued line; +but, to make, in my thoughts, one continued line of a visible and tangible +line added together, is, I find, a task far more difficult, and even +insurmountable--and I leave it to the reflection and experience of every +particular person to determine for himself. + +132. A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from the solution of +Mr. Molyneux's problem, published by Mr. Locke in his _Essay_(438): which +I shall set down as it there lies, together with Mr. Locke's opinion of +it:--"Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to +distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of +the same bigness, so as to tell when he felt one and the other, which is +the cube, and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on +a table, and the blind man made to see: Quaere, Whether by his sight, +before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the +globe, which the cube. To which the acute and judicious proposer answers: +Not. For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube +affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that what +affects his touch so or so must affect his sight so or so: or that a +protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall +appear to his eye as it doth in the cube. I agree with this thinking +gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his +problem; and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not +be able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube, whilst +he only saw them." (_Essay on Human Understanding_, B. ii. ch. 9. s. 8.) + +133. Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of the same sort with +a square surface perceived by sight, it is certain the blind man here +mentioned might know a square surface as soon as he saw it. It is no more +but introducing into his mind, by a new inlet, an idea he has been already +well acquainted with. Since therefore he is supposed to have known by his +touch that a cube is a body terminated by square surfaces; and that a +sphere is not terminated by square surfaces--upon the supposition that a +visible and tangible square differ only _in numero_, it follows that he +might know, by the unerring mark of the square surfaces, which was the +cube, and which not, while he only saw them. We must therefore allow, +either that visible extension and figures are specifically distinct from +tangible extension and figures, or else, that the solution of this +problem, given by those two [very(439)] thoughtful and ingenious men, is +wrong. + +134. Much more might be laid together in proof of the proposition I have +advanced. But, what has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to +convince any one that shall yield a reasonable attention. And, as for +those that will not be at the pains of a little thought, no multiplication +of words will ever suffice to make them understand the truth, or rightly +conceive my meaning(440). + +135. I cannot let go the above-mentioned problem without some reflection +on it. It hath been made evident that a man blind from his birth would +not, at first sight, denominate anything he saw, by the names he had been +used to appropriate to ideas of touch. (Vid. sect. 106.) Cube, sphere, +table are words he has known applied to things perceivable by touch, but +to things perfectly intangible he never knew them applied. Those words, in +their wonted application, always marked out to his mind bodies or solid +things which were perceived by the resistance they gave. But there is no +solidity, no resistance or protrusion, perceived by sight. In short, the +ideas of sight are all new perceptions, to which there be no names annexed +in his mind; he cannot therefore understand what is said to him concerning +them. And, to ask of the two bodies he saw placed on the table, which was +the sphere, which the cube, were to him a question downright bantering and +unintelligible; nothing he sees being able to suggest to his thoughts the +idea of body, distance, or, in general, of anything he had already known. + +136. It is a mistake to think the same(441) thing affects both sight and +touch. If the same angle or square which is the object of touch be also +the object of vision, what should hinder the blind man, at first sight, +from knowing it? For, though the manner wherein it affects the sight be +different from that wherein it affected his touch, yet, there being, +beside this manner or circumstance, which is new and unknown, the angle or +figure, which is old and known, he cannot choose but discern it. + +137. Visible figure and extension having been demonstrated to be of a +nature entirely different and heterogeneous from tangible figure and +extension, it remains that we inquire concerning motion. Now, that visible +motion is not of the same sort with tangible motion seems to need no +farther proof; it being an evident corollary from what we have shewn +concerning the difference there is betwixt visible and tangible extension. +But, for a more full and express proof hereof, we need only observe that +one who had not yet experienced vision would not at first sight know +motion(442). Whence it clearly follows that motion perceivable by sight is +of a sort distinct from motion perceivable by touch. The antecedent I +prove thus--By touch he could not perceive any motion but what was up or +down, to the right or left, nearer or farther from him; besides these, and +their several varieties or complications, it is impossible he should have +any idea of motion. He would not therefore think anything to be motion, or +give the name motion to any idea, which he could not range under some or +other of those particular kinds thereof. But, from sect. 95, it is plain +that, by the mere act of vision, he could not know motion upwards or +downwards, to the right or left, or in any other possible direction. From +which I conclude, he would not know motion at all at first sight. As for +the idea of motion in abstract, I shall not waste paper about it, but +leave it to my reader to make the best he can of it. To me it is perfectly +unintelligible(443). + +138. The consideration of motion may furnish a new field for inquiry(444). +But, since the manner wherein the mind apprehends by sight the motion of +tangible objects, with the various degrees thereof, may be easily +collected from what has been said concerning the manner wherein that sense +doth suggest their various distances, magnitudes, and situations, I shall +not enlarge any farther on this subject, but proceed to inquire what may +be alleged, with greatest appearance of reason, against the proposition we +have demonstrated to be true; for, where there is so much prejudice to be +encountered, a bare and naked demonstration of the truth will scarce +suffice. We must also satisfy the scruples that men may start in favour of +their preconceived notions, shew whence the mistake arises, how it came to +spread, and carefully disclose and root out those false persuasions that +an early prejudice might have implanted in the mind. + +139. _First_, therefore, it will be demanded how visible extension and +figures come to be called by the same name with tangible extension and +figures, if they are not of the same kind with them? It must be something +more than humour or accident that could occasion a custom so constant and +universal as this, which has obtained in all ages and nations of the +world, and amongst all ranks of men, the learned as well as the +illiterate. + +140. To which I answer, we can no more argue a visible and tangible square +to be of the same species, from their being called by the same name, than +we can that a tangible square, and the monosyllable consisting of six +letters whereby it is marked, are of the same species, because they are +both called by the same name. It is customary to call written words, and +the things they signify, by the same name: for, words not being regarded +in their own nature, or otherwise than as they are marks of things, it had +been superfluous, and beside the design of language, to have given them +names distinct from those of the things marked by them. The same reason +holds here also. Visible figures are the marks of tangible figures; and, +from sect. 59, it is plain that in themselves they are little regarded, or +upon any other score than for their connexion with tangible figures, which +by nature they are ordained to signify. And, because this language of +nature(445) does not vary in different ages or nations, hence it is that +in all times and places visible figures are called by the same names as +the respective tangible figures suggested by them; and not because they +are alike, or of the same sort with them. + +141. But, say you, surely a tangible square is liker to a visible square +than to a visible circle: it has four angles, and as many sides; so also +has the visible square--but the visible circle has no such thing, being +bounded by one uniform curve, without right lines or angles, which makes +it unfit to represent the tangible square, but very fit to represent the +tangible circle. Whence it clearly follows, that visible figures are +patterns of, or of the same species with, the respective tangible figures +represented by them; that they are like unto them, and of their own nature +fitted to represent them, as being of the same sort; and that they are in +no respect arbitrary signs, as words. + +142. I answer, it must be acknowledged the visible square is fitter than +the visible circle to represent the tangible square, but then it is not +because it is liker, or more of a species with it; but, because the +visible square contains in it several distinct parts, whereby to mark the +several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square, whereas the +visible circle doth not. The square perceived by touch hath four distinct +equal sides, so also hath it four distinct equal angles. It is therefore +necessary that the visible figure which shall be most proper to mark it +contain four distinct equal parts, corresponding to the four sides of the +tangible square; as likewise four other distinct and equal parts, whereby +to denote the four equal angles of the tangible square. And accordingly we +see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible parts, answering +to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified or suggested by +them. + +143. But, it will not hence follow that any visible figure is like unto or +of the same species with its corresponding tangible figure--unless it be +also shewn that not only the number, but also the kind of the parts be the +same in both. To illustrate this, I observe that visible figures represent +tangible figures much after the same manner that written words do sounds. +Now, in this respect, words are not arbitrary; it not being indifferent +what written word stands for any sound. But, it is requisite that each +word contain in it as many distinct characters as there are variations in +the sound it stands for. Thus, the single letter _a_ is proper to mark one +simple uniform sound; and the word _adultery_ is accommodated to represent +the sound annexed to it--in the formation whereof there being eight +different collisions or modifications of the air by the organs of speech, +each of which produces a difference of sound, it was fit the word +representing it should consist of as many distinct characters, thereby to +mark each particular difference or part of the whole sound. And yet +nobody, I presume, will say the single letter _a_, or the word _adultery_, +are alike unto or of the same species with the respective sounds by them +represented. It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, letters of any +language represent sounds at all; but, when that is once agreed, it is not +arbitrary what combination of letters shall represent this or that +particular sound. I leave this with the reader to pursue, and apply it in +his own thoughts. + +144. It must be confessed that we are not so apt to confound other signs +with the things signified, or to think them of the same species, as we are +visible and tangible ideas. But, a little consideration will shew us how +this may well be, without our supposing them of a like nature. These signs +are constant and universal; their connexion with tangible ideas has been +learnt at our first entrance into the world; and ever since, almost every +moment of our lives, it has been occurring to our thoughts, and fastening +and striking deeper on our minds. When we observe that signs are variable, +and of human institution; when we remember there was a time they were not +connected in our minds with those things they now so readily suggest, but +that their signification was learned by the slow steps of experience: this +preserves us from confounding them. But, when we find the same signs +suggest the same things all over the world; when we know they are not of +human institution, and cannot remember that we ever learned their +signification, but think that at first sight they would have suggested to +us the same things they do now: all this persuades us they are of the same +species as the things respectively represented by them, and that it is by +a natural resemblance they suggest them to our minds. + +145. Add to this that whenever we make a nice survey of any object, +successively directing the optic axis to each point thereof, there are +certain lines and figures, described by the motion of the head or eye, +which, being in truth perceived by feeling(446), do nevertheless so mix +themselves, as it were, with the ideas of sight that we can scarce think +but they appertain to that sense. Again, the ideas of sight enter into the +mind several at once, more distinct and unmingled than is usual in the +other senses beside the touch. Sounds, for example, perceived at the same +instant, are apt to coalesce, if I may so say, into one sound: but we can +perceive, at the same time, great variety of visible objects, very +separate and distinct from each other. Now, tangible(447) extension being +made up of several distinct coexistent parts, we may hence gather another +reason that may dispose us to imagine a likeness or analogy between the +immediate objects of sight and touch. But nothing, certainly, does more +contribute to blend and confound them together, than the strict and close +connexion(448) they have with each other. We cannot open our eyes but the +ideas of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by them. So +swift, and sudden, and unperceived is the transit from visible to tangible +ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the immediate +object of vision. + +146. The prejudice(449) which is grounded on these, and whatever other +causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so fast on our understandings, that +it is impossible, without obstinate striving and labour of the mind, to +get entirely clear of it. But then the reluctancy we find in rejecting any +opinion can be no argument of its truth, to whoever considers what has +been already shewn with regard to the prejudices we entertain concerning +the distance, magnitude, and situation of objects; prejudices so familiar +to our minds, so confirmed and inveterate, as they will hardly give way to +the clearest demonstration. + + ------------------------------------- + +147. Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude(450) that the proper +objects of Vision constitute the Universal Language of Nature; whereby we +are instructed how to regulate our actions, in order to attain those +things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our +bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. +It is by their information that we are principally guided in all the +transactions and concerns of life. And the manner wherein they signify and +mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that +of languages and signs of human appointment; which do not suggest the +things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an +habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between +them(451). + +148. Suppose one who had always continued blind be told by his guide that +after he has advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a +precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must not this to him seem very +admirable and surprising? He cannot conceive how it is possible for +mortals to frame such predictions as these, which to him would seem as +strange and unaccountable as prophecy does to others. Even they who are +blessed with the visive faculty may (though familiarity make it less +observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful art +and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for +which it was apparently designed; the vast extent, number, and variety of +objects that are at once, with so much ease, and quickness, and pleasure, +suggested by it--all these afford subject for much and pleasing +speculation, and may, if anything, give us some glimmering analogous +praenotion of things, that are placed beyond the certain discovery and +comprehension of our present state(452). + + ------------------------------------- + +149. I do not design to trouble myself much with drawing corollaries from +the doctrine I have hitherto laid down. If it bears the test, others may, +so far as they shall think convenient, employ their thoughts in extending +it farther, and applying it to whatever purposes it may be subservient to. +Only, I cannot forbear making some inquiry concerning the object of +geometry, which the subject we have been upon does naturally lead one to. +We have shewn there is no such idea as that of extension in abstract(453); +and that there are two kinds of sensible extension and figures, which are +entirely distinct and heterogeneous from each other(454). Now, it is +natural to inquire which of these is the object of geometry(455). + + ------------------------------------- + +150. Some things there are which, at first sight, incline one to think +geometry conversant about visible extension. The constant use of the eyes, +both in the practical and speculative parts of that science, doth very +much induce us thereto. It would, without doubt, seem odd to a +mathematician to go about to convince him the diagrams he saw upon paper +were not the figures, or even the likeness of the figures, which make the +subject of the demonstration--the contrary being held an unquestionable +truth, not only by mathematicians, but also by those who apply themselves +more particularly to the study of logic; I mean who consider the nature of +science, certainty, and demonstration; it being by them assigned as one +reason of the extraordinary clearness and evidence of geometry, that in +that science the reasonings are free from those inconveniences which +attend the use of arbitrary signs, the very ideas themselves being copied +out, and exposed to view upon paper. But, by the bye, how well this agrees +with what they likewise assert of abstract ideas being the object of +geometrical demonstration I leave to be considered. + +151. To come to a resolution in this point, we need only observe what has +been said in sect. 59, 60, 61, where it is shewn that visible extensions +in themselves are little regarded, and have no settled determinate +greatness, and that men measure altogether by the application of tangible +extension to tangible extension. All which makes it evident that visible +extension and figures are not the object of geometry. + +152. It is therefore plain that visible figures are of the same use in +geometry that words are. And the one may as well be accounted the object +of that science as the other; neither of them being any otherwise +concerned therein than as they represent or suggest to the mind the +particular tangible figures connected with them. There is, indeed, this +difference betwixt the signification of tangible figures by visible +figures, and of ideas by words--that whereas the latter is variable and +uncertain, depending altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men, the +former is fixed, and immutably the same in all times and places. A visible +square, for instance, suggests to the mind the same tangible figure in +Europe that it doth in America. Hence it is, that the voice of nature, +which speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation and +ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are unavoidably subject +to(456). From which may, in some measure, be derived that peculiar +evidence and clearness of geometrical demonstrations. + +153. Though what has been said may suffice to shew what ought to be +determined with relation to the object of geometry, I shall, nevertheless, +for the fuller illustration thereof, take into my thoughts the case of an +intelligence or unbodied spirit, which is supposed to see perfectly well, +i.e. to have a clear perception of the proper and immediate objects of +sight, but to have no sense of touch(457). Whether there be any such being +in nature or no, is beside my purpose to inquire; it suffices, that the +supposition contains no contradiction in it. Let us now examine what +proficiency such a one may be able to make in geometry. Which speculation +will lead us more clearly to see whether the ideas of sight can possibly +be the object of that science. + +154. _First_, then, it is certain the aforesaid intelligence could have no +idea of a solid or quantity of three dimensions, which follows from its +not having any idea of distance. We, indeed, are prone to think that we +have by sight the ideas of space and solids; which arises from our +imagining that we do, strictly speaking, see distance, and some parts of +an object at a greater distance than others; which has been demonstrated +to be the effect of the experience we have had what ideas of touch are +connected with such and such ideas attending vision. But the intelligence +here spoken of is supposed to have no experience of touch. He would not, +therefore, judge as we do, nor have any idea of distance, outness, or +profundity, nor consequently of space or body, either immediately or by +suggestion. Whence it is plain he can have no notion of those parts of +geometry which relate to the mensuration of solids, and their convex or +concave surfaces, and contemplate the properties of lines generated by the +section of a solid. The conceiving of any part whereof is beyond the reach +of his faculties. + +155. _Farther_, he cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe +a right line or circle; the rule and compass, with their use, being things +of which it is impossible he should have any notion. Nor is it an easier +matter for him to conceive the placing of one plane or angle on another, +in order to prove their equality; since that supposes some idea of +distance, or external space. All which makes it evident our pure +intelligence could never attain to know so much as the first elements of +plain geometry. And perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be found he +cannot even have an idea of plain figures any more than he can of solids; +since some idea of distance is necessary to form the idea of a geometrical +plane, as will appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it. + +156. All that is properly perceived by the visive faculty amounts to no +more than colours with their variations, and different proportions of +light and shade--but the perpetual mutability and fleetingness of those +immediate objects of sight render them incapable of being managed after +the manner of geometrical figures; nor is it in any degree useful that +they should. It is true there be divers of them perceived at once; and +more of some, and less of others: but accurately to compute their +magnitude, and assign precise determinate proportions between things so +variable and inconstant, if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be +a very trifling and insignificant labour. + +157. I must confess, it seems to be the opinion of some very ingenious men +that flat or plane figures are immediate objects of sight, though they +acknowledge solids are not. And this opinion of theirs is grounded on what +is observed in painting, wherein (say they) the ideas immediately +imprinted in the mind are only of planes variously coloured, which, by a +sudden act of the judgment, are changed into solids: but, with a little +attention, we shall find the planes here mentioned as the immediate +objects of sight are not visible but tangible planes. For, when we say +that pictures are planes, we mean thereby that they appear to the touch +smooth and uniform. But then this smoothness and uniformity, or, in other +words, this planeness of the picture is not perceived immediately by +vision; for it appeareth to the eye various and multiform. + +158. From all which we may conclude that planes are no more the immediate +object of sight than solids. What we strictly see are not solids, nor yet +planes variously coloured--they are only diversity of colours. And some of +these suggest to the mind solids, and others plane figures; just as they +have been experienced to be connected with the one or the other: so that +we see planes in the same way that we see solids--both being equally +suggested by the immediate objects of sight, which accordingly are +themselves denominated planes and solids. But, though they are called by +the same names with the things marked by them, they are, nevertheless, of +a nature entirely different, as hath been demonstrated(458). + +159. What has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to decide the +question we proposed to examine, concerning the ability of a pure spirit, +such as we have described, to know geometry. It is, indeed, no easy matter +for us to enter precisely into the thoughts of such an intelligence; +because we cannot, without great pains, cleverly separate and disentangle +in our thoughts the proper objects of sight from those of touch which are +connected with them. This, indeed, in a complete degree seems scarce +possible to be performed; which will not seem strange to us, if we +consider how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his native +language, which is familiar to him, pronounced in his ears without +understanding them. Though he endeavour to disunite the meaning from the +sound, it will nevertheless intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find +it extreme difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly in the +posture of a foreigner that never learnt the language, so as to be +affected barely with the sounds themselves, and not perceive the +signification annexed to them. + +160. By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither abstract nor +visible extension makes the object of geometry; the not discerning of +which may, perhaps, have created some difficulty and useless labour in +mathematics. [(459)Sure I am that somewhat relating thereto has occurred +to my thoughts; which, though after the most anxious and repeated +examination I am forced to think it true, doth, nevertheless, seem so far +out of the common road of geometry, that I know not whether it may not be +thought presumption if I should make it public, in an age wherein that +science hath received such mighty improvements by new methods; great part +whereof, as well as of the ancient discoveries, may perhaps lose their +reputation, and much of that ardour with which men study the abstruse and +fine geometry be abated, if what to me, and those few to whom I have +imparted it, seems evidently true, should really prove to be so.] + + + + +An Appendix To The Essay On Vision + + +[_This Appendix is contained only in the second edition._] + +The censures which, I am informed, have been made on the foregoing _Essay_ +inclined me to think I had not been clear and express enough in some +points; and, to prevent being misunderstood for the future, I was willing +to make any necessary alterations or additions in what I had written. But +that was impracticable, the present edition having been almost finished +before I received this information. Wherefore, I think it proper to +consider in this place the principal objections that are come to my +notice. + + ------------------------------------- + +In the _first_ place, it is objected, that in the beginning of the Essay I +argue either against all use of lines and angles in optics, and then what +I say is false; or against those writers only who will have it that we can +perceive by sense the optic axes, angles, &c., and then it is +insignificant, this being an absurdity which no one ever held. To which I +answer that I argue only against those who are of opinion that we perceive +the distance of objects by lines and angles, or, as they term it, by a +kind of innate geometry. And, to shew that this is not fighting with my +own shadow, I shall here set down a passage from the celebrated Des +Cartes(460):-- + + [Illustration] + +"Distantiam praeterea discimus, per mutuam quandam conspirationem oculorum. +Ut enim caecus noster duo bacilla tenens, _A E_ et _C E_, de quorum +longitudine incertus, solumque intervallum manuum _A_ et _C_, cum +magnitudine angulorum _A C E_, et _C A E_ exploratum habens, inde, ut ex +Geometria quadam omnibus innata, scire potest ubi sit punctum _E_. Sic +quum nostri oculi _R S T_ et _r s t_ ambo, vertuntur ad _X_, magnitudo +lineae _S s_, et angulorum _X S s_ et _X s S_, certos nos reddunt ubi sit +punctum _X_. Et idem opera alterutrius possumus indagare, loco illum +movendo, ut si versus _X_ illum semper dirigentes, prime sistamus in +puncto _S_, et statim post in puncto _s_, hoc sufficiet ut magnitudo lineae +_S s_, et duorum angulorum _X S s_ et _X s S_ nostrae imaginationi simul +occurrant, et distantiam puncti _X_ nos edoceant: idque per actionem +mentis, quae licet simplex judicium esse videatur, ratiocinationem tamen +quandam involutam habet, similem illi, qua Geometrae per duas stationes +diversas, loca inaccessa dimetiuntur." + + [Illustration] + +I might amass together citations from several authors to the same purpose, +but, this being so clear in the point, and from an author of so great +note, I shall not trouble the reader with any more. What I have said on +this head was not for the sake of rinding fault with other men; but, +because I judged it necessary to demonstrate in the first place that we +neither see distance _immediately_, nor yet perceive it by the mediation +of anything that hath (as lines and angles) a _necessary_ connexion with +it. For on the demonstration of this point the whole theory depends(461). + +_Secondly_, it is objected, that the explication I give of the appearance +of the horizontal moon (which may also be applied to the sun) is the same +that Gassendus had given before. I answer, there is indeed mention made of +the grossness of the atmosphere in both; but then the methods wherein it +is applied to solve the phenomenon are widely different, as will be +evident to whoever shall compare what I have said on this subject with the +following words of Gassendus:-- + +"Heinc dici posse videtur: solem humilem oculo spectatum ideo apparere +majorem, quam dum altius egreditur, quia dum vicinus est horizonti prolixa +est series vaporum, atque adeo corpusculorum quae solis radios ita +retundunt, ut oculus minus conniveat, et pupilla quasi umbrefacta longe +magis amplificetur, quam dum sole multum elato rari vapores +intercipiuntur, solque ipse ita splendescit, ut pupilla in ipsum spectans +contractissima efficiatur. Nempe ex hoc esse videtur, cur visibilis +species ex sole procedens, et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in +retinam, ampliorem in illa sedem occupet, majoremque proinde creet solis +apparentiam, quam dum per contractam pupillam eodem intromissa contendit." +Vid. _Epist. 1. De Apparente Magnitudine Solis Humilis et Sublimis_, p. 6. +This solution of Gassendus proceeds on a false principle, to wit, that the +pupil's being enlarged augments the species or image on the fund of the +eye. + + ------------------------------------- + +_Thirdly_, against what is said in Sect. 80, it is objected, that the same +thing which is so small as scarce to be discerned by a man, may appear +like a mountain to some small insect; from which it follows that the +_minimum visibile_ is not equal in respect of all creatures(462). I +answer, if this objection be sounded to the bottom, it will be found to +mean no more than that the same particle of matter which is marked to a +man by one _minimum visibile_, exhibits to an insect a great number of +_minima visibilia_. But this does not prove that one _minimum visibile_ of +the insect is not equal to one _minimum visibile_ of the man. The not +distinguishing between the mediate and immediate objects of sight is, I +suspect, a cause of misapprehension in this matter. + +Some other misinterpretations and difficulties have been made, but, in the +points they refer to, I have endeavoured to be so very plain that I know +not how to express myself more clearly. All I shall add is, that if they +who are pleased to criticise on my _Essay_ would but read the whole over +with some attention, they might be the better able to comprehend my +meaning, and consequently to judge of my mistakes. + + ------------------------------------- + +I am informed that, soon after the first edition of this treatise, a man +somewhere near London was made to see, who had been born blind, and +continued so for about twenty years(463). Such a one may be supposed a +proper judge to decide how far some tenets laid down in several places of +the foregoing Essay are agreeable to truth; and if any curious person hath +the opportunity of making proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should +gladly see my notions either amended or confirmed by experience(464). + + + + + +A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE + + +[(465)PART I] + +WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE +GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, ARE INQUIRED INTO + +_First Published in 1710_ + + + + +Editor's Preface To The Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human +Knowledge + + +This book of _Principles_ contains the most systematic and reasoned +exposition of Berkeley's philosophy, in its early stage, which we possess. +Like the _Essay on Vision_, its tentative pioneer, it was prepared at +Trinity College, Dublin. Its author had hardly completed his twenty-fifth +year when it was published. The first edition of this "First Part" of the +projected Treatise, "printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat, +bookseller in Skinner Row, Dublin," appeared early in 1710. A second +edition, with minor changes, and in which "Part I" was withdrawn from the +title-page, was published in London in 1734, "printed for Jacob Tonson"--on +the eve of Berkeley's settlement at Cloyne. It was the last in the +author's lifetime. The projected "Second Part" of the _Principles_ was +never given to the world, and we can hardly conjecture its design. In a +letter in 1729 to his American friend, Samuel Johnson, Berkeley mentions +that he had "made considerable progress on the Second Part," but "the +manuscript," he adds, "was lost about fourteen years ago, during my +travels in Italy; and I never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a +thing as writing twice on the same subject(466)." + +An edition of the _Principles_ appeared in London in 1776, twenty-three +years after Berkeley's death, with a running commentary of _Remarks_ by +the anonymous editor, on the pages opposite the text, in which, according +to the editor, Berkeley's doctrines are "carefully examined, and shewn to +be repugnant to fact, and his principles to be incompatible with the +constitution of human nature and the reason and fitness of things." In +this volume the _Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_ are appended to +the _Principles_, and a "Philosophical Discourse concerning the nature of +Human Being" is prefixed to the whole, "being a defence of Mr. Locke's +principles, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's _Essay on Truth_," by the +author of the _Remarks on Berkeley's Principles_. The acuteness of the +_Remarks_ is not in proportion to their bulk and diffuseness: many popular +misconceptions of Berkeley are served up, without appreciation of the +impotence of matter, and of natural causation as only passive +sense-symbolism, which is at the root of the theory of the material world +against which the _Remarks_ are directed. + +The Kantian and post-Kantian Idealism that is characteristic of the +nineteenth century has recalled attention to Berkeley, who had produced +his spiritual philosophy under the prevailing conditions of English +thought in the preceding age, when Idealism in any form was uncongenial. +In 1869 the book of _Principles_ was translated into German, with +annotations, by Ueberweg, professor of philosophy at Koenigsberg, the +university of Kant. The Clarendon Press edition of the Collected Works of +Berkeley followed in 1871. In 1874 an edition of the _Principles_, by Dr. +Kranth, Professor of Philosophy in the university of Pennsylvania, +appeared in America, with annotations drawn largely from the Clarendon +Press edition and Ueberweg. In 1878 Dr. Collyns Simon republished the +_Principles_, with discussions based upon the text, followed by an +appendix of remarks on Kant and Hume in their relation to Berkeley. + + ------------------------------------- + +The book of _Principles_, as we have it, must be taken as a systematic +fragment of an incompletely developed philosophy. Many years after its +appearance, the author thus describes the conditions:--"It was published +when I was very young, and without doubt hath many defects. For though the +notions should be true (as I verily think they are), yet it is difficult +to express them clearly and consistently, language being framed for common +use and received prejudices. I do not therefore pretend that my books can +teach truth. All I hope for is that they may be an occasion to inquisitive +men of discovering truth(467)." Again:--"I had no inclination to trouble +the world with large volumes. What I have done was rather with the view of +giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and curiosity to go to the +bottom of things, and pursue them in their own minds. Two or three times +reading these small tracts (_Essay on Vision_, _Principles_, _Dialogues_, +_De Motu_), and making what is read the occasion of thinking, would, I +believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off that +shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative +truths(468)." The incitements to further and deeper thought thus proposed +have met with a more sympathetic response in this generation than in the +lifetime of Berkeley. + + ------------------------------------- + +There is internal evidence in the book of _Principles_ that its author had +been a diligent and critical student of Locke's _Essay_. Like the _Essay_, +it is dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke. The word _idea_ is not less +characteristic of the _Principles_ than of the _Essay_, although Berkeley +generally uses it with a narrower application than Locke, confining it to +phenomena presented objectively to our senses, and their subjective +reproductions in imagination. With both Berkeley and Locke objective +phenomena (under the name of ideas) are the materials supplied to man for +conversion into natural science. Locke's reduction of ideas into simple +and complex, as well as some of his subdivisions, reappear with +modifications in the _Principles_. Berkeley's account of Substance and +Power, Space and Time, while different from Locke's, still bears marks of +the _Essay_. Concrete Substance, which in its ultimate meaning much +perplexes Locke, is identified with the personal pronouns "I" and "you" by +Berkeley, and is thus spiritualised. Cause proper, or Power, he finds only +in the voluntary activity of persons. Space is presented to us in our +sensuous experience of resistance to organic movements; while it is +symbolised in terms of phenomena presented to sight, as already explained +in the _Essay on Vision_. Time is revealed in our actual experience of +change in the ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in sense; +length of time being calculated by the changes in the adopted measure of +duration. Infinite space and infinite time, being necessarily incapable of +finite ideation, are dismissed as abstractions that for man must always be +empty of realisable meaning. Indeed, the _Commonplace Book_ shews that +Locke influenced Berkeley as much by antagonism as otherwise. "Such was +the candour of that great man that I persuade myself, were he alive, he +would not be offended that I differed from him, seeing that in so doing I +follow his advice to use my own judgment, see with my own eyes and not +with another's." So he argues against Locke's opinions about the infinity +and eternity of space, and the possibility of matter endowed with power to +think, and urges his inconsistency in treating some qualities of matter as +wholly material, while he insists that others, under the name of +"secondary," are necessarily dependent on sentient intelligence. Above all +he assails Locke's "abstract ideas" as germs of scepticism--interpreting +Locke's meaning paradoxically. + +Next to Locke, Descartes and Malebranche are prominent in the +_Principles_. Recognition of the ultimate supremacy of Spirit, or the +spiritual character of active power and the constant agency of God in +nature, suggested by Descartes, was congenial to Berkeley, but he was +opposed to the mechanical conception of the universe found in the +Cartesian physical treatises. That thought is synonymous with existence is +a formula with which the French philosopher might make him familiar, as +well as with the assumption that _ideas only_ are immediate objects of +human perception; an assumption in which Descartes was followed by Locke, +and philosophical thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, +but under differing interpretations of the term _idea_. + +Malebranche appears less in the _Principles_ than Locke and Descartes. In +early life, at any rate, Berkeley would be less at home in the "divine +vision" of Malebranche than among the "ideas" of Locke. The mysticism of +the _Recherche de la Verite_ is unlike the transparent lucidity of +Berkeley's juvenile thought. But the subordinate place and office of the +material world in Malebranche's system, and his conception of power as +wholly spiritual, approached the New Principles of Berkeley. + +Plato and Aristotle hardly appear, either by name or as characteristic +influence, in the book of _Principles_, which in this respect contrasts +with the abundant references to ancient and mediaeval thinkers in _Siris_, +and to a less extent in the _De Motu_ and _Alciphron_. + + ------------------------------------- + +The Introduction to the _Principles_ is a proclamation of war against +"abstract ideas," which is renewed in the body of the work, and again more +than once in the writings of Berkeley's early and middle life, but is +significantly withdrawn in his old age. In the ardour of youth, his prime +remedy for anarchy in philosophy, and for the sceptical disposition which +philosophy had been apt to generate, was suppression of abstract ideas as +impossible ideas--empty names heedlessly accepted as ideas--an evil to be +counteracted by steady adherence to the concrete experience found in our +senses and inner consciousness. Never to lose our hold of positive facts, +and always to individualise general conceptions, are regulative maxims by +which Berkeley would make us govern our investigation of ultimate +problems. He takes up his position in the actual universe of applied +reason; not in the empty void of abstract reason, remote from particulars +and succession of change, in which no real existence is found. All +realisable ideas must be either concrete data of sense, or concrete data +of inward consciousness. It is relations embodied in particular facts, not +pretended abstract ideas, that give fruitful meaning to common terms. +Abstract matter, abstract substance, abstract power, abstract space, +abstract time--unindividualisable in sense or in imagination--must all be +void of meaning; the issue of unlawful analysis, which pretends to find +what is real without the concrete ideas that make the real, because +percipient spirit is the indispensable factor of all reality. The only +lawful abstraction is _nominal_--the application, that is to say, of a name +in common to an indefinite number of things which resemble one another. +This is Berkeley's "Nominalism." + +Berkeley takes Locke as the representative advocate of the "abstract +ideas" against which he wages war in the Introduction to the _Principles_. +Under cover of an ambiguity in the term _idea_, he is unconsciously +fighting against a man of straw. He supposes that Locke means by _idea_ +only a concrete datum of sense, or of imagination; and he argues that we +cannot without contradiction abstract from all such data, and yet retain +idea. But Locke includes among _his_ ideas intellectual relations--what +Berkeley himself afterwards distinguished as _notions_, in contrast with +ideas. This polemic against Locke is therefore one of verbal confusion. In +later life he probably saw this, as he saw deeper into the whole question +involved. This is suggested by the omission of the argument against +abstract ideas, given in earlier editions of _Alciphron_, from the edition +published a year before he died. In his juvenile attack on abstractions, +his characteristic impetuosity seems to carry him to the extreme of +rejecting rational relations that are involved in the objectivity of +sensible things and natural order, thus resting experience at last only on +phenomena--particular and contingent. + +A preparatory draft of the Introduction to the _Principles_, which I found +in the manuscript department of the library of Trinity College, Dublin, is +printed in the appendix to this edition of Berkeley's Philosophical Works. +The variations are of some interest, biographical and philosophical. It +seems to have been written in the autumn of 1708, and it may with +advantage be compared with the text of the finished Introduction, as well +as with numerous relative entries in the _Commonplace Book_. + + ------------------------------------- + +After this Introduction, the New Principles themselves are evolved, in a +corresponding spirit of hostility to empty abstractions. The sections may +be thus divided:-- + +i. Rationale of the Principles (sect. 1-33). + +ii. Supposed Objections to the Principles answered (sect. 34-84). + +iii. Consequences and Applications of the Principles (sect. 85-156). + + + +i. Rationale of the Principles. + + +The reader may remember that one of the entries in the _Commonplace Book_ +runs as follows:--"To begin the First Book, not with mention of sensation +and reflexion, but, instead of sensation, to use perception, or thought in +general." Berkeley seems there to be oscillating between Locke and +Descartes. He now adopts Locke's account of the materials of which our +concrete experience consists (sect. 1). The data of human knowledge of +existence are accordingly found in the ideas, phenomena, or appearances +(_a_) of which we are percipient in the senses, and (_b_) of which we are +conscious when we attend to our inward passions and operations--all which +make up the original contents of human experience, to be reproduced in new +forms and arrangements, (_c_) in memory and (_d_) imagination and (_e_) +expectation. Those materials are called _ideas_ because living mind or +spirit is the indispensable realising factor: they all presuppose living +mind, spirit, self, or ego to realise and elaborate them (sect. 2). This +is implied in our use of personal pronouns, which signify, not ideas of +any of the preceding kinds, but that which is "entirely distinct from +them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, by which they are +perceived." In this fundamental presupposition Descartes is more apparent +than Locke, and there is even an unconscious forecast of Kant and Hegel. + +Berkeley next faces a New Question which his New Principles are intended +to answer. How is the concrete world that is presented to our senses +related to Mind or Spirit? Is all or any of its reality independent of +percipient experience? Is it true that the phenomena of which we are +percipient in sense are ultimately independent of all percipient and +conscious life, and are even the ultimate basis of all that is real? Must +we recognise in the phenomena of Matter the _substance_ of what we call +Mind? For do we not find, when we examine Body and Spirit mutually related +in our personality, that the latter is more dependent on the former, and +on the physical cosmos of which the former is a part, than our body and +its bodily surroundings are dependent on Spirit? In short, is not the +universe of existence, in its final form, only lifeless Matter? + +The claim of Matter to be supreme is what Berkeley produces his Principles +in order to reduce. Concrete reality is self-evidently unreal, he argues, +in the total absence of percipient Spirit, for Spirit is the one realising +factor. Try to imagine the material world unperceived and you are trying +to picture empty abstraction. Wholly material matter is self-evidently an +inconceivable absurdity; a universe emptied of all percipient life is an +impossible universe. The material world becomes real in being perceived: +it depends for its reality upon the spiritual realisation. As colours in a +dark room become real with the introduction of light, so the material +world becomes real in the life and agency of Spirit. It must exist in +terms of sentient life and percipient intelligence, in order to rise into +any degree of reality that human beings at least can be at all concerned +with, either speculatively or practically. Matter totally abstracted from +percipient spirit must go the way of all abstract ideas. It is an +illusion, concealed by confused thought and abuse of words; yet from +obvious causes strong enough to stifle faith in this latent but +self-evident Principle--that the universe of sense-presented phenomena can +have concrete existence only in and by sentient intelligence. It is the +reverse of this Principle that Berkeley takes to have been "the chief +source of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions and +inexplicable puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a reproach +to human reason(469)." And indeed, when it is fully understood, it is seen +in its own light to be the chief of "those truths which are so near and +obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. For +such I take this important one to be--that all the choir of heaven and +furniture of the Earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the +mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a Mind" (sect. +6). Living Mind or Spirit is the indispensable factor of all realities +that are presented to our senses, including, of course, our own bodies. + +Yet this Principle, notwithstanding its intuitive certainty, needs to be +evoked by reflection from the latency in which it lies concealed, in the +confused thought of the unreflecting. It is only gradually, and with the +help of reasoning, that the world presented to the senses is distinctly +recognised in this its deepest and truest reality. And even when we see +that the phenomena _immediately_ presented to our senses need to be +realised in percipient experience, in order to be concretely real, we are +ready to ask whether there may not be substances _like_ the things so +presented, which can exist "without mind," or in a wholly material way +(sect. 8). Nay, are there not _some_ of the phenomena immediately +presented to our senses which do not need living mind to make them real? +It is allowed by Locke and others that all those qualities of matter which +are called _secondary_ cannot be wholly material, and that living mind is +indispensable for _their_ realisation in nature; but Locke and the rest +argue, that this is not so with the qualities which they call _primary_, +and which they regard as of the essence of matter. Colours, sounds, +tastes, smells are all allowed to be not wholly material; but are not the +size, shape, situation, solidity, and motion of bodies qualities that are +real without need for the realising agency of any Mind or Spirit in the +universe, and which would continue to be what they are now if all Spirit, +divine or human, ceased to exist? + +The supposition that some of the phenomena of what is called Matter can be +real, and yet wholly material, is discussed in sections 9-15, in which it +is argued that the things of sense cannot exist really, in _any_ of their +manifestations, unless they are brought into reality in some percipient +life and experience. It is held impossible that any quality of matter can +have the reality which we all attribute to it, unless it is spiritually +realised (sect. 15). + +But may Matter not be real apart from all its so-called qualities, these +being allowed to be not wholly material, because real only within +percipient spirit? May not this wholly material Matter be Something that, +as it were, exists _behind_ the ideas, phenomena, or qualities that make +their appearance to human beings? This question, Berkeley would say, is a +meaningless and wholly unpractical one. Material substance that makes and +can make no real appearance--unphenomenal or unideal--stripped of all its +qualities--is only "another name for abstract Being," and "the abstract +idea of Being appeareth to me the most incomprehensible of all other. When +I consider the two parts or branches which make up the words _material +substance_, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them" +(sect. 17). Neither Sense nor Reason inform us of the existence of real +material substances that exist _abstractly_, or out of all relation to the +secondary and primary qualities of which we are percipient when we +exercise our senses. By our senses we cannot perceive more than ideas or +phenomena, aggregated as individual things that are presented to us: we +cannot perceive substances that make no appearance in sense. Then as for +reason, unrealised substances, abstracted from living Spirit, human or +divine, being altogether meaningless, can in no way explain the concrete +realisations of human experience. In short, if there are wholly +unphenomenal material substances, it is impossible that we should ever +discover them, or have any concern with them, speculative or practical; +and if there are not, we should have the same reason to assert that there +are which we have now (sect. 20). It is impossible to put any meaning into +wholly abstract reality. "To me the words mean either a direct +contradiction, or nothing at all" (sect. 24). + + ------------------------------------- + +The Principle that the _esse_ of matter necessarily involves _percipi_, +and its correlative Principle that there is not any other substance than +Spirit, which is thus the indispensable factor of all reality, both lead +on to the more obviously practical Principle--that the material world, _per +se_, is wholly powerless, and that all changes in Nature are the immediate +issue of the agency of Spirit (sect. 25-27). Concrete power, like concrete +substance, is essentially spiritual. To be satisfied that the whole +natural world is only the passive instrument and expression of Spiritual +Power we are asked to analyse the sensuous data of experience. We can find +no reason for attributing inherent power to any of the phenomena and +phenomenal things that are presented to our senses, or for supposing that +_they_ can be active causes, either of the changes that are continuously +in progress among themselves, or of the feelings, perceptions, and +volitions of which spiritual beings are conscious. We find the ideas or +phenomena that pass in procession before our senses related to one another +as signs to their meanings, in a cosmical order that virtually makes the +material world a language and a prophecy: but this cosmical procession is +not found to originate in the ideas or phenomena themselves, and there is +reason for supposing it to be maintained by ever-living Spirit, which thus +not only substantiates the things of sense, but explains their laws of +motion and their movements. + +Yet the universe of reality is not exclusively One Spirit. Experience +contradicts the supposition. I find on trial that my personal power to +produce changes in the ideas or phenomena which my senses present to me is +a limited power (sect. 28-33). I can make and unmake my own fancies, but I +cannot with like freedom make and unmake presentations of sense. When in +daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to determine whether I +shall see or not; nor is it in my power to determine what objects I shall +see. The cosmical order of sense-phenomena is independent of my will. When +I employ my senses, I find myself always confronted by sensible signs of +perfect Reason and omnipresent Will. But I also awake in the faith that I +am an individual person. And the sense-symbolism of which the material +world consists, while it keeps me in constant and immediate relation to +the Universal Spirit, whose language it is, keeps me likewise in +intercourse with other persons, akin to myself, who are signified to me by +their overt actions and articulate words, which enter into my sensuous +experience. Sense-given phenomena thus, among their other instrumental +offices, are the medium of communication between human beings, who by this +means can find companions, and make signs to them. So while, at _our_ +highest point of view, Nature is Spirit, experience shews that there is +room in the universe for a plurality of persons, individual, and in a +measure free or morally responsible. If Berkeley does not say all this, +his New Principles tend thus. + +At any rate, in his reasoned exposition of his Principles he is anxious to +distinguish those phenomena that are presented to the senses of all +mankind from the private ideas or fancies of individual men (sect. 28-33). +The former constitute the world which sentient beings realise in common. +He calls them _ideas_ because they are unrealisable without percipient +mind; but still on the understanding that they are not to be confounded +with the chimeras of imagination. They are more deeply and truly real than +chimeras. The groups in which they are found to coexist are the individual +things of sense, whose fixed order of succession exemplifies what we call +natural law, or natural causation: the correlation of their changes to our +pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, makes scientific knowledge of +their laws practically important to the life of man, in his embodied +state. + +Moreover, the real ideas presented to our senses, unlike those of +imagination, Berkeley would imply, cannot be either representative or +misrepresentative. Our imagination may mislead us: the original data of +sense cannot: although we may, and often do, misinterpret their relations +to one another, and to our pleasures and pains and higher faculties. The +divine meaning with which they are charged, of which science is a partial +expression, they may perhaps be said to represent. Otherwise +representative sense-perception is absurdity: the ideas of sense cannot be +representative in the way those of imagination are; for fancies are faint +representations of data of sense. The appearances that sentient +intelligence realises _are_ the things of sense, and we cannot go deeper. +If we prefer accordingly to call the material world a dream or a chimera, +we must understand that it is the _reasonable_ dream in which all sentient +intelligence participates, and by which the embodied life of man must be +regulated. + + ------------------------------------- + +Has Berkeley, in his juvenile ardour, and with the impetuosity natural to +him, while seeking to demonstrate the impotence of matter, and the +omnipresent supremacy of Spirit, so spiritualised the material world as to +make it unfit for the symbolical office in the universe of reality which +he supposes it to discharge? Is its potential existence in God, and its +percipient realisation by me, and presumably by innumerable other sentient +beings, an adequate account of the real material world existing in place +and time? Can this universal orderly dream experienced in sense involve +the objectivity implied in its being the reliable medium of social +intercourse? Does _such_ a material world provide me with a means of +escape from absolute solitude? Nay, if Matter cannot rise into reality +without percipient spirit as realising factor, can my individual +percipient spirit realise _myself_ without independent Matter? Without +intelligent life Matter is pronounced unreal. But is it not also true that +without Matter, and the special material organism we call our body, +percipient spirit is unreal? Does not Nature seem as indispensable to +Spirit as Spirit is to Nature? Must we not assume at least their +unbeginning and unending coexistence, even if we recognise in Spirit the +deeper and truer reality? Do the New Principles explain the _final_ ground +of trust and certainty about the universe of change into which I entered +as a stranger when I was born? If they make all that I have believed in as +_outward_ to be in its reality _inward_, do they not disturb the balance +that is necessary to _all_ human certainties, and leave me without any +realities at all? + +That Berkeley at the age of twenty-five, and educated chiefly by Locke, +had fathomed or even entertained all these questions was hardly to be +looked for. How far he had gone may be gathered by a study of the sequel +of his book of _Principles_. + + + +ii. Objections to the New Principles answered (sect. 34-84). + + +The supposed Objections, with Berkeley's answers, may be thus +interpreted:-- + +_First objection._ (Sect. 34-40.) The preceding Principles banish all +substantial realities, and substitute a universe of chimeras. + +_Answer._ This objection is a play upon the popular meaning of the word +"idea." That name is appropriate to the phenomena presented in sense, +because they become concrete realities only in the experience of living +Spirit; and so it is not confined to the chimeras of individual fancy, +which may misrepresent the real ideas of sense that are presented in the +natural system independently of our will. + +_Second objection._ (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles abolish the +distinction between Perception and Imagination--between imagining one's +self burnt and actually being burnt. + +_Answer._ Real fire differs from fancied fire: as real pain does from +fancied pain; yet no one supposes that real pain any more than imaginary +pain can exist unfelt by a sentient intelligence. + +_Third objection._ (Sect. 42-44.) We actually _see_ sensible things +existing at a distance from our bodies. Now, whatever is seen existing at +a distance must be seen as existing external to us in our bodies, which +contradicts the foregoing Principles. + +_Answer._ Distance, or outness, is not visible. It is a conception which +is suggested gradually, by our experience of the connexion between visible +colours and certain visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one +hand, and our tactual experience, on the other--as was proved in the _Essay +on Vision_, in which the ideality of the _visible_ world is +demonstrated(470). + +_Fourth objection._ (Sect. 45-48.) It follows from the New Principles, +that the material world must be undergoing continuous annihilation and +recreation in the innumerable sentient experiences in which it becomes +real. + +_Answer_. According to the New Principles a thing may be realised in the +sense-experience of _other_ minds, during intervals of its perception by +_my_ mind; for the Principles do not affirm dependence only on this or +that mind, but on a living Mind. If this implies a constant creation of +the material world, the conception of the universe as in a state of +constant creation is not new, and it signally displays Divine Providence. + +_Fifth objection._ (Sect. 49.) If extension and extended Matter can exist +only _in mind_, it follows that extension is an attribute of mind--that +mind is extended. + +_Answer._ Extension and other sensible qualities exist in mind, not as +_modes_ of mind, which is unintelligible, but _as ideas_ of which Mind is +percipient; and this is absolutely inconsistent with the supposition that +Mind is itself extended(471). + +_Sixth objection._ (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds on the +assumption that Matter is independent of percipient mind, and it thus +contradicts the New Principles. + +_Answer._ On the contrary, Matter--if it means what exists abstractly, or +in independence of all percipient Mind--is useless in natural philosophy, +which is conversant exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that compose +concrete things, not with empty abstractions. + +_Seventh objection._ (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to spiritual agents +alone, and to regard the things of sense as wholly impotent, thus +discharging natural causes as the New Principles do, is at variance with +human language and with good sense. + +_Answer._ While we may speak as the multitude do, we should learn to think +with the few who reflect. We may still speak of "natural causes," even +when, as philosophers, we recognise that all true efficiency must be +spiritual, and that the material world is only a system of sensible +symbols, regulated by Divine Will and revealing Omnipresent Mind. + +_Eighth objection._ (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men seems +inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent. + +_Answer._ Not so when we consider that men seldom comprehend the deep +meaning of their practical assumptions; and when we recollect the +prejudices, once dignified as good sense, which have successively +surrendered to philosophy. + +_Ninth objection._ (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is inconsistent with +our common faith in the existence of the material world must be rejected. + +_Answer._ The fact that we are conscious of not being ourselves the cause +of changes perpetually going on in our _sense_-ideas, some of which we +gradually learn by experience to foresee, sufficiently accounts for the +common belief in the independence of those ideas, and is what men truly +mean by this. + +_Tenth objection._ (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles concerning +Matter and Spirit are inconsistent with the laws of motion, and with other +truths in mathematics and natural philosophy. + +_Answer._ The laws of motion, and those other truths, may be all conceived +and expressed in consistency with the absence of independent substance and +causation in Matter. + +_Eleventh objection._ (Sect. 60-66.) If, according to the foregoing +Principles, the material world is merely phenomena presented by a Power +not-ourselves to our senses, the elaborate contrivances which we find in +Nature are useless; for we might have had all experiences that are needful +without them, by the direct agency of God. + +_Answer._ Elaborate contrivances in Nature are relatively necessary as +signs: they express to _us_ the occasional presence and some of the +experience of other men, also the constant presence and power of the +Universal Spirit, while the scientific interpretation of elaborately +constituted Nature is a beneficial moral and intellectual exercise. + +_Twelfth objection._ (Sect. 67-79.) Although the impossibility of _active_ +Matter may be demonstrable, this does not prove the impossibility of +_inactive_ Matter, _neither solid nor extended_, which may be the occasion +of our having sense-ideas. + +_Answer._ This supposition is unintelligible: the words in which it is +expressed convey no meaning. + +_Thirteenth objection._ (Sect. 80, 81.) Matter may be _an unknowable +Somewhat_, neither substance nor accident, cause nor effect, spirit nor +idea: all the reasonings against Matter, conceived as something positive, +fail, when this wholly negative notion is maintained. + +_Answer._ This is to use the word "Matter" as people use the word +"nothing": Unknowable Somewhat cannot be distinguished from nothing. + +_Fourteenth objection._ (Sect. 82-84.) Although we cannot, in opposition +to the New Principles, infer scientifically the existence of Matter, in +abstraction from all realising percipient life, or form any conception, +positive or negative, of what Matter is; yet Holy Scripture demands the +faith of every Christian in the independent reality of the material world. + +_Answer._ The _independent_ reality of the material world is nowhere +affirmed in Scripture. + + + +iii. Consequences and Applications of the New Principles (sect. 85-156). + + +In this portion of the Treatise, the New Principles, already guarded +against objections, are applied to enlighten and invigorate final faith, +often suffering from the paralysis of the scepticism produced by +materialism; also to improve the sciences, including those which relate to +Mind, in man and in God. They are applied:-- + + + 1. To the refutation of Scepticism as to the reality of the world + (sect. 85-91) and God (sect. 92-96); + + 2. To the liberation of thought from the bondage of unmeaning + abstractions (sect. 97-100); + + 3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by making it an + interpretation of ideas of sense, simply in their relations of + coexistence and sequence, according to which they constitute the + Divine Language of Nature (sect. 101-116); + + 4. To simplify Mathematics, by eliminating infinites and other + empty abstractions (sect. 117-134); + + 5. To explain and sustain faith in the Immortality of men (sect. + 135-144); + + 6. To explain the belief which each man has in the existence of + other men; as signified to him in and through sense-symbolism + (sect. 145); + + 7. To vindicate faith in God, who is signified in and through the + sense-symbolism of universal nature (sect. 146-156). + + +It was only by degrees that Berkeley's New Principles attracted attention. +A new mode of conceiving the world we live in, by a young and unknown +author, published at a distance from the centre of English intellectual +life, was apt to be overlooked. In connexion with the _Essay on Vision_, +however, it drew enough of regard to make Berkeley an object of interest +to the literary world on his first visit to London, three years after its +publication. + + + + +Dedication + + +TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE + +THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE(472), &c. + +KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER +MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL + +MY LORD, + +You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to +be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. +But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful +Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship +for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not +altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning, +and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to +both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my +poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness +which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my +lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to +shew towards our Society(473) gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to +countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations +determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather +because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and +most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the +world so justly admires in your lordship, + +My Lord, + +Your lordship's most humble +and most devoted servant, + +GEORGE BERKELEY. + + + + +The Preface + + +What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry(474), +seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known; particularly to +those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the +existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the +Soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially +examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success +of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end +this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his +judgment till he has once at least read the whole through, with that +degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to +deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are +very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to +be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an +entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though +the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is +very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I +flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. + +As for the characters of novelty and singularity(475) which some of the +following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any +apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very +little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is +capable of demonstration(476), for no other reason but because it is newly +known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. + +Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the +hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion +before they rightly comprehend it(477). + + + + +Introduction + + +1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth(478), +it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and +pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater +clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and +difficulties than other men. Yet, so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of +mankind, that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed +by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them +nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. +They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of +all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and +instinct to follow the light of a superior principle--to reason, meditate, +and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in +our minds, concerning those things which before we seemed fully to +comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover +themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we +are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and +inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in +speculation; till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, +we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a +forlorn Scepticism(479). + +2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the +natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said the +faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support +and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and +constitution of things: besides, the mind of man being finite, when it +treats of things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at if +it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible +it should ever extricate itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not to +be comprehended by that which is finite(480). + +3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault +originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of +them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true +principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or +made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully +with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge +which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to +the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it +may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such +means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the +whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of +those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up +the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. We have first +raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see. + +4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles +are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those +absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; +insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, +conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our +faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a +strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge; to sift +and examine them on all sides: especially since there may be some grounds +to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the +mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and +intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much +as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been +avoided. + +5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I +consider what a number of very great and extraordinary men have gone +before me in the like designs(481), yet I am not without some hopes; upon +the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and +that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, +and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had +escaped far better eyes. + + ------------------------------------- + +6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving +what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, +concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this +matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice +of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate +and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties +in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind +hath a power of framing _abstract_ ideas or notions of things(482). He who +is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers +must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract +ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of +those sciences which go by the name of logic and metaphysics, and of all +that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime +learning; in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such +a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is +well acquainted with them. + + ------------------------------------- + +7. It is agreed on all hands that the _qualities_ or _modes_ of things do +never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all +others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the +same object. But, we are told, the mind, being able to consider each +quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is +united, does by that means frame to itself _abstract ideas_. For example, +there is conceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this +mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent +parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the +abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible +for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind +can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of +extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension. + +8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions +perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some +other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which +distinguish them one from another, it considers apart, or singles out by +itself, that which is common; making thereof a most abstract idea of +extension; which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure +or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So +likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by +sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that +only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract; which is +neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, +in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly, not only from the body +moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular +directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which +equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be +perceived by sense. + +9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of _qualities_ or +_modes_, so does it, by the same precision, or mental separation, attain +abstract ideas of the more compounded _beings_ which include several +coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter, +James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape +and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compound idea it has of +Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to +each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea, +wherein all the particulars equally partake; abstracting entirely from and +cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine +it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come +by the abstract idea of _man_, or, if you please, humanity, or human +nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no +man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor +any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein +all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is +neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but +something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there +being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but +not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts +which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to +all the living creatures, frames the idea of _animal_; which abstracts not +only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and +insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, +life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By _body_ is meant body without any +particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to +all animals; without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, +&c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the +distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left +out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion +must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a +motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive. + +10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, +they best can tell(483). For myself, [(484)I dare be confident I have it +not.] I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining or representing to +myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of +variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two +heads; or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can +consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or +separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I +imagine(485), it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the +idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, +or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized +man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above +described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea +of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor +slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other +abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to +abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or +qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in +some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I +deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those +qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can +frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner +aforesaid--which last are the two proper acceptations of _abstraction_. And +there is ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my +case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend +to abstract notions(486). It is said they are difficult, and not to be +attained without pains and study. We may therefore reasonably conclude +that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned. + + ------------------------------------- + +11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of +abstraction(487), and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the +men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as +that seems to be. There has been a late [(488)excellent and] deservedly +esteemed philosopher(489) who, no doubt, has given it very much +countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what +puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and +beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a +perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the +faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident we +observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal +ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty +of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, +or any other general signs." And a little after:--"Therefore, I think, we +may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are +discriminated from man: and it is that proper difference wherein they are +wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For if +they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have +them(490)), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident +to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that +they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive +them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those +narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by +any kind of abstraction."--_Essay on Human Understanding_, B. II. ch. 11. § +10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of +brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the +distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of +those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason +that is here assigned, why we have no grounds to think brutes have +abstract general ideas, is, that we observe in them no use of words, or +any other general signs; which is built on this supposition, to wit, that +the making use of words implies having general ideas. From which it +follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their +ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further +appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: "Since all +things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?" His +answer is: "Words become general by being made the signs of general +ideas."--_Essay on Human Understanding_, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But it seems +that a word(491) becomes general by being made the sign, not of an +abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which +it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the +change of motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that +"whatever has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be +understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will +not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an _idea_(492) of motion +without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity; or that I +must conceive an _abstract general idea_ of extension, which is neither +line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, +nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever +particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, +horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it +holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension; it +matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that +magnitude or figure(493). + +12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the better judge how +words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny +absolutely there are _general ideas_, but only that there are any +_abstract general ideas_. For, in the passages we have quoted wherein +there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are +formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and +9(494). Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of +what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which +considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to +represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort(495). +To make this plain by an example. Suppose a geometrician is demonstrating +the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a +black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular +line, is nevertheless _with regard to its signification_ general; since, +as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so +that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other +words, of a line in general(496). And, as _that particular line_ becomes +general by being made a sign, so the _name_ line, which taken absolutely +is particular, by being a sign, is made general. And as the former owes +its generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, +but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter +must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the +various particular lines which it indifferently denotes. + +13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, +and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage +out of the _Essay on Human Understanding_, which is as follows:--"Abstract +ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, +as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by +constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect +upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances +of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer +themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some +pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none +of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be +neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor +scalenon; but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something +imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea(497) wherein some parts of several +different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind, in +this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to +them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of +knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one +has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least +this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not +those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as +its earliest knowledge is conversant about."--B. iv. ch. 7. § 9. If any man +has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is +here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor +would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and +certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, +methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. What more easy than +for any one to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether +he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the +description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle--which is +neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but +all and none of these at once? + +14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with +them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on +all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, +to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to +those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From +all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a +thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for _communication_, +which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if +they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant +and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time it +is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing +themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when +they are grown up; for then it seems they are not conscious of any such +painstaking. It remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. +And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract +notions(498) will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a +hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of +their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till +they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed +in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common +name they make use of? + +15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the _enlargement of +knowledge_ than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted +on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to +which I fully agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions +are formed by abstraction in the manner premised--_universality_, so far as +I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or +conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars +signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, +names, or notions(499), being in their own nature _particular_, are +_rendered universal_. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning +triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a +triangle: which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an +_idea_(500) of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor +equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of +this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all +rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All +which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it(501). + +16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be +true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it +demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to +all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one +particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to +any other triangle which in all respects is not the same with it. For +example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles +rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore +conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a +right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain +this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular +demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible; or once +for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all +the particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all +equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in +view(502) whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an +isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I +may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, +of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, +nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned +in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all +these particulars; but then there is not the least mention made of _them_ +in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal +to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the +sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shews +that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and +for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is +that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I +had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not +because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. +[(503)And here it must be acknowledged that a man may _consider_ a figure +merely as triangular; without attending to the particular qualities of the +angles, or relations of the sides. _So far he may abstract._ But this will +never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent _idea_ of +a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or +so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea, +either of man or of animal; inasmuch as all that is perceived is not +considered.] + +17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, +those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable +labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures +and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and +controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those +matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to +mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted +on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined +to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider +the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid +out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that +notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remain full of +darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end; +and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and +cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly +irreconcilable to the understandings of men; and that, taking all +together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to +mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and +amusement(504)--I say, the consideration of all this is apt to throw them +into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps +cease upon a view of the false Principles that have obtained in the world; +amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide influence(505) +over the thoughts of speculative men than this of _abstract general +ideas_. + + ------------------------------------- + +18. I come now to consider the _source_ of this prevailing notion, and +that seems to me to be _language_. And surely nothing of less extent than +reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally +received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the +plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge +that they are made in order to naming; from which it is clear consequence +that if there had been no such thing as speech or universal signs, there +never had been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and +elsewhere of the _Essay on Human Understanding_. + +Let us examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the origin of +that mistake.--First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to +have, one only precise and settled signification; which inclines men to +think there are certain abstract determinate ideas that constitute the +true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is +by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to +signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as +one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they +all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which +does evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly +appear to any one by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that +every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain +signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be "a plain surface +comprehended by three right lines"; by which that name is limited to +denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the +definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or +white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with +what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be +great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits +the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name +constantly to the same _definition_, and another to make it stand +everywhere for the same _idea_(506): the one is necessary, the other +useless and impracticable. + +19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine +of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that +language has no other end but the communicating ideas, and that every +significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal +certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do +not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway +concluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names +in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others +determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody +will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary +(even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which stand for +ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the +ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and discoursing, names being +for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a +particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is +not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that +particular quantity it was appointed to stand for(507). + +20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief +and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, +as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an +action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which the +former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely +omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth(508) not +unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader +to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in +hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, +admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon +the perception of certain words, without any ideas(509) coming between. At +first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to +produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when +language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the +characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first +were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite +omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a _good +thing_, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being +threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not +of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an +idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little +reflection of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will +evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety +of language without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas in his +own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper +names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our +view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by +them. For example, when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle hath said it," all +I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the +deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this +effect may be so instantly produced in the minds of those who are +accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as +it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation +should go before. [(510)So close and immediate a connexion may custom +establish betwixt the very word Aristotle(511) and the motions of assent +and reverence in the minds of some men.] Innumerable examples of this kind +may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one's +experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him? + + ------------------------------------- + +21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have +considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and +endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those ends to which they are +thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from +whence they flow, which appears evidently to be Language. + +It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their +means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint +labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the +view and made the possession of one single person. But [(512)at the same +time it must be owned that] most parts of knowledge have been [(513)so] +strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways +of speech wherein they are delivered, [that it may almost be made a +question whether language has contributed more to the hindrance or +advancement of the sciences(514)]. Since therefore words are so apt to +impose on the understanding, [I am resolved in my inquiries to make as +little use of them as possibly I can(515):] whatever ideas I consider, I +shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view; keeping out of +my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use +hath so strictly united with them. From which I may expect to derive the +following advantages:-- + +22. _First_, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely +verbal, the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has +been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. +_Secondly_, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that +fine and subtle net of abstract ideas, which has so miserably perplexed +and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, +that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so +much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. +_Thirdly_, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas(516), divested +of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I +consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking +I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that +any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern +the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what +ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing +more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own +understanding. + +23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire +deliverance from the deception of words; which I dare hardly promise +myself, so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, +and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which +difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of +_abstraction_. For, so long as men thought _abstract_ ideas were annexed +to their words, it does not seem strange that they should use words for +ideas; it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and +retain the _abstract_ idea in the mind; which in itself was perfectly +inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those who have so +emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in +their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to +perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd +opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. +And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well(517), that we attend +to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which +signify them(518). But, how good soever this advice may be they have given +others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so +long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, +and that the immediate signification of every general name was a +determinate abstract idea. + +24. But these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease +prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than +_particular_ ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and +conceive the _abstract_ idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names +do not always stand for ideas(519) will spare himself the labour of +looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to +be wished that every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear +view of the ideas he would consider; separating from them all that dress +and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment +and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens +and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings +of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only +draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose +fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. + +25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from +the embarras and delusion of Words, we may make infinite reasonings upon +them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be +never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more +irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. +Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that +he would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to +attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. +By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of +what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words. +And I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own +naked, undisguised ideas(520). + + + + +Part First + + +1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the _objects of human +knowledge_, that they are either _ideas_ actually imprinted on the senses; +or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations +of the mind; or lastly, _ideas_ formed by help of memory and +imagination--either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those +originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of +light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I +perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance; and of all +these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me +with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the +mind in all their variety of tone and composition(521). + +And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to +be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one _thing_. Thus, for +example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having +been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified +by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, +a book, and the like sensible things; which as they are pleasing or +disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so +forth(522). + +2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, +there is likewise Something which knows or perceives them; and exercises +divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This +perceiving, active being is what I call _mind_, _spirit_, _soul_, or +_myself_. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing +entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same +thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists +in being perceived(523). + + ------------------------------------- + +3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the +imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to +me it seems no less evident that the various sensations, or ideas +imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, +whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind +perceiving them(524). I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of +this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term _exist_ +when applied to sensible things(525). The table I write on I say exists; +that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it +existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or +that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that +is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or +figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can +understand by these and the like expressions(526). For as to what is said +of the _absolute_ existence of unthinking things, without any relation to +their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their +_esse_ is _percipi_; nor is it possible they should have any existence out +of the minds or thinking things which perceive them(527). + + ------------------------------------- + +4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, +mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, +natural or real(528), distinct from their being perceived by the +understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever +this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in +his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to +involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects +but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our +own(529) ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one +of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? + +5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet(530) it will, perhaps, be found at +bottom to depend on the doctrine of _abstract ideas_. For can there be a +nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible +objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing +unperceived(531)? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and +figures--in a word the things we see and feel--what are they but so many +sensations, notions(532), ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it +possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For +my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, +divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things +which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the +trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose +without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can +abstract; if that may properly be called _abstraction_ which extends only +to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really +exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining +power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or +perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything +without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to +conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the +sensation or perception of it. [(533)In truth, the object and the +sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each +other.] + +6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need +only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. +that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all +those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any +subsistence without a mind; that their _being_ is to be perceived or +known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, +or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must +either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some +Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the +absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an +existence independent of a spirit. [(534)To be convinced of which, the +reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the +_being_ of a sensible thing from its _being perceived_.] + +7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any other Substance +than _Spirit_, or that which perceives(535). But, for the fuller +proof(536) of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are +colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas +perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is +a manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive: +that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must +perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or +_substratum_ of those ideas. + + ------------------------------------- + +8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves(537) do not exist without the +mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or +resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking +substance(538). I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a +colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we +look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible +for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask +whether those supposed _originals_, or external things, of which our ideas +are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If +they are, then _they_ are ideas, and we have gained our point: but if you +say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a +colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something +which is intangible; and so of the rest. + + ------------------------------------- + +9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt _primary_ and _secondary_ +qualities(539). By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, +solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all +other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The +ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of +anything existing without the mind, or unperceived; but they will have our +ideas of the _primary qualities_ to be patterns or images of things which +exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. +By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert(540), senseless +substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But +it is evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure, +and motion are only ideas existing in the mind(541), and that an idea can +be like nothing but another idea; and that consequently neither they nor +their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is +plain that the very notion of what is called _Matter_ or _corporeal +substance_, involves a contradiction in it. [(542)Insomuch that I should +not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its absurdity. But, +because the tenet of the existence of Matter(543) seems to have taken so +deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill +consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious than omit +anything that might conduce to the full discovery and extirpation of that +prejudice.] + +10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or +original qualities(544) do exist without the mind, in unthinking +substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, +cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us are +sensations, existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned +by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of +matter(545). This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can +demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those +_original_ qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible +qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from +them, it plainly follows that _they_ exist only in the mind. But I desire +any one to reflect, and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, +conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible +qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to +frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it +some colour or other sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only +in the mind. In short, extension, figure and motion, abstracted from all +other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible +qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere +else(546). + +11. Again, _great_ and _small_, _swift_ and _slow_, are allowed to exist +nowhere without the mind(547); being entirely relative, and changing as +the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension +therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the +motion neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. But, say +you, they are extension in general, and motion in general. Thus we see how +much the tenet of extended moveable substances existing without the mind +depends on that strange doctrine of _abstract ideas_. And here I cannot +but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter, +or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by +their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed +notion of _materia prima_, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. +Without extension solidity cannot be conceived: since therefore it has +been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same +must also be true of solidity(548). + +12. That _number_ is entirely the creature of the mind(549), even though +the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to +whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of +number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same +extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers +it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly +relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to +think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. +We say one book, one page, one line, &c.; all these are equally units, +though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is +plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas +_arbitrarily_ put together by the mind(550). + +13. Unity I know some(551) will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, +accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea +answering the word _unity_ I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could +not miss finding it; on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my +understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be +perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it +is an _abstract idea_. + +14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern +philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in +Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all +other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that +heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of +real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them; for +that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. +Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not +patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter; because to the +same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same +station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of +anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved +that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing; because the thing +remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a +fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that +motion is not without the mind; since if the succession of ideas in the +mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower, +without any alteration in any external object(552)? + +15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought +manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he +shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of +extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of +arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an +outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true +extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing(553) +plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or +other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject +without the mind, or in truth that there should be any such thing as an +outward object(554). + +16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. It is said extension +is a _mode_ or _accident_ of Matter, and that Matter is the _substratum_ +that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant +by Matter's _supporting_ extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter; and +therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, +if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of +Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know +what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting +them. It is evident _support_ cannot here be taken in its usual or literal +sense, as when we say that pillars support a building. In what sense +therefore must it be taken? [(555) For my part, I am not able to discover +any sense at all that can be applicable to it.] + +17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare +themselves to mean by _material substance_, we shall find them acknowledge +they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being +in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. +The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and +incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, +as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of +those words: it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that +is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches +which make the signification of the words _material substance_, I am +convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we +trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material _substratum_ or +support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not +suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct +repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? + +18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances +may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, +yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by +Sense or by Reason(556). As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge +only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately +perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us +that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which +are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.--It remains +therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must +be by reason inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived +by sense. But ((557)I do not see) what reason can induce us to believe the +existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the +very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary +connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands +(and what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it beyond +dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we +have now, though no bodies existed without resembling them(558). Hence it +is evident the supposition of external bodies(559) is not necessary for +the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, +and might possibly be produced always, in the same order we see them in at +present, without their concurrence. + +19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, +yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of +their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather +than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things +as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be +said. For, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by +their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are +produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner +body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea +in the mind(560). Hence it is evident the production of ideas or +sensations in our minds(561), can be no reason why we should suppose +Matter or corporeal substances(562); since that is acknowledged to remain +equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it +were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so +must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without +any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are +entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose. + +20. In short, if there were external bodies(563), it is impossible we +should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very +same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one can +deny possible--an intelligence, without the help of external bodies, to be +affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, +imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask +whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence +of Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in +his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this +there can be no question. Which one consideration were enough to make any +reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think +himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind. + +21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of +Matter(564), after what has been said, I could instance several of those +errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from +that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in +philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall +not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think +arguments _a posteriori_ are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if +I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated _a priori_, as because I shall +hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them. + + ------------------------------------- + +22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in +handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which +may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own +thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, +or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. +This easy trial(565) may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is +a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole +upon this issue:--If you can but conceive it possible for one extended +moveable substance, or in general for any one idea, or anything like an +idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it(566), I shall +readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external +bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot +either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to +it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your +opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so. + +23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine +trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody +by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it. +But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind +certain ideas which you call _books_ and _trees_, and at the same time +omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not +you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is +nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining, or +forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can conceive it +possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind(567). To +make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived +or unthought of; which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to +conceive the existence of external bodies(568), we are all the while only +contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is +deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or +without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or +exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth +and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on +any other proofs against the existence of _material substance_. + +24. [(569)Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words, we should, +I believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] It is very obvious, +upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it be +possible for us to understand what is meant by the _absolute existence of +sensible objects in themselves_, or _without the mind_(570). To me it is +evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else +nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or +fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; +and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions +does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is +on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the _absolute existence of +unthinking things_ are words without a meaning, or which include a +contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly +recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. + + ------------------------------------- + +25. All our ideas, sensations, notions(571), or the things which we +perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly +inactive: there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that +one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in +another(572). To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else +requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every +part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in +them but what is perceived; but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether +of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; +there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention +will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and +inertness in it; insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do +anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can +it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from +sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion +cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are +the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, +and size of corpuscles(573), must certainly be false. + +26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited, +others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore _some_ cause +of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes +them(574). That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of +_ideas_, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a +_substance_; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material +substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal +active substance or Spirit(575). + +27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided active being--as it perceives ideas +it is called the _understanding_, and as it produces or otherwise operates +about them it is called the _will_. Hence there can be no _idea_ formed of +a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid. +sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, +that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to +have an idea which shall be _like_ that active Principle of motion and +change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of Spirit, or +that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the +effects which it produceth(576). If any man shall doubt of the truth of +what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the +idea of any power or active being; and whether he has ideas of two +principal powers, marked by the names _will_ and _understanding_, distinct +from each other, as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in +general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of +the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name _soul_ or _spirit_. +This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words _will_, +[(577)_understanding_, _mind_,] _soul_, _spirit_, do not stand for +different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something +which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be +like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [(578)Though it must be +owned at the same time that we have some _notion_ of soul, spirit, and the +operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we +know or understand the meaning of these words.] + +28. I find I can excite ideas(579) in my mind at pleasure, and vary and +shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than _willing_, and +straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it +is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of +ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain +and grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of +exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with +words(580). + + ------------------------------------- + +29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas +actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on _my_ will. When +in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether +I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present +themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; +the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of _my_ will(581). There is +therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. + +30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of +the Imagination(582); they have likewise a steadiness, order, and +coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects +of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series--the admirable +connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its +Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind we +depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called _the laws of +nature_; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and +such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary +course of things. + +31. This gives us a sort of foresight, which enables us to regulate our +actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally +at a loss: we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the +least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, +sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the +way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such +ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we know, not by +discovering any _necessary connexion_ between our ideas, but only by the +observation of the _settled laws_ of nature; without which we should be +all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to +manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born(583). + +32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays +the Goodness and Wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes +the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it +rather sends them wandering after second causes(584). For, when we +perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas, and we +know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency +to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which +nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having +observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure, +we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, +we do from thence conclude the sun to be the _cause_ of heat. And in like +manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with +sound, we are inclined to think the latter the _effect_ of the +former(585). + +33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called +_real things_: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, +vivid, and constant, are more properly termed _ideas_ or _images of_ +things, which they copy and represent. But then our _sensations_, be they +never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas(586): that is, they +exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its +own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality(587) in +them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures +of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. +They are also less dependent on the spirit or thinking substance which +perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more +powerful Spirit; yet still they are _ideas_: and certainly no idea, +whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving +it(588). + + ------------------------------------- + +34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in +answering Objections(589) which may probably be made against the +Principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too +prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since +all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature; and I am willing +to be understood by every one. + +_First_, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all +that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and +instead thereof a chimerical scheme of _ideas_ takes place. All things +that exist exist only in the mind; that is, they are purely notional. What +therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of +houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are +all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?--To all which, +and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the +Principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. +Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains +as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a _rerum natura_, and +the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. +This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is +meant by _real things_, in opposition to _chimeras_ or _ideas of our own +framing_; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that +sense(590) are alike _ideas_. + +35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can +apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my +eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least +question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which +_philosophers_ call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this +there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will +never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to +support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost +a great handle for trifling and disputation. [(591)But that is all the +harm that I can see done.] + +36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of +things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the +plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been +said:--There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or +excite ideas(592) in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, +and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense: which, being +impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak +themselves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than human +spirits(593). These latter are said to have _more reality_(594) in them +than the former;--by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, +and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving +them(595). And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, +and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense +here given of _reality_, it is evident that every vegetable, star, +mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a +_real being_ by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean +anything by the term _reality_ different from what I do, I entreat them to +look into their own thoughts and see. + +37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take +away all _corporeal substances_. To this my answer is, that if the word +_substance_ be taken in the vulgar sense, for a _combination_ of sensible +qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we +cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic +sense, for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind--then +indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away +that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination(596). + +38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink +ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word +_idea_ not being used in common discourse to signify the several +combinations of sensible qualities which are called _things_; and it is +certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language +will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the +proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and +clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our +senses(597). The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, +and suchlike qualities, which combined together(598) constitute the +several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in +the mind that perceives them: and this is all that is meant by calling +them _ideas_; which word, if it was as ordinarily used as _thing_, would +sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about +the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree +with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of +sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily +grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be +called _things_ rather than _ideas_. + +39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word _idea_, and do not rather +in compliance with custom call them _things_; I answer, I do it for two +reasons:--First, because the term _thing_, in contradistinction to _idea_, +is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind: +Secondly, because _thing_ hath a more comprehensive signification than +_idea_, including spirits, or thinking things(599), as well as ideas. +Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are +withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word _idea_; +which implies those properties(600). + +40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will +still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible +soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the +evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. +That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived +by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the +testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything +which is _not_ perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn +sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the +stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more +opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter +clearly shewn(601). + + ------------------------------------- + +41. _Secondly_, it will be objected that there is a great difference +betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or +imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so. [(602)If you suspect it to +be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and +you will be convinced with a witness.] This and the like may be urged in +opposition to our tenets.--To all which the answer is evident from what +hath been already said(603); and I shall only add in this place, that if +real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real +pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and +yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in +an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea(604). + + ------------------------------------- + +42. _Thirdly_, it will be objected that we see things actually without or +at a distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it +being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several +miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts(605).--In answer to this, +I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as +existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are +acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind. + +43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to +consider how it is that we perceive distance, and things placed at a +distance, by sight. For, that we should in truth _see_ external space, and +bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to +carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing +nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that +gave birth to my _Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_, which was +published not long since(606). Wherein it is shewn that distance or +outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight(607), nor yet +apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a +necessary connexion with it(608); but that it is only suggested to our +thoughts by certain visible ideas, and sensations attending vision, which +in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with +distance or things placed at a distance(609); but, by a connexion taught +us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the +same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to +stand for(610). Insomuch that a man born blind, and afterwards made to +see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his +mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the forementioned +treatise. + +44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and +heterogeneous(611). The former are marks and prognostics of the latter. +That the proper objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor are +the images of external things, was shewn even in that treatise(612). +Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of _tangible +objects_;--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for +establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my +purpose to examine and refute it, in a discourse concerning _Vision_. So +that in strict truth the ideas of sight(613), when we apprehend by them +distance, and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to +us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas +of touch(614) will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of +time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident, +from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in +sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas +are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us +what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this +or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this +point I refer to the Essay itself. + + ------------------------------------- + +45. _Fourthly_, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it +follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects +of sense exist only when they are perceived: the trees therefore are in +the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is +somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in +the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again +created(615).--In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been +said in sect. 3, 4, &c.; and desire he will consider whether he means +anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being +perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not +able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once +more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself +to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his +ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up +the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for +him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on +me as an absurdity, the not assenting to those propositions which at +bottom have no meaning in them(616). + +46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of +philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It +is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible +objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what +philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light +and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, +are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, +it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every +moment creating; yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. +For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter(617), +and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of +opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation; which by +them is expounded to be a continual creation(618). + +47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that, though we allow +the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably +follow, from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the +particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they +are not perceived. For, it is evident, from sect. 11 and the following +sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible +Somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies +falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make +this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of +Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and +considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it +beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of +parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived by sense(619). +The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite +magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not +because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite +number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern +them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it +perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object +appears greater; and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities +which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very +different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And +at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes +infinitely acute, the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is +no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, +considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all +shape and figure. From which it follows that, though we should grant the +existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, +the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to +acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor +anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each +particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless; and it is +the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible +world, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived. + +48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 +will not be found reasonably charged on the Principles we have premised, +so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, +though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas +which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not hence conclude they have no +existence except only while they are perceived by _us_; since there may be +some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies +are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood +to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does +not therefore follow from the foregoing Principles that bodies are +annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the +intervals between _our_ perception of them. + + ------------------------------------- + +49. _Fifthly_, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure +exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; +since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the Schools) +is predicated of the subject in which it exists.--I answer, those qualities +are in the mind only as they are perceived by it;--that is, not by way of +_mode_ or _attribute_, but only by way of _idea_(620). And it no more +follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it +alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on +all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what +philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and +unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, +extended, and square," they will have it that the word _die_ denotes a +subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure +which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot +comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things +which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, +extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject +distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning +of the word _die_. + + ------------------------------------- + +50. _Sixthly_, you will say there have been a great many things explained +by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole +corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which +have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In +short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern +philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition +that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist.--To this I answer +that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which +may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by +an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to +shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such +ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in +it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore +evident there can be no use of Matter(621) in natural philosophy. Besides, +they who attempt to account for things do it, not by corporeal substance, +but by figure, motion, and other qualities; which are in truth no more +than mere ideas, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath +been already shewn. See sect. 25. + + ------------------------------------- + +51. _Seventhly_, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem +absurd to take away natural causes(622), and ascribe everything to the +immediate operation of spirits? We must no longer say upon these +principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and +so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after +this manner?--I answer, he would so: in such things we ought to think with +the learned and speak with the vulgar. They who to demonstration are +convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the +sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they +affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear +very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will make it +manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of +alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets(623). + +52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long +as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a +manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if +taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, +propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received +opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible--even in +the most rigid, philosophic reasonings--so far to alter the bent and genius +of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend +difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will +collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, +making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made +inevitable. + +53. As to the opinion that there are no corporeal causes, this has been +heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others +among the modern philosophers; who though they allow Matter to exist, yet +will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all +things(624). These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was +none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by +consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to +exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But +then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, +which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in +nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God +might have done everything as well without them--this I say, though we +should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant +supposition(625). + + ------------------------------------- + +54. In the _eighth_ place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may +be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the +existence of external things(626). Must we suppose the whole world to be +mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and +predominant an error?--I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it +will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the +existence of Matter or things without the mind(627). Strictly speaking, to +believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it(628), +is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, +I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, +indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists; that is, they act +as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every +moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking +being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those +words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not +able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon +themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have +often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. + +55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so +universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak argument of +its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false +opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the +unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time +when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous +absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small +proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this +day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the +world. + +56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and +account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing +they perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were, not the +authors(629), as not being excited from within, nor depending on the +operation of their wills, this made them maintain _those_ ideas or objects +of perception, had an existence independent of and without the mind, +without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. +But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of +perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected +the mistake of the vulgar(630); but at the same time run into another, +which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really +existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being +perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted +by those objects on the mind(631). And this notion of the philosophers +owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being +conscious that _they_ were not the authors of their own sensations; which +they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must +have _some_ cause, distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. + +57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by +things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to _Spirit_, which +alone can act, may be accounted for. First, because they were not aware of +the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas +existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, +because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not +marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of +sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and +motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. +Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready +to own the presence of a Superior Agent. But, when we see things go on in +the ordinary course, they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order +and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, +and goodness in their Creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us, that +we do not think them the immediate effects of a _Free Spirit_; especially +since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an +imperfection, is looked on as a mark of _freedom_(632). + + ------------------------------------- + +58. _Tenthly_, it will be objected that the notions we advance are +inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For +example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by +astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing +reasons. But, on the foregoing Principles, there can be no such thing. +For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it +exists not: but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.--I +answer, That tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the +Principles we have premised: for, the question whether the earth moves or +no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason +to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were +placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and +distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to +move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like +one of them: and this, by the established rules of nature, which we have +no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena. + +59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of +ideas(633) in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, +but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be +affected with pursuant to a great train of actions; and be enabled to pass +a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed +in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein +consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty +very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this +to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of +the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. + + ------------------------------------- + +60. In the _eleventh_ place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves +that curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts +of animals. Might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and +blossoms, and animals perform all their motions, as well without as with +all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put +together;--which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, +nor have any _necessary_ connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If +it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a _fiat_, or act +of his will(634), we must think all that is fine and artificial in the +works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, +though an artist hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a +watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the +motions he designed; yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and +that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour +of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without _his_ being +at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does +not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass, that +whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some +corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by +a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the +Clockwork of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle +as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be +asked, how, upon our Principles, any tolerable account can be given, or +any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and +machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common +philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain +abundance of phenomena? + +61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties +relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned +to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing +Principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth +and certainty of those things which may be proved _a priori_, with the +utmost evidence and rigour of demonstration(635). Secondly, but neither +are the received principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may +still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of +effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might +have been effected by the mere command of His will, without all that +_apparatus_. Nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection +may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of +those machines without the mind; for it has been made evident that +solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no _activity_ or +_efficacy_ in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in +nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing +the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly +to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist +unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth +cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. + +62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though +the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary +to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of +things in a constant regular way, according to the laws of nature. There +are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural +effects: these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are +by men applied, as well to the framing artificial things for the use and +ornament of life as to the explaining the various phenomena. Which +explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular +phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same +thing, in discovering the _uniformity_ there is in the production of +natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several +instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That +there is a great and conspicuous _use_ in these regular constant methods +of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And +it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and +disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing +any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical +laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the +Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might +if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the +dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put +them in it. But yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, +by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is +necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby _he_ makes the +movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the +aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the +perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being +once corrected all is right again(636). + +63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature +display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the +ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of +nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the +Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is +a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to +choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, +which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such +plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than +to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising +events(637). + +64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what +has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than +this:--_ideas_(638) are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a +certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and +effect: there are also several combinations of them, made in a very +regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the +hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret +operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of +the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the +philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what +purpose is that connexion? And since those instruments, being barely +_inefficacious_ perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the +production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in +other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a +close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas, so +artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being [(639) +credible] that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all +that art and regularity to no purpose? + +65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas(640) +does not imply the relation of _cause_ and _effect_, but only of a mark or +_sign_ with the _thing signified_. The fire which I see is not the cause +of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns +me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this +or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign +thereof(641). Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, +that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for +combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to +signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be +variously combined together. And to the end their use be permanent and +universal, these combinations must be made by _rule_, and with _wise +contrivance_. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, +concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what +methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas(642). +Which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is +said(643) that, by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the +inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to +know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of +the thing. + +66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a +cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are +altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities, may be very +naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, +when they are considered only as marks or signs for _our_ information. And +it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if +I may so call it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment +of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by +_corporeal_ causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the +minds of men from that Active Principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in +whom we live, move, and have our being." + + ------------------------------------- + +67. In the _twelfth_ place, it may perhaps be objected that--though it be +clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, +senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable Substance, existing without +the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any man shall +leave out of his idea of Matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, +solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, +senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which +is the _occasion_ of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased +to excite ideas in us--it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this +sense may possibly exist.--In answer to which I say, first, that it seems +no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to +suppose accidents without a substance(644). But secondly, though we should +grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be +supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind(645) is agreed; and that it +exists not in place is no less certain, since all place or extension +exists only in the mind(646), as hath been already proved. It remains +therefore that it exists nowhere at all. + +68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of +Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: for this is all +that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; +which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the +relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be +observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the +description of a _nonentity_ I desire may be considered. But, say you, it +is the _unknown occasion_(647), at the presence of which ideas are excited +in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be +present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor +capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor +hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when +thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, +and which I am not able to comprehend. + +69. Again, let us examine what is meant by _occasion_. So far as I can +gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the +agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to +accompany or go before it, in the ordinary course of things. But, when it +is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be taken in neither of +those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be +an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of +all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions +in the latter sense; as when the burning my finger is said to be the +occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by +calling _matter_ an _occasion_? This term is either used in no sense at +all, or else in some very distant from its received signification. + +70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is +nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting +ideas in our minds(648). For, say you, since we observe our sensations to +be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to +suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being +produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct +parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not +excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being +altogether passive, and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, +by whom they _are_ perceived(649), as it were so many occasions to remind +Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds: that so things may go on +in a constant uniform manner. + +71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here +stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing +distinct from _Spirit_ and _idea_, from perceiving and being perceived; +but whether there are not certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the +mind of God, which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to +produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method: much +after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to +produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a +tune; though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be +entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter (which after all is +the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown +occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is +in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is +no senseless unperceived substance. + +72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform +method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit +who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably +concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a +Spirit--infinitely wise, good, and powerful--is abundantly sufficient to +explain all the appearances of nature(650). But, as for _inert, senseless +Matter_, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or +leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the +meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though +in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence; or +even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to +its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard +to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, +the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we +have just now seen. + +73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men +to suppose the existence of _material substance_; that so having observed +the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may +proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, +therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the +sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and +for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking _substratum_ +or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to +exist by themselves(651). Afterwards, in process of time, men(652) being +convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary +qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this +_substratum_ or material substance of _those_ qualities, leaving only the +primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike; which they still conceived to +exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material +support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly +exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows +that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter(653), +nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing;--so long +as that word is taken to denote an _unthinking substratum_ of qualities or +accidents, wherein they exist without the mind(654). + +74. But--though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter +was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason +entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without +any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded +thereon: yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts that we +can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the +_thing_ itself is indefensible, at least to retain the _name_; which we +apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of _being_, or +_occasion_, though without any shew of reason, at least so far as I can +see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all +the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by +sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, +thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of +an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or +even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our +minds? + +75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and +much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, +against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless _Somewhat_, +by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the +Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the +world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter; +though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on +the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the +full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor +possibility; yet the upshot of all is--that there are certain _unknown_ +Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to +be meant by _occasion_ with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no +longer contending for the thing, but for the name(655). + +76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether +_they_ may be called by the name _Matter_, I shall not dispute(656). But, +if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of +extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most +evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since it is a plain +repugnancy that those qualities should exist in, or be supported by, an +unperceiving substance(657). + +77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless +support of extension, and the other qualities or accidents which we +perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or +_substratum_ of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours +are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, +if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of _their_ +existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and +colours.--I answer, first, if what you mean by the word _Matter_ be only +the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is +such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us. And I do not see the +advantage there is in disputing about what we know not _what_, and we know +not _why_. + +78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only furnish us with +new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against +_their_ existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already +offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like. +_Qualities_, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but _sensations_ or +_ideas_, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not +only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all +possible ideas whatsoever(658). + + ------------------------------------- + +79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to believe the existence +of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it, or explain anything by +it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no +contradiction to say that Matter _exists_, and that this Matter is _in +general_ a _substance_, or _occasion of ideas_; though indeed to go about +to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular explication of those +words may be attended with great difficulties.--I answer, when words are +used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please, without +danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that +_twice two_ is equal to _seven_; so long as you declare you do not take +the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, but for marks of +you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert +thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the occasion of our +ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the +other. + + ------------------------------------- + +80. In the _last_ place, you will say, What if we give up the cause of +material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown +_Somewhat_--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea--inert, +thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no place? +For, say you, whatever may be urged against _substance_ or _occasion_, or +any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so +long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to.--I answer, You +may, if so it shall seem good, use the word _matter_ in the same sense as +other men use _nothing_, and so make those terms convertible in your +style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that +definition; the parts whereof, when I consider with attention, either +collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any +kind of effect or impression made on my mind, different from what is +excited by the term _nothing_. + +81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is included +what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract +idea of _quiddity_, _entity_, or _existence_. I own, indeed, that those +who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if +they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general +notion of all: that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others. That +there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, +whose faculties, both in number and extent, are far exceeding those the +Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me +to pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of +perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may +imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly and presumption. Since +there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or +sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have +perceived, as colours are from sounds(659). But, how ready soever I may be +to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension, with regard to the +endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any +one to pretend to a _notion_ of Entity or Existence, _abstracted_ from +_spirit_ and _idea_, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a +downright repugnancy and trifling with words. + +It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on +the part of Religion. + + ------------------------------------- + +82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real +existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount +to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as +will sufficiently convince every good Christian, that bodies do really +exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ +innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber +and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies(660)--To +which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which +use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a +meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by +our doctrine. That all those things do really exist; that there are +bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has +been shewn to be agreeable to our principles: and the difference betwixt +_things_ and _ideas_, _realities_ and _chimeras_, has been distinctly +explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either +what philosophers call _Matter_, or the existence of objects without the +mind(661), is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. + +83. Again, whether there be or be not external things(662), it is agreed +on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking _our_ +conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us: whence +it plainly follows, that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing +inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that +discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains +undisturbed. But all this seems so very manifest, from what has been +largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any +farther on it. + +84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their +stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was +it not _really_ turned into a serpent? or was there only a change of +_ideas_ in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our +Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the +sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the +appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other +miracles: which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be +looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy.--To this I +reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into +real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have +elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of +_real_ and _imaginary_ has been already so plainly and fully explained, +and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily +answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the +reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this place. I +shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and +smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me +there could be no doubt of its reality(663). So that at bottom the scruple +concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the +received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what +has been said. + + ------------------------------------- + +85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the +clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed +in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences(664). +Some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and obscure +questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are +entirely banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance can think? +Whether Matter be infinitely divisible? And how it operates on +spirit?--these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to +philosophers in all ages. But, depending on the existence of Matter, they +have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other advantages there +are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for +any one to deduce from what has been premised. But this will appear more +plainly in the sequel. + + ------------------------------------- + +86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may +naturally be reduced to two heads--that of _ideas_ and that of _Spirits_. +Of each of these I shall treat in order. + + ------------------------------------- + +And First as to _ideas_, or _unthinking things_. Our knowledge of these +has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very +dangerous errors, by supposing a two-fold existence of sense--the one +_intelligible_ or in the mind, the other _real_ and without the mind(665). +Whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of +their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I +mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is +the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things +subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth +_real_ as it was _conformable to real things_, it follows they could not +be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be +known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which +are not perceived, or exist without the mind(666)? + +87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so +many _sensations_ in the mind, are perfectly known; there being nothing in +them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or +images, referred to _things_ or _archetypes existing without the mind_, +then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and +not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or +motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible +for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our +senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary; and which of them, or +even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really +existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for +aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain +chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in _rerum +natura_. All this scepticism(667) follows from our supposing a difference +between _things_ and _ideas_, and that the former have a subsistence +without the mind, or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, +and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the +supposition of external objects. [(668)But this is too obvious to need +being insisted on.] + +88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, +distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to +know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that +it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and +doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or +feel, even of their own bodies. And after all their labouring and struggle +of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or +demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things(669). But, all +this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes +philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a +meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with the terms +_absolute_, _external_, _exist_, and such like, signifying we know not +what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things +which I actually perceive by sense: it being a manifest contradiction that +any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and +at the same time have no existence in nature; since the very existence of +an _unthinking being_ consists in _being perceived_. + +89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of +sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of +Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of _what +is meant_ by _thing_, _reality_, _existence_; for in vain shall we dispute +concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge +thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. _Thing_ +or _being_ is the most general name of all: it comprehends under it two +kinds, entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common +but the name, viz. _spirits_ and _ideas_. The former are active, +indivisible, [(670)incorruptible] substances: the latter are inert, +fleeting, [(671)perishable passions,] or dependent beings; which subsist +not by themselves(672), but are supported by, or exist in, minds or +spiritual substances. + +[(673)We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and +that of other spirits by reason(674). We may be said to have some +knowledge or _notion_(675) of our own minds, of spirits and active beings; +whereof in a strict sense we have not _ideas_. In like manner, we know and +have a _notion_ of relations between things or ideas; which relations are +distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be +perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that +_ideas_, _spirits_, and _relations_ are all in their respective kinds the +object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term +_idea_ would be improperly extended to signify _everything_ we know or +have any notion of(676).] + +90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are _real_ things, or do really +exist(677): this we do not deny; but we deny they _can_ subsist without +the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any +archetypes existing without the mind(678); since the very being of a +sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like +nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed +_external_, with regard to their origin; in that they are not generated +from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from +that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be +"without the mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in some other +mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist; but it +must be in another mind(679). + +91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the +least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received +principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, +have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But +the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations +of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves(680). +Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things +perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support +wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of +their _reality_, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the +difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by +sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot +therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible +substances, or _spirits_, which act, and think and perceive them. Whereas +philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an +inert, extended, unperceiving Substance, which they call _Matter_, to +which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking +beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the +Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they suppose only Ideas of the +corporeal substances(681) created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be +at all _created_(682). + + ------------------------------------- + +92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or Corporeal Substance to +have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the +same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and +Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive +Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient +philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have +thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him(683). How great a +friend _material substance_ has been to Atheists in all ages were needless +to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a +dependence on it, that when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole +fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no longer +worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of +every wretched sect of Atheists(684). + +93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those +systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding _immaterial +substance_, and supposing the soul to be divisible, and subject to +corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and +design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a +self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all +beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or +inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing +the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity, +arising from the impulse of one body on another--all this is very natural. +And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies +of religion lay so great a stress on _unthinking Matter_, and all of them +use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it; methinks +they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and +driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, +and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most +cheap and easy triumph in the world. + +94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the +main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth +Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider +that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are +only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but +barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship +_their own ideas_; but rather address their homage to that Eternal +Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things. + +95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our +faith, hath occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, +about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised +by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on +the supposition that a body is denominated the _same_, with regard not to +the form, or that which is perceived by sense(685), but the material +substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this +_material substance_--about the identity whereof all the dispute is--and +mean by _body_ what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to +wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination +of sensible qualities or ideas: and then their most unanswerable +objections come to nothing. + +96. Matter(686) being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many +sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and +puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well +as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the +arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration +(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, +peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. + + ------------------------------------- + +97. Beside the external(687) existence of the objects of perception, +another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal +knowledge is the doctrine of _abstract ideas_, such as it hath been set +forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are +most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are +considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and +incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or +concrete, are what everybody knows; but, having passed through the hands +of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by +men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a _time_, in such +a _place_, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those +words. In conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by +which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if +_time_ be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that +diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in +abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. + +98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of _time_, +abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, +and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in +inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all: only I hear +others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as +leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence: since that doctrine lays +one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away +innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every +moment of his life: both which seem equally absurd(688). Time therefore +being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it +follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the +number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or +mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks. And in +truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the +_existence_ of a spirit from its _cogitation_, will, I believe, find it no +easy task(689). + +99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract _extension_ and _motion_ from +all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose +sight of them, and run into great extravagances. [(690) Hence spring those +odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot, nor the wall white; or that heat +and colour are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which +depend on a twofold abstraction: first, it is supposed that extension, for +example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and, +secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being +perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he +says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are +alike _sensations_, and alike _real_; that where the extension is, there +is the colour too, to wit, in his mind(691), and that their archetypes can +exist only in some other _mind_: and that the objects of sense(692) are +nothing but those sensations, combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) +concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist +unperceived. [(693) And that consequently the wall is as truly white as it +is extended, and in the same sense.] + +100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may +think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded +from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, +this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and +virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion +that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from +all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality +difficult, and the study thereof of less use to mankind. [(694)And in +effect one may make a great progress in school ethics without ever being +the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself in the +affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he +did before.] And in effect the doctrine of _abstraction_ has not a little +contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. + + ------------------------------------- + +101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas +received from sense and their relations, are Natural Philosophy and +Mathematics. With regard to each of these I shall make some observations. + + ------------------------------------- + +And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it +is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to +depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are +drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible +blindness as to the _true_ and _real_ nature of things. This they +exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, +by our senses, and amused only with the outside and shew of things. The +real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest +object, is hid from our view: something there is in every drop of water, +every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding +to fathom or comprehend(695). But, it is evident from what has been shewn +that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false +principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know +nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. + +102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the +nature of things is, the current opinion that every thing includes _within +itself_ the cause of its properties: or that there is in each object an +inward essence, which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, +and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by +occult qualities; but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical +causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of +insensible particles(696): whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or +efficient cause than _spirit_, it being evident that motion, as well as +all other _ideas_, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour +to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, +magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we +see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be +said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned +for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and +speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by +this doctrine(697). + +103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is _attraction_. That a +stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some +appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being +told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner +of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of +their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But nothing is +determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we +know) be termed _impulse_, or _protrusion_, as _attraction_. Again, the +parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted +for by attraction; but, in this, as in the other instances, I do not +perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to +the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which +produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. + +104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them +together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For +example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea +towards the moon, in cohesion and crystallization, there is something +alike; namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of +these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man +who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only +is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the +ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the +centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive +every moment of our lives. But that they should have a like gravitation +towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, +because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose +thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain +similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue +innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he +denotes by the general name _attraction_, whatever can be reduced to that, +he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the +attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon; which to him doth +not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general +rule or law of nature. + +105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural +philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the +phenomena, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the +efficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the _will +__ of a spirit_--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby +analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of +nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general +rules, see sect. 62: which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness +observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and +sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is +present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures +touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and +place, as well as to predict things to come: which sort of endeavour +towards Omniscience is much affected by the mind. + +106. But we should proceed warily in such things: for we are apt to lay +too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour +that eagerness of the mind, whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge +into general theorems. For example, gravitation or mutual attraction, +because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing +_universal_; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is +an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is +evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and, so +far is that gravitation from being _essential_ to bodies that in some +instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the +perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is +nothing necessary or essential in the case(698); but it depends entirely +on the will of the Governing Spirit(699), who causes certain bodies to +cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, +whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to some He gives a quite +contrary tendency to fly asunder, just as He sees convenient. + +107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following +conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, +when they enquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a _mind_ +or _spirit_. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship +of a _wise and good Agent_, it should seem to become philosophers to +employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold(700)) about the final +causes of things. [(701) For, besides that this would prove a very +pleasing entertainment to the mind, it might be of great advantage, in +that it not only discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may +also direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications of +things.] And I must confess I see no reason why pointing out the various +ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were +originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one +good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. +Thirdly, from what has been premised, no reason can be drawn why the +history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and +experiments made; which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to +draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes +or relations between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and +kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sects. 30 and 31. +Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we +may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce other +phenomena. I do not say _demonstrate_; for all deductions of that kind +depend on a supposition that the Author of Nature always operates +uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules _we_ take for +principles, which we cannot evidently know(702). + +108. It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent methods of +nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of its Author, whereby He +discovers His attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the +convenience and felicity of life. Those men who frame(703) general rules +from the phenomena, and afterwards derive(704) the phenomena from those +rules, seem to consider signs(705) rather than causes. (706)A man may well +understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to +say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to write +improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar-rules; so, +in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may +extend(707) the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes. + +109. [(708) To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other books a wise +man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, +rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so, in +perusing the volume of nature, methinks it is beneath the dignity of the +mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to +general rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to +ourselves nobler views, such as to recreate and exalt the mind with a +prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: +hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, +wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator: and lastly, to make the several +parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they +were designed for--God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of +ourselves and fellow-creatures. + +110. [(709) The best key for the aforesaid analogy, or natural Science, +will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of +_Mechanics_.] In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, +Space, and Motion are distinguished into _absolute_ and _relative_, _true_ +and _apparent_, _mathematical_ and _vulgar_: which distinction, as it is +at large explained by the author, does suppose those quantities to have an +existence without the mind: and that they are ordinarily conceived with +relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature +they bear no relation at all. + +III. As for _Time_, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted +sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have +nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that +subject. Sects. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds +there is an _absolute Space_, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains +in itself similar and immoveable; and relative space to be the measure +thereof, which, being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of +sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space. _Place_ he +defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body: and +according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. +_Absolute Motion_ is said to be the translation of a body from absolute +place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to +another. And because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our +senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures; and +so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as +immoveable. But it is said, in philosophical matters we must abstract from +our senses; since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be +quiescent are truly so; and the same thing which is moved relatively may +be really at rest. As likewise one and the same body may be in relative +rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same +time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is +to be found in the apparent motions; but not at all in the true or +absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the +true we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by +the following properties. First, in true or absolute motion, all parts +which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake of the +motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is +placed therein is also moved: so that a body moving in a place which is in +motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is +never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body +itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the +body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion, barely relative, there is no +centrifugal force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, +is proportional to the quantity of motion. + +112. But, notwithstanding what hath been said, I must confess it does not +appear to me that there can be any motion other than _relative_(710): so +that to conceive motion there must be conceived at least two bodies; +whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, +if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This +seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include +relation.--[(711)Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little +attention may satisfy them.] + +113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies +than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the +force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies is +impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term +that body _moved_ which changes its distance from some other body, whether +the force [(712)or action] causing that change were impressed on it or no, +yet, as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded +in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of common sense +knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one +whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones +he passes over may be said to _move_, because they change distance with +his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one +thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation +be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not +think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not +therefore itself in motion, [(713) I mean relative motion, for other I am +not able to conceive.] + +114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is +related to it varies(714). A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent +with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to +the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in +respect of the other. In the common affairs of life, men never go beyond +the Earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in +respect of _that_ is accounted _absolutely_ to be so. But philosophers, +who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of +things, discover even the Earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to +fix their notions, they seem to conceive the Corporeal World as finite, +and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they +estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may +find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no +other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already +observed, absolute motion, exclusive of _all_ external relation, is +incomprehensible: and to this kind of relative motion all the +above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute +motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of +the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative +motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought +to prove it. See Newton's _Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, +in Schol. Def. VIII_. For the water in the vessel, at that time wherein it +is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no +motion at all: as is plain from the foregoing section. + +115. For, to denominate a body _moved_, it is requisite, first, that it +change its distance or situation with regard to some other body: and +secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to(715) it. If +either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of +mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. +I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body, which we see +change its distance from some other, to be moved, though it have no force +applied to(716) it (in which sense there may be apparent motion); but then +it is because the force causing the change(717) of distance is imagined by +us to be [(718)applied or] impressed on that body thought to move. Which +indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is +not, and that is all. [(719)But it does not prove that, in the common +acceptation of motion, a body is moved merely because it changes distance +from another; since as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving +force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So, on +the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof preserve a given +position between themselves) is imagined to exist, some there are who +think that it can be moved all manner of ways, though without any change +of distance or situation to any other bodies; which we should not deny, if +they meant only that it might have an impressed force, which, upon the +bare creation of other bodies, would produce a motion of some certain +quantity and determination. But that an actual motion (distinct from the +impressed force, or power, productive of change of place in case there +were bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such a single body, +I must confess I am not able to comprehend.] + +116. From what has been said, it follows that the philosophic +consideration of motion doth not imply the being of an _absolute Space_, +distinct from that which is perceived by sense, and related to bodies: +which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same +principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And +perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an +idea of _pure Space exclusive of all body_. This I must confess seems +impossible(720), as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in +some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is +_Space_. But if I find a resistance, then I say there is _Body_: and in +proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the +space is more or less _pure_. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, +it is not to be supposed that the word _space_ stands for an idea distinct +from, or conceivable without, body and motion. Though indeed we are apt to +think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be +separated from all others; which hath occasioned infinite mistakes. When, +therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, +I say there still remains _pure Space_; thereby nothing else is meant but +only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on +all sides without the least resistance: but if that too were annihilated +then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space(721). Some, +perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of +pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the +ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the _Essay +concerning Vision_. + +117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and +difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature +of _pure Space_. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are +freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed +their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, viz. of +thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something +beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. +Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is +certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, +have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or +annihilation of space, concluded it must be _divine_. And some of late +have set themselves particularly to shew that the incommunicable +attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may +seem of the Divine Nature, yet I must confess I do not see how we can get +clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions(722). + + ------------------------------------- + +118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy. We come now to make some inquiry +concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, +Mathematics(723). These, how celebrated soever they may be for their +clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to +be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, +if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to +the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, +though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet +their first principles are limited by the consideration of Quantity. And +they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims +which influence all the particular sciences; each part whereof, +Mathematics not excepted, doth consequently participate of the errors +involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are +true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and +incontestible, we do not deny. But we hold there may be certain erroneous +maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that +reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed, throughout the +whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects of those secret +unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof. To be +plain, we suspect the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than +other men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general +ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. + +119. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of +_number_. Of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is +supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure +and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem +with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and +elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical +speculations, which in practice are of no use, but serve only for +amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the minds of some, that +they have dreamed of mighty _mysteries_ involved in numbers, and attempted +the explication of natural things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire +into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps +entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look +on all inquiries about numbers only as so many _difficiles nugae_, so far +as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. + +120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13; from which, +and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is +not any such idea. But, number being defined a _collection of units_, we +may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity, or unit in +abstract, there are no _ideas_ of number in abstract, denoted by the +numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they +are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and +practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed +to have nothing at all for their object. Hence we may see how entirely the +science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling +it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation(724). + +121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of +discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems +and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully +consider and expose the vanity of that pretence. And this will plainly +appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what +it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what +scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for +ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in +writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to +signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to +reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one +character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the +notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use; wherein, by the +repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification +of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most +aptly expressed. Which seems to have been done in imitation of language, +so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and +names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and +places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And +agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, +were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the +parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or +_vice versa_. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or +analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and +so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any +particular things is said to be known, when we know the name or figures +(with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong +to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of +arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by +them; and thus computing in signs, (because of the connexion established +betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things, whereof one is taken +for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the +things themselves that we intend to number. + +122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the _things_ but the _signs_; +which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they +direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. +Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of Words in general (sect. +19, Introd.), it happens here likewise, that abstract ideas are thought to +be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest +ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into +a more particular dissertation on this subject; but only observe that it +is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract +truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no +object distinct from particular numerable things; except only names and +characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but +their being _signs_, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular +things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for +their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose, as if a man, +neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of +language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or +reasonings and controversies purely verbal(725). + +123. From numbers we proceed to speak of _extension_(726), which, +considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. The _infinite_ +divisibility of _finite_ extension, though it is not expressly laid down +either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is +throughout the same everywhere supposed, and thought to have so +inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and +demonstrations in Geometry that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, +or make the least question of it. And as this notion is the source from +whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a +direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted +with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so is +it the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty, which +renders the study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. Hence, if +we can make it appear that no _finite_ extension contains innumerable +parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear +the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and +contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, +and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and +pains than it hitherto hath been. + +124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of +our thought is an _idea_ existing only in the mind; and consequently each +part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot _perceive_ +innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain +they are not contained in it. But it is evident that I cannot distinguish +innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I +either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind. Wherefore I +conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than +that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it +is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an +infinite number of other ideas; that is, that they are not infinitely +divisible(727). If by _finite extension_ be meant something distinct from +a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm +or deny anything of it. But if the terms _extension_, _parts_, and the +like, are taken in any sense conceivable--that is, for _ideas_,--then to say +a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so +manifest and glaring a contradiction, that every one at first sight +acknowledges it to be so. And it is impossible it should ever gain the +assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and +slow degrees, as a converted Gentile(728) to the belief of +transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into +principles. And those propositions which once obtain the force and credit +of a _principle_, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is +deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is +no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be +prepared to swallow(729). + +125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doctrine of abstract +general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of +sense) _extension in abstract_ is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks +the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps, in virtue +thereof, be brought to admit(730) that a line but an inch long may contain +innumerable parts really existing, though too small to be discerned. These +errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, +and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult +thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the +infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. [(731) But this, +if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat +of in a particular manner.] At present we shall only observe in general +whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that +doctrine. + +126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and +demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, +Introd.): where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood, +to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are +supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other +words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude: which +doth not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not +what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on +that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a +line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it +contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as +it is universal; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it +_represents_ innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be +distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an +inch in _it_. After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are +(by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign; and thence, through +mistake, thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature. + +127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there +may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more +than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken +absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not +retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the +small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts +innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch; +but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by +that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one +side, not above an inch for example in length, to be the radius, this I +consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts, or more. For, though the +ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself, is nothing at all, +and consequently may be neglected without any error or inconveniency, yet +these described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, +whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable, it follows +that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of +10,000 parts, or more. + +128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any +theorem may become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the +lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they +do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly, we shall +perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, +or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which +is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a +line is _infinitely divisible_, we must mean(732) _a line which is +infinitely great_. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause, +why to suppose the _infinite_ divisibility of _finite extension_ has been +thought necessary in geometry. + +129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this +false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many +demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that +proofs _a posteriori_ are not to be admitted against propositions relating +to Infinity. As though it were not impossible even for an Infinite Mind to +reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could +have a necessary connexion with truth, or flow from it. But whoever +considers the weakness of this pretence, will think it was contrived on +purpose to humour the laziness of the mind, which had rather acquiesce in +an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe +examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. + +130. Of late the speculations about Infinites have run so high, and grown +to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes +among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, +not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite +number of parts, do yet farther maintain, that each of those +Infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts, or +Infinitesimals of a second order, and so on _ad infinitum_. These, I say, +assert there are Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals, +without ever coming to an end. So that according to them an inch does not +barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity +of an infinity _ad infinitum_ of parts. Others there be who hold all +orders of Infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it +with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part +of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can ever equal the +smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less +absurd to think the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root, +should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold Infinitesimals of the +first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to +maintain. + +131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are _both_ in the +wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely +small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? +But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very +foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised +that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building +a castle in the air. To this it may be replied, that whatever is useful in +geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm +and unshaken on our Principles; that science considered as practical will +rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But +to set this in a due light,[(733) and shew how lines and figures may be +measured, and their properties investigated, without supposing finite +extension to be infinitely divisible,] may be the proper business of +another place(734). For the rest, though it should follow that some of the +more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared +off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be +thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be +wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application(735) would +draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the +study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more +direct influence on the manners. + +132. If it be said that several theorems, undoubtedly true, are discovered +by methods in which Infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have +been if their existence included a contradiction in it:--I answer, that +upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it +is necessary to make use of or conceive _infinitesimal_ parts of _finite_ +lines, or even quantities less than the _minimum sensibile_: nay, it will +be evident this is never done, it being impossible. [(736) And whatever +mathematicians may think of Fluxions, or the Differential Calculus, and +the like, a little reflexion will shew them that, in working by those +methods, they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what +are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those little and almost +insensible quantities Infinitesimals, or Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals, +if they please. But at bottom this is all, they being in truth finite; nor +does the solution of problems require the supposing any other. But this +will be more clearly made out hereafter.] + + ------------------------------------- + +133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very numerous and +important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which +were impugned in the foregoing parts of this Treatise; and the opposites +of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful +Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences, highly +advantageous to true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly +_Matter_, or _the absolute_(737)_ existence of corporeal objects_, hath +been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of +all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief +strength and confidence. And surely if by distinguishing the real +existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing +them a subsistence of their own, out of the minds of spirits, no one thing +is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable +difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter(738) is barely +precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its +consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but +screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of _infinites being +incomprehensible_; if withal the removal of _this_ Matter be not attended +with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, +but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, +both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only +spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both +to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and +firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an _hypothesis_, and the +existence of Matter had been allowed possible; which yet I think we have +evidently demonstrated that it is not. + +134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing Principles, several +disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning are +rejected as useless [(739) and in effect conversant about nothing at all]. +But how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to +those who have already been deeply engaged, and made large advances in +studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any +just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down, that +they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences more clear, +compendious, and attainable than they were before. + + ------------------------------------- + +135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of +_ideas_, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of +_spirits_(740): with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so +deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for +our being thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits is our not having an +_idea_ of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a +human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of Spirit, if it is +manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake +not has been demonstrated in section 27. To which I shall here add that a +Spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein +unthinking beings or ideas can exist: but that this _substance_ which +supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea, or like an idea, is +evidently absurd. + +136. It will perhaps be said that we want a _sense_ (as some have +imagined(741)) proper to know substances withal; which, if we had, we +might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that in +case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby +some new _sensations_ or _ideas of sense_. But I believe nobody will say +that what he means by the terms _soul_ and _substance_ is only some +particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all +things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties +defective, in that they do not furnish us with an _idea_ of Spirit, or +active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for +not being able to comprehend a _round square_(742). + +137. From the opinion that Spirits are to be known after the manner of an +idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much +scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this +opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all +distinct from their body; since upon inquiry they could not find they had +an idea of it. That an _idea_, which is inactive, and the existence +whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an +agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely +attending to what is meant by those words. But perhaps you will say that +though an idea cannot resemble a Spirit in its thinking, acting, or +subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not +necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. + +138. I answer, If it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it +should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of +willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else +wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word _spirit_ we mean +only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, +constitutes the signification of that term. If therefore it is impossible +that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea [(743)or +notion], it is evident there can be no idea [or notion] of a Spirit. + +139. But it will be objected that, if there is no _idea_ signified by the +terms _soul_, _spirit_, and _substance_, they are wholly insignificant, or +have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real +thing; which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives +ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am _myself_, that which I +denote by the term _I_, is the same with what is meant by _soul_, or +_spiritual substance_. [(744)But if I should say that _I_ was nothing, or +that _I_ was an _idea_ or _notion_, nothing could be more evidently absurd +than either of these propositions.] If it be said that this is only +quarrelling at a word, and that, since the immediate significations of +other names are by common consent called _ideas_, no reason can be +assigned why that which is signified by the name _spirit_ or _soul_ may +not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects +of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence +consists only in being perceived: whereas a _soul_ or _spirit_ is an +active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in +perceiving ideas and thinking(745). It is therefore necessary, in order to +prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and +unlike, that we distinguish between _spirit_ and _idea_. See sect. 27. + +140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea [(746)or +rather a notion] of _spirit_. That is, we understand the meaning of the +word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as +we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of +our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we know other +spirits by means of our own soul: which in that sense is the image or idea +of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat +by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another(747). + + ------------------------------------- + +141. [(748)The natural immortality of the soul is a necessary consequence +of the foregoing doctrine. But before we attempt to prove this, it is fit +that we explain the meaning of that tenet.] It must not be supposed that +they who assert the natural immortality of the soul(749) are of opinion +that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power +of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to +be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion They +indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system +of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since +there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is +naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it +is inclosed. And this notion hath been greedily embraced and cherished by +the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all +impressions of virtue and religion. But it hath been made evident that +bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the +mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from +darkness(750). We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, +unextended; and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer +than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly +see befal natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the _course of +nature_) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance: +such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to +say, _the soul of man_ is _naturally immortal_(751). + + ------------------------------------- + +142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are +not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by +way of _idea_. _Spirits_ and _ideas_ are things so wholly different, that +when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must +not be thought to signify anything common to both natures(752). There is +nothing alike or common in them; and to expect that by any multiplication +or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we +do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to _see a sound_. This +is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing +several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors +concerning the nature of the soul. + +[(753)We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an _idea_ of an active +being, or of an action; although we may be said to have a _notion_ of +them. I have some knowledge or notion of _my mind_, and its acts about +ideas; inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What +I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms _idea_ +and _notion_ may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so. +But yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish +things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, +all _relations_ including an act of the mind(754), we cannot so properly +be said to have an idea, but rather a notion, of the relations and +habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way(755), the word _idea_ +is extended to _spirits_, and _relations_, and _acts_, this is, after all, +an affair of verbal concern.] + +143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of _abstract ideas_ +has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure +which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have +imagined they could frame abstract notions of the _powers_ and _acts_ of +the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit +itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great number +of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have +been introduced into metaphysics and morality; and from these have grown +infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned(756). + +144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in +controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the +mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from +sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the _motion_ of the soul: +this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, +impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is +by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of +dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, +and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be +prevailed on to [(757)depart from some received prejudices and modes of +speech, and] retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own +meaning. [(758)But the difficulties arising on this head demand a more +particular disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise.] + + ------------------------------------- + +145. From what hath been said, it is plain that we cannot know the +existence of _other spirits_ otherwise than by their operations, or the +ideas by them, excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and +combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, +like myself, which accompany them, and concur in their production. Hence, +the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the +knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me +referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or +concomitant signs(759). + +146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are +concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to every one that those +things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part +of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are _not_ produced by, or +dependent on, the wills of _men_. There is therefore some other Spirit +that causes them; since it is repugnant(760) that they should subsist by +themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant +regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising +magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite +contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact +harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the +never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or +natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals;--I say if we +consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and +import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, +we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who +works all in all" and "by whom all things consist." + +147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately +as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from ourselves. We may +even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than +the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more +numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is +not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does +not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of +Nature(761). For it is evident that, in affecting other persons, the will +of man hath no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his +body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in +the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone +it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that +intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the +existence of each other(762). And yet this pure and clear Light which +enlightens everyone is itself invisible [(763)to the greatest part of +mankind]. + +148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they +cannot _see_ God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we +should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we +need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a +_more_ full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not +that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate +view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which +represents them in the essence of God; which doctrine is, I must confess, +to me incomprehensible(764). But I shall explain my meaning. A human +spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea. When +therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we +perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and +these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to +mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like +ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man, if by _man_ is meant, +that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: but only such a +certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct +principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and +represented by it. And after the same manner we see God: all the +difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas +denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view we do at +all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: +everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign +or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions +which are produced by men(765). + +149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a +Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that +variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we +have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and +move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which +lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason +of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, +who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the +Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, +blinded with excess of light(766). + +150. But you will say--Hath Nature no share in the production of natural +things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation +of God? I answer, If by _Nature_ is meant only the _visible series_ of +effects or sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain fixed +and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, +cannot produce anything at all(767). But if by _Nature_ is meant some +being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature and things +perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound, +without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this +acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not +just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But it is +more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing +belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to +the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to +Nature. "The Lord, He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings +with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of His treasures." Jerem. x. 13. +"He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark +with night." Amos v. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with +showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His +goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys +are covered over with corn." See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding that this +is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what +aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our +affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute +some blind unthinking deputy in His stead; though (if we may believe Saint +Paul) "He be not far from every one of us." + +151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow, gradual, and +roundabout methods observed in the production of natural things do not +seem to have for their cause the _immediate_ hand of an Almighty Agent: +besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains +falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, +are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately +actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. +But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; +it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely +necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and +after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and +goodness of God(768). [(769)For, it doth hence follow that the finger of +God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless sinner; which gives +him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. +(Vid. sect. 57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty +machine of Nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on +our senses, the Hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to +men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that +hidest thyself." Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from +the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of +thought(770), yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind, nothing can be more +plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who +fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of Being. It is clear, +from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to +general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of +life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach +and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no +manner of purpose. It were even impossible there should be any such +faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration +abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence +arise(771). + +152. We should further consider, that the very blemishes and defects of +nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of +variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in +a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We +would likewise do well to examine, whether our taxing the waste of seeds +and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals before they +come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not +the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and +saving mortals. In _man_ indeed a thrifty management of those things which +he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. +But we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or +vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its +production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an +Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere _fiat_ or +act of his will. Hence it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural +things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the Agent who +produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His +power. + +153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, +pursuant to the general laws of Nature, and the actions of finite, +imperfect Spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is +indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too +narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into +our thoughts, and account it _evil_. Whereas, if we enlarge our view, so +as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, +on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and +pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are +put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those +particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have +the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of +beings(772). + +154. From what hath been said, it will be manifest to any considering +person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of +mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be +found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of +Providence; the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will +not be at the pains, to comprehend(773). But those who are masters of any +justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never +sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine +throughout the economy of Nature. But what truth is there which glares so +strongly on the mind that, by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of +the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, +if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and +little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that +conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in +reasonable creatures(774)? + +155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to +neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an +evident and momentous truth(775). And yet it is to be feared that too many +of parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through +a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into a sort of Atheism. [(776)They +cannot say there is not a God, but neither are they convinced that there +is. For what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret +misgivings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of God, +which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety?] Since it is +downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough +sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit +should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, +therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that +so we may attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord +are in every place, beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us +and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and +raiment to put on;" that He is present and conscious to our innermost +thoughts; and, that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on +Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts +with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest +incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. + +156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is, the +consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main +drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless +and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with +a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shewn the falseness or +vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of +learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary +truths of the Gospel; which to know and to practise is the highest +perfection of human nature. + + + + + +THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS THE DESIGN OF WHICH IS PLAINLY +TO DEMONSTRATE THE REALITY AND PERFECTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, THE +INCORPOREAL NATURE OF THE SOUL, AND THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OF A DEITY, +IN OPPOSITION TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS, ALSO TO OPEN A METHOD FOR +RENDERING THE SCIENCES MORE EASY, USEFUL, AND COMPENDIOUS + + +_First published in 1713_ + + + + +Editor's Preface + + +This work is the gem of British metaphysical literature. Berkeley's claim +to be the great modern master of Socratic dialogue rests, perhaps, upon +_Alciphron_, which surpasses the conversations between Hylas and Philonous +in expression of individual character, and in dramatic effect. Here +conversation is adopted as a convenient way of treating objections to the +conception of the reality of Matter which had been unfolded systematically +in the book of _Principles_. But the lucid thought, the colouring of +fancy, the glow of human sympathy, and the earnestness that pervade the +subtle reasonings pursued through these dialogues, are unique in English +metaphysical literature. Except perhaps Hume and Ferrier, none approach +Berkeley in the art of uniting metaphysical thought with easy, graceful, +and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are increased when we +recollect that this charming production of reason and imagination came +from Ireland, at a time when that country was scarcely known in the world +of letters and philosophy. + + ------------------------------------- + +The immediate impression produced by the publication of the _Principles_, +is shewn in Berkeley's correspondence with Sir John Percival. Berkeley was +eager to hear what people had to say for or against what looked like a +paradox apt to shock the reader; but in those days he was not immediately +informed by professional critics. "If when you receive my book"--he wrote +from Dublin in July, 1710, to Sir John Percival(777), then in London,--"you +can procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances who are thinking +men, addicted to the study of natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall +be extremely obliged to you." In the following month he was informed by +Sir John that it was "incredible what prejudice can work in the best +geniuses, even in the lovers of novelty. For I did but name the subject +matter of your book of _Principles_ to some ingenious friends of mine and +they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to +read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A physician of my +acquaintance undertook to discover your person, and argued you must needs +be mad, and that you ought to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a +desire of starting something new should put you upon such an undertaking. +Another told me that you are not gone so far as a gentleman in town, who +asserts not only that there is no such thing as Matter, but that we +ourselves have no being at all." + +Berkeley's reply is interesting. "I am not surprised," he says, "that I +should be ridiculed by those who won't take the pains to understand me. If +the raillery and scorn of those who criticise what they will not be at the +pains to understand had been sufficient to deter men from making any +attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of mankind, we should not +have been troubled with some very fair improvements in knowledge. The +common cry's being against any opinion seems to me, so far from proving +false, that it may with as good reason pass for an argument of its truth. +However, I imagine that whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled +opinion had need be introduced with great caution into the world. For this +reason it was that I omitted all mention of the non-existence of Matter in +the title-page, dedication, preface and introduction to the _Treatise on +the Principles of Human Knowledge_; that so the notion might steal +unawares upon the reader, who probably might never have meddled with the +book if he had known that it contained such paradoxes." + +With characteristic fervour he disclaims "variety and love of paradox" as +motives of the book of _Principles_, and professes faith in the unreality +of abstract unperceived Matter, a faith which he has held for some years, +"the conceit being at first warm in my imagination, but since carefully +examined, both by my own judgment and that of ingenious friends." What he +especially complained of was "that men who have never considered my book +should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the existence of sensible +things, and are not positive as to any one truth, no, not so much as their +own being--which I find by your letter is the case of some wild visionist +now in London. But whoever reads my book with attention will see that +there is a direct opposition between the principles that are contained in +it and those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence of +anything we perceive by our senses. I do not deny the existence of the +sensible things which Moses says were created by God. They existed from +all eternity, in the Divine Intellect; and they became perceptible (i.e. +were created) in the same manner and order as is described in Genesis. For +I take creation to belong to things only as they respect finite spirits; +there being nothing new to God. Hence it follows that the act of creation +consists in God's willing that those things should become perceptible to +other spirits which before were known only to Himself. Now both reason and +scripture assure us that there _are_ other spirits besides men, who, 'tis +possible, might have perceived this visible world as it was successively +exhibited to their view before man's creation. Besides, for to agree with +the Mosaic account of the creation, it's sufficient if we suppose that a +man, in case he was existing at the time of the chaos of sensible things, +might have perceived all things formed out of it, in the very order set +down in scripture; all which is in no way repugnant to my principles." + +Sir John in his next letter, written from London in October, 1716, reports +that the book of _Principles_ had fallen into the hands of the highest +living English authority in metaphysical theology, Samuel Clarke, who had +produced his _Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God_ four years +before. The book had also been read by Whiston, Newton's successor at +Cambridge. "I can only report at second-hand," he says, "that they think +you a fair arguer, and a clear writer; but they say your first principles +you lay down are false. They look upon you as an extraordinary genius, +ranking you with Father Malebranche, Norris, and another whose name I +forget, all of whom they think extraordinary men, but of a particular turn +of mind, and their labours of little use to mankind, on account of their +abstruseness. This may arise from these gentlemen not caring to think +after a new manner, which would oblige them to begin their studies anew; +or else it may be the strength of prejudice." + +Berkeley was vexed by this treatment on the part of Clarke and Whiston. He +sent under Sir John's care a letter to each of them, hoping through him to +discover "their reasons against his notions, as truth is his sole aim." +"As to what is said of ranking me with Father Malebranche and Mr. Norris, +whose writings are thought to be too fine-spun to be of any great use to +mankind, I have this answer, that I think the notions I embrace are not in +the least agreeing with theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with them +in the main points, inasmuch as I know few writers I take myself at bottom +to differ more from than from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what on all +occasions I declare against, and if any one shall shew anything of that +sort in my Treatise I will willingly correct it." Sir John delivered the +letters to two friends of Clarke and Whiston, and reported that "Dr. +Clarke told his friend in reply, that he did not care to write you his +thoughts, because he was afraid it might draw him into a dispute upon a +matter which was already clear to him. He thought your first principles +you go on are false; but he was a modest man, his friend said, and +uninclined to shock any one whose opinions on things of this nature +differed from his own." This was a disappointment to the ardent Berkeley. +"Dr. Clarke's conduct seems a little surprising," he replies. "That an +ingenious and candid person (as I take him to be) should refuse to shew me +where my error lies is something unaccountable. I never expected that a +gentleman otherwise so well employed as Dr. Clarke should think it worth +his while to enter into a dispute with me concerning any notions of mine. +But, seeing it was clear to him I went upon false principles, I hoped he +would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point them out to me, that so I may +more closely review and examine them. If he but once did me this favour, +he need not apprehend I should give him any further trouble. I should be +glad if you have opportunity that you would let his friend know this. +There is nothing that I more desire than to know thoroughly all that can +be said against what I take for truth." Clarke, however, was not to be +drawn. The incident is thus referred to by Whiston, in his _Memoirs_ of +Clarke. "Mr. Berkeley," he says, "published in 1710, at Dublin, the +metaphysical notion, that matter was not a real thing(778); nay, that the +common opinion of its reality was groundless, if not ridiculous. He was +pleased to send Mr. Clarke and myself each of us a book. After we had +perused it, I went to Mr. Clarke to discourse with him about it, to this +effect, that I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. +Berkeley's subtle premises, though I did not believe his absurd +conclusions. I therefore desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties, +but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's conclusion, would answer him. +_Which task he declined_." + +What Clarke's criticism of Berkeley might have been is suggested by the +following sentences in his _Remarks on Human Liberty_, published seven +years after this correspondence: "The case as to the proof of our free +agency is exactly the same as in that notable question, whether the +[material] world exists or no? There is no demonstration of it from +experience. There always remains a bare possibility that the Supreme Being +may have so framed my mind, that I shall always be necessarily deceived in +every one of my perceptions as in a dream--though possibly there be no +material world, nor any other creature existing besides myself. And yet no +man in his senses argues from thence, that experience is no proof to us of +the existence of things. The bare physical possibility too of our being so +framed by the Author of Nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this +matter by every experience of every action we perform, is no more any +ground to doubt the truth of our liberty, than the bare natural +possibility of our being all our lifetime in a dream, deceived in our +[natural] belief of the existence of the material world, is any just +ground to doubt the reality of its existence." Berkeley would hardly have +accepted this analogy. Does the conception of a material world being +dependent on percipient mind for its reality imply _deception_ on the part +of the "Supreme Being"? "Dreams," in ordinary language, may signify +illusory fancies during sleep, and so understood the term is misapplied to +a universally mind-dependent universe with its steady natural order. +Berkeley disclaims emphatically any doubt of the reality of the sensible +world, and professes only to shew in what its reality consists, or its +dependence upon percipient life as the indispensable realising factor. To +suppose that we can be "necessarily deceived in every one of our +perceptions" is to interpret the universe atheistically, and virtually +obliges us in final nescience to acknowledge that it is wholly +uninterpretable; so that experience is impossible, because throughout +unintelligible. The moral trustworthiness or perfect goodness of the +Universal Power is I suppose the fundamental postulate of science and +human life. If all our temporal experience can be called a dream it must +at any rate be a dream of the sort supposed by Leibniz. "Nullo argumento +absolute demonstrari potest, dari corpora; nec quidquam prohibet _somnia +quaedam bene ordinata_ menti nostrae, objecta esse, quae a nobis vera +judicentur, et ob consensum inter se quoad usum veris equivalent(779)." + + ------------------------------------- + +The three _Dialogues_ discuss what Berkeley regarded as the most plausible +Objections, popular and philosophical, to his account of living Mind or +Spirit, as the indispensable factor and final cause of the reality of the +material world. + + ------------------------------------- + +The principal aim of the _First Dialogue_ is to illustrate the +contradictory or unmeaning character and sceptical tendency of the common +philosophical opinion--that we perceive in sense a material world which is +_real_ only in as far as it can exist in absolute independence of +perceiving mind. The impossibility of any of the qualities in which Matter +is manifested to man--the primary qualities not less than the +secondary--having real existence in a mindless or unspiritual universe is +argued and illustrated in detail. Abstract Matter, unrealised in terms of +percipient life, is meaningless, and the material world becomes real only +in and through living perception. And Matter, as an abstract substance +without qualities, cannot, without a contradiction, it is also argued, be +presented or represented, in sense. What is called _matter_ is thus melted +in a spiritual solution, from which it issues the flexible and +intelligible medium of intercourse for spiritual beings such as men are; +whose faculties moreover are educated in interpreting the cosmical order +of the phenomena presented to their senses. + + ------------------------------------- + +The _Second Dialogue_ is in the first place directed against modifications +of the scholastic account of Matter, which attributes our knowledge of it +to inference, founded on sense-ideas assumed to be representative, or not +presentative of the reality. The advocates of Matter independent and +supreme, are here assailed in their various conjectures--that this Matter +may be the active Cause, or the Instrument, or the Occasion of our +sense-experience; or that it is an Unknowable Something somehow connected +with that experience. It is argued in this and in the preceding Dialogue, +by _Philonous_ (who personates Berkeley), that unrealised Matter--intending +by that term either a qualified substance, or a Something of which we +cannot affirm anything--is not merely unproved, but a proved impossibility: +it must mean nothing, or it must mean a contradiction, which comes to the +same thing. It is not _perceived_; nor can it be _suggested_ by what we +perceive; nor _demonstrated_ by reasoning; nor _believed in_ as an article +in the fundamental faith of intuitive reason. The only consistent theory +of the universe accordingly implies that concrete realities must all be +either (a) phenomena presented to the senses, or else (b) active spirits +percipient of presented phenomena. And neither of these two sorts of +concrete realities is strictly speaking independent of the other; although +the latter, identical amid the variations of the sensuous phenomena, are +deeper and more real than the mere data of the senses. The _Second +Dialogue_ ends by substituting, as concrete and intelligible Realism, the +universal and constant dependence of the material world upon active living +Spirit, in place of the abstract hypothetical and unintelligible Realism, +which defends Matter unrealised in percipient life, as the type of +reality. + + ------------------------------------- + +In the _Third Dialogue_ plausible objections to this conception of what +the reality of the material world means are discussed. + +Is it said that the new conception is sceptical, and Berkeley another +Protagoras, on account of it? His answer is, that the _reality_ of +sensible things, as far as man can in any way be concerned with them, does +not consist in what cannot be perceived, suggested, demonstrated, or even +conceived, but in phenomena actually seen and touched, and in the working +faith that future sense-experience may be anticipated by the analogies of +present sense-experience. + +But is not this negation of the Matter that is assumed to be real and +independent of Spirit, an unproved conjecture? It is answered, that the +affirmation of this abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture, and one +self-convicted by its implied contradictions, while its negation is only a +simple falling back on the facts of experience, without any attempt to +explain them. + +Again, is it objected that the _reality_ of sensible things involves their +continued reality during intervals of our perception of them? It is +answered, that sensible things are indeed permanently dependent on Mind, +but not on this, that, or the other finite embodied spirit. + +Is it further alleged that the reality of Spirit or Mind is open to all +the objections against independent Matter; and that, if we deny _this_ +Matter, we must in consistency allow that Spirit can be only a succession +of isolated feelings? The answer is, that there is no parity between +self-conscious Spirit, and Matter out of all relation to any Spirit. We +find, in memory, our own personality and identity; that _we_ are not our +ideas, "but somewhat else"--a thinking, active principle, that perceives, +knows, wills, and operates about ideas, and that is revealed as +continuously real. Each person is conscious of himself; and may reasonably +infer the existence of other self-conscious persons, more or less like +what he is conscious of in himself. A universe of self-conscious persons, +with their common sensuous experiences all under cosmical order, is not +open to the contradictions involved in a pretended universe of Matter, +independent of percipient realising Spirit. + +Is it still said that sane people cannot help distinguishing between the +_real existence_ of a thing and its _being perceived_? It is answered, +that all they are entitled to mean is, to distinguish between being +perceived exclusively by me, and being independent of the perception of +all sentient or conscious beings. + +Does an objector complain that this ideal realism dissolves the +distinction between facts and fancies? He is reminded of the meaning of +the word _idea_. That term is not limited by Berkeley to chimeras of +fancy: it is applied also to the objective phenomena of our +sense-experience. + +Is the supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause of all changes in +nature declaimed against as baseless? It is answered, that the supposition +of unthinking Power at the heart of the cosmos of sensible phenomena is +absurd. + +Is the negation of Abstract Matter repugnant to the common belief of +mankind? It is argued in reply, that this unrealised Matter is foreign to +common belief, which is incapable of even entertaining the conception; and +which only requires to reflect upon what it does entertain to be satisfied +with a relative or ideal reality for sensible things. + +But, if sensible things are the real things, the real moon, for instance, +it is alleged, can be only a foot in diameter. It is maintained, in +opposition to this, that the term _real moon_ is applied only to what is +an inference from the moon, one foot in diameter, which we immediately +perceive; and that the former is a part of our previsive or mediate +inference, due to what is perceived. + +The dispute, after all, is merely verbal, it is next objected; and, since +all parties refer the data of the senses and the _things_ which they +compose to _a_ Power external to each finite percipient, why not call that +Power, whatever it may be, Matter, and not Spirit? The reply is, that this +would be an absurd misapplication of language. + +But may we not, it is next suggested, assume the possibility of a third +nature--neither idea nor Spirit? Not, replies Philonous, if we are to keep +to the rule of having meaning in the words we use. We know what is meant +by a spirit, for each of us has immediate experience of one; and we know +what is meant by sense-ideas and sensible things, for we have immediate +and mediate experience of them. But we have no immediate, and therefore +can have no mediate, experience of what is neither perceived by our +senses, nor realised in inward consciousness: moreover, "entia non sunt +multiplicanda praeter necessitatem." + +Again, this conception of the realities implies, it is said, imperfection, +because sentient experience, in God. This objection, it is answered, +implies a confusion between being actually sentient and merely conceiving +sensations, and employing them, as God does, as signs for expressing His +conceptions to our minds. + +Further, the negation of independent powerful Matter seems to annihilate +the explanations of physical phenomena given by natural philosophers. But, +to be assured that it does not, we have only to recollect what physical +explanation means--that it is the reference of an apparently irregular +phenomenon to some acknowledged general rule of co-existence or succession +among sense-ideas. It is interpretation of sense-signs. + +Is the proposed ideal Realism summarily condemned as a novelty? It can be +answered, that all discoveries are novelties at first; and moreover that +this one is not so much a novelty as a deeper interpretation of the common +faith. + +Yet it seems, at any rate, it is said, to change real things into mere +ideas. Here consider on the contrary what we mean when we speak of +sensible things as real. The changing appearances of which we are +percipient in sense, united objectively in their cosmical order, are what +is truly meant by the realities of sense. + +But this reality is inconsistent with the _continued identity_ of material +things, it is complained, and also with the fact that different persons +can be percipient of the _same_ thing. Not so, Berkeley explains, when we +attend to the true meaning of the word _same_, and dismiss from our +thoughts a supposed abstract idea of identity which is nonsensical. + +But some may exclaim against the supposition that the material world +exists in mind, regarding this as an implied assertion that mind is +extended, and therefore material. This proceeds, it is replied, on +forgetfulness of what "existence in mind" means. It is intended to express +the fact that matter is real in being an objective appearance of which a +living mind is sensible. + +Lastly, is not the Mosaic account of the creation of Matter inconsistent +with the perpetual dependence of Matter for its reality upon percipient +Spirit? It is answered that the conception of creation being dependent on +the existence of finite minds is in perfect harmony with the Mosaic +account: it is what is seen and felt, not what is unseen and unfelt, that +is created. + + ------------------------------------- + +The _Third Dialogue_ closes with a representation of the new principle +regarding Matter being the harmony of two apparently discordant +propositions--the one-sided proposition of ordinary common sense; and the +one-sided proposition of the philosophers. It agrees with the mass of +mankind in holding that the material world is actually presented to our +senses, and with the philosophers in holding that this same material world +is realised only in and through the percipient experience of living +Spirit. + + ------------------------------------- + +Most of the objections to Berkeley's conception of Matter which have been +urged in the last century and a half, by its British, French, and German +critics, are discussed by anticipation in these _Dialogues_. The history +of objections is very much a history of misconceptions. Conceived or +misconceived, it has tacitly simplified and purified the methods of +physical science, especially in Britain and France. + +The first elaborate criticism of Berkeley by a British author is found in +Andrew Baxter's _Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul_, published in +1735, in the section entitled "Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the +existence of Matter examined, and shewn to be inconclusive." Baxter +alleges that the new doctrine tends to encourage scepticism. To deny +Matter, for the reasons given, involves, according to this critic, denial +of mind, and so a universal doubt. Accordingly, a few years later, Hume +sought, in his _Treatise of Human Nature_, to work out Berkeley's negation +of abstract Matter into sceptical phenomenalism--against which Berkeley +sought to guard by anticipation, in a remarkable passage introduced in his +last edition of these _Dialogues_. + +In Scotland the writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Dugald Stewart, Thomas +Brown, and Sir W. Hamilton form a magazine of objections. Reid--who +curiously seeks to refute Berkeley by refuting, not more clearly than +Berkeley had done before him, the hypothesis of a wholly representative +sense-perception--urges the spontaneous belief or common sense of mankind, +which obliges us all to recognise a direct presentation of the external +material world to our senses. He overlooks what with Berkeley is the only +question in debate, namely, the meaning of the term _external_; for, Reid +and Berkeley are agreed in holding to the reality of a world regulated +independently of the will of finite percipients, and is sufficiently +objective to be a medium of social intercourse. With Berkeley, as with +Reid, _this_ is practically self-evident. The same objection, more +scientifically defined--that we have a natural belief in the existence of +Matter, and in our own immediate perception of its qualities--is Sir W. +Hamilton's assumption against Berkeley; but Hamilton does not explain the +reality thus claimed for it. "Men naturally believe," he says, "that _they +themselves_ exist--because they are conscious of a Self or Ego; they +believe that _something different from themselves_ exists--because they +believe that they are conscious of this Not-self or Non-ego." +(_Discussions_, p. 193.) Now, the existence of a Power that is independent +of each finite Ego is at the root of Berkeley's principles. According to +Berkeley and Hamilton alike, we are immediately percipient of solid and +extended phenomena; but with Berkeley the phenomena are dependent on, at +the same time that they are "entirely distinct" from, the percipient. The +Divine and finite spirits, signified by the phenomena that are presented +to our senses in cosmical order, form Berkeley's external world. + +That Berkeley sows the seeds of Universal Scepticism; that his conception +of Matter involves the Panegoism or Solipsism which leaves me in absolute +solitude; that his is virtually a system of Pantheism, inconsistent with +personal individuality and moral responsibility--these are probably the +three most comprehensive objections that have been alleged against it. +They are in a measure due to Berkeley's imperfect criticism of first +principles, in his dread of a departure from the concrete data of +experience in quest of empty abstractions. + +In England and France, Berkeley's criticism of Matter, taken however only +on its negative side, received a countenance denied to it in Germany. +Hartley and Priestley shew signs of affinity with Berkeley. Also an +anonymous _Essay on the Nature and Existence of the Material World_, +dedicated to Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price, which appeared in 1781, is an +argument, on empirical grounds, which virtually makes the data of the +senses at last a chaos of isolated sensations. The author of the _Essay_ +is said to have been a certain Russell, who died in the West Indies in the +end of the eighteenth century. A tendency towards Berkeley's negations, +but apart from his synthetic principles, appears in James Mill and J.S. +Mill. So too with Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. + + ------------------------------------- + +The _Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_ were published in London in +1713, "printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in St. +Paul's churchyard," unlike the _Essay on Vision_ and the _Principles_, +which first appeared in Dublin. The second edition, which is simply a +reprint, issued in 1725, "printed for William and John Innys, at the West +End of St. Paul's." A third, the last in the author's lifetime, "printed +by Jacob Tonson," which contains some important additions, was published +in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of the _Principles_. The +_Dialogues_ were reprinted in 1776, in the same volume with the edition of +the _Principles, with Remarks_. + +The _Dialogues_ have been translated into French and German. The French +version appeared at Amsterdam in 1750. The translator's name is not given, +but it is attributed to the Abbe Jean Paul de Gua de Malves(780), by +Barbier, in his _Dictionnaire des Ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes_, tom. +i. p. 283. It contains a Prefatory Note by the translator, with three +curious vignettes (given in the note below) meant to symbolise the leading +thought in each Dialogue(781). A German translation, by John Christopher +Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy in Rostock, was published at Rostock +in 1756. It forms the larger part of a volume entitled _Sammlung der +vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Koerpers und +der ganzen Koerperwelt laeugnen_. This professed Collection of the most +eminent authors who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies +and of the whole material world, consists of Berkeley's _Dialogues,_ and +Arthur Collier's _Clavis Universalis_, or _Demonstration of the +Non-existence or Impossibility of an __ External World_. The volume +contains some annotations, and an Appendix in which a +counter-demonstration of the existence of Matter is attempted. +Eschenbach's principal argument is indirect, and of the nature of a +_reductio ad absurdum_. He argues (as others have done) that the reasons +produced against the independent reality of Matter are equally conclusive +against the independent reality of Spirit. + + ------------------------------------- + +An interesting circumstance connected with the _Dialogues between Hylas +and Philonous_ was the appearance, also in 1713, of the _Clavis +Universalis_, or demonstration of the impossibility of Matter, of Arthur +Collier, in which the merely ideal existence of the sensible world is +maintained. The production, simultaneously, without concert, of +conceptions of the material world which verbally at least have much in +common, is a curious coincidence. It shews that the intellectual +atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in England contained elements favourable +to a reconsideration of the ultimate meaning of Matter. They are both the +genuine produce of the age of Locke and Malebranche. Neither Berkeley nor +Collier were, when they published their books, familiar with ancient Greek +speculations; those of modern Germany had only begun to loom in the +distance. Absolute Idealism, the Panphenomenalism of Auguste Comte, and +the modern evolutionary conception of nature, have changed the conditions +under which the universal problem is studied, and are making intelligible +to this generation a manner of conceiving the Universe which, for nearly a +century and a half, the British and French critics of Berkeley were unable +to entertain. + +Berkeley's _Principles_ appeared three years before the _Clavis +Universalis_. Yet Collier tells us that it was "after a ten years' pause +and deliberation," that, "rather than the world should finish its course +without once offering to inquire in what manner it exists," he had +"resolved to put himself upon the trial of the common reader, without +pretending to any better art of gaining him than dry reason and +metaphysical demonstration." Mr. Benson, his biographer, says that it was +in 1703, at the age of twenty-three, that Collier came to the conclusion +that "there is no such thing as an external world"; and he attributes the +premises from which Collier drew this conclusion to his neighbour, John +Norris. Among Collier's MSS., there remains the outline of an essay, in +three chapters, dated January, 1708, on the non-externality of the +_visible_ world. + +There are several coincidences between Berkeley and Collier. Berkeley +virtually presented his new theory of Vision as the first instalment of +his explanation of the Reality of Matter. The first of the two Parts into +which Collier's _Clavis_ is divided consists of proofs that the Visible +World is not, and cannot be, external. Berkeley, in the _Principles_ and +the _Dialogues_, explains the reality of Matter. In like manner the Second +Part of the _Clavis_ consists of reasonings in proof of the impossibility +of an external world independent of Spirit. Finally, in his full-blown +theory, as well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted, as +intuitively known, the existence of sensible Matter; meaning by this, its +relative existence, or dependence on living Mind. The third proposition of +Collier's system asserts the real existence of visible matter in +particular, and of sensible matter in general. + +The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magnitudes and +situations, and their suggestion by interpretation of visual symbols, +propositions which occupy so large a space in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, +have no counterpart in Collier. His proof of the non-externality of the +visible world consists of an induction of instances of visible objects +that are allowed by all not to be external, although they seem to be as +much so as any that are called external. His Demonstration consists of +nine proofs, which may be compared with the reasonings and analyses of +Berkeley. Collier's Demonstration concludes with answers to objections, +and an application of his account of the material world to the refutation +of the Roman doctrine of the substantial existence of Christ's body in the +Eucharist. + +The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, and his pervading recognition +of the distinction between physical or symbolical, and efficient or +originative causation, are wanting in the narrow reasonings of Collier. +Berkeley's more comprehensive philosophy, with its human sympathies and +beauty of style, is now recognised as a striking expression and partial +solution of fundamental problems, while Collier is condemned to the +obscurity of the Schools(782). + + + + +Dedication + + +TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON(783), + + + MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, CHANCELLOR OF THE + DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST + HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. + + +MY LORD, + +The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish +your character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men +naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour: +and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great Britain that +they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your sovereign, and +the honours she has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any +application from your lordship, but entirely to her majesty's own thought, +arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an inclination to reward +it. But, as your name is prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do +honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged by the +favour you have treated me with to address these papers to your lordship. +And I was the more ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical +Treatise could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of +your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable distinctions, have +added the knowledge and relish of Philosophy. + +I am, with the greatest respect, + +My Lord, + +Your lordship's most obedient and +most humble servant, + +GEORGE BERKELEY. + + + + +The Preface(784) + + +Though it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design +of nature and providence, that the end of speculation be Practice, or the +improvement and regulation of our lives and actions; yet those who are +most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of another mind. +And indeed if we consider the pains that have been taken to perplex the +plainest things, that distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, +those abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the +sciences; it will not seem strange that men of leisure and curiosity +should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions, without descending +to the practical parts of life, or informing themselves in the more +necessary and important parts of knowledge. + +Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the +existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to +distinguish their _real_ nature from that which falls under our senses. +Hence arise scepticism and paradoxes. It is not enough that we see and +feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true nature, its absolute +external entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fiction of our +own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is +fallacious, reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those +things which other men evidently know, and believing those things which +they laugh at and despise. + +In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches, +it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities; and, +if possible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them, +together with their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves +for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits it is +engaged in. Which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence +of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality of the soul, should seem +the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to the study +and practice of virtue. + +This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the +_Principles of Human Knowledge_, published in the year 1710. But, before I +proceed to publish the Second Part(785), I thought it requisite to treat +more clearly and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and +to place them in a new light. Which is the business of the following +_Dialogues_. + +In this Treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader any knowledge of +what was contained in the former, it has been my aim to introduce the +notions I advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar manner; +especially because they carry with them a great opposition to the +prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the common +sense and natural notions of mankind. + +If the Principles which I here endeavour to propagate are admitted for +true, the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence are, +that Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intricate +points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of +science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from +paradoxes to common sense. + +And although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion to some, that when +they have taken a circuit through so many refined and unvulgar notions, +they should at last come to think like other men; yet, methinks, this +return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wandered through the +wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming home from a +long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties and +perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, and enjoys +himself with more satisfaction for the future. + +As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels by reason, so it +has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of +reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest that +the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of +Immortality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of +thought: whatever may be the result of that loose, rambling way, not +altogether improperly termed Free-thinking by certain libertines in +thought, who can no more endure the restraints of logic than those of +religion or government. + +It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so far as it tends to ease +the mind of difficult and useless inquiries, it can affect only a few +speculative persons. But if, by their speculations rightly placed, the +study of morality and the law of nature were brought more into fashion +among men of parts and genius, the discouragements that draw to Scepticism +removed, the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the +principles of Natural Religion reduced into regular systems, as artfully +disposed and clearly connected as those of some other sciences; there are +grounds to think these effects would not only have a gradual influence in +repairing the too much defaced sense of virtue in the world, but also, by +shewing that such parts of revelation as lie within the reach of human +inquiry are most agreeable to right reason, would dispose all prudent, +unprejudiced persons to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred +mysteries which are above the comprehension of our faculties. + +It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his censure of these +_Dialogues_ till he has read them through. Otherwise, he may lay them +aside in a mistake of their design, or on account of difficulties or +objections which he would find answered in the sequel. A Treatise of this +nature would require to be once read over coherently, in order to +comprehend its design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the +connexion and disposition of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a +second reading, this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain. +Especially if recourse be had to an Essay I wrote some years since upon +_Vision_, and the Treatise concerning the _Principles of Human Knowledge_; +wherein divers notions advanced in these _Dialogues_ are farther pursued, +or placed in different lights, and other points handled which naturally +tend to confirm and illustrate them. + + + + +The First Dialogue + + +_Philonous._ Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so +early. + +_Hylas._ It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up +with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not +sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden. + +_Phil._ It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable +pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the +day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild +but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, +the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless +beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties +too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, +which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally +dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed +very intent on something. + +_Hyl._ It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit +me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive myself +of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation +with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that you would +suffer me to impart my reflexions to you. + +_Phil._ With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if +you had not prevented me. + + ------------------------------------- + +_Hyl._ I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, +through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some +unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all, +or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however might +be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some +consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth +here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have +spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire +ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to +plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain +suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto +held sacred and unquestionable(786). + +_Phil._ I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected +doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am even +so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted several +of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And +I give it you on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to +the plain dictates of nature and common sense(787), I find my +understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a +great many things which before were all mystery and riddle. + +_Hyl._ I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you. + +_Phil._ Pray, what were those? + +_Hyl._ You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who +maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of +man, to wit, that there is no such thing as _material substance_ in the +world. + +_Phil._ That there is no such thing as what _philosophers_ call _material +substance_, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything +absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to +renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. + +_Hyl._ What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common +Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no +such thing as _matter_? + +_Phil._ Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold +there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain +more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no such +thing? + +_Hyl._ You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as +that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged +to give up my opinion in this point. + +_Phil._ Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which +upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote +from Scepticism? + +_Hyl._ With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about the +plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to +say. + +_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a _sceptic_? + +_Hyl._ I mean what all men mean--one that doubts of everything. + +_Phil._ He then who entertains no doubt concerning some particular point, +with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic. + +_Hyl._ I agree with you. + +_Phil._ Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or +negative side of a question? + +_Hyl._ In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that +_doubting_ signifies a suspense between both. + +_Phil._ He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, +than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance. + +_Hyl._ True. + +_Phil._ And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a +sceptic than the other. + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge it. + +_Phil._ How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me a +_sceptic_, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of +Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as +you in your affirmation. + +_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but +every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said +indeed that a _sceptic_ was one who doubted of everything; but I should +have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things. + +_Phil._ What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? +But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently +independent of Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the +denying them(788). + +_Hyl._ I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of +distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, +or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to +denominate a man a _sceptic_? + +_Phil._ Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the +reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; +since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest _sceptic_? + +_Hyl._ That is what I desire. + +_Phil._ What mean you by Sensible Things? + +_Hyl._ Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine +that I mean anything else? + +_Phil._ Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your +notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask +you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses +which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to +be _sensible_ which are perceived mediately, or not without the +intervention of others? + +_Hyl._ I do not sufficiently understand you. + +_Phil._ In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; +but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions +of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible +things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know whether +you take the things suggested by them to be so too. + +_Hyl._ No, certainly: it were absurd to think _God_ or _virtue_ sensible +things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible +marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion. + +_Phil._ It seems then, that by _sensible things_ you mean those only which +can be perceived _immediately_ by sense? + +_Hyl._ Right. + +_Phil._ Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the +sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently +conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that +cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of +seeing? + +_Hyl._ It doth. + +_Phil._ In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be +said to hear the causes of those sounds? + +_Hyl._ You cannot. + +_Phil._ And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I +cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat +or weight? + +_Hyl._ To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for +all, that by _sensible things_ I mean those only which are perceived by +sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not +perceive _immediately_: for they make no inferences. The deducing +therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone +are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason(789). + +_Phil._ This point then is agreed between us--That _sensible things are +those only which are immediately perceived by sense_. You will farther +inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, +and colours, and figures(790); or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the +palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the +touch, more than tangible qualities. + +_Hyl._ We do not. + +_Phil._ It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, +there remains nothing sensible? + +_Hyl._ I grant it. + +_Phil._ Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible +qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities? + +_Hyl._ Nothing else. + +_Phil._ _Heat_ then is a sensible thing? + +_Hyl._ Certainly. + +_Phil._ Doth the _reality_ of sensible things consist in being perceived? +or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no +relation to the mind? + +_Hyl._ To _exist_ is one thing, and to be _perceived_ is another. + +_Phil._ I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, +whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the +mind, and distinct from their being perceived? + +_Hyl._ I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any +relation to, their being perceived. + +_Phil._ Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without +the mind(791)? + +_Hyl._ It must. + +_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all +degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should +attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me +know that reason. + +_Hyl._ Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the +same exists in the object that occasions it. + +_Phil._ What! the greatest as well as the least? + +_Hyl._ I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They +are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more +sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any difference, we are +more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a +lesser degree. + +_Phil._ But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very +great pain? + +_Hyl._ No one can deny it. + +_Phil._ And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure? + +_Hyl._ No, certainly. + +_Phil._ Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed +with sense and perception? + +_Hyl._ It is senseless without doubt. + +_Phil._ It cannot therefore be the subject of pain? + +_Hyl._ By no means. + +_Phil._ Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since +you acknowledge this to be no small pain? + +_Hyl._ I grant it. + +_Phil._ What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material +Substance, or no? + +_Hyl._ It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in +it. + +_Phil._ How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in +a material substance? I desire you would clear this point. + +_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a +pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, +and the consequence or effect of it. + +_Phil._ Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple +uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations? + +_Hyl._ But one simple sensation. + +_Phil._ Is not the heat immediately perceived? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ And the pain? + +_Hyl._ True. + +_Phil._ Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same +time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, +it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately +perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense heat +immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain. + +_Hyl._ It seems so. + +_Phil._ Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement +sensation to be without pain or pleasure. + +_Hyl._ I cannot. + +_Phil._ Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure +in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, +smells? &c. + +_Hyl._--I do not find that I can. + +_Phil._ Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing +distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree? + +_Hyl._ It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a +very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it. + +_Phil._ What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between +affirming and denying? + +_Hyl._ I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful +heat cannot exist without the mind. + +_Phil._ It hath not therefore, according to you, any _real_ being? + +_Hyl._ I own it. + +_Phil._ Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really +hot? + +_Hyl._ I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say, +there is no such thing as an intense real heat. + +_Phil._ But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally +real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more +undoubtedly real than the lesser? + +_Hyl._ True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there +is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is +this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of +painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it +follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal +substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior +degree to exist in such a substance. + +_Phil._ But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which +exist only in the mind from those which exist without it? + +_Hyl._ That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist +unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in +the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to +think the same of them. + +_Phil._ I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable +of pleasure, any more than of pain. + +_Hyl._ I did. + +_Phil._ And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what +causes uneasiness, a pleasure? + +_Hyl._ What then? + +_Phil._ Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving +substance, or body. + +_Hyl._ So it seems. + +_Phil._ Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not +painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may we +not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree +of heat whatsoever? + +_Hyl._ On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a +pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain. + +_Phil._ I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a +pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make +good my conclusion. + +_Hyl._ I could rather call it an _indolence_! It seems to be nothing more +than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or +state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not +deny. + +_Phil._ If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of +heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by +appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold? + +_Hyl._ The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; +for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it +cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, +as well as a lesser degree of heat. + +_Phil._ Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we +perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate +degree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose application we +feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them. + +_Hyl._ They must. + +_Phil._ Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an +absurdity? + +_Hyl._ Without doubt it cannot. + +_Phil._ Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at +the same time both cold and warm? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that +they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an +intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to +the other(792)? + +_Hyl._ It will. + +_Phil._ Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is +really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your own +concession, to believe an absurdity? + +_Hyl._ I confess it seems so. + +_Phil._ Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have +granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity. + +_Hyl._ But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, _there is +no heat in the fire_? + +_Phil._ To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases +exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment? + +_Hyl._ We ought. + +_Phil._ When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the +fibres of your flesh? + +_Hyl._ It doth. + +_Phil._ And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more? + +_Hyl._ It doth not. + +_Phil._ Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself +occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should +not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation +occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire. + +_Hyl._ Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and +acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds. +But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external +things. + +_Phil._ But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is +the same with regard to all other sensible qualities(793), and that they +can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold? + +_Hyl._ Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that +is what I despair of seeing proved. + +_Phil._ Let us examine them in order. What think you of _tastes_--do they +exist without the mind, or no? + +_Hyl._ Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood +bitter? + +_Phil._ Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure +or pleasant sensation, or is it not? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain? + +_Hyl._ I grant it. + +_Phil._ If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal +substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, +that is, pleasure and pain, agree to them? + +_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this time. +You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not +particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which I answered simply, that +they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished:--those qualities, as +perceived by us, are pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the +external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is +no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or +sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you +to this? + +_Phil._ I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded +altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, _the +things we immediately perceive by our senses_. Whatever other qualities, +therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, +neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, +pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, +and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what +use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to +conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, +sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by +the senses), do not exist without the mind? + +_Hyl._ I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as to +those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say that +sugar is not sweet. + +_Phil._ But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that +which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear +bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive +different tastes in the same food; since that which one man delights in, +another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was something really +inherent in the food? + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge I know not how. + +_Phil._ In the next place, _odours_ are to be considered. And, with regard +to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said of tastes doth not +exactly agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing +sensations? + +_Hyl._ They are. + +_Phil._ Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an +unperceiving thing? + +_Hyl._ I cannot. + +_Phil._ Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute +animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we +perceive in them? + +_Hyl._ By no means. + +_Phil._ May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other +forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving +substance or mind? + +_Hyl._ I think so. + +_Phil._ Then as to _sounds_, what must we think of them: are they +accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not? + +_Hyl._ That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence: +because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth +no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound. + +_Phil._ What reason is there for that, Hylas? + +_Hyl._ Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound +greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion +in the air, we never hear any sound at all. + +_Phil._ And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is +produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that +the sound itself is in the air. + +_Hyl._ It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the +mind the sensation of _sound_. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it +causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to +the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called +_sound_. + +_Phil._ What! is sound then a sensation? + +_Hyl._ I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the +mind. + +_Phil._ And can any sensation exist without the mind? + +_Hyl._ No, certainly. + +_Phil._ How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the +_air_ you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind? + +_Hyl._ You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived +by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the +sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The +former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is +merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air. + +_Phil._ I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by the answer I +gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more +of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion? + +_Hyl._ I am. + +_Phil._ Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be +attributed to motion? + +_Hyl._ It may. + +_Phil._ It is then good sense to speak of _motion_ as of a thing that is +_loud, sweet, acute, or grave_. + +_Hyl._ I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident +those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or _sound_ in the +common acceptation of the word, but not to _sound_ in the real and +philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain +motion of the air? + +_Phil._ It seems then there are two sorts of sound--the one vulgar, or that +which is heard, the other philosophical and real? + +_Hyl._ Even so. + +_Phil._ And the latter consists in motion? + +_Hyl._ I told you so before. + +_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of +motion belongs? to the hearing? + +_Hyl._ No, certainly; but to the sight and touch. + +_Phil._ It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may +possibly be _seen_ or _felt_, but never _heard_. + +_Hyl._ Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my +opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the +inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language, +you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not +therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem +uncouth and out of the way. + +_Phil._ Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained +no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases +and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose +notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the general +sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical +paradox, to say that _real sounds are never heard_, and that the idea of +them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this +contrary to nature and the truth of things? + +_Hyl._ To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions +already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being +without the mind. + +_Phil._ And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of +_colours_. + +_Hyl._ Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be +plainer than that we see them on the objects? + +_Phil._ The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances +existing without the mind? + +_Hyl._ They are. + +_Phil._ And have true and real colours inhering in them? + +_Hyl._ Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it. + +_Phil._ How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight? + +_Hyl._ There is not. + +_Phil._ And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive +immediately? + +_Hyl._ How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, +we do not. + +_Phil._ Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is +anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I +know you asserted there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you +still persist in the same opinion. + +_Hyl._ I do. + +_Phil._ Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or +made up of sensible qualities? + +_Hyl._ What a question that is! who ever thought it was? + +_Phil._ My reason for asking was, because in saying, _each visible object +hath that colour which we see in it_, you make visible objects to be +corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are +sensible qualities, or else that there is something beside sensible +qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed +between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, +that your _corporeal substance_ is nothing distinct from _sensible +qualities_(794). + +_Hyl._ You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and +endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me +out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning. + +_Phil._ I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are +unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall +urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the +same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other. + +_Hyl._ The very same. + +_Phil._ What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder +clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other +form than that of a dark mist or vapour? + +_Hyl._ I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds +as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours. + +_Phil._ _Apparent_ call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent +colours from real? + +_Hyl._ Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only +at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach. + +_Phil._ And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered +by the most near and exact survey. + +_Hyl._ Right. + +_Phil._ Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a +microscope, or by the naked eye? + +_Hyl._ By a microscope, doubtless. + +_Phil._ But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different +from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had +microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no +object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour +which it exhibits to the naked eye. + +_Hyl._ And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that +there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by +artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish. + +_Phil._ I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, +that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those +on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection +which is afforded us by a microscope. Then, as to what you say by way of +prevention: I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is +better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is +less sharp? + +_Hyl._ By the former without doubt. + +_Phil._ Is it not plain from _Dioptrics_ that microscopes make the sight +more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in +case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought +that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in +itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real +than those perceived otherwise. + +_Hyl._ I confess there is something in what you say. + +_Phil._ Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually +are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which +by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those +inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? Must we suppose they are +all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath +not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears +in that of all other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident they must +see particles less than their own bodies; which will present them with a +far different view in each object from that which strikes our senses(795)? +Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same +manner. In the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it +not therefore highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a +very different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with +different humours, do not see the same colours in every object that we do? +From all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally +apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in +any outward object? + +_Hyl._ It should. + +_Phil._ The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case +colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, +they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very +bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that, +upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the humours of the +eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real alteration in +the thing itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally +disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but the +situation of some objects, and they shall present different colours to the +eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of +light. And what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently +coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day? Add to these +the experiment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of +light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to +appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether you +are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour inhering in +it; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what +certain distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and +formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for +ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones. + +_Hyl._ I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally +apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in +external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what confirms +me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light colours are still +more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours +perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, +how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body affects +the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action +of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by +impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye; nor +consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence +it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance, +which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such +is light. + +_Phil._ How! is light then a substance? + +_Hyl._ I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid +substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and +in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward +objects to the eyes, communicate different motions to the optic nerves; +which, being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions; +and these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c. + +_Phil._ It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves. + +_Hyl._ Nothing else. + +_Phil._ And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind +is affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour. + +_Hyl._ Right. + +_Phil._ And these sensations have no existence without the mind. + +_Hyl._ They have not. + +_Phil._ How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by +_light_ you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind? + +_Hyl._ Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot +exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and +configurations of certain insensible particles of matter. + +_Phil._ Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate +objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance. + +_Hyl._ That is what I say. + +_Phil._ Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible +qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may +hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the +philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about _them_; only I would +advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are +upon, it be prudent for you to affirm--_the red and blue which we see are +not real colours, but certain unknown motions and figures which no man +ever did or can see are truly so_. Are not these shocking notions, and are +not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were +obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds? + +_Hyl._ I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out any +longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed _secondary +qualities_, have certainly no existence without the mind. But by this +acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate anything from the +reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it is no more than several +philosophers maintain(796), who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable +from denying Matter. For the clearer understanding of this, you must know +sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into _Primary_ and +_Secondary_(797). The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, +Motion, and Rest; and these they hold exist really in Bodies. The latter +are those above enumerated; or, briefly, _all sensible qualities beside +the Primary_; which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas +existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are +apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible there was such +an opinion current among philosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced +of its truth until now. + +_Phil._ You are still then of opinion that _extension_ and _figures_ are +inherent in external unthinking substances? + +_Hyl._ I am. + +_Phil._ But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary +Qualities will hold good against these also? + +_Hyl._ Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the +mind. + +_Phil._ Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you +perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the +figure and extension which they see and feel? + +_Hyl._ Without doubt, if they have any thought at all. + +_Phil._ Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all +animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given +to men alone for this end? + +_Hyl._ I make no question but they have the same use in all other animals. + +_Phil._ If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to +perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming +them? + +_Hyl._ Certainly. + +_Phil._ A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things +equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; +though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best +as so many visible points(798)? + +_Hyl._ I cannot deny it. + +_Phil._ And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger? + +_Hyl._ They will. + +_Phil._ Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another +extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain? + +_Hyl._ All this I grant. + +_Phil._ Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of +different dimensions? + +_Hyl._ That were absurd to imagine. + +_Phil._ But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the +extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as +likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true +extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you +are led into an absurdity. + +_Hyl._ There seems to be some difficulty in the point. + +_Phil._ Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of +any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself? + +_Hyl._ I have. + +_Phil._ But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible +extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater +than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it +is not really inherent in the object? + +_Hyl._ I own I am at a loss what to think. + +_Phil._ Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to +think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the +rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold +was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the +other? + +_Hyl._ It was. + +_Phil._ Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no +extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem little, +smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, +uneven, and angular? + +_Hyl._ The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen? + +_Phil._ You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye +bare, and with the other through a microscope. + +_Hyl._ I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up +_extension_, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a +concession. + +_Phil._ Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will +stick at nothing for its oddness. [(799) But, on the other hand, should it +not seem very odd, if the general reasoning which includes all other +sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that +no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving +substance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension, +which we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be +really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there +must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from +extension, to be the _substratum_ of extension. Be the sensible quality +what it will--figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it +should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.] + +_Hyl._ I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to +retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in +my progress to it. + +_Phil._ That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being +despatched, we proceed next to _motion_. Can a real motion in any external +body be at the same time both very swift and very slow? + +_Hyl._ It cannot. + +_Phil._ Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to +the time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that +describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in case +it described only a mile in three hours. + +_Hyl._ I agree with you. + +_Phil._ And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as +fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of another +kind? + +_Hyl._ I own it. + +_Phil._ Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its +motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same +reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according +to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the +object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the +same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent +either with common sense, or with what you just now granted? + +_Hyl._ I have nothing to say to it. + +_Phil._ Then as for _solidity_; either you do not mean any sensible +quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it +must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are +plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to +one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness +of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the +body. + +_Hyl._ I own the very _sensation_ of resistance, which is all you +immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the _cause_ of that +sensation is. + +_Phil._ But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately +perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been +already determined. + +_Hyl._ I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little +embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions. + +_Phil._ To help you out, do but consider that if _extension_ be once +acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must +necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all +evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire +particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have +denied them all to have any real existence(800). + +_Hyl._ I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those +philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should +yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them, +how can this be accounted for? + +_Phil._ It is not my business to account for every opinion of the +philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it +seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former +than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have +something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of +extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly +absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving Substance, +men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the +Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is +something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an +intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real +existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no +rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensation +is as truly _a sensation_ as one more pleasing or painful; and +consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an +unthinking subject. + +_Hyl._ It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere +heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension(801). Now, +though it be acknowledged that _great_ and _small_, consisting merely in +the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own +bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing +obliges us to hold the same with regard to _absolute extension_, which is +something abstracted from _great_ and _small_, from this or that +particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; _swift_ and +_slow_ are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own +minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion +exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from +them doth not. + +_Phil._ Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of +extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of +swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each? + +_Hyl._ I think so. + +_Phil._ These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties, +are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call +them. + +_Hyl._ They are. + +_Phil._ That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in +general. + +_Hyl._ Let it be so. + +_Phil._ But it is a universally received maxim that _Everything which +exists is particular_(802). How then can motion in general, or extension +in general, exist in any corporeal substance? + +_Hyl._ I will take time to solve your difficulty. + +_Phil._ But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you +can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content +to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a +distinct _abstract idea_ of motion or extension, divested of all those +sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and +the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then +yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be +unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no +notion(803) of. + +_Hyl._ To confess ingenuously, I cannot. + +_Phil._ Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the +ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term +_secondary_? + +_Hyl._ What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by +themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the +mathematicians treat of them? + +_Phil._ I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general +propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any +other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly(804). +But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word _motion_ by +itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, +because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention +of _great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality, that +therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any +particular size or figure, or sensible quality(805), should be distinctly +formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, +without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as +being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying +aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, +they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension. + +_Hyl._ But what say you to _pure intellect_? May not abstracted ideas be +framed by that faculty? + +_Phil._ Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot +frame them by the help of _pure intellect_; whatsoever faculty you +understand by those words(806). Besides, not to inquire into the nature of +pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as _virtue_, _reason_, _God_, or +the like, thus much seems manifest--that sensible things are only to be +perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, +and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure +intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the +idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even +from other sensible qualities. + +_Hyl._Let me think a little----I do not find that I can. + +_Phil._ And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature +which implies a repugnancy in its conception? + +_Hyl._ By no means. + +_Phil._ Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the +ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it +not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist +likewise? + +_Hyl._ It should seem so. + +_Phil._ Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as +conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther +application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust +your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them +appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or +figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities? + +_Hyl._ You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no +secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that _all_ sensible +qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind(807). But, my +fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or +overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think. + +_Phil._ For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in +reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any +slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes +for your first opinion. + +_Hyl._ One great oversight I take to be this--that I did not sufficiently +distinguish the _object_ from the _sensation_(808). Now, though this +latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that +the former cannot. + +_Phil._ What object do you mean? the object of the senses? + +_Hyl._ The same. + +_Phil._ It is then immediately perceived? + +_Hyl._ Right. + +_Phil._ Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately +perceived and a sensation. + +_Hyl._ The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides +which, there is something perceived; and this I call the _object_. For +example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of +perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip. + +_Phil._ What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see? + +_Hyl._ The same. + +_Phil._ And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension(809)? + +_Hyl._ Nothing. + +_Phil._ What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent +with the extension; is it not? + +_Hyl._ That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the +mind, in some unthinking substance. + +_Phil._ That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. +Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your +mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses--that is, any +idea, or combination of ideas--should exist in an unthinking substance, or +exterior to _all_ minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I +imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red +and yellow were on the tulip _you saw_, since you do not pretend to _see_ +that unthinking substance. + +_Hyl._ You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from +the subject. + +_Phil._ I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to +your distinction between _sensation_ and _object_; if I take you right, +you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the +mind, the other not. + +_Hyl._ True. + +_Phil._ And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking +thing(810); but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may? + +_Hyl._ That is my meaning. + +_Phil._ So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it +were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance? + +_Hyl._ I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception. + +_Phil._ When is the mind said to be active? + +_Hyl._ When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything. + +_Phil._ Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an +act of the will? + +_Hyl._ It cannot. + +_Phil._ The mind therefore is to be accounted _active_ in its perceptions +so far forth as _volition_ is included in them? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion +of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying +it to my nose. But is either of these smelling? + +_Hyl._ No. + +_Phil._ I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing +so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can +this be called _smelling_: for, if it were, I should smell every time I +breathed in that manner? + +_Hyl._ True. + +_Phil._ Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more +there is--as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at +all--this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. +Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas? + +_Hyl._ No, the very same. + +_Phil._ Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or +keep them shut; to turn them this or that way? + +_Hyl._ Without doubt. + +_Phil._ But, doth it in like manner depend on _your_ will that in looking +on this flower you perceive _white_ rather than any other colour? Or, +directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid +seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition? + +_Hyl._ No, certainly. + +_Phil._ You are then in these respects altogether passive? + +_Hyl._ I am. + +_Phil._ Tell me now, whether _seeing_ consists in perceiving light and +colours, or in opening and turning the eyes? + +_Hyl._ Without doubt, in the former. + +_Phil._ Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and +colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were +speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow +from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, +including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is +not this a plain contradiction? + +_Hyl._ I know not what to think of it. + +_Phil._ Besides, since you distinguish the _active_ and _passive_ in every +perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that +pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an +unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then +confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are +not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call +them _external objects_, and give them in words what subsistence you +please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not +as I say? + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what +passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking +being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to +conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance.--But +then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different +view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary +to suppose a _material substratum_, without which they cannot be conceived +to exist(811). + +_Phil._ _Material substratum_ call you it? Pray, by which of your senses +came you acquainted with that being? + +_Hyl._ It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being +perceived by the senses. + +_Phil._ I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the +idea of it? + +_Hyl._ I do not pretend to any proper positive _idea_ of it. However, I +conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without +a support. + +_Phil._ It seems then you have only a relative _notion_ of it, or that you +conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to +sensible qualities? + +_Hyl._ Right. + +_Phil._ Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation +consists. + +_Hyl._ Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term _substratum_, or +_substance_? + +_Phil._ If so, the word _substratum_ should import that it is spread under +the sensible qualities or accidents? + +_Hyl._ True. + +_Phil._ And consequently under extension? + +_Hyl._ I own it. + +_Phil._ It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from +extension? + +_Hyl._ I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that +supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different +from the thing supporting? + +_Phil._ So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is +supposed to be the _substratum_ of extension? + +_Hyl._ Just so. + +_Phil._ Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is +not the idea of extension necessarily included in _spreading_? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have +in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under +which it is spread? + +_Hyl._ It must. + +_Phil._ Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the _substratum_ of +extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified +to be a _substratum_: and so on to infinity? And I ask whether this be not +absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that +the _substratum_ was something distinct from and exclusive of extension? + +_Hyl._ Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is +_spread_ in a gross literal sense under extension. The word _substratum_ +is used only to express in general the same thing with _substance_. + +_Phil._ Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term +_substance_. Is it not that it stands under accidents? + +_Hyl._ The very same. + +_Phil._ But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it +not be extended? + +_Hyl._ It must. + +_Phil._ Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity +with the former? + +_Hyl._ You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, +Philonous. + +_Phil._ I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty +to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand +something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. +How! is it as your legs support your body? + +_Hyl._ No; that is the literal sense. + +_Phil._ Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you +understand it in.--How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas? + +_Hyl._ I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well +enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more +I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know +nothing of it. + +_Phil._ It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor +positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what +relation it bears to accidents? + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge it. + +_Phil._ And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or +accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a +material support of them? + +_Hyl._ I did. + +_Phil._ That is to say, when you conceive the _real_ existence of +qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive? + +_Hyl._ It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or +other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the +ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. +Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. +Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other +sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together +form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be +supposed to exist without the mind. + +_Phil._ Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though +indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my +arguments, or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the +Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they +were not _at all_ without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and +motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was +impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, +so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the +only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that +hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it +so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it +possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible +object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually +to be so. + +_Hyl._ If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy +than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and +unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive +them existing after that manner. + +_Phil._ How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time +unseen? + +_Hyl._ No, that were a contradiction. + +_Phil._ Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of _conceiving_ a thing +which is _unconceived_? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by +you? + +_Hyl._ How should it be otherwise? + +_Phil._ And what is conceived is surely in the mind? + +_Hyl._ Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind. + +_Phil._ How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing +independent and out of all minds whatsoever? + +_Hyl._ That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me +into it.--It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a +solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to +conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering +that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I +can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own +thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. +And this is far from proving that I can conceive them _existing out of the +minds of all Spirits_. + +_Phil._ You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one +corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind? + +_Hyl._ I do. + +_Phil._ And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you +cannot so much as conceive? + + ------------------------------------- + +_Hyl._ I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some +scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I _see things at a distance_? +Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? +Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses? + +_Phil._ Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects? + +_Hyl._ I do. + +_Phil._ And have they not then the same appearance of being distant? + +_Hyl._ They have. + +_Phil._ But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be +without the mind? + +_Hyl._ By no means. + +_Phil._ You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are +without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are +perceived. + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases? + +_Phil._ By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, +neither sense nor reason informs you that _it_ actually exists without the +mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain +sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are +without the mind. + +_Hyl._ True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests +something of _outness_ or _distance_? + +_Phil._ Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure +change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances? + +_Hyl._ They are in a continual change. + +_Phil._ Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the +visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance(812), or will +be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued +series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of +your approach. + +_Hyl._ It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I +shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter +whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance +suggested in the case. + +_Phil._ Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me +whether there be any more in it than this: From the ideas you actually +perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other +ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected +with, after such a certain succession of time and motion. + +_Hyl._ Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else. + +_Phil._ Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a +sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be +_suggested_ by sight? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance +annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of +sensations, existing only in his mind? + +_Hyl._ It is undeniable. + +_Phil._ But, to make it still more plain: is not _distance_ a line turned +endwise to the eye(813)? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ And can a line so situated be perceived by sight? + +_Hyl._ It cannot. + +_Phil._ Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and +immediately perceived by sight? + +_Hyl._ It should seem so. + +_Phil._ Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance(814)? + +_Hyl._ It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind. + +_Phil._ But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same +place with extension and figures? + +_Hyl._ They do. + +_Phil._ How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, +when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the +very same with regard to both? + +_Hyl._ I know not what to answer. + +_Phil._ But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by +the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, +whatever is immediately perceived is an idea(815): and can any idea exist +out of the mind? + +_Hyl._ To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we +perceive or know nothing beside our ideas(816)? + +_Phil._ As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that is +beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you +perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, +whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own +sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this +conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this +last question, to have departed from what you then thought. + +_Hyl._ To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of +objects:--the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called _ideas_; +the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation +of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do +not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry +I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut +short your discourse. + +_Phil._ Are those external objects perceived by sense, or by some other +faculty? + +_Hyl._ They are perceived by sense. + +_Phil._ How! Is there anything perceived by sense which is not immediately +perceived? + +_Hyl._ Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on +a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to +perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses. + +_Phil._ It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately +perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are +perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to +our ideas? + +_Hyl._ That is my meaning. + +_Phil._ And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is +nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, +are perceived by sense. + +_Hyl._ In the very same. + +_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do +you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a +certain symmetry and composition of the whole? + +_Hyl._ Nothing else. + +_Phil._ And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar +see as much? + +_Hyl._ He would. + +_Phil._ Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a +degree as you? + +_Hyl._ I agree with you. + +_Phil._ Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman +emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas +of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no +advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed +from reason and memory: should it not? + +_Hyl._ It should. + +_Phil._ Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything +is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived. Though I grant +we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately +by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the +immediate perception of ideas by one sense _suggests_ to the mind others, +perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with +them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, +immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had +that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. +It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be +_heard_ but _sound_; and the coach is not properly perceived by sense, but +suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot +bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of +sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are +properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are +actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been +perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As +for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by +experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your +comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you must +hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by +sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I +would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the +existence of what you call _real things_ or _material objects_. Or, +whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; +or, if you have heard or read of any one that did. + +_Hyl._ I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never +convince me. + +_Phil._ My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge +of _material beings_. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or +mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded +sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence; or +what _medium_ you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or +your own understanding. + +_Hyl._ To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not +find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seem pretty +plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as +long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe +as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary. + +_Phil._ What! Is it come to this, that you only _believe_ the existence of +material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the +possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons against +it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him +who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you are +now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you have +more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to +pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not +exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or +representations, of certain originals that do? + +_Hyl._ You take me right. + +_Phil._ They are then like external things(817)? + +_Hyl._ They are. + +_Phil._ Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of +our senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any +motions in our bodies--suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or +organs of sense? + +_Hyl._ Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which +remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the +posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our +minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things +existing without the mind. + +_Phil._ How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and +variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and +constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, +figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon +every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how +can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted +forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and +unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, +how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones? + +_Hyl._ I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to +this. + +_Phil._ But neither is this all. Which are material objects in +themselves--perceptible or imperceptible? + +_Hyl._ Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All +material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be +perceived only by our ideas. + +_Phil._ Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals +insensible? + +_Hyl._ Right. + +_Phil._ But how can that which is sensible be _like_ that which is +insensible? Can a real thing, in itself _invisible_, be like a _colour_; +or a real thing, which is not _audible_, be like a _sound_? In a word, can +anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea? + +_Hyl._ I must own, I think not. + +_Phil._ Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do you not +perfectly know your own ideas? + +_Hyl._ I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be +no part of my idea(818). + +_Phil._ Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there +be anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can +conceive anything like them existing without the mind. + +_Hyl._ Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or +understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most +evident that _no idea can exist without the mind_(819). + +_Phil._ You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the +_reality_ of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute +existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright +sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to shew your principles led +to Scepticism. + +_Hyl._ For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced. + +_Phil._ I would fain know what more you would require in order to a +perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself +all manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and +insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you +had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could +say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word, +have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if +you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or +think of any remaining subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or comment +whatsoever, why do you not produce it? + +_Hyl._ A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see +myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have +drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my +way out. You must give me time to look about me and recollect myself. + +_Phil._ Hark; is not this the college bell? + +_Hyl._ It rings for prayers. + +_Phil._ We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again to-morrow +morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning's +discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new +means to extricate yourself. + +_Hyl._ Agreed. + + + + +The Second Dialogue + + +_Hylas._ I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All +this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had +not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else. + +_Philonous._ I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were +any mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, +you will now discover them to me. + +_Hyl._ I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search +after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined +the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the +notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident; +and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my +assent. + +_Phil._ And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that +they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and +beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to +advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure +being reviewed, or too nearly inspected. + +_Hyl._ I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be +more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long as +I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are out +of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory, +so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining things that, +I profess, I know not how to reject it. + +_Phil._ I know not what way you mean. + +_Hyl._ I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas. + +_Phil._ How is that? + +_Hyl._ It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the +brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to +all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different +impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain +vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits +propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according to the +various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously +affected with ideas(820). + +_Phil._ And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are +affected with ideas? + +_Hyl._ Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it? + +_Phil._ I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. +You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our +ideas. Pray tell me whether by the _brain_ you mean any sensible thing. + +_Hyl._ What else think you I could mean? + +_Phil._ Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things +which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the +mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to. + +_Hyl._ I do not deny it. + +_Phil._ The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists +only in the mind(821). Now, I would fain know whether you think it +reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind +occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account +for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself? + +_Hyl._ I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is +perceivable to sense--this being itself only a combination of sensible +ideas--but by another which I imagine. + +_Phil._ But are not things imagined as truly _in the mind_ as things +perceived(822)? + +_Hyl._ I must confess they are. + +_Phil._ It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all this +while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the brain; +that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it +matters not. + +_Hyl._ I begin to suspect my hypothesis. + +_Phil._ Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. +When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the +brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of ideas +imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If you do +not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable +hypothesis. + +_Hyl._ I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it. + +_Phil._ You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of +explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any +reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, +and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible +these should be the effect of that? + +_Hyl._ But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to +have. + +_Phil._ Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things +have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic? + +_Hyl._ It is too plain to be denied. + +_Phil._ Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is +there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear +springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the +prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is +lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled +with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an +agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural +beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not +the veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change +her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed! What +variety and use [(823)in the meanest productions of nature!] What +delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies! +How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends, +as to constitute opposite parts of the whole! And, while they mutually aid +and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other? Raise now +your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries +that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of the +planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those (miscalled +_erratic_) globes once known to stray, in their repeated journeys through +the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever +proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which +the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant +is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent +profusion with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole +azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into your sight a +new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous and +minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs of light at various distances, +far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. +The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round +the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind +displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big +enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering +furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its +utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. +Yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and +remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, +linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other; even with +this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd +of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond +expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers +deserve, who would, deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all +_reality_? How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to +think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To +be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought +extravagantly absurd by all men of sense? + +_Hyl._ Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have +nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I +am. + +_Phil._ There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you. + +_Hyl._ What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now +deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself +which you led me into? This surely is not fair. + +_Phil._ I deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to +Scepticism. You indeed said the _reality_ of sensible things consisted in +an _absolute existence out of the minds of spirits_, or distinct from +their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, _you_ are +obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is, according to +your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said +nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that +manner. To me it is evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible +things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, +not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on +my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by +me(824), _there must be some other Mind wherein they exist_. As sure, +therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an +infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it. + +_Hyl._ What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all +others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends +all things. + +_Phil._ Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all +things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a +God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude +the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by +Him(825). + +_Hyl._ But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it +how we come by that belief? + +_Phil._ But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, +though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet +they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being +perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no +difference between saying, _There is a God, therefore He perceives all +things_; and saying, _Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really +exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there +is an infinite Mind, or God_(826)_?_ This furnishes you with a direct and +immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the _being of a +God_. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy, from the +beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was +the workmanship of God. But that--setting aside all help of astronomy and +natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and +adjustment of things--an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred +from(827) the bare _existence of the sensible world_, is an advantage to +them only who have made this easy reflexion: That the sensible world is +that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is +perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an +idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any +laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or +tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate +for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of +unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms; +those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a word, the +whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this single +reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, +even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a +Mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own +thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a +desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either +sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no +farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a +dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can +conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a +notional to allow it a real existence(828)? + +_Hyl._ It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to +religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a +notion entertained by some eminent moderns(829), of _seeing all things in +God_? + +_Phil._ I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me. + +_Hyl._ They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of +being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves; +but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, which, +being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the +immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides, the Divine essence +contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being; and which +are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind. + +_Phil._ I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether +passive and inert(830), can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) +of the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, +pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which +occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add, that it +is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a +created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all +which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world +serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other +hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine +wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout +methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and +compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the +whole world made in vain? + +_Hyl._ But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things +in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it. + +_Phil._ [(831)Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions +are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in +themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with +each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not +therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm +of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the +most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an +absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived +by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures +of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon +the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and +mine. It must be owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture +saith, 'That in God we live and move and have our being.' But that we see +things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from +believing. Take here in brief my meaning:--It is evident that the things I +perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a +mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, +either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of _my_ mind, +since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to +determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon +opening my eyes or ears(832): they must therefore exist in some other +Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, +immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. +But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything +but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable(833). And to assert +that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not? + +_Hyl._ Without doubt. + +_Phil._ But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should +exist in and be produced by a Spirit; since this is no more than I daily +experience in myself(834), inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, +by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up +in my imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the +fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as +those perceived by my senses--which latter are called _real things_. From +all which I conclude, _there is a Mind which affects me every moment with +all the sensible impressions I perceive_. And, from the variety, order, +and manner of these, I conclude _the Author of them to be wise, powerful, +and good, beyond comprehension_. Mark it well; I do not say I see things +by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of +God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are +known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite +Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in +it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth +in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to +acknowledge? + +_Hyl._ I think I understand you very clearly; and own proof you give of a +Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing that God +is the supreme and universal Cause of all things, yet, may there not be +still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a +subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for +all that be _Matter_? + +_Phil._ How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things +immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but +there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately; +therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The +Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I +suppose; something that may be discovered by reason(835), and not by +sense. + +_Hyl._ You are in the right. + +_Phil._ Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded +on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it. + +_Hyl._ I find myself affected with various ideas whereof I know I am not +the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or +capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, +fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore _some_ cause distinct from +me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is _the cause +of my ideas_. And this thing whatever it be, I call Matter. + +_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current +proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For +example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men +pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he +meant by the word _fire_ that which others call _water_. Or, if he should +assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the +term _trees_. Would you think this reasonable? + +_Hyl._ No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of +propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to +pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to +protract and multiply disputes where there is no difference in opinion. + +_Phil._ And doth not _Matter_, in the common current acceptation of the +word, signify an extended solid moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance? + +_Hyl._ It doth. + +_Phil._ And, hath it not been made evident that no _such_ substance can +possibly exist(836)? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how +can that which is _inactive_ be a _cause_; or that which is _unthinking_ +be a _cause of thought_? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word +_Matter_ a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you +understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the +cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run +into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by +no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect _a_ cause +from the _phenomena_: but I deny that _the_ cause deducible by reason can +properly be termed Matter(837). + +_Hyl._ There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid you do +not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to +deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things. +All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a +cause of a limited and inferior nature, which _concurs_ in the production +of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that +kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. _motion_. + +_Phil._ I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded +conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing +without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or +are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth +this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which +you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist +farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas +are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in +them(838). + +_Hyl._ They are. + +_Phil._ And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas? + +_Hyl._ How often have I acknowledged that they are not. + +_Phil._ But is not _motion_ a sensible quality? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ Consequently it is no action? + +_Hyl._ I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my +finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is +active. + +_Phil._ Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being +allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: +and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be +not to talk nonsense(839): and, lastly, whether, having considered the +premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active +Cause of our ideas, other than _Spirit_, is highly absurd and +unreasonable? + +_Hyl._ I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a +cause, yet what hinders its being an _instrument_, subservient to the +supreme Agent in the production of our ideas? + +_Phil._ An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, +wheels, and motions, of that instrument? + +_Hyl._ Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its +qualities being entirely unknown to me. + +_Phil._ What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that +it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape? + +_Hyl._ I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being +already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving +substance. + +_Phil._ But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of +all sensible qualities, even extension itself? + +_Hyl._ I do not pretend to have any notion of it. + +_Phil._ And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable +Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without +it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you +form ideas in your own mind? + +_Hyl._ You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what +reasons have you not to believe it? + +_Phil._ It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of +anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on +reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know _what it is_ +you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of +it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a +philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you +know not what, and you know not why. + +_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an _instrument_, I do +not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of +instrument; but, however, I have some notion of _instrument in general_, +which I apply to it. + +_Phil._ But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the +most general notion of _instrument_, as taken in a distinct sense from +_cause_, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine +attributes? + +_Hyl._ Make that appear and I shall give up the point. + +_Phil._ What mean you by the general nature or notion of _instrument_? + +_Hyl._ That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the +general notion. + +_Phil._ Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the +doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our +wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, +because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove +part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind? +Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in +producing an effect _immediately_ depending on the will of the agent? + +_Hyl._ I own I cannot. + +_Phil._ How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose +Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an +instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it +seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive +instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that +is, by your own confession, to give up the point. + +_Hyl._ It doth not readily occur what I can answer you. + +_Phil._ But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has +been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are +forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth +the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and that he +cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it +seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool +or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner +exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they +are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real +efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but +merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions +prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation +or prescription whatsoever(840). + +_Hyl._ I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I +would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, +notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an _occasion_(841). + +_Phil._ How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be +proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say +no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame +you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term)--I +would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, +having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what +sense you understand _occasion_, pray, in the next place, be pleased to +shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of +our ideas? + +_Hyl._ As to the first point: by _occasion_ I mean an inactive unthinking +being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds. + +_Phil._ And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being? + +_Hyl._ I know nothing of its nature. + +_Phil._ Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we +should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing. + +_Hyl._ When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and +constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular +occasions, at the presence of which they are excited. + +_Phil._ You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and +that He causes them at the presence of those occasions. + +_Hyl._ That is my opinion. + +_Phil._ Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He +perceives. + +_Hyl._ Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of +acting. + +_Phil._ Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or +answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I +only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our +ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the +wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those +attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when +and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, +in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your +purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute +existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, +can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived +by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in +us? + +_Hyl._ I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of _occasion_ +seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest. + +_Phil._ Do you not at length perceive that in all these different +acceptations of _Matter_, you have been only supposing you know not what, +for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use? + +_Hyl._ I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so +accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception +that there is such a thing as _Matter_. + +_Phil._ Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately. +If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If +mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things +which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the +Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, _substratum_, cause, +instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, +shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, +then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and +rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly +hear it. + +_Hyl._ I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I +am at a loss what more to urge. + +_Phil._ And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to +make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto +suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter +exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or, +supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all +that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have +the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have(842). + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as +we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I +conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our minds. +And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is +impossible there should be such a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing +acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is _Matter_ in +some sense or other. _What that is_ I do not indeed pretend to determine. + +_Phil._ I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that +unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and +if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case +you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me +know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's +supporting them? + +_Hyl._ We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to +them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present +understand by _Matter_ neither substance nor accident, thinking nor +extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something +entirely unknown, distinct from all these(843). + +_Phil._ It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing +but the general abstract idea of _entity_. + +_Hyl._ Nothing else; save only that I superadd to this general idea the +negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I +perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend. + +_Phil._ Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist? + +_Hyl._ Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it +exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it +is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not +ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it +exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must +expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter. + +_Phil._ Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform +me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its +_existence_? + +_Hyl._ It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived. + +_Phil._ But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its +existence? + +_Hyl._ Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion +or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. +I know not what is meant by its _existence_, or how it exists. + +_Phil._ Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me +sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, +prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings(844), +all particular things whatsoever. + +_Hyl._ Hold, let me think a little----I profess, Philonous, I do not find +that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion +of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite +vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in +my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not +pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of +Matter, its _where_, its _how_, its _entity_, or anything belonging to it. + +_Phil._ When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have +not any notion in your mind? + +_Hyl._ None at all. + +_Phil._ Pray tell me if the case stands not thus:--At first, from a belief +of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects +existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next +instruments; then occasions: lastly, _something in general_, which being +interpreted proves _nothing_. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, +Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding? + +_Hyl._ Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that _our_ not +being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence. + +_Phil._ That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance, +there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately +perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the +existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of +it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither +reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; +where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is +made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, +where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended +to--I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or +existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at +all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or +signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere +jargon should be treated. + +_Hyl._ To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in +themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to +produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends +demonstration(845). I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise +of I know not what, _matter_. + +_Phil._ But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to +take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a +visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any +imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it +will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well +grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of +prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a +sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is +need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a +frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in +different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and +inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pretending to +maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not +what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or +profession of men? Or is there anything _so_ barefacedly groundless and +unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? +But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time +you neither know _what is meant_ by _Matter_, or by its _existence_. This +indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary +[(846) and of your own head], you not being led to it by any one reason; +for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to +explain or account for it. + +_Hyl._ The _reality_ of things cannot be maintained without supposing the +existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I +should be earnest in its defence? + +_Phil._ The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible? + +_Hyl._ Sensible things. + +_Phil._ My glove for example? + +_Hyl._ That, or any other thing perceived by the senses. + +_Phil._ But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient +evidence to me of the existence of this _glove_, that I see it, and feel +it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be +assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, +by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists +after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How +can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that +anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any +visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a +perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard +for you. + +_Hyl._ Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of Matter is +highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does +not appear to me. + +_Phil._ But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, +it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a +centaur. + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and +that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist. + +_Phil._ I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, evidently +proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of +the word _Matter_, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, +figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind? And have not you +acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying +the possibility of such a substance? + +_Hyl._ True, but that is only one sense of the term _Matter_. + +_Phil._ But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if +Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with +good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved +impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or +other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common +signification of words? + +_Hyl._ I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately +than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of +a term. + +_Phil._ But this now mentioned is the common received sense among +philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been +allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used +this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at +others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the +present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of +reason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun +out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly +examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And +can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, +than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you +or any one else understands it in? + +_Hyl._ But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the +impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and +indefinite sense. + +_Phil._ When is a thing shewn to be impossible? + +_Hyl._ When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in +its definition. + +_Phil._ But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be +demonstrated between ideas? + +_Hyl._ I agree with you. + +_Phil._ Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the +word _Matter_, it is plain, by your own confession, there was included no +idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the same thing as +none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy +between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter +taken in an _unknown_ sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was +only to shew you meant _nothing_; and this you were brought to own. So +that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either to mean +nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not +sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me +know what is. + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I +see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I +give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be +more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false +and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the +point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would +willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this +morning's conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you here again +about the same time. + +_Phil._ I will not fail to attend you. + + + + +The Third Dialogue + + +_Philonous._ (847)Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's +meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? +or have you since seen cause to change your opinion? + +_Hylas._ Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and +uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir +about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas! we +know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know +anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature +certainly never intended us for speculation. + +_Phil._ What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas? + +_Hyl._ There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the +real nature, or what it is in itself. + +_Phil._ Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is? + +_Hyl._ You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but +this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own +mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. +Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly +in the dark as to _that_. + +_Phil._ Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that +which I see before my eyes to be a real tree? + +_Hyl._ _Know?_ No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it. +All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your +own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that +colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures +of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all +other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They +have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by +us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything +of them, as they are in their own nature. + +_Phil._ But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: +and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was? + +_Hyl._ Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own +ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think +you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and +have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the +species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps +act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different +species, because their clothes were not of the same colour. + +_Phil._ It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of +things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I +wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel. + +_Hyl._ Even so. + +_Phil._ But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, +and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, +but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as +comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are +conversant about. + +_Hyl._ They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a +nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, +and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But +philosophers know better things. + +_Phil._ You mean, they _know_ that they _know nothing_. + +_Hyl._ That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge. + +_Phil._ But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you +seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you +are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like +another man; and do you not know what it is you call for? + +_Hyl._ How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any +one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, +ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I +declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every +other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the +true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be +denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot +be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, +I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is +impossible any _real_ corporeal thing should exist in nature. + +_Phil._ You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the +notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these +extravagances by the belief of _material substance_? This makes you dream +of those unknown natures(848) in everything. It is this occasions your +distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It +is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else +knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the +true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really +exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you +attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, +wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the +end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or +nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own +hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real +existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the +deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was(849). Tell me, +Hylas, is it not as I say? + +_Hyl._ I agree with you. _Material substance_ was no more than an +hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my +breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or +whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it +will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you +upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant +it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to +the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present. + +_Phil._ I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at +all(850). I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and +leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real +things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive(851) by my +senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and +purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown +beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach +better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, +real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other +sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking +that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by _snow_ and _fire_ +mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the +right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in _them_. But +I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to +think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature +of things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be +really perceived by my senses(852), and at the same time not really exist, +is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even +in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived. +Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name +and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them +but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses +are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and +ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in +being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be +no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those +ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to +question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him +from the veracity of God(853); or to pretend our knowledge in this point +falls short of intuition or demonstration(854)! I might as well doubt of +my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel. + +_Hyl._ Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible +things should exist without the mind. Do you not? + +_Phil._ I do. + +_Hyl._ Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible +that things perceivable by sense may still exist(855)? + +_Phil._ I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible +things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, +but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my +mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it(856). There +is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals +between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my +birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is +true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily +follows there is an _omnipresent eternal Mind_, which knows and +comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, +and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us +termed the _laws of nature_(857). + +_Hyl._ Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or +have they any agency included in them? + +_Phil._ They are altogether passive and inert(858). + +_Hyl._ And is not God an agent, a being purely active? + +_Phil._ I acknowledge it. + +_Hyl._ No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God? + +_Phil._ It cannot. + +_Hyl._ Since therefore you have no _idea_ of the mind of God, how can you +conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can +conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be +allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no +idea of it? + +_Phil._ As to your first question: I own I have properly no _idea_, either +of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented +by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that +I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my +ideas exist(859). Farther, I know what I mean by the terms _I_ and +_myself_; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not +perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, +Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, +and perceives. I say _indivisible_, because unextended; and _unextended_, +because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which +perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor +like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort +of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul +is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word _idea_ in a large +sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image +or likeness of God--though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion +I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its +powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an +inactive idea, yet in _myself_ some sort of an active thinking image of +the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of +Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas +I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately +apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and +ideas(860). Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in +myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason(861), necessarily infer the +existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God. So much +for your first question. For the second: I suppose by this time you can +answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter(862) objectively, as +you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a +reflex act(863); neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of +the one or the other(864); nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which +you know immediately(865). All which makes the case of _Matter_ widely +different from that of the _Deity_. + + ------------------------------------- + +[(866)_Hyl._ You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea +or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly +speaking, no _idea_ of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a +sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea +can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit +nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea +of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, +because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act +consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you +to this? + +_Phil._ I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of +material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but because the +notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant +that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may +exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or +notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, +nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, +secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not +perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without +some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the +existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I +immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, +infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance--either by probable +deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that +is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by +reflexion(867). You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer +to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of _material +Substance_, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But +this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in +what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. +But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the +subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted we +have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the +existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such +spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be +inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one +can be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other; +if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like +ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational +belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I +have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it(868). I do not perceive it as +an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion. + +_Hyl._ Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according +to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it +should follow that _you_ are only a system of floating ideas, without any +substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. +And, as there is no more meaning in _spiritual Substance_ than in +_material Substance_, the one is to be exploded as well as the other. + +_Phil._ How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own +being; and that I _myself_ am not my ideas, but somewhat else(869), a +thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates +about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours +and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: +that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and +sound; and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert +ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or +essence of Matter(870). On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent +can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. +Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual +substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives +ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an +unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or +the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of +case between Spirit and Matter.] + + ------------------------------------- + +_Hyl._ I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think +the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually +perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them? +Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, _to be perceived_ is +one thing, and _to exist_ is another. + +_Phil._ I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world +for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder +cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees +and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him +why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, +because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms +a real being, and saith it _is_ or _exists;_ but, that which is not +perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being. + +_Hyl._ Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists +in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived. + +_Phil._ And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without +being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us. + +_Hyl._ But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it +is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men(871). Ask the fellow +whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think +you he would make? + +_Phil._ The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of +his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the +real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by +(that is _exists in_) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at +first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; +inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies +a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question +between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a _real_ +existence out of the mind of this or that person(872), but, whether they +have an _absolute_ existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and +exterior to _all_ minds(873). This indeed some heathens and philosophers +have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the +Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion. + +_Hyl._ But, according to your notions, what difference is there between +real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a +dream--since they are all equally in the mind(874)? + +_Phil._ The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they +have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived +by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being +imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like +dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these +with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the +visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though +they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not +being connected, and of apiece with the preceding and subsequent +transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from +realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish _things_ from +_chimeras_ on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon +mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am +not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive. + +_Hyl._ But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but +spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very +oddly. + +_Phil._ I own the word _idea_, not being commonly used for _thing_, sounds +something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary +relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is +now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the +understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet +it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in +effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things +perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is +necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some +mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind +of God, in whom 'we live, and move, and have our being.' Is this as +strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that +we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their +real natures--though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all +our senses? + +_Hyl._ And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such +things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate +cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more +extravagant than this? + +_Phil._ Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say--a thing which is +inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our +perceptions, [(875)without any regard either to consistency, or the old +known axiom, _Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself_]. +Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so +extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred +places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all +those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to +Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much +the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by +citations. + +_Hyl._ You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God the immediate +Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, +sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins. + +_Phil._ In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt +is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an +instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of +an instrument, or occasion, called _Matter_, you as truly make Him the +author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those +operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or +moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, +but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and +religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or +putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the +outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, +therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an +immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin. +Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all +the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents +besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking +rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, +ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of +their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of +their actions(876). + +_Hyl._ But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is +the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the +universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most +voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the +votes. + +_Phil._ I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the +judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a +learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who +thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of +their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your +paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce +in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance +wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the +objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed(877). And +that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny. +It is therefore evident there can be no _substratum_ of those qualities +but spirit; _in_ which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as +a thing perceived in that which perceives it(878). I deny therefore that +there is any unthinking _substratum_ of the objects of sense, and _in that +acceptation_ that there is any material substance. But if by _material +substance_ is meant only _sensible body_--that which is seen and felt (and +the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more)--then I am +more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher +pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind +averse from the notions I espouse: it is a misapprehension that I deny the +reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and +not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and +not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, +that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I +perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will +take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate +of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are +so fond of. + +_Hyl._ What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the +reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking +the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square +tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, +crooked? + +_Phil._ He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, +but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the +case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly +crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that +upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same +crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont +to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from +what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the +moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is +mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and +at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in +respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas +he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, +concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines +would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with +regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the +earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were +placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other +planets, we should not then perceive its motion(879). + +_Hyl._ I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible +enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, +Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you +are now that it does not? + +_Phil._ I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was +founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon +evidence. + +_Hyl._ After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. +We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with +ideas _from without_ is evident; and it is no less evident that there must +be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind(880), +corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by +themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted; +which I call _Matter_, and you call _Spirit_. This is all the difference. + +_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, +extended? + +_Hyl._ It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the +idea of extension, + +_Phil._ It is therefore itself unextended? + +_Hyl._ I grant it. + +_Phil._ Is it not also active? + +_Hyl._ Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it? + +_Phil._ Now let me ask you two questions: _First_, Whether it be agreeable +to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name _Matter_ to +an unextended active being? And, _Secondly_, Whether it be not +ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of +language? + +_Hyl._ Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, +but some _Third Nature_ distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason +is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit +imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended? + +_Phil._ My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of +meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from +volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: +therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. +Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in +itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be +a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be +possible. I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from +without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from +ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this +powerful Being(881). I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know +not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it +to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are +actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are +volitions, there must be a _will_. Again, the things I perceive must have +an existence, they or their archetypes, out of _my_ mind: but, being +ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an +understanding; there is therefore an _understanding_. But will and +understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The +powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a +_Spirit_. + +_Hyl._ And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, +little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction. +Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God? + +_Phil._ Without a doubt. + +_Hyl._ To suffer pain is an imperfection? + +_Phil._ It is. + +_Hyl._ Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some +other Being? + +_Phil._ We are. + +_Hyl._ And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that +Spirit God? + +_Phil._ I grant it. + +_Hyl._ But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without +are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and +uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to +say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you +acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction(882). + +_Phil._ That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among +other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what +it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God, +though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself +suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, +are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external Agent, +which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. +But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense +as we do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and +liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being +as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or +indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to say, our +perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our +nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our +sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a +complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from +being perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with +corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of +nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But +God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy, or natural ties. +No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure +in His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but +to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The +former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath +ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your +not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you +fancy you see an absurdity where there is none. + +_Hyl._ But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of +Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of +bodies(883). And what can withstand demonstration? + +_Phil._ Let me see how you demonstrate that point. + +_Hyl._ I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of +motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and +quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are +equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in +each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small +inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an +equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and +consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that +motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be +demonstrated. + +_Phil._ You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of +motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and _Matter_ taken +together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the +existence of _Matter_ is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle? + +_Hyl._ In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the +velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity. + +_Phil._ But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that +gravity is proportional to _Matter_, in your philosophic sense of the +word; except you take it for granted that unknown _substratum_, or +whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; +which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude +and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as +likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not +dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers +producing them, do exist in a _material substratum_; this is what I deny, +and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not +yet proved. + +_Hyl._ I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you +shall persuade me the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this +while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the +phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter(884)? + +_Phil._ What mean you, Hylas, by the _phenomena_? + +_Hyl._ I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses. + +_Phil._ And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas? + +_Hyl._ I have told you so a hundred times. + +_Phil._ Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew how we come to be +affected with ideas, in that manner and(885) order wherein they are +imprinted on our senses. Is it not? + +_Hyl._ It is. + +_Phil._ Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the +production of any one idea in our minds by the help of _Matter_(886), I +shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it +as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of +phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or +exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly +destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any +sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, +though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its +qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from +explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the +world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have +been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of +ideas(887), they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part +of knowledge both useful and entertaining. + +_Hyl._ After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you +imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of +Matter, if there was no such thing? + +_Phil._ That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion, +or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe +you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be +either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or +because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and +given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from +it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the +belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, _taken for +something distinct from what we perceive by our senses_, is thought to +exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do +not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are +clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to +give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, +I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all. + +_Hyl._ But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New +notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds, and +nobody knows where they will end. + +_Phil._ Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in +sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle +the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I +cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, +and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like +reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything +known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all +such innovations had been forbidden, men would have made a notable +progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead +for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the +objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the +real nature of things, and can never be assured even of their existence: +that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and +motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there +are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or +figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a +spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended +parts:--these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock +the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, +embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against +these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It +is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some _ambages_, +and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly +understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found +to amount to no more than this:--that it is absolutely impossible, and a +plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without +being perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame +it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country. + +_Hyl._ As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are +out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can +anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? +You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with _scepticism_. This is so +plain, there is no denying it. + +_Phil._ You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but +rather ideas into things(888); since those immediate objects of +perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I +take to be the real things themselves(889). + +_Hyl._ Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you +leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which +strikes the senses. + +_Phil._ What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the +very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than +upon your supposition--that Matter(890) is an essential part of all +corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only +sensible forms: but herein we differ--you will have them to be empty +appearances, I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do. + +_Hyl._ You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that +in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true +nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that +disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, +perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the +better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to +the naked eye? + +_Phil._ Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we +feel(891); neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which +was by the naked eye(892). But, in case every variation was thought +sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number or +confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to +avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a +little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers +senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different +circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, +either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to +one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, +by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand +better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one +sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a +microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived +already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite +different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what +ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of +ideas(893), the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, +therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all +circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence +follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either +with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived +notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real +Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise +from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of +several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, +there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers +are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes +not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar, +merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without +any regard to speculation(894). + +_Hyl_. Methinks I apprehend your meaning. + +_Phil._ It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not +real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no +farther real than as our ideas are the true _representations_ of those +_originals_. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, +it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they +resemble them at all(895). We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real +knowledge(896). Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any +change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all +be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is +impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us +yet deeper in uncertainty(897). Again, when we consider the point, we +cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an +absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how +there should be any real thing in nature(898). The result of all which is +that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, +give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain +absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the +source of all this scepticism(899)? Secondly, whether you are informed, +either by sense or reason(900), of the existence of those unknown +originals? And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose +them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything +distinctly conceived or meant by the _absolute or external existence of +unperceiving substances_(901)? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, +it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying +aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances(902), admit +with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses? + +_Hyl._ For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I +would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the +objects perceived by the _senses_ of one, likewise perceivable to others +present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, +the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner +affected with the ideas I frame in my _imagination_. Does not this make a +difference between the former sort of objects and the latter? + +_Phil._ I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the +objects of sense and those of imagination(903). But what would you infer +from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, +because they are perceived by many. + +_Hyl._ I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into +another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the +ideas existing in our minds? + +_Phil._ It is. + +_Hyl._ But the _same_ idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in +any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that +no two can see the same thing(904)? And is not this highly absurd? + +_Phil._ If the term _same_ be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is +certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that +different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea +exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since +men are used to apply the word _same_ where no distinction or variety is +perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows +that, as men have said before, _several saw the same thing_, so they may, +upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any +deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, +if the term _same_ be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend +to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry +definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that +philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers +persons to perceive the same thing(905). But whether philosophers shall +think fit to _call_ a thing the _same_ or no, is, I conceive, of small +importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same +faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who +had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, +agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of +speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call +it the _same_ thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons +who perceived, might choose the denomination of _different_ things. But +who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is +perceived by different persons may yet have the term _same_ applied to +it(906)? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining +unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their +place; and that you should call this the _same_, and I should say it was +not the _same_ house:--would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our +thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the +difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed in our +notions; for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simple +abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know +not what you mean by the _abstracted idea of identity_; and should desire +you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood +yourself.----Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute +about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their +thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion +with you--that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is +exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves +acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own +ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes +equally against the Materialists and me. + +_Hyl._ [(907)Ay, Philonous,] But they suppose an external archetype, to +which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the +same thing. + +_Phil._ And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may +you suppose an external archetype on my principles;--_external, I mean, to +your own mind_: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind +which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of +_identity,_ as well as if it existed out of a mind(908). And I am sure you +yourself will not say it is less intelligible. + + ------------------------------------- + +_Hyl._ You have indeed clearly satisfied me--either that there is no +difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally +against both opinions. + +_Phil._ But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions +can be a proof against neither. + +_Hyl._ I acknowledge it. + +But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you +advance against _Scepticism_, it amounts to no more than this:--We are sure +that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with +sensible impressions. + +_Phil._ And how are _we_ concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel +it, I taste it: and I am sure _nothing_ cannot be seen, or felt, or +tasted: it is therefore _real_. Take away the sensations of softness, +moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not +a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a +congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: +which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the +mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the +palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected +with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I +see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the +cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing +abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word _cherry_ you mean an +unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its +_existence_ something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I +own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists. + +_Hyl._ But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same +reasons against the existence of sensible things _in a mind_ which you +have offered against their existing _in a material substratum_? + +_Phil._ When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to +them. + +_Hyl._ Is the mind extended or unextended? + +_Phil._ Unextended, without doubt. + +_Hyl._ Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind? + +_Phil._ They are. + +_Hyl._ Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions? + +_Phil._ I believe you may. + +_Hyl._ Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be +room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended +things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine +impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects +are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on +it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to +understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then +be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my +_substratum_. + +_Phil._ Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, +or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal +sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an +impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or +perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being +distinct from itself(909). This is my explication of your difficulty; and +how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material +_substratum_ intelligible, I would fain know. + +_Hyl._ Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of +it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this? + +_Phil._ None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is +the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for +philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as +things existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but what is +conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental +operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is +plain in the terms _comprehend_, _reflect_, _discourse_, &c., which, being +applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense. + +_Hyl._ You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still +remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, +indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, +without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to +make me a proselyte to your principles. + +_Phil._ Let me know this mighty difficulty. + +_Hyl._ The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly +irreconcilable with your notions(910). Moses tells us of a creation: a +creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, +solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and +I shall perhaps agree with you. + +_Phil._ Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and +animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created +by God, I make no question. If by _ideas_ you mean fictions and fancies of +the mind(911), then these are no ideas. If by _ideas_ you mean immediate +objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist +unperceived, or out of a mind(912), then these things are ideas. But +whether you do or do not call them _ideas_, it matters little. The +difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or +rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same. +In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed _ideas_, but +_things_. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any +absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a +word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, +of _real_ things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my +principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been +evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so +often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to +shew where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be +mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be +incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar +acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the +philosophic(913) acceptation, for Matter, or _an unknown __ quiddity, with +an absolute existence_. When you have proved these points, then (and not +till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute. + +_Hyl._ It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to +refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some +peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your +notions? + +_Phil._ If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of +Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, +then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you +may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all +you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither +do you pretend they exist without the mind. + +_Hyl._ Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in. + +_Phil._ Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I +should have seen things produced into being--that is become perceptible--in +the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the +Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of +believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do +not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are +eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal +existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, +are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin +a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading +therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the +several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, +endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they +were in truth perceived by them(914). This is the literal obvious sense +suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included +no mention, or no thought, either of _substratum_, instrument, occasion, +or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found +that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those +things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, +you only can tell. + +_Hyl._ But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created +things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical +being: that is to say, upon supposition there were _men_ to perceive them; +without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein +creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly +impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of +man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account? + +_Phil._ In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to +exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not +therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, +unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits +in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as +we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts +produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present--that +this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, +since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it +exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of +mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and +consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible +that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, +thankful, and resigned to their [(915)great] Creator. I say, moreover, +that, in this naked conception of things, divested of words, there will +not be found any notion of what you call the _actuality of absolute +existence_. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen +our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own +thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible +jargon. + +_Hyl._ I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you +to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their +being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did +they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how +could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer +or better connected than this? + +_Phil._ And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from +eternity? + +_Hyl._ I am. + +_Phil._ Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect. + +_Hyl._ This I acknowledge. + +_Phil._ By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to +be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point. + +_Hyl._ What shall we make then of the creation? + +_Phil._ May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of +finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to +begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become +perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He +then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a +_relative_, or _hypothetical existence_ if you please. But, so long as it +supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the +Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious +ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other +sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply +with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and +unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For, +allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal +world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as +well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth +either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and +immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem +to derogate from those attributes? + +_Hyl._ Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things +perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either +execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to +will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If +the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in +finite things(916). If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new +to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues +imperfection. + +_Phil._ Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection +concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every +other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which +can _we_ conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a +beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His +nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, +therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or +Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His +attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything +against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of +our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme; +but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or +indirectly, in what you have now objected. + +_Hyl._ I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are +such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to +that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring +myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation +and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know. + +_Phil._ What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of +things--the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The +former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the +mind of God(917). Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? +or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But +you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. +To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this +one point. Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any +hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or +complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to +conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing +conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope +of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before +apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by +ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or +understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of +the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon +mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and +so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the +supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and +inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it +need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter(918) doth not +make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it +inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence. + +_Hyl._ I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of +the creation. + +_Phil._ I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me +indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but +you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I +should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all +that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy +between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings? + +_Hyl._ And so I am. + +_Phil._ Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain +obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way? + +_Hyl._ In the plain sense, doubtless. + +_Phil._ When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been +created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by +those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader? + +_Hyl._ I cannot help thinking so. + +_Phil._ And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied +a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist? + +_Hyl._ This I have already acknowledged. + +_Phil._ The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation +of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain +unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might +terminate? + +_Hyl._ True. + +_Phil._ Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the +plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly +inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something +equally unintelligible to themselves and me? + +_Hyl._ I cannot contradict you. + +_Phil._ Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown +quiddities, of occasions, or _substratum_? No, certainly; but of things +obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if +you expect I should be reconciled to them. + +_Hyl._ I see you can assault me with my own weapons. + +_Phil._ Then as to _absolute existence_; was there ever known a more +jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible +that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain +anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute +existence to be as clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the +creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and +infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation? +That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the +minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a +Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so +impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the +ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought +Matter co-eternal with the Deity(919). Lay these things together, and then +judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of +things. + +_Hyl._ I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the _creation_ is +the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been +sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be +overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself +towards your notions. + +_Phil._ When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the +question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of +prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed +in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the +advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education. + +_Hyl._ I confess it seems to be as you say. + +_Phil._ As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw +into the scale the great advantages(920) that arise from the belief of +Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of +a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, +are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I +say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, +whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of +the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, +omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the +existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious +pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to +doubt than of our own being.--Then, with relation to human sciences. In +Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what +contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of +the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, +gravity, divisibility, &c.--do they not pretend to explain all things by +bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are +they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting +there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a +cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to +another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, +have they been able to reach the _mechanical_ production of any one animal +or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, +tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they +accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even +of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter +and corporeal causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect +Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the +_phenomena_ are nothing else but _ideas_; God is a _spirit_, but Matter an +unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power +in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If +the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently +admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all +contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in _Physics_. +Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes +men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more +cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on +their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second +causes.--Then in _Metaphysics_: what difficulties concerning entity in +abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,(921) +substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of +Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent +substances so widely different as _Spirit_ and _Matter_, should mutually +operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless +disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do +we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?--Even the _Mathematics_ +themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, +become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate +speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of +finite extension; which depends on that supposition.--But what need is +there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all +science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built +on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against +the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter +ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to +consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, +the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the +appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. +But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being +of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, +fleeting indeed, and changeable;--however, not changed at random, but +according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that +constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and +distinguishes that which is _real_ from the _irregular visions_ of the +fancy(922). + +_Hyl._ I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can +incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is +attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment +in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, +what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be +avoided by that single notion of _Immaterialism_! + + ------------------------------------- + +_Phil._ After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may +remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination +should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism. +This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the +_absolute_ existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion +has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its +consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a +greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the +marks of a true opinion and yet be false? + +_Hyl._ I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. +But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full +assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty +will occur hereafter? + +_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently +proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it +may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of +incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to +curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical +demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there +may be some particular things which _you_ know not how to reconcile with +it? If there are difficulties attending _Immaterialism_, there are at the +same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of +Matter(923) there is not one proof, and far more numerous and +insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty +difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; +something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient +pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to +any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly +soever demonstrated. + +_Hyl._ You have satisfied me, Philonous. + +_Phil._ But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: +That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof +against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you +can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the _Materialists_. Be not +deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot +conceive it easier by the help of _Materialism_, it is plain it can be no +objection against _Immaterialism_. Had you proceeded all along by this +rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in +objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that +is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than +without that supposition; and consequently makes rather _against_ than +_for_ it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty +arises from the _non-existence of Matter_. If it doth not, you might as +well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine +prescience, as from such a difficulty against _Immaterialism_. And yet, +upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if not +always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a _petitio +principii_. One is apt to say--The unknown substances ought to be esteemed +real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the +unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the +productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that +there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging +the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on +yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called _ignoratio clenchi_. You +talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible +Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their +existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, +positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way +perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; +but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown +Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed _somewhat_), which is quite stripped +of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor +apprehended by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object which +is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all +these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an +existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all +minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively +considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the +state of the question; without which your objections will always be wide +of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than +once they have been) against your own notions. + +_Hyl._ I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from +agreeing with you more than this same _mistaking the question_. In denying +Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we +see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What +think you, therefore, of retaining the name _Matter_, and applying it to +_sensible things_? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: +and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons +who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion. + +_Phil._ With all my heart: retain the word _Matter,_ and apply it to the +objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any +subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel +with you for an expression. _Matter_, or _material substance_, are terms +introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of +independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: +but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the +immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the +names of all particular things, with the terms _sensible_, _substance_, +_body_, _stuff_, and the like, are retained, the word _Matter_ should be +never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the +best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing +that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind +towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term. + +_Hyl._ Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an +unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny +me the privilege of using the word _Matter_ as I please, and annexing it +to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I +freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than _Spirit_. +But I have been so long accustomed to the _term Matter_ that I know not +how to part with it: to say, there is no _Matter_ in the world, is still +shocking to me. Whereas to say--There is no _Matter_, if by that term be +meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by +_Matter_ is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being +perceived, then there is _Matter_:--this distinction gives it quite another +turn; and men will come into your notions with small difficulty, when they +are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about +_Matter_ in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and +the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so +natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy +Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it +makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. +But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do +with Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, _abstracted from all +relation to us_? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing +or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they +are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you +leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this +doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the philosophers; nor yet +altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that +respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former +notions. + +_Phil._ I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours +tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was +before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:--the former being of +opinion, that _those things they immediately perceive are the real +things_; and the latter, that _the things immediately perceived are ideas, +which exist only in the mind_(924). Which two notions put together, do, in +effect, constitute the substance of what I advance. + +_Hyl._ I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw +things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are +removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly +convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in +pain about their _unknown natures_ or _absolute existence_. This is the +state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought +me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same +principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and +for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical +Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to +theirs. + +_Phil._ You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced +upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and +falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as +descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. +Just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, +pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense. + + + + + +DE MOTU: SIVE; DE MOTUS PRINCIPIO ET NATURA, ET DE CAUSA COMMUNICATIONIS +MOTUUM + + +_First published in 1721_ + + + + +Editor's Preface To De Motu + + +This Latin dissertation on Motion, or change of place in the component +atoms of the material world, was written in 1720, when Berkeley was +returning to Ireland, after he had spent some years in Italy, on leave of +absence from Trinity College. A prize for an essay on the "Cause of +Motion," had, it seems, been offered in that year by the Paris Academy of +Sciences. The subject suggested an advance on the line of thought pursued +in Berkeley's _Principles_ and _Dialogues_. The mind-dependent reality of +the material world, prominent in those works, was in them insisted on, not +as a speculative paradox, but mainly in order to shew the spiritual +character of the Power that is continually at work throughout the +universe. This essay on what was thus a congenial subject was finished at +Lyons, and published early in 1721, soon after Berkeley arrived in London. +It was reprinted in his _Miscellany_ in 1752. I have not found evidence +that it was ever submitted to the French Academy. At any rate the prize +was awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician and professor of +philosophy at Lausanne. + +The _De Motu_ is interesting biographically as well as philosophically, as +a revelation of Berkeley's way of thinking about the causal relations of +Matter and Spirit seven years after the publication of the _Dialogues_. In +1713 his experience of life was confined to Ireland. Now, after months in +London, in the society of Swift, and Pope, and Addison, he had observed +nature and men in France and Italy. His eager temperament and +extraordinary social charm opened the way in those years of travel to +frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the time, superseded +controversy with materialism and scepticism, and diverted his enthusiasm +to nature and high art. One likes to see how he handles the old questions +as they now arise in the philosophical treatment of motion in space, which +was regarded by many as the key to all other phenomena presented in the +material world. + +For one thing, the unreality of the data of sense after total abstraction +of living mind, the chief Principle in the earlier works, lies more in the +background in the _De Motu_. Yet it is tacitly assumed, as the basis of an +argument for the powerlessness of all sensible things, and for refunding +all active power in the universe into conscious agency. _Mens agitat +molem_ might be taken as a motto for the _De Motu_. Then there is more +frequent reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than in his +more juvenile treatises. Plato and Aristotle are oftener in view. Italy +seems to have introduced him to the physical science of Borelli and +Torricelli. Leibniz, who died in 1716, when Berkeley was in Italy, is +named by him for the first time in the _De Motu_. Perhaps he had learned +something when he was abroad about the most illustrious philosopher of the +time. And it is interesting by the way to find in one of those years what +is, I think, the only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It is contained in +one of the German philosopher's letters to Des Bosses, in 1715. "Qui in +Hybernia corporum realitatem impugnat," Leibniz writes, "videtur nec +rationes afferre idoneas, nee mentem suam satis explicare. Suspicor esse +ex eo hominum genere qui per Paradoxa cognosci volunt." This sentence is +interesting on account of the writer, although it suggests vague, and +perhaps second-hand knowledge of the Irishman and his principles. The name +of Hobbes does not appear in the _De Motu_. Yet one might have expected +it, in consideration of the supreme place which motion takes in his +system, which rests upon the principle that all changes in the universe +may be resolved into change of place. + +In the _De Motu_ the favourite language of ideal realism is abandoned for +the most part. "Bodies," not "ideas of sense," are contrasted with mind or +spirit, although body still means significant appearance presented to the +senses. Indeed the term _idea_ occurs less often in this and the +subsequent writings of Berkeley. + +I will now give some account of salient features in the _De Motu_. + + ------------------------------------- + +Like the _Principles_ the tract opens with a protest against the empty +abstractions, and consequent frivolous discussions, which even mechanical +science had countenanced although dealing with matters so obvious to sense +as the phenomena of motion. _Force_, _effort_, _solicitation of gravity_, +_nisus_, are examples of abstract terms connected with motion, to which +nothing in what is presented to the senses is found to correspond. Yet +corporeal power is spoken of as if it were something perceptible by sense, +and so found _within_ the bodies we see and touch (sect. 1-3). + +But it turns out differently when philosophers and naturalists try to +imagine the _physical force_ that is supposed to inhabit bodies, and to +explain their motions. The conception of motion has been the parent of +innumerable paradoxes and seeming contradictions among ancient Greek +thinkers; for it presents, in a striking form, the metaphysical +difficulties in the way of a reconciliation of the One and the +Many--difficulties which Berkeley had already attributed to perverse +abstractions, with which philosophers amused themselves and blocked up the +way to concrete knowledge; first wantonly raising a dust, and then +complaining that they could not see. Nor has modern mechanical science in +this respect fared better than the old philosophies. Even its leaders, +Torricelli, for instance, and Leibniz, offer us scholastic shadows--empty +metaphysical abstractions--when they speak about an active power that is +supposed to be lodged within the things of sense. Torricelli tells us that +the forces within the things around us, and within our own bodies, are +"subtle quintessences, enclosed in a corporeal substance as in the +enchanted vase of Circe"; and Leibniz speaks of their active powers as +their "substantial form," whatever that can be conceived to mean. Others +call the power to which change of place is due, the hylarchic principle, +an appetite in bodies, a spontaneity inherent in them; or they assume +that, besides their extension, solidity, and other qualities which appear +in sense, there is also something named force, latent in them if not +patent--in all which we have a flood of words, empty of concrete thought. +At best the language is metaphorical (sect. 2-9). + +For showing the active cause at work in the production of motion in +bodies, it is of no avail to name, as if it were a datum of sense, what is +not presentable to our senses. Let us, instead, turn to the only other +sort of data in realised experience. For we find only two sorts of +realities in experience, the one sort revealed by our senses, the other by +inward consciousness. We can affirm nothing about the contents of _bodies_ +except what our senses present, namely, concrete things, extended, +figured, solid, having also innumerable other qualities, which seem all to +depend upon change of place in the things, or in their constituent +particles. The contents of _mind_ or _spirit_, on the other hand, are +disclosed to inner consciousness, which reveals a sentient Ego that is +actively percipient and exertive. And it must be in the second of these +two concrete revelations of reality, that active causation, on which +motion and all other change depends, is to be found--not in empty +abstractions, covered by words like _power_, _cause_, _force_, or _nisus_, +which correspond to nothing perceived by the senses (sect. 21). + +So that which we call body presents _within itself_ nothing in which +change of place or state can originate causally. Extension, figure, +solidity, and all the other perceptible constituents of bodies are +appearances only--passive phenomena, which succeed one another in an +orderly cosmical procession, on which doubtless our pains and pleasures +largely depend. But there is no sensibly perceptible power found among +those sensuous appearances. They can only be _caused causes_, adapted, as +we presuppose, to signify to us what we may expect to follow that +appearance. The reason of their significance, i.e. of the constancy of +their sequences and coexistences, must be sought for _outside of +themselves_. Experimental research may discover new terms among the +correlated cosmical sequences or coexistences, but the newly discovered +terms must still be only passive phenomena previously unperceived. Body +means only what is presentable to the senses. Those who attribute to it +something not perceptible by sense, which they call the force or power in +which its motions originate, say in other words that the origin of motion +is unknowable by sense (sect. 22-24). + +Turn now from things of sense, the data of perception, to Mind or Spirit, +as revealed in inner consciousness. Here we have a deeper and more real +revelation of what underlies, or is presupposed in, the passive cosmical +procession that is presented to the senses. Our inward consciousness +plainly shews the thinking being actually _exercising_ power to move its +animated body. We find that we can, by a causal exertion of which we are +distinctly conscious, either excite or arrest movements in bodies. In +voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example of force or power, +_producing_ and not merely _followed by_ motion. In the case of human +volition this is no doubt conditioned power; nevertheless it exemplifies +Power on a greater scale than human, even Divine power, universally and +continuously operative, in all natural motions, and in the cosmical laws +according to which they proceed (sect. 25-30). + +Thus those who pretend to find force or active causation _within_ bodies, +pretend to find what their sensuous experience does not support, and they +have to sustain their pretence by unintelligible language. On the other +hand, those who explain motion by referring it to conscious exertion of +personal agents, say what is supported by their own consciousness, and +confirmed by high authorities, including Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, +Descartes, and Newton, demonstrating that in Spirit only do we find power +to change its own state, as well as the states and mutual relations of +bodies. Motion in nature is God continuously acting (sect. 31-34). But +physical science is conveniently confined to the order of the passive +procession of sensuous appearances, including experiments in quest of the +rules naturally exemplified in the motions of bodies: reasoning on +mathematical and mechanical principles, it leaves the contemplation of +active causation to a more exalted science (sect. 35-42). + + ------------------------------------- + +In all this it can hardly be said that Berkeley has in this adequately +sounded the depths of Causation. He proclaims inability to find through +his senses more than sequence of significant sensuous appearances, which +are each and all empty of active power; while he apparently insists that +he _has_ found active power in the mere _feeling __ of exertion_; which +after all, as such, is only one sort of antecedent sign of the motion that +is found to follow it. This is still only sequence of phenomena; not +active power. But is not causation a relation that cannot be truly +presented empirically, either in outer or inner consciousness? And is not +the Divine order that is presupposed by us in all change, a presupposition +that is inevitable in trustworthy intercourse with a changing universe; +unless we are to confess _atheistically_, that our whole sensuous +experience may in the end put us to utter confusion? The passive, uneasy +feeling of strain, more or less involved in the effort to move our bodies +and their surroundings, is no doubt apt to be confused with active +causation; for as David Hume remarks, "the animal _nisus_ which we +experience, though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power, enters +very much into the vulgar, inaccurate idea which is formed of it." So when +Berkeley supposes that he has found a concrete example of originating +power in the _nisus_ of which we are conscious when we move our bodies, he +is surely too easily satisfied. The _nisus_ followed by motion is, _per +se_, only a natural sequence, a caused cause, which calls for an +originating cause that is _absolutely_ responsible for the movement. Is +not the index to this absolutely responsible agency an ethical one, which +points to a free moral agent as alone necessarily connected with, or +responsible for, the changes which _he can_ control? Persons are causally +responsible for their own actions; and are accordingly pronounced good or +evil on account of acts of will that are not mere caused causes--passively +dependent terms in the endless succession of cosmical change. They must +originate in self, be absolutely self-referable, in a word supernatural +issues of the personality. Moral reason implies that they are not +determined _ab extra_, and so points to moral agents as our only concrete +examples of independent power; but this only so far as those issues go for +which they are morally responsible. Is not faith in the Universal Power +necessarily faith-venture in the absolutely perfect and trustworthy moral +agency of God? + + ------------------------------------- + +While the principle of Causation, in its application to change of place on +the part of bodies and their constituent atoms, is the leading thought in +the _De Motu_, this essay also investigates articulately the nature of the +phenomenon which we call _motion_ (sect. 43-66). It assumes that motion is +only an effect, seeing that no one who reflects can doubt that what is +presented to our senses in the case of motion is altogether passive: there +is nothing in the successive appearance of the same body in different +places that involves action on the part of either of the moving or the +moved body, or that can be more than inert effect (sect. 49). And all +concrete motion, it is assumed, must be something that can be perceived by +our senses. Accordingly it must be a perceptible _relation between +bodies_, as far as it is bodily: it could make no appearance at all if +space contained only one solitary body: a plurality of bodies is +indispensable to its appearance. Absolute motion of a solitary body, in +otherwise absolutely empty space, is an unmeaning abstraction, a +collocation of empty words. This leads into an inquiry about relative +space as well as relative place, and the intelligibility of absolute +space, place, and motion (sect. 52-64). + +Local motion is unintelligible unless we understand the meaning of +_space_. Now some philosophers distinguish between absolute space, which +with them is ultimately the only real space, and that which is conditioned +by the senses, or relative. The former is said to be boundless, pervading +and embracing the material world, but not itself presentable to our +senses; the other is the space marked out or differentiated by bodies +contained in it, and it is in this way exposed to our senses (sect. 52). +What must remain after the annihilation of all bodies in the universe is +relativeless, undifferentiated, absolute space, of which all attributes +are denied, even its so-called extension being neither divisible nor +measurable; necessarily imperceptible by sense, unimaginable, and +unintelligible, in every way unrealisable in experience; so that the words +employed about it denote _nothing_ (sect. 53). + +It follows that we must not speak of the real space which a body occupies +as part of a space that is necessarily abstracted from all sentient +experience; nor of real motion as change within absolute space, without +any relation between bodies, either perceived or conceived. All change of +place in one body must be relative to other bodies, among which the moving +body is supposed to change its place--our own bodies which we animate being +of course recognised among the number. Motion, it is argued, is +unintelligible, as well as imperceptible and unimaginable, without some +relation between the moving body and at least one other body: the truth of +this is tested when we try to suppose the annihilation of all other +bodies, our own included, and retain only a solitary globe: absolute +motion is found unthinkable. So that, on the whole, to see what motion +means we must rise above the mathematical postulates that are found +convenient in mechanical science; we must beware of empty abstractions; we +must treat motion as something that is real only so far as it is presented +to our senses, and remain modestly satisfied with the perceived relations +under which it then appears (sect. 65-66). + + ------------------------------------- + +Finally, is motion, thus explained, something that can be spoken of as an +entity communicable from one body to another body? May we think of it as a +datum of sense existing in the striking body, and then passing from it +into the struck body, the one losing exactly as much as the other +receives? (sect. 67). Deeper thought finds in those questions only a +revival of the previously exploded postulate of "force" as _something +sensible_, yet distinct from all the significant appearances sense +presents. The language used may perhaps be permitted in mathematical +hypotheses, or postulates of mechanical science, in which we do not intend +to go to the root of things. But the obvious fact is, that the moving body +shews less perceptible motion, and the moved body more. To dispute whether +the perceptible motion acquired is numerically the same with that lost +leads into frivolous verbal controversy about Identity and Difference, the +One and the Many, which it was Berkeley's aim to expel from science, and +so to simplify its procedure and result. Whether we say that motion passes +from the striking body into the struck, or that it is generated anew +within the struck body and annihilated in the striking, we make virtually +the same statement. In each way of expression the facts remain, that the +one body presents perceptible increase of its motion and the other +diminution. Mind or Spirit is the active cause of all that we then see. +Yet in mechanical science--which explains things only physically, by +shewing the significant connexion of events with their mechanical +rules--terms which seem to imply the conveyance of motion out of one body +into another may be pardoned, in consideration of the limits within which +physical science is confined, and its narrower point of view. In physics +we confine ourselves to the sensuous signs which arise in experience, and +their natural interpretation, in all which mathematical hypotheses are +found convenient; so that gravitation, for example, and other natural +rules of procedure, are spoken of as _causes_ of the events which conform +to them, no account being taken of the Active Power that is ultimately +responsible for the rules. For the Active Power in which we live, move, +and have our being, is not a datum of sense; meditation brings it into +light. But to pursue this thought would carry us beyond the physical laws +of Motion (sect. 69-72). + +The _De Motu_ may be compared with what we found in the _Principles_, +sect. 25-28 and 101-117. The total powerlessness of the significant +appearances presented to the senses, and the omnipotence of Mind in the +economy of external nature, is its chief philosophical lesson. + + + + +De Motu + + +1. Ad veritatem inveniendam praecipuum est cavisse ne voces males +intellectae(925) nobis officiant: quod omnes fere monent philosophi, pauci +observant. Quanquam id quidem haud adeo difficile videtur, in rebus +praesertim physicis tractandis, ubi locum habent sensus, experientia, et +ratiocinium geometricum. Seposito igitur, quantum licet, omni praejudicio, +tam a loquendi consuetudine quam a philosphorum auctoritate nato, ipsa +rerum natura diligenter inspicienda. Neque enim cujusquam auctoritatem +usque adeo valere oportet, ut verba ejus et voces in pretio sint, dummodo +nihil clari et certi iis subesse comperiatur. + + ------------------------------------- + +2. Motus contemplatio mire torsit veterum philosophorum(926) mentes, unde +natae sunt variae opiniones supra modem difficiles, ne dicam absurdae; quae, +quum jam fere in desuetudinem abierint, haud merentur ut iis discutiendis +nimio studio immoremur. Apud recentiores autem et saniores hujus aevi +philosophos(927), ubi de Motu agitur, vocabula haud pauca abstractae nimium +et obscurae significationis occurrunt, cujusmodi sunt _solicitatio +gravitatis_, _conatus_, _vires mortuae_, &c., quae scriptis, alioqui +doctissimis, tenebras offundunt, sententiisque non minus a vero, quam a +sensu hominum communi abhorrentibus, ortum praebent. Haec vero necesse est +ut, veritatis gratia, non alios refellendi studio, accurate discutiantur. + +3. _Solicitatio_ et _nisus_, sive _conatus_, rebus solummodo animatis +revera competunt(928). Cum aliis rebus tribuuntur, sensu metaphorico +accipiantur necesse est. A metaphoris autem abstinendum philosopho. Porro, +seclusa omni tarn animae affectione quam corporis motione, nihil clari ac +distincti iis vocibus significari, cuilibet constabit qui modo rem serio +perpenderit. + +4. Quamdiu corpora gravia a nobis sustinentur, sentimus in nobismet ipsis +nisum, fatigationem, et molestiam. Percipimus etiam in gravibus cadentibus +motum acceleratum versus centrum telluris; ope sensuum praeterea nihil. +Ratione tamen colligitur causam esse aliquam vel principium horum +phaenomenon; illud autem _gravitas_ vulgo nuncupatur. Quoniam vero causa +descensus gravium caeca sit et incognita, gravitas ea acceptione proprie +dici nequit qualitas sensibilis; est igitur qualitas occulta. Sed vix, et +ne vix quidem, concipere licet quid sit qualitas occulta, aut qua ratione +qualitas ulla agere aut operari quidquam possit. Melius itaque foret, si, +missa qualitate occulta, homines attenderent solummodo ad effectus +sensibiles; vocibusque abstractis (quantumvis illae ad disserendum utiles +sint) in meditatione omissis, mens in particularibus et concretis, hoc est +in ipsis rebus, defigeretur. + +5. _Vis_(929) similiter corporibus tribuitur: usurpatur autem vocabulum +illud, tanquam significaret qualitatem cognitam, distinctamque tarn a +motu, figura, omnique alia re sensibili, quam ab omni animalis affectione: +id vero nihil aliud esse quam qualitatem _occultam_, rem acrius rimanti +constabit. Nisus animalis et motus corporeus vulgo spectantur tanquam +symptomata et mensurae hujus qualitatis occultae. + +6. Patet igitur gravitatem aut vim frustra poni pro principio(930) motus: +nunquid enim principium illud clarius cognosci potest ex eo quod dicatur +qualitas occulta? Quod ipsum occultum est, nihil explicat: ut omittamus +causam agentem incognitam rectius dici posse substantiam quam qualitatem. +Porro _vis_, _gravitas_, et istiusmodi voces, saepius, nec inepte, in +concreto usurpantur; ita ut connotent corpus motum, difficultatem +resistendi, &c. Ubi vero a philosophis adhibentur ad significandas naturas +quasdam, ab hisce omnibus praecisas et abstractas, quae nec sensibus +subjiciuntur, nec ulla mentis vi intelligi nec imaginatione effingi(931) +possunt, turn demum errores et confusionem pariunt. + +7. Multos autem in errorem ducit, quod voces generales et abstractas in +disserendo utiles esse videant, nec tamen earum vim satis capiant. Partim +vero a consuetudine vulgari inventae sunt illae ad sermonem abbreviandum, +partim a philosophis ad docendum excogitatae; non quod ad naturas rerum +accommodatas sint, quae quidem singulares et concretae existunt; sed quod +idoneae ad tradendas disciplinas, propterea quod faciant notiones, vel +saltem propositiones, universales(932). + +8. _Vim corpoream_ esse aliquid conceptu facile plerumque existimamus. Ii +tamen qui rem accuratius inspexerunt in diversa sunt opinione; uti apparet +ex mira verborum obscuritate qua laborant, ubi illam explicare conantur. +Torricellius ait vim et impetum esse res quasdam abstractas subtilesque et +quintessentias, quae includuntur in substantia corporea, tanquam in vase +magico Circes(933). Leibnitius item in naturae vi explicanda haec habet--_Vis +activa, primitiva, quae est {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, animae vel formae substantiali +__ respondet_. Vide _Acta Erudit. Lips._ Usque adeo necesse est ut vel +summi viri, quamdiu abstractionibus indulgent, voces nulla certa +significatione praeditas, et meras scholasticorum umbras sectentur. Alia ex +neotericorum scriptis, nec pauca quidem ea, producere liceret; quibus +abunde constaret, metaphysicas abstractiones non usquequaque cessisse +mechanicae et experimentis, sed negotium inane philosophis etiamnum +facessere. + +9. Ex illo fonte derivantur varia absurda, cujus generis est illud, _vim +percussionis, utcunque exiguae, esse infinite magnam_. Quod sane supponit, +gravitatem esse qualitatem quandam realem ab aliis omnibus diversam; et +gravitationem esse quasi actum hujus qualitatis, a motu realiter +distinctum: minima autem percussio producit effectum majorem quam maxima +gravitatio sine motu; ilia scilicet motum aliquem edit, haec nullum. Unde +sequitur, vim percussionis ratione infinita excedere vim gravitationis, +hoc est, esse infinite magnam(934). Videantur experimenta Galilaei, et quae +de definita vi percussionis scripserunt Torricellius, Borellus, et alii. + +10. Veruntamen fatendum est vim nullam per se immediate sentiri; neque +aliter quam per effectum(935) cognosci et mensurari. Sed vis mortuae, seu +gravitationis simplicis, in corpore quiescente subjecto, nulla facta +mutatione, effectus nullus est; percussionis autem, effectus aliquis. +Quoniam, ergo, vires sunt effectibus proportionales, concludere licet vim +mortuam(936) esse nullam. Neque tamen propterea vim percussionis esse +infinitam: non enim oportet quantitatem ullam positivam habere pro +infinita, propterea quod ratione infinita superet quantitatem nullam sive +nihil. + +11. Vis gravitationis a momento secerni nequit; momentum autem sine +celeritate nullum est, quum sit moles in celeritatem ducta: porro +celeritas sine motu intelligi non potest; ergo nec vis gravitationis. +Deinde vis nulla nisi per actionem innotescit, et per eandem mensuratur; +actionem autem corporis a motu praescindere non possumus; ergo quamdiu +corpus grave plumbi subjecti vel chordae figuram mutat, tamdiu movetur; ubi +vero quiescit, nihil agit, vel, quod idem est, agere prohibetur. Breviter, +voces istae _vis mortua_ et _gravitatio_, etsi per abstractionem +metaphysicam aliquid significare supponuntur diversum a movente, moto, +motu et quiete, revera tamen id totum nihil est. + +12. Siquis diceret pondus appensum vel impositum agere in chordam, quoniam +impedit quominus se restituat vi elastica: dico, pari ratione corpus +quodvis inferum agere in superius incumbens, quoniam illud descendere +prohibet: dici vero non potest actio corporis, quod prohibeat aliud corpus +existere in eo loco quern occupat. + +13. Pressionem corporis gravitantis quandoque sentimus. Verum sensio ista +molesta oritur ex motu corporis istius gravis fibris nervisque nostri +corporis communicato, et eorundem situm immutante; adeoque percussioni +accepta referri debet. In hisce rebus multis et gravibus praejudiciis +laboramus, sed illa acri atque iterata meditatione subigenda sunt(937), +vel potius penitus averruncanda. + +14. Quo probetur quantitatem ullam esse infinitam, ostendi oportet partem +aliquam finitam homogeneam in ea infinities contineri. Sed vis mortua se +habet ad vim percussionis, non ut pars ad totum, sed ut punctum ad lineam, +juxta ipsos vis infinitae percussionis auctores. Multa in hanc rem adjicere +liceret, sed vereor ne prolixus sim. + +15. Ex principiis praemissis lites insignes solvi possunt, quae viros doctos +multum exercuerunt. Hujus rei exemplum sit controversia illa de +proportione virium. Una pars dum concedit, momenta, motus, impetus, data +mole, esse simpliciter ut velocitates, affirmat vires esse ut quadrata +velocitatum. Hanc autem sententiam supponere vim corporis distingui(938) a +momento, motu, et impetu; eaque suppositione sublata corruere, nemo non +videt. + +16. Quo clarius adhuc appareat, confusionem quandam miram per +abstractiones metaphysicas in doctrinam de motu introductam esse, videamus +quantum intersit inter notiones virorum celebrium de vi et impetu. +Leibnitius impetum cum motu confundit. Juxta Newtonum(939) impetus revera +idem est cum vi inertiae. Borellus(940) asserit impetum non aliud esse quam +gradum velocitatis. Alii impetum et conatum inter se differre, alii non +differre volunt. Plerique vim motricem motui proportionalem intelligunt. +Nonnulli aliam aliquam vim praeter motricem, et diversimode mensurandam, +utpote per quadrata velocitatum in moles, intelligere _prae_ se ferunt. Sed +infinitum esset haec prosequi. + +17. _Vis_, _gravitas_, _attractio_, et hujusmodi voces, utiles(941) sunt +ad ratiocinia et computationes de motu et corporibus motis; sed non ad +intelligendam simplicem ipsius motus naturam, vel ad qualitates totidem +distinctas designandas. Attractionem certe quod attinet, patet illam ab +Newtono adhiberi, non tanquam qualitatem veram et physicam, sed solummodo +ut hypothesin mathematicam(942). Quinetiam Leibnitius, nisum elementarem +seu solicitationem ab impetu distinguens, fatetur illa entia non re ipsa +inveniri in rerum natura, sed abstractione facienda esse. + +18. Similis ratio est compositionis et resolutionis virium quarumcunque +directarum in quascunque obliquas, per diagonalem et latera +parallelogrammi. Haec mechanicae et computationi inserviunt: sed aliud est +computationi et demonstrationibus mathematicis inservire, aliud rerum +naturam exhibere. + +19. Ex recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione, ut putent motum neque +destrui nec de novo gigni, sed eandem(943) semper motus quantitatem +permanere. Aristoteles etiam dubium illud olim proposuit--utrum motus +factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab aeterno? _Phys._ lib. viii. Quod vero +motus sensibilis pereat, patet sensibus: illi autem eundem impetum, nisum, +aut summam virium eandem manere velle videntur. Unde affirmat Borellus, +vim in percussione non imminui, sed expandi; impetus etiam contrarios +suscipi et retineri in eodem corpore. Item Leibnitius nisum ubique et +semper esse in materia, et ubi non patet sensibus, ratione intelligi +contendit.--Haec autem nimis abstracta esse et obscura, ejusdemque fere +generis cum formis substantialibus et entelechiis, fatendum. + +20. Quotquot ad explicandam motus causam atque originem, vel principio +hylarchico, vel naturae indigentia, vel appetitu, aut denique instinctu +naturali utuntur, dixisse aliquid potius quam cogitasse censendi sunt. +Neque ab hisce multum absunt qui supposuerint(944) _partes terrae esse se +moventes, aut etiam spiritus iis implantatos ad instar formae_, ut +assignent causam accelerationis gravium cadentium: aut qui dixerit(945), +_in corpore praeter solidam extensionem debere etiam poni aliquid unde +virium consideratio oriatur_. Siquidem hi omnes vel nihil particulare et +determinatum enuntiant; vel, si quid sit, tarn difficile erit illud +explicare, quam id ipsum cujus explicandi causa adducitur(946). + +21. Frustra ad naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea quae nec sensibus patent, +nec ratione intelligi possunt. Videndum ergo quid sensus, quid +experientia, quid demum ratio iis innixa, suadeat. Duo sunt summa rerum +genera--_corpus_ et _anima_. Rem extensam, solidam, mobilem, figuratam, +aliisque qualitatibus quae sensibus occurrunt praeditam, ope sensuum; rem +vero sentientem, percipientem, intelligentem, conscientia quadam interna +cognovimus. Porro, res istas plane inter se diversas esse, longeque +heterogeneas, cernimus. Loquor autem de rebus cognitis: de incognitis enim +disserere nil juvat(947). + + ------------------------------------- + +22. Totum id quod novimus, cui nomen _corpus_ indidimus, nihil _in se_ +continet quod motus principium seu causa efficiens esse possit. Etenim +impenetrabilitas, extensio, figura nullam includunt vel connotant +potentiam producendi motum; quinimo e contrario non modo illas, verum +etiam alias, quotquot sint, corporis qualitates sigillatim percurrentes, +videbimus omnes esse revera passivas, nihilque iis activum inesse, quod +ullo modo intelligi possit tanquam fons et principium motus(948). +Gravitatem quod attinet, voce illa nihil cognitum et ab ipso effectu +sensibili, cujus causa quaeritur, diversum significari jam ante ostendimus. +Et sane quando corpus grave dicimus, nihil aliud intelligimus, nisi quod +feratur deorsum; de causa hujus effectus sensibilis nihil omnino +cogitantes. + +23. De corpore itaque audacter pronunciare licet, utpote de re comperta, +quod non sit principium motus. Quod si quisquam, praeter solidam +extensionem ejusque modificationes, vocem _corpus_ qualitatem etiam +_occultam_, virtutem, formam, essentiam complecti sua significatione +contendat; licet quidem illi inutili negotio sine ideis disputare, et +nominibus nihil distincte exprimentibus abuti. Caeterum sanior +philosophandi ratio videtur ab notionibus abstractis et generalibus (si +modo notiones dici debent quae intelligi nequeunt) quantum fieri potest +abstinuisse. + +24. Quicquid continetur in idea corporis novimus; quod vero novimus in +corpore, id non esse principium motus constat(949). Qui praeterea aliquid +incognitum in corpore, cujus ideam nullam habent, comminiscuntur, quod +motus principium dicant, ii revera nihil aliud quam _principium motus esse +incognitum_ dicunt. Sed hujusmodi subtilitatibus diutius immorari piget. + + ------------------------------------- + +25. Praeter res corporeas alterum est _genus rerum cogitantium_(950). In +iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi, propria experientia +didicimus(951); quandoquidem anima nostra pro lubitu possit ciere et +sistere membrorum motus, quacunque tandem ratione id fiat. Hoc certe +constat, corpora moveri ad nutum animae; eamque proinde haud inepte dici +posse principium motus: particulare quidem et subordinatum, quodque ipsum +dependeat a primo et universali Principio(952). + +26. Corpora gravia feruntur deorsum, etsi nullo impulsu apparente agitata; +non tamen existimandum propterea in iis contineri principium motus: cujus +rei hanc rationem assignat Aristoteles(953);--_Gravia et levia_ (inquit) +_non moventur a seipsis; id enim vitale esset, et se sistere possent_. +Gravia omnia una eademque certa et constanti lege centrum telluris petunt, +neque in ipsis animadvertitur principium vel facultas ulla motum istum +sistendi, minuendi, vel, nisi pro rata proportione, augendi, aut denique +ullo modo immutandi: habent adeo se passive. Porro idem, stricte et +accurate loquendo, dicendum de corporibus percussivis. Corpora ista +quamdiu moventur, ut et in ipso percussionis momento, si gerunt passive, +perinde scilicet atque cum quiescunt. Corpus iners tam agit quam corpus +motum, si res ad verum exigatur: id quod agnoscit Newtonus, ubi ait, vim +inertiae esse eandem cum impetu(954). Corpus autem iners et quietum nihil +agit, ergo nee motum. + +27. Revera corpus aeque perseverat in utrovis statu, vel motus vel quietis. +Ista vero perseverantia non magis dicenda est actio corporis, quam +existentia ejusdem actio diceretur. Perseverantia nihil aliud est quam +continuatio in eodem modo existendi, quae proprie dici actio non potest. +Caeterum resistentiam, quam experimur in sistendo corpore moto, ejus +actionem esse fingimus vana specie delusi. Revera enim ista resistentia +quam sentimus(955), passio est in nobis, neque arguit corpus agere, sed +nos pati: constat utique nos idem passuros fuisse, sive corpus illud a se +moveatur, sive ab alio principio impellatur. + +28. Actio et reactio dicuntur esse in corporibus: nec incommode ad +demonstrationes mechanicas(956). Sed cavendum, ne propterea supponamus +virtutem aliquam realem, quae motus causa sive principium sit, esse in iis. +Etenim voces illae eodem modo intelligendae sunt ac vox _attractio_; et +quemadmodum haec est hypothesis solummodo mathematica(957), non autem +qualitas physica: idem etiam de illis intelligi debet, et ob eandem +rationem. Nam sicut veritas et usus theorematum de mutua corporum +attractione in philosophia mechanica stabiles manent, utpote unice fundati +in motu corporum, sive motus iste causari supponatur per actionem corporum +se mutuo attrahentium, sive per actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus +diversi impellentis et moderantis corpora; pari ratione, quaecunque tradita +sunt de regulis et legibus motuum, simul ac theoremata inde deducta, +manent inconcussa, dum modo concedantur effectus sensibiles, et ratiocinia +iis innixa; sive supponamus actionem ipsam, aut vim horum effectuum +causatricem, esse in corpore, sive in agente incorporeo. + +29. Auferantur ex idea corporis extensio, soliditas, figura, remanebit +nihil(958). Sed qualitates istae sunt ad motum indifferentes, nec in se +quidquam habent quod motus principium dici possit. Hoc ex ipsis ideis +nostris perspicuum est. Si igitur voce _corpus_ significatur id quod +concipimus, plane constat inde non peti posse principium motus: pars +scilicet nulla aut attributum illius causa efficiens vera est, quae motum +producat. Vocem autem proferre, et nihil concipere, id demum indignum +esset philosopho. + +30. Datur res cogitans, activa, quam principium motus ... in nobis +experimur(959). Hanc _animam_, _mentem_, _spiritum_ ... Datur etiam res +extensa, iners, impenetrabilis, ... quae a priori toto coelo differt, +novumque genus(960) ... Quantum intersit inter res cogitantes et extensas, +primus omnium deprehendens Anaxagoras, vir longe sapientissimus, asserebat +mentem nihil habere cum corporibus commune, id quod constat ex primo libro +Aristotelis _De Anima_(961). Ex neotericis idem optime animadvertit +Cartesius(962). Ab eo alii(963) rem satis claram vocibus obscuris +impeditam ac difficilem reddiderunt. + + ------------------------------------- + +31. Ex dictis manifestum est eos qui vim activam, actionem, motus +principium, in _corporibus_ revera inesse affirmant, sententiam nulla +experientia fundatam amplecti, eamque terminis obscuris et generalibus +adstruere, nec quid sibi velint satis intelligere. E contrario, qui +_mentem_ esse principium motus volunt, sententiam propria experientia +munitam proferunt, hominumque omni aevo doctissimorum suffragiis +comprobatam. + +32. Primus Anaxagoras(964) {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} introduxit, qui motum inerti materiae +imprimeret. Quam quidem sententiam probat etiam Aristoteles(965), +pluribusque confirmat, aperto pronuncians primum movens esse immobile, +indivisibile, et nullam habens magnitudinem. Dicere autem, omne me vum +esse mobile, recte animadvertit idem esse ac s diceret, omne aedificativum +esse aedificabile, _Physic_, lib Plato insuper in Timaeo(966) tradit +machinam hanc corpo seu mundum visibilem, agitari et animari a mente, +sensum omnem fugiat. Quinetiam hodie philosophi siani(967) principium +motuum naturalium Deum agnoscun. Et Newtonus(968) passim nec obscure +innuit, non solummodo motum ab initio a numine profectum esse, verum adhuc +systema mundanum ab eodem actu moveri. Hoc sacris literis consonum est: +hoc scholasticorum calculo comprobatur. Nam etsi Peripatetici naturam +tradant esse principium motus et quietis, interpretantur tamen naturam +naturantem esse Deum(969). Intelligunt nimirum corpora omnia systematis +hujusce mundani a mente praepotenti juxta certam et constantem +rationem(970) moveri. + +33. Caeterum qui principium vitale corporibus tribuunt, obscurum aliquid et +rebus parum conveniens fingunt. Quid enim aliud est vitali principio +praeditum esse quam vivere? aut vivere quam se movere, sistere, et statum +suum mutare? Philosophi autem hujus saeculi doctissimi pro principio +indubitato ponunt, omne corpus perseverare in statu suo, vel quietis vel +motus uniformis in directum, nisi quatenus aliunde cogitur statum ilium +mutare: e contrario, in anima sentimus esse facultatem tam statum suum +quam aliarum rerum mutandi; id quod proprie dicitur vitale, animamque a +corporibus longe discriminat. + +34. Motum et quietem in corporibus recentiores considerant velut duos +status existendi, in quorum utrovis corpus omne sua natura iners +permaneret(971), nulla vi externa urgente. Unde colligere licet, eandem +esse causam motus et quietis, quae est existentiae corporum. Neque enim +quaerenda videtur alia causa existentiae corporis successivae in diversis +partibus spatii, quam illa unde derivatur existentia ejusdem corporis +successiva in diversis partibus temporis. De Deo autem Optimo Maximo rerum +omnium Conditore et Conservatore tractare, et qua ratione res cunctae a +summo et vero Ente pendeant demonstrare, quamvis pars sit scientiae humanae +praecellentissima, spectat tamen potius ad philosophiam primam(972), seu +metaphysicam et theologiam, quam ad philosophiam naturalem, quae hodie fere +omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica. Itaque cognitionem de Deo +vel supponit philosophia naturalis, vel mutuatur ab aliqua scientia +superiori. Quanquam verissimum sit, naturae investigationem scientiis +altioribus argumenta egregia ad sapientiam, bonitatem, et potentiam Dei +illustrandam et probandam undequaque subministrare. + +35. Quod haec minus intelligantur, in causa est, cur nonnulli immerito +repudient physicae principia mathematica, eo scilicet nomine quod illa +causas rerum efficientes non assignant: quum tamen revera ad physicam aut +mechanicam spectet regulas(973) solummodo, non causas efficientes, +impulsionum attractionumve, et ut verbo dicam, motuum leges tradere; ex +iis vero positis phaenomenon particularium solutionem, non autem causam +efficientem assignare. + +36. Multum intererit considerasse quid proprie sit principium, et quo +sensu intelligenda sit vox illa apud philosophos(974). Causa quidem vera +efficiens et conservatrix rerum omnium jure optimo appellatur fons et +principium earundem. Principia vero philosophiae experimentalis proprie +dicenda sunt fundamenta quibus illa innititur, seu fontes unde derivatur, +(non dico existentia, sed) cognitio rerum corporearum, sensus utique ex +experientia. Similiter, in philosophia mechanica, principia dicenda sunt, +in quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina, leges illae motuum +primariae, quae experimentis comprobatae, ratiocinio etiam excultae sunt et +redditae universales(975). Hae motuum leges commode dicuntur principia, +quoniam ab iis tam theoremata mechanica generalia quam particulares {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} explicationes derivantur. + +37. Tum nimirum dici potest quidpiam explicari mechanice, cum reducitur ad +ista principia simplicissima et universalissima, et per accuratum +ratiocinium, cum iis consentaneum et connexum esse ostenditur. Nam +inventis semel naturae legibus, deinceps monstrandum est philosopho, ex +constanti harum legum observatione, hoc est, ex iis principiis phaenomenon +quodvis necessario consequi: id quod est phaenomena explicare et solvere, +causamque, id est rationem cur fiant, assignare. + +38. Mens humana gaudet scientiam suam extendere et dilatare. Ad hoc autem +notiones et propositiones generales efformandae sunt, in quibus quodam modo +continentur propositiones et cognitiones particulares, quae turn demum +intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis continuo nexu deducuntur. Hoc +geometris notissimum est. In mechanica etiam praemittuntur notiones, hoc +est definitiones, et enunciationes de motu primae et generales, ex quibus +postmodum methodo mathematica conclusiones magis remotae et minus generales +colliguntur. Et sicut per applicationem theorematum geometricorum, +corporum particularium magnitudines mensurantur; ita etiam per +applicationem theorematum mechanices universalium, systematis mundani +partium quarumvis motus, et phaenomena inde pendentia, innotescunt et +determinantur: ad quem scopum unice collineandum physico. + +39. Et quemadmodum geometrae, disciplinae causa, multa comminiscuntur, quae +nec ipsi describere possunt, nec in rerum natura invenire; simili prorsus +ratione mechanicus voces quasdam abstractas et generales adhibet, +fingitque in corporibus _vim_, _actionem_, _attractionem_, +_solicitationem_, &c. quae ad theorias et enunciationes, ut et +computationes de motu apprime utiles sunt, etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate +et corporibus actu existentibus frustra quaererentur, non minus quam quae a +geometris per abstractionem mathematicam finguntur. + +40. Revera ope sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates sensibiles, et res +corporeas omnino passivas, sive in motu sint sive in quiete, percipimus: +ratioque et experientia activum nihil praeter mentem aut animam esse +suadet. Quidquid ultra fingitur, id ejusdem generis esse cum aliis +hypothesibus et abstractionibus mathematicis existimandum: quod penitu +sanimo infigere oportet. Hoc ni fiat, facile in obscuram scholasticorum +subtilitatem, quae per tot saecula, tanquam dira quaedam pestis, philosophiam +corrupit, relabi possumus. + +41. Principia mechanica legesque motuum aut naturae universales, saeculo +ultimo feliciter inventae, et subsidio geometriae tractatae et applicatae, +miram lucem in philosophiam intulerunt. Principia vero metaphysica +causaeque reales efficientes motus et existentiae corporum attributorumve +corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut experimenta pertinent; neque eis +lucem dare possunt, nisi quatenus, velut praecognita, inserviant ad limites +physicae praefiniendos, eaque ratione ad tollendas difficultates +quaestionesque peregrinas. + +42. Qui a spiritibus motus principium petunt, ii vel rem corpoream vel +incorpoream voce _spiritus_ intelligunt. Si rem corpoream, quantumvis +tenuem, tamen redit difficultas: si incorpoream, quantumvis id verum sit, +attamen ad physicam non proprie pertinet. Quod si quis philosophiam +naturalem ultra limites experimentorum et mechanicae extenderit, ita ut +rerum etiam incorporearum, et inextensarum cognitionem complectatur, +latior quidem illa vocis acceptio tractationem de anima, mente, seu +principio vitali admittit. Caeterum commodius erit, juxta usum jam fere +receptum, ita distinguere inter scientias, ut singulae propriis +circumscribantur cancellis, et philosophus naturalis totus sit in +experimentis, legibusque motuum, et principiis mechanicis, indeque +depromptis ratiociniis; quidquid autem de aliis rebus protulerit, id +superiori alicui scientiae acceptum referat. Etenim ex cognitis naturae +legibus pulcherrimae theoriae, praxes etiam mechanicae ad vitam utiles +consequuntur. Ex cognitione autem ipsius naturae Auctoris considerationes +longe praestantissimae quidem illae, sed metaphysicae, theologicae, morales +oriuntur. + + ------------------------------------- + +43. De _principiis_ hactenus: nunc dicendum de _natura_ motus(976). Atque +is quidem, cum sensibus clare percipiatur, non tam natura sua, quam doctis +philosophorum commentis obscuratus est. Motus nunquam in sensus nostros +incurrit sine mole corporea, spatio, et tempore. Sunt tamen qui motum, +tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et abstractam, atque ab omnibus aliis +rebus sejunctam, contemplari student. Verum idea illa tenuissima et +subtilissima(977) intellectus aciem eludit: id quod quilibet secum +meditando experiri potest. Hinc nascuntur magnae difficultates de natura +motus, et definitiones, ipsa re quam illustrare debent longe obscuriores. +Hujusmodi sunt definitiones illae Aristotelis et Scholasticorum(978), qui +motum dicunt esse _actum mobilis quatenus est mobile, vel actum entis in +potentia quatenus in potentia_. Hujusmodi etiam est illud viri(979) inter +recentiores celebris, qut asserit _nihil in motu esse reale praeter +momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente constitui debet_. Porro +constat, horum et similium definitionum auctores in animo habuisse +abstractam motus naturam, seclusa omni temporis et spatii consideratione, +explicare: sed qua ratione abstracta ilia motus quintessentia (ut ita +dicam) intelligi possit, non video. + +44. Neque hoc contenti, ulterius pergunt, partesque ipsius motus a se +invicem dividunt et secernunt, quarum ideas distinctas, tanquam entium +revera distinctorum, efformare conantur. Etenim sunt qui motionem a motu +distinguant, illam velut instantaneum motus elementum spectantes. +Velocitatem insuper, conatum, vim, impetum totidem res essentia diversas +esse volunt, quarum quaeque per propriam atque ab aliis omnibus segregatam +et abstractam ideam intellectui objiciatur. Sed in hisce rebus +discutiendis, stantibus iis quae supra disseruimus(980), non est cur +diutius immoremur. + +45. Multi etiam per _transitum_(981) motum definiunt, obliti, scilicet, +transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi non posse, et per motum definiri +oportere. Verissimum adeo est definitiones, sicut nonnullis rebus lucem, +ita vicissim aliis tenebras afferre. Et profecto, quascumque res sensu +percipimus, eas clariores aut notiores definiendo efficere vix quisquam +potuerit. Cujus rei vana spe allecti res faciles difficillimas(982) +reddiderunt philosophi, mentesque suas difficultatibus, quas ut plurimum +ipsi peperissent, implicavere. Ex hocce definiendi, simul ac abstrahendi +studio, multae tam de motu quam de aliis rebus natae subtilissimae +quaestiones, eaedemque nullius utilitatis, hominum ingenia frustra +torserunt; adeo ut Aristoteles ultro et saepius fateatur motum esse _actum +quendam cognitu difficilem_(983), et nonnulli ex veteribus usque eo nugis +exercitati deveniebant, ut motum omnino esse negarent(984). + +46. Sed hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget. Satis sit fontes solutionum +indicasse: ad quos etiam illud adjungere libet: quod ea quae de infinita +divisione temporis et spatii in mathesi traduntur, ob congenitam rerum +naturam paradoxa et theorias spinosas (quales sunt illae omnes in quibus +agitur de infinito(985)) in speculationes de motu intulerunt. Quidquid +autem hujus generis sit, id omne motus commune habet cum spatio et +tempore, vel potius ad ea refert acceptum. + +47. Et quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio seu divisio rerum vere +inseparabilium, ita ab altera parte compositio seu potius confusio rerum +diversissimarum motus naturam perplexam reddidit. Usitatum enim est motum +cum causa motus efficiente confundere(986). Unde accidit ut motus sit +quasi biformis, unam faciem sensibus obviam, alteram caliginosa nocte +obvolutam habens. Inde obscuritas et confusio, et varia de motu paradoxa +originem trahunt, dum effectui perperam tribuitur id quod revera causae +solummodo competit. + +48. Hinc oritur opinio illa, _eandem_ semper motus quantitatem +conservari(987). Quod, nisi intelligatur de vi et potentia causae, sive +causa ilia dicatur natura, sive {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, vel quodcunque tandem agens sit, +falsum esse cuivis facile constabit. Aristoteles(988) quidem l. viii. +_Physicorum_, ubi quaerit utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab +aeterno tanquam vita immortalis insit rebus omnibus, vitale principium +potius, quam effectum externum, sive mutationem loci(989), intellexisse +videtur. + +49. Hinc etiam est, quod multi suspicantur motum non esse meram passionem +in corporibus. Quod si intelligamus id quod in motu corporis sensibus +objicitur, quin omnino passivum sit nemo dubitare potest. Ecquid enim in +se habet successiva corporis existentia in diversis locis, quod actionem +referat, aut aliud sit quam nuduset iners effectus? + +50. Peripatetici, qui dicunt motum esse actum unum utriusque, moventis et +moti(990), non satis discriminant causam ab effectu. Similiter, qui nisum +aut conatum in motu fingunt, aut idem corpus simul in contrarias partes +ferri putant, eadem idearum confusione, eadem vocum ambiguitate ludificari +videntur. + +51. Juvat multum, sicut in aliis omnibus, ita in scientia de motu +accuratam diligentiam adhibere, tam ad aliorum conceptus intelligendos +quam ad suos enunciandos: in qua re nisi peccatum esset, vix credo in +disputationem trahi potuisse, utrum corpus indifferens sit ad motum et ad +quietem, necne. Quoniam enim experientia constat, esse legem naturae +primariam, ut corpus perinde perseveret in _statu motus ac quietis, +quamdiu aliunde nihil accidat ad statum istum mutandum_; et propterea vim +inertiae sub diverso respectu esse vel resistentiam, vel impetum, +colligitur: hoc sensu profecto corpus dici potest sua natura indifferens +ad motum vel quietem. Nimirum tam difficile est quietem in corpus motum, +quam motum in quiescens inducere: cum vero corpus pariter conservet statum +utrumvis, quidni dicatur ad utrumvis se habere indifferenter? + + ------------------------------------- + +52. Peripatetici pro varietate mutationum, quas res aliqua subire potest, +varia motus genera distinguebant. Hodie de motu agentes intelligunt +solummodo _motum localem_(991). Motus autem localis intelligi nequit nisi +simul intelligatur quid sit _locus_: is vero a neotericis(992) definitur +_pars spatii quam corpus occupat_: unde dividitur in relativum et +absolutum pro ratione spatii. Distinguunt enim inter spatium absolutum +sive verum, ac relativum sive apparens. Volunt scilicet dari spatium +undequaque immensum, immobile, insensibile, corpora universa permeans et +continens, quod vocant spatium absolutum. Spatium autem a corporibus +comprehensum vel definitum, sensibusque adeo subjectum, dicitur spatium +relativum, apparens, vulgare. + +53. Fingamus itaque corpora cuncta destrui, et in nihilum redigi. Quod +reliquum est vocant spatium absolutum, omni relatione quae a situ et +distantiis corporum oriebatur, simul cum ipsis corporibus, sublata. Porro +spatium illud est infinitum, immobile, indivisibile, insensibile, sine +relatione et sine distinctione. Hoc est, omnia ejus attributa sunt +privativa vel negativa: videtur igitur esse merum nihil(993). Parit +solummmodo difficultatem aliquam quod extensum sit. Extensio autem est +qualitas positiva. Verum qualis tandem extensio est illa quae nec dividi +potest, nec mensurari, cujus nullam partem, nec sensu percipere, nec +imaginatione depingere possumus? Etenim nihil in imaginationem cadit, +quod, ex natura rei, non possibile est ut sensu percipiatur; siquidem +_imaginatio_(994) nihil aliud est quam facultas representatrix rerum +sensibilium, vel actu existentium, vel saltem possibilium. Fugit insuper +_intellectum purum_, quum facultas illa versetur tantum circa res +spirituales et inextensas, cujusmodi sunt mentes nostrae, earumque habitus, +passiones, virtutes, et similia. Ex spatio igitur absoluto auferamus modo +vocabula, et nihil remanebit in sensu, imaginatione, aut intellectu: nihil +aliud ergo iis designatur, quam pura privatio aut negatio, hoc est, merum +nihil. + +54. Confitendum omnino est nos circa hanc rem gravissimis praejudiciis +teneri, a quibus ut liberemur, omnis animi vis exercenda. Etenim multi, +tantum abest quod spatium absolutum pro nihilo ducant, ut rem esse ex +omnibus (Deo excepto) unicam existiment, quae annihilari non possit: +statuantque illud suapte natura necessario existere, aeternumque esse et +increatum, atque adeo attributorum divinorum particeps(995). Verum +enimvero quum certissimum sit, res omnes, quas nominibus designamus, per +qualitates aut relationes, vel aliqua saltem ex parte cognosci (ineptum +enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil, nihil notionis, ideae vel +conceptus subjiceretur), inquiramus diligenter, utrum formare liceat +_ideam_ ullam spatii illius puri, realis, absoluti, quod post omnium +corporum annihilationem perseveret existere. Ideam porro talem paulo +acrius intuens, reperio ideam esse nihili purissimam, si modo idea +appellanda sit. Hoc ipse summa adhibita diligentia expertus sum: hoc alios +pari adhibita diligentia experturos reor. + +55. Decipere nos nonnunquam solet, quod aliis omnibus corporibus +imaginatione sublatis, _nostrum_(996) tamen manere supponimus. Quo +supposito, motum membrorum ab omni parte liberrimum imaginamur. Motus +autem sine spatio concipi non potest. Nihilominus si rem attento animo +recolamus, constabit primo concipi spatium relativum partibus nostri +corporis definitum: 2 deg.. movendi membra potestatem liberrimam nullo +obstaculo retusam: et praeter haec duo nihil. Falso tamen credimus tertium +aliquod, spatium videlicet immensum, realiter existere, quod liberam +potestatem nobis faciat movendi corpus nostrum: ad hoc enim requiritur +absentia solummodo aliorum corporum. Quam absentiam, sive privationem +corporum, nihil esse positivum fateamur necesse est(997). + +56. Caeterum hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine perspexerit, verba +et voces parum valent. Meditanti vero, et rationes secum reputanti, ni +fallor, manifestum erit, quaecunque de spatio puro et absoluto praedicantur, +ea omnia de nihilo praedicari posse. Qua ratione mens humana facillime +liberatur a magnis difficultatibus simulque ab ea absurditate tribuendi +existentiam necessariam(998) ulli rei praeterquam soli Deo optimo maximo. + +57. In proclivi esset sententiam nostram argumentis a posteriori (ut +loquuntur) ductis confirmare, quaestiones de spatio absoluto proponendo; +exempli gratia, utrum sit substantia vel accidens? utrum creatum vel +increatum? et absurditates ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando. Sed +brevitati consulendum. Illud tamen omitti non debet, quod sententiam +hancce Democritus olim calculo suo comprobavit, uti auctor est Aristoteles +1. i. _Phys._(999) ubi haec habet: _Democritus solidum et inane ponit +principia, quorum aliud quidem ut quod est, aliud ut quod non est esse +dicit._ Scrupulum si forte injiciat, quod distinctio illa inter spatium +absolutum et relativum a magni nominis philosophis usurpetur, eique quasi +fundamento inaedificentur multa praeclara theoremata, scrupulum istum vanum +esse, ex iis quae secutura sunt, apparebit. + +58. Ex praemissis patet, non convenire ut definiamus locum verum corporis +esse partem spatii absoluti quam occupat corpus, motumque verum seu +absolutum esse mutationem loci veri et absoluti. Siquidem omnis locus est +relativus, ut et omnis motus. Veruntamen ut hoc clarius appareat, +animadvertendum est, motum nullum intelligi posse sine determinatione +aliqua seu directione, quae quidem intelligi nequit, nisi praeter corpus +motum, nostrum etiam corpus, aut aliud aliquod, simul intelligatur +existere. Nam sursum, deorsum, sinistrorsum, dextrorsum, omnesque plagae et +regiones in relatione aliqua fundantur, et necessario corpus a moto +diversum connotant et supponunt. Adeo ut, si reliquis corporibus in +nihilum redactis, globus, exempli gratia, unicus existere supponatur; in +illo motus nullus concipi possit: usque adeo necesse est, ut detur aliud +corpus, cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur. Hujus sententiae veritas +clarissime elucebit, modo corporum omnium tam nostri quam aliorum, praeter +globum istum unicum, annihilationem recte supposuerimus. + +59. Concipiantur porro duo globi, et praeterea nil corporeum, existere. +Concipiantur deinde vires quomodocunque applicari: quicquid tandem per +applicationem virium intelligamus, motus circularis duorum globorum circa +commune centrum nequit per imaginationem concipi. Supponamus deinde coelum +fixarum creari: subito ex concepto appulsu globorum ad diversas coeli +istius partes motus concipietur. Scilicet cum motus natura sua sit +relativus, concipi non potuit priusquam darentur corpora correlata. +Quemadmodum nec ulla relatio alia sine correlatis concipi potest. + +60. Ad motum circularem quod attinet, putant multi, crescente motu vero +circulari, corpus necessario magis semper magisque ab axe niti. Hoc autem +ex eo provenit, quod, cum motus circularis spectari possit tanquam in omni +momento a duabus directionibus ortum trahens, una secundum radium, altera +secundum tangentem; si in hac ultima tantum directione impetus augeatur, +tum a centro recedet corpus motum, orbita vero desinet esse circularis. +Quod si aequaliter augeantur vires in utraque directione, manebit motus +circularis, sed acceleratus conatu, qui non magis arguet vires recedendi +ab axe, quam accedendi ad eundem, auctas esse. Dicendum igitur, aquam in +situla circumactam ascendere ad latera vasis, propterea quod, applicatis +novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quamvis particulam aquae, eodem +instanti non applicentur novae vires aequales centripetae. Ex quo experimento +nullo modo sequitur, motum absolutum circularem per vires recedendi ab axe +motus necessario dignosci. Porro qua ratione intelligendae sunt voces istae, +_vires corporum et conatus_, ex praemissis satis superque innotescit. + +61. Quo modo curva considerari potest tanquam constans ex rectis +infinitis, etiamsi revera ex illis non constet, sed quod ea hypothesis ad +geometriam utilis sit, eodem modo motus circularis spectari potest tanquam +a directionibus rectilineis infinitis ortum ducens, quae suppositio utilis +est in philosophia mechanica. Non tamen ideo affirmandum, impossibile +esse, ut centrum gravitatis corporis cujusvis successive existat in +singulis punctis peripheriae circularis, nulla ratione habita directionis +ullius rectilineae, sive in tangente sive in radio. + +62. Haud omittendum est, motum lapidis in funda, aut aquae in situla +circumacta, dici non posse motum vere circularem, juxta mentem eorum qui +per partes spatii absoluti definiunt loca vera corporum; cum sit mire +compositus ex motibus non solum situlae vel fundae, sed etiam telluris +diurno circa proprium axem, menstruo circa commune centrum gravitatis +terrae et lunae, et annuo circa solem: et propterea particula quaevis lapidis +vel aquae describat lineam a circulari longe abhorrentem. Neque revera est, +qui creditur, conatus axifugus, quoniam non respicit unum aliquem axem +ratione spatii absoluti, supposito quod detur tale spatium: proinde non +video quomodo appellari possit conatus unicus, cui motus vere circularis +tanquam proprio et adaequato effectui respondet. + +63. Motus nullus dignosci potest, aut mensurari, nisi per res sensibiles. +Cum ergo spatium absolutum nullo modo in sensus incurrat, necesse est ut +inutile prorsus sit ad distinctionem motuum. Praeterea determinatio sive +directio motui essentialis est, ilia vero in relatione consistit. Ergo +impossibile est ut motus absolutus concipiatur. + +64. Porro quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit motus ejusdem +corporis, quinimo uno respectu moveri, altero quiescere dici quidpiam +possit(1000); ad determinandum motum verum et quietem veram, quo scilicet +tollatur ambiguitas, et consulatur mechanicae philosophorum, qui systema +rerum latius contemplantur, satis fuerit spatium relativum fixarum coelo, +tanquam quiescente spectato, conclusum adhibere, loco spatii absoluti. +Motus autem et quies tali spatio relativo definiti, commode adhiberi +possunt loco absolutorum, qui ab illis nullo symptomate discerni possunt. +Etenim imprimantur utcunque vires, sint quicunque conatus, concedamus +motum distingui per actiones in corpora exercitas; nunquam tamen inde +sequetur, dari spatium illud et locum absolutum, ejusque mutationem esse +locum verum. + +65. Leges motuum, effectusque, et theoremata eorundem proportiones et +calculos continentia, pro diversis viarum figuris, accelerationibus itidem +et directionibus diversis, mediisque plus minusve resistentibus, haec omnia +constant sine calculatione motus absoluti. Uti vel ex eo patet quod, quum +secundum illorum principia qui motum absolutum inducunt, nullo symptomate +scire liceat, utrum integra rerum compages quiescat, an moveatur +uniformiter in directum, perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis +cognosci posse. + + ------------------------------------- + +66. Ex dictis patet ad veram motus naturam perspiciendam summopere +juvaturum, 1 deg.. Distinguere inter hypotheses mathematicas et naturas rerum: +2 deg.. Cavere ab abstractionibus: 3 deg.. Considerare motum tanquam aliquid +sensibile, vel saltem imaginabile; mensurisque relativis esse contentos. +Quae si fecerimus, simul clarissima quaeque philosophiae mechanicae +theoremata, quibus reserantur naturae recessus, mundique systema calculis +humanis subjicitur, manebunt intemerata, et motus contemplatio a mille +minutiis, subtilitatibus, ideisque abstractis libera evadet. Atque haec de +natura motus dicta sufficiant. + + ------------------------------------- + +67. Restat, ut disseramus de causa communicationis motuum(1001). Esse +autem vim impressam in corpus mobile causam motus in eo, plerique +existimant. Veruntamen illos non assignare causam motus cognitam, et a +corpore motuque distinctam, ex praemissis constat. Patet insuper vim non +esse rem certam et determinatam, ex eo quod viri summi de ilia multum +diversa, immo contraria, proferant, salva tamen in consequentiis veritate. +Siquidem Newtonus(1002) ait vim impressam consistere in actione sola, +esseque actionem exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus mutandum, nee post +actionem manere. Torricellius(1003) cumulum quendam sive aggregatum virium +impressarum per percussionem in corpus mobile recipi, ibidemque manere +atque impetum constituere contendit. Idem fere Borellus(1004) aliique +praedicant. At vero, tametsi inter se pugnare videantur Newtonus et +Torricellius, nihilominus, dum singuli sibi consentanea proferunt, res +satis commode ab utrisque explicatur. Quippe vires omnes corporibus +attributae tam sunt hypotheses mathematicae quam vires attractivae in +planetis et sole. Caeterum entia mathematica in rerum natura stabilem +essentiam non habent: pendent autem a notione definientis; unde eadem res +diversimode explicari potest. + +68. Statuamus motum novum in corpore percusso conservari, sive per vim +insitam, qua corpus quodlibet perseverat in statu suo vel motus vel +quietis uniformis in directum; sive per vim impressam, durante percussione +in corpus percussum receptam ibidemque permanentem; idem erit quoad rem, +differentia existente in nominibus tantum. Similiter, ubi mobile +percutiens perdit, et percussum acquirit motum, parum refert disputare, +utrum motus acquisitus sit idem numero cum motu perdito, ducit enim in +minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de identitate. Itaque sive +dicamus motum transire a percutiente in percussum, sive in percusso motum +de novo generari, destrui autem in percutiente, res eodem recidit. +Utrobique intelligitur unum corpus motum perdere, alterum acquirere, et +praeterea nihil. + +69. Mentem, quae agitat et continet universam hancce molem corpoream, +estque causa vera efficiens motus, eandem esse, proprie et stricte +loquendo, causam communicationis ejusdem haud negaverim. In philosophia +tamen physica, causas et solutiones phaenomenon a principiis mechanicis +petere oportet. Physice igitur res explicatur non assignando ejus causam +vere agentem et incorpoream, sed demonstrando ejus connexionem cum +principiis mechanicis: cujusmodi est illud, _actionem et reactionem esse +semper contrarias et aequales_(1005), a quo, tanquam fonte et principio +primario, eruuntur regulae de motuum communicatione, quae a neotericis, +magno scientiarum bono, jam ante repertae sunt et demonstratae. + +70. Nobis satis fuerit, si innuamus principium illud alio modo declarari +potuisse. Nam si vera rerum natura potius quam abstracta mathesis +spectetur, videbitur rectius dici, in attractione vel percussione +passionem corporum, quam actionem, esse utrobique aequalem. Exempli gratia, +lapis fune equo alligatus tantum trahitur versus equum, quantum equus +versus lapidem: corpus etiam motum in aliud quiescens impactum, patitur +eandem mutationem cum corpore quiescente. Et quoad effectum realem, +percutiens est item percussum, percussumque percutiens. Mutatio autem illa +est utrobique, tam in corpore equi quam in lapide, tam in moto quam in +quiescente, passio mera. Esse autem vim, virtutem, aut actionem corpoream +talium effectuum vere et proprie causatricem non constat. Corpus motum in +quiescens impingitur; loquimur tamen active, dicentes illud hoc impellere: +nec absurde in mechanicis, ubi ideae mathematicae potius quam verae rerum +naturae spectantur. + +71. In physica, sensus et experientia, quae ad effectus apparentes +solummodo pertingunt, locum habent; in mechanica, notiones abstractae +mathematicorum admittuntur. In philosophia prima, seu metaphysica, agitur +de rebus incorporeis, de causis, veritate, et existentia rerum. Physicus +series sive successiones rerum sensibilium contemplatur, quibus legibus +connectuntur, et quo ordine, quid praecedit tanquam causa, quid sequitur +tanquam effectus, animadvertens.(1006) Atque hac ratione dicimus corpus +motum esse causam motus in altero, vel ei motum imprimere, trahere etiam, +aut impellere. Quo sensu causae secundae corporeae intelligi debent, nulla +ratione habita verae sedis virium, vel potentiarum actricum, aut causae +realis cui insunt. Porro dici possunt causae vel principia mechanica, ultra +corpus, figuram, motum, etiam axiomata scientiae mechanicae primaria, +tanquam causae consequentium spectata. + +72. Causae vere activae meditatione tantum et ratiocinio e tenebris erui +quibus involvuntur possunt, et aliquatenus cognosci. Spectat autem ad +philosophiam primam, seu metaphysicam, de iis agere. Quodsi cuique +scientiae provincia sua(1007) tribuatur, limites assignentur, principia et +objecta accurate distinguantur, quae ad singulas pertinent, tractare +licuerit majore, cum facilitate, tum perspicuitate. + + + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + +_ 1 Philosophy of Theism_: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the + University of Edinburgh in 1894-96. (Second Edition, 1899.) + +_ 2 Essay on Vision_, sect. 147, 148. + +_ 3 Principles_, sect. 6. + + 4 Preface to the _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_. + + 5 By Anthony Collins. + + 6 See vol. III, Appendix B. + + 7 Murdoch Martin, a native of Skye, author of a _Voyage to St. Kilda_ + (1698), and a _Description of the Western Islands of Scotland_ + (1703). + + 8 See Stewart's _Works_ (ed. Hamilton), vol. I. p. 161. There is a + version of this story by DeQuincey, in his quaint essay on _Murder + considered as one of the Fine Arts._ + + 9 Sir John became Lord Percival in that year. + + 10 A place more than once visited by Berkeley. + + 11 Bakewell's _Memoirs of the Court of Augustus_, vol. II. p. 177. + + 12 A letter in Berkeley's _Life and Letters_, p. 93, which led me to a + different opinion, I have now reason to believe was not written by + him, nor was it written in 1721. The research of Dr. Lorenz, + confirmed by internal evidence, shews that it was written in + October, 1684, before Berkeley the philosopher was born, and when + the Duke of Ormond was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The writer was + probably the Hon. and Rev. George Berkeley, a Prebendary of + Westminster in 1687, who died in 1694. The wife of the "pious Robert + Nelson" was a daughter of Earl Berkeley, and this "George" was her + younger brother. + + 13 Percival MSS. + + 14 For the letter, see Editor's Preface to the _Proposal for a College + in Bermuda_, vol. IV. pp. 343-44. + + 15 Afterwards Sir John James. + + 16 Smibert the artist, who made a picture of Berkeley in 1725, and + afterwards in America of the family party then at Gravesend. + +_ 17 Historical Register_, vol. XIII, p. 289 (1728). + +_ 18 New England Weekly Courier_, Feb. 3, 1729. + + 19 For valuable information about Rhode Island, reproduced in + _Berkeley's Life and Correspondence_ and here, I am indebted to + Colonel Higginson, to whom I desire to make this tardy but grateful + acknowledgement. + + 20 James, Dalton, and Smibert. + + 21 Whitehall, having fallen into decay, has been lately restored by the + pious efforts of Mrs. Livingston Mason, in concert with the Rev. Dr. + E. E. Hale, and others. This good work was completed in the summer + of 1900; and the house is now as nearly as possible in the state in + which Berkeley left it. + + 22 See vol. III, Appendix C. + +_ 23 Three Men of Letters_, by Moses Coit Tyler (New York, 1895). He + records some of the American academical and other institutions that + are directly or indirectly, due to Berkeley. + + 24 The thought implied in this paragraph is pursued in my _Philosophy + of Theism_, in which the ethical perfection of the Universal Mind is + taken as the fundamental postulate in all human experience. If the + Universal Mind is not ethically perfect, the universe (including our + spiritual constitution) is radically untrustworthy. + +_ 25 Life and Letters of Berkeley_, p. 222. + + 26 The third Earl of Shaftesbury, the pupil of Locke, and author of the + _Characteristics_. In addition to the well-known biography by Dr. + Fowler, the present eminent Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Shaftesbury + has been interpreted in two other lately published works--a _Life_ by + Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. (1900), and an edition of the + _Characteristics_, with an Introduction and Notes, by John M. + Robertson (1900). + + 27 The title of this book is--_Things Divine and Supernatural conceived + by Analogy with Things Natural and Human_, by the Author of _The + Procedure, Extent and Limits of the Human Understanding_. The + _Divine Analogy_ appeared in 1733, and the _Procedure_ in 1728. + + 28 Spinoza argues that what is _called_ "understanding" and "will" in + God, has no more in common with human understanding and will than + the dog-star in the heavens has with the animal we call a dog. See + Spinoza's _Ethica_, I. 17, _Scholium_. + + 29 The question of the knowableness of God, or Omnipotent Moral + Perfection in the concrete, enters into recent philosophical and + theological discussion in Britain. Calderwood, in his _Philosophy of + the Infinite_ (1854), was one of the earliest, and not the least + acute, of Hamilton's critics in this matter. The subject is lucidly + treated by Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) in his _Lectures + on Theism_ (1897) and in a supplement to Calderwood's _Life_ (1900). + So also Huxley's _David Hume_ and Professor Iverach's _Is God + Knowable?_ + + 30 Stewart's _Works_. vol. I. pp. 350-1. + + 31 Berkeley MSS. possessed by Archdeacon Rose. + + 32 Pope's poetic tribute to Berkeley belongs to this period-- + + "Even in a bishop I can spy desert; + Secker is decent; Rundle has a heart: + Manners with candour are to Benson given, + To Berkeley--every virtue under heaven." + + _Epilogue to the Satires._ + + Also his satirical tribute to the critics of Berkeley-- + + "Truth's sacred fort th' exploded laugh shall win; + And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin." + + _Essay on Satire, _Part II. + + 33 Berkeley's _Life and Letters_, p. 210. + + 34 Bacon's _Novuin Organum_. Distributio Operis. + + 35 Section 141. + + 36 See "Editor's Preface to Alciphron." + + 37 Compare Essay II in the _Guardian_ with this. + + 38 Taylor, in later life, conformed to the Anglican Church. + + 39 See Berkeley's _Life and Letters_, chap. viii. + + 40 The Primacy. + + 41 This seems to have been his eldest son, Henry. + + 42 His son George was already settled at Christ Church. Henry, the + eldest son, born in Rhode Island, was then "abroad in the south of + France for his health," as one of his brother George's letters tells + us, found among the Johnson MSS. + + 43 See Appendix D. Reid, like Berkeley, held that "matter cannot be the + cause of anything," but this not as a consequence of the new + conception of the world presented to the senses, through which alone + Berkeley opens _his_ way to its powerlessness; although Reid + supposes that in his youth he followed Berkeley in this too. See + _Thomas Reid_ (1898), in "Famous Scots Series," where I have + enlarged on this. + + 44 Johnson MSS. + + 45 That Berkeley was buried in Oxford is mentioned in his son's letter + to Johnson, in which he says : "His remains are interred in the + Cathedral of Christ Church, and next week a monument to his memory + will be erected with an inscription by Dr. Markham, a Student of + this College." As the son was present at, and superintended the + arrangements for his father's funeral, it can be no stretch of + credulity to believe that he knew where his father was buried. It + may be added that Berkeley himself had provided in his Will "that my + body be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which I die." The + Will, dated July 31, 1752, is given _in extenso_ in my _Life and + Letters_ of Berkeley, p. 345. We have also the record of burial in + the Register of Christ Church Cathedral, which shews that "on + January ye 20th 1753, ye Right Reverend John (_sic_) Berkley, Ld + Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed" there. This disposes of the statement + on p. 17 of Diprose's _Account of the Parish of Saint Clement Danes_ + (1868), that Berkeley was buried in that church. + + I may add that a beautiful memorial of Berkeley has lately been + placed in the Cathedral of Cloyne, by subscriptions in this country + and largely in America. + + M1 I. + + 46 "General ideas," i.e. _abstract_ general ideas, distinguished, in + Berkeley's nominalism, from _concrete_ general ideas, or from + general names, which are signs of any one of an indefinite number of + individual objects. Cf. _Principles,_ Introduction, sect. 16. + + 47 Introduction to the _Principles of Human Knowledge_. + + M2 N. + + 48 "co-existing ideas," i.e. phenomena presented in uniform order to + the senses. + + M3 M. P. + M4 M. P. + M5 M. + + 49 Newton postulates a world of matter and motion, governed + mechanically by laws within itself: Berkeley finds himself charged + with New Principles, demanded by reason, with which Newton's + postulate is inconsistent. + + M6 E. + + 50 He attempts this in many parts of the _Principles_ and _Dialogues_. + He recognises the difficulty of reconciling his New Principles with + the _identity_ and _permanence_ of sensible things. + + M7 M. + M8 E. + + 51 He contemplated thus early applications of his New Principles to + Mathematics, afterwards made in his book of _Principles_, sect. + 118-32. + + 52 What Berkeley calls _ideas_ are either perceptible by the senses or + imagined: either way they are concrete: _abstract ideas_ are empty + words. + + M9 S. + M10 M. P. + + 53 i.e. the existence of bodies and qualities independently of--in + abstraction from--all percipient mind. While the spiritual theism of + Descartes is acceptable, he rejects his mechanical conception of the + material world. + + M11 M. + + 54 But a "house" or a "church" includes more than _visible_ ideas, so + that we cannot, strictly speaking, be said to see it. We see + immediately only visible signs of its invisible qualities. + + M12 E. + + 55 This is added in the margin. + + M13 N. + M14 N. + M15 N. + + 56 The total impotence of Matter, and the omnipotence of Mind or Spirit + in Nature, is thus early becoming the dominant thought with + Berkeley. + + M16 N. + M17 N. + + 57 This refers to an objection to the New Principles that is apparently + reinforced by recent discoveries in geology. But if these contradict + the Principles, so does the existence of a table while I am only + seeing it. + + M18 E. + + 58 Existence, in short, can be realised only in the form of living + percipient mind. + + 59 Berkeley hardly distinguishes uncontingent mathematical _relations_, + to which the sensible ideas or phenomena in which the relations are + concretely manifested must conform. + + 60 M. T. = matter tangible; M. V. = matter visible; M. . = matter + sensible. The distinctions n question were made prominent in the + _Essay on Vision_. See sect. 1, 121-45. + + M19 P. + + 61 Which the common supposition regarding primary qualities seems to + contradict. + + 62 [That need not have been blotted out--'tis good sense, if we do but + determine wt we mean by _thing_ and _idea_.]--AUTHOR, on blank page + of the MS. + + M20 P. + M21 N. + + 63 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises + attempts to define motion, as involving a _petitio_. + + M22 P. + M23 N. + M24 N. + + 64 George Cheyne, the physician (known afterwards as author of the + _English Malady_), published in 1705 a work on Fluxions, which + procured him admission to the Royal Society. He was born in 1670. + + 65 This reminds us of Hume, and inclines towards the empirical notion + of Causation, as merely constancy in sequence--not even continuous + metamorphosis. + + 66 This is Berkeley's objection to abstract, i.e. unperceived, + quantities and infinitesimals--important in the sequel. + + 67 The "lines and figures" of pure mathematics, that is to say; which + he rejects as meaningless, in his horror unrealisable abstractions. + + M25 I. + M26 I. + M27 M. E. + M28 E. + + 68 Things really exist, that is to say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser + degree, when they are imagined than when they are actually perceived + by our senses; but, in this wide meaning of existence, they may in + both cases be said to exist. + + M29 E. + + 69 Added on blank page of the MS. + + 70 In Berkeley's limitation of the term _idea_ to what is presented + objectively in sense, or represented concretely in imagination. + Accordingly "an infinite idea" would be an idea which transcends + ideation--an express contradiction. + + M30 M. + M31 M. + M32 M. + M33 S. + + 71 Does the _human_ spirit depend on _sensible_ ideas as much as they + depend on spirit? Other orders of spiritual beings may be percipient + of other sorts of phenomena than those presented in those few senses + to which man is confined, although self-conscious activity + abstracted from _all_ sorts of presented phenomena seems impossible. + But a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily dependent on _our_ + material world or _our_ sense experience. + + M34 S. + M35 S. + + 72 [This I do not altogether approve of.]--AUTHOR, on margin. + + M36 M. + M37 S. + + 73 He afterwards guarded the difference, by contrasting _notion_ and + _idea_, confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to + our senses, or represented in sensuous imagination, and applying the + former to intellectual apprehension of "operations of the mind," and + of "relations" among ideas. + + M38 E. + + 74 See _Principles_, sect. 89. + + 75 Is thought, then, independent of language? Can we realise thought + worthy of the name without use of words? This is Berkeley's + excessive juvenile reaction against verbal abstractions. + + 76 Every general notion is _ideally realisable_ in one or other of its + possible concrete or individual applications. + + M39 N. + M40 S. + + 77 This is the germ of Berkeley's notion of the objectivity of the + material world to individual percipients and so of the rise of + individual self-consciousness. + + M41 S. + + 78 Added by Berkeley on blank page of the MS. + + 79 Cf. p. 420, note 2. Bishop Sprat's _History of the Royal Society_ + appeared in 1667. + + 80 Much need; for what he means by _idea_ has not been attended to by + his critics. + + M42 I. Mo. + + 81 What "Second Book" is this? Does he refer to the "Second Part" of + the _Principles_, which never appeared? God is the culmination of + his philosophy, in _Siris_. + + M43 M. + + 82 This is Berkeley's material substance. Individual material + substances are for him, steady aggregates of sense-given phenomena, + having the efficient and final cause of their aggregation in + eternally active Mind--active mind, human and Divine, being essential + to their realisation for man. + + M44 I. + + 83 Cf. Introduction to the _Principles_, especially sect. 18-25. + + M45 M. + + 84 Stillingfleet charges Locke with "discarding substance out of the + reasonable part of the world." + + M46 M. + + 85 The philosophers supposed the real things to exist behind our ideas, + in concealment: Berkeley was now beginning to think that the + objective ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, the existence + of which needs no proof, were _themselves_ the significant and + interpretable realities of physical science. + + M47 I. + M48 M. + M49 S. + M50 I. + M51 N. + M52 P. + M53 M. + M54 N. + M55 M. + + 86 If the material world can be _real_ only in and through a percipient + intelligence, as the realising factor. + + M56 S. + M57 Mo. + M58 Mo. + M59 Mo. + M60 I. + + 87 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 119-122, which deny the possibility of + an idea or mental picture corresponding to abstract number. + + M61 M. P. + + 88 "Praecedaneous," i.e. precedent. + + M62 S. + + 89 Who refunds human as well as natural causation into Divine agency. + + M63 Mo. + + 90 In which Locke treats "Of the Reality of Knowledge," including + questions apt to lead Berkeley to inquire, Whether we could in + reason suppose reality in the absence of all realising mind. + + M64 M. + M65 M. + M66 E. + M67 M. + M68 Mo. + M69 I. + M70 I. + M71 I. + + 91 Locke's "abstract idea" is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley + in his impetuosity. + + M72 M. + + 92 This and other passages refer to the scepticism, that is founded on + the impossibility of our comparing our ideas of things with + unperceived real things; so that we can never escape from the circle + of subjectivity. Berkeley intended to refute this scepticism. + + M73 I. + M74 I. + M75 I. + M76 Mo. + + 93 Probably Samuel Madden, who afterwards edited the _Querist_. + + M77 M. + + 94 This "First Book" seems to be "Part I" of the projected + _Principles_--the only Part ever published. Here he inclines to + "perception or thought in general," in the language of Descartes; + but in the end he approximates to Locke's "sensation and + reflection." See _Principles_, sect. 1, and notes. + + M78 I. + M79 E. + M80 S. + M81 S. + + 95 Does he mean, like Hume afterwards, that ideas or phenomena + constitute the ego, so that I am only the transitory conscious state + of each moment? + + M82 S. + + 96 "Consciousness"--a term rarely used by Berkeley or his + contemporaries. + + 97 This too, if strictly interpreted, looks like an anticipation of + Hume's reduction of the ego into successive "impressions"--"nothing + but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed + one another with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux + and movement." See Hume's _Treatise_, Part IV. sect. 6. + + M83 S. + M84 M. + + 98 What "Third Book" is here projected? Was a "Third Part" of the + _Principles_ then in embryo? + + M85 S. + + 99 This is scarcely done in the "Introduction" to the _Principles_. + + M86 S. + M87 E. + + 100 Berkeley, as we find in the _Commonplace Book_, is fond of + conjecturing how a man all alone in the world, freed from the + abstractions of language, would apprehend the realities of + existence, which he must then face directly, without the use or + abuse of verbal symbols. + + M88 E. + M89 T. + M90 I. + M91 I. + M92 E. + M93 I. + M94 I. + + 101 This "N. B." is expanded in the Introduction to the _Principles_. + + M95 M. + M96 S. + M97 I. + M98 M. + M99 I. + M100 M. + + 102 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 4. + + M101 E. + M102 M. + + 103 What is immediately realised in our percipient experience must be + presumed or trusted in as real, if we have any hold of reality, or + the moral right to postulate that our universe is fundamentally + trustworthy. + + M103 I. + M104 S. + + 104 But he distinguishes, in the _Principles_ and elsewhere, between an + idea of sense and a percipient ego. + + M105 S. + M106 S. + M107 S. + M108 S. + M109 S. + M110 S. + M111 N. + + 105 They reappear in _Siris_. + + M112 M. + + 106 In one of Berkeley's letters to Johnson, a quarter of a century + after the _Commonplace Book_, when he was in America, he observes + that "the mechanical philosophers pretend to demonstrate that matter + is proportional to gravity. But their argument concludes nothing, + and is a mere circle"--as he proceeds to show. + + 107 In the _Principles_, sect. 1-33, he seeks to fulfil the expository + part of this intention; in sect. 33-84, also in the _Dialogues + between Hylas and Philonous_, he is "particular in answering + objections." + + M113 S. + M114 M. + + 108 If Matter is arbitrarily credited with omnipotence. + + M115 S. + M116 S. + M117 S. + M118 S. + M119 S. + M120 S. + + 109 On freedom as implied in a moral and responsible agent, cf. _Siris_, + sect. 257 and note. + + M121 N. + + 110 Is not this one way of expressing the Universal Providence and + constant uniting agency of God in the material world? + + 111 Here _idea_ seems to be used in its wider signification, including + _notion_. + + M122 G. + + 112 "infinitely greater"--Does infinity admit of imaginable degrees? + + M123 G. + + 113 'embrangled'--perplexed--involved in disputes. + + 114 See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 24. + + M124 S. + + 115 "homonymy," i.e. equivocation. + + 116 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense, + nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses "thing" in + the wide meaning which comprehends persons. + + M125 S. + + 117 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense, + nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses "thing" in + the wide meaning which comprehends persons. + + M126 S. + M127 E. + M128 T. + M129 S. + + 118 Is this consistent with other entries? + + M130 S. + +_ 119 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19. + + M131 S. + + 120 This is one way of meeting the difficulty of supposed interruptions + of conscious or percipient activity. + + M132 S. + M133 S. + + 121 This seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously + self-originated. + + M134 S. + M135 N. + M136 T. + M137 S. + + 122 "perception." He does not include the percipient. + + 123 "without," i.e. unrealised by any percipient. + + M138 M. + + 124 This would make _idea_ the term only for what is imagined, as + distinguished from what is perceived in sense. + + M139 S. + M140 S. + + 125 In a strict use of words, only _persons_ exercise will--not _things_. + + M141 S. + M142 S. + + 126 As we must do in imagination, which (unlike sense) is + representative; for the mental images represent original data of + sense-perception. + + M143 S. + M144 S. + M145 S. + M146 I. + M147 S. + M148 Mo. + M149 Mo. + + 127 Does he not allow that we have _meaning_, if not _ideas_, when we + use the terms virtue and vice and moral action? + + 128 As Locke says we are. + + M150 E. + + 129 "_Existence_ and _unity_ are ideas that are suggested to the + understanding by every object without and every idea within. When + ideas are in our minds, we consider that _they_ exist." Locke's + _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7. + + M151 E. + + 130 i.e. of Existence in the abstract--unperceived and + unperceiving--realised neither in percipient life nor in moral + action. + + M152 S. + M153 S. + M154 S. + M155 S. E. + M156 G. + + 131 This suggests that God knows sensible things without being sentient + of any. + + M157 N. Mo. + M158 Mo. + M159 I. + M160 I. + + 132 Cf. _Principles_, Introd., sect. 1-5. + + M161 I. + + 133 Cf. Preface to _Principles_; also to _Dialogues_. + + M162 S. + M163 I. + M164 Mo. + + 134 i.e. that ethics was a science of phenomena or ideas. + + M165 S. + M166 I. + + 135 i.e. of the _independent_ existence of Matter. + + M167 M. + + 136 'bodies'--i.e. sensible things--not unrealised Matter. + + M168 I. &c. + + 137 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 13. + + M169 I. + + 138 Locke died in October, 1704. + + M170 S. + + 139 "without the mind," i.e. abstracted from all active percipient life. + + M171 Mo. + M172 Mo. + M173 P. S. + + 140 e.g. secondary qualities of sensible things, in which pleasure and + pain are prominent. + + 141 e.g. primary qualities, in which pleasure and pain are latent. + + M174 I. + M175 Mo. + M176 M. + + 142 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV. + ch. 3. § 6; also his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding + the possibility of Matter thinking. With Berkeley real space is a + finite creature, dependent for realisation on living percipient + Spirit. + + M177 I. + M178 Mo. + M179 Mo. + M180 S. + + 143 But what of the origination of the volition itself? + + M181 M. S. + +_ 144 Essay_, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See also Locke's _Letters_ to + Stillingfleet. + + M182 M. S. + + 145 It is, according to Berkeley, the steady union or co-existence of a + group of sense-phenomena. + + M183 I. + M184 I. + M185 S. + +_ 146 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. § 10--where he argues for interruptions of + consciousness. "Men think not always." + + M186 Mo. + M187 S. + M188 S. + M189 S. + M190 S. + M191 S. + M192 S. + M193 S. + + 147 In other words, the material world is wholly impotent: all activity + in the universe is spiritual. + + M194 I. + + 148 On the order of its four books and the structure of Locke's _Essay_, + see the Prolegomena in my edition of the _Essay_, pp. liv-lviii. + + M195 M. + + 149 i.e. independent imperceptible Matter. + + M196 I. + M197 M. + + 150 What of the earliest geological periods, asks Ueberweg? But is there + greater difficulty in such instances than in explaining the + existence of a table or a house, while one is merely seeing, without + touching? + + M198 M. + + 151 Locke explains "substance" as "an uncertain supposition of we know + not what." _Essay_, Bk. I. ch. 4. § 18. + + M199 E. + M200 I. + M201 Mo. + M202 Mo. + + 152 Locke makes certainty consist in the agreement of "our ideas with + the reality of things." See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 4. § 18. Here the + sceptical difficulty arises, which Berkeley meets under his + Principle. If we have no perception of reality, we cannot compare + our ideas with it, and so cannot have any criterion of reality. + + M203 Mo. + M204 Mo. + + 153 [This seems wrong. Certainty, real certainty, is of sensible ideas. + I may be certain without affirmation or negation.--AUTHOR.] This + needs further explanation. + + M205 Mo. + M206 Mo. + M207 Mo. + M208 I. + + 154 This entry and the preceding tends to resolve all judgments which + are not what Kant calls analytical into contingent. + + M209 I. + M210 I. + M211 E. + M212 N. Mo. + + 155 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 1, §§ 3-7, and ch. 3. §§ 7-21. The + stress Berkeley lays on "co-existence" is significant. + + M213 P. + + 156 i.e. we must not doubt the reality of the immediate data of sense + but accept it, as "the mob" do. + + M214 I. + M215 S. + M216 S. + + 157 But is imagination different from actual perception only in _degree_ + of reality? + + M217 S. + M218 E. + + 158 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 120; also Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. + 7. sect. 7. + + M219 I. + + 159 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 1. + + M220 I. + + 160 Berkeley's aim evidently is to deliver men from empty abstractions, + by a return to more reasonably interpreted common-sense. + + M221 S. + + 161 The sort of _external_ world that is intelligible to us is that of + which _another person_ is percipient, and which is _objective_ to + me, in a percipient experience foreign to mine. + + M222 S. + M223 Mo. + M224 S. + + 162 Cf. Berkeley's _Arithmetica_ and _Miscellanea Mathematica_, + published while he was making his entries in this _Commonplace + Book_. + + 163 Minima sensibilia? + + M225 Mo. + M226 E. + M227 Mo. + M228 Mo. + + 164 Pleasures, _qua_ pleasures, are natural causes of correlative + desires, as pains or uneasinesses are of correlative aversions. This + is implied in the very nature of pleasure and pain. + + M229 I. + M230 I. + + 165 Here we have his explanation of _idea_. + + M231 M. S. + + 166 Absent things. + + 167 Here, as elsewhere, he resolves geometry, as strictly demonstrable, + into a reasoned system of analytical or verbal propositions. + + M232 I. M. + + 168 Compare this with note 3, p. 34; also with the contrast between + Sense and Reason, in _Siris_. Is the statement consistent with + implied assumptions even in the _Principles_, apart from which they + could not cohere? + + M233 S. G. + M234 E. + M235 G. + + 169 To have an _idea_ of God--as Berkeley uses idea--would imply that God + is an immediately perceptible, or at least an imaginable object. + + M236 M. E. + + 170 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 89. + + M237 I. + M238 M. S. + M239 S. + M240 Mo. + M241 S. + M242 M. + + 171 Ch. 11. § 5. + + M243 S. + M244 E. + + 172 Why add--"or perception"? + + M245 Mo. + M246 M. + + 173 Here we have Berkeley's favourite thought of the divine + arbitrariness of the constitution of Nature, and of its laws of + change. + + M247 M. S. + M248 S. + M249 S. + + 174 This suggests the puzzle, that the cause of every volition must be a + preceding volition, and so on _ad infinitum_. + + M250 S. + M251 E. S. + M252 M. P. E. + +_ 175 Recherche_, I. 19. + + M253 P. + + 176 i.e. of his own individual mind. + + M254 M. P. + + 177 i.e. to _a_ percipient mind, but not necessarily to _mine_; for + natural laws are independent of individual will, although the + individual participates in perception of the ordered changes. + + 178 Cf. the _Arithmetica_. + + M255 M. N. + M256 G. + M257 S. + + 179 i.e. which are not phenomena. This recognition of originative Will + even then distinguished Berkeley. + + M258 M. + + 180 Is this Part II of the _Principles_, which was lost in Italy? + + M259 I. S. + M260 I. Mo. + M261 S. + + 181 The thought of articulate _relations_ to which real existence must + conform, was not then at least in Berkeley's mind. Hence the + empiricism and sensationalism into which he occasionally seems to + rush in the _Commonplace Book_, in his repulsion from empty + abstractions. + + M262 G. S. + + 182 This is the essence of Berkeley's philosophy--"a blind agent is a + contradiction." + + M263 G. + M264 S. + M265 S. + M266 S. Mo. + M267 Mo. N. + M268 M. + + 183 This is the basis of Berkeley's reasoning for the necessarily + _unrepresentative_ character of the ideas or phenomena that are + presented to our senses. _They_ are the originals. + + M269 M. S. + M270 S. + M271 S. + M272 S. + M273 M. + M274 M. + M275 G. + + 184 Berkeley's horror of abstract or unperceived space and atoms is + partly explained by dogmas in natural philosophy that are now + antiquated. + + M276 I. E. + M277 G. + + 185 Ralph [?] Raphson, author of _Demonstratio de Deo_ (1710), and also + of _De Spatio Reali, seu ente Infinito: conamen + mathematico-metaphysicum_ (1697), to which Berkeley refers in one of + his letters to Johnson. See also Green's _Principles of Natural + Philosophy_ (1712). The immanence of omnipotent goodness in the + material world was unconsciously Berkeley's presupposition. In God + we have our being. + + M278 S. + M279 S. + M280 G. + M281 E. N. + + 186 Note here Berkeley's version of the causal principle, which is + really the central presupposition of his whole philosophy--viz. every + event in the material world must be the issue of acting Will. + + M282 P. + M283 S. + + 187 So Locke on an ideally perfect memory. _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. x. § 9. + + M284 G. + M285 M. + + 188 John Sergeant was the author of _Solid Philosophy asserted against + the Fancies of the Ideists_ (London, 1697); also of _the Method to + Science_ (1696). He was a deserter from the Church of England to the + Church of Rome, and wrote several pieces in defence of Roman + theology--some of them in controversy with Tillotson. + + M286 S. + M287 E. S. + + 189 Spirit and Matter are mutually dependent; but Spirit is the + realising factor and real agent in the universe. + + M288 M. + M289 P. + M290 G. + + 190 See Descartes, _Meditations_, III; Spinoza, _Epist._ II, ad + Oldenburgium. + + M291 S. + + 191 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2. + + M292 S. + M293 S. + M294 N. S. + M295 Mo. + M296 Mo. + M297 Mo. N. + + 192 Is "inclusion" here virtually a synonym for verbal definition? + + M298 S. + M299 N. + M300 N. + M301 S. + M302 I. + M303 I. + M304 I. + M305 M. + M306 M. + M307 M. S. + + 193 See _Principles_, sect. 2. The universe of Berkeley consists of + Active Spirits that perceive and produce motion in impotent ideas or + phenomena, realised in the percipient experience of persons. All + supposed powers in Matter are refunded into Spirit. + + M308 P. + M309 P. + M310 I. + M311 S. + M312 S. + M313 S. + M314 S. + + 194 When self-conscious agents are included among "things." We can have + no sensuous image, i.e. idea, of _spirit_, although he maintains we + can use the word intelligently. + + M315 Mo. + M316 M. + M317 S. G. + M318 P. + M319 M. + M320 S. + M321 M. P. + M322 Mo. N. + + 195 Berkeley insists that we should individualise our thinking--"ipsis + consuescere rebus," as Bacon says,--to escape the dangers of + artificial signs. This is the drift of his assault on abstract + ideas, and his repulsion from what is not concrete. He would even + dispense with words in his meditations in case of being + sophisticated by abstractions. + + M323 N. + + 196 Nature or the phenomenal world in short is the revelation of + perfectly reasonable Will. + + M324 M. S. + M325 S. + + 197 Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian. + + M326 S. + M327 G. T. + M328 T. + M329 T. + M330 T. + M331 M. + M332 M. + M333 M. + M334 M. + + 198 Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons + exist? + + M335 N. + + 199 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8. + + M336 M. S. + M337 M. + M338 M. + M339 T. + M340 M. + M341 N. + M342 M. + M343 T. + + 200 Time being relative to the capacity of the percipient. + + 201 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8. + + M344 M. + + 202 To perceive what is not an idea (as Berkeley uses idea) is to + perceive what is not realised, and therefore not real. + + 203 So things have a _potential_ objective existence in the Divine Will. + + 204 With Berkeley, change is time, and time, abstracted from all + changes, is meaningless. + + 205 Could he know, by seeing only, even that he _had_ a body? + + M345 M. + M346 M. + M347 M. + M348 M. + M349 M. N. + M350 N. + + 206 "the ideas attending these impressions," i.e. the ideas that are + correlatives of the (by us unperceived) organic impressions. + + M351 M. + M352 M. + M353 M. + + 207 The Italian physical and metaphysical philosopher Fardella + (1650-1718) maintained, by reasonings akin to those of Malebranche, + that the existence of the material world could not be scientifically + proved, and could only be maintained by faith in authoritative + revelation. See his _Universae Philosophiae Systema_ (1690), and + especially his _Logica_ (1696). + + M354 M. + + 208 Locke's _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11. + + 209 What does he mean by "unknown substratum"? + + M355 M. + M356 S. + M357 M. + M358 M. + + 210 He gets rid of the infinite in quantity, because it is incapable of + concrete manifestation to the senses. When a phenomenon given in + sense reaches the _minimum sensibile_, it reaches what is for us the + margin of realisable existence: it cannot be infinitely little and + still a phenomenon: insensible phenomena of sense involve a + contradiction. And so too of the infinitely large. + + M359 T. + + 211 In short he would idealise the visible world but not the tangible + world. In the _Principles_, Berkeley idealises both. + + M360 S. + M361 M. + + 212 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 149-59, where he concludes that + "neither abstract nor visible extension makes the object of + geometry." + + 213 By the adult, who has learned to interpret its visual signs. + + 214 Inasmuch as no physical consequences _follow_ the volition; which + however is still self-originated. + + M362 G. + + 215 "A succession of ideas I take to _constitute_ time, and not to be + only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think." + (Berkeley's letter to Johnson.) + + M363 P. + M364 M. + M365 T. + M366 S. + + 216 Cf. _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 16, sect. 8. + + 217 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 67-77. + + 218 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 88-120. + + M367 T. + M368 M. + M369 M. + + 219 This is of the essence of Berkeley's philosophy. + + M370 M. + M371 M. + M372 Mo. S. + M373 S. + M374 S. + M375 S. + + 220 But in moral freedom originates in the agent, instead of being + "consecutive" to his voluntary acts or found only in their + consequences. + + M376 M. + + 221 "Strigose" (strigosus)--meagre. + + M377 S. Mo. + M378 N. + M379 I. S. + M380 S. + + 222 As he afterwards expresses it, we have intelligible _notions_, but + not _ideas_--sensuous pictures--of the states or acts of our minds. + + 223 ["Omnes reales rerum proprietates continentur in Deo." What means Le + Clerc &c. by this? Log. I. ch. 8.]--AUTHOR, on margin. + + M381 G. + + 224 "Si non rogas intelligo." + + M382 M. + M383 P.N. + M384 M. P. + + 225 This way of winning others to his own opinions is very + characteristic of Berkeley. See p. 92 and note. + + M385 M. P. + + 226 See _Third Dialogue_, on _sameness_ in things and _sameness_ in + persons, which it puzzles him to reconcile with his New Principles. + + M386 N. + M387 S. + + 227 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 52-61. + + 228 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 101-134. + + 229 "distance"--on opposite page in the MS. Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. + 140. + + 230 Direct perception of phenomena is adequate to the perceived + phenomena; indirect or scientific perception is inadequate, leaving + room for faith and trust. + + M388 M. P. + + 231 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 107-8. + + M389 M. + M390 S. + + 232 The Divine Ideas of Malebranche and the sensuous ideas of Berkeley + differ. + + M391 N. + + 233 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 71. + + 234 Cf. Malebranche, _Recherche_, Bk. I. c. 6. That and the following + chapters seem to have been in Berkeley's mind. + + 235 He here assumes that extension (visible) is implied in the visible + idea we call colour. + + 236 This strikingly illustrates Berkeley's use of "idea," and what he + intends when he argues against "abstract" ideas. + + M392 M. P. + + 237 An interesting autobiographical fact. From childhood he was + indisposed to take things on trust. + + M393 M. P. + M394 M. + M395 M. + +_ 238 Essay on Vision_, sect. 88-119. + + M396 M. + M397 M. + M398 M. + M399 M. + M400 P. + M401 M. P. + M402 M. + M403 M. + M404 I. + M405 M. + + 239 "thoughts," i.e. ideas of sense? + + 240 This, in a crude way, is the distinction of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. It + helps to explain Berkeley's meaning, when he occasionally speaks of + the ideas or phenomena that appear in the sense experience of + different persons as if they were absolutely independent entities. + + M406 M. + M407 M. + + 241 To be "in an unperceiving thing," i.e. to be real, yet unperceived. + Whatever is perceived is, because realised only through a percipient + act, an _idea_--in Berkeley's use of the word. + + M408 I. + + 242 This as to the "Platonic strain" is not in the tone of _Siris_. + + M409 M. + M410 M. + M411 M. + + 243 John Keill (1671-1721), an eminent mathematician, educated at the + University of Edinburgh; in 1710 Savilian Professor of Astronomy at + Oxford, and the first to teach the Newtonian philosophy in that + University. In 1708 he was engaged in a controversy in support of + Newton's claims to the discovery of the method of fluxions. + + M412 M. P. + M413 M. + + 244 This suggests a negative argument for Kant's antinomies, and for + Hamilton's law of the conditioned. + + M414 M. + M415 N. + + 245 Newton became Sir Isaac on April 16, 1705. Was this written before + that date? + + 246 These may be _considered_ separately, but not _pictured_ as such. + + M416 P. + M417 M. + + 247 In as far as they have not been sensibly realised in finite + percipient mind. + + 248 [Or rather that invisible length does exist.]--AUTHOR, on margin. + + 249 Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647), the Italian mathematician. His + _Geometry of Indivisibles_ (1635) prepared the way for the Calculus. + + M418 M. + M419 P. G. + + 250 [By "the excuse" is meant the finiteness of our mind--making it + possible for contradictions to appear true to us.]--AUTHOR, on + margin. + + 251 He allows elsewhere that words with meanings not realisable in + imagination, i.e. in the form of idea, may discharge a useful + office. See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 20. + + M420 M. P. + + 252 We do not perceive unperceived matter, but only matter realised in + living perception--the percipient act being the factor of its + reality. + + M421 M. + M422 P. + + 253 The secondary qualities of things. + + M423 M. P. + + 254 Because, while dependent on percipient sense, they are independent + of _my_ personal will, being determined to appear under natural law, + by Divine agency. + + M424 P. + M425 M. + + 255 Keill's _Introductio ad veram Physicam_ (Oxon. 1702)--Lectio 5--a + curious work, dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke. + + 256 [Extension without breadth--i. e. insensible, intangible length--is + not conceivable. 'Tis a mistake we are led into by the doctrine of + abstraction.]--AUTHOR, on margin of MS. + + 257 Here "Sir Isaac." Hence written after April, 1705. + + M426 M. + +_ 258 Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. iv. sect. 18; ch. v. sect. 3, &c. + + 259 He applies _thing_ to self-conscious persons as well as to passive + objects of sense. + +_ 260 Scaligerana Secunda_, p. 270. + + 261 [These arguments must be proposed shorter and more separate in the + Treatise.]--AUTHOR, on margin. + + 262 "Idea" here used in its wider meaning--for "operations of mind," as + well as for sense presented phenomena that are independent of + individual will. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 1. + + 263 "sensations," i.e. objective phenomena presented in sense. + + 264 See _Principles_, sect. 1. + + 265 See _Principles_, sect. 2. + + 266 An "unperceiving thing" cannot be the factor of material reality. + + 267 [To the utmost accuracy, wanting nothing of perfection. _Their_ + solutions of problems, themselves must own to fall infinitely short + of perfection.]--AUTHOR, on margin. + + M427 P. + + 268 Jean de Billy and Rene de Billy, French mathematicians--the former + author of _Nova Geometriae Clavis_ and other mathematical works. + + M428 T. + + 269 According to Baronius, in the fifth volume of his "Annals," Ficinus + appeared after death to Michael Mercatus--agreeably to a promise he + made when he was alive--to assure him of the life of the human spirit + after the death of the body. + + M429 M. + + 270 So far as we are factors of their reality, in sense and in science, + or can be any practical way concerned with them. + + 271 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 101-34. + + M430 P. + + 272 "something," i.e. _abstract_ something. + + 273 Lord Pembroke (?)--to whom the _Principles_ were dedicated, and to + whom Locke dedicated his _Essay_. + + 274 This is an interesting example of a feature that is conspicuous in + Berkeley--the art of "humoring an opponent in his own way of + thinking," which it seems was an early habit. It is thus that he + insinuates his New Principles in the _Essay on Vision_, and so + prepares to unfold and defend them in the book of _Principles_ and + the three _Dialogues_--straining language to reconcile them with + ordinary modes of speech. + + 275 In Diderot's _Lettre sur les aveugles, a l'usage de ceux qui + voient_, where Berkeley, Molyneux, Condillac, and others are + mentioned. Cf. also Appendix, pp. 111, 112; and _Theory of Vision + Vindicated_, sect. 71, with the note, in which some recorded + experiments are alluded to. + +_ 276 De Anima_, II. 6, III. 1, &c. Aristotle assigns a pre-eminent + intellectual value to the sense of sight. See, for instance, his + _Metaphysics_, I. 1. + + 277 Sir A. Grant, (_Ethics of Aristotle_, vol. II. p. 172) remarks, as + to the doctrine that the Common Sensibles are apprehended + concomitantly by the senses, that: "this is surely the true view; we + see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an + operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and + categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It would follow + then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the + senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge. + Aristotle's doctrine of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} would go far, if carried out, + to modify his doctrine of the simple and innate character of the + senses, e.g. sight (cf. _Eth._ II. 1, 4), and would prevent its + collision with Berkeley's _Theory of Vision_."--See also Sir W. + Hamilton, _Reid's Works_, pp. 828-830. + + Dugald Stewart (_Collected Works_, vol. I. p. 341, note) quotes + Aristotle's _Ethics_, II. 1, as evidence that Berkeley's doctrine, + "with respect to the acquired perceptions of sight, was quite + unknown to the best metaphysicians of antiquity." + + 278 A work resembling Berkeley's in its title, but in little else, + appeared more than twenty years before the _Essay_--the _Nova + Visionis Theoria_ of Dr. Briggs, published in 1685. + + 279 See _Treatise on the Eye_, vol. II. pp. 299, &c. + + 280 See Reid's _Inquiry_, ch. v. §§ 3, 5, 6, 7; ch. vi. § 24, and + _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, II. ch. 10 and 19. + + 281 While Sir W. Hamilton (_Lectures on Metaphysics_, lxxviii) + acknowledges the scientific validity of Berkeley's conclusions, as + to the way we judge of distances, he complains, in the same lecture, + that "the whole question is thrown into doubt by the analogy of the + lower animals," i.e. by their probable _visual instinct_ of + distances; and elsewhere (Reid's _Works_, p. 137, note) he seems to + hesitate about Locke's Solution of Molyneux's Problem, at least in + its application to Cheselden's case. Cf. Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais_, + Liv. II. ch. 9, in connexion with this last. + + 282 An almost solitary exception in Britain to this unusual uniformity + on a subtle question in psychology is found in Samuel Bailey's + _Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the + unsoundness of that celebrated Speculation_, which appeared in 1842. + It was the subject of two interesting rejoinders--a well-weighed + criticism, in the _Westminster Review_, by J.S. Mill, since + republished in his _Discussions_; and an ingenious Essay by + Professor Ferrier, in _Blackwood's Magazine_, republished in his + _Philosophical Remains_. The controversy ended on that occasion with + Bailey's _Letter to a Philosopher in reply to some recent attempts + to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision, and in further elucidation + of its unsoundness_, and a reply to it by each of his critics. It + was revived in 1864 by Mr. Abbott of Trinity College, Dublin, whose + essay on _Sight and Touch_ is "an attempt to disprove the received + (or Berkeleian) Theory of Vision." + + 283 Afterwards (in 1733) Earl of Egmont. Born about 1683, he succeeded + to the baronetcy in 1691, and, after sitting for a few years in the + Irish House of Commons, was in 1715 created Baron Percival, in the + Irish peerage. In 1732 he obtained a charter to colonise the + province of Georgia in North America. His name appears in the list + of subscribers to Berkeley's Bermuda Scheme in 1726. He died in + 1748. He corresponded frequently with Berkeley from 1709 onwards. + + 284 Similar terms are applied to the sense of seeing by writers with + whom Berkeley was familiar. Thus Locke (_Essay_, II. ix. 9) refers + to sight as "the most comprehensive of all our senses." Descartes + opens his _Dioptrique_ by designating it as "le plus universal et le + plus noble de nos sens;" and he alludes to it elsewhere (_Princip._ + IV. 195) as "le plus subtil de tous les sens." Malebranche begins + his analysis of sight (_Recherche_, I. 6) by describing it as "le + premier, le plus noble, et le plus etendu de tous les sens." The + high place assigned to this sense by Aristotle has been already + alluded to. Its office, as the chief organ through which a + conception of the material universe as placed in ambient space is + given to us, is recognised by a multitude of psychologists and + metaphysicians. + + 285 On Berkeley's originality in his Theory of Vision see the Editor's + Preface. + + 286 In the first edition alone this sentence followed:--"In treating of + all which, it seems to me, the writers of Optics have proceeded on + wrong principles." + + 287 Sect. 2-51 explain the way in which we learn in seeing to judge of + Distance or Outness, and of objects as existing remote from our + organism, viz. by their association with what we see, and with + certain muscular and other sensations in the eye which accompany + vision. Sect. 2 assumes, as granted, the invisibility of distance in + the line of sight. Cf. sect. 11 and 88--_First Dialogue between Hylas + and Philonous--Alciphron_, IV. 8--_Theory of Vision Vindicated and + Explained_, sect. 62-69. + + 288 i.e. outness, or distance outward from the point of vision--distance + in the line of sight--the third dimension of space. Visible distance + is visible space or interval between two points (see sect. 112). We + can be sensibly percipient of it only when _both_ points are seen. + + 289 This section is adduced by some of Berkeley's critics as if it were + the evidence discovered by him for his _Theory_, instead of being, + as it is, a passing reference to the scientific ground of the + already acknowledged invisibility of outness, or distance in the + line of sight. See, for example, Bailey's _Review of Berkeley's + Theory of Vision_, pp. 38-43, also his _Theory of Reasoning_, p. 179 + and pp. 200-7--Mill's _Discussions_, vol. II. p. 95--Abbott's _Sight + and Touch_, p. 10, where this sentence is presented as "the sole + positive argument advanced by Berkeley." The invisibility of outness + is not Berkeley's discovery, but the way we learn to interpret its + visual signs, and what these are. + + 290 i.e. aerial and linear perspective are acknowledged signs of remote + distances. But the question, in this and the thirty-six following + sections, concerns the visibility of _near_ distances only--a few + yards in front of us. It was "agreed by all" that beyond this limit + distances are suggested by our experience of their signs. + + 291 Cf. this and the four following sections with the quotations in the + Editor's Preface, from Molyneux's _Treatise of Dioptrics_. + + 292 In the author's last edition we have this annotation: "See what Des + Cartes and others have written upon the subject." + + 293 In the first edition this section opens thus: "I have here set down + the common current accounts that are given of our perceiving near + distances by sight, which, though they are unquestionably received + for true by mathematicians, and accordingly made use of by them in + determining the apparent places of objects, do nevertheless," &c. + + 294 Omitted in the author's last edition. + + 295 i.e. although immediately invisible, it is mediately seen. Mark, + here and elsewhere, the ambiguity of the term _perception_, which + now signifies the act of being conscious of sensuous phenomena, and + again the act of inferring phenomena of which we are at the time + insentient; while it is also applied to the object perceived instead + of to the percipient act; and sometimes to imagination, and the + higher acts of intelligence. + + 296 "Some men"--"mathematicians," in first edition. + + 297 i.e. the _mediate_ perception. + + 298 "any man"--"all the mathematicians in the world," in first edition. + + 299 Omitted in the author's last edition. + + 300 Omitted in the author's last edition. + + 301 Sect. 3, 9. + + 302 Observe the first introduction by Berkeley of the term _suggestion_, + used by him to express a leading factor in his account of the + visible world, and again in his more comprehensive account of our + knowledge of the material universe in the _Principles_. It had been + employed occasionally, among others, by Hobbes and Locke. There are + three ways in which the objects we have an immediate perception of + in sight may be supposed to conduct us to what we do not immediately + perceive: (1) Instinct, or what Reid calls "_original suggestion_" + (_Inquiry_, ch. VI. sect. 20-24); (2) Custom; (3) Reasoning from + accepted premisses. Berkeley's "suggestion" corresponds to the + second. (Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 42.) + + 303 In the _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 66, it is added that + this "sensation" belongs properly to the sense of touch. Cf. also + sect. 145 of this _Essay_. + + 304 Here "natural"="necessary": elsewhere=divinely arbitrary connexion. + + 305 That our _mediate_ vision of outness and of objects as thus + external, is due to media which have a contingent or arbitrary, + instead of a necessary, connexion with the distances which they + enable us to see, or of which they are the signs, is a cardinal part + of his argument. + + 306 Sect. 2. + + 307 Here, as generally in the _Essay_, the appeal is to our inward + experience, not to phenomena observed by our senses in the organism. + + 308 See sect. 35 for the difference between confused and faint vision. + Cf. sect. 32-38 with this section. Also _Theory of Vision + Vindicated_, sect. 68. + + 309 See sect. 6. + + 310 These sections presuppose previous contiguity as an associative law + of mental phenomena. + + 311 See Reid's _Inquiry_, ch. vi. sect. 22. + + 312 Sect. 16-27.--For the signs of remote distances, see sect. 3. + + 313 These are muscular sensations felt in the organ, and degrees of + confusion in a visible idea. Berkeley's "arbitrary" signs of + distance, near and remote, are either (_a_) invisible states of the + visual organ, or (_b_) visible appearances. + + 314 In Molyneux's _Treatise of Dioptrics_, Pt. I. prop. 31, sect. 9, + Barrow's difficulty is stated. Cf. sect. 40 below. + + 315 Christopher Scheiner, a German astronomer, and opponent of the + Copernican system, born 1575, died 1650. + + 316 Andrea Tacquet, a mathematician, born at Antwerp in 1611, and + referred to by Molyneux as "the ingenious Jesuit." He published a + number of scientific treatises, most of which appeared after his + death, in a collected form, at Antwerp in 1669. + + 317 In what follows Berkeley tries to explain by his visual theory + seeming contradictions which puzzled the mathematicians. + + 318 This is offered as a verification of the theory that near distances + are suggested, according to the order of nature, by non-resembling + visual signs, contingently connected with real distance. + + 319 Cf. sect. 78; also _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 31. + + 320 Berkeley here passes from his proof of visual "suggestion" of all + outward distances--i.e. intervals between extremes in the line of + sight--by means of arbitrary signs, and considers the nature of + visible externality. See note in Hamilton's _Reid_, p. 177, on the + distinction between perception of the external world and perception + of distance through the eye. + + 321 See Descartes, _Dioptrique_, VI--Malebranche, _Recherche_, Liv. I. + ch. 9, 3--Reid's _Inquiry_, VI. 11. + + 322 Berkeley here begins to found, on the experienced connexion between + extension and colour, and between visible and tangible extension, a + proof that _outness_ is invisible. From Aristotle onwards it has + been assumed that colour is the only phenomenon of which we are + immediately percipient in seeing. Visible extension, visible figure, + and visible motion are accordingly taken to be dependent on the + sensation of colour. + + 323 In connexion with this and the next illustration, Berkeley seems to + argue that we are not only unable to see distance in the line of + sight, but also that we do not see a distant object in its _real + visible_ magnitude. But elsewhere he affirms that only _tangible_ + magnitude is entitled to be called _real_. Cf. sect. 55, 59, 61. + + 324 The sceptical objections to the trustworthiness of the senses, + proposed by the Eleatics and others, referred to by Descartes in his + _Meditations_, and by Malebranche in the First Book of his + _Recherche_, may have suggested the illustrations in this section. + Cf. also Hume's Essay _On the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy_. + The sceptical difficulty is founded on the assumption that the + object seen at different distances is the _same visible object_: it + is really different, and so the difficulty vanishes. + + 325 Here Berkeley expressly introduces "touch"--a term which with him + includes, not merely organic sense of contact, but also muscular and + locomotive sense-experience. After this he begins to unfold the + antithesis of visual and tactual phenomena, whose subsequent + synthesis it is the aim of the _New Theory_ to explain. Cf. + _Principles of Human Knowledge_, sect. 43--_Theory of Vision + Vindicated_, sect. 22 and 25. Note here Berkeley's reticence of his + idealization of Matter--tangible as well as visible. Cf. + _Principles_, sect. 44. + + 326 This connexion of our knowledge of distance with our locomotive + experience points to a theory which ultimately resolves space into + experience of unimpeded locomotion. + + 327 Locke (_Essay_, Introduction, § 8) takes _idea_ vaguely as "the term + which serves best to stand whatsoever is the object of the + understanding when a man thinks." Oversight of what Berkeley intends + the term idea has made his whole conception of nature and the + material universe a riddle to many, of which afterwards. + + 328 The expressive term "outness," favoured by Berkeley, is here first + used. + + 329 "We get the idea of Space," says Locke, "both by our sight and + touch" (_Essay_, II. 13. § 2). Locke did not contemplate Berkeley's + antithesis of visible and tangible extension, and the consequent + ambiguity of the term extension; which sometimes signifies + _coloured_, and at others _resistant_ experience in sense. + + 330 For an explanation of this difficulty, see sect. 144. + + 331 "object"--"thing," in the earlier editions. + + 332 This is the issue of the analytical portion of the _Essay_. + + 333 Cf. sect. 139-40. + + 334 Here the question of externality, signifying independence of all + percipient life, is again mixed up with that of the invisibility of + distance outwards in the line of sight. + + 335 Omitted in author's last edition. + + 336 i.e. including muscular and locomotive experience as well as sense + of contact. But what are the _tangibilia_ themselves? Are they also + significant, like _visibilia_, of a still ulterior reality? This is + the problem of the _Principles of Human Knowledge_. + + 337 In this section the conception of a natural Visual Language, makes + its appearance, with its implication that Nature is (for us) + virtually Spirit. Cf. sect. 140, 147--_Principles_, sect. + 44--_Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous_--_Alciphron_, IV. 8, 11--and + _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, passim. + + 338 Sect. 52-87 treat of the invisibility of real, i.e. tactual, + Magnitude. Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 54-61. + + 339 Sect. 8-15. + + 340 Sect. 41, &c. + + 341 See Molyneux's _Treatise on Dioptrics_, B. I. prop. 28. + + 342 See sect. 122-126. + + 343 In short there is a point at which, with our limited sense, we cease + to be percipient of colour, in seeing; and of resistance, in + locomotion. Though Berkeley regards all visible extensions as + sensible, and therefore dependent for their reality on being + realised by sentient mind, he does not mean that mind or + consciousness is extended. With him, extension, though it exists + only in mind,--i.e. as an idea seen, in the case of visible + extension, and as an idea touched, in the case of tangible + extension,--is yet no _property_ of mind. Mind can exist without + being percipient of extension, although extension cannot be realised + without mind. + + 344 But this is true, though less obviously, of tangible as well as of + visible objects. + + 345 Sect. 49. + + 346 Cf. sect. 139, 140, &c. + + 347 "situation"--not in the earlier editions. + + 348 Sect. 55. + + 349 Omitted in the author's last edition. + + 350 Ordinary sight is virtually foresight. Cf. sect. 85.--See also + Malebranche on the external senses, as given primarily for the + urgent needs of embodied life, not to immediately convey scientific + knowledge, _Recherche_, Liv. I. ch. 5, 6, 9, &c. + + 351 Sect. 44.--See also sect. 55, and note. + + 352 This supposes "settled" _tangibilia_, but not "settled" _visibilia_. + Yet the sensible extension given in touch and locomotive experience + is also relative--an object being _felt_ as larger or smaller + according to the state of the organism, and the other conditions of + our embodied perception. + + 353 What follows, to end of sect. 63, added in the author's last + edition. + + 354 "outward objects," i.e. objects of which we are percipient in + tactual experience, taken in this _Essay_ provisionally as the real + external objects. See _Principles_, sect. 44. + + 355 Cf. sect. 144. Note, in this and the three preceding sections, the + stress laid on the _arbitrariness_ of the connexion between the + signs which suggest magnitudes, or other modes of extension, and + their significates. This is the foundation of the _New Theory_; + which thus resolves _physical_ causality into a relation of signs to + what they signify and predict--analogous to the relation between + words and their accepted meanings. + + 356 In sect. 67-78, Berkeley attempts to verify the foregoing account of + the natural signs of Size, by applying it to solve a phenomenon, the + cause of which had been long debated among men of science--the + visible magnitude of heavenly bodies when seen in the horizon. + + 357 Cf. sect. 10. + + 358 Omitted in the author's last edition. Cf sect. 76, 77.--The + explanation in question is attributed to Alhazen, and by Bacon to + Ptolemy, while it is sanctioned by eminent scientific names before + and since Berkeley. + + 359 "Fourthly" in the second edition. Cf. what follows with sect. 74. + Why "lesser"? + + 360 When Berkeley, some years afterwards, visited Italy, he remarked + that distant objects appeared to him much nearer than they really + were--a phenomenon which he attributed to the comparative purity of + the southern air. + + 361 i.e. the original perception, apart from any synthetic operation of + suggestion and inferential thought, founded on visual signs. + + 362 In Riccioli's _Almagest_, II. lib. X. sect. 6. quest. 14, we have an + account of many hypotheses then current, in explanation of the + apparent magnitude of the horizontal moon. + + 363 Gassendi's "Epistolae quatuor de apparente magnitudine solis humilis + et sublimis."--_Opera_, tom. III pp. 420-477. Cf. Appendix to this + _Essay_, p. 110. + + 364 See _Dioptrique_, VI. + +_ 365 Opera Latina_, vol. I, p. 376, vol. II, pp. 26-62; _English Works_, + vol. I. p. 462. (Molesworth's Edition.) + + 366 The paper in the Transactions is by Molyneux. + + 367 See Smith's _Optics_, pp. 64-67, and _Remarks_, pp. 48, &c. At p. 55 + Berkeley's _New Theory_ is referred to, and pronounced to be at + variance with experience. Smith concludes by saying, that in "the + second edition of Berkeley's _Essay_, and also in a Vindication and + Explanation of it (called the _Visual Language_), very lately + published, the author has made some additions to his solution of the + said phenomenon; but seeing it still involves and depends on the + principle of faintness, I may leave the rest of it to the reader's + consideration." This, which appeared in 1738, is one of the very few + early references to Berkeley's _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_. + + 368 Sect. 2-51. + + 369 This sentence is omitted in the author's last edition. + + 370 What follows to the end of this section is not contained in the + first edition. + + 371 i.e. tangible. + + 372 Cf. sect. 38; and _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 31. + + 373 "Never"--"hardly," in first edition. + + 374 Cf. Appendix, p. 208.--See Smith's _Optics_, B. I. ch. v, and + _Remarks_, p. 56, in which he "leaves it to be considered, whether + the said phenomenon is not as clear an instance of the insufficiency + of faintness" as of mathematical computation. + + 375 A favourite doctrine with Berkeley, according to whose theory of + visibles there can be no absolute visible magnitude, the _minimum_ + being the least that is _perceivable_ by each seeing subject, and + thus relative to his visual capacity. This section is thus + criticised, in January, 1752, in a letter signed "Anti-Berkeley," in + the _Gent. Mag._ (vol. XXII, p. 12): "Upon what his lordship asserts + with respect to the _minimum visibile_, I would observe that it is + certain that there are infinite numbers of animals which are + imperceptible to the naked eye, and cannot be perceived but by the + help of a microscope; consequently there are animals whose whole + bodies are far less than the _minimum visibile_ of a man. Doubtless + these animals have eyes, and, if their _minimum visibile_ were equal + to that of a man, it would follow that they cannot perceive anything + but what is much larger than their whole body; and therefore their + own bodies must be invisible to them, because we know they are so to + men, whose _minimum visibile_ is asserted by his lordship to be + equal to theirs." There is some misconception in this. Cf. Appendix + to _Essay_, p. 209. + + 376 Those two defects belong to human consciousness. See Locke's + _Essay_, II. 10, on the defects of human memory. It is this + imperfection which makes reasoning needful--to assist finite + intuition. Reasoning is the sign at once of our dignity and our + weakness. + + 377 Sect. 59. + + 378 Sect. 80-82. + + 379 Sect. 88-119 relate to the nature, invisibility, and arbitrary + visual signs of Situation, or of the localities of tangible things. + Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 44-53. + + 380 Cf. sect. 2, 114, 116, 118. + + 381 This illustration is taken from Descartes. See Appendix. + + 382 Sect. 10 and 19. + + 383 Sect. 2-51. + + 384 Omitted in author's last edition. + + 385 This is Berkeley's universal solvent of the psychological + difficulties involved in visual-perception. + + 386 Cf. sect. 103, 106, 110, 128, &c. Berkeley treats this case + hypothetically in the _Essay_, in defect of actual experiments upon + the born-blind, since accumulated from Cheselden downwards. See + however the Appendix, and _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 71. + + 387 i.e. tangible things. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 44. + + 388 The "prejudice," to wit, which Berkeley would dissolve by his + introspective analysis of vision. Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, + sect. 35. + + 389 Thus forming individual concrete things out of what is perceived + separately through different senses. + + 390 This briefly is Berkeley's solution of "the knot about inverted + images," which long puzzled men of science. + + 391 i.e. perceive _mediately_--visible objects, _per se_, having no + tactual situation. Pure vision, he would say, has nothing to do with + "high" and "low," "great" and "inverted," in the real or tactual + meaning of those terms. + + 392 i.e. tangible. + + 393 e.g. "extension," which, according to Berkeley, is an equivocal + term, common (in its different meanings) to _visibilia_ and + _tangibilia_. Cf. sect. 139, 140. + + 394 Cf. sect. 93, 106, 110, 128. + + 395 i.e. real or tangible head. + + 396 Cf. sect. 140, 143. In the _Gent. Mag._ (vol. XXII. p. 12), + "Anti-Berkeley" thus argues the case of one born blind. "This man," + he adds, "would, by being accustomed to feel one hand with the + other, have perceived that the extremity of the hand was divided + into fingers--that the extremities of these fingers were + distinguished by certain hard, smooth surfaces, of a different + texture from the rest of the fingers--and that each finger had + certain joints or flexures. Now, if this man was restored to sight, + and immediately viewed his hand before he touched it again, it is + manifest that the divisions of the extremity of the hand into + fingers would be visibly perceived. He would note too the small + spaces at the extremity of each finger, which affected his sight + differently from the rest of the fingers; upon moving his fingers he + would see the joints. Though therefore, by means of this lately + acquired sense of seeing, the object affected his mind in a new and + different manner from what it did before, yet, as by _touch_ he had + acquired the knowledge of these several divisions, marks, and + distinctions of the hand, and, as the new object of _sight_ appeared + to be divided, marked, and distinguished in a similar manner, I + think he would certainly conclude, _before he touched his hand_, + that the thing which he now saw was _the same_ which he had felt + before and called his hand." + + 397 Locke, _Essay_, II. 8, 16. Aristotle regards number as a Common + Sensible.--_De Anima_, II. 6, III. 1. + + 398 "If the visible appearance of two shillings had been found connected + from the beginning with the tangible idea of one shilling, that + appearance would as naturally and readily have signified the unity + of the (tangible) object as it now signifies its duplicity." Reid, + _Inquiry_, VI. 11. + + 399 Here again note Berkeley's inconvenient reticence of his full theory + of matter, as dependent on percipient life for its reality. Tangible + things are meantime granted to be real "without mind." Cf. + _Principles_, sect. 43, 44. "Without the mind"--in contrast to + sensuous phenomenon only. + + 400 Cf. sect. 131. + + 401 Sect. 2, 88, 116, 118. + + 402 In short, we _see_ only _quantities of colour_--the real or tactual + distance, size, shape, locality, up and down, right and left, &c., + being gradually associated with the various visible modifications of + colour. + + 403 i.e. tangible. + + 404 Sect. 41-44. + + 405 i.e. tangible things. + + 406 i.e. visible. + + 407 Cf. sect. 41-44. The "eyes"--visible and tangible--are themselves + objects of sense. + + 408 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 21-25. + + 409 "Visible ideas"--including sensations muscular and locomotive, _felt_ + in the organ of vision. Sect. 16, 27, 57. + + 410 i.e. objects which, in this tentative _Essay_, are granted, for + argument's sake, to be external, or independent of percipient mind. + + 411 i.e. to inquire whether there are, in this instance, Common + Sensibles; and, in particular, whether an _extension_ of the same + kind at least, if not numerically the same, is presented in each. + The Kantian theory of an _a priori_ intuition of space, the common + condition of tactual and visual experience, because implied in + sense-experience as such, is not conceived by Berkeley. Cf. _Theory + of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 15. + + 412 In the following reasoning against abstract, as distinguished from + concrete or sense presented (visible or tangible) extension, + Berkeley urges some of his favourite objections to "abstract ideas," + fully unfolded in his _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 6-20.--See + also _Alciphron_, VII. 5-8.--_Defence of Free Thinking in + Mathematics_, sect. 45-48. + + 413 Berkeley's _ideas_ are concrete or particular--immediate data of + sense or imagination. + + 414 i.e. it cannot be individualized, either as a perceived or an + imagined object. + + 415 Sect. 105. + + 416 "Endeavours" in first edition. + + 417 i.e. a mental image of an abstraction, an impossible image, in which + the extension and comprehension of the notion must be adequately + pictured. + + 418 "deservedly admired author," in the first edition. + + 419 "this celebrated author,"--"that great man" in second edition. In + assailing Locke's "abstract idea," he discharges the meaning which + Locke intended by the term, and then demolishes his own figment. + + 420 Omitted in the author's last edition. + + 421 Omitted in last edition. + + 422 Omitted in last edition. + + 423 Omitted in last edition. + + 424 See _Principles_, passim. + + 425 Omitted in author's last edition. + + 426 He probably has Locke in his eye. + + 427 On Berkeley's theory, space without relation to bodies (i.e. + insensible or abstract space) would not be extended, as not having + parts; inasmuch as parts can be assigned to it only with relation to + bodies. Berkeley does not distinguish space from sensible extension. + Cf. Reid's _Works_, p. 126, note--in which Sir W. Hamilton suggests + that one may have an _a priori_ conception of pure space, and _also_ + an _a posteriori_ perception of finite, concrete space. + + 428 Sect. 121. Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 15. + + 429 i.e. there are no Common Sensibles: from which it follows that we + can reason from the one sense to the other only by founding on the + constant connexion of their respective phenomena, under a natural + yet (for us) contingent law. Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, + sect. 27, 28. + + 430 Omitted in last edition. + + 431 Cf. sect. 93, 103, 106, 110. + + 432 Omitted in last edition. + + 433 Cf. sect. 43, 103, &c. A plurality of co-existent _minima_ of + coloured points constitutes Berkeley's visible extension; while a + plurality of successively experienced _minima_ of resistant points + constitutes his tactual extension. Whether we can perceive visible + extension without experience of muscular movement at least in the + eye, he does not here say. + + 434 Omitted in last edition. + + 435 Real distance belongs originally, according to the _Essay_, to our + tactual experience only--in the wide meaning of touch, which includes + muscular and locomotive perceptions, as well as the simple + perception of contact. + + 436 Added in second edition. + + 437 Omitted in last edition. + + 438 See also Locke's "Correspondence" with Molyneux, in Locke's _Works_, + vol. IX. p. 34.--Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais_, Liv. II. ch. 9, who, so + far granting the fact, disputes the heterogeneity.--Smith's + _Optics._--_Remarks_, §§ 161-170.--Hamilton's Reid, p. 137, note, and + _Lect. Metaph._ II. p. 176. + + 439 Omitted in last edition. + + 440 Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 70. + + 441 Cf. sect. 49, 146, &c. Here "same" includes "similar." + + 442 i.e. visible and tangible motions being absolutely heterogeneous, + and the former, _at man's point of view_, only contingent signs of + the latter, we should not, at first sight, be able to interpret the + visual signs of tactual phenomena. + + 443 Cf. sect. 122-125. + + 444 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116; also _Analyst_, query 12. On + Berkeley's system space in its three dimensions is unrealisable + without experience of motion. + + 445 Here the term "language of nature" makes its appearance, as + applicable to the ideas or visual signs of tactual realities. + + 446 Cf. sect. 16, 27, 97. + + 447 Is "tangible" here used in its narrow meaning--excluding muscular and + locomotive experience? + + 448 i.e. as natural signs, divinely associated with their thus implied + meanings. + + 449 Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 35. + + 450 Berkeley, in this section, enunciates the principal conclusion in + the _Essay_, which conclusion indeed forms his new theory of Vision. + + 451 A suggestion thus due to natural laws of association. The + explanation of the fact that we apprehend, by those ideas or + phenomena which are objects of sight, certain other ideas, which + neither resemble them, nor efficiently cause them, nor are so caused + by them, nor have any necessary connexion with them, comprehends, + according to Berkeley, the whole Theory of Vision. "The imagination + of every thinking person," remarks Adam Smith, "will supply him with + instances to prove that the ideas received by any one of the senses + do readily excite such other ideas, either of the same sense or of + any other, as have habitually been associated with them. So that if, + on this account, we are to suppose, with a late ingenious writer, + that the ideas of sight constitute a Visual Language, because they + readily suggest the corresponding ideas of touch--as the terms of a + language excite the ideas answering to them--I see not but we may, + for the same reason, allow of a tangible, audible, gustatory, and + olefactory language; though doubtless the Visual Language will be + abundantly more copious than the rest." Smith's _Optics_.--_Remarks_, + p. 29.--And into this conception of a universal sense symbolism, + Berkeley's theory of Vision ultimately rises. + + 452 Cf. _Alciphron_, Dialogue IV. sect. 11-15. + + 453 Sect. 122-125. + + 454 Sect. 127-138. + + 455 Some modern metaphysicians would say, that neither tangible nor + visible extension is the object geometry, but abstract extension; + and others that space is a necessary implicate of sense-experience, + rather than, _per se_, an object of any single sense. Cf. Kant's + explanation of the origin of our mathematical knowledge, _Kritik der + reinen Vernunft_. Elementarlehre, I. + + 456 Cf. sect. 51-66, 144. + + 457 This is a conjecture, not as to the probable ideas of one born + blind, but as to the ideas of an "unbodied" intelligence, whose + _only_ sense was that of seeing. See Reid's speculation (_Inquiry_, + VI. 9) on the "Geometry of Visibles," and the mental experience of + Idomenians, or imaginary beings supposed to have no ideas of the + material world except those got by seeing. + + 458 Cf. sect. 130, and _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 57. Does + Berkeley, in this and the two preceding sections, mean to hint that + the only proper object of sight is _unextended_ colour; and that, + apart from muscular movement in the eye or other locomotion, + _visibilia_ resolve into unextended mathematical points? This + question has not escaped more recent British psychologists, + including Stewart, Brown, Mill, and Bain, who seem to hold that + unextended colour is perceivable and imaginable. + + 459 The bracketed sentence is not retained in the author's last edition, + in which the first sentence of sect. 160 is the concluding one of + sect. 159, and of the _Essay_. + + 460 This passage is contained in the _Dioptrices_ of Descartes, VI. 13; + see also VI. 11. + + 461 The arbitrariness or contingency--as far as our knowledge carries + us--of the connexion between the visual phenomena, as signs, on the + one hand, and actual distance, as perceived through this means, on + the other. + + 462 Cf. sect. 80-83. + + 463 The reference here seems to be to the case described in the _Tatler_ + (No. 55) of August 16, 1709, in which William Jones, born blind, had + received sight after a surgical operation, at the age of twenty, on + the 29th of June preceding. A medical narrative of this case + appeared, entitled _A full and true account of a miraculous cure of + a Young Man in Newington, who was born blind, and was in five + minutes brought to perfect sight, by Mr. Roger Grant, oculist_. + London, 1709. + + 464 Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 71, with the relative + note. + + 465 Omitted on the title-page in the second edition, but retained in the + body of the work. + + 466 Beardsley's _Life and Correspondence of Samuel Johnson, D.D., First + President of King's College, New York_, p. 72 (1874). + + 467 Beardsley's _Life of Johnson_, pp. 71, 72. + + 468 Chandler's _Life of Johnson_, Appendix, p. 161. + +_ 469 Commonplace Book._ + + 470 Moreover, even if the outness or distance of things _were_ visible, + it would not follow that either they or their distances could be + real if unperceived. On the contrary, Berkeley implies that they + _are_ perceived _visually_. + + 471 It is also to be remembered that sensible things exist "in mind," + without being exclusively _mine_, as creatures of _my will_. In one + sense, that only is mine in which my will exerts itself. But, in + another view, my involuntary states of feeling and imagination are + _mine_, because their existence depends on my consciousness of them; + and even sensible things are so far _mine_, because, though present + in many minds in common, they are, for me, dependent on _my_ + percipient mind. + + 472 Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl of Pembroke and fifth Earl of + Montgomery, was the correspondent and friend of Locke--who dedicated + his famous _Essay_ to him, as a work "having some little + correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the + sciences your lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a + draft of." He represents a family renowned in English political and + literary history. He was born in 1656; was a nobleman of Christ + Church, Oxford, in 1672; succeeded to his titles in 1683; was sworn + of the Privy Council in 1689; and made a Knight of the Garter in + 1700. He filled some of the highest offices in the state, in the + reigns of William and Mary, and of Anne. He was Lord Lieutenant of + Ireland in 1707, having previously been one of the Commissioners by + whom the union between England and Scotland was negotiated. He died + in January 1733. + + 473 Trinity College, Dublin. + + 474 In his _Commonplace Book_ Berkeley seems to refer his speculations + to his boyhood. The conception of the material world propounded in + the following Treatise was in his view before the publication of the + _New Theory of Vision_, which was intended to prepare the way for + it. + + 475 Cf. Locke, in the "Epistle Dedicatory" of his _Essay_. + Notwithstanding the "novelty" of the New Principles, viz. _negation_ + of abstract or unperceived Matter, Space, Time, Substance, and + Power; and _affirmation_ of Mind, as the Synthesis, Substance, and + Cause of all--much in best preceding philosophy, ancient and modern, + was a dim anticipation of it. + + 476 Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c., in illustration of the demonstrative claim + of Berkeley's initial doctrine. + + 477 Berkeley entreats his reader, here and throughout, to take pains to + understand his meaning, and especially to avoid confounding the + ordered ideas or phenomena, objectively presented to our senses, + with capricious chimeras of imagination. + + 478 "Philosophy is nothing but the true knowledge of things." Locke. + + 479 The purpose of those early essays of Berkeley was to reconcile + philosophy with common sense, by employing reflection to make + _latent_ common sense, or common reason, reveal itself in its + genuine integrity. Cf. the closing sentences in the _Third Dialogue + between Hylas and Philonous_. + + 480 Cf. Locke's _Essay_, Introduction, sect. 4-7; Bk. II. ch. 23, § 12, + &c. Locke (who is probably here in Berkeley's eye) attributes the + perplexities of philosophy to our narrow faculties, which are meant + to regulate our lives, not to remove all mysteries. See also + Descartes, _Principia_, I. 26, 27, &c.; Malebranche, _Recherche_, + III. 2. + + 481 His most significant forerunners were Descartes in his _Principia_, + and Locke in his _Essay_. + + 482 Here "idea" and "notion" seem to be used convertibly. See sect. 142. + Cf. with the argument against _abstract ideas_, unfolded in the + remainder of the Introduction, _Principles_, sect. 97-100, 118-132, + 143; _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 122-125; _Alciphron_, Dial. vii. + 5-7; _Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics_, sect. 45-48. Also + _Siris_, sect. 323, 335, &c., where he distinguishes Idea in a + higher meaning from his sensuous ideas. As mentioned in my Preface, + the third edition of _Alciphron_, published in 1752, the year before + Berkeley died, omits the three sections of the Seventh Dialogue + which repeat the following argument against abstract ideas. + + 483 As in Derodon's _Logica_, Pt. II. c. 6, 7; _Philosophia Contracta_, + I. i. §§ 7-11; and Gassendi, _Leg. Instit._, I. 8; also Cudworth, + _Eternal and Immutable Morality_, Bk. IV. + + 484 Omitted in second edition. + + 485 We must remember that what Berkeley intends by an _idea_ is either a + percept of sense, or a sensuous imagination; and his argument is + that none of _these_ can be an abstraction. We can neither perceive + nor imagine what is not concrete and part of a succession. + + 486 "abstract notions"--here used convertibly with "abstract ideas." Cf. + _Principles_, sect. 89 and 142, on the special meaning of _notion_. + + 487 Supposed by Berkeley to mean, that we can imagine, in abstraction + from all phenomena presented in concrete experience, e.g. imagine + _existence_, in abstraction from all phenomena in which it manifests + itself to us; or _matter_, stripped of all the phenomena in which it + is realised in sense. + + 488 Omitted in second edition. + + 489 Locke. + + 490 Descartes, who regarded brutes as (sentient?) machines. + + 491 "To this I cannot assent, being of opinion that a word," &c.--in + first edition. + + 492 "an idea," i.e. a concrete mental picture. + + 493 So that "generality" in an idea is our "consideration" of a + particular idea (e.g. a "particular motion" or a "particular + extension") not _per se_, but under general relations, which that + particular idea exemplifies, and which, as he shews, may be + signified by a corresponding word. All ideas (in Berkeley's confined + meaning of "idea") are particular. We rise above particular ideas by + an intellectual apprehension of their relations; not by forming + _abstract pictures_, which are contradictory absurdities. + + 494 Locke is surely misconceived. He does not say, as Berkeley seems to + suppose, that in forming "abstract ideas," we are forming abstract + mental images--pictures in the mind that are not individual pictures. + + 495 Does Locke intend more than this, although he expresses his meaning + in ambiguous words? + + 496 It is a particular idea, but considered relatively--a _significant_ + particular idea, in other words. We realise our notions in examples, + and these must be concrete. + + 497 i.e. "ideas" in Locke's meaning of idea, under which he comprehends, + not only the particular ideas of sense and imagination--Berkeley's + "ideas"--but these considered relatively, and so seen intellectually, + when Locke calls them abstract, general, or universal. Omniscience + in its all-comprehensive intuition may not require, or even admit, + such general ideas. + + 498 Here and in what follows, "abstract _notion_," "universal _notion_," + instead of abstract _idea_. Notion seems to be here a synonym for + idea, and not taken in the special meaning which he afterwards + attached to the term, when he contrasted it with idea. + + 499 "notions," again synonymous with ideas, which are all particular or + concrete, in his meaning of _idea_, when he uses it strictly. + +_ 500 idea_, i.e. individual mental picture. + + 501 In all this he takes no account of the intellectual relations + necessarily embodied in concrete knowledge, and without which + experience could not cohere. + + 502 "have in view," i.e. actually realise in imagination. + + 503 What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the second or + 1734 edition. + + 504 So Bacon in many passages of his _De Augmentis Scientiarium_ and + _Novum Organum_. + + 505 "wide influence,"--"wide and extended sway"--in first edition. + + 506 "idea," i.e. individual datum of sense or of imagination. + + 507 See Leibniz on Symbolical Knowledge (_Opera Philosophica_, pp. 79, + 80, Erdmann), and Stewart in his _Elements_, vol. I. ch. 4, § 1, on + our habit of using language without realising, in individual + examples or ideas, the meanings of the common terms used. + + 508 "doth"--"does," here and elsewhere in first edition. + + 509 "ideas," i.e. representations in imagination of _any_ of the + individual objects to which the names are applicable. The sound or + sight of a verbal sign may do duty for the concrete idea in which + the notion signified by the word might be exemplified. + + 510 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. + + 511 Elsewhere he mentions Aristotle as "certainly a great admirer and + promoter of the doctrine of abstraction," and quotes his statement + that there is hardly anything so incomprehensible to men as notions + of the utmost universality; for they are the most remote from sense. + _Metaph._, Bk. I. ch. 2. + + 512 Added in second edition. + + 513 Omitted in second edition. + + 514 Omitted in second edition. + + 515 Omitted in second edition. + + 516 "my own ideas," i.e. the concrete phenomena which I can realise as + perceptions of sense, or in imagination. + + 517 He probably refers to Locke. + + 518 According to Locke, "that which has most contributed to hinder the + due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and + agreements or disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, + the ill use of words. It is impossible that men should ever truly + seek, or certainly discover, the agreement or disagreement of ideas + themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only in + sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians, + abstracting their thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves to + set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would + consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a + great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion which has so + much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge." _Essay_, + Bk. IV. ch. 3, § 30. See also Bk. III. ch. 10, 11. + + 519 General names involve in their signification intellectual relations + among ideas or phenomena; but the relations, _per se_, are + unimaginable. + + 520 The rough draft of the Introduction, prepared two years before the + publication of the _Principles_ (see Appendix, vol. III), should be + compared with the published version. He there tells that "there was + a time when, being bantered and abused by words," he "did not in the + least doubt" that he was "able to abstract his ideas"; adding that + "after a strict survey of my abilities, I not only discovered my own + deficiency on this point, but also cannot conceive it possible that + such a power should be even in the most perfect and exalted + understanding." What he thus pronounces "impossible," is a + _sensuous_ perception or imagination of an intellectual relation, as + to which most thinkers would agree with him. But in so arguing, he + seems apt to discard the intellectual relations themselves that are + necessarily embodied in experience. + + David Hume refers thus to Berkeley's doctrine about "abstract + ideas":--"A great philosopher has asserted that all general ideas are + nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives + them a more extensive signification. I look upon this to be one of + the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of + late years in the republic of letters." (_Treatise of H. N._ Pt. I, + sect. 7.) + + 521 This resembles Locke's account of the ideas with which human + knowledge is concerned. They are all originally presented to the + senses, or got by reflexion upon the passions and acts of the mind; + and the materials contributed in this external and internal + experience are, with the help of memory and imagination, elaborated + by the human understanding in ways innumerable, true and false. See + Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II, ch. 1, §§ 1-5; ch. 10, 11, 12. + + 522 The ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in our five senses + make their appearance, not isolated, but in individual masses, + constituting the things, that occupy their respective places in + perceived ambient space. It is as _qualities_ of _things_ that the + ideas or phenomena of sense arise in human experience. + + 523 This is an advance upon the language of the _Commonplace Book_, in + which "mind" is spoken of as only a "congeries of perceptions." Here + it is something "entirely distinct" from ideas or perceptions, in + which they exist and are perceived, and on which they ultimately + depend. Spirit, intelligent and active, presupposed with its + implicates in ideas, thus becomes the basis of Berkeley's + philosophy. Is this subjective idealism only? Locke appears in sect. + 1, Descartes, if not Kant by anticipation, in sect. 2. + + 524 This sentence expresses Berkeley's New Principle, which filled his + thoughts in the _Commonplace Book_. Note "in _a_ mind," not + necessarily in _my_ mind. + + 525 That is to say, one has only to put concrete meaning into the terms + _existence_ and _reality_, in order to have "an intuitive knowledge" + that matter depends for its real existence on percipient spirit. + + 526 In other words, the things of sense become real, only in the + concrete experience of living mind, which gives them the only + reality we can conceive or have any sort of concern with. Extinguish + Spirit and the material world necessarily ceases to be real. + + 527 That _esse_ is _percipi_ is Berkeley's initial Principle, called + "intuitive" or self-evident. + + 528 Mark that it is the "natural or real existence" of the material + world, in the absence of all realising Spirit, that Berkeley insists + is impossible--meaningless. + + 529 "our own"--yet not exclusively _mine_. They depend for their reality + upon _a_ percipient, not on _my_ perception. + + 530 "this tenet," i.e. that the concrete material world could still be a + reality after the annihilation of all realising spiritual life in + the universe--divine or other. + + 531 "existing unperceived," i.e. existing without being realised in any + living percipient experience--existing in a totally abstract + existence, whatever that can mean. + + 532 "notions"--a term elsewhere (see sect. 27, 89, 142) restricted, is + here applied to the immediate data of the senses--the ideas of sense. + + 533 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. + + 534 In the first edition, instead of this sentence, we have the + following: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of + an Axiom, it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflexion of + the reader, that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, + and turn his thoughts upon the subject itself; free and disengaged + from all embarras of words and prepossession in favour of received + mistakes." + + 535 In other words, active percipient Spirit is at the root of all + intelligible trustworthy experience. + + 536 'proof'--"demonstration" in first edition; yet he calls it + "intuitive." + + 537 "the ideas themselves," i.e. the phenomena immediately presented in + sense, and that are thus realised in and through the percipient + experience of living mind, as their factor. + + 538 As those say who assume that perception is ultimately only + representative of the material reality, the very things themselves + not making their appearance to us at all. + + 539 He refers especially to Locke, whose account of Matter is + accordingly charged with being incoherent. + + 540 "inert." See the _De Motu_. + + 541 "ideas existing in the mind," i.e. phenomena of which _some_ mind is + percipient; which are realised in the sentient experience of a + living spirit, human or other. + + 542 What follows to the end of the section is omitted in the second + edition. + + 543 "the existence of Matter," i.e. the existence of the material world, + regarded as a something that does not need to be perceived in order + to be real. + + 544 Sometimes called _objective_ qualities, because they are supposed to + be realised in an abstract objectivity, which Berkeley insists is + meaningless. + + 545 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II, ch. 8, §§ 13, 18; ch. 23, § 11; Bk. IV, + ch. 3, § 24-26. Locke suggests this relation between the secondary + and the primary qualities of matter only hypothetically. + + 546 "in the mind, and nowhere else," i.e. perceived or conceived, but in + no other manner can they be real or concrete. + + 547 "without the mind," i.e. independently of all percipient experience. + + 548 Extension is thus the distinguishing characteristic of the material + world. Geometrical and physical solidity, as well as motion, imply + extension. + + 549 "number is the creature of the mind," i.e. is dependent on being + realised in percipient experience. This dependence is here + illustrated by the relation of concrete number to the point of view + of each mind; as the dependence of the other primary qualities was + illustrated by their dependence on the organisation of the + percipient. In this, the preceding, and the following sections, + Berkeley argues the inconsistency of the abstract reality attributed + to the primary qualities with their acknowledged dependence on the + necessary conditions of sense perception. + + 550 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 109. + + 551 e.g. Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II, ch. 7, § 7; ch. 16, § 1. + + 552 "without any alteration in any external object"--"without any + external alteration"--in first edition. + + 553 These arguments, founded on the mind-dependent nature of _all_ the + qualities of matter, are expanded in the _First Dialogue between + Hylas and Philonous_. + + 554 "an outward object," i.e. an object wholly abstract from living + Mind. + + 555 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. + + 556 "reason," i.e. reasoning. It is argued, in this and the next + section, that a reality unrealised in percipient experience cannot + be proved, either by our senses or by reasoning. + + 557 Omitted in the second edition, and the sentence converted into a + question. + + 558 But the ideas of which we are cognizant in waking dreams, and dreams + of sleep, differ in important characteristics from the external + ideas of which we are percipient in sense. Cf. sect. 29-33. + + 559 "external bodies," i.e. bodies supposed to be real independently of + all percipients in the universe. + + 560 i.e. they cannot shew how their unintelligible hypothesis of Matter + accounts for the experience we have, or expect to have; or which we + believe other persons have, or to be about to have. + + 561 "the production," &c., i.e. the fact that we and others have + percipient experience. + + 562 Mind-dependent Matter he not only allows to exist, but maintains its + reality to be intuitively evident. + + 563 i.e. bodies existing in abstraction from living percipient spirit. + + 564 "Matter," i.e. abstract Matter, unrealised in sentient intelligence. + + 565 The appeal here and elsewhere is to consciousness--directly in each + person's experience, and indirectly in that of others. + + 566 i.e. otherwise than in the form of an idea or actual appearance + presented to our senses. + + 567 This implies that the material world may be realised in imagination + as well as in sensuous perception, but in a less degree of reality; + for reality, he assumes, admits of degrees. + + 568 "to conceive the existence of external bodies," i.e. to conceive + bodies that are not conceived--that are not ideas at all, but which + exist in abstraction. To suppose what we conceive to be unconceived, + is to suppose a contradiction. + + 569 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. + + 570 "The existence of things without mind," or in the absence of all + spiritual life and perception, is what Berkeley argues against, as + _meaningless_, if not _contradictory_; not the existence of a + material world, when this means the realised order of nature, + regulated independently of individual will, and to which our actions + must conform if we are to avoid physical pain. + + 571 Here again _notion_ is undistinguished from _idea_. + + 572 This and the three following sections argue for the essential + impotence of matter, and that, as far as we are concerned, so-called + "natural causes" are only _signs_ which foretell the appearance of + their so-called effects. The material world is presented to our + senses as a procession of orderly, and therefore interpretable, yet + in themselves powerless, ideas or phenomena: motion is always an + effect, never an originating active cause. + + 573 As Locke suggests. + + 574 This tacitly presupposes the necessity in reason of the Principle of + Causality, or the ultimate need for an efficient cause of every + change. To determine the sort of Causation that constitutes and + pervades the universe is the aim of his philosophy. + + 575 In other words, the material world is not only real in and through + percipient spirit, but the changing forms which its phenomena + assume, in the natural evolution, are the issue of the perpetual + activity of in-dwelling Spirit. The argument in this section + requires a deeper criticism of its premisses. + + 576 In other words, an agent cannot, as such, be perceived or imagined, + though its effects can. The spiritual term _agent_ is not + meaningless; yet we have no _sensuous idea_ of its meaning. + + 577 Omitted in second edition. + + 578 This sentence is not contained in the first edition. It is + remarkable for first introducing the term _notion_, to signify + _idealess meaning_, as in the words soul, active power, &c. Here he + says that "the operations of the mind" belong to notions, while, in + sect. 1, he speaks of "_ideas_ perceived by attending to the + 'operations' of the mind." + + 579 "ideas," i.e. fancies of imagination; as distinguished from the more + real ideas or phenomena that present themselves objectively to our + senses. + + 580 With Berkeley the world of external ideas is distinguished from + Spirit by its essential passivity. Active power is with him the + essence of Mind, distinguishing me from the changing ideas of which + I am percipient. We must not attribute free agency to phenomena + presented to our senses. + + 581 In this and the four following sections, Berkeley mentions _marks_ + by which the ideas or phenomena that present themselves to the + senses may be distinguished from all other ideas, in consequence of + which they may be termed "external," while those of feeling and + imagination are wholly subjective or individual. + + 582 This mark--the superior strength and liveliness of the ideas or + phenomena that are presented to the senses--was afterwards noted by + Hume. See _Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, sect. II. + + 583 Berkeley here and always insists on the _arbitrary_ character of + "settled laws" of change in the world, as contrasted with "necessary + connexions" discovered in mathematics. The material world is thus + virtually an interpretable natural language, constituted in what, at + our point of view, is _arbitrariness_ or _contingency_. + + 584 Under this conception of the universe, "second causes" are _divinely + established signs_ of impending changes, and are only metaphorically + called "causes." + + 585 So Schiller, in _Don Carlos_, Act III, where he represents sceptics + as failing to see the God who veils Himself in everlasting laws. But + in truth God is eternal law or order vitalised and moralised. + + 586 "_sensations_," with Berkeley, are not mere feelings, but in a sense + external appearances. + + 587 "_more_ reality." This implies that reality admits of degrees, and + that the difference between the phenomena presented to the senses + and those which are only imagined is a difference in degree of + reality. + + 588 In the preceding sections, two relations should be carefully + distinguished--that of the material world to percipient mind, in + which it becomes _real_; and that between changes in the world and + spiritual agency. These are Berkeley's two leading Principles. The + first conducts to and vindicates the second--inadequately, however, + apart from explication of their root in moral reason. The former + gives a relation _sui generis_. The latter gives our only example of + active causality--the natural order of phenomena being the outcome of + the causal energy of intending Will. + + 589 Sect. 34-84 contain Berkeley's answers to supposed _objections_ to + the foregoing Principles concerning Matter and Spirit in their + mutual relations. + + 590 To be an "idea" is, with Berkeley, to be the imaginable object of a + percipient spirit. But he does not define precisely the relation of + ideas to mind. "Existence in mind" is existence _in this relation_. + His question (which he determines in the negative) is, the + possibility of concrete phenomena, naturally presented to sense, + _yet out of all relation to living mind_. + + 591 Omitted in second edition. + + 592 i.e. of imagination. Cf. sect. 28-30. + + 593 Cf. sect. 29. + + 594 "more reality." This again implies that reality admits of degrees. + What is perceived in sense is more real than what is imagined, and + eternal realities are more deeply real than the transitory things of + sense. + + 595 Cf. sect. 33. "Not fictions," i.e. they are presentative, and + therefore cannot misrepresent. + + 596 With Berkeley _substance_ is either (_a_) active reason, i.e. + spirit--substance proper, or (_b_) an aggregate of sense-phenomena, + called a "sensible thing"--substance conventionally and + superficially. + + 597 And which, because realised in living perception, are called + _ideas_--to remind us that reality is attained in and through + percipient mind. + + 598 "combined together," i.e. in the form of "sensible things," + according to natural laws. Cf. sect. 33. + + 599 "thinking things"--more appropriately called _persons_. + + 600 Berkeley uses the word idea to mark the fact, that sensible things + are real only as they manifest themselves in the form of passive + objects, presented to sense-percipient mind; but he does not, as + popularly supposed, regard "sensible things" as created and + regulated by the activity of his own individual mind. They are + perceived, but are neither created nor regulated, by the individual + percipient, and are thus _practically external_ to each person. + + 601 Cf. sect. 87-91, against the scepticism which originates in alleged + fallacy of sense. + + 602 Omitted in second edition. + + 603 It is always to be remembered that with Berkeley ideas or phenomena + presented to sense are _themselves_ the real things, whilst ideas of + imagination are representative (or misrepresentative). + + 604 Here feelings of pleasure or pain are spoken of, without + qualification, as in like relation to living mind as sensible things + or ideas are. + + 605 That the ideas of sense should be seen "at a distance of several + miles" seems not inconsistent with their being dependent on a + percipient, if ambient space is _itself_ (as Berkeley asserts) + dependent on percipient experience. Cf. sect. 67. + + 606 In the preceding year. + +_ 607 Essay_, sect. 2. + + 608 Ibid. sect. 11-15. + + 609 Ibid. sect. 16-28. + + 610 Ibid. sect. 51. + + 611 Ibid. sect. 47-49, 121-141. + + 612 Ibid. sect. 43. + + 613 i.e. what we are _immediately_ percipient of in seeing. + + 614 Touch is here and elsewhere taken in its wide meaning, and includes + our muscular and locomotive experience, all which Berkeley included + in the "tactual" meaning of distance. + + 615 To explain the condition of sensible things _during the intervals of + our perception of them_, consistently with the belief of all sane + persons regarding the material world, is a challenge which has been + often addressed to the advocates of ideal Realism. According to + Berkeley, there are no intervals in the existence of sensible + things. They are permanently perceivable, under the laws of nature, + though not always perceived by this, that or the other individual + percipient. Moreover they always exist _really_ in the Divine Idea, + and _potentially_, in relation to finite minds, in the Divine Will. + + 616 Berkeley allows to bodies unperceived by me potential, but (for me) + not real existence. When I say a body exists thus conditionally, I + mean that if, in the light, I open my eyes, I shall see it, and that + if I move my hand, I must feel it. + + 617 i.e. unperceived material substance. + + 618 Berkeley remarks, in a letter to the American Samuel Johnson, that + "those who have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged + that _natura naturans_ (to use the language of the Schoolmen) is + God; and that the Divine conservation of things is equipollent to, + and in fact the same thing with, a continued repeated creation;--in a + word, that conservation and creation differ only as the _terminus a + quo_. These are the common opinions of Schoolmen; and Durandus, who + held the world to be a machine, like a clock made up and put in + motion by God, but afterwards continued to go of itself, was therein + particular, and had few followers. The very poets teach a doctrine + not unlike the Schools--_mens agitat molem_ (Virgil, AEneid, VI). The + Stoics and Platonists are everywhere full of the same notion. I am + not therefore singular in this point itself, so much as in my way of + proving it." Cf. _Alciphron_, Dial. IV. sect. 14; _Vindication of + New Theory of Vision_, sect. 8, 17, &c.; _Siris_, _passim_, but + especially in the latter part. See also _Correspondence between + Clarke and Leibniz_ (1717). Is it not possible that the universe of + things and persons is in continuous natural creation, unbeginning + and unending? + + 619 Cf. sect. 123-132. + + 620 He distinguishes "idea" from "mode or attribute." With Berkeley, the + "substance" of _matter_ (if the term is still to be applied to + sensible things) is the naturally constituted aggregate of phenomena + of which each particular thing consists. Now extension, and the + other qualities of sensible things, are not, Berkeley argues, "in + mind" either (_a_) according to the abstract relation of substance + and attribute of which philosophers speak; nor (_b_) as one idea or + phenomenon is related to another idea or phenomenon, in the natural + aggregation of sense-phenomena which constitute, with him, the + _substance_ of a _material_ thing. Mind and its "ideas" are, on the + contrary, related as percipient to perceived--in whatever "otherness" + that altogether _sui generis_ relation implies. + + 621 "Matter," i.e. abstract material Substance, as distinguished from + the concrete things that are realised in living perceptions. + + 622 "take away natural causes," i.e. empty the material world of all + originative power, and refer the supposed powers of bodies to the + constant and omnipresent agency of God. + + 623 Some philosophers have treated the relation of Matter to Mind in + _perception_ as one of cause and effect. This, according to + Berkeley, is an illegitimate analysis, which creates a fictitious + duality. On his New Principles, philosophy is based on a recognition + of the fact, that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of + its object, but in a relation to it that is altogether _sui + generis_. + + 624 He refers to Descartes, and perhaps Geulinx and Malebranche, who, + while they argued for material _substance_, denied the _causal + efficiency_ of sensible things. Berkeley's new Principles are + presented as the foundation in reason for this denial, and for the + essential spirituality of all active power in the universe. + + 625 On the principle, "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter + necessitatem." + + 626 "external things," i.e. things in the abstract. + + 627 That the unreflecting part of mankind should have a confused + conception of what should be meant by the _external reality_ of + matter is not wonderful. It is the office of philosophy to improve + their conception, making it deeper and truer, and this was + Berkeley's preliminary task; as a mean for shewing the impotence of + the things of sense, and conclusive evidence of omnipresent + spiritual activity. + + 628 Cf. sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24. + + 629 i.e. their _sense-ideas_.--Though sense-ideas, i.e. the appearances + presented to the senses, are independent of the _will_ of the + individual percipient, it does not follow that they are independent + of _all perception_, so that they can be real in the absence of + realising percipient experience. Cf. sect. 29-33. + + 630 By shewing that what we are percipient of in sense must be _idea_, + or that it is immediately known by us only as sensuous appearance. + + 631 i.e. "imprinted" by unperceived Matter, which, on this dogma of a + representative sense-perception, was assumed to exist behind the + perceived ideas, and to be the _cause_ of their appearance. Cf. + _Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous_. + + 632 Hence the difficulty men have in recognising that Divine Reason and + Will, and Law in Nature, are coincident. But the advance of + scientific discovery of the laws which express Divine Will in + nature, instead of narrowing, extends our knowledge of God. And + _divine_ or _absolutely reasonable_ "arbitrariness" is not caprice. + + 633 "ideas," i.e. ideas of _sense_. This "experience" implied an + association of sensuous ideas, according to the divine or reasonable + order of nature. + + 634 Cf. sect. 25-33, and other passages in Berkeley's writings in which + he insists upon the _arbitrariness_--divine or reasonable--of the + natural laws and sense-symbolism. + + 635 Cf. sect. 3, 4, 6, 22-24, 26, in which he proceeds upon the + intuitive certainty of his two leading Principles, concerning + _Reality_ and _Causation_. + + 636 In short, what is virtually the language of universal natural order + is the divine way of revealing omnipresent Intelligence; nor can we + conceive how this revelation could be made through a capricious or + chaotic succession of changes. + + 637 He here touches on moral purpose in miraculous phenomena, but + without discussing their relation to the divine, or perfectly + reasonable, order of the universe. Relatively to a fine knowledge of + nature, they seem anomalous--exceptions from general rules, which + nevertheless express, immediately and constantly, perfect active + Reason. + + 638 "ideas," i.e. the phenomena presented to the senses. + + 639 "imaginable"--in first edition. + + 640 "the connexion of ideas," i.e. the presence of law or reasonable + uniformity in the coexistence and succession of the phenomena of + sense; which makes them interpretable signs. + + 641 According to Berkeley, it is by an abuse of language that the term + "power" is applied to those ideas which are invariable antecedents + of other ideas--the prior forms of their existence, as it were. + + 642 Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus implies Universal Natural + Symbolism as the essential character of the sensible world, in its + relation to man. + + 643 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. IV, ch. 3, § 25-28, &c., in which he + suggests that the secondary qualities of bodies may be the natural + issue of the different relations and modifications of their primary + qualities. + + 644 With Berkeley, _material substance_ is merely the natural + combination of sense-presented phenomena, which, under a _divine_ or + _reasonable_ "arbitrariness," constitute a concrete thing. Divine + Will, or Active Reason, is the constantly sustaining cause of this + combination or substantiation. + + 645 i.e. that it is not realised in a living percipient experience. + + 646 For "place" is realised only as perceived--percipient experience + being its concrete existence. Living perception is, with Berkeley, + the condition of the possibility of concrete locality. + + 647 So in the Cartesian theory of occasional causes. + + 648 So Geulinx and Malebranche. + + 649 As known in Divine intelligence, they are accordingly _Divine + Ideas_. And, if this means that the sensible system is the + expression of Divine Ideas, which are its ultimate archetype--that + the Ideas of God are symbolised to our senses, and then interpreted + (or misinterpreted) by human minds, this allies itself with Platonic + Idealism. + + 650 "It seems to me," Hume says, "that this theory of the universal + energy and operation of the Supreme Being is _too bold_ ever to + carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently apprised of the + weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is + confined in all its operations." But is it not virtually presupposed + in the assumed trustworthiness of our experience of the universe? + + 651 Accordingly we are led to ask, what the deepest support of their + reality must be. Is it found in living Spirit, i.e. Active Reason, + or in blind Matter? + + 652 e.g. Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c. + + 653 In short, if we mean by Matter, something unrealised in percipient + experience of sense, what is called its _reality_ is something + unintelligible. + + 654 And if sensible phenomena are _sufficiently_ externalised, when + regarded as regulated by Divine Reason. + + 655 Twenty years after the publication of the _Principles_, in a letter + to his American friend Johnson, Berkeley says:--"I have no objection + against calling the Ideas in the mind of God _archetypes_ of ours. + But I object against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be + real things, and so to have an absolute rational existence distinct + from their being perceived by any mind whatsoever; it being the + opinion of all materialists that an ideal existence in the Divine + Mind is one thing, and the real existence of material things + another." + + 656 Berkeley's philosophy is not inconsistent with Divine Ideas which + receive expression in the laws of nature, and of which human science + is the imperfect interpretation. In this view, assertion of the + existence of Matter is simply an expression of faith that the + phenomenal universe into which we are born is a reasonable and + interpretable universe; and that it would be fully interpreted, if + our notions could be fully harmonised with the Divine Ideas which it + expresses. + + 657 Cf. sect. 3-24. + + 658 So that superhuman persons, endowed with a million senses, would be + no nearer this abstract Matter than man is, with his few senses. + + 659 Matter and physical science is _relative_, so far that we may + suppose in other percipients than men, an indefinite number of + additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of qualities in + things, of course inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an + intelligence destitute of _all our_ senses, and so in a material + world wholly different in its appearances from ours. + + 660 The authority of Holy Scripture, added to our natural tendency to + believe in external reality, are grounds on which Malebranche and + Norris infer a material world. Berkeley's material world claims no + logical proof of its reality. His is not to prove the reality of the + world, but to shew what we should mean when we affirm its reality, + and the basis of its explicability in science. + + 661 i.e. existing unrealised in any intelligence--human or Divine. + + 662 "external things," i.e. things existing really, yet out of all + relation to active living spirit. + + 663 Simultaneous perception of the "same" (similar?) _sense_-ideas, _by + different persons_, as distinguished from purely individual + consciousness of feelings and fancies, is here taken as a test of + the _virtually external reality_ of the former. + + Berkeley does not ask whether the change of the rod into a serpent, + or of the water into wine, is the issue of divine agency and order, + otherwise than as all natural evolution is divinely providential. + + 664 Some of the Consequences of adoption of the New Principles, in their + application to the physical sciences and mathematics, and then to + psychology and theology, are unfolded in the remaining sections of + the _Principles_. + + 665 Berkeley disclaims the supposed _representative_ character of the + ideas given in sensuous perception, and recognises as the real + object only what is ideally presented in consciousness. + + 666 So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who all see in a wholly representative + sense-perception, with its double object, the germ of total + scepticism. Berkeley claims that, under _his_ interpretation of what + the reality of the material world means, immediate knowledge of + mind-dependent matter is given in sense. + + 667 "scepticism"--"sceptical cant" in the first edition. + + 668 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. + + 669 Berkeley's argument against a _finally representative_ perception so + far resembles that afterwards employed by Reid and Hamilton. They + differ as regards the dependence of the sensible object upon + percipient spirit for its reality. + + 670 Omitted in second edition. + + 671 Omitted in second edition. + + 672 But whilst unthinking things depend on being perceived, do not our + spirits depend on ideas of some sort for their percipient life? + + 673 The important passage within brackets was added in the second + edition. + + 674 "reason," i.e. reasoning. + + 675 "Notion," in its stricter meaning, is thus confined by Berkeley to + apprehension of the _Ego_, and intelligence of _relations_. The term + "notion," in this contrast with _his_ "idea," becomes important in + his vocabulary, although he sometimes uses it vaguely. + + 676 Locke uses _idea_ in this wider signification. + + 677 Inasmuch as they are _real_ in and through living percipient mind. + + 678 i.e. _unthinking_ archetypes. + + 679 In this section Berkeley explains what he means by _externality_. + Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world--in + some meaning of the term "external." It is the business of the + philosopher to explicate its true meaning. + + 680 i.e. they are not _substances_ in the truest or deepest meaning of + the word. + + 681 "Ideas of the corporeal substances." Berkeley might perhaps + say--Divine Ideas which are _themselves_ our world of sensible things + in its ultimate form. + + 682 On the scheme of ideal Realism, "creation" of matter is presenting + to finite minds sense-ideas or phenomena, which are, as it were, + letters of the alphabet, in that language of natural order which God + employs for the expression of _His_ Ideas to us. + + 683 The _independent_ eternity of Matter must be distinguished from an + unbeginning and endless _creation_ of sensible ideas or phenomena, + in percipient spirits, according to divine natural law and order, + with implied immanence of God. + + 684 Because the question at issue with Atheism is, whether the universe + of things and persons is finally substantiated and evolved in + unthinking Matter or in the perfect Reason of God. + + 685 Of which Berkeley does _not_ predicate a _numerical_ identity. Cf. + _Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous_. + + 686 "matter," i.e. matter abstracted from all percipient life and + voluntary activity. + + 687 "external"--not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90, + note 2. + +_ 688 Si non rogas, intelligo._ Berkeley writes long after this to + Johnson thus:--"A succession of ideas (phenomena) I take to + _constitute_ time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, + as Mr. Locke and others think. But in these matters every man is to + think for himself, and speak as he finds. One of my earliest + inquiries was about _time_; which led me into several paradoxes that + I did not think it fit or necessary to publish, particularly into + the notion that the resurrection follows the next moment after + death. We are confounded and perplexed about time--supposing a + succession in God; that we have an abstract idea of time; that time + in one mind is to be measured by succession of ideas in another + mind: not considering the true use of words, which as often + terminate in the will as in the understanding, being employed to + excite and direct action rather than to produce clear and distinct + ideas." Cf. Introduction, sect. 20. + + 689 As the _esse_ of unthinking things is _percipi_, according to + Berkeley, so the _esse_ of persons is _percipere_. The real + existence of individual Mind thus depends on having ideas of some + sort: the real existence of matter depends on a percipient. + + 690 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. + + 691 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 43. + + 692 "objects of sense," i.e. sensible things, practically external to + each person. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of _thing_, as distinct + from the distinguishable ideas or phenomena that are naturally + aggregated in the form of concrete things. + + 693 Omitted in second edition. + + 694 Omitted in second edition. + + 695 Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With Berkeley, the real essence of + sensible things is given in perception--so far as our perceptions + carry us. + + 696 e.g. Locke's _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 3. + + 697 Berkeley advocates a Realism, which eliminates effective causation + from the material world, concentrates it in Mind, and in physical + research seeks among data of sense for their divinely maintained + natural laws. + + 698 In interpreting the data of sense, we are obliged to assume that + every _new_ phenomenon must have previously existed in some + equivalent form--but not necessarily in this or that particular form, + for a knowledge of which we are indebted to inductive comparisons of + experience. + + 699 The preceding forms of new phenomena, being finally determined by + Will, are, in that sense, arbitrary; but not capricious, for the + Will is perfect Reason. God is the immanent cause of the natural + order. + + 700 He probably refers to Bacon. + + 701 Omitted in second edition. + + 702 What we are able to discover in the all-comprehensive order may be + subordinate and provisional only. Nature in its deepest meaning + explains itself in the Divine Omniscience. + + 703 i.e. inductively. + + 704 i.e. deductively. + + 705 "seem to consider signs," i.e. to be grammarians rather than + philosophers: physical sciences deal with the grammar of the divine + language of nature. + + 706 "A man may be well read in the language of nature without + understanding the grammar of it, or being able to say," &c.--in first + edition. + + 707 "extend"--"stretch"--in first edition. + + 708 Omitted in second edition. + + 709 In the first edition, the section commences thus: "The best grammar + of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a + treatise of _Mechanics_, demonstrated and applied to Nature, by a + philosopher of a neighbouring nation, whom all the world admire. I + shall not take upon me to make remarks on the performance of that + extraordinary person: only some things he has advanced so directly + opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should + be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great a man did + we not take some notice of them." He refers, of course, to Newton. + The first edition of Berkeley's _Principles_ was published in + Ireland--hence "neighbouring nation." Newton's _Principia_ appeared + in 1687. + + 710 "Motion," in various aspects, is treated specially in the _De Motu_. + An imagination of trinal space presupposes locomotive + experience--unimpeded, in contrast with--impeded locomotion. Cf. sect. + 116. + + 711 Omitted in second edition. + + 712 Added in second edition. + + 713 Omitted in second edition. + + 714 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10. + + 715 "applied to"--"impressed on"--in first edition. + + 716 "applied to"--"impressed on"--in first edition. + + 717 "the _force_ causing the change"--which "force," according to + Berkeley, can only be attributed metaphorically to the so-called + impelling body; inasmuch as _bodies_, or the data of sense, can only + be signs of their consequent events, not efficient causes of change. + + 718 Added in second edition. + + 719 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second + edition. + + 720 "seems impossible"--"is above my capacity"--in first edition. + + 721 In short, empty Space _is_ the sensuous idea of unresisted motion. + This is implied in the _New Theory of Vision_. He minimises Space, + treating it as a datum of sense. + + 722 He probably refers to Samuel Clarke's _Demonstration of the Being + and Attributes of God_, which appeared in 1706, and a treatise _De + Spatio Reali_, published in the same year. + + 723 Sect. 118-132 are accordingly concerned with the New Principles in + their application to Mathematics. The foundation of the mathematical + sciences engaged much of Berkeley's thought in early life and in his + later years. See his _Analyst_. + + 724 Numerical relations are _realised_ only in concrete experience. + + 725 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 107, &c. + + 726 Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160. + + 727 An infinitely divided extension, being unperceived, must be + unreal--if its existence is made real only in and through actual + perception, or at least imagination. The only possible extension is, + accordingly, sensible extension, which could not be infinitely + divided without the supposed parts ceasing to be perceived or real. + + 728 "converted Gentile"--"pagan convert"--in first edition. + + 729 Cf. Locke's _Essay_, Bk. I, ch. 3, § 25. + + 730 "will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit," &c.--"will not + stick to affirm," &c.--in first edition. + + 731 Omitted in second edition. See the _Analyst_. + + 732 "we must mean"--"we mean (if we mean anything)"--in first edition. + + 733 Omitted in the second edition. + + 734 Does this refer to the intended "Part II" of the _Principles_? + + 735 "men of great abilities and obstinate application," &c.--"men of the + greatest abilities and most obstinate application," &c.--in first + edition. + + 736 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second + edition. + + 737 "absolute," i.e. abstract, independent, irrelative existence--as + something of which there can be no sensuous perception or + conception. + + 738 Matter unrealised in perception--not the material world that is + realised in percipient experience of sense. + + 739 Omitted in second edition. + + 740 Sect. 135-156 treat of consequences of the New Principles, in their + application to sciences concerned with our notions of _Spirit_ or + _Mind_; as distinguished from sciences of ideas in external Nature, + and their mathematical relations. Individual mind, with Berkeley, + needs data of sense in order to its realisation in consciousness; + while it is dependent on God, in a relation which he does not define + distinctly. + + 741 e.g. Locke suggests this. + + 742 Is this analogy applicable? + + 743 Omitted in second edition, as he had previously learned to + distinguish _notion_ from _idea_. Cf. sect. 89, 142. + + 744 Ibid. In the omitted passage it will be seen that he makes _idea_ + and _notion_ synonymous. + + 745 Is the reality of mind as dependent on having ideas (of some sort) + as ideas are on mind; although mind is more deeply and truly real + than its ideas are? + + 746 Introduced in second edition. + + 747 We know _other finite persons_ through sense-presented phenomena, + but not as themselves phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It is a mediate + knowledge that we have of other persons. The question about the + individuality of finite egos, as distinguished from God, Berkeley + has not touched. + + 748 These sentences are omitted in the second edition. + + 749 "the soul," i.e. the individual Ego. + + 750 Cf. sect. 2; 25-27. + + 751 This is Berkeley's application of his new conception of the reality + of matter, to the final human question of the self-conscious + existence of the individual human Ego, after physical death. + Philosophers and theologians were accustomed in his generation to + ground their argument for a future life on the metaphysical + assumption of the physical indivisibility of our self-conscious + spirit, and on our contingent connexion with the body. "Our bodies," + says Bishop Butler, "are no more _ourselves_, or _part of + ourselves_, than any other matter around us." This train of thought + is foreign to us at the present day, when men of science remind us + that self-conscious life is found only in correlation with corporeal + organisation, whatever may be the abstract possibility. Hope of + continued life after physical death seems to depend on ethical + considerations more than on metaphysical arguments, and on what is + suggested by faith in the final outcome of personal life in a + _divinely_ constituted universe. + + 752 Mind and the ideas presented to the senses are at opposite poles of + existence. But he does not say that, thus opposed, they are each + independent of the other. + + 753 What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which _notion_ + is contrasted with _idea_. + + 754 Here is a germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that + activity of mind which constitutes _relation_, nor systematically + unfolded the relations involved in the rational constitution of + experience. There is more disposition to this in _Siris_. + + 755 As with Locke, for example. + + 756 Note this condemnation of the tendency to substantiate "powers of + mind." + + 757 Omitted in second edition. Berkeley was after all reluctant to + "depart from received modes of speech," notwithstanding their often + misleading associations. + + 758 Omitted in second edition. + + 759 This is one of the notable sections in the _Principles_, as it + suggests the _rationale_ of Berkeley's rejection of Panegoism or + Solipsism. Is this consistent with his conception of the reality of + the material world? It is objected (e.g. by Reid) that ideal realism + dissolves our faith in the existence of other persons. The + difficulty is to shew how appearances presented to my senses, which + are sensuous and subjective, can be media of communication between + persons. The question carries us back to the theistic presupposition + in the trustworthiness of experience--which is adapted to deceive if + I am the only person existing. With Berkeley a chief function of + ideas of sense is to signify other persons to each person. See + _Alciphron_, Dial. IV; _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, and + _Siris_. + + 760 "repugnant"--for it would involve thought in incoherence, by + paralysis of its indispensable causal presupposition. + + 761 Is not God the indispensable presupposition of trustworthy + experience, rather than an empirical inference? + + 762 This suggests an explanation of the objective reality and + significance of _ideas of sense_; through which they become media of + social intercourse in the fundamentally divine universe. God so + regulates the sense-given ideas of which human beings are + individually percipient, as that, _while numerically different, as + in each mind_, those ideas are nevertheless a sufficient medium for + social intercourse, if the Power universally at work is morally + trustworthy. Unless our God-given experience is deceiving, Solipsism + is not a necessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be + percipient of my sensuous experience. + + 763 Omitted in second edition. + + 764 Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. See _Recherche_, Liv. III. + p. ii. ch. 6, &c. + + 765 For all finite persons _somehow_ live, and move, and have their + being "in God." The existence of _eternal_ living Mind, and the + _present_ existence of other men, are both _inferences_, resting on + the same foundation, according to Berkeley. + + 766 The theistic trust in which our experience is rooted remaining + latent, or being unintelligent. + + 767 Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66. His conception of Divine causation in + Nature, as the constant omnipresent agency in all natural law, is + the deepest part of his philosophy. It is pursued in the _De Motu_. + + 768 Is not the unbeginning and unending natural evolution, an articulate + revelation of Eternal Spirit or Active Reason at the heart of the + whole? + + 769 Omitted in second edition. + + 770 So Pascal in the _Pensees_. + + 771 Divine reason ever active in Nature is the necessary correlate to + reason in man; inasmuch as otherwise the changing universe in which + we live would be unfit to be reasoned about or acted in. + + 772 The existence of _moral_ evil, or what ought not to exist, is _the_ + difficulty which besets faith in the fundamental divinity or + goodness of the universe. Yet that faith is presupposed in + interpretation of nature, which proceeds on the _postulate_ of + universal order; and this implies the moral trustworthiness of the + world which we begin to realise when we begin to be conscious. That + we are living and having our being in omnipotent goodness is thus + not an inference, but the implied basis of all real inferences. I + have expanded this thought in my _Philosophy of Theism_. We cannot + _prove_ God, for we must assume God, as the basis of all proof. + Faith even in the uniformity of nature is virtually faith in + omnipotent goodness immanent in the universe. + + 773 So Leibniz in his _Theodicee_, which was published in the same year + as Berkeley's _Principles_. + + 774 The divine presupposition, latent in all human reasoning and + experience, is hid from the unreflecting, in whom the higher life is + dormant, and the ideal in the universe is accordingly undiscerned. + Unless the universe is assumed to be physically and morally + trustworthy, i.e. unless God is presupposed, even natural science + has no adequate foundation. + + 775 Our necessarily incomplete knowledge of the Universe in which we + find ourselves is apt to disturb the fundamental faith, that the + phenomena presented to us are significant of God. Yet we _tacitly + assume_ that they are thus significant when we interpret real + experience, physical or moral. + + 776 Omitted in second edition. + + 777 For the following extracts from previously unpublished + correspondence of Berkeley and Sir John Percival, I am indebted to + the kindness of his descendant, the late Lord Egmont. + + 778 What Berkeley seeks to shew is, not that the world of the senses is + unreal, but in what its reality consists. Is it inexplicable chaos, + or explicable expression of ever active Intelligence, more or less + interpreted in natural science? + + 779 Leibniz: _De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis_ + (1707). + + 780 For some information relative to Gua de Malves, see Querard's _La + France Litteraire,_ tom. iii. p. 494. + + 781 The following is the translator's Prefatory Note, on the objects of + the _Dialogues,_ and in explanation of the three illustrative + vignettes:-- + + "L'Auteur expose dans le premier Dialogue le sentiment du Vulgaire + et celui des Philosophes, sur les qualites secondaires et premieres, + la nature et l'existence des corps; et il pretend prouver en meme + tems l'insuffisance de l'un et de l'autre. La Vignette qu'on voit a + la tete du Dialogue, fait allusion a cet objet. Elle represente un + Philosophe dans son cabinet, lequel est distrait de son travail par + un enfant qu'il appercoit se voyant lui-meme dans un miroir, en + tendant les mains pour embrasser sa propre image. Le Philosophe rit + de l'erreur ou il croit que tombe l'enfant; tandis qu'on lui + applique a lui-meme ces mots tires d'Horace: + + _Quid rides?....de te_ + _ Fabula narratur._ + + "Le second Dialogue est employe a exposer le sentiment de l'Auteur + sur le meme sujet, scavoir, que les choses corporelles ont une + existence reelle dans les esprits qui les appercoivent; mais + qu'elles ne scauroient exister hors de tous les esprits a la fois, + meme de l'esprit infini de Dieu; et que par consequent la Matiere, + prise suivant l'acception ordinaire du mot, non seulement n'existe + point, mais seroit meme absolument impossible. On a tache de + representer aux yeux ce sentiment dans la Vignette du Dialogue. Le + mot grec {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} qui signifie _ame_, designe l'ame: les rayons qui en + partent marquent l'attention que l'ame donne a des idees ou objets; + les tableaux qu'on a places aux seuls endroits ou les rayons + aboutissent, et dont les sujets sont tires de la description des + beautes de la nature, qui se trouve dans le livre, representent les + idees ou objets que l'ame considere, pas le secours des facultes + qu'elle a recues de Dieu; et l'action de l'Etre supreme sur l'ame + est figuree par un trait, qui, partant d'un triangle, symbole de la + Divinite, et percant les nuages dont le triangle est environne. + s'etend jusqu'a l'ame pour la vivifier; enfin, on a fait en sorte de + rendre le meme sentiment par ces mots: + + _Quae noscere cumque Deus det,_ + _ Esse puta._ + + "L'objet du troisieme Dialogue est de repondre aux difficultes + auxquelles le sentiment qu'on a etabli dans les Dialogues precedens, + peut etre sujet, de l'eclaircir en cette sorte de plus, d'en + developper toutes les heureuses consequences, enfin de faire voir, + qu'etant bien entendu, il revient aux notions les plus communes. Et + comme l'Auteur exprime a la fin du livre cette derniere pensee, en + comparant ce qu'il vient de dire, a l'eau que les deux + Interlocuteurs sont supposes voir jaillir d'un jet, et qu'il + remarque que la meme force de la gravite fait elever jusqu'a une + certaine hauteur et retomber ensuite dans le bassin d'ou elle etoit + d'abord partie; on a pris cet embleme pour le sujet de la Vignette + de ce Dialogue; on a represente en consequence dans cette derniere + Vignette les deux Interlocuteurs, se promenant dans le lieu ou + l'Auteur les suppose, et s'entretenant la-dessus, et pour donner au + Lecteur l'explication de l'embleme, on a mis au bas le vers suivant: + + _Urget aquas vis sursum, eadem flectitque deorsum._" + + 782 Collier never came fairly in sight of the philosophical public of + last century. He is referred to in Germany by Bilfinger, in his + _Dilucidationes Philosophicae_ (1746), and also in the _Ada + Eruditorum_, Suppl. VI. 244, &c., and in England by Corry in his + _Reflections on Liberty and Necessity_ (1761), as well as in the + _Remarks_ on the Reflections, and _Answers_ to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8 + (1763), where he is described as "a weak reasoner, and a very dull + writer also." Collier was dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in + his _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a + subject of correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at + Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity to Dugald Stewart. + A beautiful reprint of the _Clavis_ (of the original edition of + which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in + Edinburgh in 1836; and in the following year it was included in a + collection of _Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the + Eighteenth Century_, prepared for the press by Dr. Parr. + + 783 William, fourth Lord Berkeley of Stratton, born about 1663, + succeeded his brother in 1697, and died in 1741 at Bruton in + Somersetshire. The Berkeleys of Stratton were descended from a + younger son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley of Berkeley Castle, who died + in 1326. His descendant, Sir John Berkeley of Bruton, a zealous + Royalist, was created first Lord Berkeley of Stratton in 1658, and + in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which he held + till 1672, when he was succeeded by the Earl of Essex (see Burke's + _Extinct Peerages_). It is said that Bishop Berkeley's father was + related to him. The Bishop himself was introduced by Dean Swift, in + 1713, to the Lord Berkeley of Stratton, to whom the _Dialogues_ are + dedicated, as "a cousin of his Lordship." The title of Berkeley of + Stratton became extinct on the death of the fifth Lord in 1773. + + 784 This interesting Preface is omitted in his last edition of the + _Dialogues_. + + 785 The Second Part of the _Principles_ was never published, and only in + part written. See Editor's Preface to the _Principles_. + +_ 786 Principles_, Introduction, sect. 1. + + 787 Berkeley's philosophy is professedly a "revolt" from abstract ideas + to an enlightened sense of concrete realities. In these Dialogues + _Philonous_ personates the revolt, and represents Berkeley. _Hylas_ + vindicates the uncritical conception of independent Matter. + + 788 Berkeley's zeal against Matter in the abstract, and all abstract + ideas of concrete things, is therefore not necessarily directed + against "universal intellectual notions"--"the principles and + theorems of sciences." + + 789 Here "reason" means reasoning or inference. Cf. _Theory of Vision + Vindicated_, sect. 42, including the distinction between + "suggestion" and "inference." + + 790 "figure" as well as colour, is here included among the original data + of sight. + + 791 "without the mind," i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind. + + 792 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 14. + + 793 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 14, 15. + + 794 "Sensible qualities," i.e. the significant appearances presented in + sense. + + 795 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 80-86. + + 796 Descartes and Locke for example. + + 797 On Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, and their mutual + relations, cf. _Principles_, sect. 9-15. See also Descartes, + _Meditations_, III, _Principia_, I. sect. 69; Malebranche, + _Recherche_, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2; Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. + 8. + + 798 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 80. + + 799 What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and + second editions. + + 800 Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of + _all_ the qualities of sensible things. + + 801 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 122-126; _Principles_, sect. 123, + &c.; _Siris_, sect. 270, &c. + + 802 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 15. + + 803 Is "notion" here a synonym for idea? + + 804 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 16. + + 805 "Size or figure, or sensible quality"--"size, color &c.," in the + first and second editions. + + 806 In Berkeley's later and more exact terminology, the data or + implicates of pure intellect are called _notions_, in contrast to + his _ideas_, which are concrete or individual sensuous + presentations. + + 807 They need living percipient mind to make them real. + + 808 So Reid's _Inquiry_, ch. ii, sect. 8, 9; _Essays on the Intellectual + Powers_, II. ch. 16. Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 8, + &c. + + 809 i.e. figured or extended visible colour. Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, + sect. 43, &c. + + 810 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26. + + 811 After maintaining, in the preceding part of this Dialogue, the + inevitable dependence of all the qualities of Matter upon percipient + Spirit, the argument now proceeds to dispose of the supposition that + Matter may still be an unmanifested or unqualified _substratum_, + independent of living percipient Spirit. + + 812 [See the _Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_, and its + _Vindication_.] Note by the _Author_ in the 1734 edition. + + 813 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 2. + + 814 Cf. Ibid., sect. 43. + + 815 "an idea," i.e. a phenomenon present to our senses. + + 816 This was Reid's fundamental question in his criticism of Berkeley. + + 817 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8. + + 818 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26. + + 819 In other words, the percipient activity of a living spirit is the + necessary condition of the real existence of all ideas or phenomena + immediately present to our senses. + + 820 An "explanation" afterwards elaborately developed by Hartley, in his + _Observations on Man_ (1749). Berkeley has probably Hobbes in view. + + 821 The brain with the human body in which it is included constitutes a + part of the material world, and must equally with the rest of the + material world depend for its realisation upon percipient Spirit as + the realising factor. + + 822 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 23. + + 823 "in stones and minerals"--in first and second editions. + + 824 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-33; also sect. 90.--The _permanence_ of a + thing, during intervals in which it may be unperceived and + unimagined by human beings, is here assumed, as a natural + conviction. + + 825 In other words, men are apt to treat the omniscience of God as an + inference from the dogmatic assumption that God exists, instead of + seeing that our cosmic experience necessarily presupposes omnipotent + and omniscient Intelligence at its root. + + 826 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 90. A permanent material world is grounded + on Divine Mind, because it cannot but depend on Mind, while its + reality is only partially and at intervals sustained by finite + minds. + + 827 "necessarily inferred from"--rather necessarily presupposed in. + + 828 The present reality of Something implies the eternal existence of + living Mind, if Something _must_ exist eternally, and if real or + concrete existence involves living Mind. Berkeley's conception of + material nature presupposes a theistic basis. + + 829 He refers of course to Malebranche and his Divine Vision. + + 830 But Malebranche uses _idea_ in a higher meaning than Berkeley + does--akin to the Platonic, and in contrast to the sensuous phenomena + which Berkeley calls ideas. + + 831 The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition. + + 832 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25-33. + + 833 Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24. + + 834 I _can_ represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving + things; because I have an example of this my own conscious life. I + _cannot_ represent to myself sensible things existing totally + unperceived and unimagined; because I cannot, without a + contradiction, have an example of this in my own experience. + + 835 "reason," i.e. by reasoning. + + 836 Berkeley's _material substance_ is a natural or divinely ordered + aggregate of sensible qualities or phenomena. + + 837 Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit, and + it would be an abuse of language to call this Matter. + + 838 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26. + + 839 It is here argued that as _volition_ is the only _originative_ cause + implied in our experience, and which consequently alone puts true + meaning into the term Cause, to apply that term to what is not + volition is to make it meaningless, or at least to misapply it. + + 840 While thus arguing against the need for independent matter, as an + instrument needed by God, Berkeley fails to explain how dependent + matter can be a medium of intercourse between persons. It must be + more than a subjective dream, however well ordered, if it is + available for this purpose. Unless the visible and audible ideas or + phenomena presented to me are actually seen and heard by other men, + how can they be instrumental in intercommunication? + + 841 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 68-79. + + 842 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 20. + + 843 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 80, 81. + + 844 i.e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena. + + 845 This, according to Hume (who takes for granted that Berkeley's + reasonings can produce no conviction), is the natural effect of + Berkeley's philosophy.--"Most of the writings of that very ingenious + author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to + be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not + excepted.... That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, + in reality, merely sceptical, appear from this--_that they admit of + no answer, and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to cause + that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is + the result of scepticism." (Hume's _Essays_, vol. II. Note N, p. + 554.) + + 846 Omitted in last edition. + + 847 "Tell me, Hylas,"--"So Hylas"--in first and second editions. + + 848 Variously called _noumena_, "things-in-themselves," absolute + substances, &c.--which Berkeley's philosophy banishes, on the ground + of their unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther + questions concerning them. Questions about existence are thus + confined within the concrete or realising experiences of living + spirits. + + 849 Berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism, and + excludes the possibility of fallacy in sense, in excluding an + ultimately representative perception of Matter. He also assumes the + reasonableness of faith in the reality and constancy of natural law. + When we see an orange, the visual sense guarantees only colour. The + other phenomena, which we associate with this colour--the other + "qualities" of the orange--are, when we only _see_ the orange, matter + of faith. We believe them to be realisable. + + 850 He accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense + symbols proceeds--that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational + order, under laws that are independent of, and in that respect + external to, the individual percipient. + + 851 Mediately as well as immediately. + + 852 We can hardly be said to have an _immediate_ sense-perception of an + individual "thing"--meaning by "thing" a congeries of sense-ideas or + phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately perceive + some of them, and believe in the others, which those suggest. See + the last three notes. + + 853 He probably refers to Descartes, who _argues_ for the + trustworthiness of our faculties from the veracity of God; thus + apparently arguing in a circle, seeing that the existence of God is + manifested to us only through our suspected faculties. But is not + confidence in the trustworthiness of the Universal Power at the + heart of the universe, the fundamental _presupposition_ of all human + experience, and God thus the basis and end of philosophy and of + experience? + + 854 As Locke does. See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11. + + 855 Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, sect. 45-48. + + 856 And to be thus external to individual minds. + + 857 It is here that Berkeley differs, for example, from Hume and Comte + and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given phenomena, and assume the + constancy of their orderly reappearances, _as a matter of fact_, + while they confess total ignorance of the _cause_ of natural order. + (Thus ignorant, why do they assume reason or order in nature?) The + ground of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine Power, + Mill expresses by the term "_permanent possibility_ of sensation." + (See his _Examination of Hamilton_, ch. 11.) Our belief in the + continued existence of a sensible thing _in our absence_ merely + means, with him, our conviction, derived from custom, that we should + perceive it under inexplicable conditions which determine its + appearance. + + 858 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26. + + 859 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142. + + 860 Inasmuch as I am conscious of _myself_, I can gather, through the + sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my + own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of + another person. + + 861 "reason," i.e. reasoning or necessary inference--founded here on our + sense of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense + symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief + in the existence of finite minds, external to our own, is, with + Berkeley, an application of this faith. + + 862 "Matter," i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. _Principles_, sect. + 135-138. + + 863 Does this imply that with Berkeley, _self_, as distinguished from + the _phenomena_ of which the material world consists, is not a + necessary presuppostion of experience? He says in many places--I am + _conscious_ of "my own being," and that my mind is myself. Cf. + _Principles_, sect, 2. + + 864 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8. + + 865 Cf. Ibid., sect. 20 + + 866 This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the + first and second editions of the _Dialogues_. It is, by + anticipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the + objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the + reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as + identical amid the changes of its successive states. + + 867 See note 4 on preceding page. + + 868 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 142. + + 869 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume that he exists when he is not + conscious of ideas--sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is + ever unconscious? + + 870 That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind. + Berkeley speaks here of a _consciousness_ of matter. Does he mean + consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance? + + 871 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 54-57. + + 872 Which he does not doubt. + + 873 This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his + antagonists. + + 874 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-41. + + 875 The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition. + + 876 The index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus + the ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency + of _persons_, as absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused + causes. + + 877 That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be + assented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent + sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical + data. + + 878 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 49. + + 879 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58. + + 880 "without the mind," i.e. without the mind of each percipient person. + + 881 This is the gist of the whole question. According to the + Materialists, sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented, + unperceived, abstract Matter; according to Berkeley, to living + Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their origin is unknowable, + yet (incoherently) they claim that we _can_ interpret them--in + physical science. + + 882 A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of + Berkeley in the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_. + + 883 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 50; _Siris_, sect. 319. + + 884 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58. + + 885 "order"--"series," in first and second editions. + + 886 "Matter," i.e. when the reality of "matter" is supposed to signify + what Berkeley argues cannot be; because really meaningless. + + 887 "the connexion of ideas," i.e. the physical coexistences and + sequences, maintained in constant order by Power external to the + individual, and which are disclosed in the natural sciences. + + 888 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things + _subjective_, but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to + the senses as _objective_. + + 889 They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things + themselves making their appearance, as far as our limited senses + allow them to be realised for us. + + 890 i.e. abstract Matter. + + 891 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 49; and _New Theory of Vision + Vindicated_, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c. + + 892 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 84-86. + + 893 "the connexion of ideas," i.e. the order providentially maintained + in nature. + + 894 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 23-25. + + 895 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8-10, 86, 87. + + 896 This difficulty is thus pressed by Reid:--"The ideas in my mind + cannot be the same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if + the objects I perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that two or + more such minds can perceive the same thing. Thus there is one + unconfutable consequence of Berkeley's system, which he seems not to + have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at + all possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this--that, + although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it + seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent + beings like ourselves. What I call a father, or a brother, or a + friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they cannot + possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine, + any more than the pain felt by me can be the _individual pain_ felt + by another. I am thus left alone as the only creature of God in the + universe" (Hamilton's _Reid_, pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or + Panegoism is thus charged against Berkeley, unless his conception of + the material world is further guarded. + + 897 Reid and Hamilton argue in like manner against a fundamentally + representative sense-perception. + + 898 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 6. + + 899 Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90. + + 900 Cf. Ibid., sect. 18. + + 901 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 24. + + 902 "unknown," i.e. unrealised in percipient life. + + 903 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-33. + + 904 See also Collier's _Clavis Universalis_, p. 6: "Two or more persons + who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be + said to hear the _same_ notes; yet the sound which the one hears is + _not the very same_ with the sound which another hears, _because the + souls or persons are supposed to be different_." + + 905 Berkeley seems to hold that in _things_ there is no identity other + than perfect similarity--only in _persons_. And even as to personal + identity he is obscure. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347, &c. + + 906 But the question is, whether the very ideas or phenomena that are + perceived by me _can_ be also perceived by other persons; and if + not, how I can discover that "other persons" exist, or that any + finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos--if the + sort of _sameness_ that Berkeley advocates is all that can be + predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only _similar_, or + generically the same. Unless the ideas are _numerically_ the same, + can different persons make signs to one another through them? + + 907 Omitted in author's last edition. + + 908 This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is + maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, under + a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the + phenomena of which I am conscious, and the phenomena of which my + neighbour is conscious; so that they are _practically_ "the same." + If we are living in a fundamentally divine, and therefore absolutely + trustworthy, universe, the phenomena presented to my senses, which I + attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed + rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me. + + 909 This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley's critics. + + 910 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 82-84. + + 911 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its wholly subjective and + popular meaning. + + 912 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its objective meaning. + + 913 "philosophic," i.e. _pseudo_-philosophic, against which he argues. + + 914 Had this their relative existence--this realisation of the material + world through finite percipient and volitional life--any beginning? + May not God have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses + of percipient beings in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet + elsewhere, perhaps under other conditions? Has there been any + beginning in the succession of finite persons? + + 915 In the first and second editions only. + + 916 Is "creation" by us distinguishable from continuous evolution, + unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is + there a distinction between creation or evolution of _things_ and + creation or evolution of _persons_? + + 917 Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347-349. + + 918 "Matter," i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the + word. + + 919 Thus Origen in the early Church. That "Matter" is co-eternal with + God would mean that God is eternally making things real in the + percipient experience of persons. + + 920 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and + scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the + material cosmos are illustrated, when it is rightly understood and + applied. + + 921 "substance and accident"--"subjects and adjuncts,"--in the first and + the second edition. + + 922 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-42. In _Siris_, sect. 294-297, 300-318, + 335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism, + if not to Hegelianism. + + 923 "Matter," i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine. + + 924 These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley's conception of the + material world. With him, the _immediate_ objects of sense, realise + in _perception_, are independent of the _will_ of the percipient, + and are thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley's + "material world" of enlightened Common Sense, resulting from two + factors, Divine and human, is independent of each finite mind; but + not independent of all living Mind. + + 925 "voces male intellectae." Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, + "Introduction," sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially + by abstraction. + + 926 "veterum philosophorum." The history of ancient speculations about + motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a + history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the + material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to + Spirit. + + 927 "hujus aevi philosophos." As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions + raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the + following sections. + + 928 Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the principle of Causality, + exemplified in the motion, or change of place and state, that is + continually going on in the material world, and which was supposed + by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe. + + 929 "vis." The assumption that _active power_ is an immediate datum of + sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He + proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is + meaningless. + + 930 "principio"--the ultimate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect. + 36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations, + it is argued, when _bodily_ power or force, in any form, e.g. + gravitation, is taken as the real cause of motion. To call these + "occult causes" is to say nothing that is intelligible. The + perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we + know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors. + + 931 Cf. sect. 53, where _sense_, _imagination_, and _intelligence_ are + distinguished. + + 932 Cf. _Principles_, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also _Alciphron_, Dial. VII. + sect. 8, 17. + + 933 [La Materia altro non e che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale + serve per ricettacolo della forza et de' momenti dell' impeto. La + forzae l'impeti sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto + spiritose, che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che + nell' intima corpulenza de' solidi naturali, Vide _Lezioni + Accademiche_.]--AUTHOR. Torricelli (1608-47), the eminent Italian + physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who invented + the barometer. + + 934 Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and + then of medicine at Florence; see his _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. + XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. XXVII. + + 935 "per effectum," i.e. by its sensible effects--real power or active + force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual + efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency. + + 936 "vim mortuam." The only power we can find is the living power of + Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible + through the senses, and revealed to _them_ only in its sensible + effects. "Power," e.g. "gravitation," in things, _per se_, is + distinguished from perceived "motion" only through illusion due to + misleading abstraction. There is no _physical_ power, intermediate + between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes + we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11. + + 937 "meditatione subigenda sunt." Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, + sect. 35, 70. + + 938 "distingui." It is here argued that so-called power within the + things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived + sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes + the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in + the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according + to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible + effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 236, 247, 249. + +_ 939 Principia Math._ Def. III. + +_ 940 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. I. + + 941 "utiles." Such words as "force," "power," "gravity," "attraction," + are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the + _phenomena_ of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of + the _cause_ of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical + science. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 234, 235. + + 942 Cf. sect. 67. + + 943 "candem." So in recent discussions on the conservation of force. + + 944 [Borellus.]--AUTHOR. See _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIII. + + 945 [Leibnitius.]--AUTHOR. + + 946 On Berkeley's reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that + real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover + for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of + personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of + language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail + in sect. 21-35. + + 947 Our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to (_a_) _bodies_, + i.e. the data of the senses, and (_b_) _mind_ or _spirit_--sentient, + intelligent, active--revealed by internal consciousness. Cf. + _Principles_, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into + _ideas_ and the _active intelligence_ which they presuppose. Here + the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, + "bodies" is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the + passive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of + the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded. + + 948 "nihilque," &c. Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, e.g. sect. 26, + 65, 66. where the essential passivity of the _ideas_ presented to + the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal + principle--on the positive ground of our percipient experience of + sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as _something + sensible_, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know + nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra. + + 949 The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the + measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the + senses present _only_ conditioned change of place in bodies, we must + look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal + consciousness presents to us. + + 950 "_genus rerum cogitantium._" Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2. + + 951 "experientia didicimus." Can the merely empirical data even of + internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition + and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith? + + 952 "a primo et universali Principio" i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, + in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a + way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and + exhaustively in philosophical system. + +_ 953 Phys._ {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}. 4. 255 a 5-7. + +_ 954 Princip. Math._ Def. III. + + 955 "resistentia." Our muscular _sensation_ of resistance is apt to be + accepted empirically as itself _active power in the concrete_, + entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea + of power which is formed. See Editor's Preface. + + 956 "nec incommode." Cf. sect. 17, and note. + + 957 "hypothesis mathematica." Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also + _Siris_, sect. 250-251. + + 958 "nihil." This section sums up Berkeley's objections to crediting + _matter_ with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what + is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas + Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in + recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves + causation among bodies into invariable sequence. + + 959 Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the + relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of + our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition, + which _supernaturalises_ man in his voluntary or morally responsible + activity? This obliges us to see _ourselves_ as absolutely original + causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally + approved or blamed. + + 960 "novumque genus." Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley's antithesis + of mind and matter--spirits and external phenomena presented to the + senses--persons in contrast to passive ideas. + +_ 961 De Anima_, I. ii. 13, 22, 24. + + 962 "Cartesius." The antithesis of extended things and thinking things + pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of + the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible + things. See e.g. _Principia_, P. I. §§ 63, 64. + + 963 "alii." Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of + matter thinking? + + 964 See Aristotle, _De Anima_, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. + i. 6. + +_ 965 Nat. Ausc._ VIII. 15; also _De Anima_, III, x. 7. + + 966 Hardly any passage in the _Timaeus_ exactly corresponds to this. The + following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:--{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the _Timaeus_ in the same + connexion, _De Anima_, I. iii. ii. + + 967 "philosophi Cartesiani." Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium + motuum et quietum est Deus.--Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 30. + +_ 968 Principia Mathematica_--Scholium Generale. + + 969 "naturam naturantem esse Deum"--as we might say, God considered as + imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Opera_, + vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27. + + 970 "juxta certam et constantem rationem." While all changes in Nature + are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The + so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us, + and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality + expresses Perfect Reason. + + 971 "permaneret." Cf. sect. 51. + + 972 "spectat potius ad philosophiam primam." The drift of the _De Motu_ + is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which + the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which + metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach + through consciousness. + + 973 "regulas." Cf. _Siris_, sect. 231-235. + + 974 Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and + their immanent originating Power--matter and mind--physics and + metaphysics--he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to + explain more fully what ha means by _principium_ and also the two + meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of _solutio_. By + _principium_, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient + supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to + the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active + cause of the order. + + 975 "ratiocinio ... redditae universales." Relations of the data of sense + to universalising reason are here recognised. + + 976 "natura motus." Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the _effect_--i.e. + perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin + (_principium_) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to + metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience, + belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies; + or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that + absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116. + + 977 "idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima." The difficulty as to + definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the + inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete + experience. + + 978 Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:--{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. + Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. + + 979 Newton. + + 980 Cf. sect. 3-42. + + 981 Descartes, _Principia_, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, _De Vi + Percussionis_, p. 1. + + 982 "res faciles difficillimas." Cf. _Principles_, "Introduction," sect. + 1. + + 983 {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. _Nat. Ausc._ III. + ii. + + 984 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion, + referred to as a signal example of fallacy. + + 985 "de infinite, &c." Cf. _Principles_, sect. 130-132, and the + _Analyst_ passim, for Berkeley's treatment of infinitesimals. + + 986 "confundere." Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusion. + + 987 The modern conception of the "conservation of force." + + 988 Aristotle states the question in _Nat. Ausc._ VIII. cap. i, and + solves it in cap. iv. + + 989 "mutatio loci" is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; + "vitale principium" the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency. + + 990 "moventis et moti," i.e. as concauses. + + 991 "motum localem." Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or + empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception + of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute + space and motion is argued. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 116, 117. See + Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also _Papers which passed + between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16_, pp. 55-59; 73-81; + 97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute space "an ideal of some modern + Englishman." + + 992 Newton's _Principia_, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, _Physica_, P. + I. cap. vi. § 1. + + 993 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the "possibility of space existing + without matter," _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13. + + 994 Note the account here given of _imagination_ and _intellect_, as + distinguished from _sense_, which may be compared with {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} in Aristotelian psychology. + + 995 "attributorum divinorum particeps." See Samuel Clarke, in his + _Demonstration_, and in the _Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz_. + + 996 "nostrum," sc. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we + are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material + world. + + 997 [Vide quae contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro _De + Principiis Cognitionis Humanae_, idiomate anglicano decem abhine + annis edito.]--AUTHOR. He refers to sect. 116 of the _Principles_. + + 998 He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent + on Perception and Will. + +_ 999 Phys._ {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. 5. 188a. 22, 23. + + 1000 See Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10. + + 1001 Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the + striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is + the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or + equivalent to, that given forth by the former? + +_ 1002 Principia_, Def. IV. + +_ 1003 Lezioni Accademiche._ + +_ 1004 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. IX. + + 1005 Newton's third law of motion. + + 1006 Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the + sensible and intelligible worlds--a conception unfolded in his + _Siris_, more than twenty years later. + + 1007 "provincia sua." The _De Motu_, so far as it treats of motion + perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to + theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation. + + + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY. 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