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Vol. 1 of 4. by + George Berkeley</p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This eBook is + for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no + restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use + it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License <a href= + "#pglicense" class="tei tei-ref">included with this eBook</a> or + online at <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/license" class= + "tei tei-xref">http://www.gutenberg.org/license</a></p> + </div> + <pre class="pre tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> +Title: The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. + +Author: George Berkeley + +Release Date: May 20, 2012 [Ebook #39746] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY. VOL. 1 OF 4.*** +</pre> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"></div> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">The Works of George Berkeley D.D.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">Formerly Bishop of Cloyne</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">Including his Posthumous Works</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">With Prefaces, Annotations, Appendices, and An + Account of his Life, by</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">Alexander Campbell Fraser</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">Hon. D.C.L., Oxford</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">Hon. LL.D. Glasgow and Edinburgh; Emeritus + Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of + Edinburgh</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">In Four Volumes</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">Vol. 1: Philosophical Works, 1705-21</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em">Oxford</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em">At the Clarendon + Press</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em">1901</p> + </div> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Contents</span></h1> + + <ul class="tei tei-index tei-index-toc"> + <li><a href="#toc1">Preface</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc3">George Berkeley, By The Editor</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc5">Errata</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc7">Commonplace Book. Mathematical, Ethical, + Physical, And Metaphysical</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc9">Editor's Preface To + The Commonplace Book</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc11">Commonplace + Book</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc13">An Essay Towards A New Theory Of + Vision</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc15">Editor's Preface To + The Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc17">Dedication</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc19">An Essay Towards A + New Theory Of Vision</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc21">An Appendix To The + Essay On Vision</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc23">A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human + Knowledge</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc25">Editor's Preface To + The Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc27">Dedication</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc29">The Preface</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc31">Introduction</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc33">Part First</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc35">Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous + The Design Of Which Is Plainly To Demonstrate The Reality And + Perfection Of Human Knowledge, The Incorporeal Nature Of The Soul, + And The Immediate Providence Of A Deity, In Opposition To Sceptics + And Atheists, Also To Open A Method For Rendering The Sciences More + Easy, Useful, And Compendious</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc37">Editor's + Preface</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc39">Dedication</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc41">The Preface</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc43">The First + Dialogue</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc45">The Second + Dialogue</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc47">The Third + Dialogue</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc49">De Motu: Sive; De Motus Principio Et Natura, + Et De Causa Communicationis Motuum</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc51">Editor's Preface To + De Motu</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc53">De Motu</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc55">Footnotes</a></li> + </ul> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-body" style= + "margin-bottom: 6.00em; margin-top: 6.00em"> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagev">[pg v]</span><a name="Pgv" id="Pgv" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc1" id="toc1"></a> <a name="pdf2" id="pdf2"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Preface</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 50%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/frontispiece.png" alt="Frontispiece" /></div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">More than thirty + years ago I was honoured by a request to prepare a complete edition + of the Works of Bishop Berkeley, with Notes, for the Clarendon Press, + Oxford. That edition, which contains many of his writings previously + unpublished, appeared in 1871. It was followed in 1874 by a volume of + annotated Selections from his philosophical works; and in 1881 I + prepared a small volume on <span class="tei tei-q">“Berkeley”</span> + for Blackwood's <span class="tei tei-q">“Philosophical + Classics.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The 1871 edition + of the Works originated, I believe, in an essay on <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The Real World of Berkeley,”</span> which I gave to + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Macmillan's + Magazine</span></span> in 1862, followed by another in 1864, in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">North + British Review</span></span>. These essays suggested advantages to + contemporary thought which might be gained by a consideration of + final questions about man and the universe, in the form in which they + are presented by a philosopher who has suffered more from + misunderstanding than almost any other modern thinker. During a part + of his lifetime, he was the foremost metaphysician in Europe in an + unmetaphysical generation. And in this country, after a revival of + philosophy in the later part of the eighteenth century, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">matter</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em>, + and other terms which play an important part in his writings, had + lost the meaning that he intended; <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagevi">[pg vi]</span><a name="Pgvi" id="Pgvi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> while in Germany the sceptical speculations of + David Hume gave rise to a reconstructive criticism, on the part of + Kant and his successors, which seemed at the time to have little + concern with the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> + methods and the principles of Berkeley.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The success of the + attempt to recall attention to Berkeley has far exceeded expectation. + Nearly twenty thousand copies of the three publications mentioned + above have found their way into the hands of readers in Europe and + America; and the critical estimates of Berkeley, by eminent writers, + which have appeared since 1871, in Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, + Holland, Italy, America, and India, confirm the opinion that his + Works contain a word in season, even for the twentieth century. Among + others who have delivered appreciative criticisms of Berkeley within + the last thirty years are J.S. Mill, Mansel, Huxley, T.H. Green, + Maguire, Collyns Simon, the Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, Mr. Leslie + Stephen, Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Professor T.K. Abbott, Professor Van + der Wyck, M. Penjon, Ueberweg, Frederichs, Ulrici, Janitsch, Eugen + Meyer, Spicker, Loewy, Professor Höffding of Copenhagen, Dr. Lorenz, + Noah Porter, and Krauth, besides essays in the chief British, + Continental, and American reviews. The text of those Works of + Berkeley which were published during his lifetime, enriched with a + biographical Introduction by Mr. A.J. Balfour, carefully edited by + Mr. George Sampson, appeared in 1897. In 1900 Dr. R. Richter, of the + University of Leipsic, produced a new translation into German of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Dialogues + between Hylas and Philonous</span></span>, with an <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagevii">[pg vii]</span><a name="Pgvii" id="Pgvii" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> excellent Introduction and notes. These + estimates form a remarkable contrast to the denunciations, founded on + misconception, by Warburton and Beattie in the eighteenth + century.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In 1899 I was + unexpectedly again asked by the Delegates of the Oxford University + Press to prepare a New Edition of Berkeley's Works, with some account + of his life, as the edition of 1871 was out of print; a circumstance + which I had not expected to occur in my lifetime. It seemed + presumptuous to undertake what might have been entrusted to some one + probably more in touch with living thought; and in one's + eighty-second year, time and strength are wanting for remote + research. But the recollection that I was attracted to philosophy + largely by Berkeley, in the morning of life more than sixty years + ago, combined with the pleasure derived from association in this way + with the great University in which he found an academic home in his + old age, moved me in the late evening of life to make the attempt. + And now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, I offer these + volumes, which still imperfectly realise my ideal of a final Oxford + edition of the philosopher who spent his last days in Oxford, and + whose mortal remains rest in its Cathedral.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Since 1871 + materials of biographical and philosophical interest have been + discovered, in addition to the invaluable collection of MSS. which + Archdeacon Rose then placed at my disposal, and which were included + in the supplementary volume of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Life and Letters</span></span>. Through the + kindness of the late Earl of Egmont I had access, some years ago, to + a large <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pageviii">[pg + viii]</span><a name="Pgviii" id="Pgviii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + number of letters which passed between his ancestor, Sir John + (afterwards Lord) Percival, and Berkeley, between 1709 and 1730. I + have availed myself freely of this correspondence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Some interesting + letters from and concerning Berkeley, addressed to his friend Dr. + Samuel Johnson of Stratford in Connecticut, afterwards President of + King's College in New York, appeared in 1874, in Dr. Beardsley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life of + Johnson</span></span>, illustrating Berkeley's history from 1729 till + his death. For these and for further information I am indebted to Dr. + Beardsley.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the present + edition of Berkeley's Works, the Introductions and the annotations + have been mostly re-written. A short account of his romantic life is + prefixed, intended to trace its progress in the gradual development + and application of his initial Principle; and also the external + incidents of his life in their continuity, with the help of the new + material in the Percival MSS. and the correspondence with Johnson. It + forms a key to the whole. This biography is not intended to supersede + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life + and Letters</span></span> of Berkeley that accompanied the 1871 + edition, which remains as a magazine of facts for reference.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The rearrangement + of the Works is a feature in the present edition. Much of the new + material that was included in the 1871 edition reached me when the + book was far advanced in the press, and thus the chronological + arrangement, strictly followed in the present edition, was not + possible. A chronological arrangement is suggested by Berkeley + himself. <span class="tei tei-q">“I <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pageix">[pg ix]</span><a name="Pgix" id="Pgix" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> could wish that all the things I have published + on these philosophical subjects were read in the order wherein I + published them,”</span> are his words in one of his letters to + Johnson; <span class="tei tei-q">“and a second time with a critical + eye, adding your own thought and observation upon every part as you + went along.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The first three + volumes in this edition contain the Philosophical Works exclusively; + arranged in chronological order, under the three periods of + Berkeley's life. The First Volume includes those of his early life; + the Second those produced in middle life; and the Third those of his + later years. The Miscellaneous Works are presented in like manner in + the Fourth Volume.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The four little + treatises in which Berkeley in early life unfolded his new thought + about the universe, along with his college <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span> published in 1871, which prepared the way for + them, form, along with the Life, the contents of the First Volume. It + is of them that the author writes thus, in another of his letters to + Johnson:—<span class="tei tei-q">“I do not indeed wonder that on + first reading what I have written men are not thoroughly convinced. + On the contrary, I should very much wonder if prejudices which have + been many years taking root should be extirpated in a few hours' + reading. I had no inclination to trouble the world with large + volumes. What I have done was rather with a view of giving hints to + thinking men, who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of + things, and pursue them in their own minds. Two or three times + reading these small tracts, and making what is read the occasion of + thinking, would, I believe, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagex">[pg + x]</span><a name="Pgx" id="Pgx" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> render + the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off that shocking + appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative + truths.”</span> Except Johnson, none of Berkeley's eighteenth-century + critics seem to have observed this rule.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Alciphron, or The + Minute Philosopher</span></span>, with its supplement in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of + Visual Language Vindicated</span></span>, being the philosophical + works of his middle life, associated with its American enterprise, + form the Second Volume. In them the conception of the universe that + was unfolded in the early writings is applied, in vindication of + religious morality and Christianity, against the Atheism attributed + to those who called themselves Free-thinkers; who were treated by + Berkeley as, at least by implication, atheistic.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Third Volume + contains the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, + which belong to his later life, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> being especially + characteristic of its serene quiet. In both there is a deepened sense + of the mystery of the universe, and in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> + especially a more comprehensive conception of the final problem + suggested by human life. But the metaphysics of the one is lost in + mathematical controversy; that of the other in medical controversy, + and in undigested ancient and mediæval learning. The metaphysical + importance of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> was long unrecognised, + although in it Berkeley's thought culminates, not in a paradox about + Matter, but in the conception of God as the concatenating principle + of the universe; yet this reached through the conception of Matter as + real only in and through living Mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Miscellaneous + Works, after the two juvenile Latin tracts in mathematics, deal with + observations of nature and man gathered in his travels, questions + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexi">[pg xi]</span><a name="Pgxi" id= + "Pgxi" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of social economy, and lessons in + religious life. Several are posthumous, and were first published in + the 1871 edition. Of these, perhaps the most interesting is the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Journal in + Italy</span></span>. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discourse on Passive Obedience</span></span> is + the nearest approach to ethical theory which Berkeley has given to + us, and as such it might have taken its place in the First Volume; + but on the whole it seemed more appropriately placed in the Fourth, + where it is easily accessible for those who prefer to read it + immediately after the book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have introduced, + in an Appendix to the Third Volume, some matter of philosophical + interest for which there was no place in the editorial Prefaces or in + the annotations. The historical significance of Samuel Johnson and + Jonathan Edwards, as pioneers of American philosophy, and also + advocates of the new conception of the material world that is + associated with Berkeley, is recognised in Appendix C. Illustrations + of the misinterpretation of Berkeley by his early critics are + presented in Appendix D. A lately discovered tractate by Berkeley + forms Appendix E. In the Fourth Volume, numerous queries contained in + the first edition of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Querist</span></span>, and omitted in the later + editions, are given in an Appendix, which enables the reader to + reconstruct that interesting tract in the form in which it originally + appeared.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The present + edition is thus really a new work, which possesses, I hope, a certain + philosophical unity, as well as pervading biographical interest.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As Berkeley is the + immediate successor of Locke, and as he was educated by collision + with the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexii">[pg xii]</span><a name="Pgxii" id="Pgxii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">on Human + Understanding</span></span>, perhaps Locke ought to have had more + prominence in the editorial portion of this book. Limitation of space + partly accounts for the omission; and I venture instead to refer the + reader to the Prolegomena and notes in my edition of Locke's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, which was published by the + Clarendon Press in 1894. I may add that an expansion of thoughts + which run through the Life and many of the annotations, in this + edition of Berkeley, may be found in my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Philosophy of + Theism</span></span><a id="noteref_1" name="noteref_1" href= + "#note_1"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reader need + not come to Berkeley in the expectation of finding in his Works an + all-comprehensive speculative system like Spinoza's, or a reasoned + articulation of the universe of reality such as Hegel is supposed to + offer. But no one in the succession of great English philosophers + has, I think, proposed in a way more apt to invite reflexion, the + final alternative between Unreason, on the one hand, and Moral Reason + expressed in Universal Divine Providence, on the other hand, as the + root of the unbeginning and endless evolution in which we find + ourselves involved; as well as the further question, Whether this + tremendous practical alternative <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">can</span></em> be + settled by any means that are within the reach of man? His + Philosophical Works, taken collectively, may encourage those who see + in a reasonable <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">via media</span></span> between + Omniscience and Nescience the true path of progress, under man's + inevitable venture of reasonable Faith.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One is therefore + not without hope that a fresh <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexiii">[pg xiii]</span><a name="Pgxiii" id="Pgxiii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> impulse may be given to philosophy and + religious thought by this reappearance of George Berkeley, under the + auspices of the University of Oxford, at the beginning of the + twentieth century. His readers will at any rate find themselves in + the company of one of the most attractive personalities of English + philosophy, who is also among the foremost of those thinkers who are + masters in English literature—Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, George + Berkeley and David Hume.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A. Campbell + Fraser.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-variant: small-caps">Gorton, + Hawthornden, Midlothian</span></span>,<br /> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">March, + 1901</span></span>.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxiii">[pg xxiii]</span><a name= + "Pgxxiii" id="Pgxxiii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc3" id="toc3"></a> <a name="pdf4" id="pdf4"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">George Berkeley, By The + Editor</span></h1> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">I. Early Life + (1685-1721).</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Towards the end + of the reign of Charles the Second a certain William Berkeley, + according to credible tradition, occupied a cottage attached to the + ancient Castle of Dysert, in that part of the county of Kilkenny + which is watered by the Nore. Little is known about this William + Berkeley except that he was Irish by birth and English by descent. + It is said that his father went over to Ireland soon after the + Restoration, in the suite of his reputed kinsman, Lord Berkeley of + Stratton, when he was Lord Lieutenant. William Berkeley's wife + seems to have been of Irish blood, and in some remote way related + to the family of Wolfe, the hero of Quebec. It was in the modest + abode in the valley of the Nore that George, the eldest of their + six sons, was born, on March 12, 1685.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is nothing + in the recorded family history of these Dysert Berkeleys that helps + to explain the singular personality and career of the eldest son. + The parents have left no mark, and make no appearance in any extant + records of the family. They probably made their way to the valley + of the Nore among families of English connexion who, in the quarter + of a century preceding the birth of George Berkeley, were finding + settlements in Ireland. The family, as it appears, was not wealthy, + but was recognised as of gentle blood. Robert, the fifth son, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxiv">[pg xxiv]</span><a name= + "Pgxxiv" id="Pgxxiv" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> became rector of + Middleton and vicar-general of Cloyne; and another son, William, + held a commission in the army. According to the Register of Trinity + College, one of the sons was born <span class="tei tei-q">“near + Thurles,”</span> in 1699, and Thomas, the youngest, was born in + Tipperary, in 1703, so that the family may have removed from Dysert + after the birth of George. In what can be gleaned of the younger + sons, one finds little appearance of sympathy with the religious + and philosophical genius of the eldest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Regarding this + famous eldest son in those early days, we have this significant + autobiographical fragment in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span>: <span class="tei tei-q">“I was distrustful at + eight years old, and consequently by nature disposed for the new + doctrines.”</span> In his twelfth year we find the boy in Kilkenny + School. The register records his entrance there in the summer of + 1696, when he was placed at once in the second class, which seems + to imply precocity, for it is almost a solitary instance. He spent + the four following years in Kilkenny. The School was in high repute + for learned masters and famous pupils; among former pupils were the + poet Congreve and Swift, nearly twenty years earlier than George + Berkeley; among his school-fellows was Thomas Prior, his life-long + friend and correspondent. In the days of Berkeley and Prior the + head master was Dr. Hinton, and the School was still suffering from + the consequences of <span class="tei tei-q">“the warre in + Ireland”</span> which followed the Revolution.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley in + Kilkenny School is hardly visible, and we have no means of + estimating his mental state when he left it. Tradition says that in + his school-days he was wont to feed his imagination with airy + visions and romance, a tradition which perhaps originated long + after in popular misconceptions of his idealism. Dimly discernible + at Kilkenny, only a few years later he was a conspicuous figure in + an island that was then beginning to share in the intellectual + movement of the modern world, taking <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxv">[pg xxv]</span><a name="Pgxxv" id="Pgxxv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> his place as a classic in English literature, + and as the most subtle and ardent of contemporary English-speaking + thinkers.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In March, 1700, + at the age of fifteen, George Berkeley entered Trinity College, + Dublin. This was his home for more than twenty years. He was at + first a mystery to the ordinary undergraduate. Some, we are told, + pronounced him the greatest dunce, others the greatest genius in + the College. To hasty judges he seemed an idle dreamer; the + thoughtful admired his subtle intelligence and the beauty of his + character. In his undergraduate years, a mild and ingenuous youth, + inexperienced in the ways of men, vivacious, humorous, satirical, + in unexpected ways inquisitive, often paradoxical, through + misunderstandings he persisted in his own way, full of simplicity + and enthusiasm. In 1704 (the year in which Locke died) he passed + Bachelor of Arts, and became Master in 1707, when he was admitted + to a Fellowship, <span class="tei tei-q">“the only reward of + learning which that kingdom had to bestow.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In Trinity + College the youth found himself on the tide of modern thought, for + the <span class="tei tei-q">“new philosophy”</span> of Newton and + Locke was then invading the University. Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + published in 1690, was already in vogue. This early recognition of + Locke in Dublin was chiefly due to William Molyneux, Locke's + devoted friend, a lawyer and member of the Irish Parliament, much + given to the experimental methods. Descartes, too, with his + sceptical criticism of human beliefs, yet disposed to spiritualise + powers commonly attributed to matter, was another accepted + authority in Trinity College; and Malebranche was not unknown. + Hobbes was the familiar representative of a finally materialistic + conception of existence, reproducing in modern forms the atomism of + Democritus and the ethics of Epicurus. Above all, Newton was + acknowledged master in physics, whose <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, issued three + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxvi">[pg xxvi]</span><a name= + "Pgxxvi" id="Pgxxvi" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> years sooner than + Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, was transforming the + conceptions of educated men regarding their surroundings, like the + still more comprehensive law of physical evolution in the + nineteenth century.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">John Toland, an + Irishman, one of the earliest and ablest of the new sect of + Free-thinkers, made his appearance at Dublin in 1696, as the author + of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Christianity not Mysterious</span></span>. The + book was condemned by College dignitaries and dignified clergy with + even more than Irish fervour. It was the opening of a controversy + that lasted over half of the eighteenth century in England, in + which Berkeley soon became prominent; and it was resumed later on, + with greater intellectual force and in finer literary form, by + David Hume and Voltaire. The collision with Toland about the time + of Berkeley's matriculation may have awakened his interest. Toland + was supposed to teach that matter is eternal, and that motion is + its essential property, into which all changes presented in the + outer and inner experience of man may at last be resolved. + Berkeley's life was a continual protest against these dogmas. The + Provost of Trinity College in 1700 was Dr. Peter Browne, who had + already entered the lists against Toland; long after, when Bishop + of Cork, he was in controversy with Berkeley about the nature of + man's knowledge of God. The Archbishop of Dublin in the early years + of the eighteenth century was William King, still remembered as a + philosophical theologian, whose book on the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Origin of + Evil</span></span>, published in 1702, was criticised by Boyle and + Leibniz.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Dublin in those + years was thus a place in which a studious youth, who had been + <span class="tei tei-q">“distrustful at eight years old,”</span> + might be disposed to entertain grave questions about the ultimate + meaning of his visible environment, and of the self-conscious life + to which he was becoming awake. Is the universe of existence + confined to the visible world, and is matter the really active + power in existence? Is God <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxvii">[pg xxvii]</span><a name="Pgxxvii" id="Pgxxvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the root and centre of all that is real, and + if so, what is meant by God? Can God be good if the world is a + mixture of good and evil? Questions like these were ready to meet + the inquisitive Kilkenny youth in his first years at Dublin.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One of his + earliest interests at College was mathematical. His first + appearance in print was as the anonymous author of two Latin + tracts, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Arithmetica</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Miscellanea + Mathematica</span></span>, published in 1707. They are interesting + as an index of his intellectual inclination when he was hardly + twenty; for he says they were prepared three years before they were + given to the world. His disposition to curious questions in + geometry and algebra is further shewn in his College <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This lately + discovered <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span> throws a flood + of light upon Berkeley's state of mind between his twentieth and + twenty-fourth year. It is a wonderful revelation; a record under + his own hand of his thoughts and feelings when he first came under + the inspiration of a new conception of the nature and office of the + material world. It was then struggling to find adequate expression, + and in it the sanguine youth seemed to find a spiritual panacea for + the errors and confusions of philosophy. It was able to make short + work, he believed, with atheistic materialism, and could dispense + with arguments against sceptics in vindication of the reality of + experience. The mind-dependent existence of the material world, and + its true function in the universe of concrete reality, were to be + disclosed under the light of a new transforming self-evident + Principle. <span class="tei tei-q">“I wonder not at my sagacity in + discovering the obvious and amazing truth. I rather wonder at my + stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before—'tis no witchcraft + to see.”</span> The pages of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span> give vent to rapidly forming thoughts about the + things of sense and the <span class="tei tei-q">“ambient + space”</span> of a youth entering into reflective life, in company + with Descartes <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxviii">[pg + xxviii]</span><a name="Pgxxviii" id="Pgxxviii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and Malebranche, Bacon and Hobbes, above all, + Locke and Newton; who was trying to translate into reasonableness + his faith in the reality of the material world and God. Under the + influence of this new conception, he sees the world like one + awakening from a confused dream. The revolution which he wanted to + inaugurate he foresaw would be resisted. Men like to think and + speak about things as they have been accustomed to do: they are + offended when they are asked to exchange this for what appears to + them absurdity, or at least when the change seems useless. But in + spite of the ridicule and dislike of a world long accustomed to put + empty words in place of living thoughts, he resolves to deliver + himself of his burden, with the politic conciliation of a skilful + advocate however; for he characteristically reminds himself that + one who <span class="tei tei-q">“desires to bring another over to + his own opinions must seem to harmonize with him at first, and + humour him in his own way of talking.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In 1709, when he + was twenty-four years old, Berkeley presented himself to the world + of empty verbal reasoners as the author of what he calls modestly + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">An Essay + towards a New Theory of Vision</span></span>. It was dedicated to + Sir John Percival, his correspondent afterwards for more than + twenty years; but I have not discovered the origin of their + friendship. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> was a pioneer, meant to + open the way for the disclosure of the Secret with which he was + burdened, lest the world might be shocked by an abrupt disclosure. + In this prelude he tries to make the reader recognise that in + ordinary seeing we are always interpreting visual signs; so that we + have daily presented to our eyes what is virtually an intelligible + natural language; so that in all our intercourse with the visible + world we are in intercourse with all-pervading active Intelligence. + We are reading absent data of touch and of the other senses in the + language of their visual signs. And the <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagexxix">[pg xxix]</span><a name="Pgxxix" id="Pgxxix" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> visual signs themselves, which are the + immediate objects of sight, are necessarily dependent on sentient + and percipient mind; whatever may be the case with the tangible + realities which the visual data signify, a fact evident by our + experience when we make use of a looking-glass. The material world, + so far at least as it presents itself visibly, is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> + only in being <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">realised</span></em> by living and seeing + beings. The mind-dependent <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visual</span></em> signs of which we are + conscious are continually speaking to us of an invisible and + distant world of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tangible</span></em> realities; and through + the natural connexion of the visual signs with their tactual + meanings, we are able in seeing practically to perceive, not only + what is distant in space, but also to anticipate the future. The + Book of Vision is in literal truth a Book of Prophecy. The chief + lesson of the tentative <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span> is thus summed + up:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that + the proper objects of Vision constitute the Universal Language of + Nature; whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in + order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation + and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be + hurtful and destructive of them. And the manner wherein they + signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance is + the same with that of languages and signs of human appointment; + which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or + identity of nature, but only by an habitual connexion that + experience has made us to observe between them. Suppose one who had + always continued blind be told by his guide that after he has + advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice, + or be stopped by a wall; must not this to him seem very admirable + and surprising? He cannot conceive how it is possible for mortals + to frame such predictions as these, which to him would seem as + strange and unaccountable as prophecy does to others. Even + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxx">[pg xxx]</span><a name= + "Pgxxx" id="Pgxxx" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> they who are blessed + with the visive faculty may (though familiarity make it less + observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration. The + wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those + ends and purposes for which it was apparently designed; the vast + extent, number, and variety of objects that are at once, with so + much ease and quickness and pleasure, suggested by it—all these + afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, and may, if + anything, give us some glimmering analogous prænotion of things + that are placed beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of + our present state<a id="noteref_2" name="noteref_2" href= + "#note_2"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">2</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley took + orders in the year in which his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span> was published. On February 1, 1709, he was + ordained as deacon, in the chapel of Trinity College, by Dr. George + Ashe, Bishop of Clogher. Origen and Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, + Malebranche, Fenelon, and Pascal, Cudworth, Butler, Jonathan + Edwards, and Schleiermacher, along with Berkeley, are among those + who are illustrious at once in the history of philosophy and of the + Christian Church. The Church, it has been said, has been for nearly + two thousand years the great Ethical Society of the world, and if + under its restrictions it has been less conspicuous on the field of + philosophical criticism and free inquiry, these names remind us of + the immense service it has rendered to meditative thought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The light of the + Percival correspondence first falls on Berkeley's life in 1709. The + earliest extant letters from Berkeley to Sir John Percival are in + September, October, and December of that year, dated at Trinity + College. In one of them he pronounces Socrates <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the best and most admirable man that the heathen world + has produced.”</span> Another letter, in March, 1710, accompanies a + copy of the second edition of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>. <span class="tei tei-q">“I have made some + alterations and additions in the body of the treatise,”</span> he + says, <span class="tei tei-q">“and in the appendix have endeavoured + to meet the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxi">[pg + xxxi]</span><a name="Pgxxxi" id="Pgxxxi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> objections of the Archbishop of + Dublin;”</span> whose sermon he proceeds to deprecate, for + <span class="tei tei-q">“denying that goodness and understanding + are more to be affirmed of God than feet or hands,”</span> although + all these may, in a metaphorical sense. How far, or whether at all, + God is knowable by man, was, as we shall see, matter of discussion + and controversy with Berkeley in later life; but this shews that + the subject was already in his thoughts. Returning to the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, he tells Sir John that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“there remains one objection, that with regard to the + uselessness of that book of mine; but in a little time I hope to + make what is there laid down appear subservient to the ends of + morality and religion, in a <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise</span></span> I have in the press, + the design of which is to demonstrate the existence and attributes + of God, the immortality of the soul, the reconciliation of God's + foreknowledge and the freedom of man; and by shewing the emptiness + and falsehood of several parts of the speculative sciences, to + induce men to the study of religion and things useful. How far my + endeavours will prove successful, and whether I have been all this + time in a dream or no, time will shew. I do not see how it is + possible to demonstrate the being of a God on the principles of the + Archbishop—that strictly goodness and understanding can no more be + assumed of God than that He has feet or hands; there being no + argument that I know for God's existence which does not prove Him + at the same time to be an understanding and benevolent being, in + the strict, literal, and proper meaning of these words.”</span> He + adds, <span class="tei tei-q">“I have written to Mr. Clarke to give + me his thoughts on the subject of God's existence, but have got no + answer.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The work + foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the summer of 1710, as the + <span class="tei tei-q">“First part”</span> of a <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise concerning + the Principles of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief causes of + error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of + Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquired + into</span></span>. In this fragment of a larger work, never + finished, Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxii">[pg + xxxii]</span><a name="Pgxxxii" id="Pgxxxii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> spiritual conception of matter and cosmos is + unfolded, defended, and applied. According to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, the world, as far as it is visible, is + dependent on living mind. According to this book of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> the whole material + world, as far as it can have any practical concern with the + knowings and doings of men, is real only by being realised in like + manner in the percipient experience of some living mind. The + concrete world, with which alone we have to do, could not exist in + its concrete reality if there were no living percipient being in + existence to actualise it. To suppose that it could would be to + submit to the illusion of a metaphysical abstraction. Matter + unrealised in its necessary subordination to some one's percipient + experience is the chief among the illusions which philosophers have + been too ready to encourage, and which the mass of mankind, who + accept words without reflecting on their legitimate meanings, are + ready to accept blindly. But we have only to reflect in order to + see the absurdity of a material world such as we have experience of + existing without ever being realised or made concrete in any + sentient life. Try to conceive an eternally dead universe, empty + for ever of God and all finite spirits, and you find you cannot. + Reality can be real only in a living form. Percipient life + underlies or constitutes all that is real. The <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">esse</span></span> of the concrete material + world is <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">percipi</span></span>. This + was the <span class="tei tei-q">“New Principle”</span> with which + the young Dublin Fellow was burdened—the Secret of the universe + which he had been longing to discharge upon mankind for their + benefit, yet without sign of desire to gain fame for himself as the + discoverer. It is thus that he unfolds it:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind + that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this + important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and + furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose + the mighty frame of the world, have not <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagexxxiii">[pg xxxiii]</span><a name="Pgxxxiii" id="Pgxxxiii" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> any subsistence without a Mind; that + their <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">being</span></em> is to be perceived or known; + that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, + or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, + they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the + mind of some Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and + involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any + single part of them an existence independent of a Spirit<a id= + "noteref_3" name="noteref_3" href="#note_3"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">3</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This does not + mean denial of the existence of the world that is daily presented + to our senses and which includes our own bodies. On the contrary, + it affirms, as intuitively true, the existence of the only real + matter which our senses present to us. The only material world of + which we have any experience consists of the appearances + (misleadingly called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> of sense by Berkeley) which + are continually rising as real objects in a passive procession of + interpretable signs, through means of which each finite person + realises his own individual personality; also the existence of + other finite persons; and the sense-symbolism that is more or less + interpreted in the natural sciences; all significant of God. So the + material world of concrete experience is presented to us as + mind-dependent and in itself powerless: the deepest and truest + reality must always be spiritual. Yet this mind-dependent material + world is the occasion of innumerable pleasures and pains to human + percipients, in so far as they conform to or contradict its + customary laws, commonly called the laws of nature. So the + sense-symbolism in which we live is found to play an important part + in the experience of percipient beings. But it makes us sceptics + and atheists when, in its name, we put a supposed dead abstract + matter in room of the Divine Active Reason of which all natural + order is the continuous providential expression.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Accordingly, God + must exist, because the material world, in order to be a real + world, needs to be continually <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxxiv">[pg xxxiv]</span><a name="Pgxxxiv" id="Pgxxxiv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> realised and regulated by living Providence; + and we have all the certainty of sense and sanity that there + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">is</span></em> a (mind-dependent) material + world, a boundless and endlessly evolving sense-symbolism.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the two years + after the disclosure of his New Principle we see Berkeley chiefly + through his correspondence with Percival. He was eager to hear the + voice of criticism; but the critics were slow to speak, and when + they did speak they misconceived the question, and of course his + answer to it. <span class="tei tei-q">“If when you receive my + book,”</span> he writes from Dublin, in July, 1710, to Sir John, + who was then in London, <span class="tei tei-q">“you can procure me + the opinion of some of your acquaintances who are thinking men, + addicted to the study of natural philosophy and mathematics, I + shall be extremely obliged to you.”</span> He also asks Percival to + present the book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> to Lord Pembroke, to + whom he had ventured to dedicate it, as Locke had done his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>. The reply was + discouraging.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“I did but name the subject-matter of your book of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> to some ingenuous + friends of mine,”</span> Percival says, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“and they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the + same time refusing to read it; which I have not yet got one to do. + A physician of my acquaintance undertook to describe your person, + and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to take + remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire and vanity of starting + something new should put you upon such an undertaking; and when I + justified you in that part of your character, and added other + deserving qualities you have, he could not tell what to think of + you. Another told me an ingenious man ought not to be discouraged + from exerting his wit, and said Erasmus was not worse thought of + for writing in praise of folly; but that you are not gone as far as + a gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is no such + thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being at + all.”</span></p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxv">[pg + xxxv]</span><a name="Pgxxxv" id="Pgxxxv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is not + surprising that a book which was supposed to deny the existence of + all that we see and touch should be ridiculed, and its author + called a madman. What vexed the author was, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“that men who had never considered my book should + confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the existence of sensible + things, and are not positive of any one thing, not even of their + own being. But whoever reads my book with attention will see that I + question not the existence of anything we perceive by our senses. + Fine spun metaphysics are what on all occasions I declaim against, + and if any one shall shew anything of that sort in my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise</span></span> I will willingly + correct it.”</span> A material world that was real enough to yield + physical science, to make known to us the existence of other + persons and of God, and which signified in very practical ways + happiness or misery to sentient beings, seemed to him sufficiently + real for human science and all other purposes. Nevertheless, in the + ardour of youth Berkeley had hardly fathomed the depths into which + his New Principle led, and which he hoped to escape by avoiding the + abstractions of <span class="tei tei-q">“fine-spun + metaphysics.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In December + Percival writes from London that he has <span class= + "tei tei-q">“given the book to Lord Pembroke,”</span> who + <span class="tei tei-q">“thought the author an ingenious man, and + to be encouraged”</span>; but for himself he <span class= + "tei tei-q">“cannot believe in the non-existence of Matter”</span>; + and he had tried in vain to induce Samuel Clarke, the great English + metaphysician, either to refute or to accept the New Principle. In + February Berkeley sends an explanatory letter for Lord Pembroke to + Percival's care. In a letter in June he turns to social questions, + and suggests that if <span class="tei tei-q">“some Irish gentlemen + of good fortune and generous inclinations would constantly reside + in England, there to watch for the interests of Ireland, they might + bring far greater advantage than they could by spending their + incomes at home.”</span> And so 1711 passes, with responses of + ignorant critics; vain endeavours to draw <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagexxxvi">[pg xxxvi]</span><a name="Pgxxxvi" id="Pgxxxvi" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> worthy criticism from Samuel Clarke; + the author all the while doing work as a Tutor in Trinity College + on a modest income; now and then on holidays in Meath or elsewhere + in Ireland. Three discourses on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Passive + Obedience</span></span> in the College Chapel in 1712, + misinterpreted, brought on him the reproach of Jacobitism. Yet they + were designed to shew that society rests on a deeper foundation + than force and calculations of utility, and is at last rooted in + principles of an immutable morality. Locke's favourite opinion, + that morality is a demonstrable, seems to weigh with him in these + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discourses</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But Berkeley was + not yet done with the exposition and vindication of his new + thought, for it seemed to him charged with supreme practical issues + for mankind. In the two years which followed the publication of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> he was preparing to + reproduce his spiritual conception of the universe, in the dramatic + form of dialogue, convenient for dealing popularly with plausible + objections. The issue was the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Three Dialogues between Hylas and + Philonous</span></span>, in which Philonous argues for the + absurdity of an abstract matter that is unrealised in the + experience of living beings, as against Hylas, who is put forward + to justify belief in this abstract reality. The design of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> is to present in a + familiar form <span class="tei tei-q">“such principles as, by an + easy solution of the perplexities of philosophers, together with + their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves as + genuine to the mind, and rescue philosophy from the endless + pursuits it is engaged in; which, with a plain demonstration of the + Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, should seem the readiest + preparation, as well as the strongest motive to the study and + practice of virtue<a id="noteref_4" name="noteref_4" href= + "#note_4"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">4</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> were completed, at the + end of 1712, Berkeley resolved to visit London, as he told + Percival, <span class="tei tei-q">“in order to print my new book of + Dialogues, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxvii">[pg + xxxvii]</span><a name="Pgxxxvii" id="Pgxxxvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and to make acquaintance with men of + merit.”</span> He got leave of absence from his College + <span class="tei tei-q">“for the recovery of his health,”</span> + which had suffered from study, and perhaps too he remembered that + Bacon commends travel as <span class="tei tei-q">“to the younger + sort a part of education.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley made + his appearance in London in January, 1713. On the 26th of that + month he writes to Percival that he <span class="tei tei-q">“had + crossed the Channel from Dublin a few days before,”</span> + describes adventures on the road, and enlarges on the beauty of + rural England, which he liked more than anything he had seen in + London. <span class="tei tei-q">“Mr. Clarke”</span> had already + introduced him to Lord Pembroke. He had also called on his + countryman Richard Steele, <span class="tei tei-q">“who desired to + be acquainted with him. Somebody had given him my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise on the + Principles of Human Knowledge</span></span>, and that was the + ground of his inclination to my acquaintance.”</span> He + anticipates <span class="tei tei-q">“much satisfaction in the + conversation of Steele and his friends,”</span> adding that + <span class="tei tei-q">“there is lately published a bold and + pernicious book, a <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discourse on Free-thinking</span></span><a id= + "noteref_5" name="noteref_5" href="#note_5"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">5</span></span></a>.”</span> + In February he <span class="tei tei-q">“dines often with Steele in + his house in Bloomsbury Square,”</span> and tells in March + <span class="tei tei-q">“that you will soon hear of Mr. Steele + under the character of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Guardian</span></span>; he designs his paper + shall come out every day as the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spectator</span></span>.”</span> The night + before <span class="tei tei-q">“a very ingenious new poem upon + <span class="tei tei-q">‘Windsor Forest’</span> had been given to + him by the author, Mr. Pope. The gentleman is a Papist, but a man + of excellent wit and learning, one of those Mr. Steele mentions in + his last paper as having writ some of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spectator</span></span>.”</span> A few days + later he has met <span class="tei tei-q">“Mr. Addison, who has the + same talents as Steele in a high degree, and is likewise a great + philosopher, having applied himself to the speculative studies more + than any of the wits I know. I breakfasted with him at Dr. Swift's + lodgings. His coming in while I was there, and the good + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxviii">[pg + xxxviii]</span><a name="Pgxxxviii" id="Pgxxxviii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> temper he showed, was construed by me as a + sign of the approaching coalition of parties. A play of Mr. + Steele's, which was expected, he has now put off till next winter. + But <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cato</span></span>, a most noble play of Mr. + Addison, is to be acted in Easter week.”</span> Accordingly, on + April 18, he writes that <span class="tei tei-q">“on Tuesday last + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cato</span></span> was acted for the first + time. I was present with Mr. Addison and two or three more friends + in a side box, where we had a talk and two or three flasks of + Burgundy and Champagne, which the author (who is a very sober man) + thought necessary to support his spirits, and indeed it was a + pleasant refreshment to us all between the Acts. Some parts of the + prologue, written by Mr. Pope, a Tory and even a Papist, were + hissed, being thought to savour of Whiggism; but the clap got much + the better of the hiss. Lord Harley, who sat in the next box to us, + was observed to clap as loud as any in the house all the time of + the play.”</span> Swift and Pope have described this famous first + night of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cato</span></span>; now for the first time we + have Berkeley's report. He adds, <span class="tei tei-q">“This day + I dined at Dr. Arbuthnot's lodging in the Queen's + Palace.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">His countryman, + Swift, was among the first to welcome him to London, where Swift + had himself been for four years, <span class="tei tei-q">“lodging + in Bury Street,”</span> and sending the daily journal to Stella, + which records so many incidents of that memorable London life. Mrs. + Vanhomrigh and her daughter, the unhappy Vanessa, were living in + rooms in the same street as Swift, and there he <span class= + "tei tei-q">“loitered, hot and lazy, after his morning's + work,”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“often dined out of mere + listlessness.”</span> Berkeley was a frequent visitor at Swift's + house, and this Vanhomrigh connexion with Swift had an influence on + Berkeley's fortune long afterwards. On a Sunday in April we find + him at Kensington, at the Court of Queen Anne, in the company of + Swift. <span class="tei tei-q">“I went to Court to-day,”</span> + Swift's journal records, <span class="tei tei-q">“on purpose to + present Mr. Berkeley, one of the Fellows of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxix">[pg xxxix]</span><a name="Pgxxxix" id= + "Pgxxxix" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Trinity. College, to Lord + Berkeley of Stratton. That Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man, + and a great philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the + ministers, and have given them some of his writings, and I will + favour him as much as I can.”</span> In this, Swift was as good as + his word. <span class="tei tei-q">“Dr. Swift,”</span> he adds, + <span class="tei tei-q">“is admired both by Steele and Addison, and + I think Addison one of the best natured and most agreeable men in + the world.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One day about + this time, at the instance of Addison, it seems that a meeting was + arranged between Berkeley and Samuel Clarke, the metaphysical + rector of St. James's in Piccadilly, whose opinion he had in vain + tried to draw forth two years before through Sir John Percival. + Berkeley's personal charm was felt wherever he went, and even + <span class="tei tei-q">“the fastidious and turbulent + Atterbury,”</span> after intercourse with him, is reported to have + said: <span class="tei tei-q">“So much understanding, so much + knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think + had been the portion of any but angels till I saw this + gentleman.”</span> Much was expected from the meeting with Clarke, + but Berkeley had again to complain that although Clarke had neither + refuted his arguments nor disproved his premisses, he had not the + candour to accept his conclusion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It was thus that + Berkeley became known to <span class="tei tei-q">“men of + merit”</span> in that brilliant society. He was also brought among + persons on whom he would hardly have conferred this title. He tells + Percival that he had attended several free-thinking clubs, in the + pretended character of a learner, and that he there heard Anthony + Collins, author of <span class="tei tei-q">“the bold and pernicious + book on free-thinking,”</span> boast <span class="tei tei-q">“that + he was able to demonstrate that the existence of God is an + impossible supposition.”</span> The promised <span class= + "tei tei-q">“demonstration”</span> seems to have been Collins' + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Inquiry + Concerning Human Liberty</span></span>, which appeared two years + later, according to which all that happens in mind and matter is + the issue of natural necessity. Steele invited Berkeley to + contribute <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexl">[pg + xl]</span><a name="Pgxl" id="Pgxl" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Guardian</span></span> during its short-lived + existence between March and September, 1713. He took the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discourse</span></span> of Collins for the + subject of his first essay. Three other essays are concerned with + man's hope of a future life, and are among the few passages in his + writings in which his philosophy is a meditation upon Death.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In May, Percival + writes to him from Dublin that he hears the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“new book of Dialogues is printed, though not yet + published, and that your opinion has gained ground among the + learned; that Mr. Addison has come over to your view; and that what + at first seemed shocking is become so familiar that others envy you + the discovery, and make it their own.”</span> In his reply in June, + Berkeley mentions that <span class="tei tei-q">“a clergyman in + Wiltshire has lately published a treatise wherein he advances + something published three years ago in my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles of Human + Knowledge</span></span>.”</span> The clergyman was Arthur Collier, + author of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Clavis Universalis</span></span>, or + demonstration of the impossibility of an external world<a id= + "noteref_6" name="noteref_6" href="#note_6"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">6</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Three + Dialogues</span></span> were published in June. In the middle of + that same month he was in Oxford, <span class="tei tei-q">“a most + delightful place,”</span> where he spent two months, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“witnessed the Act and grand performances at the + theatre, and a great concourse from London and the country, amongst + whom were several foreigners.”</span> The Drury Lane Company had + gone down to Oxford, and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cato</span></span> was on the stage for + several nights. The Percival correspondence now first discloses + this prolonged visit to Oxford in the summer of 1713, that ideal + home from whence, forty years after, he departed on a more + mysterious journey than any on this planet. In a letter from thence + to Percival, he had claimed Arbuthnot as one of the converts to the + <span class="tei tei-q">“new Principle.”</span> Percival replied + that Swift demurred to this, on which Berkeley rejoins: + <span class="tei tei-q">“As to what you say of Dr. Arbuthnot not + being of my opinion, it is true there <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexli">[pg xli]</span><a name="Pgxli" id="Pgxli" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> has been some difference between us + concerning some notions relating to the necessity of the laws of + nature; but this does not touch the main points of the + non-existence of what philosophers call material substance; against + which he acknowledges he can assert nothing.”</span> One would + gladly have got more than this from Berkeley, about what touched + his favourite conception of the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“arbitrariness”</span> of law in nature, as + distinguished from the <span class="tei tei-q">“necessity”</span> + which some modern physicists are ready vaguely to take for + granted.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The scene now + changes. On October 15 Berkeley suddenly writes from London: + <span class="tei tei-q">“I am on the eve of going to Sicily, as + chaplain to Lord Peterborough, who is Ambassador Extraordinary on + the coronation of the new king.”</span> He had been recommended by + Swift to the Ambassador, one of the most extraordinary characters + then in Europe, who a few years before had astonished the world in + the war of the Succession in Spain, and afterwards by his genius as + a diplomatist: in Holland, nearly a quarter of a century before, he + had formed an intimate friendship with John Locke. Ten months in + France and Italy in the suite of Lord Peterborough brought the + young Irish metaphysician, who had lately been introduced to the + wits of London and the dons of Oxford, into a new world. It was to + him the beginning of a career of wandering and social activity, + which lasted, with little interruption, for nearly twenty years, + during which metaphysics and authorship were in the background. On + November 25 we find him in Paris, writing letters to Percival and + Prior. <span class="tei tei-q">“From London to Calais”</span>, he + tells Prior, <span class="tei tei-q">“I came in company of a + Flamand, a Spaniard, a Frenchman, and three English servants of my + Lord. The three gentlemen, being of three different nations, + obliged me to speak the French language (which is now familiar), + and gave me the opportunity of seeing much of the world in little + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexlii">[pg xlii]</span><a name= + "Pgxlii" id="Pgxlii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> compass.... On + November 1 (O.S.) I embarked in the stage-coach, with a company + that were all perfect strangers to me. There were two Scotch, and + one English gentleman. One of the former happened to be the author + of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Voyage to St. Kilda</span></span> and the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Account + of the Western Isles</span></span><a id="noteref_7" name= + "noteref_7" href="#note_7"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">7</span></span></a>. We + were good company on the road; and that day se'ennight came to + Paris. I have since been taken up in viewing churches, convents, + palaces, colleges, &c., which are very numerous and magnificent + in this town. The splendour and riches of these things surpasses + belief; but it were endless to descend to particulars. I was + present at a disputation in the Sorbonne, which indeed had much of + the French fire in it. I saw the Irish and the English Colleges. In + the latter I saw, enclosed in a coffin, the body of the late King + James.... To-morrow I intend to visit Father Malebranche, and + discourse him on certain points.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Abbé + D'Aubigné, as he informs Percival, was to introduce him to + Malebranche, then the chief philosopher of France, whose Vision of + the world in God had some affinity with Berkeley's own thought. + Unfortunately we have no record of the intended interview with the + French idealist, who fourteen years before had been visited by + Addison, also on his way to Italy, when Malebranche expressed great + regard for the English nation, and admiration for Newton; but he + shook his head when Hobbes was mentioned, whom he ventured to + disparage as a <span class="tei tei-q">“poor silly + creature.”</span> Malebranche died nearly two years after + Berkeley's proposed interview; and according to a story + countenanced by Dugald Stewart, Berkeley was the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“occasional cause”</span> of his death. He found the + venerable Father, we are told, in a cell, cooking, in a pipkin, a + medicine for a disorder with which he was troubled. The + conversation naturally turned on Berkeley's system, of which + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexliii">[pg xliii]</span><a name= + "Pgxliii" id="Pgxliii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Malebranche had + received some knowledge from a translation. The issue of the debate + proved tragical to poor Malebranche. In the heat of disputation he + raised his voice so high, and gave way so freely to the natural + impetuosity of a man of genius and a Frenchman, that he brought on + a violent increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few + days after<a id="noteref_8" name="noteref_8" href= + "#note_8"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">8</span></span></a>. This + romantic tale is, I suspect, mythical. The Percival correspondence + shews that Berkeley was living in London in October, 1715, the + month in which Malebranche died, and I find no trace of a short + sudden visit to Paris at that time.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">After a month + spent in Paris, another fortnight carried Berkeley and two + travelling companions to Italy through Savoy. They crossed Mont + Cenis on New Year's Day in 1714—<span class="tei tei-q">“one of the + most difficult and formidable parts of the Alps which is ever + passed over by mortal man,”</span> as he tells Prior in a letter + from Turin. <span class="tei tei-q">“We were carried in open chairs + by men used to scale these rocks and precipices, which at this + season are more slippery and dangerous than at other times, and at + the best are high, craggy, and steep enough to cause the heart of + the most valiant man to melt within him.”</span> At the end of + other six weeks we find him at Leghorn, where he spent three + months, <span class="tei tei-q">“while my lord was in + Sicily.”</span> He <span class="tei tei-q">“prefers England or + Ireland to Italy: the only advantage is in point of air.”</span> + From Leghorn he writes in May a complimentary letter to Pope, on + the occasion of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Rape of the Lock</span></span>: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Style, painting, judgment, spirit, I had already + admired in your other writings; but in this I am charmed with the + magic of your invention, with all those images, allusions, and + inexplicable beauties which you raise so surprisingly, and at the + same time so naturally, out of a trifle.... I remember to have + heard you mention some <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexliv">[pg + xliv]</span><a name="Pgxliv" id="Pgxliv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> half-formed design of coming to Italy. What + might we not expect from a muse that sings so well in the bleak + climate of England, if she felt the same warm sun and breathed the + same air with Virgil and Horace.”</span> In July we find Berkeley + in Paris on his way back to England. He had <span class= + "tei tei-q">“parted from Lord Peterborough at Genoa, where my lord + took post for Turin, and thence designed passing over the Alps, and + so through Savoy, on his way to England.”</span> In August they are + in London, where the aspect of English politics was changed by the + death of the Queen in that month. He seems to have had a fever soon + after his return. In October, Arbuthnot, in one of his chatty + letters to Swift, writes thus: <span class="tei tei-q">“Poor + philosopher Berkeley has now the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of + health, which was very hard to produce in him, for he had an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of a strange fever upon him, + so strange that it was very hard to destroy it by introducing a + contrary one.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our record of + the two following years is a long blank, first broken by a letter + to Percival in July, 1715, dated at London. Whether he spent any + time at Fulham with Lord Peterborough after their return from Italy + does not appear, nor whether he visited Ireland in those years, + which is not likely. We have no glimpses of brilliant London + society as in the preceding year. Steele was now in Parliament. + Swift had returned to Dublin, and Addison was the Irish chief + secretary. But Pope was still at Binfield, among the glades of + Windsor, and Berkeley congratulated him after receiving the first + volume of his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Homer</span></span>. Of his own literary + pursuits we hear nothing. Perhaps the Second Part of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, which was lost + afterwards in his travels, engaged him. In the end of July he wrote + to Lord Percival<a id="noteref_9" name="noteref_9" href= + "#note_9"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">9</span></span></a> from + Flaxley<a id="noteref_10" name="noteref_10" href= + "#note_10"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">10</span></span></a> on the + Severn; and in August, September, October, and November he wrote + from London, chiefly interested in <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexlv">[pg xlv]</span><a name="Pgxlv" id="Pgxlv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> reports about <span class="tei tei-q">“the + rebels in Scotland,”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“the forces + under Lord Mar, which no doubt will languish and disperse in a + little time. The Bishop of Bristol assured me the other day that + the Court expect that the Duke of Orleans would, in case of need, + supply them with forces against the Pretender.”</span> Our next + glimpse of him is in May, 1716, when he writes to Lord Percival + that he is <span class="tei tei-q">“like soon to go to Ireland, the + Prince of Wales having recommended him to the Lords Justices for + the living of St. Paul's in Dublin.”</span> This opening was soon + closed, and the visit to Ireland was abandoned. A groundless + suspicion of Jacobitism was not overcome by the interest of + Caroline, Princess of Wales. In June, 1716, Charles Dering wrote + from Dublin, that <span class="tei tei-q">“the Lords Justices have + made a strong representation against him.”</span> He had to look + elsewhere for the immediate future.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We find him at + Turin in November, 1716, with a fresh leave of absence for two + years from his College. It seems that Ashe, Bishop of Clogher, had + engaged him as travelling tutor to his son, a means not then + uncommon for enabling young authors of moderate fortune to see new + countries and mix with society. Addison had visited Italy in this + way sixteen years before, and Adam Smith long afterwards travelled + with the young Duke of Buccleuch. With young Ashe, Berkeley crossed + Mont Cenis a second time. They reached Rome at the beginning of + 1717. His <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Journal in Italy</span></span> in that year, + and occasional letters to Percival, Pope, and Arbuthnot, shew + ardent interest in nature and art. With the widest views, + <span class="tei tei-q">“this very great though singular sort of + man descended into a minute detail, and begrudged neither pains nor + expense for the means of information. He travelled through a great + part of Sicily on foot; clambered over the mountains and crept into + the caverns, to investigate its natural history and discover the + causes of its volcanoes; and I have known him sit for hours in + forges and foundries to inspect their <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexlvi">[pg xlvi]</span><a name="Pgxlvi" id="Pgxlvi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> successive operations<a id="noteref_11" name= + "noteref_11" href="#note_11"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">11</span></span></a>.”</span> + If the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Journal</span></span> had been transformed by + his own hand into a book, his letter to Pope from Inarime shews + that the book might have rivalled Addison's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Remarks on Parts of + Italy</span></span> in grace of style and large human interest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the summer of + 1720 we find the travellers at Florence, afterwards for some time + at Lyons, and in London at the beginning of the next year. On the + way home his metaphysical inspiration was revived. The <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Cause of Motion”</span> had been proposed by the + French Academy as the subject of a prize dissertation. The subject + gave an opportunity for further unfolding his early thought. In the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> he had argued for the + necessary dependence of matter, for its concrete substantial + reality, upon living percipient mind. He would now shew its + powerlessness as it is presented to us in sense. The material + world, chiefly under the category of substance, inspired the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. The material world, + under the category of cause or power, inspired the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>. This Latin Essay sums up the distinctive + thought of Berkeley, as it appears in the authorship of his early + life. <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Moles evolvit et agitat + mentes</span></span> might be taken as the formula of the + materialism which he sought to dissolve. <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mens percipit et agitat molem significantem, + cujus esse est percipi</span></span> expresses what Berkeley would + substitute for the materialistic formula.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The end of the + summer of 1721 found Berkeley still in London. England was in the + social agitation and misery consequent upon the failure of the + South Sea Company, a gigantic commercial speculation connected with + British trade in America. A new inspiration took possession of him. + He thought he saw in this catastrophe signs of a decline in public + morals worse than that which followed the Restoration. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Political corruption”</span>, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“decay of religion,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“growth of atheism,”</span> were descriptive words used + by the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexlvii">[pg + xlvii]</span><a name="Pgxlvii" id="Pgxlvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> thoughtful. Berkeley's eager imagination was + apt to exaggerate the evil. He became inspired by social idealism, + and found vent for his fervour in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">An Essay towards + preventing the Ruin of Great Britain</span></span>, which, as well + as the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>, made its appearance in 1721. This <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + is a significant factor in his career. It was the Cassandra wail of + a sorrowful and indignant prophet, prepared to shake the dust from + his feet, and to transfer his eye of hope to other regions, in + which a nearer approach to Utopia might be realised. The true + personality of the individual is unrealisable in selfish isolation. + His favourite <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">non sibi, sed toti + mundo</span></span> was henceforward more than ever the ruling + maxim of his life.</p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">II. Middle Life + (1722-34).</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In October, + 1721, Berkeley was in Dublin. The register of the College shews + that <span class="tei tei-q">“on November 14, 1721, Mr. Berkeley + had the grace of the House for the Degree of Bachelor and Doctor of + Divinity.”</span> There is no ground for the report that he + returned to Ireland at this time as Chaplain to the Duke of + Grafton, the Lord Lieutenant<a id="noteref_12" name="noteref_12" + href="#note_12"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">12</span></span></a>. But + preferment in the Church seemed within his reach. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I had no sooner set foot on shore,”</span> he wrote to + Percival in that October, <span class="tei tei-q">“than I heard + that the Deanery of Dromore was vacant.”</span> Percival used his + influence with the Lord Lieutenant, and in February, 1722, + Berkeley's patent was <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexlviii">[pg + xlviii]</span><a name="Pgxlviii" id="Pgxlviii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> <span class="tei tei-q">“passing the Seals + for the Deanery of Dromore.”</span> But the Bishop of Dromore + claimed the patronage, and this led to a protracted and ineffectual + lawsuit, which took Berkeley to London in the following winter, + <span class="tei tei-q">“to see friends and inform himself of + points of law,”</span> and he tells that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“on the way he was nearly drowned in crossing to + Holyhead<a id="noteref_13" name="noteref_13" href= + "#note_13"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">13</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + interest in church preferment was not personal. He saw in it only + means to an end. In March, 1723, he surprised Lord Percival by + announcing, in a letter from London, a project which it seems for + some time had occupied his thoughts. <span class="tei tei-q">“It is + now about ten months,”</span> he says, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“since I have determined to spend the residue of my + days in Bermuda, where I trust in Providence I may be the mean + instrument of doing great good to mankind. Whatever happens, go I + am resolved, if I live. Half a dozen of the most ingenious and + agreeable men in our College are with me in this project, and since + I came hither I have got together about a dozen Englishmen of + quality, who intend to retire to those islands.”</span> He then + explains the project, opening a vision of Christian civilisation + radiating from those fair islands of the West, whose idyllic bliss + poets had sung, diffused over the New World, with its magnificent + possibilities in the future history of mankind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I find no + further record of the origin of this bright vision. As it had + become a practical determination <span class="tei tei-q">“ten + months”</span> before March, 1723, one is carried back to the first + months after his return to Dublin and to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + that was called forth by the South Sea catastrophe. One may + conjecture that despair of England and the Old World—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“such as Europe breeds in her decay”</span>—led him to + look westward for the hopeful future of mankind, moved, perhaps, by + the connexion of the catastrophe with America. His active + imagination pictured a better Republic than Plato's, and a grander + Utopia than More's, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexlix">[pg + xlix]</span><a name="Pgxlix" id="Pgxlix" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> emanating from a College in the isles of + which Waller had sung.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the meantime + a curious fortune unexpectedly favoured him. Swift's unhappy + Vanessa, associated with Bury Street in 1713, had settled on her + property at Marley Abbey near Dublin; and Swift had privately + married Stella, as she confessed to Vanessa, who thereafter revoked + the bequest of her fortune to Swift, and left it to be divided + between Berkeley and Marshal, afterwards an Irish judge. Vanessa + died in May, 1723. A few days after Berkeley wrote thus to Lord + Percival: <span class="tei tei-q">“Here is something that will + surprise your lordship as it doth me. Mrs. Hester Vanhomrigh, a + lady to whom I was a perfect stranger, having never in the whole + course of my life exchanged a word with her, died on Sunday. + Yesterday her Will was opened, by which it appears that I am + constituted executor, the advantage whereof is computed by those + who understand her affairs to be worth £3000.... My Bermuda scheme + is now stronger in my mind than ever; this providential event + having made many things easy which were otherwise before.”</span> + Lord Percival in reply concludes that he would <span class= + "tei tei-q">“persist more than ever in that noble scheme, which may + in some time exalt your name beyond that of St. Xavier and the most + famous missionaries abroad.”</span> But he warns him that, + <span class="tei tei-q">“without the protection of + Government,”</span> he would encounter insurmountable difficulties. + The Vanessa legacy, and the obstructions in the way of the Deanery + of Dromore, were the subjects of a tedious correspondence with his + friend and business factotum, <span class="tei tei-q">“Tom + Prior,”</span> in 1724 and the three following years. In the end, + the debts of Vanessa absorbed most of the legacy. And as to the + Deanery of Dromore, he tells Percival, on September 19, 1723: + <span class="tei tei-q">“I despair of seeing it end to my + advantage. The truth is, my fixed purpose of going to Bermuda sets + me above soliciting anything with earnestness in this part + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagel">[pg l]</span><a name="Pgl" id= + "Pgl" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of the world. It can be of no use + to me, but as it may enable me the better to prosecute that design; + and it must be owned that the present possession of something in + the Church would make my application for an establishment in those + islands more considered.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Nevertheless, he + got a Deanery at last. In May, 1724, he informs Lord Percival from + Trinity College: <span class="tei tei-q">“Yesterday I received my + patent for the best Deanery in the kingdom, that of Derry. It is + said to be worth £1500 per annum. But as I do not consider it with + an eye to enriching myself, so I shall be perfectly contented if it + facilitates and recommends my scheme of Bermuda, which I am in + hopes will meet with a better reception if it comes from one + possessed of so great a Deanery.”</span> In September he is on his + way, not to Derry, but to London, <span class="tei tei-q">“to raise + funds and obtain a Charter for the Bermuda College from George the + First,”</span> fortified by a remarkable letter from Swift to Lord + Carteret, the new Lord Lieutenant, who was then in Bath<a id= + "noteref_14" name="noteref_14" href="#note_14"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">14</span></span></a>. As + Swift predicted in this letter, Berkeley's conquests spread far and + fast in England, where he organised his resources during the four + following years. Nothing shews more signally the magic of his + personality than the story of his life in London in those years of + negotiation and endeavour. The proposal met with a response + wonderful in a generation represented by Walpole. The subscriptions + soon reached five thousand pounds, and Walpole was among the + subscribers. The Scriblerus Club, meeting at Lord Bathurst's, + agreed to rally Berkeley, who was among them, on his Bermuda + scheme. He asked to be heard in defence, and presented the case + with such force of enthusiasm that the company <span class= + "tei tei-q">“were struck dumb, and after a pause simultaneously + rose and asked leave to accompany him.”</span> Bermuda for a time + inspired London.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pageli">[pg + li]</span><a name="Pgli" id="Pgli" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley was not + satisfied with this. He remembered what Lord Percival had said + about failure without help from Government. Accordingly he obtained + a Charter from George the First early in 1726, and after canvassing + the House of Commons, secured a grant of £20,000, with only two + dissentient votes, in May of that year. This was the beginning of + his difficulties. Payment was indefinitely delayed, and he was kept + negotiating; besides, with the help of Prior, he was unravelling + legal perplexities in which the Vanessa legacy was involved. It was + in these years that he was seen at the receptions of Caroline at + Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of Wales, and afterwards at + St. James's or at Kensington, when she became Queen in 1727; not, + he says, because he loved Courts, but because he loved America. + Clarke was still rector of St. James's, and Butler had not yet + migrated to his parsonage at Stanhope; so their society was open to + him. The Queen liked to listen to a philosophical discussion. Ten + years before, as Princess of Wales, she had been a royal go-between + in the famous correspondence between Clarke and Leibniz. And now, + Berkeley being in London, he too was asked to her weekly reunions, + when she loved to hear Clarke arguing with Berkeley, or Berkeley + arguing with Hoadley. Also in 1726 Voltaire made his lengthened + visit to England, a familiar figure in the circle of Pope's + friends, attracted to the philosophy of Locke and Newton; and + Voltaire mentions that he met <span class="tei tei-q">“the + discoverer of the true theory of vision”</span> during his stay in + London.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From the summer + of 1727 until the spring of 1728 there is no extant correspondence + either with Percival or <span class="tei tei-q">“Tom Prior”</span> + to throw light on his movements. In February, 1728, he was still in + London, but he <span class="tei tei-q">“hoped to set out for Dublin + in March, and to America in May.”</span> There is a mystery about + this visit to Dublin. <span class="tei tei-q">“I propose to set out + for Dublin about a month hence,”</span> he writes to <span class= + "tei tei-q">“dear <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelii">[pg + lii]</span><a name="Pglii" id="Pglii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Tom,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“but of this you must not give + the least intimation to anybody. It is of all things my earnest + desire (and for very good reasons) not to have it known that I am + in Dublin. Speak not, therefore, one syllable of it to any mortal + whatsoever. When I formerly desired you to take a place for me near + the town, you gave out that you were looking for a retired lodging + for a friend of yours; upon which everybody surmised me to be the + person. I must beg you not to act in the like manner now, but to + take for me an entire house in your own name, and as for yourself; + for, all things considered, I am determined upon a whole house, + with no mortal in it but a maid of your own putting, who is to look + on herself as your servant. Let there be two bed-chambers: one for + you, another for me; and, as you like, you may ever and anon lie + there. I would have the house, with necessary furniture, taken by + the month (or otherwise, as you can), for I propose staying not + beyond that time; and yet perhaps I may. Take it as soon as + possible.... Let me entreat you to say nothing of this to anybody, + but to do the thing directly.... I would of all things ... have a + proper place in a retired situation, where I may have access to + fields and sweet air provided against the moment I arrive. I am + inclined to think one may be better concealed in the outermost + skirt of the suburbs, than in the country or within the town.... A + house quite detached in the country I should have no objection to, + provided you judge that I shall not be liable to discovery in it. + The place called Bermuda I am utterly against. Dear Tom, do this + matter cleanly and cleverly, without waiting for further advice.... + To the person from whom you hire it (whom alone I would have you + speak of it to) it will not seem strange you should at this time of + the year be desirous, for your own convenience or health, to have a + place in a free and open air.”</span> This mysterious letter was + written in April. From April till September Berkeley again + disappears. There is in all <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pageliii">[pg liii]</span><a name="Pgliii" id="Pgliii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> this a curious secretiveness of which one has + repeated examples in his life. Whether he went to Dublin in that + spring, or why he wanted to go, does not appear.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But in September + he emerges unexpectedly at Gravesend, newly married, and ready to + sail for Rhode Island, <span class="tei tei-q">“in a ship of 250 + tons which he had hired.”</span> The marriage, according to Stock, + took place on August 1, whether in Ireland or in England I cannot + tell. The lady was Anne, daughter of John Forster, late Chief + Justice, and then Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. She shared + his fortune when he was about to engage in the most romantic, and + ideally the grandest, Christian mission of the eighteenth century. + According to tradition she was a devoutly religious mystic: Fénelon + and Madame Guyon were among her favourites. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I chose her,”</span> he tells Lord Percival, + <span class="tei tei-q">“for her qualities of mind and her + unaffected inclination to books. She goes with great thankfulness, + to live a plain farmer's life, and wear stuff of her own spinning. + I have presented her with a spinning-wheel.”</span> A letter to + Prior, dated <span class="tei tei-q">“Gravesend September 5, + 1728,”</span> thus describes the little party on the eve of their + departure:—<span class="tei tei-q">“To-morrow, with God's blessing, + I set sail for Rhode Island, with my wife and a friend of hers, my + Lady Handcock's daughter, who bears us company. I am married since + I saw you to Miss Forster, whose humour and turn of mind pleases me + beyond anything that I know in her whole sex. Mr. James<a id= + "noteref_15" name="noteref_15" href="#note_15"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">15</span></span></a>, Mr. + Dalton, and Mr. Smibert<a id="noteref_16" name="noteref_16" href= + "#note_16"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">16</span></span></a> go + with us on this voyage. We are now all together at Gravesend, and + are engaged in one view.”</span> We are further told<a id= + "noteref_17" name="noteref_17" href="#note_17"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">17</span></span></a> that + they carried stores and goods to a great value, and that the Dean + <span class="tei tei-q">“embarked 20,000 books, besides what the + two gentlemen carried. They <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pageliv">[pg liv]</span><a name="Pgliv" id="Pgliv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> sailed in September for Rhode Island, where + the Dean intends to winter, and to purchase an estate, in order to + settle a correspondence and trade between that island and + Bermudas.”</span> Berkeley was in his forty-fourth year, when, full + of glowing visions of Christian Empire in the West, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Time's noblest offspring,”</span> he left England, on + his way to Bermuda, with the promise of Sir Robert Walpole that he + should receive the promised grant after he had made an investment. + He bought land in America, but he never reached Bermuda.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Towards the end + of January, in 1729, the little party, in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“hired ship of 250 tons,”</span> made their appearance + in Narragansett Bay, on the western side of Rhode Island. + <span class="tei tei-q">“Blundering about the ocean,”</span> they + had touched at Virginia on the way, whence a correspondent, + sceptical of the enterprise, informs Lord Percival that the Dean + <span class="tei tei-q">“had dined with the Governor, and visited + our College,”</span> but thinks that <span class="tei tei-q">“when + the Dean comes to put his visionary scheme into practice, he will + find it no better than a religious frenzy,”</span> and that + <span class="tei tei-q">“he is as much a Don Quixote in zeal as + that renowned knight was in chivalry. I wish the good Dean may not + find out at last that Waller really kidnapt him over to Bermuda, + and that the project he has been drawn into may not prove in every + point of it poetical.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have a + picture of the landing at Newport, on a winter day early in 1729. + <span class="tei tei-q">“Yesterday arrived here Dean Berkeley of + Londonderry, in a pretty large ship. He is a gentleman of middle + stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, and erect aspect. He was + ushered into the town with a great number of gentlemen, to whom he + behaved himself after a very complaisant manner. 'Tis said he + proposes to tarry here with his family about three months<a id= + "noteref_18" name="noteref_18" href="#note_18"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">18</span></span></a>.”</span> + Newport was then a flourishing town, nearly a century old, an + emporium of American commerce, in those days the rival of Boston + and New York. He was <span class="tei tei-q">“never more + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelv">[pg lv]</span><a name="Pglv" + id="Pglv" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> agreeably surprised,”</span> + he says, than <span class="tei tei-q">“at the size of the town and + harbour.”</span> Around him was some of the softest rural and + grandest ocean scenery in the world, which had fresh charms even + for one whose boyhood was spent in the valley of the Nore, who had + lingered in the Bay of Naples, and wandered in Inarime and among + the mountains of Sicily. He was seventy miles from Boston, and + about as far from Newhaven and Yale College. A range of hills + crosses the centre of the island, whence meadows slope to the rocky + shore. The Gulf Stream tempers the surrounding sea. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The people,”</span> he tells Percival, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“are industrious; and though less orthodox have not + less virtue, and I am sure they have more regularity, than those I + left in Europe. They are indeed a strange medley of different + persuasions.”</span> The gentry retained the customs of the squires + in England: tradition tells of a cheerful society: the fox chase, + with hounds and horses, was a favourite recreation. The society, + for so remote a region, was well informed. The family libraries and + pictures which remain argue culture and refinement. Smibert, the + artist of the missionary party, who had moved to Boston, soon found + employment in America, and his pictures still adorn houses in Rhode + Island<a id="noteref_19" name="noteref_19" href= + "#note_19"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">19</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Dean and his + young wife lived in Newport for some months after their arrival. + Mr. Honeyman, a missionary of the English Society, had been placed + there, in Trinity Church, in 1704. The church is still a + conspicuous object from the harbour. Berkeley preached in it three + days after his arrival, and occasionally afterwards. Notes of his + sermons are included in this edition among his Miscellaneous + Works.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the summer of + 1729 he moved from Newport to a quiet valley in the interior of the + island, where he <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelvi">[pg + lvi]</span><a name="Pglvi" id="Pglvi" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + bought a farm, and built a house. In this island-home, named + Whitehall, he lived for more than two years—years of domestic + happiness, and of resumed study, much interrupted since he left + Dublin in 1713. The house may still be seen, a little aside from + the road that runs eastward from Newport, about three miles from + the town. It is built of wood. The south-west room was probably the + library. The ocean is seen in the distance, while orchards and + groves offer the shade and silence which soothed the thinker in his + recluse life. No invitations of the three companions of his + voyage<a id="noteref_20" name="noteref_20" href= + "#note_20"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">20</span></span></a>, who + had migrated to Boston, could allure him from this retreat, where + he diverted his anxieties about Bermuda by the thoughts which found + expression in the dialogues of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, + redolent of Rhode Island and the invigorating breezes of its ocean + shore. Tradition tells that much of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span> was the issue of + meditation in the open air, at a favourite retreat, beneath the + Hanging Rocks, which commands an extensive view of the beach and + the ocean; and the chair in which he sat in this alcove is still + preserved with veneration.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">While Berkeley + loved domestic quiet at Whitehall<a id="noteref_21" name= + "noteref_21" href="#note_21"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">21</span></span></a> and + the <span class="tei tei-q">“still air of delightful + studies,”</span> he mixed occasionally in the society of Newport. + He found it not uncongenial, and soon after he was settled at + Whitehall he led the way in forming a club, which held occasional + meetings, the germ of the Redwood Library, still a useful Newport + institution. His own house was a place of meeting for the New + England missionaries.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 80%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/whitehall.png" alt="Illustration" title= + "Whitehall, Berkeley's Residence in Rhode Island" /> + + <div class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + Whitehall, Berkeley's Residence in Rhode Island + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Soon after his + arrival in Rhode Island, Berkeley was visited by the Reverend + Samuel Johnson, missionary at Stratford, an acute and independent + thinker, one of the two contemporary representatives of philosophy + in America. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelvii">[pg + lvii]</span><a name="Pglvii" id="Pglvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> The other was Jonathan Edwards, at that time + Congregational minister at Northampton on the Connecticut river. + They had both adopted a conception of the meaning and office of the + material world in the economy of existence that was in many + respects similar to Berkeley's<a id="noteref_22" name="noteref_22" + href="#note_22"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">22</span></span></a>. It + seems that Berkeley's book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> had before this + fallen into Johnson's hands. He hastened to visit the author when + he heard of his arrival. A succession of visits and a life-long + correspondence followed. The <span class="tei tei-q">“non-existence + of Matter,”</span> interpreted as a whimsical and even insane + paradox, was found by Johnson to mean the absence of unrealisable + Substance behind the real material world that is presented to our + senses, and of unrealisable Power in the successive sense-presented + appearances of which alone we are percipient. He came to see the + real existence of the things of sense in the constant order of the + data of sense, through which we gain our knowledge of the existence + of our fellow men, and of the omnipresent constant Providence of + God; whose Ideas are the true archetypes of the visible world. He + adopted and applied this conception with a lucidity and force which + give him a high place among American thinkers.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All the while a + cloud darkened the recluse life at Whitehall. In June, 1729, + Berkeley explains to Percival the circumstances and secrecy of his + departure from England:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Before I left England I was reduced to a difficult + situation. Had I continued there, the report would have obtained + (which I had found beginning to spread) that I had dropped the + design, after it had cost me and my friends so much trouble and + expense. On the other hand, if I had taken leave of my friends, + even those who assisted and approved my undertaking would have + condemned my coming abroad before the King's bounty was + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelviii">[pg lviii]</span><a name= + "Pglviii" id="Pglviii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> received. This + obliged me to come away in the private manner that I did, and to + run the risque of a tedious winter voyage. Nothing less would have + convinced the world that I was in earnest, after the report I knew + was growing to the contrary.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Months passed, + and Walpole's promise was still unfulfilled. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I wait here,”</span> he tells Lord Percival in March, + 1730, <span class="tei tei-q">“with all the anxiety that attends + suspense, until I know what I can depend upon, or what course I am + to take. On the one hand I have no notion that the Court would put + what men call a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bite</span></em> upon a poor clergyman, who + depended upon charters, grants, votes, and the like engagements. On + the other hand, I see nothing done towards payment of the + money.”</span> Later on he writes—<span class="tei tei-q">“As for + the raillery of European wits, I should not mind it, if I saw my + College go on and prosper; but I must own the disappointments I + have met with in this particular have nearly touched me, not + without affecting my health and spirits. If the founding a College + for the spread of religion and learning in America had been a + foolish project, it cannot be supposed the Court, the Ministers, + and the Parliament would have given such public encouragement to + it; and if, after all that encouragement, they who engaged to endow + and protect it let it drop, the disappointment indeed may be to me, + but the censure, I think, will light elsewhere.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The suspense was + at last ended. Gibson, the Bishop of London, pressed Walpole for a + final answer. <span class="tei tei-q">“If,”</span> he replied, + <span class="tei tei-q">“you put this question to me as a Minister, + I must, and can, assure you that the money shall most undoubtedly + be paid, as soon as suits with public convenience; but if you ask + me as a friend, whether Dean Berkeley should continue in America + expecting the payment of twenty thousand pounds, I advise him by + all means to return home to Europe, and to give up his present + expectations.”</span> It was thus that in 1731 the Prime Minister + of England <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelix">[pg + lix]</span><a name="Pglix" id="Pglix" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + crushed the project conceived ten years before, and to which the + intervening period had, under his encouragement, been devoted by + the projector with a singular enthusiasm.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 80%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/alcove.png" alt="Illustration" title= + "Berkeley's Alcove, Rhode Island" /> + + <div class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + Berkeley's Alcove, Rhode Island + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A few months + after this heavy blow, Berkeley, with his wife, and Henry their + infant child, bade farewell to the island home. They sailed from + Boston in the late autumn of 1731, and in the following February we + find them in London. Thus ended the romantic episode of Rhode + Island, with its ideal of Christian civilisation, which so moves + the heart and touches the imagination in our retrospect of the + eighteenth century. Of all who have ever landed on the American + shore, none was ever moved by a purer and more self-sacrificing + spirit. America still acknowledges that by Berkeley's visit on this + mission it has been invested with the halo of an illustrious name, + and associated with religious devotion to a magnificent ideal, even + if it was sought to be realised by impracticable means. To reform + the New World, and mankind at last, by a College on an island in + the Atlantic, six hundred miles from America, the Indians whom it + was intended to civilise being mostly in the interior of the + continent, and none in Bermuda, was not unnaturally considered + Quixotic; and that it was at first supported by the British Court + and Parliament is a wonderful tribute to the persuasive genius of + the projector. Perhaps he was too much influenced by Lord + Percival's idea, that it could not be realised by private + benevolence, without the intervention of the Crown. But the + indirect influence of Berkeley's American inspiration is apparent + in many ways in the intellectual and spiritual life of that great + continent, during the last century and a half, especially by the + impulse given to academical education. It is the testimony of an + American author that, <span class="tei tei-q">“by methods different + from those intended by Berkeley, and in ways more manifold than + even he could have dreamed, he has since accomplished, and through + all coming time, by a thousand ineffaceable <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagelx">[pg lx]</span><a name="Pglx" id="Pglx" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> influences, he will continue to + accomplish, some portion at least of the results which he had aimed + at in the founding of his university. It is the old story over + again; the tragedy of a Providence wiser than man's foresight; God + giving the victory to His faithful servant even through the + bitterness of overruling him and defeating him<a id="noteref_23" + name="noteref_23" href="#note_23"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">23</span></span></a>.”</span> + American Empire, as we now see it with its boundless beneficent + influence, is at least an imperfect realisation of Berkeley's + dream.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's head + quarters were in London, in Green Street, for more than two years + after the return to England in the beginning of 1732. Extant + correspondence with Lord Percival ends in Rhode Island, and our + picture of the two years in London is faintly formed by letters to + Prior and Johnson. These speak of ill-health, and breathe a less + sanguine spirit. The brilliant social life of former visits was + less attractive now, even if old friends had remained. But Swift + had quitted England for ever, and Steele had followed Addison to + the grave. Gay, the common friend of Berkeley and Pope, died soon + after the return from Rhode Island, and Arbuthnot was approaching + his end at Hampstead. Samuel Clarke had passed away when Berkeley + was at Whitehall; but Seeker now held the rectory of St. James's, + and Butler was in studious retirement on the Wear; while Pope was + at Twickenham, publishing his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Man</span></span>, receiving visits + from Bolingbroke, or visiting Lord Bathurst at Cirencester Park. + Queen Caroline, too, was holding her receptions at Kensington; but + <span class="tei tei-q">“those who imagine (as you write),”</span> + he tells Prior in January, 1734, <span class="tei tei-q">“that I + have been making my court here all this time, would never believe + (what is most true) that I have not been at the Court or at the + Minister's but once these seven years. The care of my health and + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxi">[pg lxi]</span><a name= + "Pglxi" id="Pglxi" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the love of + retirement have prevailed over whatsoever ambition might have come + to my share.”</span> There is a hint of a visit to Oxford, at + Commemoration in 1733, when his friend Seeker received the honorary + degree.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Soon after he + had settled in London, the fruit of his studies in Rhode Island was + given to the world in the Seven Dialogues of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Alciphron, or The + Minute Philosopher</span></span>. Here the philosophical + inspiration of his early years is directed to sustain faith in + Divine Moral Order, and in the Christian Revelation. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span> is the longest, and in + literary form perhaps the most finished of his works, unsurpassed + in lively strokes of irony and satire. Yet if it is to be regarded + as a philosophical justification of religion, as against modern + agnosticism, one may incline to the judgment of Mr. Leslie Stephen, + that it is <span class="tei tei-q">“the least admirable of all its + author's admirable works.”</span> As we have seen, the sect of + free-thinkers was early the object of Berkeley's ridicule and + sarcasm. They claimed for themselves wide intellectual vision, yet + they were blind to the deep realities of the universe; they took + exclusive credit for freedom of thought, although their thinking + was confined within the narrow compass of our data in sense. The + book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>, and the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span> + of his early years, were designed to bring into clear light the + absolute dependence of the world that is presented to our senses on + Omnipresent Spirit; and the necessary subjection of all changes in + our surroundings to the immediate agency or providence of God. + Boasted <span class="tei tei-q">“free-thinking”</span> was really a + narrow atheism, so he believed, in which meaningless Matter usurped + the place that belonged in reason to God, and he employed reason to + disclose Omnipotent Intelligence in and behind the phenomena that + are presented to the senses in impotent natural sequence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The causes of + the widespread moral corruption of the Old World, which had moved + Berkeley so profoundly, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxii">[pg + lxii]</span><a name="Pglxii" id="Pglxii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> seem to have been pondered anew during his + recluse life in Rhode Island. The decline of morals was explained + by the deification of Matter: consequent life of sensuous pleasure + accounted for decay of religion. That vice is hurtful was argued by + free-thinkers like Mandeville to be a vulgar error, and a + fallacious demonstration was offered of its utility. That virtue is + intrinsically beautiful was taught by Shaftesbury; but Berkeley + judged the abstract beauty, with which <span class= + "tei tei-q">“minute philosophers”</span> were contented, unfit to + move ordinary human beings to self-sacrificing action; for this + involves devotion to a Perfect Person by whom goodness is finally + distributed. Religion alone inspires the larger and higher life, in + presenting distributive justice personified on the throne of the + universe, instead of abstract virtue.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + turning-point in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span> is in man's vision of + God. This is pressed in the Fourth Dialogue. The free-thinker + asserts that <span class="tei tei-q">“the notion of a Deity, or + some invisible power, is of all prejudices the most unconquerable; + the most signal example of belief without reason for + believing.”</span> He demands proof—<span class="tei tei-q">“such + proof as every man of sense requires of a matter of fact.... Should + a man ask, why I believe there is a king of Great Britain? I might + answer, Because I had seen him. Or a king of Spain? Because I had + seen those who saw him. But as for this King of kings, I neither + saw Him myself, nor any one else that ever did see Him.”</span> To + which Euphranor replies, <span class="tei tei-q">“What if it should + appear that God really speaks to man; would this content you? What + if it shall appear plainly that God speaks to men by the + intervention and use of arbitrary, outward, sensible signs, having + no resemblance or necessary connexion with the things they stand + for and suggest; if it shall appear that, by innumerable + combinations of these signs, an endless variety of things is + discovered and made known to us; and that we are thereby instructed + or informed in their different natures; that we are taught + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxiii">[pg lxiii]</span><a name= + "Pglxiii" id="Pglxiii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and admonished + what to shun and what to pursue; and are directed how to regulate + our motions, and how to act with respect to things distant from us, + as well in time as place: will this content you?”</span> Euphranor + accordingly proceeds to shew that Visible Nature is a Language, in + which the Universal Power that is continually at work is speaking + to us all, in a way similar to that in which our fellow men speak + to us; so that we have as much (even more) reason to believe in the + existence of the Universal Person who is the Speaker, as we have to + believe in the existence of persons around us; who become known to + us, when they too employ sense-symbols, in the words and actions by + which we discover that we are not alone in the universe. For men + are really living spirits: their <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bodies</span></em> + are only the sign of their spiritual personality. And it is so with + God, who is also revealed in the visible world as a Spirit. + <span class="tei tei-q">“In a strict sense,”</span> says Euphranor, + <span class="tei tei-q">“I do not see Alciphron, but only such + visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being of that + invisible thinking principle or soul. Even so, in the self-same + manner, it seems to me that, though I cannot with eyes of flesh + behold the invisible God, yet I do, in the strictest sense, behold + and perceive, by all my senses, such signs and tokens ... as + suggest, indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God as certainly, + and with the same evidence, at least, as any other signs, perceived + by sense, do suggest to me the existence of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">your</span></em> + soul, spirit, or thinking principle; which I am convinced of only + by a few signs or effects, and the motions of one small organised + body; whereas I do, at all times, and in all places, perceive + sensible signs which evince the being of God.”</span> In short, God + is the living Soul of the Universe; as you and I are the living + souls that keep our bodies and their organs in significant motion. + We can interpret the character of God in the history of the + universe, even as we can interpret the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagelxiv">[pg lxiv]</span><a name="Pglxiv" id="Pglxiv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> character of our neighbour by observing his + words and outward actions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This overwhelmed + Alciphron. <span class="tei tei-q">“You stare to find that God is + not far from any one of us, and that in Him we live and move and + have our being,”</span> rejoins Euphranor. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“You who, in the beginning of this conference, thought + it strange that God should leave Himself without a witness, do now + think it strange the witness should be so full and clear.”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“I must own I do,”</span> was the reply. + <span class="tei tei-q">“I never imagined it could be pretended + that we saw God with our fleshly eyes, as plain as we see any human + person whatsoever, and that He daily speaks to our senses in a + manifest and clear dialect.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Although this + reasoning satisfied Alciphron, others may think it inconclusive. + How one is able to discover the existence of other persons, and + even the meaning of finite personality, are themselves questions + full of speculative difficulty. But, waiving this, the analogy + between the relation of a human spirit to its body, and that of the + Omnipresent and Omnipotent Spirit to the Universe of things and + persons, fails in several respects. God is supposed to be + continually creating the world by constant and continuous + Providence, and His Omniscience is supposed to comprehend all its + concrete relations: a man's body is not absolutely dependent on the + man's own power and providence; and even his scientific knowledge + of it, in itself and in its relations, is scanty and imperfect, as + his power over it is limited and conditioned. Then the little that + a man gradually learns of what is going on in the surrounding + universe is dependent on his senses: Omniscience comprehends + Immensity and Eternity (so we suppose) in a single intuition. Our + bodies, moreover, are visible things: the universe, this organism + of God, is crowded with <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">persons</span></em>, to whom there is nothing + corresponding within the organism which reveals one man to + another.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But this is not + all. After Euphranor has found that the Universal Power is + Universal Spirit, this is still an inadequate <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagelxv">[pg lxv]</span><a name="Pglxv" id="Pglxv" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> God; for what we want to know is what + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sort</span></em> of Spirit God is. Is God + omnipotent or of limited power, regarded ethically, fair or unfair + in His treatment of persons; good or evil, according to the highest + yet attained conception of goodness; a God of love, or a devil + omnipotent? I infer the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">character</span></em> of my neighbour from his + words and actions, patent to sense in the gradual outward evolution + of his life. I am asked to infer the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">character</span></em> of the Omnipresent + Spirit from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">His</span></em> words and actions, manifested + in the universe of things and persons. But we must not attribute to + the Cause more than it reveals of itself in its effects. God and + men alike are known by the effects they produce. The Universal + Power is, on this condition, righteous, fair, and loving to the + degree in which those conceptions are implied in His visible + embodiment: to affirm more or other than this, on the basis of + analogy <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">alone</span></em>, is either to indulge in + baseless conjecture, or to submit blindly to dogma and + authority.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now the + universe, as far as it comes within the range of human experience + on this planet, is full of suffering and moral disorder. The + <span class="tei tei-q">“religious hypothesis”</span> of a + perfectly righteous and benevolent God is here offered to account + for the appearances which the universe presents to us. But do these + signify exact distributive justice? Is not visible nature + apparently cruel and unrelenting? If we infer cruelty in the + character of a man, because his bodily actions cause undeserved + suffering, must we not, by this analogy, infer in like manner + regarding the character of the Supreme Spirit, manifested in the + progressive evolution of the universal organism?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We find it + impossible to determine with absolute certainty the character even + of our fellow men, from their imperfectly interpreted words and + actions, so that each man is more or less a mystery to his fellows. + The mystery deepens when we try to read the character of + animals,—to interpret the motives which determine the overt acts + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxvi">[pg lxvi]</span><a name= + "Pglxvi" id="Pglxvi" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of dogs or horses. + And if we were able to communicate by visible signs with the + inhabitants of other planets, with how much greater difficulty + should we draw conclusions from their visible acts regarding + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">their</span></em> character? But if this is so + when we use the data of sense for reading the character of finite + persons, how infinite must be the difficulty of reading the + character of the Eternal Spirit, in and through the gradual + evolution of the universe of things and persons, which in this + reasoning is supposed to be His body; and the history of that + universe the facts of His biography, in and by which He is + eternally revealing Himself! For we know nothing about the + unbeginning and unending. The universe of persons is assumed to + have no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">end</span></em>; and I know not why its + evolution must be supposed to have had a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">beginning</span></em>, or that there ever was + a time in which God was unmanifested, to finite persons.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Shall we in + these circumstances turn with Euphranor, in the Fifth and Sixth + Dialogues, to professed revelation of the character of the + Universal Mind presented in miraculous revelation, by inspired + prophets and apostles, who are brought forward as authorities able + to speak infallibly to the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">character</span></em> of God? If the whole + course of nature, or endless evolution of events, is the Divine + Spirit revealed in omnipresent activity, what room is there for any + other less regular revelation? The universe of common experience, + it is implied by Berkeley, is essentially miraculous, and therefore + absolutely perfect. Is it consistent with fairness, and + benevolence, and love of goodness in all moral agents for its own + sake, that the Christian revelation should have been so long + delayed, and be still so incompletely made known? Is not the + existence of wicked persons on this or any other planet, wicked men + or devils, a dark spot in the visible life of God? Does not perfect + goodness in God mean restoration of goodness in men, for its own + sake, apart from their merit; and must not Omnipotent Goodness, + infinitely opposite to all evil, either <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagelxvii">[pg lxvii]</span><a name="Pglxvii" id="Pglxvii" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> convert to goodness all beings in the + universe who have made themselves bad, or else relieve the universe + of their perpetual presence in ever-increasing wickedness?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sceptical + criticism of this sort has found expression in the searching minute + philosophy of a later day than Berkeley's and Alciphron's; as in + David Hume and Voltaire, and in the agnosticism of the nineteenth + century. Was not Euphranor too ready to yield to the demand for a + visible God, whose character had accordingly to be determined by + what appears in nature and man, under the conditions of our limited + and contingent experience? Do we not need to look below data of + sensuous experience, and among the presuppositions which must + consciously or unconsciously be taken for granted in all man's + dealings with the environment in which he finds himself, for the + root of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">trustworthy</span></em> experience? On merely + physical reasoning, like that of Euphranor, the righteous love of + God is an unwarranted inference, and it even seems to be + contradicted by visible facts presented in the history of the + world. But if Omnipotent Goodness must <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> be attributed to the Universal Mind, as an + indispensable condition for man's having reliable intercourse of + any sort with nature; if this is the primary postulate necessary to + the existence of truth of any kind—then the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“religious hypothesis”</span> that God is Good, + according to the highest conception of goodness, is no groundless + fancy, but the fundamental faith-venture in which man has to live. + It <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">must</span></em> stand in reason; unless it + can be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">demonstrated</span></em> that the mixture of + good and evil which the universe presents, necessarily contradicts + this fundamental presupposition: and if so, man is lost in + pessimistic Pyrrhonism, and can assert nothing about anything<a id= + "noteref_24" name="noteref_24" href="#note_24"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">24</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The religious + altruism, however inadequate, which <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagelxviii">[pg lxviii]</span><a name="Pglxviii" id="Pglxviii" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Berkeley offered in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span> made some noise at the + time of its appearance, although its theistic argument was too + subtle to be popular. The conception of the visible world as Divine + Visual Language was <span class="tei tei-q">“received with ridicule + by those who make ridicule the test of truth,”</span> although it + has made way since. <span class="tei tei-q">“I have not seen Dean + Berkeley,”</span> Gay the poet writes to Swift in the May following + the Dean's return, and very soon after the appearance of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“but I have been reading his book, and like many parts + of it; but in general think with you that it is too + speculative.”</span> Warburton, with admiration for Berkeley, + cannot comprehend his philosophy, and Hoadley shewed a less + friendly spirit. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A Letter from a Country + Clergyman</span></span>, attributed to Lord Hervey, the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Sporus”</span> of Pope, was one of several + ephemeral attacks which the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Minute Philosopher</span></span> encountered + in the year after its appearance. Three other critics, more worthy + of consideration, are mentioned in one of Berkeley's letters from + London to his American friend Johnson at Stratford: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“As to the Bishop of Cork's book, and the other book + you allude to, the author of which is one Baxter, they are both + very little considered here; for which reason I have taken no + public notice of them. To answer objections already answered, and + repeat the same things, is a needless as well as disagreeable task. + Nor should I have taken notice of that Letter about Vision, had it + not been printed in a newspaper, which gave it course, and spread + it through the kingdom. Besides, the theory of Vision I found was + somewhat obscure to most people; for which reason I was not + displeased at an opportunity to explain it<a id="noteref_25" name= + "noteref_25" href="#note_25"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">25</span></span></a>.”</span> + The explanation was given in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">The Theory of Visual Language + Vindicated</span></span>, in January, 1733, as a supplement to + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>. Its blot is a tone of + polemical bitterness directed against Shaftesbury<a id="noteref_26" + name="noteref_26" href="#note_26"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">26</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagelxix">[pg lxix]</span><a name="Pglxix" id="Pglxix" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Although + Berkeley <span class="tei tei-q">“took no public notice”</span> of + <span class="tei tei-q">“the Bishop of Cork's book<a id= + "noteref_27" name="noteref_27" href="#note_27"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">27</span></span></a>”</span> + it touched a great question, which periodically has awakened + controversy, and been the occasion of mutual misunderstanding among + the controversialists in past ages. <span class="tei tei-q">“Is God + knowable by man; or must religion be devotion to an object that is + unknowable?”</span> In one of his first letters to Lord Percival, + as we saw, Berkeley animadverted on a sermon by the Archbishop of + Dublin, which seemed to deny that there was goodness, or + understanding God, any more than feet or hands. An opinion somewhat + similar had been attributed to Bishop Browne, in his answer to + Toland, and afterwards in 1728, in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Procedure and Limits + of Human Understanding</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This touched to + the quick Berkeley's ultimate conception of the universe, as + realisable only in, and therefore necessarily dependent on, living + mind. We are reminded of the famous analogy of Spinoza<a id= + "noteref_28" name="noteref_28" href="#note_28"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">28</span></span></a>. If + the omnipresent and omnipotent Mind, on which Euphranor rested, can + be called <span class="tei tei-q">“mind”</span> only + metaphorically, and can be called <span class= + "tei tei-q">“good”</span> only when the term is used without human + meaning, it may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we have + unknowable Matter or unknowable Mind at the root of things and + persons. Both are empty words. The Power universally at work is + equally unintelligible, equally unfit to be the object of worship + in the final venture of faith, whether we use the term Matter or + the term Mind. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxx">[pg + lxx]</span><a name="Pglxx" id="Pglxx" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + The universe is neither explained nor sustained by a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“mind”</span> that is mind only metaphorically. To call + this <span class="tei tei-q">“God”</span> is to console us with an + empty abstraction. The minutest philosopher is ready to grant with + Alciphron that <span class="tei tei-q">“there is a God in this + indefinite sense”</span>; since nothing can be inferred from such + an account of God about conduct or religion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Bishop of + Cork replied to the strictures of Euphranor in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Minute + Philosopher</span></span>. He qualified and explained his former + utterances in some two hundred dull pages of his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Divine + Analogy</span></span>, which hardly touch the root of the matter. + The question at issue is the one which underlies modern + agnosticism. It was raised again in Britain in the nineteenth + century, with deeper insight, by Sir William Hamilton; followed by + Dean Mansel, in controversy with F. D. Maurice, at the point of + view of Archbishop King and Bishop Browne, in philosophical + vindication of the mysteries of Christian faith; by Mr. Herbert + Spencer and by Huxley in a minute philosophy that has been deepened + by Hume's criticism of the rationale of theism in Berkeley<a id= + "noteref_29" name="noteref_29" href="#note_29"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">29</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Andrew Baxter's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Inquiry + into the Nature of the Human Soul</span></span>, referred to in + Berkeley's letter to Johnson, appeared in 1733. It has a chapter on + <span class="tei tei-q">“Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the + existence of Matter and a Material World,”</span> which is worthy + of mention because it is the earliest elaborate criticism of the + New Principle, although it had then been before the world for more + than twenty years. The title of the chapter shews Baxter's + imperfect comprehension of the proposition which he attempts to + refute. It suggests <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxi">[pg + lxxi]</span><a name="Pglxxi" id="Pglxxi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> that Berkeley argued for the non-existence of + the things we see and touch, instead of for their necessary + dependence on, or subordination to, realising percipient Mind, so + far as they are concrete realities. Baxter, moreover, was a Scot; + and his criticism is interesting as a foretaste of the protracted + discussion of the <span class="tei tei-q">“ideal theory”</span> by + Reid and his friends, and later on by Hamilton. But Baxter's book + was not the first sign of Berkeley's influence in Scotland. We are + told by Dugald Stewart, that <span class="tei tei-q">“the novelty + of Berkeley's paradox attracted very powerfully the attention of a + set of young men who were then prosecuting their studies at + Edinburgh, who formed themselves into a Society for the express + purpose of soliciting from him an explanation of some parts of his + theory which seemed to them obscurely or equivocally expressed. To + this correspondence the amiable and excellent prelate seems to have + given every encouragement; and I have been told on the best + authority that he was accustomed to say that his reasoning had been + nowhere better understood than by this club of young Scotsmen<a id= + "noteref_30" name="noteref_30" href="#note_30"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">30</span></span></a>.”</span> + Thus, and afterwards through Hume and Reid, Berkeley is at the root + of philosophy in Scotland.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The two years of + indifferent health and authorship in London sum up what may be + called the American period of Berkeley's life. Early in 1734 + letters to Prior open a new vista in his history. He was nominated + to the bishopric of Cloyne in the south of Ireland, and we have now + to follow him to the remote region which was his home for eighteen + years. The interest of the philosophic Queen, and perhaps some + compensation for the Bermuda disappointment, may explain the + appearance of the metaphysical and social idealist in the place + where he shone as a star of the first magnitude in the Irish Church + of the eighteenth century.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxii">[pg + lxxii]</span><a name="Pglxxii" id="Pglxxii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">III. Later Years + (1734-53).</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In May, 1734, + Berkeley was consecrated as Bishop of Cloyne, in St. Paul's Church, + Dublin. Except occasional visits, he had been absent from Ireland + for more than twenty years. He returned to spend eighteen years of + almost unbroken seclusion in his remote diocese. It suited a + growing inclination to a recluse, meditative life, which had been + encouraged by circumstances in Rhode Island. The eastern and + northern part in the county of Cork formed his diocese, bounded on + the west by Cork harbour, and on the east by the beautiful + Blackwater and the mountains of Waterford; the sea, which was its + southern boundary, approached within two miles of the episcopal + residence in the village of Cloyne.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As soon as he + was settled, he resumed study <span class="tei tei-q">“with + unabated attention,”</span> but still with indifferent health. + Travelling had become irksome to him, and at Cloyne he was almost + as much removed as he had been in Rhode Island from the thinking + world. Cork took the place of Newport; but Cork was twenty miles + from Cloyne, while Newport was only three miles from Whitehall. His + episcopal neighbour at Cork was Bishop Browne, the critic of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>. Isaac Gervais, + afterwards Dean of Tuam, often enlivened the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“manse-house”</span> at Cloyne by his wit and + intercourse with the great world. Secker, the Bishop of Bristol, + and Benson, the Bishop of Gloucester, now and then exchanged + letters with him, and correspondence was kept up as of old with + Prior at Dublin and Johnson at Stratford. But there is no trace of + intercourse with Swift, who was wearing out an unhappy old age, or + with Pope, almost the only survivor of the brilliant society of + other years. We are told, indeed, that the beauty of Cloyne + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxiii">[pg lxxiii]</span><a name= + "Pglxxiii" id="Pglxxiii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> was so + described to the bard of Twickenham, by the pen which in former + days had described Ischia, that Pope was almost moved to visit it. + And a letter from Secker in February, 1735<a id="noteref_31" name= + "noteref_31" href="#note_31"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">31</span></span></a>, + contains this scrap: <span class="tei tei-q">“Your friend Mr. Pope + is publishing small poems every now and then, full of much wit and + not a little keenness<a id="noteref_32" name="noteref_32" href= + "#note_32"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">32</span></span></a>.”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“Our common friend, Dr. Butler,”</span> he + adds, <span class="tei tei-q">“hath almost completed a set of + speculations upon the credibility of religion from its analogy to + the constitution and course of nature, which I believe in due time + you will read with pleasure.”</span> Butler's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Analogy</span></span> + appeared in the following year. But I have found no remains of + correspondence between Berkeley and their <span class= + "tei tei-q">“common friend”</span>; the two most illustrious + religious thinkers of the Anglican communion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When he left + London in 1734 Berkeley was on the eve of what sounded like a + mathematical controversy, although it was in his intention + metaphysical, and was suggested by the Seventh Dialogue in + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>. In one of his letters + to Prior, early in that year, he told him that though he + <span class="tei tei-q">“could not read, owing to ill + health,”</span> yet his thought was as distinct as ever, and that + for amusement <span class="tei tei-q">“he passed his early hours in + thinking of certain mathematical matters which may possibly produce + something<a id="noteref_33" name="noteref_33" href= + "#note_33"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">33</span></span></a>.”</span> + This turned, it seems, upon a form of scepticism among contemporary + mathematicians, occasioned by the presence of mysteries of + religion. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span> was the issue. It was + followed <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxiv">[pg + lxxiv]</span><a name="Pglxxiv" id="Pglxxiv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> by a controversy in which some of the most + eminent mathematicians took part. <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mathematica exeunt in mysteria</span></span> + might have been the motto of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span>. The assumptions in + mathematics, it is argued, are as mysterious as those of + theologians and metaphysicians. Mathematicians cannot translate + into perfectly intelligible thought their own doctrines in + fluxions. If man's knowledge of God is rooted in mystery, so too is + mathematical analysis. Pure science at last loses itself in + propositions which usefully regulate action, but which cannot be + comprehended. This is the drift of the argument in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span>; but perhaps Berkeley's + inclination to extreme conclusions, and to what is verbally + paradoxical, led him into doubtful positions in the controversy to + which the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span> gave rise. Instead of + ultimate imperfect comprehensibility, he seems to attribute + absolute contradiction to the Newtonian fluxions. Baxter, in his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, had asserted that + things in Berkeley's book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> forced the author + <span class="tei tei-q">“to suspect that even mathematics may not + be very sound knowledge at the bottom.”</span> The metaphysical + argument of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span> was obscured in a cloud + of mathematics.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The social + condition of Ireland attracted Berkeley almost as soon as he was + settled in Cloyne. He was surrounded by a large native Irish + population and a small group of English colonists. The natives, + long governed in the interest of the stranger, had never learned to + exert and govern themselves. The self-reliance which Berkeley + preached fifteen years before, as a mean for <span class= + "tei tei-q">“preventing the ruin of Great Britain,”</span> was more + wanting in Ireland, where the simplest maxims of social economy + were neglected. It was a state of things fitted to move one who was + too independent to permit his aspirations to be confined to the + ordinary routine of the Irish episcopate, and who could not forget + the favourite moral maxim of his life.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The social chaos + of Ireland was the occasion of what <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagelxxv">[pg lxxv]</span><a name="Pglxxv" id="Pglxxv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> to some may be the most interesting of + Berkeley's writings. His thoughts found vent characteristically in + a series of penetrating practical queries. The First Part of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Querist</span></span> appeared in 1735, + anonymously, edited by Dr. Madden of Dublin, who along with Prior + had lately founded a Society for promoting industrial arts in + Ireland. The Second and Third Parts were published in the two + following years. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A Discourse to Magistrates occasioned by the + Enormous Licence and Irreligion of the Times</span></span>, which + appeared in 1736, was another endeavour, with like philanthropic + intention. And the only important break in his secluded life at + Cloyne, in eighteen years of residence, was when he went for some + months to Dublin in 1737, to render social service to Ireland in + the Irish House of Lords.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">His metaphysic, + at first encountered by ridicule, was now beginning to receive more + serious treatment. A Scotsman had already recognised it. In 1739 + another and more famous Scotsman, David Hume, refers thus to + Berkeley in one of the opening sections of his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise of Human + Nature</span></span>: <span class="tei tei-q">“A very material + question has been started concerning abstract or general + ideas—whether they be general or particular in the mind's + conception of them. A great philosopher, Dr. Berkeley, has disputed + the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted that all + general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain + term which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes + them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to + them. I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable + discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of + letters.”</span> It does not appear that Berkeley heard of + Hume.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A curious + interest began to engage him about this time. The years following + 1739 were years of suffering in the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagelxxvi">[pg lxxvi]</span><a name="Pglxxvi" id="Pglxxvi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> Irish diocese. It was a time of famine + followed by widespread disease. His correspondence is full of + allusions to this. It had consequences of lasting importance. + Surrounded by disease, he pondered remedies. Experience in Rhode + Island and among American Indians suggested the healing properties + of tar. Further experiments in tar, combined with meditation and + much curious reading, deepened and expanded his metaphysical + philosophy. Tar seemed to grow under his experiments, and in his + thoughts, into a Panacea for giving health to the organism on which + living mind in man is meanwhile dependent. This natural dependence + of health upon tar introduced thoughts of the interdependence of + all things, and then of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediate</span></em> dependence of all in + nature upon Omnipresent and Omnipotent Mind. The living Mind that + underlies the phenomena of the universe began to be conceived under + a new light. Since his return to the life of thought in Rhode + Island, he had been immersed in Platonic and Neoplatonic + literature, and in books of mystical Divinity, encouraged perhaps + by the mystical disposition attributed to his wife. An eccentric + ingenuity connected the scientific experiments and prescriptions + with the Idealism of Plato and Plotinus. The natural law according + to which tar-water was universally restorative set his mind to work + about the immanence of living Mind. He mused about a medicine thus + universally beneficial, and the thought occurred that it must be + naturally charged with 'pure invisible fire, the most subtle and + elastic of bodies, and the vital element in the universe'; and + water might be the natural cause which enables this elementary fire + to be drawn out of tar and transferred to vegetable and animal + organisms. But the vital fire could be only a natural cause; which + in truth is no efficient cause at all, but only a sign of divine + efficiency transmitted through the world of sense: the true cause + of this and all other natural effects must be the immanent Mind or + Reason in which <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxvii">[pg + lxxvii]</span><a name="Pglxxvii" id="Pglxxvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> we all participate; for in God we live and + move and have our being.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is thus that + Berkeley's thought culminates in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, + that <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and + Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water, and divers other + subjects connected together and arising one from + another</span></span>, which appeared in 1744. This little book + made more noise at the time of its appearance than any of his + books; but not because of its philosophy, which was lost in its + medicinal promise to mankind of immunity from disease. Yet it was + Berkeley's last attempt to express his ultimate conception of the + universe in its human and divine relations. When <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> + is compared with the book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, the immense + difference in tone and manner of thought shews the change wrought + in the intervening years. The sanguine argumentative gladiatorship + of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> is exchanged for + pensive speculation, which acknowledges the weakness of human + understanding, when it is face to face with the Immensities and + Eternities. Compare the opening sections of the Introduction to the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> with the closing + sections of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>. The contingent data of + our experience are now felt to be insufficient, and there is a more + or less conscious grounding of the Whole in the eternal and + immutable Ideas of Reason. <span class="tei tei-q">“Strictly, the + sense knows nothing. We perceive, indeed, sounds by hearing and + characters by sight. But we are not therefore said to understand + them.... Sense and experience acquaint us with the course and + analogy of appearances and natural effects: thought, reason, + intellect, introduce us into the knowledge of their causes.... The + principles of science are neither objects of sense nor imagination: + intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to truth.”</span> So + the shifting basis of the earlier thought is found to need support + in the intellectual and moral faith that must be involved in all + reasonable human intercourse with the phenomena presented in the + universe.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxviii">[pg + lxxviii]</span><a name="Pglxxviii" id="Pglxxviii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The inadequate + thought of God, as only a Spirit or Person supreme among the + spirits or persons, in and through whom the material world is + realised, a thought which pervades <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, makes way in + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> for the thought of God as + the infinite omnipresent Ground, or final sustaining Power, + immanent in Nature and Man, to which Berkeley had become accustomed + in Neoplatonic and Alexandrian metaphysics. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Comprehending God and the creatures in One general + notion, we may <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">say</span></em> that all things together (God + and the universe of Space and Time) make One Universe, or τὸ Πᾶν. + But if we should say that all things make One God, this would be an + erroneous notion of God; but would not amount to atheism, as long + as Mind or Intellect was admitted to be τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, or the + governing part.... It will not seem just to fix the imputation of + atheism upon those philosophers who hold the doctrine of τὸ + Ἕν.”</span> It is thus that he now regards God. Metaphysics and + theology are accordingly one.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No attempt is + made in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> to articulate the universe + in the light of unifying Mind or Reason. And we are still apt to + ask what the truth and goodness at the heart of all really mean; + seeing that, as conceived in human minds, they vary in the gradual + evolution of intellect and conscience in men. <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Omnia exeunt in mysteria</span></span> is the + tone of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> at the end. The universe + of reality is too much for our articulate intellectual digestion: + it must be left for omniscience; it transcends finite intelligence + and the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">via media</span></span> of + human understanding. Man must be satisfied to pass life, in the + infinitesimal interval between birth and death, as a faith-venture, + which he may convert into a growing insight, as the generations + roll on, but which can never be converted into complete knowledge. + <span class="tei tei-q">“In this state we must be satisfied to make + the best of those glimpses within our reach. It is Plato's remark + in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theætetus</span></span>, that while we sit + still we are never the wiser; but going into the river, and moving + up and down, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxix">[pg + lxxix]</span><a name="Pglxxix" id="Pglxxix" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> is the way to discover its depths and + shallows. If we exercise and bestir ourselves, we may even here + discover something. The eye by long use comes to see even in the + darkest cavern; and there is no subject so obscure but we may + discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it. Truth is the + cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly where it is the chief + passion it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it + contented with a little ardour in the early time of life: a time + perhaps to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that + would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as + well as his youth, the later growth as well as the first-fruits, at + the altar of Truth.”</span> Such was Berkeley, and such were his + last words in philosophy. They may suggest the attitude of Bacon + when, at a different view-point, he disclaims exhaustive system: + <span class="tei tei-q">“I have made a beginning of the work: the + fortune of the human race will give the issue. For the matter in + hand is no mere felicity of speculation, but the real business and + fortunes of the human race<a id="noteref_34" name="noteref_34" + href="#note_34"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">34</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">While Berkeley's + central thought throughout his life is concerned with God as the + one omnipresent and omnipotent Providential Agent in the universe, + he says little about the other final question, of more exclusively + human interest, which concerns the destiny of men. That men are + born into a universe which, as the visible expression of Moral + Providence, must be scientifically and ethically trustworthy; + certain not to put man to confusion intellectually or morally, + seeing that it could not otherwise be trusted for such in our + ultimate venture of faith—this is one thing. That all persons born + into it are certain to continue living self-consciously for ever, + is another thing. This is not obviously implied in the former + presupposition, whether or not it can be deduced <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxx">[pg lxxx]</span><a name="Pglxxx" id= + "Pglxxx" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> from it, or else discovered by + other means. Although man's environment is essentially Divine, and + wholly in its smallest details Providential, may not his body, in + its living organisation from physical birth until physical death, + be the measure of the continuance of his self-conscious + personality? Is each man's immortal existence, like God's, + indispensable?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Doubt about the + destiny of men after they die is, at the end of the nineteenth + century, probably more prevalent than doubt about the underlying + Providence of God, and His constant creative activity; more perhaps + than it was in the days of Toland, and Collins, and Tindal. Future + life had been made so familiar to the imagination by the early and + mediaeval Church, and afterwards by the Puritans, as in Milton, + Bunyan, and Jonathan Edwards, that it then seemed to the religious + mind more real than anything that is seen and touched. The habit + wholly formed by natural science is apt to dissipate this and to + make a human life lived under conditions wholly strange to its + <span class="tei tei-q">“minute philosophy”</span> appear + illusory.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A section in the + book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span><a id="noteref_35" + name="noteref_35" href="#note_35"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">35</span></span></a> in + which the common argument for the <span class="tei tei-q">“natural + immortality”</span> of the human soul is reproduced, strengthened + by his new conception of what the reality of body means, is + Berkeley's metaphysical contribution for determining between the + awful alternatives of annihilation or continued self-conscious life + after physical death. The subject is touched, in a less recondite + way, in two of his papers in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Guardian</span></span>, and in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discourse</span></span> delivered in Trinity + College Chapel in 1708, in which a revelation of the immortality of + men is presented as the special gospel of Jesus Christ. To argue, + as Berkeley does in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, that men cannot be + annihilated at death, because they are spiritual substances having + powers independent of the sequences of nature, implies assumptions + regarding finite persons which are <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagelxxxi">[pg lxxxi]</span><a name="Pglxxxi" id="Pglxxxi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> open to criticism. The justification in + reason for our venture of faith that Omnipotent Goodness is at the + heart of the universe is—that without this presupposition we can + have no reasonable intercourse, scientific or otherwise, with the + world of things and persons in which we find ourselves; for reason + and will are then alike paralysed by universal distrust. But it can + hardly be maintained <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> that men, or other spiritual beings in the + universe, are equally with God indispensable to its natural order; + so that when they have once entered on conscious existence they + must <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">always</span></em> continue to exist + consciously. Is not the philosophical justification of man's hope + of endless life ethical rather than metaphysical; founded on that + faith in the justice and goodness of the Universal Mind which has + to be taken for granted in every attempt to interpret experience, + with its mixture of good and evil, in this evanescent embodied + life? Can a life such as this is be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all</span></em> for + men, in a universe that, because it is essentially Divine, must + operate towards the extinction of the wickedness which now makes it + a mystery of Omnipotent Goodness?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A cheerful + optimism appears in Berkeley's habit of thought about death, as we + have it in his essays in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Guardian</span></span>: a sanguine + apprehension of a present preponderance of good, and consequent + anticipation of greater good after death; unlike those whose + pessimistic temperament induces a lurid picture of eternal moral + disorder. But his otherwise active imagination seldom makes + philosophy a meditation upon death. He does not seem to have + exercised himself in the way those do who find in the prospect of + being in the twenty-first century as they were in the first, what + makes them appalled that they have ever come at all into transitory + percipient life; or as those others who recoil from an unbodied + life after physical death, as infinitely more appalling than the + thought of being transported <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in this body</span></em> into another planet, + or <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxii">[pg + lxxxii]</span><a name="Pglxxxii" id="Pglxxxii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> even to a material world outside our solar + system. In one of his letters to Johnson<a id="noteref_36" name= + "noteref_36" href="#note_36"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">36</span></span></a> he + does approach the unbodied life, and in a characteristic way:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“I see no difficulty in conceiving a change of state, + such as is vulgarly called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">death</span></em>, as well without as with + material substance. It is sufficient for that purpose that we allow + sensible bodies, i.e. such as are immediately perceived by sight + and touch; the existence of which I am so far from questioning, as + philosophers are used to do, that I establish it, I think, upon + evident principles. Now it seems very easy to conceive the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em> to exist in a separate state + (i.e. divested from those limits and laws of motion and perception + with which she is embarrassed here) and to exercise herself on new + ideas, without the intervention of these tangible things we call + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bodies</span></em>. It is even very possible + to apprehend how the soul may have ideas of colour without an eye, + or of sounds without an ear<a id="noteref_37" name="noteref_37" + href="#note_37"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">37</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But while we may + thus be supposed to have all our present sensuous experience in an + unbodied state, this does not enable one to conceive how unbodied + persons can communicate with one another in the absence of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">all</span></em> sense signs; whether of the + sort derived from our present senses, or from other senses of whose + data we can in this life have no imagination.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + tar-water enthusiasm lasted throughout the rest of his life, and + found vent in letters and pamphlets in support of his Panacea, from + 1744 till 1752. Notwithstanding this, he was not forgetful of other + interests—ecclesiastical, and the social ones which he included in + his large meaning of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“ecclesiastical.”</span> The Rising under Charles + Edward in 1745 was the occasion of a <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Letter to the Roman + Catholics of Cloyne</span></span>, characteristically humane + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxiii">[pg + lxxxiii]</span><a name="Pglxxxiii" id="Pglxxxiii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and liberal. It was followed in 1749 by an + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Exhortation to the Roman Catholic Clergy of + Ireland</span></span> in a similar spirit; and this unwonted + courtesy of an Irish Protestant bishop was received by those to + whom it was addressed in a corresponding temper.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is difficult + to determine Berkeley's relation to rival schools or parties in + Church and State. His disposition was too singular and independent + for a partisan. Some of his early writings, as we have seen, were + suspected of high Tory and Jacobite leanings; but his arguments in + the suspected <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discourse</span></span> were such as ordinary + Tories and Jacobites failed to understand, and the tenor of his + words and actions was in the best sense liberal. In religious + thought <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> might place him among + latitudinarians; perhaps in affinity with the Cambridge Platonists. + His true place is foremost among the religious philosophers of the + Anglican Church; the first to prepare the religious problem for the + light in which we are invited to look at the universe by modern + agnostics, and under the modern conception of natural evolution. He + is the most picturesque figure in that Anglican succession which, + in the seventeenth century, includes Hooker and Cudworth; in the + eighteenth, Clarke and Butler; and in the nineteenth, may we say + Coleridge, in lack of a representative in orders; although Mansel, + Maurice, Mozley, and Jowett are not to be forgotten, nor Isaac + Taylor among laymen<a id="noteref_38" name="noteref_38" href= + "#note_38"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">38</span></span></a>: + Newman and Arnold, illustrious otherwise, are hardly + representatives of metaphysical philosophy.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A more pensive + tone runs through the closing years at Cloyne. Attempts were made + in vain to withdraw him from the <span class="tei tei-q">“remote + corner”</span> to which he had been so long confined. His friends + urged his claims for the Irish Primacy. <span class="tei tei-q">“I + am no man's rival or competitor in this matter,”</span> were his + words to Prior. <span class="tei tei-q">“I am not in love with + feasts, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxiv">[pg + lxxxiv]</span><a name="Pglxxxiv" id="Pglxxxiv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and crowds, and visits, and late hours, and + strange faces, and a hurry of affairs often insignificant. For my + own private satisfaction, I had rather be master of my time than + wear a diadem.”</span> Letters to his American friends, Johnson and + Clap, shew him still moved by the inspiration which carried him + over the Atlantic, and record his influence in the development of + American colleges<a id="noteref_39" name="noteref_39" href= + "#note_39"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">39</span></span></a>. The + home education of his three sons was another interest. We are told + by his widow that <span class="tei tei-q">“he would not trust his + sons to mercenary hands. Though old and sickly, he performed the + constant tedious task himself.”</span> Of the fruit of this home + education there is little to tell. The death of William, his + favourite boy, in 1751, <span class="tei tei-q">“was thought to + have struck too close to his father's heart.”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I am a man,”</span> so he writes, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“retired from the amusements, politics, visits, and + what the world calls pleasure. I had a little friend, educated + always under mine own eye, whose painting delighted me, whose music + ravished me, and whose lively gay spirit was a continual feast. It + has pleased God to take him hence.”</span> The eldest son, Henry, + born in Rhode Island, did not long survive his father. George, the + third son, was destined for Oxford, and this destiny was connected + with a new project. The <span class="tei tei-q">“life + academico-philosophical,”</span> which he sought in vain to realise + in Bermuda, he now hoped to find for himself in the city of + colleges on the Isis. <span class="tei tei-q">“The truth + is,”</span> he wrote to Prior as early as September 1746, + <span class="tei tei-q">“I have a scheme of my own for this long + time past, in which I propose more satisfaction and enjoyment to + myself than I could in that high station<a id="noteref_40" name= + "noteref_40" href="#note_40"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">40</span></span></a>, which + I neither solicited, nor so much as wished for. A greater income + would not tempt me to remove from Cloyne, and set aside my Oxford + scheme; which, though delayed by the illness of my son<a id= + "noteref_41" name="noteref_41" href="#note_41"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">41</span></span></a>, yet I + am as intent upon it and as much resolved as + ever.”</span></p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxv">[pg + lxxxv]</span><a name="Pglxxxv" id="Pglxxxv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The last of + Berkeley's letters which we have is to Dean Gervais. It expresses + the feeling with which in April, 1752, he was contemplating life, + on the eve of his departure from Cloyne.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“I submit to years and infirmities. My views in this + world are mean and narrow; it is a thing in which I have small + share, and which ought to give me small concern. I abhor business, + and especially to have to do with great persons and great affairs. + The evening of life I choose to pass in a quiet retreat. Ambitious + projects, intrigues and quarrels of statesmen, are things I have + formerly been amused with, but they now seem to be a vain, fugitive + dream.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Four months + after this, Berkeley saw Cloyne for the last time. In August he + quitted it for Oxford, which he had long pictured in imagination as + the ideal home of his old age. When he left Cork in the vessel + which carried his wife, his daughter, and himself to Bristol, he + was prostrated by weakness, and had to be taken from Bristol to + Oxford on a horse-litter. It was late in August when they arrived + there<a id="noteref_42" name="noteref_42" href= + "#note_42"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">42</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our picture of + Berkeley at Oxford is dim. According to tradition he occupied a + house in Holywell Street, near the gardens of New College and not + far from the cloisters of Magdalen. It was a changed world to him. + While he was exchanging Ireland for England, death was removing old + English friends. Before he left Cloyne he must have heard of the + death of Butler in June, at Bath, where Benson, at the request of + Secker, affectionately watched the last hours of the author of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analogy</span></span>. Benson followed Butler + in August.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxvi">[pg + lxxxvi]</span><a name="Pglxxxvi" id="Pglxxxvi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We hear of study + resumed in improved health in the home in Holy well Street. In + October a <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Miscellany, containing several Tracts on + various Subjects</span></span>, <span class="tei tei-q">“by the + Bishop of Cloyne,”</span> appeared simultaneously in London and + Dublin. The Tracts were reprints, with the exception of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Further + Thoughts on Tar-water</span></span>, which may have been written + before he left Ireland. The third edition of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span> also appeared in this + autumn. But <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> is the latest record of + his philosophical thought. A comparison of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span> and the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> with the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span> + and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span> gives the measure of his + advancement. After the sanguine beginning perhaps the comparison + leaves a sense of disappointment, when we find metaphysics mixed up + with mathematics in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span>, and metaphysics + obscurely mixed up with medicine in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is curious + that, although in 1752 David Hume's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise of Human + Nature</span></span> had been before the world for thirteen years + and his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry concerning Human + Understanding</span></span> for four years, there is no allusion to + Hume by Berkeley. He was Berkeley's immediate successor in the + eighteenth-century evolution of European thought. The sceptical + criticism of Hume was applied to the dogmatic religious philosophy + of Berkeley, to be followed in its turn by the abstractly rational + and the moral reconstructive criticism of Kant. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span> is, however, expressly + referred to by Hume; indirectly, too, throughout the religious + agnosticism of his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, also afterwards in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Dialogues + on Natural Religion</span></span>, in a vindication of minute + philosophy by profounder reasonings than those which satisfied + Lysicles and Alciphron. Berkeley, Hume, and Kant are the three + significant philosophical figures of their century, each holding + the supreme place successively in its beginning, middle, and later + years. Perhaps Reid in Scotland did more than any other in his + generation to make Berkeley known; not, however, for his true work + in constructive <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxvii">[pg + lxxxvii]</span><a name="Pglxxxvii" id="Pglxxxvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> religious thought, but for his supposed + denial of the reality of the things we see and touch.<a id= + "noteref_43" name="noteref_43" href="#note_43"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">43</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The ideal life + in Oxford did not last long. On the evening of Sunday, January 14, + 1753, Berkeley was suddenly confronted by the mystery of death. + <span class="tei tei-q">“As he was sitting with my mother, my + sister, and myself,”</span> so his son wrote to Johnson at + Stratford, in October, <span class="tei tei-q">“suddenly, and + without the least previous notice or pain, he was removed to the + enjoyment of eternal rewards; and although all possible means were + instantly used, no symptom of life ever appeared after; nor could + the physicians assign any cause for his death. He arrived at Oxford + on August 25, and had received great benefit from the change of + air, and by God's blessing on tar-water, insomuch that for some + years he had not been in better health than he was the instant + before he left us<a id="noteref_44" name="noteref_44" href= + "#note_44"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">44</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Six days later + he was buried in Oxford, in the Cathedral of Christ Church<a id= + "noteref_45" name="noteref_45" href="#note_45"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">45</span></span></a>, where + his tomb bears an appropriate inscription by Dr. Markham, + afterwards Archbishop of York.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagelxxxviii">[pg + lxxxviii]</span><a name="Pglxxxviii" id="Pglxxxviii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc5" id="toc5"></a> <a name="pdf6" id="pdf6"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Errata</span></h1> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Vol. I</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 99, line 3 + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> 149-80 <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + 149-60.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 99, line 22 + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span>—and to be <span class= + "tei tei-q">“suggested,”</span> not signified <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">read</span></span>—instead of being only + suggested.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 100, line + 10 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> hearing <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + seeing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 103, note, + lines 5, 6 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> pp. 111, 112 <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> p. + 210.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 200, note, + line 14 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> Adam <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + Robert.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 364, line 8 + from foot <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + which.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 512, note + 6, line 3 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> imminent <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + immanent.</p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Vol. II</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 194, note, + line 3 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> Tyndal <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + Tindal.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 207, line + 1, insert 13. before <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alc.</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 377, line 6 + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> antethesis <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">read</span></span> + antithesis.</p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Vol. IV</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Page 285, lines + 4, 5 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">for</span></span> Thisus Alus Cujus, &c. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">read</span></span> Ursus. Alus. Cuius. &c. + The inscription, strictly speaking, appears on the Palace of the + Counts Orsini, and is dated MD.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page001">[pg 001]</span><a name= + "Pg001" id="Pg001" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc7" id="toc7"></a> <a name="pdf8" id="pdf8"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Commonplace Book. Mathematical, + Ethical, Physical, And Metaphysical</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Written At Trinity + College, Dublin, In 1705-8</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">First published in + 1871</span></span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc9" id="toc9"></a> <a name="pdf10" id="pdf10"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Editor's Preface To The Commonplace + Book</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + juvenile <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span> is a small + quarto volume, in his handwriting, found among the Berkeley + manuscripts in possession of the late Archdeacon Rose. It was first + published in 1871, in my edition of Berkeley's Works. It consists + of occasional thoughts, mathematical, physical, ethical, and + metaphysical, set down in miscellaneous fashion, for private use, + as they arose in the course of his studies at Trinity College, + Dublin. They are full of the fervid enthusiasm that was natural to + him, and of sanguine expectations of the issue of the prospective + authorship for which they record preparations. On the title-page is + written, <span class="tei tei-q">“G. B. Trin. Dub. alum.,”</span> + with the date 1705, when he was twenty years of age. The entries + are the gradual accumulation of the next three years, in one of + which the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Arithmetica</span></span> and the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Miscellanea + Mathematica</span></span> made their appearance. The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, given to the world in 1709, was evidently + much in his mind, as well as the sublime conception of the material + world in its necessary subordination to the spiritual world, of + which he delivered himself in his book of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, in + 1710.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page002">[pg + 002]</span><a name="Pg002" id="Pg002" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This disclosure + of Berkeley's thoughts about things, in the years preceding the + publication of his first essays, is indeed a precious record of the + initial struggles of ardent philosophical genius. It places the + reader in intimate companionship with him when he was beginning to + awake into intellectual and spiritual life. We hear him + soliloquising. We see him trying to translate into reasonableness + our crude inherited beliefs about the material world and the + natural order of the universe, self-conscious personality, and the + Universal Power or Providence—all under the sway of a new + determining Principle which was taking profound possession of his + soul. He finds that he has only to look at the concrete things of + sense in the light of this great discovery to see the artificially + induced perplexities of the old philosophers disappear, along with + their imposing abstractions, which turn out empty words. The + thinking is throughout fresh and sincere; sometimes impetuous and + one-sided; the outcome of a mind indisposed to take things upon + trust, resolved to inquire freely, a rebel against the tyranny of + language, morally burdened with the consciousness of a new + world-transforming conception, which duty to mankind obliged him to + reveal, although his message was sure to offend. Men like to regard + things as they have been wont. This new conception of the + surrounding world—the impotence of Matter, and its subordinate + office in the Supreme Economy must, he foresees, disturb those + accustomed to treat outward things as the only realities, and who + do not care to ask what constitutes reality. Notwithstanding the + ridicule and ill-will that his transformed material world was sure + to meet with, amongst the many who accept empty words instead of + genuine insight, he was resolved to deliver himself of his thoughts + through the press, but with the politic conciliation of a + persuasive Irish pleader.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span> steadily recognises the adverse influence of one + insidious foe. Its world-transforming-Principle <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page003">[pg 003]</span><a name="Pg003" id="Pg003" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> has been obscured by <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the mist and veil of words.”</span> The abstractions + of metaphysicians, which poison human language, had to be driven + out of the author's mind before he could see the light, and must be + driven out of the minds of others before they could be got to see + it along with him: the concrete world as realisable only in + percipient mind is with difficulty introduced into the vacant + place. <span class="tei tei-q">“The chief thing I pretend to is + only to remove the mist and veil of words.”</span> He exults in the + transformed mental scene that then spontaneously rises before him. + <span class="tei tei-q">“My speculations have had the same effect + upon me as visiting foreign countries,—in the end I return where I + was before, get my heart at ease, and enjoy myself with more + satisfaction. The philosophers lose their abstract matter; the + materialists lose their abstract extension; the profane lose their + extended deity. Pray what do the rest of mankind lose?”</span> This + beneficent revolution seemed to be the issue of a simple + recognition of the fact, that the true way of regarding the world + we see and touch is to regard it as consisting of ideas or + phenomena that are presented to human senses, somehow regularly + ordered, and the occasions of pleasure or pain to us as we conform + to or rebel against their natural order. This is the surrounding + universe—at least in its relations to us, and that is all in it + that we have to do with. <span class="tei tei-q">“I know + not,”</span> he says, <span class="tei tei-q">“what is meant by + things considered in themselves, i.e. in abstraction. This is + nonsense. Thing and idea are words of much about the same extent + and meaning. Existence is not conceivable without perception and + volition. I only declare the meaning of the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>, as far as I can + comprehend it.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span> we see the + youth at Trinity College forging the weapons which he was soon to + direct against the materialism and scepticism of the generation + into which he was born. Here are rough drafts, crude hints of + intended arguments, probing of unphilosophical mathematicians—even + Newton and Descartes, memoranda <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page004">[pg 004]</span><a name="Pg004" id="Pg004" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of facts, more or less relevant, on their way + into the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span> and the treatise + on <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>—seeds of the + philosophy that was to be gradually unfolded in his life and in his + books. We watch the intrepid thinker, notwithstanding the + inexperience of youth, more disposed to give battle to + mathematicians and metaphysicians than to submit even provisionally + to any human authority. It does not seem that his scholarship or + philosophical learning was extensive. Descartes, Malebranche, and + Locke were his intimates; Hobbes and Spinoza were not unknown to + him; Newton and some lesser lights among the mathematicians are + often confronted. He is more rarely in company with the ancients or + the mediaevalists. No deep study of Aristotle appears, and there is + even a disposition to disparage Plato. He seeks for his home in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“new philosophy”</span> of experience; + without anticipations of Kant, as the critic of what is presupposed + in the scientific reliability of any experience, against whom his + almost blind zeal against abstractions would have set him at this + early stage. <span class="tei tei-q">“Pure intellect I understand + not at all,”</span> is one of his entries. He asks himself, + <span class="tei tei-q">“What becomes of the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">aeternae veritates</span></span>?”</span> and + his reply is, <span class="tei tei-q">“They vanish.”</span> When he + tells himself that <span class="tei tei-q">“we must with the mob + place certainty in the senses,”</span> the words are apt to suggest + that the senses are our only source of knowledge, but I suppose his + meaning is that the senses must be trustworthy, as 'the mob' + assume. Yet occasionally he uses language which looks like an + anticipation of David Hume, as when he calls mind <span class= + "tei tei-q">“a congeries of perceptions. Take away + perceptions,”</span> he adds, <span class="tei tei-q">“and you take + away mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind. The + understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions and + ideas.”</span> He seems unconscious of the total scepticism which + such expressions, when strictly interpreted, are found to involve. + But after all, the reader must not apply rigorous rules of + interpretation to random entries or provisional <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page005">[pg 005]</span><a name="Pg005" id="Pg005" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> memoranda, meant only for private use, + by an enthusiastic student who was preparing to produce books.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have followed + the manuscript of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>, omitting a few + repetitions of thought in the same words. Here and there Berkeley's + writing is almost obliterated and difficult to decipher, apparently + through accident by water in the course of his travels, when, as he + mentions long after in one of his letters, several of his + manuscripts were lost and others were injured.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The letters of + the alphabet which are interpreted on the first page, and prefixed + on the margin to some of the entries, may so far help to bring the + apparent chaos of entries under a few articulate heads.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have added + some annotations here and there as they happened to occur, and + these might have been multiplied indefinitely had space + permitted.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page007">[pg 007]</span><a name= + "Pg007" id="Pg007" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc11" id="toc11"></a> <a name="pdf12" id="pdf12"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Commonplace Book</span></h2> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + I. = Introduction. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + M. = Matter. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + P. = Primary and Secondary qualities. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + E. = Existence. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + T. = Time. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + S. = Soul—Spirit. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + G. = God. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + Mo. = Moral Philosophy. + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + N. = Natural Philosophy. + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. If there be + not two kinds of visible extension—one perceiv'd by a confus'd + view, the other by a distinct successive direction of the optique + axis to each point?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No general + ideas<a id="noteref_46" name="noteref_46" href= + "#note_46"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">46</span></span></a>. The + contrary a cause of mistake or confusion in mathematiques, &c. + This to be intimated in y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> Introduction<a id= + "noteref_47" name="noteref_47" href="#note_47"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">47</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Principle + may be apply'd to the difficulties of conservation, co-operation, + &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Trifling for the + [natural] philosophers to enquire the cause of magnetical + attractions, &c. They onely search after co-existing + ideas<a id="noteref_48" name="noteref_48" href= + "#note_48"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">48</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Quæcunque in + Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum, militant pro me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All things in + the Scripture w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> side with the vulgar + against the learned, side with me also. I side in all things with + the mob.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page008">[pg + 008]</span><a name="Pg008" id="Pg008" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I know there is + a mighty sect of men will oppose me, but yet I may expect to be + supported by those whose minds are not so far overgrown + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> madness. These are far the + greatest part of mankind—especially Moralists, Divines, + Politicians; in a word, all but Mathematicians and Natural + Philosophers. I mean only the hypothetical gentlemen. Experimental + philosophers have nothing whereat to be offended in me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Newton begs his + Principles; I demonstrate mine<a id="noteref_49" name="noteref_49" + href="#note_49"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">49</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must be very + particular in explaining w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is meant by things + existing—in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.—w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + not perceiv'd as well as w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> perceived; and shew how the + vulgar notion agrees with mine, when we narrowly inspect into the + meaning and definition of the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">h</span></span> is + no simple idea, distinct from perceiving and being perceived<a id= + "noteref_50" name="noteref_50" href="#note_50"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">50</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Schoolmen + have noble subjects, but handle them ill. The mathematicians have + trifling subjects, but reason admirably about them. Certainly their + method and arguing are excellent.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">God knows how + far our knowledge of intellectual beings may be enlarg'd from the + Principles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reverse of + the Principle I take to have been the chief source of all that + scepticism and folly, all those contradictions and inextricable + puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a reproach to + human reason, as well as of that idolatry, whether of images or of + gold, that blinds the greatest part of the world, and that + shamefull immorality that turns us into beasts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">היה Vixit & + fuit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">οὐσία, the name + for substance, used by Aristotle, the Fathers, &c.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If at the same + time we shall make the Mathematiques much more easie and much more + accurate, w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> can be objected to us<a id= + "noteref_51" name="noteref_51" href="#note_51"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">51</span></span></a>?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page009">[pg 009]</span><a name="Pg009" id="Pg009" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We need not + force our imagination to conceive such very small lines for + infinitesimals. They may every whit as well be imagin'd big as + little, since that the integer must be infinite.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Evident that + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> has an infinite number of + parts must be infinite.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We cannot + imagine a line or space infinitely great—therefore absurd to talk + or make propositions about it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We cannot + imagine a line, space, &c., quovis lato majus. Since + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> what we imagine must be + datum aliquod; a thing can't be greater than itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If you call + infinite that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is greater than any + assignable by another, then I say, in that sense there may be an + infinite square, sphere, or any other figure, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is absurd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. if extension + be resoluble into points it does not consist of?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No reasoning + about things whereof we have no ideas<a id="noteref_52" name= + "noteref_52" href="#note_52"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">52</span></span></a>; + therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No word to be + used without an idea.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If uneasiness be + necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. how shall we will in + heaven?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Bayle's, + Malbranch's, &c. arguments do not seem to prove against Space, + but onely against Bodies.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I agree in + nothing w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> the Cartesians as to + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> existence of Bodies & + Qualities<a id="noteref_53" name="noteref_53" href= + "#note_53"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">53</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Aristotle as + good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed to have been mistaken.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lines not proper + for demonstration.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We see the house + itself, the church itself; it being an idea and nothing more. The + house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e. an + object—immediate object—of thought<a id="noteref_54" name= + "noteref_54" href="#note_54"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">54</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page010">[pg 010]</span><a name="Pg010" id="Pg010" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Instead of + injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Existence is + percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere<a id="noteref_55" + name="noteref_55" href="#note_55"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">55</span></span></a>]. The + horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In physiques I + have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but have not + leisure.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hyps and such + like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Angle not well + defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by Harris, &c. This one ground + of trifling.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One idea not the + cause of another—one power not the cause of another. The cause of + all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to enquire after + second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the + Divinity<a id="noteref_56" name="noteref_56" href= + "#note_56"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">56</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Absurd to study + astronomy and other the like doctrines as speculative sciences.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The absurd + account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">How was light + created before man? Even so were Bodies created before man<a id= + "noteref_57" name="noteref_57" href="#note_57"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">57</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Impossible + anything besides that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> thinks and is thought on + should exist<a id="noteref_58" name="noteref_58" href= + "#note_58"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">58</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is visible cannot be made + up of invisible things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">M.S. is that + wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable sensible parts. Now + how can that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> hath not sensible parts be + divided into sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into + insensible parts, I say these are nothings.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension + abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, I grant; but then + there is no such idea, as any one may try<a id="noteref_59" name= + "noteref_59" href="#note_59"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">59</span></span></a>. There + is onely a considering the number of points without the sort of + them, & this makes more for me, since it must be in a + considering thing.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page011">[pg + 011]</span><a name="Pg011" id="Pg011" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Before I + have shewn the distinction between visible & tangible + extension, I must not mention them as distinct. I must not mention + M. T. & M. V., but in general M. S., &c.<a id="noteref_60" + name="noteref_60" href="#note_60"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">60</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether a M. + V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any tangible quality?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If visible + extension be the object of geometry, 'tis that which is survey'd by + the optique axis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I may say the + pain is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in</span></em> my finger, &c., according + to my doctrine<a id="noteref_61" name="noteref_61" href= + "#note_61"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">61</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Nicely to + discuss w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is meant when we say a line + consists of a certain number of inches or points, &c.; a circle + of a certain number of square inches, points, &c. Certainly we + may think of a circle, or have its idea in our mind, without + thinking of points or square inches, &c.; whereas it should + seem the idea of a circle is not made up of the ideas of points, + square inches, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Is any more + than this meant by the foregoing expressions, viz. that squares or + points may be perceived in or made out of a circle, &c., or + that squares, points, &c. are actually in it, i.e. are + perceivable in it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A line in + abstract, or Distance, is the number of points between two points. + There is also distance between a slave & an emperor, between a + peasant & philosopher, between a drachm & a pound, a + farthing & a crown, &c.; in all which Distance signifies + the number of intermediate ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Halley's + doctrine about the proportion between infinitely great quantities + vanishes. When men speak of infinite quantities, either they mean + finite quantities, or else talk of [that whereof they have<a id= + "noteref_62" name="noteref_62" href="#note_62"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">62</span></span></a>] no + idea; both which are absurd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If the + disputations of the Schoolmen are blam'd for intricacy, + triflingness, & confusion, yet it must be acknowledg'd + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page012">[pg 012]</span><a name= + "Pg012" id="Pg012" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> that in the main + they treated of great & important subjects. If we admire the + method & acuteness of the Math[ematicians]—the length, the + subtilty, the exactness of their demonstrations—we must + nevertheless be forced to grant that they are for the most part + about trifling subjects, and perhaps mean nothing at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Motion on 2d + thoughts seems to be a simple idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Motion distinct + from y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> thing moved is not + conceivable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To take + notice of Newton for defining it [motion]; also of Locke's wisdom + in leaving it undefin'd<a id="noteref_63" name="noteref_63" href= + "#note_63"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">63</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ut ordo partium + temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo partium spatii. Moveantur + hæ de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Truly + number is immensurable. That we will allow with Newton.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ask a Cartesian + whether he is wont to imagine his globules without colour. + Pellucidness is a colour. The colour of ordinary light of the sun + is white. Newton in the right in assigning colours to the rays of + light.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A man born blind + would not imagine Space as we do. We give it always some dilute, or + duskish, or dark colour—in short, we imagine it as visible, or + intromitted by the eye, w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> he would not do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Proinde vim + inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce (v. tempus, spatium, motus) + de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi interpretantur. Newton, p. 10.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I differ from + Newton, in that I think the recession ab axe motus is not the + effect, or index, or measure of motion, but of the vis impressa. It + sheweth not w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is truly moved, but + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> has the force impressed on + it, or rather that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> hath an impressed + force.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">D</span></em> and + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">P</span></em> are not proportional in all + circles. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">d d</span></em> is to 1/4<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">d p</span></em> as + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">d</span></em> to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">p</span></em>/4; + but <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">d</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">p</span></em>/4 are + not in the same proportion in all circles. Hence 'tis nonsense to + seek the terms of one general proportion whereby to rectify all + peripheries, or of another whereby to square all circles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. If the + circle be squar'd arithmetically, 'tis squar'd geometrically, + arithmetic or numbers being nothing but lines & proportions of + lines when apply'd to geometry.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page013">[pg 013]</span><a name="Pg013" id="Pg013" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To remark + Cheyne<a id="noteref_64" name="noteref_64" href= + "#note_64"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">64</span></span></a> & + his doctrine of infinites.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension, + motion, time, do each of them include the idea of succession, & + so far forth they seem to be of mathematical consideration. Number + consisting in succession & distinct perception, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + also consists in succession; for things at once perceiv'd are + jumbled and mixt together in the mind. Time and motion cannot be + conceiv'd without succession; and extension, qua mathemat., cannot + be conceiv'd but as consisting of parts w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + may be distinctly & successively perceiv'd. Extension perceived + at once & <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">in confuso</span></span> does + not belong to math.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The simple idea + call'd Power seems obscure, or rather none at all, but onely the + relation 'twixt Cause and Effect. When I ask whether A can move B, + if A be an intelligent thing, I mean no more than whether the + volition of A that B move be attended with the motion of B? If A be + senseless, whether the impulse of A against B be followed by + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> motion of B<a id= + "noteref_65" name="noteref_65" href="#note_65"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">65</span></span></a>?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Barrow's arguing + against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is a petitio principii, for + the Demonstration of Archimedes supposeth the circumference to + consist of more than 24 points. Moreover it may perhaps be + necessary to suppose the divisibility <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>, in order to demonstrate that the radius is + equal to the side of the hexagon.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Shew me an + argument against indivisibles that does not go on some false + supposition.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A great number + of insensibles—or thus, two invisibles, say you, put together + become visible; therefore that M. V. contains or is made up of + invisibles. I answer, the M. V. does not comprise, is not composed + of, invisibles. All the matter amounts to this, viz. whereas I had + no idea awhile agoe, I have an idea now. It remains for you to + prove that I came by the present idea because there were two + invisibles added together. I say the invisibles are nothings, + cannot exist, include a contradiction<a id="noteref_66" name= + "noteref_66" href="#note_66"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">66</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page014">[pg 014]</span><a name="Pg014" id="Pg014" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am young, I am + an upstart, I am a pretender, I am vain. Very well. I shall + endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening, vilifying + appellations the pride & rage of man can devise. But one thing + I know I am not guilty of. I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of + any great man. I act not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do + not adhere to any opinion because it is an old one, a reviv'd one, + a fashionable one, or one that I have spent much time in the study + and cultivation of.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sense rather + than reason or demonstration ought to be employed about lines and + figures, these being things sensible; for as for those you call + insensible, we have proved them to be nonsense, nothing<a id= + "noteref_67" name="noteref_67" href="#note_67"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">67</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If in some + things I differ from a philosopher I profess to admire, 'tis for + that very thing on account whereof I admire him, namely, the love + of truth. This &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whenever my + reader finds me talk very positively, I desire he'd not take it + ill. I see no reason why certainty should be confined to the + mathematicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I say there are + no incommensurables, no surds. I say the side of any square may be + assign'd in numbers. Say you assign unto me the side of the square + 10. I ask w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> 10—10 feet, inches, + &c., or 10 points? If the later, I deny there is any such + square, 'tis impossible 10 points should compose a square. If the + former, resolve y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">r</span></span> 10 square inches, feet, + &c. into points, & the number of points must necessarily be + a square number whose side is easily assignable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A mean + proportional cannot be found betwixt any two given lines. It can + onely be found betwixt those the numbers of whose points multiply'd + together produce a square number. Thus betwixt a line of 2 inches + & a line of 5 inches a mean geometrical cannot be found, except + the number of points contained in 2 inches multiply'd by + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> number of points contained + in 5 inches make a square number.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If the wit and + industry of the Nihilarians were employ'd <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page015">[pg 015]</span><a name="Pg015" id="Pg015" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> about the usefull & practical + mathematiques, what advantage had it brought to mankind!</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">You ask me + whether the books are in the study now, when no one is there to see + them? I answer, Yes. You ask me, Are we not in the wrong for + imagining things to exist when they are not actually perceiv'd by + the senses? I answer, No. The existence of our ideas consists in + being perceiv'd, imagin'd, thought on. Whenever they are imagin'd + or thought on they do exist. Whenever they are mentioned or + discours'd of they are imagin'd & thought on. Therefore you can + at no time ask me whether they exist or no, but by reason of + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> very question they must + necessarily exist.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But, say you, + then a chimæra does exist? I answer, it doth in one sense, i.e. it + is imagin'd. But it must be well noted that existence is vulgarly + restrain'd to actuall perception, and that I use the word existence + in a larger sense than ordinary.<a id="noteref_68" name= + "noteref_68" href="#note_68"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">68</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B.—According + to my doctrine all things are <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">entia rationis</span></span>, i.e. solum + habent esse in intellectum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<a id= + "noteref_69" name="noteref_69" href="#note_69"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">69</span></span></a>According + to my doctrine all are not <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">entia + rationis</span></span>. The distinction between <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ens rationis</span></span> and <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ens reale</span></span> is kept up by it as + well as any other doctrine.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">You ask me + whether there can be an infinite idea? I answer, in one sense there + may. Thus the visual sphere, tho' ever so small, is infinite, i.e. + has no end. But if by infinite you mean an extension consisting of + innumerable points, then I ask y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">r</span></span> + pardon. Points, tho' never so many, may be numbered. The multitude + of points, or feet, inches, &c., hinders not their + numbrableness (i.e. hinders not their being numerable) in the + least. Many or most are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, + if by infinite idea you mean an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> + too great to be comprehended or perceiv'd all at once, you must + excuse me. I think such an infinite is no less than a + contradiction<a id="noteref_70" name="noteref_70" href= + "#note_70"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">70</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page016">[pg 016]</span><a name="Pg016" id="Pg016" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The sillyness of + the current doctrine makes much for me. They commonly suppose a + material world—figures, motions, bulks of various sizes, + &c.—according to their own confession to no purpose. All our + sensations may be, and sometimes actually are, without them; nor + can men so much as conceive it possible they should concur in any + wise to the production of them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ask a man, I + mean a philosopher, why he supposes this vast structure, this + compages of bodies? he shall be at a stand; he'll not have one word + to say. W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> sufficiently shews the + folly of the hypothesis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Or rather why he + supposes all y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">s</span></span> Matter? For bodies and + their qualities I do allow to exist independently of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">our</span></em> + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How is the + soul distinguish'd from its ideas? Certainly if there were no + sensible ideas there could be no soul, no perception, remembrance, + love, fear, &c.; no faculty could be exerted<a id="noteref_71" + name="noteref_71" href="#note_71"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">71</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The soul is the + Will, properly speaking, and as it is distinct from ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The grand + puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake, easily solv'd.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + minima or meer minima may not be compar'd by their sooner or later + evanescence, as well as by more or less points, so that one + sensible may be greater than another, though it exceeds it not by + one point?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Circles on + several radius's are not similar figures, they having neither all + nor any an infinite number of sides. Hence in vain to enquire after + 2 terms of one and y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> same proportion that should + constantly express the reason of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">d</span></span> to + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">p</span></span> in all circles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To remark + Wallis's harangue, that the aforesaid proportion can neither be + expressed by rational numbers nor surds.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page017">[pg 017]</span><a name="Pg017" id="Pg017" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We can no more + have an idea of length without breadth or visibility, than of a + general figure.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One idea may be + like another idea, tho' they contain no common simple idea<a id= + "noteref_72" name="noteref_72" href="#note_72"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">72</span></span></a>. Thus + the simple idea red is in some sense like the simple idea blue; + 'tis liker it than sweet or shrill. But then those ideas + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> are so said to be alike, + agree both in their connexion with another simple idea, viz. + extension, & in their being receiv'd by one & the same + sense. But, after all, nothing can be like an idea but an idea.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No sharing + betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Materialists + must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power + of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like + absurditys.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Enquire + concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of + Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The ... & + ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as + so many noughts or nothings.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To make + experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they + have any or no, & whether they can be of that green + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> seems to be compounded of + yellow and blue.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether it + were not better <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">not</span></em> to call the operations of the + mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible<a id="noteref_73" + name="noteref_73" href="#note_73"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">73</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. diligently + to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so + great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of + those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This + sprung from their not knowing w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + Existence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all + their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and + import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide + difference betwixt the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page018">[pg + 018]</span><a name="Pg018" id="Pg018" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this + is new to me<a id="noteref_74" name="noteref_74" href= + "#note_74"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">74</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have learn'd + from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, + coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just + nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We + may apply it to the Mathematicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How can all + words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour + without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not + an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour + without extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke seems + wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating + & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use + words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private + meditations<a id="noteref_75" name="noteref_75" href= + "#note_75"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">75</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No one abstract + simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with + one & the same 3<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">d</span></span> simple idea, or be + intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in + themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no + likeness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How can + there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as + of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. + I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing + to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, + & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the + same kind<a id="noteref_76" name="noteref_76" href= + "#note_76"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">76</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Much to + recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What means Cause + as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + wills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that + happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is + some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these + perceptions in us<a id="noteref_77" name="noteref_77" href= + "#note_77"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">77</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page019">[pg 019]</span><a name="Pg019" id="Pg019" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<a id= + "noteref_78" name="noteref_78" href="#note_78"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">78</span></span></a>It + should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being + unintelligible.]</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One square + cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is + false.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Some writers of + catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object + in the Barrovian case behind the eye.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Blew and yellow + chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to + prove the composition of green.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is in + green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & + yellow. Therefore green is compounded.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A mixt cause + will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded + that we see.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To consider + Newton's two sorts of green.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. My + abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the + Royall Society. 'Tis w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> their meeting did + ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.<a id="noteref_79" name= + "noteref_79" href="#note_79"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">79</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To premise + a definition of idea<a id="noteref_80" name="noteref_80" href= + "#note_80"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">80</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The 2 great + principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. + Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book<a id= + "noteref_81" name="noteref_81" href="#note_81"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">81</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Subvertitur + geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Archimedes's + proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with + circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the + circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will + follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Those curve + lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their + equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an + inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as + the best.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether the + substance of body or anything else be <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page020">[pg 020]</span><a name="Pg020" id="Pg020" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> any more than the collection of concrete + ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular + body is extension, solidity, figure<a id="noteref_82" name= + "noteref_82" href="#note_82"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">82</span></span></a>. Of + general abstract body we can have no idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Most + carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to + express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a + man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction<a id= + "noteref_83" name="noteref_83" href="#note_83"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">83</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To + endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this + axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. what the + geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to + their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to + a right line?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + me you call those lines equal w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + contain an equal number of points, then there will be no + difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + contains the same points as the right one doth.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I take not away + substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out + of the reasonable world<a id="noteref_84" name="noteref_84" href= + "#note_84"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">84</span></span></a>. I + onely reject the philosophic sense (w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + in effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted + with their jargon w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he means by corporeal + substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, + solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The + philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no + idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never + had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In short, be not + angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span>ever you can in any wise + conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & + absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll + never deprive you of it.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page021">[pg 021]</span><a name="Pg021" id="Pg021" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. I am more + for reality than any other philosophers<a id="noteref_85" name= + "noteref_85" href="#note_85"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">85</span></span></a>. They + make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be + deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A line in the + sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that + there are curve lines.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Curves perfectly + incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If men look for + a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it + is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, + he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & + dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and + knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where + 'tis to be found.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All knowledge + onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems + improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person + stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things + ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Abstract ideas + cause of much trifling and mistake.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mathematicians + seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere + define w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> they mean by that word when + apply'd to lines.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke says the + modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by + degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. + What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> do + the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either + they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give + them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them + polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I + think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is + this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that + belongs not to it but to a different idea?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page022">[pg 022]</span><a name="Pg022" id="Pg022" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what + they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under + triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I + ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, + then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + they will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot + touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., + according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch + a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Do you mean by + saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up + equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal + spaces? If you mean <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">spatia + congruentia</span></span>, answer the above difficulty truly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I can mean (for + my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing + equal numbers of points.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I can mean + nothing by equal lines but lines w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + 'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> I + observe by my senses no difference, & w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + therefore have the same name.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Must the + imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then + imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure + intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not + operations of the mind.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If I speak + positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I + am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think + before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to + refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an + affected modesty & submission to better judgments. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I lay before you are + undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor + learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by + figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own + evidence.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When you speak + of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. + & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer + colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page023">[pg 023]</span><a name="Pg023" id="Pg023" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Any subject can + have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. + Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Well, say you, + according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is + nothing w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is not an <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">ens + rationis</span></span>. I answer, things are as real, and exist + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in rerum natura</span></span>, as much as + ever. The difference between <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">entia realia</span></span> & <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">entia rationis</span></span> may be made as + properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour + rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in + this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Fruitless the + distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We are not + acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, + existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are + frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd + answers them in our understandings. This must be well + inculcated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Vain is the + distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world<a id= + "noteref_86" name="noteref_86" href="#note_86"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">86</span></span></a>. V. + Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more + beautiful than this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Foolish in men + to despise the senses. If it were not for</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">them the mind + could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of + introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if + these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the + senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it + makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and + agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in + philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea + of heaven or the joys of the blest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The vast, + wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not + consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, + settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each + other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations + of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus + we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the + relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to + understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This + we think <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page024">[pg + 024]</span><a name="Pg024" id="Pg024" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of + the last importance,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I allow not of + the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I'd never blame + a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other + principles. The not considering these things has been of ill + consequence in morality.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My positive + assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with + <span class="tei tei-q">“It seems to me,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I suppose,”</span> &c.; since I declare, once for + all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they + appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts + agree with mine. This in the Preface.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Two things are + apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. + Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible + ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some + latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words + in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of + not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed + by studying the understanding.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Unity no simple + idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number + consists in relations<a id="noteref_87" name="noteref_87" href= + "#note_87"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">87</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Entia realia et + entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have an + intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides + ourselves & order, præcedaneous<a id="noteref_88" name= + "noteref_88" href="#note_88"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">88</span></span></a>. To + the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or + else we cannot think.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We move our legs + ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from + Malbranch<a id="noteref_89" name="noteref_89" href= + "#note_89"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">89</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Nicely to + discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke<a id="noteref_90" name="noteref_90" + href="#note_90"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">90</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Again and + again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of + things, rerum natura, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I + say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd + & determin'd ideas annexed to <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page025">[pg 025]</span><a name="Pg025" id="Pg025" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> their words they can hardly be mistaken. + Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> colours are not simple + ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This + to be heartily insisted on.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The abstract + idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They + never use those words standing for abstract ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must not say + the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of + mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still + for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before + they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I approve not of + that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and + separating of signs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke cannot + explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and + propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. + Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men have been + very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. + But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side + there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered + by me. A vast field for invention.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Twelve inches + not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive + a foot who never thought of an inch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A foot is equal + to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they + contain both the same number of points.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[Forasmuch as] + to be used.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To mention + somewhat w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> may encourage the study of + politiques, and testify of me y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I + am well dispos'd toward them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If men did not + use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract + ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. + Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide + Locke<a id="noteref_91" name="noteref_91" href= + "#note_91"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">91</span></span></a>, lib. + 4. c. 7. s. 9.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A various or + mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This + demonstrable from the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page026">[pg + 026]</span><a name="Pg026" id="Pg026" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be + frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end + definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to + Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am the + farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive + knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. + This is w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> Locke nor scarce any other + thinking philosopher will pretend to<a id="noteref_92" name= + "noteref_92" href="#note_92"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">92</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Doctrine of + abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. + Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke greatly + out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses + and not the abuses of language.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Of great use + & y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> last importance to + contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable + abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out words. Such a one would + never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Wonderful in + Locke that he could, w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> advanced in years, see at + all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was + consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he + did not see farther.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Identity of + ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or + excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, + &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am glad the + people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. + This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the + happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not + proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this + & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, + Madden<a id="noteref_93" name="noteref_93" href= + "#note_93"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">93</span></span></a>, + &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral + matters.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To observe + (w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> you talk of the division of + ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page027">[pg 027]</span><a name= + "Pg027" id="Pg027" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of the + undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; + viz. the want of names.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To begin + the First Book<a id="noteref_94" name="noteref_94" href= + "#note_94"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">94</span></span></a> not + with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation + to use perception or thought in general.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I defy any man + to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea + without perception.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke's very + supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is + absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke's harangue + about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd + to the mathematicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">They talk of + determining all the points of a curve by an equation. W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + mean they by this? W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> would they signify by the + word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We think we know + not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea + annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Certainly we do + not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the + word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our + knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The very + existence of ideas constitutes the Soul<a id="noteref_95" name= + "noteref_95" href="#note_95"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">95</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"> + Consciousness<a id="noteref_96" name="noteref_96" href= + "#note_96"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">96</span></span></a>, + perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Consult, ransack + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">r</span></span> understanding. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> find you there besides + several perceptions or thoughts? W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + mean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you + perceive, or y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> you do not perceive. A + thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you + do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter + strangely abused by words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mind is a + congeries of perceptions<a id="noteref_97" name="noteref_97" href= + "#note_97"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">97</span></span></a>. Take + away perceptions <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page028">[pg + 028]</span><a name="Pg028" id="Pg028" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Say you, the + mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I + answer, you are abused by the words <span class="tei tei-q">“that a + thing.”</span> These are vague and empty words with us.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The having ideas + is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he + only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth + perception.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> extreamly strengthens us + in prejudice is y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> we think we see an empty + space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third + Book<a id="noteref_98" name="noteref_98" href= + "#note_98"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">98</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There may be + demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, + as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be + founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate + demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we + define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence + 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or + monarchy to be established <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">jure + Divino</span></span> to demonstrate their doctrines if they are + true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the + Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. if there be + any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & + others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, + sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white + differ from white men....</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I shall + demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set + forth and insisted on in the Introduction<a id="noteref_99" name= + "noteref_99" href="#note_99"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">99</span></span></a>. In + that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all + demonstration to be about abstract ideas, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> I + say we have not nor can have.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. + Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A good proof + that Existence is nothing without or <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page029">[pg 029]</span><a name="Pg029" id="Pg029" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> distinct from perception, may be drawn from + considering a man put into the world without company<a id= + "noteref_100" name="noteref_100" href="#note_100"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">100</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There was a + smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common + speech confirms my doctrine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No broken + intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; + each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We are + frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd + meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine + words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether + inconceivable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“A stone is a stone.”</span> This a nonsensical + proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor + do I believe he would ever think on this: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The whole is equal to its parts,”</span> &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Let it not be + said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the + word, so far as I can comprehend it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If you take away + abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by + language. Rather by degrees of more and less.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as + something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such + thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. Much + complaint about the imperfection of language<a id="noteref_101" + name="noteref_101" href="#note_101"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">101</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But perhaps some + man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not + extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have + no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> I come to treat more + particularly of Existence.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Will not rightly + distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing + to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or + non-existence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To enquire + diligently into that strange mistery, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page030">[pg 030]</span><a name="Pg030" id="Pg030" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> viz. How it is that I can cast about, think + of this or that man, place, action, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my + senses at the present?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis not to be + imagin'd w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> a marvellous emptiness + & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside + all use of words in his meditations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Incongruous in + Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke owns that + abstract ideas were made in order to naming.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The common + errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles<a id= + "noteref_102" name="noteref_102" href="#note_102"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">102</span></span></a>, + strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and + distant from their mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am persuaded, + would men but examine w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> they mean by the word + existence, they wou'd agree with me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">c. 20. s. 8. b. + 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The supposition + that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, + & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our + knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own + ideas<a id="noteref_103" name="noteref_103" href= + "#note_103"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">103</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether the + solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to + record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in + writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We read in + history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of + parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too + unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the + words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction + and dispute.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been + one great cause of imagining material substances<a id="noteref_104" + name="noteref_104" href="#note_104"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">104</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That God and + blessed spirits have Will is a manifest <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page031">[pg 031]</span><a name="Pg031" id="Pg031" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> argument against Locke's proofs that the Will + cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous + uneasiness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The act of the + Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be + without volition.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Volition is + distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Also from + uneasiness and idea together.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or + ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Will not + distinct from particular volitions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is not so + very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without + all volition or act.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This allow'd + hereafter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To ask whether a + man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">can</span></em> presupposes volition.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Anima mundi, + substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, + Hylaschic principle—all these vanish<a id="noteref_105" name= + "noteref_105" href="#note_105"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">105</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Newton proves + that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all<a id= + "noteref_106" name="noteref_106" href="#note_106"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">106</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether it + be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the + vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To express + the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to + be full and particular in answering objections<a id="noteref_107" + name="noteref_107" href="#note_107"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">107</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To say + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> Will is a power; + [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them + from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be + distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking + substance.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page032">[pg + 032]</span><a name="Pg032" id="Pg032" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An extended may + have passive modes of thinking good actions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There might be + idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest + uneasiness w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out any volition, therefore + the....</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Matter once + allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter<a id= + "noteref_108" name="noteref_108" href="#note_108"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">108</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Man is free. + There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the + signification of the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">free</span></em>—if we had an idea annext to + the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We are imposed + on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Uneasiness + precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Trace an infant + in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe + how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you + with its nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Complacency + seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">You tell me, + according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> you mean by the word free, + and I shall resolve you<a id="noteref_109" name="noteref_109" href= + "#note_109"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">109</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> do men mean when they talk + of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, + or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd + this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should + see intervalls and other bodies behind those wh<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + now seem to touch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Upon all + occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> the utmost civility & + respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. To rein in + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> satyrical nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Blame me not if + I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page033">[pg 033]</span><a name="Pg033" id="Pg033" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> that you cannot always apprehend the + clear and determinate meaning of my words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Say you, there + might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas<a id= + "noteref_110" name="noteref_110" href="#note_110"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">110</span></span></a>. Say + I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for + me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to + think should exist.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I affirm 'tis + manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man + should use a word without an idea<a id="noteref_111" name= + "noteref_111" href="#note_111"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">111</span></span></a>. + Certainly we shall find that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> ever word we make use of in + matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, + annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be + compleatly known.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis + demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should + exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself + with words.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We imagine a + great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, + &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt + man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater<a id= + "noteref_112" name="noteref_112" href="#note_112"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">112</span></span></a> + difference.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We find in our + own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God + a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, + is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and + number, old and known, we apply to that w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is unknown. But I am embrangled<a id="noteref_113" name= + "noteref_113" href="#note_113"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">113</span></span></a> in + words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The chief thing + I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of + words<a id="noteref_114" name="noteref_114" href= + "#note_114"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">114</span></span></a>. This + has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the + schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The grand cause + of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we + imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), + we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our + ideas; whereas in <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page034">[pg + 034]</span><a name="Pg034" id="Pg034" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tis <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">toto cælo</span></span> different from the + understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or + rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy<a id= + "noteref_115" name="noteref_115" href="#note_115"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">115</span></span></a> in + the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></em>, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas + are passive<a id="noteref_116" name="noteref_116" href= + "#note_116"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">116</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thing & idea + are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, + do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater + latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. + Now these are no ideas<a id="noteref_117" name="noteref_117" href= + "#note_117"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">117</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There can be + perception w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out volition. Qu. whether + there can be volition without perception?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Existence not + conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd + therefrom.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. Several + distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so + by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other + senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity + of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or + rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the + idea of time—or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">is</span></em> time itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + would the solitary man think of number?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There are innate + ideas, i.e. ideas created with us<a id="noteref_118" name= + "noteref_118" href="#note_118"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">118</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke seems to + be mistaken w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> he says thought is not + essential to the mind<a id="noteref_119" name="noteref_119" href= + "#note_119"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">119</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Certainly the + mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep + and trances the mind <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">exists not</span></em>—there is no time, no + succession of ideas<a id="noteref_120" name="noteref_120" href= + "#note_120"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">120</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To say the mind + exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Folly to inquire + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> determines the Will. + Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do + nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will<a id="noteref_121" + name="noteref_121" href="#note_121"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">121</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page035">[pg 035]</span><a name="Pg035" id="Pg035" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Again, + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> mean you by determine?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For want of + rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are + forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 + diameters of earth in a second of time.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Twas the + opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd, or before perception, + that made men think perception<a id="noteref_122" name= + "noteref_122" href="#note_122"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">122</span></span></a> was + somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> it + was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv'd was an idea + of sensation. I say, 'twas this made 'em think the understanding + took it in, receiv'd it from without; w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + could never be did not they think it existed without<a id= + "noteref_123" name="noteref_123" href="#note_123"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">123</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Properly + speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination's making. This is + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> likeness of, and refer'd to + the real idea, or (if you will) thing<a id="noteref_124" name= + "noteref_124" href="#note_124"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">124</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To ask, have we + an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble + nothing but an idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If you ask + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> thing it is that wills, I + answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any + idea, then I say, 'tis no thing at all that wills<a id= + "noteref_125" name="noteref_125" href="#note_125"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">125</span></span></a>. This + how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are + cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Again, if by is + you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is perceived or does + perceive wills.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The referring + ideas to things w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> are not ideas, the using + the term <span class="tei tei-q">“idea of<a id="noteref_126" name= + "noteref_126" href="#note_126"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">126</span></span></a>,”</span> + is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in + this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Some words there + are w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> do not stand for ideas, + viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and + their concomitant ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There seem to be + but two colours w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> are simple ideas, viz. + those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the + others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by + composition.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page036">[pg + 036]</span><a name="Pg036" id="Pg036" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have no idea + of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other + intelligence; for that were a contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. Simple + ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, + tho' it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable + ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to + call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover + the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of + chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till + after the dissolution of the bodies—w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining + entire.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All our + knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke. All our + sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither + know nor perceive them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis allow'd + that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be + empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for + operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke says all + our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is + the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis + homo vivit.”</span> It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to + the words <span class="tei tei-q">“animal”</span> and <span class= + "tei tei-q">“vivit”</span>) to no more than this: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis + homo est homo.”</span> A mere sport and trifling with sounds.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have no ideas + of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions<a id= + "noteref_127" name="noteref_127" href="#note_127"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">127</span></span></a>. + Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are capable of arriving + at demonstration about them<a id="noteref_128" name="noteref_128" + href="#note_128"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">128</span></span></a>, the + morality consisting in the volition chiefly.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Strange it is + that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since + that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into + the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection<a id= + "noteref_129" name="noteref_129" href="#note_129"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">129</span></span></a>, + methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted + with it.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page037">[pg + 037]</span><a name="Pg037" id="Pg037" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This I am sure, + I have no idea of Existence<a id="noteref_130" name="noteref_130" + href="#note_130"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">130</span></span></a>, or + annext to the word Existence. And if others have that's nothing to + me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being + incommunicable by language.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Say you, the + unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I + have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have + an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which + you will think absurd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is + somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our + volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes + toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Things are + twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active things is to + act; of inactive to be perceiv'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S. E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Distinct from or + without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there + existence without perception.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">God may + comprehend all ideas, even the ideas w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained + thereby<a id="noteref_131" name="noteref_131" href= + "#note_131"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">131</span></span></a>. Thus + we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any + misery or uneasiness at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N. Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Truth, three + sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Agreement of + relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: + of signification, by including, in morality.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Gyant who shakes + the mountain that's on him must be acknowledged. Or rather thus: I + am no more to be reckon'd stronger than Locke than a pigmy should + be reckon'd stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the + molehill w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> lay upon him, and the + gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. + This in the Preface.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Promise to + extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull + contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the + Introduction in a modest way<a id="noteref_132" name="noteref_132" + href="#note_132"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">132</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page038">[pg 038]</span><a name="Pg038" id="Pg038" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whoever shall + pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, + else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or + Introduction<a id="noteref_133" name="noteref_133" href= + "#note_133"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">133</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Doctrine of + identity best explain'd by taking the Will for volitions, the + Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> are never acted surely + solv'd thereby.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must + acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone + before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not + always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho' they + attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known + the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made + more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The opinion that + men had ideas of moral actions<a id="noteref_134" name= + "noteref_134" href="#note_134"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">134</span></span></a> has + render'd the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An idea being + itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active + thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Excuse to be + made in the Introduction for using the word <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></span>, + viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution must be added.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Scripture and + possibility are the onely proofs<a id="noteref_135" name= + "noteref_135" href="#note_135"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">135</span></span></a> with + Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think + so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think + before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the + existence of Matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">On second + thoughts I am on t'other extream. I am certain of that + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> Malbranch seems to doubt + of, viz. the existence of bodies<a id="noteref_136" name= + "noteref_136" href="#note_136"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">136</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. &c.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To bring + the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to + bring Locke's general triangle in the last<a id="noteref_137" name= + "noteref_137" href="#note_137"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">137</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">They give good + rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. + They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same + time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I'll [instance] + in Locke's opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I + have met with.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page039">[pg + 039]</span><a name="Pg039" id="Pg039" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Such was the + candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he + alive<a id="noteref_138" name="noteref_138" href= + "#note_138"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">138</span></span></a>, he + would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in + so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see + with my own eyes, & not with another's. Introduction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The word thing, + as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as + standing for idea and archetype without the mind<a id="noteref_139" + name="noteref_139" href="#note_139"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">139</span></span></a>, + mischievous and useless.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To demonstrate + morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see + which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk + of the work.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke's + instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own + rule, trifling propositions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How comes it + that some ideas are confessedly allow'd by all to be onely in the + mind<a id="noteref_140" name="noteref_140" href= + "#note_140"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">140</span></span></a>, and + others as generally taken to be without the mind<a id="noteref_141" + name="noteref_141" href="#note_141"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">141</span></span></a>, if, + according to you, all are equally and only in the mind? Ans. + Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended + with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. + Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If men would lay + aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible they should ever mistake, + save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they + should be positive & secure that anything was true + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> in truth is not so. + Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we + can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have + certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there + may be slips of memory.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From my doctrine + there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those + things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are + not consequences of our volitions.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Candidly to + take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the + infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility of Matter's + thinking<a id="noteref_142" name="noteref_142" href= + "#note_142"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">142</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page040">[pg 040]</span><a name="Pg040" id="Pg040" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Once more I + desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of + words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible + empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into + absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as + occasions of bringing into his mind determin'd significations. So + far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve + not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to + find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span>ever I see myself 'tis + impossible I can paint it out in words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. To + consider well w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is meant by that + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> Locke saith concerning + algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a + method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in + mathematiques.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Homo</span></span> is not proved to be + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vivens</span></span> by means of any + intermediate idea. I don't fully agree w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + Locke in w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he says concerning sagacity + in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of + demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely + means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is a + difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition + without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power + implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the + effects following the volition<a id="noteref_143" name= + "noteref_143" href="#note_143"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">143</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have + assuredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd of Locke<a id= + "noteref_144" name="noteref_144" href="#note_144"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">144</span></span></a> to + think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable + to the Stillingfleetians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The substance of + Body we know<a id="noteref_145" name="noteref_145" href= + "#note_145"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">145</span></span></a>. The + substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being + a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">purus + actus</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Words have + ruin'd and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, + astrology, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Abstract ideas + only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they + have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera + & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to + them.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page041">[pg + 041]</span><a name="Pg041" id="Pg041" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke's + out<a id="noteref_146" name="noteref_146" href= + "#note_146"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">146</span></span></a>—the + case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but + not of soul without thought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">God ought to be + worship'd. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the + signification of the words God, worship, ought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No perception, + according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no + idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether + active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I can will the + calling to mind something that is past, tho' at the same time that + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> I call to mind was not in + my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I + could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Will & + the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sed quia + voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. + 479, ad Limburgum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">You cannot say + the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. + [minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv'd, + and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same + with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce + perceiv'd.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension seems + to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it + is seen or felt.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The spirit—the + active thing—that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is soul, & God—is the + Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The concrete of + the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest + offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or + making much mention of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">You ask, do + these volitions make <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> Will? W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + you ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more<a id= + "noteref_147" name="noteref_147" href="#note_147"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">147</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. To use + utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the + Church or Churchmen.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page042">[pg + 042]</span><a name="Pg042" id="Pg042" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Even to speak + somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame + them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke's great + oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at + least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the + 2<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">d</span></span> & 4<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + books don't agree w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he + says in y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> 3<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">d</span></span><a id="noteref_148" name= + "noteref_148" href="#note_148"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">148</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If Matter<a id= + "noteref_149" name="noteref_149" href="#note_149"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">149</span></span></a> is + once allow'd to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may + think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho' he seems positive of the + contrary.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Since I say men + cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if + they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will + contain nothing but w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is certain & evident + demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it + but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When I say I + will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and + adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant + thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the + Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not + Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us + (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as + a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. + This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my + part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, + and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that + are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall + come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall + yield an explicit belief. Introd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Complexation of + ideas twofold. Y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">s</span></span> refers to colours being + complex ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Considering + length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> it will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I may say earth, + plants, &c. were created before man—there being other + intelligences to perceive them, before man was created<a id= + "noteref_150" name="noteref_150" href="#note_150"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">150</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page043">[pg 043]</span><a name="Pg043" id="Pg043" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is a + philosopher<a id="noteref_151" name="noteref_151" href= + "#note_151"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">151</span></span></a> who + says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or + reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for + it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. + Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an + idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in + his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the + common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. That not + common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed + to stand for an abstract general idea.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Writers of + Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes + and distances.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis evident + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + the solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give + him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas + which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he had before. If he had + not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it + after he is taught to speak.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Homo est homo,”</span> &c. comes at last to Petrus + est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought + after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical + mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hence we see the + doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, + comes to nothing<a id="noteref_152" name="noteref_152" href= + "#note_152"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">152</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We may have + certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas + than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being + to be used indifferently.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems to me + that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis + improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no + mental propositions <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page044">[pg + 044]</span><a name="Pg044" id="Pg044" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis + allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and + consequently no certainty<a id="noteref_153" name="noteref_153" + href="#note_153"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">153</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reason why + we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly + arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The obscure + ambiguous term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relation</span></em>, which is said to be the + largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Let any man shew + me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false + principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> effect of God's will, and + we know not how soon it may be changed.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. What becomes + of the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">æternæ + veritates</span></span>? Ans. They vanish<a id="noteref_154" name= + "noteref_154" href="#note_154"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">154</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But, say you, I + find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. + Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of + this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To view the + deformity of error we need onely undress it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Cogito ergo sum.”</span> Tautology. No mental + proposition answering thereto.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N. Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Knowledge, or + certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and + diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh + merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this + latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only + real knowledge seemeth to be found<a id="noteref_155" name= + "noteref_155" href="#note_155"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">155</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We must + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> the mob place certainty in + the senses<a id="noteref_156" name="noteref_156" href= + "#note_156"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">156</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis a man's + duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. + Wonder not therefore that I do w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I + do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A man of slow + parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness + might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring + the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. + Introd.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page045">[pg + 045]</span><a name="Pg045" id="Pg045" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke to + Limborch, &c. Talk of <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">judicium + intellectus</span></span> preceding the volition: I think + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">judicium</span></span> includes volition. I + can by no means distinguish these—<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">judicium</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">intellectus</span></span>, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">indifferentia</span></span>, uneasiness to + many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the + motion of my hand.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> mean you by my perceptions, + my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive<a id= + "noteref_157" name="noteref_157" href="#note_157"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">157</span></span></a>, + &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Homo est agens + liberum. What mean they by <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">homo</span></span> + and <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">agens</span></span> in this + place?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Will any man say + that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet + if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange + they should want them<a id="noteref_158" name="noteref_158" href= + "#note_158"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">158</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is a strange + thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men + have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they + look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They + discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + other men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of + admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. + There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their + eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is perceived, & at + length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this + proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.<a id="noteref_159" name= + "noteref_159" href="#note_159"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">159</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">These men with a + supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. + They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, + catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & + air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract + ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems not + improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see + more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the + largest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Words (by them + meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being + (w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> duly us'd or in their own + nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page046">[pg 046]</span><a name="Pg046" id="Pg046" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> or an hindrance to knowledge, without + them there could in mathematiques themselves be no + demonstration.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To be + eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to + Common Sense<a id="noteref_160" name="noteref_160" href= + "#note_160"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">160</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We cannot + conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We + suppose ourselves affected w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> such & such thoughts + & such and such sensations<a id="noteref_161" name= + "noteref_161" href="#note_161"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">161</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether + composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to + discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can + imagine a blue horse or chimera.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Naturalists do + not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after + co-existing ideas or occasions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Morality may be + demonstrated as mixt mathematics.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Perception is + passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no + idea of volition.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Algebraic + species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore + Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2 crowns are + called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Complex ideas + are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of + numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am better + informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, + than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to + judge of the bargain you'd have me make w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + you tell me how much (i.e. the name of y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span>) + money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without + naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may + appear the nature of numbers.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Children are + unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in + language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the + senses.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page047">[pg + 047]</span><a name="Pg047" id="Pg047" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Numbers are + nothing but names—never words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Imaginary + roots—to unravel that mystery.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ideas of utility + are annexed to numbers.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In arithmetical + problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a + denomination. This is all can be of use to them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Take away the + signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + remains?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">These are + sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in + societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas + in them<a id="noteref_162" name="noteref_162" href= + "#note_162"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">162</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether + Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt + mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted + pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these + to points<a id="noteref_163" name="noteref_163" href= + "#note_163"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">163</span></span></a>?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke of + Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con + over that chapter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Existence, + Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, + unknown and useless to the vulgar.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sensual pleasure + is the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">summum bonum</span></span>. + This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, + all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be + demonstrated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sensual + pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man<a id= + "noteref_164" name="noteref_164" href="#note_164"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">164</span></span></a>. But + if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause + of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater + pleasure.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> I + consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they + are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of + them near.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">By <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> I + mean any sensible or imaginable thing<a id="noteref_165" name= + "noteref_165" href="#note_165"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">165</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To be sure or + certain of w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> we do not actually + perceive<a id="noteref_166" name="noteref_166" href= + "#note_166"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">166</span></span></a> (I + say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page048">[pg 048]</span><a name="Pg048" id="Pg048" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> passive; there must be a disposition to + act; there must be assent, w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is active. Nay, what do I + talk; there must be actual volition.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What do we + demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. + may not be called by the same name<a id="noteref_167" name= + "noteref_167" href="#note_167"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">167</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I approve of + this axiom of the Schoolmen, <span class="tei tei-q">“Nihil est in + intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”</span><a id="noteref_168" + name="noteref_168" href="#note_168"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">168</span></span></a> I + wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of + abstract ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S. G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Nihil dat quod non habet,”</span> or, the effect is + contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe + to be true.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whoever shall + cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see + the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, + &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Absurd to argue + the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis + impossible<a id="noteref_169" name="noteref_169" href= + "#note_169"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">169</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Cause of much + errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by + Reality<a id="noteref_170" name="noteref_170" href= + "#note_170"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">170</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Des Cartes, in + Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than + that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he + forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these + general conceptions are usually confused.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Des Cartes, in + Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended + substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are + substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of + substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis commonly + said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were + self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. + This I do not understand.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page049">[pg 049]</span><a name="Pg049" id="Pg049" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To excite + men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, + nor bring those evils after them, as others.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We see no + variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their + effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This + Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, + &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a + party.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke in his + 4<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> Book<a id="noteref_171" + name="noteref_171" href="#note_171"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">171</span></span></a>, and + Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of + objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our + will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">While I exist or + have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing + in the present state is willing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The existence of + any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or + perception<a id="noteref_172" name="noteref_172" href= + "#note_172"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">172</span></span></a>. + Volition or Will, W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is not imaginable, regard + must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There are four + sorts of propositions:—<span class="tei tei-q">“Gold is a + metal;”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“Gold is yellow;”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“Gold is fixt;”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Gold is not a stone”</span>—of which the first, + second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions + answering them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. In + vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes + saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses + oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me + not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed + these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go + together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity + of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free + will of God<a id="noteref_173" name="noteref_173" href= + "#note_173"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">173</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Des Cartes owns + we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, + that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">d</span></span> + objection of Hobbs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hobbs in some + degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or + himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hobbs in his + Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page050">[pg 050]</span><a name="Pg050" id="Pg050" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the scholastiques—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“the will wills,”</span> &c. So does Locke. I am of + another mind<a id="noteref_174" name="noteref_174" href= + "#note_174"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">174</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Des Cartes, in + answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a + thing from its modus or manner.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Opinion that + existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It + is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P. E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Malbranch in his + illustration<a id="noteref_175" name="noteref_175" href= + "#note_175"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">175</span></span></a> + differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I + doubt not in the least of this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I differ from + Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist + really in bodies independent of our mind<a id="noteref_176" name= + "noteref_176" href="#note_176"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">176</span></span></a>. All + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> carefully and lucidly to be + set forth.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Not to mention + the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects + themselves—do really exist, even w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + not actually perceived; but still with relation to perception<a id= + "noteref_177" name="noteref_177" href="#note_177"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">177</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The great use of + the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about + signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the + characters themselves<a id="noteref_178" name="noteref_178" href= + "#note_178"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">178</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Reasoning there + may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration + can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Quoth Des + Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to + nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other + idea, even of his own making.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The not + distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. + He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas<a id= + "noteref_179" name="noteref_179" href="#note_179"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">179</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Say you, At this + rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as + real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less + real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not + mentioned <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page051">[pg + 051]</span><a name="Pg051" id="Pg051" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one + too, which I shall give in the Second Book<a id="noteref_180" name= + "noteref_180" href="#note_180"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">180</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Idea is the + object of thought. Y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I think on, whatever it be, + I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an + act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the + Will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke, in B. 4. + c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so + difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract + ideas. Y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> idea of a horse is as + complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“horse is white”</span> I form a mental proposition + with ease. But when I say <span class="tei tei-q">“fortitude is a + virtue”</span> I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at + all to be come at.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Pure intellect I + understand not<a id="noteref_181" name="noteref_181" href= + "#note_181"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">181</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke is in + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> right in those things + wherein he differs from y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> Cartesians, and they cannot + but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or + causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The properties + of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding + as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent + is a contradiction<a id="noteref_182" name="noteref_182" href= + "#note_182"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">182</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am certain + there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of + Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is + meant by certainty.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems that + the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether + perception must of necessity precede volition?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S. Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Error is not in + the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, + that I understand. There can be no errour in this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo. N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To take + notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to + shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Say Des Cartes + & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our + ideas proceed from bodies, or that <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page052">[pg 052]</span><a name="Pg052" id="Pg052" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> bodies do exist. Pray w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + mean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination + are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, + but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as + themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span><a id="noteref_183" name= + "noteref_183" href="#note_183"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">183</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Cartesius per + ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. + Tract. de Methodo.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. May there + not be an Understanding without a Will?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Understanding is + in some sort an action.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Silly of Hobbs, + &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it + has no likeness.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ideas of Sense + are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, + &c. are copies, images, of these.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My doctrines + rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, + Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, + comes to the ground.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hobbs & + Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same<a id= + "noteref_184" name="noteref_184" href="#note_184"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">184</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. E.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ens, res, + aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. + 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of + the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Spinosa (vid. + Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be <span class= + "tei tei-q">“omnium rerum causa immanens,”</span> and to + countenance this produces that of St. Paul, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in Him we live,”</span> &c. Now this of St. Paul + may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, + or Hobbs's, or Raphson's<a id="noteref_185" name="noteref_185" + href="#note_185"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">185</span></span></a>, + &c.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Will is + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">purus actus</span></span>, or rather pure + spirit not imaginable, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page053">[pg + 053]</span><a name="Pg053" id="Pg053" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the + understanding, no wise perceivable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Substance of a + spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please + (to avoid the quibble y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> may be made of the word + <span class="tei tei-q">“it”</span>) to act, cause, will, operate. + Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why may we not + conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? + Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E. N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Ex nihilo nihil fit.”</span> This (saith Spinoza, + Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are called <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">veritates æternæ</span></span>, because + <span class="tei tei-q">“nullam fidem habent extra mentem.”</span> + To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should + express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a + Will<a id="noteref_186" name="noteref_186" href= + "#note_186"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">186</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The philosophers + talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, + or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same + things considered with respect to us. I know not w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + they mean by <span class="tei tei-q">“things considered in + themselves.”</span> This is nonsense, jargon.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems there + can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no + ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than + annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an + equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain + to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & + uneasiness, but w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> are preferable to + annihilation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Recipe in animum + tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut + sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis a + perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a + great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; + whereas we can only see a point<a id="noteref_187" name= + "noteref_187" href="#note_187"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">187</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> I treat of mathematiques to + enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and + Wallis.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page054">[pg + 054]</span><a name="Pg054" id="Pg054" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Every sensation + of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of + nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, + demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal + spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I say not with + J.S. [John Sergeant] that we <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">see</span></em> solids. I reject his + <span class="tei tei-q">“solid philosophy”</span>—solidity being + only perceived by touch<a id="noteref_188" name="noteref_188" href= + "#note_188"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">188</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems to me + that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be + separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">E. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Some ideas or + other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or + sort of ideas being essential<a id="noteref_189" name="noteref_189" + href="#note_189"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">189</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The distinction + between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making + one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the + other of sense and the constant laws of nature.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Dico quod + extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza + in Epist. 2<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">a</span></span> ad Oldenburgium.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My definition of + the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & + Spinoza, viz. <span class="tei tei-q">“Ens summe perfectum & + absolute infinitum,”</span> or <span class="tei tei-q">“Ens + constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est + infinitum<a id="noteref_190" name="noteref_190" href= + "#note_190"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">190</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis chiefly the + connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not + the visible ideas themselves.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the grand + mistake is that we know not what we mean by <span class= + "tei tei-q">“we,”</span> or <span class= + "tei tei-q">“selves,”</span> or <span class= + "tei tei-q">“mind,”</span> &c. 'Tis most sure & certain + that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the + Spirit<a id="noteref_191" name="noteref_191" href= + "#note_191"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">191</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must not + mention the understanding as a faculty or <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page055">[pg 055]</span><a name="Pg055" id="Pg055" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> part of the mind. I must include + understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all + that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not + from the particular ideas, or the will from particular + volitions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Spirit, the + Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I say there are + no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but + Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort + of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as + well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another + which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you + into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll + be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the + word Cause.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In valuing good + we reckon too much on the present & our own.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There be two + sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to + somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination + thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the + former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for + recreation, those not but in order to their end.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo. N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Three sorts of + useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our + Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in + Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which + perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality<a id= + "noteref_192" name="noteref_192" href="#note_192"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">192</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Will, + understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are + acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their + objects, circumstances, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We must + carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & + spiritual.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The physical may + more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them + causes—but then we must mean causes y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> do + nothing.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">According to + Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page056">[pg 056]</span><a name="Pg056" id="Pg056" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> so long as we live, bating the time of sleep + or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an + action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, + & this an uneasiness.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must not + pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all + passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of + expectation in my friend.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If this be the + case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than + a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex + light of a mirrour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Or thus, like + deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light + of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What can an idea + be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a + sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is it not + nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a + colour is like a thing w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">h</span></span> cannot be seen?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Bodies exist + without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This + I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom<a id= + "noteref_193" name="noteref_193" href="#note_193"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">193</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Certainly we + should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Motion is an + abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by + itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Contradictions + cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn + from consequences. Introd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Will and + Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered + by their meaning abstract ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Speculative + Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty + them again.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Tho' it might + have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is M.V. should be also + M.T., or very near it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must not give + the soul or mind the scholastique name <span class= + "tei tei-q">“pure act,”</span> but rather pure spirit, or active + being.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page057">[pg + 057]</span><a name="Pg057" id="Pg057" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I must not say + the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both + abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being even <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ratione</span></span> different from the + Spirit, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">quâ</span></span> faculties, + or active.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Dangerous to + make idea & thing terms convertible<a id="noteref_194" name= + "noteref_194" href="#note_194"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">194</span></span></a>. That + were the way to prove spirits are nothing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">veritas</span></span> stands not for an + abstract idea?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis plain the + moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. + no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S. G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether the + Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If there were + only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be + no variety of appearance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">According to the + doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a + rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension, tho' + it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind + can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book + II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul + and Body or extended being.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis an absurd + question w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> Locke puts, whether man be + free to will?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To enquire + into the reason of the rule for determining questions in + Algebra.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It has already + been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary + use than in numbering.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I will grant you + that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind + in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as + distinct from the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo. N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Certainly it is + not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real + truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and + imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & + science doth not altogether depend upon words or names<a id= + "noteref_195" name="noteref_195" href="#note_195"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">195</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page058">[pg 058]</span><a name="Pg058" id="Pg058" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I think not that + things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is + necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all + voluntary<a id="noteref_196" name="noteref_196" href= + "#note_196"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">196</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If a man with + his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will + not say <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">he</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">his + mind</span></em> is the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or + firmament be without mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis strange to + find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas + of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De + Vries<a id="noteref_197" name="noteref_197" href= + "#note_197"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">197</span></span></a>, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Ideis + Innatis</span></span>, p. 64.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">De Vries will + have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but + sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain + distinction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">August 28th, + 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It were to be + wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, + would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, + literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in + knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great + actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes + out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high + trusts. Clov. B. 7.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One eternity + greater than another of the same kind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In what sense + eternity may be limited.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G. T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whether + succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Time is the + train of ideas succeeding each other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Duration not + distinguish'd from existence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Succession + explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why time in pain + longer than time in pleasure?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Duration + infinitely divisible, time not so.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page059">[pg 059]</span><a name="Pg059" id="Pg059" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The same τὸ νῦν + not common to all intelligences.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Time thought + infinitely divisible on account of its measure.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension not + infinitely divisible in one sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Revolutions + immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Time a + sensation; therefore onely in y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Eternity is + onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> soul easily conceiv'd, or + rather the immortality of the person, that of y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + soul not being necessary for ought we can see.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Swiftness of + ideas compar'd with y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> of motions shews the wisdom + of God.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> if + succession of ideas were swifter, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> if + slower?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Fall of Adam, + use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about + divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material + substances.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension a + sensation, therefore not without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the + immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Primary ideas + prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + secondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Demonstrations + of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without + breadth, or invisible length, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is absurd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">World + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out thought is <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nec quid</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nec quantum</span></span>, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nec quale</span></span>, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis wondrous to + contemplate y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> World empty'd of all + intelligences.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Nothing properly + but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are + not so much existences as manners of y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + existence of persons<a id="noteref_198" name="noteref_198" href= + "#note_198"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">198</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. about the + soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Infinite + divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of + extension; but the later is false, ergo y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + former also.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Blind man + made to see, would he know motion at 1<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">st</span></span> + sight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Motion, figure, + and extension perceivable by sight are <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page060">[pg 060]</span><a name="Pg060" id="Pg060" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> different from those ideas perceived by touch + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> goe by the same name.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Diagonal + incommensurable w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + side. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. how to + reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Terminations of + surfaces & lines not imaginable <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Molyneux's blind + man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at + first sight<a id="noteref_199" name="noteref_199" href= + "#note_199"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">199</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension so far + from being incompatible w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>, y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + 'tis impossible it should exist without thought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension itself + or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or + sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No extension but + surface perceivable by sight.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> we + imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a + person affected with these sensations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension to + exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of + perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a + contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. if visible + motion be proportional to tangible motion?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In some dreams + succession of ideas swifter than at other times.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If a piece of + matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular + bigness & figure, but &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Nothing + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out corresponds to our + primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration + of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we + depend.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The name of + colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> story of the German + Count.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How came + visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all + languages?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) + whether Being, added to y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> faculties, compleat the + real essence and adequate definition of the soul?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether, on + the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know + that any body is absolutely <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page061">[pg 061]</span><a name="Pg061" id="Pg061" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> at rest, since that supposing ideas much + slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">d</span></span> + then be apparently at rest?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. What can be + like a sensation but a sensation?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Did ever any + man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should + compare them to these, and make these like unto them?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The age of a + fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> of + a man<a id="noteref_200" name="noteref_200" href= + "#note_200"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">200</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Visible distance + heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several + ways:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">st</span></span>. + If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible + inch, thence it will follow y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> unequals are equals, + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is absurd: for at what + distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the + tangible inch?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">d</span></span>. + One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing + he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot + length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed + falsum id, ergo et hoc.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">dly</span></span>. + From Molyneux's problem, w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> otherwise is falsely + solv'd by Locke and him<a id="noteref_201" name="noteref_201" href= + "#note_201"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">201</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Nothing but + ideas perceivable<a id="noteref_202" name="noteref_202" href= + "#note_202"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">202</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A man cannot + compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he + cannot say anything w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is not an idea is like or + unlike an idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Bodies &c. + do exist even w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> not perceived—they being + powers in the active being<a id="noteref_203" name="noteref_203" + href="#note_203"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">203</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Succession a + simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable + idea,] Locke says<a id="noteref_204" name="noteref_204" href= + "#note_204"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">204</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Visible + extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] + encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the + same.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page062">[pg + 062]</span><a name="Pg062" id="Pg062" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If extension be + without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or + both?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mathematical + propositions about extension & motion true in a double + sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension + thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + pleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for + that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant + perception of 'em].</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Blind at + 1<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">st</span></span> sight could not tell how + near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out him or in his eye<a id= + "noteref_205" name="noteref_205" href="#note_205"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">205</span></span></a>. Qu. + Would he not think the later?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Blind at + 1<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">st</span></span> sight could not know + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he + saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same + thing—not knowing how <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + tangibile</span></span> would look in vision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. That + homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of + God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In every bodie + two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of + visible.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All things to a + blind [man] at first seen in a point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ignorance of + glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Homogeneous + portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension if in + matter changes its relation w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span>, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + seems to be fixt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether m.v. + be fix'd?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Each particle of + matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite + series of extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If the world be + granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and + proportion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I + have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in + all men between a visible & tangible inch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Tangible and + visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common + measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements + are specifically different, viz. <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">punctum visibile & + tangibile</span></span>. N. B. The former seems to be no good + reason.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page063">[pg + 063]</span><a name="Pg063" id="Pg063" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">By immateriality + is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our idea we call + extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely + small or great.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Greatest + possible extension seen under an angle w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + will be less than 180 degrees, the legs of w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + angle proceed from the ends of the extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Allowing there + be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis + impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even + according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions + made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these + impressions<a id="noteref_206" name="noteref_206" href= + "#note_206"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">206</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Unity + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in abstracto</span></span> not at all + divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at + all; <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">in concreto</span></span> not + divisible <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>, + there being no one idea demonstrable <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Any subject can + have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. + Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether we + have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their + relations?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Of solidity see + L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will + know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension + of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why may not I + say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible + extension is a continuity of tangible points?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. That I take + notice that I do not fall in w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> sceptics, Fardella<a id= + "noteref_207" name="noteref_207" href="#note_207"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">207</span></span></a>, + &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + they doubt of.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am more + certain of y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> existence & reality of + bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he + calls sensitive knowledge<a id="noteref_208" name="noteref_208" + href="#note_208"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">208</span></span></a>, + whereas I think I have demonstrative <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page064">[pg 064]</span><a name="Pg064" id="Pg064" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> knowledge of their existence—by them meaning + combinations of powers in an unknown substratum<a id="noteref_209" + name="noteref_209" href="#note_209"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">209</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our ideas we + call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension + of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, + those not so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis impossible + a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will + appear broad to an acute sense.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men die, or are + in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Powers. Qu. + whether more or one onely?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lengths abstract + from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a + point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from + extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Every position + alters the line.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether + ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot + made up of general ideas of an inch?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The idea of an + inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why + we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose + 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of + extension by position.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No stated ideas + of length without a minimum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Material + substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In my doctrine + all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease<a id= + "noteref_210" name="noteref_210" href="#note_210"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">210</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether if + (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times + too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & + visible extension and figure?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether if + succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God + a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But one only + colour & its degrees.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page065">[pg 065]</span><a name="Pg065" id="Pg065" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Enquiry about a + grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of + microscopes magnifying objects.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether a + born-blind [man] made to see would at 1<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">st</span></span> + give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since + he would take distance y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> that he had perceived by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">touch</span></em> to be something existing + without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">seen</span></em> was without his mind<a id= + "noteref_211" name="noteref_211" href="#note_211"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">211</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Space without + any bodies existing <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">in rerum + natura</span></span> would not be extended, as not having parts—in + that parts are assigned to it w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + respect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. + Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be + Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Two + demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he + saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from + microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. + radius of the visual sphere.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The trees are in + the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything + about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, + & I shall not avoid seeing them.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">By extension + blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by + something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that + perception; w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> power is without, in the + thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be + in things visible till he had try'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Geometry seems + to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & + motion—and not visible<a id="noteref_212" name="noteref_212" href= + "#note_212"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">212</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A man will say a + body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be + less than w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> it was; therefore the + bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the + visible extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension or + space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three + several ideas.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page066">[pg + 066]</span><a name="Pg066" id="Pg066" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Depth or + solidity <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">now</span></em> perceived by sight<a id= + "noteref_213" name="noteref_213" href="#note_213"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">213</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Strange + impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; + he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, + these having no power at all<a id="noteref_214" name="noteref_214" + href="#note_214"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">214</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Length + perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, + breadth, & depth by touch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + affects us must be a thinking thing, for w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + thinks not cannot subsist.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Number not in + bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on + its consideration, & being more or less as the mind + pleases<a id="noteref_215" name="noteref_215" href= + "#note_215"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">215</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Quære + whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use + not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Round figure a + perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. + L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Mark well + the later part of the last cited section.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Solids, or any + other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by + the German Count.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Of”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“thing”</span> + causes of mistake.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The visible + point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less + than mine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether the + propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them + suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whether motion + be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lines & + points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those + conceiv'd absolutely.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Every position + alters a line.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Blind man at + 1<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">st</span></span> would not take colours to + be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place + with the coloured extension: therefore extension w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">d</span></span> + not seem to be without the mind.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page067">[pg 067]</span><a name="Pg067" id="Pg067" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All visible + concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely + equal.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Infinite + number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke<a id="noteref_216" + name="noteref_216" href="#note_216"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">216</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. how 'tis + possible we should see flats or right lines?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. why the moon + appears greatest in the horizon<a id="noteref_217" name= + "noteref_217" href="#note_217"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">217</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. why we see + things erect when painted inverted<a id="noteref_218" name= + "noteref_218" href="#note_218"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">218</span></span></a>?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Question put by + Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Matter tho' + allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Motion is + proportionable to space described in given time.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Velocity not + proportionable to space describ'd in given time.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No active power + but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not<a id= + "noteref_219" name="noteref_219" href="#note_219"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">219</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Magnitude when + barely taken for the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ratio partium extra + partes</span></span>, or rather for co-existence & succession, + without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is + infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, + divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But + definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting + of points whereby (together w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> distance & position) + they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Again. Magnitude + taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is + one simple idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Simple ideas + include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in + themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in + power, red, extension, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Space not + imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without + body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of + infinite space)—for w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> the body has past may be + conceiv'd annihilated.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page068">[pg + 068]</span><a name="Pg068" id="Pg068" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. What can we + see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, + pleasure, pain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why not + taste & smell extension?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why not + tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, + so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought + heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as + blue & red?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Moon + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> horizontal does not appear + bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence + difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles + &c. cease.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">potentiæ</span></span> alike indifferent.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A. B. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> does he mean by his + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">potentia</span></span>? Is it the will, + desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes + t'other?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No agent can be + conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">We</span></em> do + not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make + objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">Mo. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A finite + intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place + and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my + present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness + determines the will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Doctrines of + liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always + seen through an inverting glass?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All lines + subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy + experiment); therefore they are equal.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have not pure + simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps + black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether this + be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, + perhaps, rays of air w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> will onely exhibit one + particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Colours not + definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because + we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they + include, or because we want names for their component + ideas.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page069">[pg + 069]</span><a name="Pg069" id="Pg069" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">By Soul is meant + onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & + perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be + defined.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We cannot + possibly conceive any active power but the Will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In moral matters + men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only + the freedom of doing as they please; w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative + faculties<a id="noteref_220" name="noteref_220" href= + "#note_220"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">220</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men impute their + actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of + ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether + good or bad.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This does not + prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If anything is + meant by the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">potentia</span></span> of A. + B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be + indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself + be indifferent in respect of w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> he desires till after he + has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of + desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Actions leading + to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will + them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. concerning + the procession of Wills <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">in + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Herein + mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. + Their definitions, being of words not yet known to y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + learner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & + morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may + chance to be contraverted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The short jejune + way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: + for y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> about mathematical + propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be + encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not + so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely + demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples + and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, + strigose<a id="noteref_221" name="noteref_221" href= + "#note_221"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">221</span></span></a>, + rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, + else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with + most.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page070">[pg + 070]</span><a name="Pg070" id="Pg070" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension seems + to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without + mixture.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Or rather + visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the + mind.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S. Mo.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Enquiring and + judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> depend on the Will, + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is determin'd by some + uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd + by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot + do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of + A. B. are insignificant.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension, + motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to + them, which seems to be a simple idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To enquire + into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The sphere of + vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open + firmament, for 1<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">st</span></span>, in both cases the retina + is full; 2<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">d</span></span>, the radius's of both + spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; + 3<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">dly</span></span>, equal numbers of points + in one & t'other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the Barrovian + case purblind would judge aright.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why the + horizontal moon greater?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why objects seen + erect?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To what purpose + certain figure and texture connected w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + other perceptions?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men estimate + magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">st</span></span> + could not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from + experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't + perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or + judge of extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether it + be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or + more points, than we do, by diminishing the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">punctum visibile</span></span> below 30 + minutes?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I. S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Speech + metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their + modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by + words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The grand + mistake is that we think we have <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page071">[pg + 071]</span><a name="Pg071" id="Pg071" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + operations of our minds<a id="noteref_222" name="noteref_222" href= + "#note_222"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">222</span></span></a>. + Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How can our + idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple + & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35<a id="noteref_223" + name="noteref_223" href="#note_223"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">223</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things + proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much + perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may + clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and + not be able to define them<a id="noteref_224" name="noteref_224" + href="#note_224"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">224</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The substance + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wood</span></em> a collection of simple ideas. + See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. concerning + strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + possible that those visible ideas w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been + connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be no + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion between those + thoughts?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Speculums seem + to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, + but by altering the apparent distance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hence Qu. if + blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by + concaves?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Motion not one + idea. It cannot be perceived at once.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To allow + existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but + not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes + without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their + souls insensibly<a id="noteref_225" name="noteref_225" href= + "#note_225"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">225</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Colours in + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> dark do exist really, i.e. + were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, + provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">How the retina + is fill'd by a looking-glass?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Convex speculums + have the same effect w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> concave + glasses.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page072">[pg + 072]</span><a name="Pg072" id="Pg072" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + concave speculums have the same effect w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + convex glasses?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reason why + convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully + assign'd by any writer I know.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why not + objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex + lens?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How to make + a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the + distance without altering the angle?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No identity + (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides + persons<a id="noteref_226" name="noteref_226" href= + "#note_226"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">226</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As well make + tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts + move w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> local motion as immaterial + spirit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">On account of my + doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in + something else than continued existence, or relation to determined + time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our + thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being + frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & + endings.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + identity of person consists not in the Will?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No necessary + connexion between great or little optique angles and great or + little extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Distance is not + perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension + perceiv'd by sight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Apparent + magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but + directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, + &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that + attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the + magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Glasses or + speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the + optique angle, but to no purpose.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex + speculum as another?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Wherein + consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then + I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I + think of w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I then <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page073">[pg 073]</span><a name="Pg073" id="Pg073" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> did. Not in potential; for then all + persons may be the same, for ought we know.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Story of + Mr. Deering's aunt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Two sorts of + potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § + but one, I mean the latter.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If by magnitude + be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible + extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be + properly & <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">per se</span></span> + perceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, + &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of + seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The greatness + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span> perceivable by the sight + is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others + seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion + of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark + that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by + reasoning.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This is all the + greatness the pictures have <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">per + se</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hereby meere + seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not + availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical + surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; + for a point may subtend the same angle w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> a + mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up + as much of the orb.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men judge of + magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and + confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little + angles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hence 'tis plain + the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might + have been connected w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> smallness, and vice versâ: + there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and + distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, + any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion<a id= + "noteref_227" name="noteref_227" href="#note_227"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">227</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My end is not to + deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but + in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how + they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.<a id= + "noteref_228" name="noteref_228" href="#note_228"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">228</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span> proportion of visible + magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of + distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page074">[pg 074]</span><a name= + "Pg074" id="Pg074" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> as great in viewing + any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole + confusedly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To correct + my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to + avoid giving handle.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If men could + without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they + might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the + same optic angle remaining.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The bigness in + one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the + nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other + objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. + Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and + manner of demonstrating, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Two sorts of + bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly and + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">toto cælo</span></span> different—the one the + proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances + perceived at the same time w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> it, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of + sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> would happen if the sphæræ + of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We think by the + meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; + also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of + things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why may I not + add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension seems + to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As long as the + same angle determines the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> to two persons, no different conformation of + the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same + thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly + know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons + on account of their eyes.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If a man could + see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence + there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the + proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its + proportion to the M. V.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Were there but + one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it + naturally as soon as born, and <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page075">[pg 075]</span><a name="Pg075" id="Pg075" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> were it not in the power of men to conceal + their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an + inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">posito uno, ponitur alterum</span></span> by + the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as + much as that they see extension<a id="noteref_229" name= + "noteref_229" href="#note_229"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">229</span></span></a>?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All our ideas + are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect + & adæquate<a id="noteref_230" name="noteref_230" href= + "#note_230"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">230</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men are in the + right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. + Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, + motion, time, &c.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We know many + things w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> we want words to express. + Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of + considering w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> divers men have run into + sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by + sounds; w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> foundering them, they + thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in + their language.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether the + sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the + sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Or, Is it onely + the constant & long association of ideas entirely different + that makes me judge them the same?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I + see is onely variety of colours & light. W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> I + feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> resemblance have these + thoughts with those?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A picture + painted w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> great variety of colours + affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore + conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles + or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore + can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are + (because 2) connected w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> the tangible ones, or the + visible head (because one) connected w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + the tangible head<a id="noteref_231" name="noteref_231" href= + "#note_231"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">231</span></span></a>?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page076">[pg 076]</span><a name="Pg076" id="Pg076" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All things by us + conceivable are—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1st, + thoughts;</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2ndly, powers to + receive thoughts;</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3rdly, powers to + cause thoughts; neither of all w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + can possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An object + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out a glass may be seen + under as great an angle as w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> a glass. A glass therefore + does not magnify the appearance by the angle.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">S.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Absurd that men + should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence + Malbranch confuted<a id="noteref_232" name="noteref_232" href= + "#note_232"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">232</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I saw gladness + in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or + distance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why things + seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Tho' we should + judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we + therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same + angle, further distant, and greaterness?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My doctrine + affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Perfect circles, + &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect + or no), but in the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lines thought + divisible <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>, + because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are + thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + view'd thro' magnifying glasses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">They who knew + not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibility + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">No idea of + circle, &c. in abstract.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Metaphysiques as + capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be + demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & + have not so many prejudices in ethiques.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Visible ideas + come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence + extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more + blended.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why not + extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the + smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct + ideas?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page077">[pg + 077]</span><a name="Pg077" id="Pg077" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Blew and yellow + particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their + extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct + sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is + perceiv'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Distinct + perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible + ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous + extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Object. Why a + mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in + proportion to the faintness<a id="noteref_233" name="noteref_233" + href="#note_233"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">233</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To enquire + touching the squaring of the circle, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> seems smooth & round + to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion betwixt + visible ideas and tangible ones.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In geometry it + is not prov'd that an inch is divisible <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Geometry not + conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for + these are not divisible <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Particular + circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a + diameter may be found betwixt w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + & the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore + there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a + perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In + vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, + for in y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> case there is ('tis true) a + difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others + much greater, entirely different therefrom<a id="noteref_234" name= + "noteref_234" href="#note_234"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">234</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Any visible + circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the + common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other + being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a + circle; this being w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> makes the distinction + between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are + perhaps apt to think.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The same is true + of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in + squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown + away.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To press + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> last precedes more homely, + & so think on't again.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A meer line or + distance is not made up of points, does <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page078">[pg 078]</span><a name="Pg078" id="Pg078" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an + idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without + extension<a id="noteref_235" name="noteref_235" href= + "#note_235"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">235</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. A great + difference between <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">considering</span></em> length w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out breadth, & having + an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imagining</span></em>, length without + breadth<a id="noteref_236" name="noteref_236" href= + "#note_236"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">236</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Malbranch out + touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis possible + (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we + may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no + necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These + ideas, viz. great relation to <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sphæra visualis</span></span>, or to the m. v. + (w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is all that I would have + meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly + have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly + the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that + men view little objects near the eye.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Malbranch out in + asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the + world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Diagonal of + particular square commensurable w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + its side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I do not think + that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps + may be solid that sophism w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> would prove the oblique + line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Suppose an inch + represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> mile represented is + something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be + neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a + mile.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Particular + determin'd lines are not divisible <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, + they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of + points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he + can demonstrate an inch line is divisible <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A body moving in + the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without + experience. There is ('tis <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page079">[pg 079]</span><a name="Pg079" id="Pg079" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems + less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of + place.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To enquire + most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale + & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being + divisible <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>, + i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisible <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span> (unit being + nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite + indivisibility deduced therefrom is a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">petitio principii</span></span>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The diagonal is + commensurable with the side.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From Malbranch, + Locke, & my first arguings it can't be prov'd that extension is + not in matter. From Locke's arguings it can't be proved that + colours are not in bodies.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. That I was + distrustful at 8 years old; and consequently by nature disposed for + these new doctrines<a id="noteref_237" name="noteref_237" href= + "#note_237"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">237</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. How can a + line consisting of an unequal number of points be divisible + [<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>] in two equals?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To discuss + copiously how & why we do not see the pictures.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Allowing + extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know even their + proportions—contrary to Malbranch.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I wonder how men + cannot see a truth so obvious, as that extension cannot exist + without a thinking substance.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Species of all + sensible things made by the mind. This prov'd either by turning + men's eyes into magnifyers or diminishers.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">r</span></span> m. + v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">rd</span></span> + person have perfect ideas of both our m. v<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">s</span></span>. + His idea of my m. v. contains his idea of yours, & somewhat + more. Therefore 'tis made up of parts: therefore his idea of my m. + v. is not perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether a m. + v. or t. be extended?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. The strange + errours men run into about the pictures. We think them small + because should a man be suppos'd to see them their pictures would + take up but little room in the fund of his eye.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page080">[pg 080]</span><a name="Pg080" id="Pg080" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems all + lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts. Mem. To examine how the + geometers prove the contrary.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">'Tis impossible + there should be a m. v. less than mine. If there be, mine may + become equal to it (because they are homogeneous) by detraction of + some part or parts. But it consists not of parts, ergo &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Suppose + inverting perspectives bound to y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + eyes of a child, & continu'd to the years of manhood—when he + looks up, or turns up his head, he shall behold w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> we + call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">under</span></em>. Qu. What would he think of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">up</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">down</span></em><a id="noteref_238" name= + "noteref_238" href="#note_238"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">238</span></span></a>?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I wonder not at + my sagacity in discovering the obvious tho' amazing truth. I rather + wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before—'tis + no witchcraft to see.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our simple ideas + are so many simple thoughts or perceptions; a perception cannot + exist without a thing to perceive it, or any longer than it is + perceiv'd; a thought cannot be in an unthinking thing; one uniform + simple thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple + thought. Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assemblage of + simple ideas, and can be the image of nothing, or like unto + nothing, but another assemblage of simple ideas, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Cartesian + opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox enough even in + their eyes who think the Scripture expression may favour the common + opinion. Why may not mine also? But there is nothing in Scripture + that can possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps, many + things for me.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Bodies &c. + do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken in a + twofold sense—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">1. Collections of thoughts.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">2. Collections of powers to cause those + thoughts.</span></p> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">These later + exist; tho' perhaps <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a parte + rei</span></span> it may be one simple perfect power.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether the + extension of a plain, look'd at straight and slantingly, survey'd + minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk and confusedly at once, + be the same? N. B. The plain is suppos'd to keep the same + distance.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page081">[pg + 081]</span><a name="Pg081" id="Pg081" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The ideas we + have by a successive, curious inspection of y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the extension of + that plain view'd & consider'd all together.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ignorance in + some sort requisite in y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> person that should disown + the Principle.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thoughts do most + properly signify, or are mostly taken for the interior operations + of the mind, wherein the mind is active. Those y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + obey not the acts of volition, and in w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + the mind is passive, are more properly call'd sensations or + perceptions. But y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> is all a case of words.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension being + the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e. of + perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv'd + without a perceiving substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Malbranch does + not prove that the figures & extensions exist not when they are + not perceiv'd. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be prov'd + on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and + onely in the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The great + argument to prove that extension cannot be in an unthinking + substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from or without + all tangible or visible quality.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Tho' matter be + extended w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> an indefinite extension, + yet the mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind + perceiving them, & even now they are not without the mind. + Houses, trees, &c., tho' indefinitely extended matter do exist, + are not without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The great danger + of making extension exist without the mind is, that if it does it + must be acknowledg'd infinite, immutable, eternal, + &c.;—w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> will be to make either God + extended (w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> I think dangerous), or an + eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside God.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Finiteness of + our minds no excuse for the geometers.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Principle + easily proved by plenty of arguments <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + absurdum</span></span>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The twofold + signification of Bodies, viz.</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">1. Combinations of thoughts</span><a id= + "noteref_239" name="noteref_239" href="#note_239"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">239</span></span></a><span style="font-size: 90%">;</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">2. Combinations of powers to raise + thoughts.</span></p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page082">[pg 082]</span><a name= + "Pg082" id="Pg082" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">These, I say, in + conjunction with homogeneous particles, may solve much better the + objections from the creation than the supposition that Matter does + exist. Upon w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> supposition I think they + cannot be solv'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Bodies taken for + powers do exist w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> not perceiv'd; but this + existence is not actual<a id="noteref_240" name="noteref_240" href= + "#note_240"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">240</span></span></a>. + W<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> I say a power exists, no + more is meant than that if in the light I open my eyes, and look + that way, I shall see it, i.e. the body, &c.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. whether + blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours & + visible extension, after the same manner as we perceive them + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> eyes shut, or in the + dark—not imagining, but seeing after a sort?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Visible + extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible extension. Visible + and tangible points can't make one sum. Therefore these extensions + are heterogeneous.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A probable + method propos'd whereby one may judge whether in near vision there + is a greater distance between the crystalline & fund than + usual, or whether the crystalline be onely render'd more convex. If + the former, then the v. s. is enlarg'd, & the m. v. corresponds + to less than 30 minutes, or w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span>ever it us'd to correspond + to.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Stated measures, + inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible extensions.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Locke, More, + Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended. 'Tis nevertheless of + great use to religion to take extension out of our idea of God, + & put a power in its place. It seems dangerous to suppose + extension, w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is manifestly inert, in + God.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But, say you, + The thought or perception I call extension is not itself in an + unthinking thing or Matter—but it is like something w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is in Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend or conceive + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> you say extension is like + unto, or do you not? If the later, how know you they are alike? How + can you compare any things besides your own ideas? If the former, + it must be an idea, i.e. perception, thought, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page083">[pg 083]</span><a name="Pg083" id="Pg083" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> or sensation—w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + to be in an unperceiving thing is a contradiction<a id= + "noteref_241" name="noteref_241" href="#note_241"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">241</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">I.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I abstain from + all flourish & powers of words & figures, using a great + plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft found it difficult + to understand those that use the lofty & Platonic, or subtil + & scholastique strain<a id="noteref_242" name="noteref_242" + href="#note_242"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">242</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whatsoever has + any of our ideas in it must perceive; it being that very having, + that passive recognition of ideas, that denominates the mind + perceiving—that being the very essence of perception, or that + wherein perception consists.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The faintness + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> alters the appearance of + the horizontal moon, rather proceeds from the quantity or grossness + of the intermediate atmosphere, than from any change of distance, + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is perhaps not + considerable enough to be a total cause, but may be a partial of + the phenomenon. N. B. The visual angle is less in cause the + horizon.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We judge of the + distance of bodies, as by other things, so also by the situation of + their pictures in the eye, or (w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + is the same thing) according as they appear higher or lower. Those + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> seem higher are farther + off.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. why we see + objects greater in y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> dark? whether this can be + solv'd by any but my Principles?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reverse of + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> Principle introduced + scepticism.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. On my + Principles there is a reality: there are things: there is a + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rerum natura</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. The surds, + doubling the cube, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We think that if + just made to see we should judge of the distance & magnitude of + things as we do now; but this is false. So also w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> we + think so positively of the situation of objects.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Hays's, + Keill's<a id="noteref_243" name="noteref_243" href= + "#note_243"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">243</span></span></a>, + &c. method of proving the infinitesimals of the 3<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">d</span></span> + order absurd, & perfectly contradictions.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page084">[pg 084]</span><a name="Pg084" id="Pg084" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Angles of + contact, & verily all angles comprehended by a right line & + a curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches intercepted not being + similar.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The danger of + expounding the H. Trinity by extension.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why should + the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem'd the true one rather + than that seen at a farther distance? Why should the sun be thought + many 1000 miles rather than one foot in diameter—both being equally + apparent diameters? Certainly men judg'd of the sun not in himself, + but w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> relation to + themselves.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">4 Principles + whereby to answer objections, viz.</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by + us.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">2. There is a law or course of + nature.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; + words stand for nothing else.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a + contradiction that bears equally hard upon the other</span><a id= + "noteref_244" name="noteref_244" href="#note_244"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">244</span></span></a><span style="font-size: 90%">.</span></p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What shall I + say? Dare I pronounce the admired ἀκρίβεια mathematica, that + darling of the age, a trifle?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Most certainly + no finite extension divisible <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Difficulties + about concentric circles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">N.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To examine + & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + definition of Mr. Newton's<a id="noteref_245" name="noteref_245" + href="#note_245"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">245</span></span></a> + Principia.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Ridiculous in + the mathematicians to despise Sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Is it not + impossible there should be abstract general ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All ideas come + from without. They are all particular. The mind, 'tis true, can + consider one thing w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out another; but then, + considered asunder, they make not 2 ideas. Both together can make + but one, as for instance colour & visible extension<a id= + "noteref_246" name="noteref_246" href="#note_246"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">246</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page085">[pg 085]</span><a name="Pg085" id="Pg085" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The end of a + mathematical line is nothing. Locke's argument that the end of his + pen is black or white concludes nothing here.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Take care + how you pretend to define extension, for fear of the geometers.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why + difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we are not used to + take notice of 'em singly; they not being able singly to pleasure + or hurt us, thereby to deserve our regard.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To prove + against Keill y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> the infinite divisibility + of matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts with + the whole.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To examine + how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as a + plea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Why may not + the mathematicians reject all the extensions below the M. as well + as the dd, &c., w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> are allowed to be + something, & consequently may be magnify'd by glasses into + inches, feet, &c., as well as the quantities next below the + M.?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Big, little, and + number are the works of the mind. How therefore can y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + extension you suppose in Matter be big or little? How can it + consist of any number of points?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. Strictly to + remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Schoolmen + compar'd with the mathematicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension is + blended w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> tangible or visible ideas, + & by the mind præscinded therefrom.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mathematiques + made easy—the scale does almost all. The scale can tell us the + subtangent in y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> parabola is double the + abscisse.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + need of the utmost accuracy w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> the mathematicians own + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in rerum natura</span></span> they cannot find + anything corresponding w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> their nice ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One should + endeavour to find a progression by trying w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">th</span></span> + the scale.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Newton's + fluxions needless. Anything below an M might serve for Leibnitz's + Differential Calculus.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">How can they + hang together so well, since there are in them (I mean the + mathematiques) so many <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">contradictoriæ + argutiæ</span></span>. V. Barrow, Lect.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A man may read a + book of Conics with ease, knowing how to try if they are right. He + may take 'em on the credit of the author.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page086">[pg 086]</span><a name="Pg086" id="Pg086" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Where's the need + of certainty in such trifles? The thing that makes it so much + esteem'd in them is that we are thought not capable of getting it + elsewhere. But we may in ethiques and metaphysiques.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The not leading + men into mistakes no argument for the truth of the infinitesimals. + They being nothings may perhaps do neither good nor harm, except + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> they are taken for + something, & then the contradiction begets a contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">a + 500 nothings + = a + 50 nothings—an innocent silly truth.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My doctrine + excellently corresponds w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> the creation. I suppose no + matter, no stars, sun, &c. to have existed before<a id= + "noteref_247" name="noteref_247" href="#note_247"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">247</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems all + circles are not similar figures, there not being the same + proportion betwixt all circumferences & their diameters.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When a small + line upon paper represents a mile, the mathematicians do not + calculate the 1/10000 of the paper line, they calculate the 1/10000 + of the mile. 'Tis to this they have regard, 'tis of this they + think; if they think or have any idea at all. The inch perhaps + might represent to their imaginations the mile, but y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">e</span></span> + 1/10000 of the inch cannot be made to represent anything, it not + being imaginable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the 1/10000 + of a mile being somewhat, they think the 1/10000 inch is somewhat: + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">n</span></span> they think of y<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + they imagine they think on this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3 faults occur + in the arguments of the mathematicians for divisibility <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">1. They suppose extension to exist without the + mind, or not perceived.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">2. They suppose that we have an idea of length + without breadth</span><a id="noteref_248" name="noteref_248" + href="#note_248"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">248</span></span></a><span style="font-size: 90%">, + or that length without breadth does exist.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">3. That unity is divisible</span> <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span><span style="font-size: 90%">.</span></p> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To suppose a M. + S. divisible is to say there are distinguishable ideas where there + are no distinguishable ideas.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page087">[pg 087]</span><a name="Pg087" id="Pg087" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The M. S. is not + near so inconceivable as the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">signum in magnitudine + individuum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mem. To examine + the math, about their <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">point</span></em>—what it is—something or + nothing; and how it differs from the M. S.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All might be + demonstrated by a new method of indivisibles, easier perhaps and + juster than that of Cavalierius<a id="noteref_249" name= + "noteref_249" href="#note_249"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">249</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Unperceivable + perception a contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P. G.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Proprietates + reales rerum omnium in Deo, tam corporum quum spirituum + continentur. Clerici, Log. cap. 8.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Let my + adversaries answer any one of mine, I'll yield. If I don't answer + every one of theirs, I'll yield.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The loss of the + excuse<a id="noteref_250" name="noteref_250" href= + "#note_250"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">250</span></span></a> may + hurt Transubstantiation, but not the Trinity.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We need not + strain our imaginations to conceive such little things. Bigger may + do as well for infinitesimals, since the integer must be an + infinite.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Evident + y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + has an infinite number of parts must be infinite.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether + extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Nor can it be + objected that we reason about numbers, w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + are only words & not ideas<a id="noteref_251" name= + "noteref_251" href="#note_251"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">251</span></span></a>; for + these infinitesimals are words of no use, if not supposed to stand + for ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Axiom. No + reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no + reasoning about infinitesimals.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Much less + infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Axiom. No word + to be used without an idea.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our eyes and + senses inform us not of the existence of matter or ideas existing + without the mind<a id="noteref_252" name="noteref_252" href= + "#note_252"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">252</span></span></a>. They + are not to be blam'd for the mistake.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page088">[pg 088]</span><a name="Pg088" id="Pg088" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I defy any man + to assign a right line equal to a paraboloid, but w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">n</span></span> + look'd at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Newton's + harangue amounts to no more than that gravity is proportional to + gravity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One can't + imagine an extended thing without colour. V. Barrow, L. G.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men allow + colours, sounds, &c.<a id="noteref_253" name="noteref_253" + href="#note_253"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">253</span></span></a> not + to exist without the mind, tho' they have no demonstration they do + not. Why may they not allow my Principle with a demonstration?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M. P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Qu. Whether I + had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the + mind for the active thing w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> I call <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“myself”</span>—y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> seems to be distinct from + the understanding<a id="noteref_254" name="noteref_254" href= + "#note_254"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">254</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The taking + extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible + qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to + be without the mind.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I see no wit in + any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere + Nihilarians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The folly of the + mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason + was given us for nobler uses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Keill's filling + the world with a mite<a id="noteref_255" name="noteref_255" href= + "#note_255"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">255</span></span></a>. This + follows from the divisibility of extension <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Extension, or + length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of + points that lie betwixt any 2 points<a id="noteref_256" name= + "noteref_256" href="#note_256"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">256</span></span></a>. It + seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To what purpose + is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sir Isaac<a id= + "noteref_257" name="noteref_257" href="#note_257"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">257</span></span></a> owns + his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of + indivisibles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Innumerable + vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I'll not admire + the mathematicians. 'Tis w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> any one of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page089">[pg 089]</span><a name="Pg089" id="Pg089" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> common sense might attain to by + repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human + sense, and I &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mathematicians + have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not + been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such + fools they knew not how to employ their parts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & + certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em<a id="noteref_258" name= + "noteref_258" href="#note_258"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">258</span></span></a>. I + see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span>out the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">By <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing</span></em> I + either mean ideas or that w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> has ideas<a id= + "noteref_259" name="noteref_259" href="#note_259"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">259</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Nullum præclarum + ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger<a id= + "noteref_260" name="noteref_260" href="#note_260"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">260</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A great genius + cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they + consider.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1. <a id= + "noteref_261" name="noteref_261" href="#note_261"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">261</span></span></a>All + significant words stand for ideas<a id="noteref_262" name= + "noteref_262" href="#note_262"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">262</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2. All knowledge + about our ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3. All ideas + come from without or from within.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">4. If from + without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd + sensations<a id="noteref_263" name="noteref_263" href= + "#note_263"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">263</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">5. If from + within they are the operations of the mind, & are called + thoughts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">6. No sensation + can be in a senseless thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">7. No thought + can be in a thoughtless thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">8. All our ideas + are either sensations or thoughts<a id="noteref_264" name= + "noteref_264" href="#note_264"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">264</span></span></a>, by + 3, 4, 5.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">9. None of our + ideas can be in a thing w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is both thoughtless & + senseless<a id="noteref_265" name="noteref_265" href= + "#note_265"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">265</span></span></a>, by + 6, 7, 8.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">10. The bare + passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">11. Whatever has + in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner + of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page090">[pg 090]</span><a name="Pg090" id="Pg090" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">12. All ideas + either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">13. That thing + w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> is like unto another thing + must agree w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> it in one or more simple + ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">14. Whatever is + like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same + sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">15. Nothing like + an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another + demonstration of the same thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">16. Two things + cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been + compar'd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">17. Comparing is + the viewing two ideas together, & marking w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> + they agree in and w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> they disagree in.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">18. The mind can + compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">19. Nothing like + an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. Other + arguments innumerable, both <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> & <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span>, drawn from all the sciences, from the + clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the + Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our + ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing<a id="noteref_266" + name="noteref_266" href="#note_266"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">266</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. Not one + argument of any kind w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span>soever, certain or probable, + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> or <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span>, from any art or + science, from either sense or reason, against it.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Mathematicians + have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly + apply'd to prove extension divisible <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have got the + Algebra of pure intelligences.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We can prove + Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon + truer principles than himself<a id="noteref_267" name="noteref_267" + href="#note_267"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">267</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Barrow owns the + downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as + it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But for + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + nothings</span></em>, I'll leave them to their + admirers.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page091">[pg + 091]</span><a name="Pg091" id="Pg091" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I'll teach any + one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that + another will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Much banter got + from the prefaces of the mathematicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Newton says + colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or + is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I can square the + circle, &c.; they cannot. W<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">ch</span></span> + goes on the best principles?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Billys<a id= + "noteref_268" name="noteref_268" href="#note_268"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">268</span></span></a> use a + finite visible line for an 1/m.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">T.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Marsilius + Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of + time<a id="noteref_269" name="noteref_269" href= + "#note_269"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">269</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">M.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The philosophers + lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose + their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended + Deity. Pray w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> do the rest of mankind + lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still<a id="noteref_270" + name="noteref_270" href="#note_270"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">270</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">N. B. The future + nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain<a id= + "noteref_271" name="noteref_271" href="#note_271"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">271</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-marginnote tei-marginnote-margin"> + <div class="tei tei-marginnotetext"> + <span style="font-size: 80%">P.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There are men + who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say + the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen + cannot attain to these truths.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they + harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisible + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>. We Irishmen can + conceive no such lines.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + mathematicians talk of w<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">t</span></span> they call a point. This, + they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. + Now we Irishmen are apt to think something<a id="noteref_272" name= + "noteref_272" href="#note_272"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">272</span></span></a> & + nothing are next neighbours.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Engagements to + P.<a id="noteref_273" name="noteref_273" href= + "#note_273"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">273</span></span></a> on + account of y<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">e</span></span> Treatise that grew up under + his eye; on account also of his approving my <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page092">[pg 092]</span><a name="Pg092" id="Pg092" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> harangue. Glorious for P. to be the + protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">How could I + venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use + to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they + suited other men's ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I publish not + this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have + the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be + inform'd as to my own particular.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My speculations + have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I + return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life + with new satisfaction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Passing through + all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us + the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">He that would + bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him + at first, and humour him in his own way of talking<a id= + "noteref_274" name="noteref_274" href="#note_274"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">274</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From my + childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It doth not + argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can + throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles + beneath a mountain.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The whole + directed to practise and morality—as appears 1<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">st</span></span>, + from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; + 2<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">dly</span></span>, from cutting off the + useless labour of sciences, and so forth.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page095">[pg 095]</span><a name= + "Pg095" id="Pg095" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc13" id="toc13"></a> <a name="pdf14" id="pdf14"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">An Essay Towards A New Theory Of + Vision</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">First published in + 1709</span></span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc15" id="toc15"></a> <a name="pdf16" id="pdf16"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards + A New Theory Of Vision</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay + towards a New Theory of Vision</span></span> was meant to prepare + the way for the exposition and defence of the new theory of the + material world, its natural order, and its relation to Spirit, that + is contained in his book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and in the relative + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>, which speedily + followed. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> was the firstfruits of his + early philosophical studies at Dublin. It was also the first + attempt to show that our apparently immediate Vision of Space and + of bodies extended in three-dimensioned space, is either tacit or + conscious inference, occasioned by constant association of the + phenomena of which alone we are visually percipient with assumed + realities of our tactual and locomotive experience.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The first + edition of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> appeared early in 1709, + when its author was about twenty-four years of age. A second + edition, with a few verbal changes and an Appendix, followed before + the end of that year. Both were issued in Dublin, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“printed by Aaron Rhames, at the back of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page096">[pg 096]</span><a name="Pg096" id="Pg096" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Dick's Coffeehouse, for Jeremy Pepyat, + bookseller in Skinner Row.”</span> In March, 1732, a third edition, + without the Appendix, was annexed to <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron,</span></span> on account of its + relation to the Fourth Dialogue in that book. This was the author's + last revision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the present + edition the text of this last edition is adopted, after collation + with those preceding. The Appendix has been restored, and also the + Dedication to Sir John Percival, which appeared only in the first + edition.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A due + appreciation of Berkeley's theory of seeing, and his conception of + the visible world, involves a study, not merely of this tentative + juvenile <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, but also of its fuller + development and application in his more matured works. This has + been commonly forgotten by his critics.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Various + circumstances contribute to perplex and even repel the reader of + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, making it less fit to be + an easy avenue of approach to Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Its occasion and + design, and its connexion with his spiritual conception of the + material world, are suggested in Sections 43 and 44 of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. Those sections are a + key to the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>. They inform us that in + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> the author intentionally + uses language which seems to attribute a reality independent of all + percipient spirit to the ideas or phenomena presented in Touch; it + being beside his purpose, he says, to <span class= + "tei tei-q">“examine and refute”</span> that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“vulgar error”</span> in <span class="tei tei-q">“a + work on Vision.”</span> This studied reticence of a verbally + paradoxical conception of Matter, in reasonings about vision which + are fully intelligible only under that conception, is one cause of + a want of philosophical lucidity in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Another + circumstance adds to the embarrassment of those who approach the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and the three + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> through the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> offers no exception to the + lax employment of equivocal words familiar in the early literature + of English philosophy, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page097">[pg + 097]</span><a name="Pg097" id="Pg097" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + but which is particularly inconvenient in the subtle discussions to + which we are here introduced. At the present day we are perhaps + accustomed to more precision and uniformity in the philosophical + use of language; at any rate we connect other meanings than those + here intended with some of the leading words. It is enough to refer + to such terms as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensation</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perception</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">touch</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">externality</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">distance</span></em>, and their conjugates. It + is difficult for the modern reader to revive and remember the + meanings which Berkeley intends by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em>—so significant in his + vocabulary; and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">touch</span></em> with him connotes muscular + and locomotive experience as well as the pure sense of contact. + Interchange of the terms <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">outward</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">outness</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">externality</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">without the + mind</span></em>, and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">without the eye</span></em> is confusing, if + we forget that Berkeley implies that percipient mind is virtually + coextensive with our bodily organism, so that being <span class= + "tei tei-q">“without”</span> or <span class="tei tei-q">“at a + distance from”</span> our bodies is being at a distance from the + percipient mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some of + these ambiguities, of which Berkeley himself warns us (cf. sect. + 120).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + moreover abounds in repetitions, and interpolations of antiquated + optics and physiology, so that its logical structure and even its + supreme generalisation are not easily apprehended. I will try to + disentangle them.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reader must + remember that this <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span> is professedly + an introspective appeal to human consciousness. It is an analysis + of what human beings are conscious of when they see, the results + being here and there applied, partly by way of verification, to + solve some famous optical or physiological puzzle. The aim is to + present the facts, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts of + our internal visual experience, as distinguished from supposed + facts and empty abstractions, which an irregular exercise of + imagination, or abuse of words, had put in their place. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page098">[pg 098]</span><a name= + "Pg098" id="Pg098" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> The investigation, + moreover, is not concerned with Space in its metaphysical infinity, + but with finite sections of Space and their relations, which + concern the sciences, physical and mathematical, and with real or + tangible Distance, Magnitude, and Place, in their relation to + seeing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From the second + section onwards the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> naturally falls into six + Parts, devoted successively to the proof of the six following + theses regarding the relation of Sight to finite spaces and to + things extended:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I. (Sect. 2-51.) + Distance, or outness from the eye in the line of vision, is not + seen: it is only suggested to the mind by visible phenomena and by + sensations felt in the eye, all which are somehow its arbitrarily + constituted and non-resembling Signs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">II. (Sect. + 52-87.) Magnitude, or the amount of space that objects of sense + occupy, is really invisible: we only see a greater or less quantity + of colour, and colour depends upon percipient mind: our supposed + visual perceptions of real magnitude are only our own + interpretations of the tactual meaning of the colours we see, and + of sensations felt in the eye, which are its Signs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">III. (Sect. + 88-120.) Situation of objects of sense, or their real relation to + one another in ambient space, is invisible: what we see is variety + in the relations of colours to one another: our supposed vision of + real tangible locality is only our interpretation of its visual + non-resembling Signs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">IV. (Sect. + 121-46.) There is no object that is presented in common to Sight + and Touch: space or extension, which has the best claim to be their + common object, is specifically as well as numerically different in + Sight and in Touch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">V. (Sect. + 147-48.) The explanation of the tactual significance of the visible + and visual Signs, upon which human experience proceeds, is offered + in the Theory that all visible phenomena are arbitrary signs in + what is virtually <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page099">[pg + 099]</span><a name="Pg099" id="Pg099" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the Language of Nature, addressed by God to the senses and + intelligence of Man.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">VI. (Sect. + 149-60.) The true object studied in Geometry is the kind of + Extension given in Touch, not that given in Sight: real Extension + in all its phases is tangible, not visible: colour is the only + immediate object of Sight, and colour being mind-dependent + sensation, cannot be realised without percipient mind. These + concluding sections are supplementary to the main argument.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The fact that + distance or outness is invisible is sometimes regarded as + Berkeley's contribution to the theory of seeing. It is rather the + assumption on which the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> proceeds (sect. 2). The + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> does not prove this + invisibility, but seeks to shew how, notwithstanding, we learn to + find outness through seeing. That the relation between the visual + signs of outness, on the one hand, and the real distance which they + signify, on the other, is in all cases arbitrary, and discovered + through experience, is the burden of sect. 2-40. The previously + recognised signs of <span class="tei tei-q">“considerably + remote”</span> distances, are mentioned (sect. 3). But <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">near</span></em> + distance was supposed to be inferred by a visual geometry—and to be + <span class="tei tei-q">“suggested,”</span> not signified by + arbitrary signs. The determination of the visual signs which + suggest outness, near and remote, is Berkeley's professed discovery + regarding vision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An induction of + the visual signs which <span class="tei tei-q">“suggest”</span> + distance, is followed (sect. 43) by an assertion of the wholly + sensuous reality of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">colour</span></em>, which is acknowledged to + be the only immediate object of sight. Hence <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">visible</span></em> + extension, consisting in colour, must be dependent for its + realisation upon sentient or percipient mind. It is then argued + (sect. 44) that this mind-dependent visible outness has no + resemblance to the tangible reality (sect. 45). This is the first + passage in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> in which Touch and its + data are formally brought into view. Tactual or <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page100">[pg 100]</span><a name="Pg100" id="Pg100" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> locomotive experience, it is implied, + is needed to infuse true reality into our conceptions of distance + or outness. This cannot be got from seeing any more than from + hearing, or tasting, or smelling. It is as impossible to see and + touch the same object as it is to hear and touch the same object. + Visible objects and ocular sensations can only be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideal + signs</span></em> of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real things</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The sections in + which Touch is thus introduced are among the most important in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>. They represent the + outness given in hearing as wholly sensuous, ideal, or + mind-dependent: they recognise as more truly real that got by + contact and locomotion. But if this is all that man can see, it + follows that his <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visible</span></em> world, at any rate, + becomes real only in and through percipient mind. The problem of an + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span> is thus, to explain <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">how</span></em> the + visible world of extended colour can inform us of tangible + realities, which it does not in the least resemble, and with which + it has no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion. That visible + phenomena, or else certain organic sensations involved in seeing + (sect. 3, 16, 21, 27), gradually <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">suggest</span></em> + the real or tangible outness with which they are connected in the + divinely constituted system of nature, is the explanation which now + begins to dawn upon us.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Here an + ambiguity in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> appears. It concludes that + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visible</span></em> world cannot be real + without percipient realising mind, i.e. not otherwise than ideally: + yet the argument seems to take for granted that we are percipient + of a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tangible</span></em> world that is independent + of percipient realising mind. The reader is apt to say that the + tangible world must be as dependent on percipient mind for its + reality as the visible world is concluded to be, and for the same + reason. This difficulty was soon afterwards encountered in the book + of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, where the worlds of + sight and touch are put on the same level; and the possibility of + unperceived reality in both cases is denied; on the ground that a + material world cannot be realised in the total <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page101">[pg 101]</span><a name="Pg101" id="Pg101" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> absence of Spirit—human and divine. The + term <span class="tei tei-q">“external”</span> may still be applied + to tactual and locomotive phenomena alone, if men choose; but this + not because of the ideal character of what is seen, and the unideal + reality of what is touched, but only because tactual perceptions + are found to be more firm and steady than visual. Berkeley + preferred in this way to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">insinuate</span></em> his new conception of + the material world by degrees, at the risk of exposing this + juvenile and tentative <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span> to a charge of + incoherence.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The way in which + visual ideas or phenomena <span class="tei tei-q">“suggest”</span> + the outness or distance of things from the organ of sight having + been thus explained, in what I call the First Part of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, the Second and Third + Parts (sect. 52-120) argue for the invisibility of real extension + in two other relations, viz. magnitude and locality or situation. + An induction of the visual signs of tangible size and situation is + given in those sections. The result is applied to solve two + problems then notable in optics, viz. (1) the reason for the + greater visible size of the horizontal moon than of the moon in its + meridian (sect. 67-87); and (2) the fact that objects are placed + erect in vision only on condition that their images on the retina + are inverted (sect. 88-120). Here the antithesis between the ideal + world of coloured extension, and the real world of resistant + extension is pressed with vigour. The <span class= + "tei tei-q">“high”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“low”</span> + of the visible world is not the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“high”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“low”</span> + of the tangible world (sect. 91-106). There is no resemblance and + no necessary relation, between those two so-called extensions; not + even when the number of visible objects happen to coincide with the + number of tangible objects of which they are the visual signs, e.g. + the visible and tangible fingers on the hand: for the born-blind, + on first receiving sight, could not parcel out the visible + phenomena in correspondence with the tangible.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page102">[pg 102]</span><a name="Pg102" id="Pg102" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The next Part of + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> (sect. 121-45) argues for + a specific as well as a numerical difference between the original + data of sight and the data of touch and locomotion. Sight and touch + perceive nothing in common. Extension in its various relations + differs in sight from extension in touch. Coloured extension, which + alone is visible, is found to be different in kind from resistant + extension, which alone is tangible. And if actually perceived or + concrete extensions differ thus, the question is determined. For + all extension with which man can be concerned must be concrete + (sect. 23). Extension in the abstract is meaningless (sect. + 124-25). What remains is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to + guard the foregoing conclusions against objections. This is + attempted in sections 128-46.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The enunciation + of the summary generalisation, which forms the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“New Theory of Vision”</span> (sect. 147-8), may be + taken as the Fifth and culminating Part of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The closing + sections (149-60), as I have said, are supplementary, and profess + to determine the sort of extension—visible or tangible—with which + Geometry is concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries + to picture the mental state of Idominians, or unbodied spirits, + endowed with visual perceptions <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">only</span></em>, + and asks what <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">their</span></em> conception of outness and + solid extension must be. Here further refinements in the + interpretation of visual perception, and its organic conditions, + which have not escaped the attention of latter psychologists and + biologists, are hinted at.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whether the data + of sight consist of non-resembling arbitrary Signs of the tactual + distances, sizes, and situations of things, is a question which + some might prefer to deal with experimentally—by trial of the + experience of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page103">[pg 103]</span><a name= + "Pg103" id="Pg103" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Of this sort would + be the experience of the born-blind, immediately after their sight + has been restored; the conception of extension and its relations + found in persons who continue from birth unable to see; the + experience (if it could be got) of persons always destitute of all + tactual and locomotive perceptions, but familiar with vision; and + the facts of seeing observed in infants of the human species, and + in the lower animals.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley did not + try to verify his conclusions in this way. Here and there (sect. + 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, 110, 128, 132-37), he conjectures what + the first visual experience of those rescued from born-blindness is + likely to be; he also speculates, as we have seen, about the + experience of unbodied spirits supposed to be able to see, but + unable to touch or move (sect. 153-59); and in the Appendix he + refers, in confirmation of his New Theory, to a reported case of + one born blind who had obtained sight. But he forms his Theory + independently of those delicate and difficult investigations. His + testing facts were sought introspectively. Indeed those + physiologists and mental philosophers who have since tried to + determine what vision in its purity is, by cases either of + communicated sight or of continued born-blindness, have illustrated + the truth of Diderot's remark—<span class="tei tei-q">“préparer et + interroger un aveugle-né n'eût point été une occupation indigne des + talens réunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke, et Leibniz<a id= + "noteref_275" name="noteref_275" href="#note_275"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">275</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> has been quoted as a signal example of + discovery in metaphysics. The subtle analysis which distinguishes + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">seeing</span></em> strictly so called, from + judgments about extended things, suggested by what we see, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page104">[pg 104]</span><a name= + "Pg104" id="Pg104" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> appears to have been + imperfectly known to the ancient philosophers. Aristotle, indeed, + speaks of colour as the only proper object of sight; but, in + passages of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Anima</span></span><a id="noteref_276" + name="noteref_276" href="#note_276"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">276</span></span></a> where + he names properties peculiar to particular senses, he enumerates + others, such as motion, figure, and magnitude, which belong to all + the senses in common. His distinction of Proper and Common + Sensibles appears at first to contradict Berkeley's doctrine of the + heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible worlds. + Aristotle, however, seems to question the immediate perceptibility + of Common Sensibles, and to regard them as realised through the + activity of intelligence<a id="noteref_277" name="noteref_277" + href="#note_277"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">277</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Some writers in + Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early modern philosophy, + advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining the relation of our + matured notion of distance to what we originally perceive in + seeing, and in the fifteenth century it was discovered by Maurolyco + that the rays of light from the object converge to a focus in the + eye; but I have not been able to trace even the germ of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> in these speculations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Excepting some + hints by Descartes, Malebranche was among the first dimly to + anticipate Berkeley, in resolving our supposed power of seeing + outness into an interpretation <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page105">[pg 105]</span><a name="Pg105" id="Pg105" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of visual signs which we learn by experience + to understand. The most important part of Malebranche's account of + seeing is contained in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche de la Vérité</span></span> (Liv. I. + ch. 9), in one of those chapters in which he discusses the frequent + fallaciousness of the senses, and in particular of our visual + perceptions of extension. He accounts for their inevitable + uncertainty by assigning them not to sense but to misinterpretation + of what is seen. He also enumerates various visual signs of + distance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span> of Malebranche, + published more than thirty years before the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + was familiar to Berkeley before the publication of his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span>, is proved by internal evidence, and by his + juvenile <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>. I am not able + to discover signs of a similar connexion between the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> and the chapter on the mystery of sensation in + Glanvill's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Scepsis Scientifica</span></span> (ch. 5), + published some years before the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span> of Malebranche, where + Glanvill refers to <span class="tei tei-q">“a secret + deduction,”</span> through which—from motions, &c., of which we + are immediately percipient—we <span class="tei tei-q">“spell + out”</span> figures, distances, magnitudes, and colours, which have + no resemblance to them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An approach to + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> is found in a passage which first appeared in + the second edition of Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, published in 1694, to + which Berkeley refers in his own <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + (sect. 132-35), and which, on account of its relative importance, I + shall here transcribe at length:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“We are further to consider concerning Perception that + the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, + altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we + set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, e.g. gold, + alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in + our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several + degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But, we having + by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex + bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page106">[pg 106]</span><a name= + "Pg106" id="Pg106" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in the reflection of + light by the difference in the sensible figures of bodies—the + judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances + into their causes; so that, from that which is truly variety of + shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a + mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex + figure and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from them is + only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in + painting.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that + very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned + and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was pleased to send me in a + letter some months since, and it is this:—Suppose a man born blind, + and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a + cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same + bigness, so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other, which + is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and the + sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quere, + whether, by his sight, before he touched them, he could not + distinguish and tell, which is the globe and which the cube? To + which the acute and judicious proposer answers: <span class= + "tei tei-q">‘Not.’</span> For, though he has obtained the + experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has + not obtained the experience that what affects his touch so and so, + must affect his sight so and so; so that a protuberant angle in the + cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as + it does in the cube.—I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I + am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem, and + am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able + to say with certainty which was the globe and which the cube, + whilst he only saw them; though he would unerringly name them by + his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference in + their figures felt.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page107">[pg 107]</span><a name= + "Pg107" id="Pg107" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> occasion for him to + consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, + and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use of, + or help from them: and the rather because this observing gentleman + further adds that, having, upon the occasion of my book, proposed + this problem to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with + one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till + by hearing his reasons they were convinced.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but + those received by sight: because sight, the most comprehensive of + the senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, + which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different + ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties of which + change the appearance of its proper object, i.e. light and colours; + we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, + in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have + frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that + we take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea + formed by our judgment; so that one, i.e. that of sensation, serves + only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as + a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding takes + little notice of the character or sounds, but of the ideas that are + excited in him by them.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little + notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are + performed; for, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have + no extension, so its actions seem to require no time, but many of + them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison + of the actions of the body.... Secondly, we shall not be much + surprised that this is done with us in so little notice, if we + consider how the facility we get of doing things, by a custom of + doing, makes them often pass in us without notice. Habits, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page108">[pg 108]</span><a name= + "Pg108" id="Pg108" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> especially such as + are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us which + often escape our observation.... And therefore it is not so strange + that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into + that of its judgment, and make the one serve only to excite the + other, without our taking notice of it.”</span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay concerning + Human Understanding</span></span>, Book II. ch. 9. § 8.)</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This remarkable + passage anticipates by implication the view of an interpretation of + materials originally given in the visual sense, which, under the + name of <span class="tei tei-q">“suggestion,”</span> is the ruling + factor in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The following + sentences relative to the invisibility of distances, contained in + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise of Dioptrics</span></span> (published + in 1690) of Locke's friend and correspondent William Molyneux, + whose son was Berkeley's pupil, illustrate Locke's statements, and + may be compared with the opening sections of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“In plain vision the estimate we make of the distance + of objects (especially when so far removed that the interval + between our two eyes bears no sensible proportion thereto, or when + looked upon with one eye only) is rather the act of our judgment + than of sense; and acquired by exercise, and a faculty of + comparing, rather than natural. For, distance of itself is not to + be perceived; for, 'tis a line (or a length) presented to our eye + with its end toward us, which must therefore be only a point, and + that is invisible. Wherefore distance is chiefly perceived by means + of interjacent bodies, as by the earth, mountains, hills, fields, + trees, houses, &c. Or by the estimate we make of the + comparative magnitude of bodies, or of their faint colours, &c. + These I say are the chief means of apprehending the distance of + objects that are considerably remote. But as to nigh objects—to + whose distance the interval of the eyes bears a sensible + proportion—their distance is perceived by the turn of the eyes, or + by the angle of the optic axes (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Gregorii Opt. + Promot.</span></span> prop. 28). This was the opinion of the + ancients, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page109">[pg + 109]</span><a name="Pg109" id="Pg109" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Alhazen, Vitellio, &c. And though the ingenious Jesuit Tacquet + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Opt. + Lib. I.</span></span> prop. 2) disapprove thereof, and objects + against it a new notion of Gassendus (of a man's seeing only with + one eye at a time one and the same object), yet this notion of + Gassendus being absolutely false (as I could demonstrate were it + not beside my present purpose), it makes nothing against this + opinion.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of + itself perceivable, if an object were conveyed to the eye by one + single ray only, there were no other means of judging of its + distance but by some of those hinted before. Therefore when we + estimate the distance of nigh objects, either we take the help of + both eyes; or else we consider the pupil of one eye as having + breadth, and receiving a parcel of rays from each radiating point. + And, according to the various inclinations of the rays from one + point on the various parts of the pupil, we make our estimate of + the distance of the object. And therefore (as is said before), by + one single eye we can only judge of the distance of such objects to + whose distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible + proportion.... For, it is observed before (prop. 29, sec. 2, see + also <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Gregorii Opt. Promot.</span></span> prop. 29) + that for viewing objects remote and nigh, there are requisite + various conformations of the eye—the rays from nigh objects that + fall on the eye diverging more than those from more remote + objects.”</span> (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise of Dioptrics</span></span>, Part I. + prop. 31.)</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All this helps + to shew the state of science regarding vision about the time + Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> appeared, especially among + those with whose works he was familiar<a id="noteref_278" name= + "noteref_278" href="#note_278"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">278</span></span></a>. I + shall next refer to illustrations of the change which the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> produced.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> has occasioned some interesting criticism + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page110">[pg 110]</span><a name= + "Pg110" id="Pg110" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> since its appearance + in 1709. At first it drew little attention. For twenty years after + its publication the allusions to it were few. The account of + Cheselden's experiment upon one born blind, published in 1728, in + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophical Transactions</span></span>, + which seemed to bring the Theory to the test of scientific + experiment, recalled attention to Berkeley's reasonings. The state + of religious thought about the same time confirmed the tendency to + discuss a doctrine which represented human vision as interpretation + of a natural yet divine language, thus suggesting Omnipresent + Mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Occasional + discussions of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory</span></span> may be found in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Gentleman's Magazine</span></span>, from 1732 + till Berkeley's death in 1753. Some criticisms may also be found in + Smith's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Optics</span></span>, published in 1738.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Essential parts + of Berkeley's analysis are explained by Voltaire, in his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Élémens + de la Philosophie de Newton</span></span>. The following from that + work is here given on its own account, and also as a prominent + recognition of the new doctrine in France, within thirty years from + its first promulgation:—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span class= + "tei tei-q"><span style="font-size: 90%">“</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Il faut absolument conclure de tout ceci, que les + distances, les grandeurs, les situations, ne sont pas, à proprement + parler, des choses visibles, c'est-à-dire, ne sont pas les objets + propres et immédiats de la vue. L'objet propre et immédiat de la + vue n'est autre chose que la lumière colorée: tout le reste, nous + ne le sentons qu'à la longue et par expérience. Nous apprenons à + voir précisément comme nous apprenons à parler et à lire. La + différence est, que l'art de voir est plus facile, et que la nature + est également à tous notre maître.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span class= + "tei tei-q"><span style="font-size: 90%">“</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Les jugements soudains, presque uniformes, que + toutes nos âmes, à un certain âge, portent des distances, des + grandeurs, des situations, nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu'à + ouvrir les yeux pour voir la manière dont nous voyons. On se + trompe; il y faut le secours des autres sens. Si les hommes + n'avaient que le sens de la vue, ils n'auraient</span> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page111">[pg 111]</span><a name= + "Pg111" id="Pg111" class="tei tei-anchor"></a><span style= + "font-size: 90%">aucun moyen pour connaître l'étendue en + longueur, largeur et profondeur; et un pur esprit ne la + connaîtrait pas peutêtre, à moins que Dieu ne la lui révélât. Il + est très difficile de séparer dans notre entendement l'extension + d'un objet d'avec les couleurs de cet objet. Nous ne voyons + jamais rien que d'étendu, et de là nous sommes tous portés à + croire que nous voyons en effet l'étendue.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">(</span><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Élémens de la Philos. de + Newton</span></span><span style="font-size: 90%">, Seconde + Partie, ch. 7.)</span></p> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Condillac, in + his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essais sur l'Origine des Connaissances + Humaines</span></span> (Part I. sect. 6), published in 1746, + combats Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory</span></span>, and maintains that + an extension exterior to the eye is immediately discernible by + sight; the eye being naturally capable of judging at once of + figures, magnitudes, situations, and distances. His reasonings in + support of this <span class="tei tei-q">“prejudice,”</span> as he + afterwards allowed it to be, may be found in the section entitled + <span class="tei tei-q">“De quelques jugemens qu'on a attribués à + l'âme sans fondement, ou solution d'un problème de + métaphysique.”</span> Here Locke, Molyneux, Berkeley, and Voltaire + are criticised, and Cheselden's experiment is referred to. + Condillac's subsequent recantation is contained in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Traité des + Sensations</span></span>, published in 1754, and in his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">L'Art de + Penser</span></span>. In the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Traité des Sensations</span></span> (Troisième + Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, &c.) the whole question is + discussed at length, and Condillac vindicates what he allows must + appear a marvellous paradox to the uninitiated—that we only + gradually learn to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. He argues in + particular that the eye cannot originally perceive an extension + that is beyond itself, and that perception of trinal space is due + to what we experience in touch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Voltaire and + Condillac gave currency to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> in France, and it soon became a commonplace + with D'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon, and other French philosophers. In + Germany we have allusions to it in the Berlin Memoirs and + elsewhere; but, although known by name, if not in its distinctive + principle and latent idealism, it has not obtained <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page112">[pg 112]</span><a name="Pg112" id="Pg112" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the consideration which its author's + developed theory of the material as well as the visible world has + received. The Kantian <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> criticism of our cognition of Space, and of + our mathematical notions, subsequently indisposed the German mind + to the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> + reasoning of Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Its influence is + apparent in British philosophy. The following passages in Hartley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Observations on Man</span></span>, published + in 1749, illustrate the extent to which some of the distinctive + parts of the new doctrine were at that time received by an eminent + English psychologist:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Distance is judged of by the quantity of motion, and + figure by the relative quantity of distance.... And, as the sense + of sight is much more extensive and expedite than feeling, we judge + of tangible qualities chiefly by sight, which therefore may be + considered, agreeably to Bishop Berkeley's remark, as a + philosophical language for the ideas of feeling; being, for the + most part, an adequate representative of them, and a language + common to all mankind, and in which they all agree very nearly, + after a moderate degree of experience.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“However, if the informations from touch and sight + disagree at any time, we are always to depend upon touch, as that + which, according to the usual ways of speaking upon these subjects, + is the true representation of the essential properties, i.e. as the + earnest and presage of what other tangible impressions the body + under consideration will make upon our feeling in other + circumstances; also what changes it will produce in other bodies; + of which again we are to determine by our feeling, if the visual + language should not happen to correspond to it exactly. And it is + from this difference that we call the touch the reality, light the + representative—also that a person born blind may foretell with + certainty, from his present tangible impressions, what others would + follow upon varying the circumstances; whereas, if we could suppose + a person to be born without <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page113">[pg 113]</span><a name="Pg113" id="Pg113" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> feeling, and to arrive at man's estate, he + could not, from his present visible impressions, judge what others + would follow upon varying the circumstances. Thus the picture of a + knife, drawn so well as to deceive his eye, would not, when applied + to another body, produce the same change of visible impressions as + a real knife does, when it separates the parts of the body through + which it passes. But the touch is not liable to these deceptions. + As it is therefore the fundamental source of information in respect + of the essential properties of matter, it may be considered as our + first and principal key to the knowledge of the external + world.”</span> (Prop. 30.)</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In other parts + of Hartley's book (e.g. Prop. 58) the relation of our visual + judgments of magnitude, figure, motion, distance, and position to + the laws of association is explained, and the associating + circumstances by which these judgments are formed are enumerated in + detail.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Dr. Porterfield + of Edinburgh, in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise on the Eye, or the Manner and + Phenomena of Vision</span></span> (Edinburgh, 1759), is an + exception to the consent which the doctrine had then widely + secured. He maintains, in opposition to Berkeley, that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the judgments we form of the situation and distance of + visible objects, depend not on custom and experience, but on + original instinct, to which mind is subject in our embodied + state<a id="noteref_279" name="noteref_279" href= + "#note_279"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">279</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves our visual perceptions + of distance into interpretation of arbitrary signs, received the + qualified approbation of Reid, in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Inquiry into the + Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense</span></span> (1764). + He criticises it in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, where the doctrine of + visual signs, of which Berkeley's whole philosophy is a + development, is accepted, and to some extent applied. With Reid it + is divorced, however, from the Berkeleian conception of the + material world, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page114">[pg + 114]</span><a name="Pg114" id="Pg114" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + although the Theory of Vision was the seminal principle of + Berkeley's Theory of Matter<a id="noteref_280" name="noteref_280" + href="#note_280"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">280</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This Theory of + Matter was imperfectly conceived and then rejected by Reid and his + followers, while the New Theory of Vision obtained the general + consent of the Scottish metaphysicians. Adam Smith refers to it in + his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essays</span></span> (published in 1795) as + <span class="tei tei-q">“one of the finest examples of + philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or in + any other language.”</span> Dugald Stewart characterises it in his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Elements</span></span> as <span class= + "tei tei-q">“one of the most beautiful, and at the same time one of + the most important theories of modern philosophy.”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“The solid additions,”</span> he afterwards + remarks in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dissertation</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“made by Berkeley to the stock of human knowledge, were + important and brilliant. Among these the first place is + unquestionably due to his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision</span></span>, a work + abounding with ideas so different from those commonly received, and + at the same time so profound and refined, that it was regarded by + all but a few accustomed to deep metaphysical reflection, rather in + the light of a philosophical romance than of a sober inquiry after + truth. Such, however, has since been the progress and diffusion of + this sort of knowledge, that the leading and most abstracted + doctrines contained in it form now an essential part of every + elementary treatise on optics, and are adopted by the most + superficial smatterers in science as fundamental articles of their + faith.”</span> The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory</span></span> is accepted by Thomas + Brown, who proposes (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Lectures</span></span>, 29) to extend the + scope of its reasonings. With regard to perceptions of sight, + Young, in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Lectures on Intellectual + Philosophy</span></span> (p. 102), says that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“it has been universally admitted, at least since the + days of Berkeley, that many of those which appear to us at present + to be instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn to be + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page115">[pg 115]</span><a name= + "Pg115" id="Pg115" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> acquired; that most + of the adult perceptions of sight are founded on the previous + information of touch; that colour can give us no conception + originally of those qualities of bodies which produce it in us; and + that primary vision gives us no notion of distance, and, as I + believe, no notion of magnitude.”</span> Sir James Mackintosh, in + his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dissertation</span></span>, characterises the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory of Vision</span></span> as <span class="tei tei-q">“a great + discovery in Mental Philosophy.”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Nothing in the compass of inductive reasoning,”</span> + remarks Sir William Hamilton (Reid's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Works</span></span>, + p. 182, note), <span class="tei tei-q">“appears more satisfactory + than Berkeley's demonstration of the necessity and manner of our + learning, by a slow process of observation and comparison alone, + the connexion between the perceptions of vision and touch, and, in + general, all that relates to the distance and magnitude of external + things<a id="noteref_281" name="noteref_281" href= + "#note_281"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">281</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The New Theory + of Vision has in short been generally accepted, so far as it was + understood, alike by the followers of Hartley and by the associates + and successors of Reid. Among British psychologists, it has + recommended itself to rationalists and sensationalists, to the + advocates of innate principles, and to those who would explain by + accidental association what their opponents attribute to reason + originally latent in man. But this wide conscious assent is I think + chiefly confined to the proposition that distance is invisible, and + hardly reaches the deeper implicates of the theory, on its + extension to all the senses, leading to a perception of the final + unity <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page116">[pg 116]</span><a name= + "Pg116" id="Pg116" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of the natural and + the supernatural, and the ultimate spirituality of the + universe<a id="noteref_282" name="noteref_282" href= + "#note_282"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">282</span></span></a>.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page117">[pg 117]</span><a name= + "Pg117" id="Pg117" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc17" id="toc17"></a> <a name="pdf18" id="pdf18"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Dedication</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">TO THE RT. HON. + SIR JOHN PERCIVALE, BART.<a id="noteref_283" name="noteref_283" + href="#note_283"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">283</span></span></a>,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">ONE OF HER + MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">IN THE KINGDOM + OF IRELAND.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sir,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I could not, + without doing violence to myself, forbear upon this occasion to + give some public testimony of the great and well-grounded esteem I + have conceived for you, ever since I had the honour and happiness + of your acquaintance. The outward advantages of fortune, and the + early honours with which you are adorned, together with the + reputation you are known to have amongst the best and most + considerable men, may well imprint veneration and esteem on the + minds of those who behold you from a distance. But these are not + the chief motives that inspire me with the respect I bear you. A + nearer approach has given me the view of something in your person + infinitely beyond the external ornaments of honour and estate. I + mean, an intrinsic stock of virtue and good sense, a true concern + for religion, and disinterested love of your country. Add to these + an uncommon proficiency in the best and most useful parts of + knowledge; together with (what in my mind is <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page118">[pg 118]</span><a name="Pg118" id="Pg118" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> a perfection of the first rank) a + surpassing goodness of nature. All which I have collected, not from + the uncertain reports of fame, but from my own experience. Within + these few months that I have the honour to be known unto you, the + many delightful hours I have passed in your agreeable and improving + conversation have afforded me the opportunity of discovering in you + many excellent qualities, which at once fill me with admiration and + esteem. That one at those years, and in those circumstances of + wealth and greatness, should continue proof against the charms of + luxury and those criminal pleasures so fashionable and predominant + in the age we live in; that he should preserve a sweet and modest + behaviour, free from that insolent and assuming air so familiar to + those who are placed above the ordinary rank of men; that he should + manage a great fortune with that prudence and inspection, and at + the same time expend it with that generosity and nobleness of mind, + as to shew himself equally remote from a sordid parsimony and a + lavish inconsiderate profusion of the good things he is intrusted + with—this, surely, were admirable and praiseworthy. But, that he + should, moreover, by an impartial exercise of his reason, and + constant perusal of the sacred Scriptures, endeavour to attain a + right notion of the principles of natural and revealed religion; + that he should with the concern of a true patriot have the interest + of the public at heart, and omit no means of informing himself what + may be prejudicial or advantageous to his country, in order to + prevent the one and promote the other; in fine, that, by a constant + application to the most severe and useful studies, by a strict + observation of the rules of honour and virtue, by frequent and + serious reflections on the mistaken measures of the world, and the + true end and happiness of mankind, he should in all respects + qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before him, to + deserve the character of great and good in this life, and be ever + happy hereafter—this were amazing and almost incredible. Yet all + this, and more than this, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Sir</span></span>, might I justly say of + you, did either your modesty permit, or your character stand in + need of it. I know it might deservedly be thought a vanity in me to + imagine that anything coming from so obscure a hand as mine could + add a lustre to your reputation. But, I am withal sensible how + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page119">[pg 119]</span><a name= + "Pg119" id="Pg119" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> far I advance the + interest of my own, by laying hold on this opportunity to make it + known that I am admitted into some degree of intimacy with a person + of your exquisite judgment. And, with that view, I have ventured to + make you an address of this nature, which the goodness I have ever + experienced in you inclines me to hope will meet with a favourable + reception at your hands. Though I must own I have your pardon to + ask, for touching on what may possibly be offensive to a virtue you + are possessed of in a very distinguishing degree. Excuse me, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Sir</span></span>, if it was out of my + power to mention the name of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Sir John Percivale</span></span> without + paying some tribute to that extraordinary and surprising merit + whereof I have so clear and affecting an idea, and which, I am + sure, cannot be exposed in too full a light for the imitation of + others,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Of late I have + been agreeably employed in considering the most noble, pleasant, + and comprehensive of all the senses<a id="noteref_284" name= + "noteref_284" href="#note_284"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">284</span></span></a>. The + fruit of that (labour shall I call it or) diversion is what I now + present you with, in hopes it may give some entertainment to one + who, in the midst of business and vulgar enjoyments, preserves a + relish for the more refined pleasures of thought and reflexion. My + thoughts concerning Vision have led me into some notions so far out + of the common road<a id="noteref_285" name="noteref_285" href= + "#note_285"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">285</span></span></a> that + it had been improper to address them to one of a narrow and + contracted genius. But, you, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Sir</span></span>, being master of a + large and free understanding, raised above the power of those + prejudices that enslave the far greater part of mankind, may + deservedly be thought a proper patron for an attempt of this kind. + Add to this, that you are no less disposed to forgive than + qualified to discern whatever faults may occur in it. Nor do I + think <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page120">[pg 120]</span><a name= + "Pg120" id="Pg120" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> you defective in any + one point necessary to form an exact judgment on the most abstract + and difficult things, so much as in a just confidence of your own + abilities. And, in this one instance, give me leave to say, you + shew a manifest weakness of judgment. With relation to the + following <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, I shall only add that I + beg your pardon for laying a trifle of that nature in your way, at + a time when you are engaged in the important affairs of the nation, + and desire you to think that I am, with all sincerity and + respect,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Sir</span></span>,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Your most + faithful and most humble servant,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">GEORGE + BERKELEY.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page127">[pg 127]</span><a name= + "Pg127" id="Pg127" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc19" id="toc19"></a> <a name="pdf20" id="pdf20"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">An Essay Towards A New Theory Of + Vision</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1. My design is + to shew the manner wherein we perceive by Sight the Distance, + Magnitude, and Situation of objects: also to consider the + difference there is betwixt the ideas of Sight and Touch, and + whether there be any idea common to both senses<a id="noteref_286" + name="noteref_286" href="#note_286"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">286</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2. It is, I + think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and immediately, + cannot be seen<a id="noteref_287" name="noteref_287" href= + "#note_287"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">287</span></span></a>. For, + distance<a id="noteref_288" name="noteref_288" href= + "#note_288"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">288</span></span></a> being + a line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in + the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, + whether the distance be longer or shorter<a id="noteref_289" name= + "noteref_289" href="#note_289"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">289</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page128">[pg 128]</span><a name="Pg128" id="Pg128" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3. I find it + also acknowledged that the estimate we make of the distance of + objects considerably remote is rather an act of judgment grounded + on experience than of sense. For example, when I perceive a great + number of intermediate objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and + the like, which I have experienced to take up a considerable space, + I thence form a judgment or conclusion, that the object I see + beyond them is at a great distance. Again, when an object appears + faint and small which at a near distance I have experienced to make + a vigorous and large appearance, I instantly conclude it to be far + off<a id="noteref_290" name="noteref_290" href= + "#note_290"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">290</span></span></a>. And + this, it is evident, is the result of experience; without which, + from the faintness and littleness, I should not have inferred + anything concerning the distance of objects.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">4. But, when an + object is placed at so near a distance as that the interval between + the eyes bears any sensible proportion to it<a id="noteref_291" + name="noteref_291" href="#note_291"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">291</span></span></a>, the + opinion of speculative men is, that the two optic axes (the fancy + that we see only with one eye at once being exploded), concurring + at the object, do there make an angle, by means of which, according + as it is greater or lesser, the object is perceived to be nearer or + farther off<a id="noteref_292" name="noteref_292" href= + "#note_292"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">292</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">5. Betwixt which + and the foregoing manner of estimating distance there is this + remarkable difference:—that, whereas there was no apparent + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion between small + distance and a large and strong appearance, or between great + distance and a little and faint appearance, there <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page129">[pg 129]</span><a name="Pg129" id="Pg129" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> appears a very <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion between an + obtuse angle and near distance, and an acute angle and farther + distance. It does not in the least depend upon experience, but may + be evidently known by any one before he had experienced it, that + the nearer the concurrence of the optic axes the greater the angle, + and the remoter their concurrence is, the lesser will be the angle + comprehended by them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">6. There is + another way, mentioned by optic writers, whereby they will have us + judge of those distances in respect of which the breadth of the + pupil hath any sensible bigness. And that is the greater or lesser + divergency of the rays which, issuing from the visible point, do + fall on the pupil—that point being judged nearest which is seen by + most diverging rays, and that remoter which is seen by less + diverging rays, and so on; the apparent distance still increasing, + as the divergency of the rays decreases, till at length it becomes + infinite, when the rays that fall on the pupil are to sense + parallel. And after this manner it is said we perceive distance + when we look only with one eye.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">7. In this case + also it is plain we are not beholden to experience: it being a + certain necessary truth that, the nearer the direct rays falling on + the eye approach to a parallelism, the farther off is the point of + their intersection, or the visible point from whence they flow.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">8. <a id= + "noteref_293" name="noteref_293" href="#note_293"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">293</span></span></a>Now, + though the accounts here given of perceiving <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">near</span></em> + distance by sight are received for true, and accordingly made use + of in determining the apparent places of objects, they do + nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory, and that for these + following reasons:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">9. [<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">First</span></em><a id="noteref_294" name= + "noteref_294" href="#note_294"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">294</span></span></a>,] It + is evident that, when the mind perceives any idea not immediately + and of itself, it must be by the means of some other idea. Thus, + for instance, the passions which are in the mind of another are of + themselves to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page130">[pg 130]</span><a name= + "Pg130" id="Pg130" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> by sight; though not + immediately, yet by means of the colours they produce in the + countenance. We often see shame or fear in the looks of a man, by + perceiving the changes of his countenance to red or pale.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">10. Moreover, it + is evident that no idea which is not itself perceived can be to me + the means of perceiving any other idea. If I do not perceive the + redness or paleness of a man's face themselves, it is impossible I + should perceive by them the passions which are in his mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">11. Now, from + sect. ii., it is plain that distance is in its own nature + imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight<a id="noteref_295" + name="noteref_295" href="#note_295"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">295</span></span></a>. It + remains, therefore, that it be brought into view by means of some + other idea, that is itself immediately perceived in the act of + vision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">12. But those + lines and angles, by means whereof some men<a id="noteref_296" + name="noteref_296" href="#note_296"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">296</span></span></a> + pretend to explain the perception<a id="noteref_297" name= + "noteref_297" href="#note_297"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">297</span></span></a> of + distance, are themselves not at all perceived; nor are they in + truth ever thought of by those unskilful in optics. I appeal to any + one's experience, whether, upon sight of an object, he computes its + distance by the bigness of the angle made by the meeting of the two + optic axes? or whether he ever thinks of the greater or lesser + divergency of the rays which arrive from any point to his pupil? + nay, whether it be not perfectly impossible for him to perceive by + sense the various angles wherewith the rays, according to their + greater or lesser divergence, do fall on the eye? Every one is + himself the best judge of what he perceives, and what not. In vain + shall any man<a id="noteref_298" name="noteref_298" href= + "#note_298"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">298</span></span></a> tell + me, that I perceive certain lines and angles, which introduce into + my mind the various ideas of distance, so long as I myself am + conscious of no such thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">13. Since + therefore those angles and lines are not themselves <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page131">[pg 131]</span><a name="Pg131" id="Pg131" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> perceived by sight, it follows, from + sect. x., that the mind does not by them judge of the distance of + objects.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">14. [<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em><a id="noteref_299" name= + "noteref_299" href="#note_299"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">299</span></span></a>,] The + truth of this assertion will be yet farther evident to any one that + considers those lines and angles have no real existence in nature, + being only an hypothesis framed by the mathematicians, and by them + introduced into optics, that they might treat of that science in a + geometrical way.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">15. The + [<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">third</span></em> and<a id="noteref_300" name= + "noteref_300" href="#note_300"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">300</span></span></a>] last + reason I shall give for rejecting that doctrine is, that though we + should grant the real existence of those optic angles, &c., and + that it was possible for the mind to perceive them, yet these + principles would not be found sufficient to explain the phenomena + of distance, as shall be shewn hereafter.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">16. Now it being + already shewn<a id="noteref_301" name="noteref_301" href= + "#note_301"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">301</span></span></a> that + distance is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suggested</span></em><a id="noteref_302" name= + "noteref_302" href="#note_302"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">302</span></span></a> to + the mind, by the mediation of some other idea which is itself + perceived in the act of seeing, it remains that we inquire, what + ideas or sensations there be that attend vision, unto which we may + suppose the ideas of distance are connected, and by which they are + introduced into the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">first</span></em>, + it is certain by experience, that when we look at a near object + with both eyes, according as it approaches or recedes from us, we + alter the disposition of our eyes, by lessening or widening the + interval between the pupils. This disposition or turn of the eyes + is attended with a sensation<a id="noteref_303" name="noteref_303" + href="#note_303"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">303</span></span></a>, + which seems to me to be that which in this case brings the idea of + greater or lesser distance into the mind.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page132">[pg 132]</span><a name="Pg132" id="Pg132" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">17. Not that + there is any natural or necessary<a id="noteref_304" name= + "noteref_304" href="#note_304"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">304</span></span></a> + connexion between the sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes + and greater or lesser distance. But—because the mind has, by + constant experience, found the different sensations corresponding + to the different dispositions of the eyes to be attended each with + a different degree of distance in the object—there has grown an + habitual or customary connexion between those two sorts of ideas: + so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the + different turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the pupils + nearer or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different + idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that + sensation. Just as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is + immediately suggested to the understanding which custom had united + with it<a id="noteref_305" name="noteref_305" href= + "#note_305"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">305</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">18. Nor do I see + how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. I know evidently that + distance is not perceived of itself<a id="noteref_306" name= + "noteref_306" href="#note_306"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">306</span></span></a>; + that, by consequence, it must be perceived by means of some other + idea, which is immediately perceived, and varies with the different + degrees of distance. I know also that the sensation arising from + the turn of the eyes is of itself immediately perceived; and + various degrees thereof are connected with different distances, + which never fail to accompany them into my mind, when I view an + object distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small that in + respect of it the interval between the eyes has any considerable + magnitude.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">19. I know it is + a received opinion that, by altering the disposition of the eyes, + the mind perceives whether the angle of the optic axes, or the + lateral angles comprehended between the interval of the eyes or the + optic axes, are made greater or lesser; and that, accordingly, by a + kind of natural geometry, it judges the point of their intersection + to be nearer or farther off. But that this is not true I am + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page133">[pg 133]</span><a name= + "Pg133" id="Pg133" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> convinced by my own + experience; since I am not conscious that I make any such use of + the perception I have by the turn of my eyes. And for me to make + those judgments, and draw those conclusions from it, without + knowing that I do so, seems altogether incomprehensible<a id= + "noteref_307" name="noteref_307" href="#note_307"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">307</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">20. From all + which it follows, that the judgment we make of the distance of an + object viewed with both eyes is entirely the result of experience. + If we had not constantly found certain sensations, arising from the + various disposition of the eyes, attended with certain degrees of + distance, we should never make those sudden judgments from them + concerning the distance of objects; no more than we would pretend + to judge of a man's thoughts by his pronouncing words we had never + heard before.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">21. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, an object placed at a + certain distance from the eye, to which the breadth of the pupil + bears a considerable proportion, being made to approach, is seen + more confusedly<a id="noteref_308" name="noteref_308" href= + "#note_308"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">308</span></span></a>. And + the nearer it is brought the more confused appearance it makes. And + this being found constantly to be so, there arises in the mind an + habitual connexion between the several degrees of confusion and + distance; the greater confusion still implying the lesser distance, + and the lesser confusion the greater distance of the object.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">22. This + confused appearance of the object doth therefore seem to be the + medium whereby the mind judges of distance, in those cases wherein + the most approved writers of optics will have it judge by the + different divergency with which the rays flowing from the radiating + point fall on the pupil<a id="noteref_309" name="noteref_309" href= + "#note_309"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">309</span></span></a>. No + man, I believe, will pretend to see or feel those imaginary angles + that the rays are supposed to form, according to their various + inclinations on his eye. But he cannot choose seeing whether the + object appear more or less confused. It is therefore a manifest + consequence from what has been demonstrated that, instead of the + greater or lesser divergency of the rays, the mind makes use of the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page134">[pg 134]</span><a name= + "Pg134" id="Pg134" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> greater or lesser + confusedness of the appearance, thereby to determine the apparent + place of an object.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">23. Nor doth it + avail to say there is not any necessary connexion between confused + vision and distance great or small. For I ask any man what + necessary connexion he sees between the redness of a blush and + shame? And yet no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in + the face of another but it brings into his mind the idea of that + passion which hath been observed to accompany it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">24. What seems + to have misled the writers of optics in this matter is, that they + imagine men judge of distance as they do of a conclusion in + mathematics; betwixt which and the premises it is indeed absolutely + requisite there be an apparent necessary connexion. But it is far + otherwise in the sudden judgments men make of distance. We are not + to think that brutes and children, or even grown reasonable men, + whenever they perceive an object to approach or depart from them, + do it by virtue of geometry and demonstration.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">25. That one + idea may suggest another to the mind, it will suffice that they + have been observed to go together, without any demonstration of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessity</span></em> of their coexistence, or + without so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to + coexist. Of this there are innumerable instances, of which no one + can be ignorant<a id="noteref_310" name="noteref_310" href= + "#note_310"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">310</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">26. Thus, + greater confusion having been constantly attended with nearer + distance, no sooner is the former idea perceived but it suggests + the latter to our thoughts. And, if it had been the ordinary course + of nature that the farther off an object were placed the more + confused it should appear, it is certain the very same perception + that now makes us think an object approaches would then have made + us to imagine it went farther off; that perception, abstracting + from custom and experience, being equally fitted to produce the + idea of great distance, or small distance, or no distance at + all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">27. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thirdly</span></em>, an object being placed at + the distance above specified, and brought nearer to the eye, we may + nevertheless prevent, at least for some time, the appearance's + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page135">[pg 135]</span><a name= + "Pg135" id="Pg135" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> growing more + confused, by straining the eye<a id="noteref_311" name= + "noteref_311" href="#note_311"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">311</span></span></a>. In + which case that sensation supplies the place of confused vision, in + aiding the mind to judge of the distance of the object; it being + esteemed so much the nearer by how much the effort or straining of + the eye in order to distinct vision is greater.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">28. I have + here<a id="noteref_312" name="noteref_312" href= + "#note_312"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">312</span></span></a> set + down those sensations or ideas<a id="noteref_313" name= + "noteref_313" href="#note_313"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">313</span></span></a> that + seem to be the constant and general occasions of introducing into + the mind the different ideas of near distance. It is true, in most + cases, that divers other circumstances contribute to frame our idea + of distance, viz. the particular number, size, kind, &c. of the + things seen. Concerning which, as well as all other the + forementioned occasions which suggest distance, I shall only + observe, they have none of them, in their own nature, any relation + or connexion with it: nor is it possible they should ever signify + the various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experience they + have been found to be connected with them.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">29. I shall + proceed upon these principles to account for a phenomenon which has + hitherto strangely puzzled the writers of optics, and is so far + from being accounted for by any of their theories of vision, that + it is, by their own confession, plainly repugnant to them; and of + consequence, if nothing else could be objected, were alone + sufficient to bring their credit in question. The whole difficulty + I shall lay before you in the words of the learned Doctor Barrow, + with which he concludes his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Optic Lectures</span></span><a id= + "noteref_314" name="noteref_314" href="#note_314"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">314</span></span></a>:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 60%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/illus-1.png" alt="Illustration" /></div> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span class= + "tei tei-q"><span style="font-size: 90%">“</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Hæc sunt, quæ circa partem opticæ præcipue + mathematicam dicenda mihi suggessit meditatio. Circa reliquas (quæ + φυσικώτεραι sunt, adeoque sæpiuscule pro certis principiis + plausibiles conjecturas venditare necessum habent) nihil fere + quicquam admodum verisimile succurrit,</span> <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page136">[pg 136]</span><a name="Pg136" id="Pg136" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-size: 90%">a + pervulgatis (ab iis, inquam, quæ Keplerus, + Scheinerus</span><a id="noteref_315" name="noteref_315" href= + "#note_315"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">315</span></span></a><span style="font-size: 90%">, + Cartesius, et post illos alii tradiderunt) alienum aut diversum. + Atqui tacere malo, quam toties oblatam cramben reponere. Proinde + receptui cano; nee ita tamen ut prorsus discedam, anteaquam + improbam quandam difficultatem (pro sinceritate quam et vobis et + veritati debeo minime dissimulandam) in medium protulero, quæ + doctrinæ nostræ, hactenus inculcatæ, se objicit adversam, ab ea + saltem nullam admittit solutionem. Illa, breviter, talis est. + Lenti vel speculo cavo</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">EBF</span></span> + <span style="font-size: 90%">exponatur punctum visibile</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, ita distans, ut radii ex</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">manantes ex inflectione versus axem</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">AB</span></span> + <span style="font-size: 90%">cogantur. Sitque radiationis limes + (seu puncti</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">imago, qualem supra passim statuimus) + punctum</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Z</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">. Inter hoc autem et inflectentis + verticem</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">uspiam positus concipiatur oculus. Quæri jam + potest, ubi loci debeat punctum</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">apparere? Retrorsum ad punctum</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Z</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">videri non fert natura (cum omnis impressio + sensum afficiens proveniat a partibus</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">) ac experientia reclamat. Nostris autem e + placitis consequi videtur, ipsum ad partes anticas apparens, ab + intervallo longissime dissito (quod et maximum sensibile quodvis + intervallum quodammodo exsuperet), apparere. Cum enim quo radiis + minus divergentibus attingitur objectum, eo (seclusis utique + prænotionibus et præjudiciis) longius abesse sentiatur; et quod + parallelos ad oculum radios projicit, remotissime positum + æstimetur: exigere ratio videtur, ut quod convergentibus radiis + apprehenditur, adhuc magis, si fieri posset, quoad apparentiam + elongetur. Quin et circa casum hunc generatim inquiri possit, + quidnam omnino sit, quod apparentem puncti</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">locum determinet, faciatque quod constanti + ratione nunc propius, nunc remotius appareat? Cui itidem dubio + nihil quicquam ex hactenus dictorum analogia responderi posse + videtur, nisi</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page137">[pg + 137]</span><a name="Pg137" id="Pg137" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-size: 90%">debere + punctum</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">perpetuo longissime semotum videri. Verum + experientia secus attestatur, illud pro diversa oculi inter + puncta</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">,</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Z</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, positione varie distans, nunquam fere (si + unquam) longinquius ipso</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">libere spectato, subinde vero multo propinquius + adparere; quinimo, quo oculum appellentes radii magis convergunt, + eo speciem objecti propius accedere. Nempe, si puncto</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">admoveatur oculus, suo (ad lentem) fere nativo + in loco conspicitur punctum</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">(vel æque distans, ad speculum); ad</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">O</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">reductus oculus ejusce speciem appropinquantem + cernit; ad</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">P</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">adhuc vicinius ipsum existimat; ac ita sensim, + donec alicubi tandem, velut ad</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Q</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, constituto oculo, objectum summe propinquum + apparens in meram confusionem incipiat evanescere. Quæ sane + cuncta rationibus atque decretis nostris repugnare videntur, aut + cum iis saltem parum amice conspirant. Neque nostram tantum + sententiam pulsat hoc experimentum, at ex æquo cæteras quas norim + omnes: veterem imprimis ac vulgatam, nostræ præ reliquis affinem, + ita convellere videtur, ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus A. + Tacquetus isti principio (cui pene soli totam + inædificaverat</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Catoptricam</span></span> + <span style="font-size: 90%">suam) ceu infido ac inconstanti + renunciarit, adeoque suam ipse doctrinam labefactarit? id tamen, + opinor, minime facturus, si rem totam inspexissit penitius, atque + difficultatis fundum attigissit. Apud me vero non ita pollet hæc, + nec eousque præpollebit ulla difficultas, ut ab iis quæ manifeste + rationi consentanea video, discedam; præsertim quum, ut his + accidit, ejusmodi difficultas in singularis cujuspiam casus + disparitate fundetur. Nimirum in præsente casu peculiare quiddam, + naturæ subtilitati involutum, delitescit, ægre fortassis, nisi + perfectius explorato videndi modo, detegendum. Circa quod nil, + fateor, hactenus excogitare potui, quod adblandiretur animo meo, + nedum plane satisfaceret. Vobis itaque nodum hunc, utinam + feliciore conatu, resolvendum committo.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span></p> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">In English as + follows</span></em>:</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span class= + "tei tei-q"><span style="font-size: 90%">“</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">I have here delivered what my thoughts have + suggested to me concerning that part of optics which is more + properly mathematical. As for the other parts of that science + (which, being rather physical, do consequently abound with + plausible conjectures instead of certain principles), there has in + them scarce anything occurred to my observation</span> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page138">[pg 138]</span><a name= + "Pg138" id="Pg138" class="tei tei-anchor"></a><span style= + "font-size: 90%">different from what has been already said by + Kepler, Scheinerus, Des Cartes, &c. And methinks I had better + say nothing at all than repeat that which has been so often said + by others. I think it therefore high time to take my leave of + this subject. But, before I quit it for good and all, the fair + and ingenuous dealing that I owe both to you and to truth obliges + me to acquaint you with a certain untoward difficulty, which + seems directly opposite to the doctrine I have been hitherto + inculcating, at least admits of no solution from it. In short it + is this. Before the double convex glass or concave + speculum</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">EBF</span></span><span style="font-size: 90%">, + let the point</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">be placed at such a distance that the rays + proceeding from</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, after refraction or reflection, be brought to + unite somewhere in the axis</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">AB</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">. And suppose the point of union (i.e. the image + of the point</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, as hath been already set forth) to be</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Z</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">; between which and</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, the vertex of the glass or speculum, conceive + the eye to be anywhere placed. The question now is, where the + point</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">ought to appear. Experience shews that it doth + not appear behind at the point</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Z</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">; and it were contrary to nature that it should; + since all the impression which affects the sense comes from + towards</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">. But, from our tenets it should seem to follow + that it would appear before the eye at a vast distance off, so + great as should in some sort surpass all sensible distance. For + since, if we exclude all anticipations and prejudices, every + object appears by so much the farther off by how much the rays it + sends to the eye are less diverging; and that object is thought + to be most remote from which parallel rays proceed unto the eye; + reason would make one think that object should appear at yet a + greater distance which is seen by converging rays. Moreover, it + may in general be asked concerning this case, what it is that + determines the apparent place of the point</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, and maketh it to appear after a constant + manner, sometimes nearer, at</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page139">[pg 139]</span><a name="Pg139" id="Pg139" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-size: 90%">other times + farther off? To which doubt I see nothing that can be answered + agreeable to the principles we have laid down, except only that + the point</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">ought always to appear extremely remote. But, on + the contrary, we are assured by experience, that the point</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">appears variously distant, according to the + different situations of the eye between the points</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">and</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Z</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">. And that it doth almost never (if at all) seem + farther off than it would if it were beheld by the naked eye; + but, on the contrary, it doth sometimes appear much nearer. Nay, + it is even certain that by how much the rays falling on the eye + do more converge, by so much the nearer does the object seem to + approach. For, the eye being placed close to the point</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, the object</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">A</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">appears nearly in its own natural place, if the + point</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">B</span></span> <span style= + "font-size: 90%">is taken in the glass, or at the same distance, + if in the speculum. The eye being brought back to</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">O</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, the object seems to draw near; and, being come + to</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">P</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, it beholds it still nearer: and so on by + little and little, till at length the eye being placed somewhere, + suppose at</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Q</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, the object appearing extremely near begins to + vanish into mere confusion. All which doth seem repugnant to our + principles; at least, not rightly to agree with them. Nor is our + tenet alone struck at by this experiment, but likewise all others + that ever came to my knowledge are every whit as much endangered + by it. The ancient one especially (which is most commonly + received, and comes nearest to mine) seems to be so effectually + overthrown thereby that the most learned Tacquet has been forced + to reject that principle, as false and uncertain, on which alone + he had built almost his whole</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Catoptrics</span></span><span style="font-size: 90%">, + and consequently, by taking away the foundation, hath himself + pulled down the superstructure he had raised on it. Which, + nevertheless, I do not believe he would have done, had he but + considered the whole matter more thoroughly, and examined the + difficulty to the bottom. But as for me, neither this nor any + other difficulty shall have so great an influence on me, as to + make me renounce that which I know to be manifestly agreeable to + reason. Especially when, as it here falls out, the difficulty is + founded in the peculiar nature of a certain odd and particular + case. For, in the present case something peculiar lies hid, + which, being involved in the subtilty of nature, will perhaps + hardly be discovered till such time</span> <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page140">[pg 140]</span><a name="Pg140" id= + "Pg140" class="tei tei-anchor"></a><span style= + "font-size: 90%">as the manner of vision is more perfectly made + known. Concerning which, I must own I have hitherto been able to + find out nothing that has the least show of probability, not to + mention certainty. I shall therefore leave this knot to be untied + by you, wishing you may have better success in it than I have + had.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span></p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">30. The ancient + and received principle, which Dr. Barrow here mentions as the main + foundation of Tacquet's<a id="noteref_316" name="noteref_316" href= + "#note_316"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">316</span></span></a> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Catoptrics</span></span>, is, that every + <span class="tei tei-q">“visible point seen by reflection from a + speculum shall appear placed at the intersection of the reflected + ray and the perpendicular of incidence.”</span> Which intersection + in the present case happening to be behind the eye, it greatly + shakes the authority of that principle whereon the aforementioned + author proceeds throughout his whole <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Catoptrics</span></span>, in determining the + apparent place of objects seen by reflection from any kind of + speculum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">31. Let us now + see how this phenomenon agrees with our tenets<a id="noteref_317" + name="noteref_317" href="#note_317"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">317</span></span></a>. The + eye, the nearer it is placed to the point <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span> in + the above figures, the more distinct is the appearance of the + object: but, as it recedes to <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">O</span></span>, the appearance grows more + confused; and at <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">P</span></span> it sees the object yet more + confused; and so on, till the eye, being brought back to + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Z</span></span>, sees the object in the + greatest confusion of all. Wherefore, by sect. 21, the object + should seem to approach the eye gradually, as it recedes from the + point <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span>; that is, at <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">O</span></span> it + should (in consequence of the principle I have laid down in the + aforesaid section) seem nearer than it did at <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span>, and + at <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">P</span></span> nearer than at <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">O</span></span>, and + at <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Q</span></span> nearer than at <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">P</span></span>, and + so on, till it quite vanishes at <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Z</span></span>. + Which is the very matter of fact, as any one that pleases may + easily satisfy himself by experiment.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">32. This case is + much the same as if we should suppose an Englishman to meet a + foreigner who used the same words with the English, but in a direct + contrary <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page141">[pg + 141]</span><a name="Pg141" id="Pg141" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + signification. The Englishman would not fail to make a wrong + judgment of the ideas annexed to those sounds, in the mind of him + that used them. Just so in the present case, the object speaks (if + I may so say) with words that the eye is well acquainted with, that + is, confusions of appearance; but, whereas heretofore the greatest + confusions were always wont to signify nearer distances, they have + in this case a direct contrary signification, being connected with + the greater distances. Whence it follows that the eye must + unavoidably be mistaken, since it will take the confusions in the + sense it has been used to, which is directly opposed to the + true.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">33. This + phenomenon, as it entirely subverts the opinion of those who will + have us judge of distance by lines and angles, on which supposition + it is altogether inexplicable, so it seems to me no small + confirmation of the truth of that principle whereby it is + explained<a id="noteref_318" name="noteref_318" href= + "#note_318"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">318</span></span></a>. But, + in order to a more full explication of this point, and to shew how + far the hypothesis of the mind's judging by the various divergency + of rays may be of use in determining the apparent place of an + object, it will be necessary to premise some few things, which are + already well known to those who have any skill in Dioptrics.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">34. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + Any radiating point is then distinctly seen when the rays + proceeding from it are, by the refractive power of the crystalline, + accurately reunited in the retina or fund of the eye. But if they + are reunited either before they arrive at the retina, or after they + have passed it, then there is confused vision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 60%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/vision-fig-1.png" alt="Illustration" title= + "Figure 1" /> + + <div class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + Figure 1 + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 60%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/vision-fig-2.png" alt="Illustration" title= + "Figure 2" /> + + <div class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + Figure 2 + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 60%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/vision-fig-3.png" alt="Illustration" title= + "Figure 3" /> + + <div class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + Figure 3 + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">35. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, Suppose, in the adjacent + figures, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">NP</span></span> represent an eye duly framed, + and retaining its natural figure. In fig. 1 the rays falling nearly + parallel on the eye, are, by the crystalline <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">AB</span></span>, + refracted, so as their focus, or point of union <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">F</span></span>, + falls exactly on the retina. But, if the rays fall sensibly + diverging on the eye, as in fig. 2, then their focus falls beyond + the retina; or, if the rays are made to converge by the lens + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">QS</span></span>, before they come at the eye, + as in fig. 3, their focus <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">F</span></span> will fall before the retina. + In which two last cases it is <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page142">[pg 142]</span><a name="Pg142" id="Pg142" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> evident, from the foregoing section, that the + appearance of the point <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Z</span></span> is confused. And, by how much + the greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays falling on + the pupil, by so much the farther will the point of their reunion + be from the retina, either before or behind it, and consequently + the point <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Z</span></span> will appear by so much the + more confused. And this, by the bye, may shew us the difference + between confused and faint vision. Confused vision is, when the + rays proceeding from each distinct point of the object are not + accurately re-collected in one corresponding point on the retina, + but take up some space thereon—so that rays from different points + become mixed and confused together. This is opposed to a distinct + vision, and attends near objects. Faint vision is when, by reason + of the distance of the object, or grossness of the interjacent + medium, few rays arrive from the object to the eye. <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page143">[pg 143]</span><a name="Pg143" id="Pg143" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> This is opposed to vigorous or clear + vision, and attends remote objects. But to return.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">36. The eye, or + (to speak truly) the mind, perceiving only the confusion itself, + without ever considering the cause from which it proceeds, doth + constantly annex the same degree of distance to the same degree of + confusion. Whether that confusion be occasioned by converging or by + diverging rays it matters not. Whence it follows that the eye, + viewing the object <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Z</span></span> through the glass <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">QS</span></span> + (which by refraction causeth the rays <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">ZQ</span></span>, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ZS</span></span>, &c. to converge), should + judge it to be at such a nearness, at which, if it were placed, it + would radiate on the eye, with rays diverging to that degree as + would produce the same confusion which is now produced by + converging rays, i.e. would cover a portion of the retina equal to + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">DC.</span></span> (Vid. fig. 3, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">sup.</span></span>) + But then this must be understood (to use Dr. Barrow's phrase) + <span class="tei tei-q">“seclusis prænotionibus et + præjudiciis,”</span> in case we abstract from all other + circumstances of vision, such as the figure, size, faintness, + &c. of the visible objects—all which do ordinarily concur to + form our idea of distance, the mind having, by frequent experience, + observed their several sorts or degrees to be connected with + various distances.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">37. It plainly + follows from what has been said, that a person perfectly purblind + (i.e. that could not see an object distinctly but when placed close + to his eye) would not make the same wrong judgment that others do + in the forementioned case. For, to him, greater confusions + constantly suggesting greater distances, he must, as he recedes + from the glass, and the object grows more confused, judge it to be + at a farther distance; contrary to what they do who have had the + perception of the objects growing more confused connected with the + idea of approach.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">38. Hence also + it doth appear, there may be good use of computation, by lines and + angles, in optics<a id="noteref_319" name="noteref_319" href= + "#note_319"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">319</span></span></a>; not + that the mind judges of distance immediately by them, but because + it judges by somewhat which is connected with them, and to the + determination whereof they may be subservient. Thus, the mind + judging of the distance <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page144">[pg + 144]</span><a name="Pg144" id="Pg144" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of an object by the confusedness of its appearance, and this + confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked eye, according as + the object is seen by rays more or less diverging, it follows that + a man may make use of the divergency of the rays, in computing the + apparent distance, though not for its own sake, yet on account of + the confusion with which it is connected. But so it is, the + confusion itself is entirely neglected by mathematicians, as having + no necessary relation with distance, such as the greater or lesser + angles of divergency are conceived to have. And these (especially + for that they fall under mathematical computation) are alone + regarded, in determining the apparent places of objects, as though + they were the sole and immediate cause of the judgments the mind + makes of distance. Whereas, in truth, they should not at all be + regarded in themselves, or any otherwise than as they are supposed + to be the cause of confused vision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">39. The not + considering of this has been a fundamental and perplexing + oversight. For proof whereof, we need go no farther than the case + before us. It having been observed that the most diverging rays + brought into the mind the idea of nearest distance, and that still + as the divergency decreased the distance increased, and it being + thought the connexion between the various degrees of divergency and + distance was immediate—this naturally leads one to conclude, from + an ill-grounded analogy, that converging rays shall make an object + appear at an immense distance, and that, as the convergency + increases, the distance (if it were possible) should do so + likewise. That this was the cause of Dr. Barrow's mistake is + evident from his own words which we have quoted. Whereas had the + learned Doctor observed that diverging and converging rays, how + opposite soever they may seem, do nevertheless agree in producing + the same effect, to wit, confusedness of vision, greater degrees + whereof are produced indifferently, either as the divergency or + convergency of the rays increaseth; and that it is by this effect, + which is the same in both, that either the divergency or + convergency is perceived by the eye—I say, had he but considered + this, it is certain he would have made a quite contrary judgment, + and rightly concluded <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page145">[pg + 145]</span><a name="Pg145" id="Pg145" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + that those rays which fall on the eye with greater degrees of + convergency should make the object from whence they proceed appear + by so much the nearer. But it is plain it was impossible for any + man to attain to a right notion of this matter so long as he had + regard only to lines and angles, and did not apprehend the true + nature of vision, and how far it was of mathematical + consideration.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">40. Before we + dismiss this subject, it is fit we take notice of a query relating + thereto, proposed by the ingenious Mr. Molyneux, in his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise + of Dioptrics</span></span> (par. i. prop. 31. sect. 9), where, + speaking of the difficulty we have been explaining, he has these + words: <span class="tei tei-q">“And so he (i.e. Dr. Barrow) leaves + this difficulty to the solution of others, which I (after so great + an example) shall do likewise; but with the resolution of the same + admirable author, of not quitting the evident doctrine which we + have before laid down, for determining the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">locus objecti</span></span>, on account of + being pressed by one difficulty, which seems inexplicable till a + more intimate knowledge of the visive faculty be obtained by + mortals. In the meantime I propose it to the consideration of the + ingenious, whether the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">locus + apparens</span></span> of an object placed as in this ninth section + be not as much before the eye as the distinct base is behind the + eye?”</span> To which query we may venture to answer in the + negative. For, in the present case, the rule for determining the + distance of the distinct base, or respective focus from the glass + is this: <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">As the difference between the distance of the + object and focus is to the focus or focal length, so the distance + of the object from the glass is to the distance of the respective + focus or distinct base from the glass.</span></em> (Molyneux, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dioptr.</span></span>, par. i. prop. 5.) Let + us now suppose the object to be placed at the distance of the focal + length, and one-half of the focal length from the glass, and the + eye close to the glass. Hence it will follow, by the rule, that the + distance of the distinct base behind the eye is double the true + distance of the object before the eye. If, therefore, Mr. + Molyneux's conjecture held good, it would follow that the eye + should see the object twice as far off as it really is; and in + other cases at three or four times its due distance, or more. But + this manifestly contradicts experience, the object never appearing, + at farthest, beyond its due distance. Whatever, therefore, is built + on this supposition <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page146">[pg + 146]</span><a name="Pg146" id="Pg146" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + (vid. corol. i. prop. 57. ibid.) comes to the ground along with + it.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">41. From what + hath been premised, it is a manifest consequence, that a man born + blind, being made to see, would at first have no idea of distance + by sight: the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the + nearer, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The + objects intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth they + are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each + whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure, + or the most inward passions of his soul. For, our judging objects + perceived by sight to be at any distance, or without the mind, is + (vid. sect, xxviii.) entirely the effect of experience; which one + in those circumstances could not yet have attained to<a id= + "noteref_320" name="noteref_320" href="#note_320"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">320</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">42. It is indeed + otherwise upon the common supposition—that men judge of distance by + the angle of the optic axes, just as one in the dark, or a blind + man by the angle comprehended by two sticks, one whereof he held in + each hand<a id="noteref_321" name="noteref_321" href= + "#note_321"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">321</span></span></a>. For, + if this were true, it would follow that one blind from his birth, + being made to see, should stand in need of no new experience, in + order to perceive distance by sight. But that this is false has, I + think, been sufficiently demonstrated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">43. And perhaps, + upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find that even those who from + their birth have grown up in a continued habit of seeing are + irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side, to wit, in thinking + what they see to be at a distance from them. For, at this time it + seems agreed on all hands, by those who have had any thoughts of + that matter, that colours, which are the proper and immediate + object of sight, are not without the mind.—But then, it will be + said, by sight we have also the ideas of extension, and figure, and + motion; all which may well be thought without and at some distance + from the mind, though colour should <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page147">[pg 147]</span><a name="Pg147" id="Pg147" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> not. In answer to this, I appeal to any man's + experience, whether the visible extension of any object do not + appear as near to him as the colour of that object; nay, whether + they do not both seem to be in the very same place. Is not the + extension we see coloured, and is it possible for us, so much as in + thought, to separate and abstract colour from extension? Now, where + the extension is, there surely is the figure, and there the motion + too. I speak of those which are perceived by sight<a id= + "noteref_322" name="noteref_322" href="#note_322"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">322</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">44. But for a + fuller explication of this point, and to shew that the immediate + objects of sight are not so much as the ideas or resemblances of + things placed at a distance, it is requisite that we look nearer + into the matter, and carefully observe what is meant in common + discourse when one says, that which he sees is at a distance from + him. Suppose, for example, that looking at the moon I should say it + were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from me. Let + us see what moon this is spoken of. It is plain it cannot be the + visible moon, or anything like the visible moon, or that which I + see—which is only a round luminous plain, of about thirty visible + points in diameter. For, in case I am carried from the place where + I stand directly towards the moon, it is manifest the object varies + still as I go on; and, by the time that I am advanced fifty or + sixty semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far from being near + a small, round, luminous flat that I shall perceive nothing like + it—this object having long since disappeared, and, if I would + recover it, it must be by going back to the earth from whence I set + out<a id="noteref_323" name="noteref_323" href= + "#note_323"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">323</span></span></a>. + Again, suppose I perceive by sight the faint and obscure idea of + something, which I doubt whether it be a man, or a tree, or a + tower, but <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page148">[pg + 148]</span><a name="Pg148" id="Pg148" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + judge it to be at the distance of about a mile. It is plain I + cannot mean that what I see is a mile off, or that it is the image + or likeness of anything which is a mile off; since that every step + I take towards it the appearance alters, and from being obscure, + small, and faint, grows clear, large, and vigorous. And when I come + to the mile's end, that which I saw first is quite lost, neither do + I find anything in the likeness of it<a id="noteref_324" name= + "noteref_324" href="#note_324"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">324</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">45. In these and + the like instances, the truth of the matter, I find, stands + thus:—Having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable + by touch<a id="noteref_325" name="noteref_325" href= + "#note_325"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">325</span></span></a>—as + distance, tangible figure, and solidity—to have been connected with + certain ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, + forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted ordinary + course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an object, I perceive + a certain visible figure and colour, with some degree of faintness + and other circumstances, which, from what I have formerly observed, + determine me to think that if I advance forward so many paces, + miles, &c., I shall be affected with such and such ideas of + touch. So that, in truth and strictness of speech, I neither see + distance itself, nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I + say, neither distance nor things placed at a distance are + themselves, or their ideas, truly perceived by sight. This I am + persuaded of, as to what concerns myself. And I believe whoever + will look narrowly into his own thoughts, and examine what he means + by saying he sees this or that thing at a distance, will agree with + me, that what he sees <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page149">[pg + 149]</span><a name="Pg149" id="Pg149" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + only suggests to his understanding that, after having passed a + certain distance, to be measured by the motion of his body, which + is perceivable by touch<a id="noteref_326" name="noteref_326" href= + "#note_326"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">326</span></span></a>, he + shall come to perceive such and such tangible ideas, which have + been usually connected with such and such visible ideas. But, that + one might be deceived by these suggestions of sense, and that there + is no necessary connexion between visible and tangible ideas + suggested by them, we need go no farther than the next + looking-glass or picture to be convinced. Note that, when I speak + of tangible ideas, I take the word idea for any the immediate + object of sense, or understanding—in which large signification it + is commonly used by the moderns<a id="noteref_327" name= + "noteref_327" href="#note_327"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">327</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">46. From what we + have shewn, it is a manifest consequence that the ideas of space, + outness<a id="noteref_328" name="noteref_328" href= + "#note_328"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">328</span></span></a>, and + things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object + of sight<a id="noteref_329" name="noteref_329" href= + "#note_329"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">329</span></span></a>; they + are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. Sitting in + my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look through the + casement and see it; I walk out and enter into it. Thus, common + speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and touched the + same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas + intromitted by each sense are widely different, and distinct from + each other; but, having been observed constantly to go together, + they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation of + the noise, I perceive the different distances of the coach, and + know that it approaches before I look out. Thus, by the ear I + perceive distance just after the same manner as I do by the + eye.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">47. I do not + nevertheless say I hear distance, in like <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page150">[pg 150]</span><a name="Pg150" id="Pg150" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> manner as I say that I see it—the ideas + perceived by hearing not being so apt to be confounded with the + ideas of touch as those of sight are. So likewise a man is easily + convinced that bodies and external things are not properly the + object of hearing, but only sounds, by the mediation whereof the + idea of this or that body, or distance, is suggested to his + thoughts. But then one is with more difficulty brought to discern + the difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and touch<a id= + "noteref_330" name="noteref_330" href="#note_330"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">330</span></span></a>: + though it be certain, a man no more sees and feels the same thing, + than he hears and feels the same thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">48. One reason + of which seems to be this. It is thought a great absurdity to + imagine that one and the same thing should have any more than one + extension and one figure. But, the extension and figure of a body + being let into the mind two ways, and that indifferently, either by + sight or touch, it seems to follow that we see the same extension + and the same figure which we feel.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">49. But, if we + take a close and accurate view of the matter, it must be + acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same + object<a id="noteref_331" name="noteref_331" href= + "#note_331"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">331</span></span></a>. That + which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another. If + the visible figure and extension be not the same with the tangible + figure and extension, we are not to infer that one and the same + thing has divers extensions. The true consequence is that the + objects of sight and touch are two distinct things<a id= + "noteref_332" name="noteref_332" href="#note_332"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">332</span></span></a>. It + may perhaps require some thought rightly to conceive this + distinction. And the difficulty seems not a little increased, + because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly the same + name as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is + connected—which doth of necessity arise from the use and end of + language<a id="noteref_333" name="noteref_333" href= + "#note_333"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">333</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">50. In order, + therefore, to treat accurately and unconfusedly of vision, we must + bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects apprehended by the + eye—the one primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by + intervention of the former. Those of the first sort neither are nor + appear to be without the mind, or at any distance off<a id= + "noteref_334" name="noteref_334" href="#note_334"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">334</span></span></a>. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page151">[pg 151]</span><a name= + "Pg151" id="Pg151" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> They may, indeed, + grow greater or smaller, more confused, or more clear, or more + faint. But they do not, cannot approach, [or even seem to approach + <a id="noteref_335" name="noteref_335" href= + "#note_335"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">335</span></span></a>] or + recede from us. Whenever we say an object is at a distance, + whenever we say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always + mean it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the + touch<a id="noteref_336" name="noteref_336" href= + "#note_336"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">336</span></span></a>, and + are not so truly perceived as suggested by the eye, in like manner + as thoughts by the ear.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">51. No sooner do + we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears but + the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds: in + the very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the + understanding: so closely are they united that it is not in our + power to keep out the one except we exclude the other also. We even + act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves. So + likewise the secondary objects, or those which are only suggested + by sight, do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded, + than the proper objects of that sense; along with which they enter + into the mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion + than ideas have with words<a id="noteref_337" name="noteref_337" + href="#note_337"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">337</span></span></a>. + Hence it is we find it so difficult to discriminate between the + immediate and mediate objects of sight, and are so prone to + attribute to the former what belongs only to the latter. They are, + as it were, most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated + together. And the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our + thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language, and want + of reflection. However, I doubt not but anyone that shall + attentively consider what we have already said, and shall say upon + this subject before we have done (especially if he pursue it in his + own thoughts), may be able to deliver himself from that prejudice. + Sure I am, it is worth some <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page152">[pg 152]</span><a name="Pg152" id="Pg152" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> attention to whoever would understand the + true nature of vision.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">52. I have now + done with Distance, and proceed to shew how it is that we perceive + by sight the Magnitude of objects<a id="noteref_338" name= + "noteref_338" href="#note_338"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">338</span></span></a>. It + is the opinion of some that we do it by angles, or by angles in + conjunction with distance. But, neither angles nor distance being + perceivable by sight<a id="noteref_339" name="noteref_339" href= + "#note_339"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">339</span></span></a>, and + the things we see being in truth at no distance from us<a id= + "noteref_340" name="noteref_340" href="#note_340"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">340</span></span></a>, it + follows that, as we have shewn lines and angles not to be the + medium the mind makes use of in apprehending the apparent place, so + neither are they the medium whereby it apprehends the apparent + magnitude of objects.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">53. It is well + known that the same extension at a near distance shall subtend a + greater angle, and at a farther distance a lesser angle. And by + this principle (we are told) the mind estimates the magnitude of an + object<a id="noteref_341" name="noteref_341" href= + "#note_341"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">341</span></span></a>, + comparing the angle under which it is seen with its distance, and + thence inferring the magnitude thereof. What inclines men to this + mistake (beside the humour of making one see by geometry) is, that + the same perceptions or ideas which suggest distance do also + suggest magnitude. But, if we examine it, we shall find they + suggest the latter as immediately as the former. I say, they do not + first suggest distance and then leave it to the judgment to use + that as a medium whereby to collect the magnitude; but they have as + close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as with the + distance; and suggest magnitude as independently of distance, as + they do distance independently of magnitude. All which will be + evident to whoever considers what has been already said and what + follows.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">54. It has been + shewn there are two sorts of objects apprehended by sight, each + whereof has its distinct magnitude, or extension—the one, properly + tangible, i.e. to be perceived and measured by touch, and not + immediately falling under the sense of seeing; the other, properly + and immediately visible, by mediation of which the former is + brought in view. Each of these magnitudes are greater or + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page153">[pg 153]</span><a name= + "Pg153" id="Pg153" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> lesser, according as + they contain in them more or fewer points, they being made up of + points or minimums. For, whatever may be said of extension in + abstract<a id="noteref_342" name="noteref_342" href= + "#note_342"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">342</span></span></a>, it + is certain sensible extension is not infinitely divisible<a id= + "noteref_343" name="noteref_343" href="#note_343"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">343</span></span></a>. + There is a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + tangibile</span></span>, and a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span>, beyond which + sense cannot perceive. This every one's experience will inform + him.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">55. The + magnitude of the object which exists without the mind, and is at a + distance, continues always invariably the same: but, the visible + object still changing as you approach to or recede from the + tangible object, it hath no fixed and determinate greatness. + Whenever therefore we speak of the magnitude of any thing, for + instance a tree or a house, we must mean the tangible magnitude; + otherwise there can be nothing steady and free from ambiguity + spoken of it<a id="noteref_344" name="noteref_344" href= + "#note_344"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">344</span></span></a>. Now, + though the tangible and visible magnitude do in truth belong to two + distinct objects<a id="noteref_345" name="noteref_345" href= + "#note_345"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">345</span></span></a>, I + shall nevertheless (especially since those objects are called by + the same name, and are observed to coexist<a id="noteref_346" name= + "noteref_346" href="#note_346"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">346</span></span></a>), to + avoid tediousness and singularity of speech, sometimes speak of + them as belonging to one and the same thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">56. Now, in + order to discover by what means the magnitude of tangible objects + is perceived by sight, I need only reflect on what passes in my own + mind, and observe what those things be which introduce the ideas of + greater or lesser into my thoughts when I look on any object. And + these I find to be, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">first</span></em>, the magnitude or extension + of the visible object, which, being immediately perceived by sight, + is connected with that other which is tangible and placed at a + distance: <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">secondly</span></em>, the confusion or + distinctness: and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thirdly</span></em>, the vigorousness or + faintness of the aforesaid <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page154">[pg 154]</span><a name="Pg154" id="Pg154" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> visible appearance. <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cæteris paribus</span></span>, by how much the + greater or lesser the visible object is, by so much the greater or + lesser do I conclude the tangible object to be. But, be the idea + immediately perceived by sight never so large, yet, if it be withal + confused, I judge the magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it + be distinct and clear, I judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I + apprehend it to be yet greater. What is here meant by confusion and + faintness has been explained in sect. 35.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">57. Moreover, + the judgments we make of greatness do, in like manner as those of + distance, depend on the disposition of the eye; also on the figure, + number, and situation<a id="noteref_347" name="noteref_347" href= + "#note_347"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">347</span></span></a> of + intermediate objects, and other circumstances that have been + observed to attend great or small tangible magnitudes. Thus, for + instance, the very same quantity of visible extension which in the + figure of a tower doth suggest the idea of great magnitude shall in + the figure of a man suggest the idea of much smaller magnitude. + That this is owing to the experience we have had of the usual + bigness of a tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">58. It is also + evident that confusion or faintness have no more a necessary + connexion with little or great magnitude than they have with little + or great distance. As they suggest the latter, so they suggest the + former to our minds. And, by consequence, if it were not for + experience, we should no more judge a faint or confused appearance + to be connected with great or little magnitude than we should that + it was connected with great or little distance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">59. Nor will it + be found that great or small visible magnitude hath any necessary + relation to great or small tangible magnitude—so that the one may + certainly and infallibly be inferred from the other. But, before we + come to the proof of this, it is fit we consider the difference + there is betwixt the extension and figure which is the proper + object of touch, and that other which is termed visible; and how + the former is principally, though not immediately, taken notice of + when we look at any object. This has been before mentioned<a id= + "noteref_348" name="noteref_348" href="#note_348"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">348</span></span></a>, but + we shall here inquire into the cause thereof. We regard the objects + that environ us in proportion as they are adapted to benefit or + injure our own <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page155">[pg + 155]</span><a name="Pg155" id="Pg155" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensations of pleasure + or pain. Now, bodies operating on our organs by an immediate + application, and the hurt and advantage arising therefrom depending + altogether on the tangible, and not at all on the visible, + qualities of any object—this is a plain reason why those should be + regarded by us much more than these. And for this end + [chiefly<a id="noteref_349" name="noteref_349" href= + "#note_349"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">349</span></span></a>] the + visive sense seems to have been bestowed on animals, to wit, that, + by the perception of visible ideas (which in themselves are not + capable of affecting or anywise altering the frame of their + bodies), they may be able to foresee<a id="noteref_350" name= + "noteref_350" href="#note_350"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">350</span></span></a> (from + the experience they have had what tangible ideas are connected with + such and such visible ideas) the damage or benefit which is like to + ensue upon the application of their own bodies to this or that body + which is at a distance. Which foresight, how necessary it is to the + preservation of an animal, every one's experience can inform him. + Hence it is that, when we look at an object, the tangible figure + and extension thereof are principally attended to; whilst there is + small heed taken of the visible figure and magnitude, which, though + more immediately perceived, do less sensibly affect us, and are not + fitted to produce any alteration in our bodies.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">60. That the + matter of fact is true will be evident to any one who considers + that a man placed at ten foot distance is thought as great as if he + were placed at the distance only of five foot; which is true, not + with relation to the visible, but tangible greatness of the object: + the visible magnitude being far greater at one station than it is + at the other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">61. Inches, + feet, &c. are settled, stated lengths, whereby we measure + objects and estimate their magnitude. We say, for example, an + object appears to be six inches, or six foot long. Now, that this + cannot be meant of visible inches, &c. is evident, because a + visible inch is itself no constant determinate magnitude<a id= + "noteref_351" name="noteref_351" href="#note_351"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">351</span></span></a>, and + cannot therefore serve to mark out and determine the magnitude of + any <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page156">[pg 156]</span><a name= + "Pg156" id="Pg156" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> other thing. Take an + inch marked upon a ruler; view it successively, at the distance of + half a foot, a foot, a foot and a half, &c. from the eye: at + each of which, and at all the intermediate distances, the inch + shall have a different visible extension, i.e. there shall be more + or fewer points discerned in it. Now, I ask which of all these + various extensions is that stated determinate one that is agreed on + for a common measure of other magnitudes? No reason can be assigned + why we should pitch on one more than another. And, except there be + some invariable determinate extension fixed on to be marked by the + word inch, it is plain it can be used to little purpose; and to say + a thing contains this or that number of inches shall imply no more + than that it is extended, without bringing any particular idea of + that extension into the mind. Farther, an inch and a foot, from + different distances, shall both exhibit the same visible magnitude, + and yet at the same time you shall say that one seems several times + greater than the other. From all which it is manifest, that the + judgments we make of the magnitude of objects by sight are + altogether in reference to their tangible extension. Whenever we + say an object is great or small, of this or that determinate + measure, I say, it must be meant of the tangible and not the + visible extension<a id="noteref_352" name="noteref_352" href= + "#note_352"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">352</span></span></a>, + which, though immediately perceived, is nevertheless little taken + notice of.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">62. Now, that + there is no necessary connexion between these two distinct + extensions is evident from hence—because our eyes might have been + framed in such a manner as to be able to see nothing but what were + less than the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + tangibile</span></span>. In which case it is not impossible we + might have perceived all the immediate objects of sight the very + same that we do now; but unto those visible appearances there would + not be connected those different tangible magnitudes that are now. + Which shews the judgments we make of the magnitude of things placed + at a distance, from the various greatness of the immediate objects + of sight, do not <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page157">[pg + 157]</span><a name="Pg157" id="Pg157" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + arise from any essential or necessary, but only a customary, tie + which has been observed betwixt them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">63. Moreover, it + is not only certain that any idea of sight might not have been + connected with this or that idea of touch we now observe to + accompany it, but also that the greater visible magnitudes might + have been connected with and introduced into our minds lesser + tangible magnitudes, and the lesser visible magnitudes greater + tangible magnitudes. Nay, that it actually is so, we have daily + experience—that object which makes a strong and large appearance + not seeming near so great as another the visible magnitude whereof + is much less, but more faint,<a id="noteref_353" name="noteref_353" + href="#note_353"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">353</span></span></a> and + the appearance upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower on + the retina, which faintness and situation suggest both greater + magnitude and greater distance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">64. From which, + and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest that, as we do not + perceive the magnitude of objects immediately by sight, so neither + do we perceive them by the mediation of anything which has a + necessary connexion with them. Those ideas that now suggest unto us + the various magnitudes of external objects before we touch them + might possibly have suggested no such thing; or they might have + signified them in a direct contrary manner, so that the very same + ideas on the perception whereof we judge an object to be small + might as well have served to make us conclude it great;—those ideas + being in their own nature equally fitted to bring into our minds + the idea of small or great, or no size at all, of outward + objects<a id="noteref_354" name="noteref_354" href= + "#note_354"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">354</span></span></a>, just + as the words of any language are in their own nature indifferent to + signify this or that thing, or nothing at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">65. As we see + distance so we see magnitude. And we see both in the same way that + we see shame or anger in the looks of a man. Those passions are + themselves invisible; they are nevertheless let in by the eye along + with colours and alterations of countenance which are the immediate + object of vision, and which signify them for no other reason than + barely because they have been observed to accompany them. Without + which experience we should <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page158">[pg 158]</span><a name="Pg158" id="Pg158" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> no more have taken blushing for a sign of + shame than of gladness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">66. We are + nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are + perceived only by the mediation of others to be themselves the + immediate objects of sight, or at least to have in their own nature + a fitness to be suggested by them before ever they had been + experienced to coexist with them. From which prejudice every one + perhaps will not find it easy to emancipate himself, by any the + clearest convictions of reason. And there are some grounds to think + that, if there was one only invariable and universal language in + the world, and that men were born with the faculty of speaking it, + it would be the opinion of some, that the ideas in other men's + minds were properly perceived by the ear, or had at least a + necessary and inseparable tie with the sounds that were affixed to + them. All which seems to arise from want of a due application of + our discerning faculty, thereby to discriminate between the ideas + that are in our understandings, and consider them apart from each + other; which would preserve us from confounding those that are + different, and make us see what ideas do, and what do not, include + or imply this or that other idea<a id="noteref_355" name= + "noteref_355" href="#note_355"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">355</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">67. There is a + celebrated phenomenon<a id="noteref_356" name="noteref_356" href= + "#note_356"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">356</span></span></a> the + solution whereof I shall attempt to give, by the principles that + have been laid down, in reference to the manner wherein we + apprehend by sight the magnitude of objects.—The apparent magnitude + of the moon, when placed in the horizon, is much greater than when + it is in the meridian, though the angle under which the diameter of + the moon is seen be not observed greater in the former case than in + the latter; and <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page159">[pg + 159]</span><a name="Pg159" id="Pg159" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the horizontal moon doth not constantly appear of the same bigness, + but at some times seemeth far greater than at others.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">68. Now, in + order to explain the reason of the moon's appearing greater than + ordinary in the horizon, it must be observed that the particles + which compose our atmosphere do intercept the rays of light + proceeding from any object to the eye; and, by how much the greater + is the portion of atmosphere interjacent between the object and the + eye, by so much the more are the rays intercepted, and, by + consequence, the appearance of the object rendered more faint—every + object appearing more vigorous or more faint in proportion as it + sendeth more or fewer rays into the eye. Now, between the eye and + the moon when situated in the horizon there lies a far greater + quantity of atmosphere than there does when the moon is in the + meridian. Whence it comes to pass, that the appearance of the + horizontal moon is fainter, and therefore, by sect. 56, it should + be thought bigger in that situation than in the meridian, or in any + other elevation above the horizon.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">69. Farther, the + air being variously impregnated, sometimes more and sometimes less, + with vapours and exhalations fitted to retund and intercept the + rays of light, it follows that the appearance of the horizontal + moon hath not always an equal faintness, and, by consequence, that + luminary, though in the very same situation, is at one time judged + greater than at another.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">70. That we have + here given the true account of the phenomena of the horizontal + moon, will, I suppose, be farther evident to any one from the + following considerations:—<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">First</span></em>, it is plain, that which in + this case suggests the idea of greater magnitude, must be something + which is itself perceived; for, that which is unperceived cannot + suggest to our perception any other thing<a id="noteref_357" name= + "noteref_357" href="#note_357"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">357</span></span></a>. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, it must be something + that does not constantly remain the same, but is subject to some + change or variation; since the appearance of the horizontal moon + varies, being at one time greater than at another. [<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thirdly</span></em>, it must not lie in the + circumjacent or intermediate objects, such as mountains, houses, + fields, &c.; because that when all those objects are + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page160">[pg 160]</span><a name= + "Pg160" id="Pg160" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> excluded from sight + the appearance is as great as ever<a id="noteref_358" name= + "noteref_358" href="#note_358"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">358</span></span></a>.] And + yet, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thirdly</span></em><a id="noteref_359" name= + "noteref_359" href="#note_359"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">359</span></span></a>, it + cannot be the visible figure or magnitude; since that remains the + same, or is rather lesser, by how much the moon is nearer to the + horizon. It remains therefore, that the true cause is that + affection or alteration of the visible appearance, which proceeds + from the greater paucity of rays arriving at the eye, and which I + term faintness: since this answers all the forementioned + conditions, and I am not conscious of any other perception that + does.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">71. Add to this + that in misty weather it is a common observation, that the + appearance of the horizontal moon is far larger than usual, which + greatly conspires with and strengthens our opinion. Neither would + it prove in the least irreconcilable with what we have said, if the + horizontal moon should chance sometimes to seem enlarged beyond its + usual extent, even in more serene weather. For, we must not only + have regard to the mist which happens to be in the place where we + stand; we ought also to take into our thoughts the whole sum of + vapours and exhalations which lie betwixt the eye and the moon: all + which co-operating to render the appearance of the moon more faint, + and thereby increase its magnitude, it may chance to appear greater + than it usually does even in the horizontal position, at a time + when, though there be no extraordinary fog or haziness just in the + place where we stand, yet the air between the eye and the moon, + taken altogether, may be loaded with a greater quantity of + interspersed vapours and exhalations than at other times<a id= + "noteref_360" name="noteref_360" href="#note_360"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">360</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">72. It may be + objected that, in consequence of our principles, the interposition + of a body in some degree opaque, which may intercept a great part + of the rays of light, should render the appearance of the moon in + the meridian as large as when it is viewed in the horizon. To which + I answer, it is not faintness anyhow applied that suggests + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page161">[pg 161]</span><a name= + "Pg161" id="Pg161" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> greater magnitude; + there being no necessary, but only an experimental, connexion + between those two things. It follows that the faintness which + enlarges the appearance must be applied in such sort, and with such + circumstances, as have been observed to attend the vision of great + magnitudes. When from a distance we behold great objects, the + particles of the intermediate air and vapours, which are themselves + unperceivable, do interrupt the rays of light, and thereby render + the appearance less strong and vivid. Now, faintness of appearance, + caused in this sort, hath been experienced to co-exist with great + magnitude. But when it is caused by the interposition of an opaque + sensible body, this circumstance alters the case; so that a faint + appearance this way caused does not suggest greater magnitude, + because it hath not been experienced to co-exist with it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">73. Faintness, + as well as all other ideas or perceptions which suggest magnitude + or distance, does it in the same way that words suggest the notions + to which they are annexed. Now, it is known a word pronounced with + certain circumstances, or in a certain context with other words, + hath not always the same import and signification that it hath when + pronounced in some other circumstances, or different context of + words. The very same visible appearance, as to faintness and all + other respects, if placed on high, shall not suggest the same + magnitude that it would if it were seen at an equal distance on a + level with the eye. The reason whereof is, that we are rarely + accustomed to view objects at a great height; our concerns lie + among things situated rather before than above us; and accordingly + our eyes are not placed on the top of our heads, but in such a + position as is most convenient for us to see distant objects + standing in our way. And, this situation of them being a + circumstance which usually attends the vision of distant objects, + we may from hence account for (what is commonly observed) an + object's appearing of different magnitude, even with respect to its + horizontal extension, on the top of a steeple, e.g. a hundred feet + high, to one standing below, from what it would if placed at a + hundred feet distance, on a level with his eye. For, it hath been + shewn that the judgment we make on the magnitude of a thing depends + not on the visible appearance only, but also on divers other + circumstances, any <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page162">[pg + 162]</span><a name="Pg162" id="Pg162" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + one of which being omitted or varied may suffice to make some + alteration in our judgment. Hence, the circumstance of viewing a + distant object in such a situation as is usual and suits with the + ordinary posture of the head and eyes, being omitted, and instead + thereof a different situation of the object, which requires a + different posture of the head, taking place—it is not to be + wondered at if the magnitude be judged different. But it will be + demanded, why a high object should constantly appear less than an + equidistant low object of the same dimensions; for so it is + observed to be. It may indeed be granted that the variation of some + circumstances may vary the judgment made on the magnitude of high + objects, which we are less used to look at; but it does not hence + appear why they should be judged less rather than greater? I + answer, that in case the magnitude of distant objects was suggested + by the extent of their visible appearance alone, and thought + proportional thereto, it is certain they would then be judged much + less than now they seem to be. (Vid. sect. 79.) But, several + circumstances concurring to form the judgment we make on the + magnitude of distant objects, by means of which they appear far + larger than others whose visible appearance hath an equal or even + greater extension, it follows that upon the change or omission of + any of those circumstances which are wont to attend the vision of + distant objects, and so come to influence the judgments made on + their magnitude, they shall proportionally appear less than + otherwise they would. For, any of those things that caused an + object to be thought greater than in proportion to its visible + extension being either omitted, or applied without the usual + circumstances, the judgment depends more entirely on the visible + extension; and consequently the object must be judged less. Thus, + in the present case the situation of the thing seen being different + from what it usually is in those objects we have occasion to view, + and whose magnitude we observe, it follows that the very same + object being a hundred feet high, should seem less than if it was a + hundred feet off, on (or nearly on) a level with the eye. What has + been here set forth seems to me to have no small share in + contributing to magnify the appearance of the horizontal moon, and + deserves not to be passed over in the explication of + it.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page163">[pg + 163]</span><a name="Pg163" id="Pg163" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">74. If we + attentively consider the phenomenon before us, we shall find the + not discerning between the mediate and immediate objects of sight + to be the chief cause of the difficulty that occurs in the + explication of it. The magnitude of the visible moon, or that which + is the proper and immediate object of vision<a id="noteref_361" + name="noteref_361" href="#note_361"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">361</span></span></a>, is + no greater when the moon is in the horizon than when it is in the + meridian. How comes it, therefore, to seem greater in one situation + than the other? What is it can put this cheat on the understanding? + It has no other perception of the moon than what it gets by sight. + And that which is seen is of the same extent—I say, the visible + appearance hath the very same, or rather a less, magnitude, when + the moon is viewed in the horizontal than when in the meridional + position. And yet it is esteemed greater in the former than in the + latter. Herein consists the difficulty; which doth vanish and admit + of the most easy solution, if we consider that as the visible moon + is not greater in the horizon than in the meridian, so neither is + it thought to be so. It hath been already shewn that, in any act of + vision, the visible object absolutely, or in itself, is little + taken notice of—the mind still carrying its view from that to some + tangible ideas, which have been observed to be connected with it, + and by that means come to be suggested by it. So that when a thing + is said to appear great or small, or whatever estimate be made of + the magnitude of any thing, this is meant not of the visible but of + the tangible object. This duly considered, it will be no hard + matter to reconcile the seeming contradiction there is, that the + moon should appear of a different bigness, the visible magnitude + thereof remaining still the same. For, by sect. 56, the very same + visible extension, with a different faintness, shall suggest a + different tangible extension. When therefore the horizontal moon is + said to appear greater than the meridional moon, this must be + understood, not of a greater visible extension, but of a greater + tangible extension, which, by reason of the more than ordinary + faintness of the visible appearance, is suggested to the mind along + with it.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page164">[pg + 164]</span><a name="Pg164" id="Pg164" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">75. Many + attempts have been made by learned men to account for this + appearance<a id="noteref_362" name="noteref_362" href= + "#note_362"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">362</span></span></a>. + Gassendus<a id="noteref_363" name="noteref_363" href= + "#note_363"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">363</span></span></a>, Des + Cartes<a id="noteref_364" name="noteref_364" href= + "#note_364"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">364</span></span></a>, + Hobbes<a id="noteref_365" name="noteref_365" href= + "#note_365"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">365</span></span></a>, and + several others have employed their thoughts on that subject; but + how fruitless and unsatisfactory their endeavours have been is + sufficiently shewn in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophical Transactions</span></span><a id= + "noteref_366" name="noteref_366" href="#note_366"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">366</span></span></a> + (Numb. 187, p. 314), where you may see their several opinions at + large set forth and confuted, not without some surprise at the + gross blunders that ingenious men have been forced into by + endeavouring to reconcile this appearance with the ordinary + principles of optics<a id="noteref_367" name="noteref_367" href= + "#note_367"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">367</span></span></a>. + Since the writing of which there hath been published in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Transactions</span></span> (Numb. 187, p. 323) + another paper relating to the same affair, by the celebrated Dr. + Wallis, wherein he attempts to account for that phenomenon; which, + though it seems not to contain anything new, or different from what + had been said before by others, I shall nevertheless consider in + this place.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">76. His opinion, + in short, is this:—We judge not of the magnitude of an object by + the optic angle alone, but by the optic angle in conjunction with + the distance. Hence, though the angle remain the same, or even + become less, yet, if withal the distance seem to have been + increased, the object shall appear greater. Now, one way whereby we + estimate the distance of anything is by the number and extent of + the intermediate objects. When therefore the moon is seen in the + horizon, the variety of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page165">[pg + 165]</span><a name="Pg165" id="Pg165" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + fields, houses, &c. together with the large prospect of the + wide extended land or sea that lies between the eye and the utmost + limb of the horizon, suggest unto the mind the idea of greater + distance, and consequently magnify the appearance. And this, + according to Dr. Wallis, is the true account of the extraordinary + largeness attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon, at a time + when the angle subtended by its diameter is not one jot greater + than it used to be.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">77. With + reference to this opinion, not to repeat what has been already said + concerning distance<a id="noteref_368" name="noteref_368" href= + "#note_368"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">368</span></span></a>, I + shall only observe, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">first</span></em>, that if the prospect of + interjacent objects be that which suggests the idea of farther + distance, and this idea of farther distance be the cause that + brings into the mind the idea of greater magnitude, it should hence + follow that if one looked at the horizontal moon from behind a + wall, it would appear no bigger than ordinary. For, in that case, + the wall interposing cuts off all that prospect of sea and land, + &c. which might otherwise increase the apparent distance, and + thereby the apparent magnitude of the moon. Nor will it suffice to + say, the memory doth even then suggest all that extent of land, + &c. which lies within the horizon, which suggestion occasions a + sudden judgment of sense, that the moon is farther off and larger + than usual. For, ask any man who from such a station beholding the + horizontal moon shall think her greater than usual, whether he hath + at that time in his mind any idea of the intermediate objects, or + long tract of land that lies between his eye and the extreme edge + of the horizon? and whether it be that idea which is the cause of + his making the aforementioned judgment? He will, without doubt, + reply in the negative, and declare the horizontal moon shall appear + greater than the meridional, though he never thinks of all or any + of those things that lie between him and it. [And as for the + absurdity of any idea's introducing into the mind another, whilst + itself is not perceived, this has already fallen under our + observation, and is too evident to need any farther enlargement on + it<a id="noteref_369" name="noteref_369" href= + "#note_369"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">369</span></span></a>.] + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, it seems impossible, by + this hypothesis, to account for the moon's <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page166">[pg 166]</span><a name="Pg166" id="Pg166" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> appearing, in the very same situation, at one + time greater than at another; which, nevertheless, has been shewn + to be very agreeable to the principles we have laid down, and + receives a most easy and natural explication from them. [<a id= + "noteref_370" name="noteref_370" href="#note_370"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">370</span></span></a>For + the further clearing up of this point, it is to be observed, that + what we immediately and properly see are only lights and colours in + sundry situations and shades, and degrees of faintness and + clearness, confusion and distinctness. All which visible objects + are only in the mind; nor do they suggest aught external<a id= + "noteref_371" name="noteref_371" href="#note_371"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">371</span></span></a>, + whether distance or magnitude, otherwise than by habitual + connexion, as words do things. We are also to remark, that beside + the straining of the eyes, and beside the vivid and faint, the + distinct and confused appearances (which, bearing some proportion + to lines and angles, have been substituted instead of them in the + foregoing part of this Treatise), there are other means which + suggest both distance and magnitude—particularly the situation of + visible points or objects, as upper or lower; the former suggesting + a farther distance and greater magnitude, the latter a nearer + distance and lesser magnitude—all which is an effect only of custom + and experience, there being really nothing intermediate in the line + of distance between the uppermost and the lowermost, which are both + equidistant, or rather at no distance from the eye; as there is + also nothing in upper or lower which by necessary connexion should + suggest greater or lesser magnitude. Now, as these customary + experimental means of suggesting distance do likewise suggest + magnitude, so they suggest the one as immediately as the other. I + say, they do not (vide sect. 53) first suggest distance, and then + leave the mind from thence to infer or compute magnitude, but + suggest magnitude as immediately and directly as they suggest + distance.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">78. This + phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear instance of the + insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining the way wherein + the mind perceives and estimates the magnitude of outward objects. + There is, nevertheless, a use of computation by them<a id= + "noteref_372" name="noteref_372" href="#note_372"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">372</span></span></a>—in + order to determine the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page167">[pg + 167]</span><a name="Pg167" id="Pg167" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + apparent magnitude of things, so far as they have a connexion with + and are proportional to those other ideas or perceptions which are + the true and immediate occasions that suggest to the mind the + apparent magnitude of things. But this in general may, I think, be + observed concerning mathematical computation in optics—that it can + never<a id="noteref_373" name="noteref_373" href= + "#note_373"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">373</span></span></a> be + very precise and exact<a id="noteref_374" name="noteref_374" href= + "#note_374"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">374</span></span></a>, + since the judgments we make of the magnitude of external things do + often depend on several circumstances which are not proportional to + or capable of being defined by lines and angles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">79. From what + has been said, we may safely deduce this consequence, to wit, that + a man born blind, and made to see, would, at first opening of his + eyes, make a very different judgment of the magnitude of objects + intromitted by them from what others do. He would not consider the + ideas of sight with reference to, or as having any connexion with, + the ideas of touch. His view of them being entirely terminated + within themselves, he can no otherwise judge them great or small + than as they contain a greater or lesser number of visible points. + Now, it being certain that any visible point can cover or exclude + from view only one other visible point, it follows that whatever + object intercepts the view of another hath an equal number of + visible points with it; and, consequently, they shall both be + thought by him to have the same magnitude. Hence, it is evident one + in those circumstances would judge his thumb, with which he might + hide a tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to that tower; or his + hand, the interposition whereof might conceal the firmament from + his view, equal to the firmament: how great an inequality soever + there may, in our apprehensions, seem to be betwixt those two + things, because of the customary and close connexion that has grown + up in our minds between the objects of sight and touch, whereby the + very different and distinct ideas of those two senses are so + blended and confounded together as to be mistaken for one and the + same thing—out of which prejudice we cannot easily extricate + ourselves.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page168">[pg + 168]</span><a name="Pg168" id="Pg168" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">80. For the + better explaining the nature of vision, and setting the manner + wherein we perceive magnitudes in a due light, I shall proceed to + make some observations concerning matters relating thereto, whereof + the want of reflection, and duly separating between tangible and + visible ideas, is apt to create in us mistaken and confused + notions. And, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">first</span></em>, I shall observe, that the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> is exactly + equal in all beings whatsoever that are endowed with the visive + faculty<a id="noteref_375" name="noteref_375" href= + "#note_375"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">375</span></span></a>. No + exquisite formation of the eye, no peculiar sharpness of sight, can + make it less in one creature than in another; for, it not being + distinguishable into parts, nor in anywise consisting of them, it + must necessarily be the same to all. For, suppose it otherwise, and + that the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> of a mite, for instance, be less than the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> of a man; the + latter therefore may, by detraction of some part, be made equal to + the former. It doth therefore consist of parts, which is + inconsistent with the notion of a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> or point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">81. It will, + perhaps, be objected, that the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> of a man doth + really and in itself contain parts whereby it surpasses that of a + mite, though they are not perceivable by the man. To which I + answer, the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> having (in like manner as all other the + proper and immediate objects of sight) been shewn not to have any + existence without the mind of him who sees it, it follows there + cannot be any part of it that is not actually perceived and + therefore visible. Now, for any object to contain several distinct + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page169">[pg 169]</span><a name= + "Pg169" id="Pg169" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> visible parts, and + at the same time to be a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span>, is a manifest contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">82. Of these + visible points we see at all times an equal number. It is every + whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near + objects as when it is extended to larger and remoter ones. For, it + being impossible that one <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> should obscure or keep out of sight more + than one other, it is a plain consequence that, when my view is on + all sides bounded by the walls of my study, I see just as many + visible points as I could in case that, by the removal of the + study-walls and all other obstructions, I had a full prospect of + the circumjacent fields, mountains, sea, and open firmament. For, + so long as I am shut up within the walls, by their interposition + every point of the external objects is covered from my view. But, + each point that is seen being able to cover or exclude from sight + one only other corresponding point, it follows that, whilst my + sight is confined to those narrow walls, I see as many points, or + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minima visibilia</span></span>, as I should + were those walls away, by looking on all the external objects whose + prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever, therefore, we are said + to have a greater prospect at one time than another, this must be + understood with relation, not to the proper and immediate, but the + secondary and mediate objects of vision—which, as hath been shewn, + do properly belong to the touch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">83. The visive + faculty, considered with reference to its immediate objects, may be + found to labour of two defects. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + in respect of the extent or number of visible points that are at + once perceivable by it, which is narrow and limited to a certain + degree. It can take in at one view but a certain determinate number + of <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minima + visibilia</span></span>, beyond which it cannot extend its + prospect. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, our sight is defective + in that its view is not only narrow, but also for the most part + confused. Of those things that we take in at one prospect, we can + see but a few at once clearly and unconfusedly; and the more we fix + our sight on any one object, by so much the darker and more + indistinct shall the rest appear.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">84. + Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may imagine as many + perfections, to wit, 1st. That of comprehending in one view a + greater number of visible points; <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page170">[pg 170]</span><a name="Pg170" id="Pg170" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> 2dly, of being able to view them all equally + and at once, with the utmost clearness and distinction. That those + perfections are not actually in some intelligences of a different + order and capacity from ours, it is impossible for us to know<a id= + "noteref_376" name="noteref_376" href="#note_376"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">376</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">85. In neither + of those two ways do microscopes contribute to the improvement of + sight. For, when we look through a microscope, we neither see more + visible points, nor are the collateral points more distinct, than + when we look with the naked eye at objects placed at a due + distance. A microscope brings us, as it were, into a new world. It + presents us with a new scene of visible objects, quite different + from what we behold with the naked eye. But herein consists the + most remarkable difference, to wit, that whereas the objects + perceived by the eye alone have a certain connexion with tangible + objects, whereby we are taught to foresee what will ensue upon the + approach or application of distant objects to the parts of our own + body—which much conduceth to its preservation<a id="noteref_377" + name="noteref_377" href="#note_377"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">377</span></span></a>—there + is not the like connexion between things tangible and those visible + objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">86. Hence, it is + evident that, were our eyes turned into the nature of microscopes, + we should not be much benefitted by the change. We should be + deprived of the forementioned advantage we at present receive by + the visive faculty, and have left us only the empty amusement of + seeing, without any other benefit arising from it. But, in that + case, it will perhaps be said, our sight would be endued with a far + greater sharpness and penetration than it now hath. But I would + fain know wherein consists that sharpness which is esteemed so + great an excellency of sight. It is certain, from what we have + already shewn<a id="noteref_378" name="noteref_378" href= + "#note_378"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">378</span></span></a>, that + the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> is never greater or lesser, but in all cases + constantly the same. And in the case of microscopical eyes, I see + only this difference, to wit, that upon the ceasing of a certain + observable connexion betwixt the divers perceptions of sight and + touch, which before enabled us to <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page171">[pg 171]</span><a name="Pg171" id="Pg171" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> regulate our actions by the eye, it would now + be rendered utterly unserviceable to that purpose.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">87. Upon the + whole, it seems that if we consider the use and end of sight, + together with the present state and circumstances of our being, we + shall not find any great cause to complain of any defect or + imperfection in it, or easily conceive how it could be mended. With + such admirable wisdom is that faculty contrived, both for the + pleasure and convenience of life.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">88. Having + finished what I intended to say concerning the Distance and + Magnitude of objects, I come now to treat of the manner wherein the + mind perceives by sight their Situation<a id="noteref_379" name= + "noteref_379" href="#note_379"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">379</span></span></a>. + Among the discoveries of the last age, it is reputed none of the + least, that the manner of vision has been more clearly explained + than ever it had been before. There is, at this day, no one + ignorant that the pictures of external objects are painted on the + retina or fund of the eye; that we can see nothing which is not so + painted; and that, according as the picture is more distinct or + confused, so also is the perception we have of the object<a id= + "noteref_380" name="noteref_380" href="#note_380"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">380</span></span></a>. But + then, in this explication of vision, there occurs one mighty + difficulty, viz. the objects are painted in an inverted order on + the bottom of the eye: the upper part of any object being painted + on the lower part of the eye, and the lower part of the object on + the upper part of the eye; and so also as to right and left. Since + therefore the pictures are thus inverted, it is demanded, how it + comes to pass that we see the objects erect and in their natural + posture?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 80%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/vision-fig-4.png" alt="Illustration" title= + "Figure 4" /> + + <div class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + Figure 4 + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">89. In answer to + this difficulty, we are told that the mind, perceiving an impulse + of a ray of light on the upper part of the eye, considers this ray + as coming in a direct line from the lower part of the object; and, + in like manner, tracing the ray that strikes on the lower part of + the eye, it is directed to the upper part of the object. Thus, in + the adjacent figure, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">C</span></span>, the lower point of the object + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ABC</span></span>, is projected on + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">c</span></span> the upper part of the eye. So + likewise, the highest point <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span> is projected on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></span> the + lowest part of the eye; which makes the representation <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">cba</span></span> + inverted. But the mind—considering <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page172">[pg 172]</span><a name="Pg172" id="Pg172" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the stroke that is made on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">c</span></span> as + coming in the straight line <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cc</span></span> from the lower end of the + object; and the stroke or impulse on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></span>, as + coming in the line <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Aa</span></span> from the upper end of the + object—is directed to make a right judgment of the situation of the + object <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ABC</span></span>, notwithstanding the picture + of it be inverted. Moreover, this is illustrated by conceiving a + blind man, who, holding in his hands two sticks that cross each + other, doth with them touch the extremities of an object, placed in + a perpendicular situation<a id="noteref_381" name="noteref_381" + href="#note_381"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">381</span></span></a>. It + is certain this man will judge that to be the upper part of the + object which he touches with the stick held in the undermost hand, + and that to be the lower part of the object which he touches with + the stick in his uppermost hand. This is the common explication of + the erect appearance of objects, which is generally received and + acquiesced in, being (as Mr. Molyneux tells us, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Diopt.</span></span> + part ii. ch. vii. p. 289) <span class="tei tei-q">“allowed by all + men as satisfactory.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">90. But this + account to me does not seem in any degree true. Did I perceive + those impulses, decussations, and directions of the rays of light, + in like manner as hath been set forth, then, indeed, it would not + at first view be altogether void of probability. And there might be + some pretence for the comparison of the blind man and his cross + sticks. But the case is far otherwise. I know very well that I + perceive no such thing. And, of consequence, I cannot thereby make + an estimate of the situation of objects. Moreover, I appeal to any + one's experience, whether he be conscious to himself that he thinks + on the intersection made by the radius pencils, or pursues the + impulses they give in right lines, whenever he perceives by sight + the position of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page173">[pg + 173]</span><a name="Pg173" id="Pg173" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + any object? To me it seems evident that crossing and tracing of the + rays, &c. is never thought on by children, idiots, or, in + truth, by any other, save only those who have applied themselves to + the study of optics. And for the mind to judge of the situation of + objects by those things without perceiving them, or to perceive + them without knowing it<a id="noteref_382" name="noteref_382" href= + "#note_382"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">382</span></span></a>, take + which you please, it is perfectly beyond my comprehension. Add to + this, that the explaining the manner of vision by the example of + cross sticks, and hunting for the object along the axes of the + radius pencils, doth suppose the proper objects of sight to be + perceived at a distance from us, contrary to what hath been + demonstrated<a id="noteref_383" name="noteref_383" href= + "#note_383"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">383</span></span></a>. [We + may therefore venture to pronounce this opinion, concerning the way + wherein the mind perceives the erect appearance of objects, to be + of a piece with those other tenets of writers in optics, which in + the foregoing parts of this treatise we have had occasion to + examine and refute<a id="noteref_384" name="noteref_384" href= + "#note_384"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">384</span></span></a>.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">91. It remains, + therefore, that we look for some other explication of this + difficulty. And I believe it not impossible to find one, provided + we examine it to the bottom, and carefully distinguish between the + ideas of sight and touch; which cannot be too oft inculcated in + treating of vision<a id="noteref_385" name="noteref_385" href= + "#note_385"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">385</span></span></a>. But, + more especially throughout the consideration of this affair, we + ought to carry that distinction in our thoughts; for that from want + of a right understanding thereof, the difficulty of explaining + erect vision seems chiefly to arise.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">92. In order to + disentangle our minds from whatever prejudices we may entertain + with relation to the subject in hand, nothing seems more apposite + than the taking into our thoughts the case of one born blind, and + afterwards, when grown up, made to see. And—though perhaps it may + not be a task altogether easy and familiar to us, to divest + ourselves entirely of the experiences received from sight, so as to + be able to put our thoughts exactly in the posture of such a + one's—we must, nevertheless, as far as possible, endeavour to frame + true conceptions of what might reasonably be supposed to pass in + his mind<a id="noteref_386" name="noteref_386" href= + "#note_386"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">386</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page174">[pg 174]</span><a name="Pg174" id="Pg174" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">93. It is + certain that a man actually blind, and who had continued so from + his birth, would, by the sense of feeling, attain to have ideas of + upper and lower. By the motion of his hand, he might discern the + situation of any tangible object placed within his reach. That part + on which he felt himself supported, or towards which he perceived + his body to gravitate, he would term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">lower</span></em>, + and the contrary to this <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">upper</span></em>; and accordingly denominate + whatsoever objects he touched.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">94. But then, + whatever judgments he makes concerning the situation of objects are + confined to those only that are perceivable by touch. All those + things that are intangible, and of a spiritual nature—his thoughts + and desires, his passions, and in general all the modifications of + his soul—to these he would never apply the terms upper and lower, + except only in a metaphorical sense. He may perhaps, by way of + allusion, speak of high or low thoughts: but those terms, in their + proper signification, would never be applied to anything that was + not conceived to exist without the mind. For, a man born blind, and + remaining in the same state, could mean nothing else by the words + higher and lower than a greater or lesser distance from the earth; + which distance he would measure by the motion or application of his + hand, or some other part of his body. It is, therefore, evident + that all those things which, in respect of each other, would by him + be thought higher or lower, must be such as were conceived to exist + without his mind, in the ambient space<a id="noteref_387" name= + "noteref_387" href="#note_387"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">387</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">95. Whence it + plainly follows, that such a one, if we suppose him made to see, + would not at first sight think that anything he saw was high or + low, erect or inverted. For, it hath been already demonstrated, in + sect. 41, that he would not think the things he perceived by sight + to be at any distance from him, or without his mind. The objects to + which he had hitherto been used to apply the terms up and down, + high and low, were such only as affected, or were some way + perceived by his touch. But the proper <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page175">[pg 175]</span><a name="Pg175" id="Pg175" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> objects of vision make a new set of ideas, + perfectly distinct and different from the former, and which can in + no sort make themselves perceived by touch. There is, therefore, + nothing at all that could induce him to think those terms + applicable to them. Nor would he ever think it, till such time as + he had observed their connexion with tangible objects, and the same + prejudice<a id="noteref_388" name="noteref_388" href= + "#note_388"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">388</span></span></a> began + to insinuate itself into his understanding, which, from their + infancy, had grown up in the understandings of other men.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">96. To set this + matter in a clearer light, I shall make use of an example. Suppose + the above-mentioned blind person, by his touch, perceives a man to + stand erect. Let us inquire into the manner of this. By the + application of his hand to the several parts of a human body, he + had perceived different tangible ideas; which being collected into + sundry complex ones<a id="noteref_389" name="noteref_389" href= + "#note_389"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">389</span></span></a> have + distinct names annexed to them. Thus, one combination of a certain + tangible figure, bulk, and consistency of parts is called the head; + another the hand; a third the foot, and so of the rest—all which + complex ideas could, in his understanding, be made up only of ideas + perceivable by touch. He had also, by his touch, obtained an idea + of earth or ground, towards which he perceives the parts of his + body to have a natural tendency. Now—by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">erect</span></em> + nothing more being meant than that perpendicular position of a man + wherein his feet are nearest to the earth—if the blind person, by + moving his hand over the parts of the man who stands before him, do + perceive the tangible ideas that compose the head to be farthest + from, and those that compose the feet to be nearest to, that other + combination of tangible ideas which he calls earth, he will + denominate that man erect. But, if we suppose him on a sudden to + receive his sight, and that he behold a man standing before him, it + is evident, in that case, he would neither judge the man he sees to + be erect nor inverted; for he, never having known those terms + applied to any other save tangible things, or which existed in the + space without him, and what he sees neither being tangible, nor + perceived as existing without, he could not <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page176">[pg 176]</span><a name="Pg176" id="Pg176" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> know that, in propriety of language, + they were applicable to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">97. Afterwards, + when, upon turning his head or eyes up and down to the right and + left, he shall observe the visible objects to change, and shall + also attain to know that they are called by the same names, and + connected with the objects perceived by touch; then, indeed, he + will come to speak of them and their situation in the same terms + that he has been used to apply to tangible things: and those that + he perceives by turning up his eyes he will call upper, and those + that by turning down his eyes he will call lower.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">98. And this + seems to me the true reason why he should think those objects + uppermost that are painted on the lower part of his eye. For, by + turning the eye up they shall be distinctly seen; as likewise they + that are painted on the highest part of the eye shall be distinctly + seen by turning the eye down, and are for that reason esteemed + lowest. For we have shewn that to the immediate objects of sight, + considered in themselves, he would not attribute the terms high and + low. It must therefore be on account of some circumstances which + are observed to attend them. And these, it is plain, are the + actions of turning the eye up and down, which suggest a very + obvious reason why the mind should denominate the objects of sight + accordingly high or low. And, without this motion of the eye—this + turning it up and down in order to discern different + objects—doubtless <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">erect</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inverse</span></em>, and other the like terms + relating to the position of tangible objects, would never have been + transferred, or in any degree apprehended to belong to the ideas of + sight, the mere act of seeing including nothing in it to that + purpose; whereas the different situations of the eye naturally + direct the mind to make a suitable judgment of the situation of + objects intromitted by it<a id="noteref_390" name="noteref_390" + href="#note_390"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">390</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">99. Farther, + when he has by experience learned the connexion there is between + the several ideas of sight and touch, he will be able, by the + perception he has of the situation of visible things in respect of + one another, to make a sudden and true estimate of the situation of + outward, tangible things corresponding to them. And thus + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page177">[pg 177]</span><a name= + "Pg177" id="Pg177" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> it is he shall + perceive<a id="noteref_391" name="noteref_391" href= + "#note_391"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">391</span></span></a> by + sight the situation of external<a id="noteref_392" name= + "noteref_392" href="#note_392"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">392</span></span></a> + objects, which do not properly fall under that sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">100. I know we + are very prone to think that, if just made to see, we should judge + of the situation of visible things as we do now. But, we are also + as prone to think that, at first sight, we should in the same way + apprehend the distance and magnitude of objects, as we do now; + which hath been shewn to be a false and groundless persuasion. And, + for the like reasons, the same censure may be passed on the + positive assurance that most men, before they have thought + sufficiently of the matter, might have of their being able to + determine by the eye, at first view, whether objects were erect or + inverse.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">101. It will + perhaps be objected to our opinion, that a man, for instance, being + thought erect when his feet are next the earth, and inverted when + his head is next the earth, it doth hence follow that, by the mere + act of vision, without any experience or altering the situation of + the eye, we should have determined whether he were erect or + inverted. For both the earth itself, and the limbs of the man who + stands thereon, being equally perceived by sight, one cannot choose + seeing what part of the man is nearest the earth, and what part + farthest from it, i.e. whether he be erect or inverted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">102. To which I + answer, the ideas which constitute the tangible earth and man are + entirely different from those which constitute the visible earth + and man. Nor was it possible, by virtue of the visive faculty + alone, without superadding any experience of touch, or altering the + position of the eye, ever to have known, or so much as suspected, + there had been any relation or connexion between them. Hence, a man + at first view would not denominate anything he saw, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">earth</span></em>, + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">head</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">foot</span></em>; + and consequently, he could not tell, by the mere act of vision, + whether the head or feet were nearest the earth. Nor, indeed, would + we have thereby any thought of earth or man, erect or inverse, at + all—which will be made yet <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page178">[pg 178]</span><a name="Pg178" id="Pg178" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> more evident, if we nicely observe, and make + a particular comparison between, the ideas of both senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">103. That which + I see is only variety of light and colours. That which I feel is + hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similitude, what + connexion, have those ideas with these? Or, how is it possible that + any one should see reason to give one and the same name<a id= + "noteref_393" name="noteref_393" href="#note_393"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">393</span></span></a> to + combinations of ideas so very different, before he had experienced + their co-existence? We do not find there is any necessary connexion + betwixt this or that tangible quality, and any colour whatsoever. + And we may sometimes perceive colours, where there is nothing to be + felt. All which doth make it manifest that no man, at first + receiving of his sight<a id="noteref_394" name="noteref_394" href= + "#note_394"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">394</span></span></a>, + would know there was any agreement between this or that particular + object of his sight and any object of touch he had been already + acquainted with. The colours therefore of the head would to him no + more suggest the idea of head<a id="noteref_395" name="noteref_395" + href="#note_395"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">395</span></span></a> than + they would the idea of feet.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">104. Farther, we + have at large shewn (vid. sect. 63 and 64) there is no discoverable + necessary connexion between any given visible magnitude and any one + particular tangible magnitude; but that it is entirely the result + of custom and experience, and depends on foreign and accidental + circumstances, that we can, by the perception of visible extension, + inform ourselves what may be the extension of any tangible object + connected with it. Hence, it is certain, that neither the visible + magnitude of head or foot would bring along with them into the + mind, at first opening of the eyes, the respective tangible + magnitudes of those parts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">105. By the + foregoing section, it is plain the visible figure of any part of + the body hath no necessary connexion with the tangible figure + thereof, so as at first sight to suggest it to the mind. For, + figure is the termination of magnitude. Whence it follows that no + visible magnitude having in its own nature an aptness to suggest + any one particular tangible magnitude, so neither can any visible + figure be inseparably connected with its corresponding tangible + figure, so as of itself, and in a way prior to experience, it might + suggest it <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page179">[pg + 179]</span><a name="Pg179" id="Pg179" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + to the understanding. This will be farther evident, if we consider + that what seems smooth and round to the touch may to sight, if + viewed through a microscope, seem quite otherwise.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">106. From all + which, laid together and duly considered, we may clearly deduce + this inference:—In the first act of vision, no idea entering by the + eye would have a perceivable connexion with the ideas to which the + names earth, man, head, foot, &c. were annexed in the + understanding of a person blind from his birth; so as in any sort + to introduce them into his mind, or make themselves be called by + the same names, and reputed the same things with them, as + afterwards they come to be.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">107. There doth, + nevertheless, remain one difficulty, which to some may seem to + press hard on our opinion, and deserve not to be passed over. For, + though it be granted that neither the colour, size, nor figure of + the visible feet have any necessary connexion with the ideas that + compose the tangible feet, so as to bring them at first sight into + my mind, or make me in danger of confounding them, before I had + been used to and for some time experienced their connexion; yet + thus much seems undeniable, namely, that the number of the visible + feet being the same with that of the tangible feet, I may from + hence, without any experience of sight, reasonably conclude that + they represent or are connected with the feet rather than the head. + I say, it seems the idea of two visible feet will sooner suggest to + the mind the idea of two tangible feet than of one head—so that the + blind man, upon first reception of the visive faculty, might know + which were the feet or two, and which the head or one.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">108. In order to + get clear of this seeming difficulty, we need only observe that + diversity of visible objects does not necessarily infer diversity + of tangible objects corresponding to them. A picture painted with + great variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner; + it is therefore evident that I do not, by any necessary + consecution, independent of experience, judge of the number of + things tangible from the number of things visible. I should not + therefore at first opening my eyes conclude that because I see two + I shall feel two. How, therefore, can I, before experience teaches + me, know that the visible legs, because <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page180">[pg 180]</span><a name="Pg180" id="Pg180" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> two, are connected with the tangible legs; or + the visible head, because one, is connected with the tangible head? + The truth is, the things I see are so very different and + heterogeneous from the things I feel that the perception of the one + would never have suggested the other to my thoughts, or enabled me + to pass the least judgment thereon, until I had experienced their + connexion<a id="noteref_396" name="noteref_396" href= + "#note_396"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">396</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">109. But, for a + fuller illustration of this matter, it ought to be considered, that + number (however some may reckon it amongst the primary + qualities<a id="noteref_397" name="noteref_397" href= + "#note_397"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">397</span></span></a>) is + nothing fixed and settled, really existing in things themselves. It + is entirely the creature of the mind, considering either a simple + idea by itself, or any combination of simple ideas to which it + gives one name, and so makes it pass for a unit. According as the + mind variously combines its ideas, the unit varies; and as the + unit, so the number, which is only a collection of units, doth also + vary. We call a window one, a chimney one; and yet a house, in + which there are many windows and many chimneys, has an equal right + to be called one; and many houses go to the making of one city. In + these and the like instances, it is evident the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">unit</span></em> + constantly relates to the particular draughts the mind makes of its + ideas, to which it affixes names, and wherein it <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page181">[pg 181]</span><a name="Pg181" id="Pg181" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> includes more or less, as best suits + its own ends and purposes. Whatever therefore the mind considers as + one, that is an unit. Every combination of ideas is considered as + one thing by the mind, and in token thereof is marked by one name. + Now, this naming and combining together of ideas is perfectly + arbitrary, and done by the mind in such sort as experience shews it + to be most convenient—without which our ideas had never been + collected into such sundry distinct combinations as they now + are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">110. Hence, it + follows that a man born blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made + to see, would not, in the first act of vision, parcel out the ideas + of sight into the same distinct collections that others do who have + experienced which do regularly co-exist and are proper to be + bundled up together under one name. He would not, for example, make + into one complex idea, and thereby esteem and unite all those + particular ideas which constitute the visible head or foot. For, + there can be no reason assigned why he should do so, barely upon + his seeing a man stand upright before him. There crowd into his + mind the ideas which compose the visible man, in company with all + the other ideas of sight perceived at the same time. But, all these + ideas offered at once to his view he would not distribute into + sundry distinct combinations, till such time as, by observing the + motion of the parts of the man and other experiences, he comes to + know which are to be separated and which to be collected + together<a id="noteref_398" name="noteref_398" href= + "#note_398"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">398</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">111. From what + hath been premised, it is plain the objects of sight and touch + make, if I may so say, two sets of ideas, which are widely + different from each other. To objects of either kind we + indifferently attribute the terms high and low, right and left, and + such like, denoting the position or situation of things; but then + we must well observe that the position of any object is determined + with respect only to objects of the same sense. We say any object + of touch is high or low, according as it is more or less distant + from the tangible earth: and in like manner we <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page182">[pg 182]</span><a name="Pg182" id="Pg182" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> denominate any object of sight high or + low, in proportion as it is more or less distant from the visible + earth. But, to define the situation of visible things with relation + to the distance they bear from any tangible thing, or <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vice versa</span></span>, this were absurd and + perfectly unintelligible. For all visible things are equally in the + mind, and take up no part of the external space; and consequently + are equidistant from any tangible thing which exists without the + mind<a id="noteref_399" name="noteref_399" href= + "#note_399"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">399</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">112. Or rather, + to speak truly, the proper objects of sight are at no distance, + neither near nor far from any tangible thing. For, if we inquire + narrowly into the matter, we shall find that those things only are + compared together in respect of distance which exist after the same + manner, or appertain unto the same sense. For, by the distance + between any two points, nothing more is meant than the number of + intermediate points. If the given points are visible, the distance + between them is marked out by the number of the interjacent visible + points; if they are tangible, the distance between them is a line + consisting of tangible points; but, if they are one tangible and + the other visible, the distance between them doth neither consist + of points perceivable by sight nor by touch, i.e. it is utterly + inconceivable<a id="noteref_400" name="noteref_400" href= + "#note_400"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">400</span></span></a>. + This, perhaps, will not find an easy admission into all men's + understanding. However, I should gladly be informed whether it be + not true, by any one who will be at the pains to reflect a little, + and apply it home to his thoughts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">113. The not + observing what has been delivered in the two last sections, seems + to have occasioned no small part of the difficulty that occurs in + the business of direct appearances. The head, which is painted + nearest the earth, seems to be farthest from it; and on the other + hand, the feet, which are painted farthest from the earth, are + thought nearest to it. Herein lies the difficulty, which vanishes + if we express the thing more clearly and free from ambiguity, + thus:—How comes it that, to the eye, the visible head, which is + nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page183">[pg 183]</span><a name="Pg183" id="Pg183" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> earth; and the visible feet, which are + farthest from the tangible earth, seem nearest the earth? The + question being thus proposed, who sees not the difficulty is + founded on a supposition that the eye or visive faculty, or rather + the soul by means thereof, should judge of the situation of visible + objects with reference to their distance from the tangible earth? + Whereas, it is evident the tangible earth is not perceived by + sight. And it hath been shewn, in the two last preceding sections, + that the location of visible objects is determined only by the + distance they bear from one another, and that it is nonsense to + talk of distance, far or near, between a visible and tangible + thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">114. If we + confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight, the whole is + plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from, and the feet + nearest to, the visible earth; and so they appear to be. What is + there strange or unaccountable in this? Let us suppose the pictures + in the fund of the eye to be the immediate objects of sight<a id= + "noteref_401" name="noteref_401" href="#note_401"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">401</span></span></a>. The + consequence is that things should appear in the same posture they + are painted in; and is it not so? The head which is seen seems + farthest from the earth which is seen; and the feet which are seen + seem nearest to the earth which is seen. And just so they are + painted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">115. But, say + you, the picture of the man is inverted, and yet the appearance is + erect. I ask, what mean you by the picture of the man, or, which is + the same thing, the visible man's being inverted? You tell me it is + inverted, because the heels are uppermost and the head undermost? + Explain me this. You say that by the head's being undermost, you + mean that it is nearest to the earth; and, by the heels being + uppermost, that they are farthest from the earth. I ask again, what + earth you mean? You cannot mean the earth that is painted on the + eye or the visible earth—for the picture of the head is farthest + from the picture of the earth, and the picture of the feet nearest + to the picture of the earth; and accordingly the visible head is + farthest from the visible earth, and the visible feet nearest to + it. It remains, therefore, that you mean the tangible earth; and so + determine the situation of visible things with respect to tangible + things—contrary to what hath been demonstrated in sect. 111 and + 112. The two <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page184">[pg + 184]</span><a name="Pg184" id="Pg184" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + distinct provinces of sight and touch should be considered apart, + and as though their objects had no intercourse, no manner of + relation to one another, in point of distance or position<a id= + "noteref_402" name="noteref_402" href="#note_402"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">402</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">116. Farther, + what greatly contributes to make us mistake in this matter is that, + when we think of the pictures in the fund of the eye, we imagine + ourselves looking on the fund of another's eye, or another looking + on the fund of our own eye, and beholding the pictures painted + thereon. Suppose two eyes, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span>. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span> from some distance looking on + the pictures in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span> sees them inverted, and for + that reason concludes they are inverted in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span>. But + this is wrong. There are projected in little on the bottom of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span> the images of the pictures of, + suppose, man, earth, &c., which are painted on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span>. And, + besides these, the eye <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span> itself, and the objects which + environ it, together with another earth, are projected in a larger + size on <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span>. Now, by the eye <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span> these + larger images are deemed the true objects, and the lesser only + pictures in miniature. And it is with respect to those greater + images that it determines the situation of the smaller images; so + that, comparing the little man with the great earth, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span> + judges him inverted, or that the feet are farthest from and the + head nearest to the great earth. Whereas, if <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span> + compare the little man with the little earth, then he will appear + erect, i.e. his head shall seem farthest from and his feet nearest + to the little earth. But we must consider that <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span> does + not see two earths as <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span> does. It sees only what is + represented by the little pictures in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span>, and + consequently shall judge the man erect. For, in truth, the man in + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span> is not inverted, for there the + feet are next the earth; but it is the representation of it in + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">A</span></span> which is inverted, for there + the head of the representation of the picture of the man in + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span> is next the earth, and the + feet farthest from the earth—meaning the earth which is without the + representation of the pictures in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span>. For, + if you take the little linages of the pictures in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">B</span></span>, and + consider them by themselves, and with respect only to one another, + they are all erect and in their natural posture.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page185">[pg 185]</span><a name="Pg185" id="Pg185" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">117. Farther, + there lies a mistake in our imagining that the pictures of + external<a id="noteref_403" name="noteref_403" href= + "#note_403"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">403</span></span></a> + objects are painted on the bottom of the eye. It has been shewn + there is no resemblance between the ideas of sight and things + tangible. It hath likewise been demonstrated<a id="noteref_404" + name="noteref_404" href="#note_404"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">404</span></span></a>, that + the proper objects of sight do not exist without the mind. Whence + it clearly follows that the pictures painted on the bottom of the + eye are not the pictures of external objects. Let any one consult + his own thoughts, and then tell me, what affinity, what likeness, + there is between that certain variety and disposition of colours + which constitute the visible man, or picture of a man, and that + other combination of far different ideas, sensible by touch, which + compose the tangible man. But, if this be the case, how come they + to be accounted pictures or images, since that supposes them to + copy or represent some originals or other?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">118. To which I + answer—In the forementioned instance, the eye <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span> takes + the little images, included within the representation of the other + eye <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span>, to be pictures or copies, + whereof the archetypes are not things existing without<a id= + "noteref_405" name="noteref_405" href="#note_405"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">405</span></span></a>, but + the larger pictures<a id="noteref_406" name="noteref_406" href= + "#note_406"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">406</span></span></a> + projected on its own fund; and which by <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span> are + not thought pictures, but the originals or true things themselves. + Though if we suppose a third eye <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">C</span></span>, from + a due distance, to behold the fund of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span>, then + indeed the things projected thereon shall, to <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">C</span></span>, seem + pictures or images, in the same sense that those projected on + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">B</span></span> do to <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">119. Rightly to + conceive the business in hand, we must carefully distinguish + between the ideas of sight and touch, between the visible and + tangible eye; for certainly on the tangible eye nothing either is + or seems to be painted. Again, the visible eye, as well as all + other visible objects, hath been shewn to exist only in the + mind<a id="noteref_407" name="noteref_407" href= + "#note_407"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">407</span></span></a>; + which, perceiving its own ideas, and comparing them together, does + call some pictures in respect to others. What hath been said, being + rightly comprehended and laid together, does, I think, afford a + full and genuine explication of the erect appearance of + objects—which phenomenon, I must <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page186">[pg 186]</span><a name="Pg186" id="Pg186" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> confess, I do not see how it can be explained + by any theories of vision hitherto made public.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">120. In treating + of these things, the use of language is apt to occasion some + obscurity and confusion, and create in us wrong ideas. For, + language being accommodated to the common notions and prejudices of + men, it is scarce possible to deliver the naked and precise truth, + without great circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an unwary + reader) seeming contradictions. I do, therefore, once for all, + desire whoever shall think it worth his while to understand what I + have written concerning vision, that he would not stick in this or + that phrase or manner of expression, but candidly collect my + meaning from the whole sum and tenor of my discourse, and, laying + aside the words<a id="noteref_408" name="noteref_408" href= + "#note_408"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">408</span></span></a> as + much as possible, consider the bare notions themselves, and then + judge whether they are agreeable to truth and his own experience or + no.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">121. We have + shewn the way wherein the mind, by mediation of visible ideas<a id= + "noteref_409" name="noteref_409" href="#note_409"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">409</span></span></a>, doth + perceive or apprehend the distance, magnitude, and situation of + tangible objects<a id="noteref_410" name="noteref_410" href= + "#note_410"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">410</span></span></a>. I + come now to inquire more particularly concerning the difference + between the ideas of sight and touch which are called by the same + names, and see whether there be any idea common to both + senses<a id="noteref_411" name="noteref_411" href= + "#note_411"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">411</span></span></a>. From + what we have at large set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing + parts of this treatise, it is plain there is no one self-same + numerical extension, perceived both by sight and touch; but that + the particular figures and extensions perceived by sight, however + they may be called by the same names, and reputed the same things + with those perceived by touch, are nevertheless different, and have + an existence very distinct and <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page187">[pg 187]</span><a name="Pg187" id="Pg187" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> separate from them. So that the question is + not now concerning the same numerical ideas, but whether there be + any one and the same sort or species of ideas equally perceivable + to both senses? or, in other words, whether extension, figure, and + motion perceived by sight, are not specifically distinct from + extension, figure, and motion perceived by touch?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">122. But, before + I come more particularly to discuss this matter, I find it proper + to take into my thoughts extension in abstract<a id="noteref_412" + name="noteref_412" href="#note_412"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">412</span></span></a>. For + of this there is much talk; and I am apt to think that when men + speak of extension as being an idea common to two senses, it is + with a secret supposition that we can single out extension from all + other tangible and visible qualities, and form thereof an abstract + idea, which idea they will have common both to sight and touch. We + are therefore to understand by extension in abstract, an idea<a id= + "noteref_413" name="noteref_413" href="#note_413"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">413</span></span></a> of + extension—for instance, a line or surface entirely stripped of all + other sensible qualities and circumstances that might determine it + to any particular existence; it is neither black, nor white, nor + red, nor hath it any colour at all, or any tangible quality + whatsoever, and consequently it is of no finite determinate + magnitude<a id="noteref_414" name="noteref_414" href= + "#note_414"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">414</span></span></a>; for + that which bounds or distinguishes one extension from another is + some quality or circumstance wherein they disagree.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">123. Now, I do + not find that I can perceive, imagine, or anywise frame in my mind + such an abstract idea as is here spoken of. A line or surface which + is neither black, nor white, nor blue, nor yellow, &c.; nor + long, nor short, nor rough, nor smooth, nor square, nor round, + &c. is perfectly incomprehensible. This I am sure of as to + myself; how far the faculties of other men may reach they best can + tell.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">124. It is + commonly said that the object of geometry is <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page188">[pg 188]</span><a name="Pg188" id="Pg188" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> abstract extension. But geometry + contemplates figures: now, figure is the termination of + magnitude<a id="noteref_415" name="noteref_415" href= + "#note_415"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">415</span></span></a>; but + we have shewn that extension in abstract hath no finite determinate + magnitude; whence it clearly follows that it can have no figure, + and consequently is not the object of geometry. It is indeed a + tenet, as well of the modern as the ancient philosophers, that all + general truths are concerning universal abstract ideas; without + which, we are told, there could be no science, no demonstration of + any general proposition in geometry. But it were no hard matter, + did I think it necessary to my present purpose, to shew that + propositions and demonstrations in geometry might be universal, + though they who make them never think of abstract general ideas of + triangles or circles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">125. After + reiterated efforts and pangs of thought<a id="noteref_416" name= + "noteref_416" href="#note_416"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">416</span></span></a> to + apprehend the general idea of a triangle<a id="noteref_417" name= + "noteref_417" href="#note_417"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">417</span></span></a>, I + have found it altogether incomprehensible. And surely, if any one + were able to let that idea into my mind, it must be the + author<a id="noteref_418" name="noteref_418" href= + "#note_418"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">418</span></span></a> of + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay + concerning Human Understanding</span></span>: he, who has so far + distinguished himself from the generality of writers, by the + clearness and significancy of what he says. Let us therefore see + how this celebrated author<a id="noteref_419" name="noteref_419" + href="#note_419"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">419</span></span></a> + describes the general or [which is the same thing, the<a id= + "noteref_420" name="noteref_420" href="#note_420"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">420</span></span></a>] + abstract idea of a triangle. <span class="tei tei-q">“It must + be,”</span> says he, <span class="tei tei-q">“neither oblique nor + rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenum; but all + and none of these at once. In effect it is somewhat imperfect that + cannot exist; an idea, wherein some parts of several different and + inconsistent ideas are put together.”</span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on Human + Understanding</span></span>, B. iv. ch. 7. s. 9.) This is the idea + which he thinks needful for the enlargement of knowledge, which is + the subject of mathematical demonstration, and without which we + could never come to know any general proposition <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page189">[pg 189]</span><a name="Pg189" id="Pg189" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> concerning triangles. [Sure I am, if + this be the case, it is impossible for me to attain to know even + the first elements of geometry: since I have not the faculty to + frame in my mind such an idea as is here described<a id= + "noteref_421" name="noteref_421" href="#note_421"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">421</span></span></a>.] + That author acknowledges it doth <span class="tei tei-q">“require + some pains and skill to form this general idea of a + triangle.”</span> (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ibid.</span></span>) But, had he called to + mind what he says in another place, to wit, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“that ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent + ideas are put together, cannot so much as exist in the mind, i.e. + be conceived,”</span> (vid. B. iii. ch. 10. s. 33, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ibid.</span></span>)—I say, had this occurred + to his thoughts, it is not improbable he would have owned it above + all the pains and skill he was master of, to form the + above-mentioned idea of a triangle, which is made up of manifest + staring contradictions. That a man [of such a clear + understanding<a id="noteref_422" name="noteref_422" href= + "#note_422"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">422</span></span></a>], who + thought so much and so well, and laid so great a stress on clear + and determinate ideas, should nevertheless talk at this rate, seems + very surprising. But the wonder will lessen, if it be considered + that the source whence this opinion [of abstract figures and + extension <a id="noteref_423" name="noteref_423" href= + "#note_423"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">423</span></span></a>] + flows is the prolific womb which has brought forth innumerable + errors and difficulties, in all parts of philosophy, and in all the + sciences. But this matter, taken in its full extent, were a subject + too vast and comprehensive to be insisted on in this place<a id= + "noteref_424" name="noteref_424" href="#note_424"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">424</span></span></a>. [I + shall only observe that your metaphysicians and men of speculation + seem to have faculties distinct from those of ordinary men, when + they talk of general or abstracted triangles and circles, &c., + and so peremptorily declare them to be the subject of all the + eternal, immutable, universal truths in geometry<a id="noteref_425" + name="noteref_425" href="#note_425"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">425</span></span></a>.] And + so much for extension in abstract.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">126. Some, + perhaps, may think pure space, vacuum, or trine dimension, to be + equally the object of sight and touch<a id="noteref_426" name= + "noteref_426" href="#note_426"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">426</span></span></a>. But, + though we have a very great propension to think the ideas of + outness and space to be the immediate object of sight, yet, if I + mistake not, in the foregoing parts of this <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + that hath been clearly demonstrated <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page190">[pg 190]</span><a name="Pg190" id="Pg190" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> to be a mere delusion, arising from the quick + and sudden suggestion of fancy, which so closely connects the idea + of distance with those of sight, that we are apt to think it is + itself a proper and immediate object of that sense, till reason + corrects the mistake<a id="noteref_427" name="noteref_427" href= + "#note_427"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">427</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">127. It having + been shewn that there are no abstract ideas of figure, and that it + is impossible for us, by any precision of thought, to frame an idea + of extension separate from all other visible and tangible + qualities, which shall be common both to sight and touch—the + question now remaining is<a id="noteref_428" name="noteref_428" + href="#note_428"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">428</span></span></a>, + whether the particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived + by sight, be of the same kind with the particular extensions, + figures, and motions perceived by touch? In answer to which I shall + venture to lay down the following proposition:—<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">The extension, + figures, and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct + from the ideas of touch, called by the same names; nor is there any + such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common</span><a id= + "noteref_429" name="noteref_429" href="#note_429"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">429</span></span></a> + <span style="font-style: italic">to both senses.</span></em> This + proposition may, without much difficulty, be collected from what + hath been said in several places of this Essay. But, because it + seems so remote from, and contrary to the received notions and + settled opinion of mankind, I shall attempt to demonstrate it more + particularly and at large by the following arguments:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">128. [<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">First</span></em><a id="noteref_430" name= + "noteref_430" href="#note_430"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">430</span></span></a>,] + When, upon perception of an idea, I range it under this or that + sort, it is because it is perceived after the same manner, or + because it has a likeness or conformity with, or affects me in the + same way as the ideas of the sort I rank it under. In short, it + must not be entirely new, but have something in it old and already + perceived by me. It must, I say, have so much, at least, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page191">[pg 191]</span><a name= + "Pg191" id="Pg191" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in common with the + ideas I have before known and named, as to make me give it the same + name with them. But, it has been, if I mistake not, clearly made + out<a id="noteref_431" name="noteref_431" href= + "#note_431"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">431</span></span></a> that + a man born blind would not, at first reception of his sight, think + the things he saw were of the same nature with the objects of + touch, or had anything in common with them; but that they were a + new set of ideas, perceived in a new manner, and entirely different + from all he had ever perceived before. So that he would not call + them by the same name, nor repute them to be of the same sort, with + anything he had hitherto known. [And surely the judgment of such an + unprejudiced person is more to be relied on in this case than the + sentiments of the generality of men; who, in this as in almost + everything else, suffer themselves to be guided by custom, and the + erroneous suggestions of prejudice, rather than reason and sedate + reflection<a id="noteref_432" name="noteref_432" href= + "#note_432"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">432</span></span></a>.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">129. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, Light and colours are + allowed by all to constitute a sort or species entirely different + from the ideas of touch; nor will any man, I presume, say they can + make themselves perceived by that sense. But there is no other + immediate object of sight besides light and colours<a id= + "noteref_433" name="noteref_433" href="#note_433"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">433</span></span></a>. It + is therefore a direct consequence, that there is no idea common to + both senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">130. It is a + prevailing opinion, even amongst those who have thought and writ + most accurately concerning our ideas, and the ways whereby they + enter into the understanding, that something more is perceived by + sight than barely light and colours with their variations. [The + excellent<a id="noteref_434" name="noteref_434" href= + "#note_434"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">434</span></span></a>] Mr. + Locke termeth sight <span class="tei tei-q">“the most comprehensive + of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and + colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far + different ideas of space, figure, and motion.”</span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on Human + Understanding</span></span>, B. iii. ch. 9. s. 9.) Space or + distance<a id="noteref_435" name="noteref_435" href= + "#note_435"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">435</span></span></a>, we + have shewn, is no otherwise the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page192">[pg 192]</span><a name="Pg192" id="Pg192" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> object of sight than of hearing. (Vid. sect. + 46.) And, as for figure and extension, I leave it to any one that + shall calmly attend to his own clear and distinct ideas to decide + whether he has any idea intromitted immediately and properly by + sight save only light and colours: or, whether it be possible for + him to frame in his mind a distinct abstract idea of visible + extension, or figure, exclusive of all colour; and, on the other + hand, whether he can conceive colour without visible extension? For + my own part, I must confess, I am not able to attain so great a + nicety of abstraction. I know very well that, in a strict sense, I + see nothing but light and colours, with their several shades and + variations. He who beside these doth also perceive by sight ideas + far different and distinct from them, hath that faculty in a degree + more perfect and comprehensive than I can pretend to. It must be + owned, indeed, that, by the mediation of light and colours, other + far different ideas are suggested to my mind. But so they are by + hearing<a id="noteref_436" name="noteref_436" href= + "#note_436"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">436</span></span></a>. But + then, upon this score, I see no reason why the sight should be + thought more comprehensive than the hearing, which, beside sounds + which are peculiar to that sense, doth, by their mediation, suggest + not only space, figure, and motion, but also all other ideas + whatsoever that can be signified by words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">131. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thirdly</span></em>, It is, I think, an axiom + universally received, that <span class="tei tei-q">“quantities of + the same kind may be added together and make one entire + sum.”</span> Mathematicians add lines together; but they do not add + a line to a solid, or conceive it as making one sum with a surface. + These three kinds of quantity being thought incapable of any such + mutual addition, and consequently of being compared together in the + several ways of proportion, are by them for that reason esteemed + entirely disparate and heterogeneous. Now let any one try in his + thoughts to add a visible line or surface to a tangible line or + surface, so as to conceive them making one continued sum or whole. + He that can do this may think them homogeneous; but he that cannot + must, by the foregoing axiom, think them heterogeneous. [I + acknowledge myself to be of the latter sort<a id="noteref_437" + name="noteref_437" href="#note_437"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">437</span></span></a>.] A + blue and a red line I can conceive added together into one sum and + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page193">[pg 193]</span><a name= + "Pg193" id="Pg193" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> making one continued + line; but, to make, in my thoughts, one continued line of a visible + and tangible line added together, is, I find, a task far more + difficult, and even insurmountable—and I leave it to the reflection + and experience of every particular person to determine for + himself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">132. A farther + confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from the solution of Mr. + Molyneux's problem, published by Mr. Locke in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span><a id="noteref_438" name= + "noteref_438" href="#note_438"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">438</span></span></a>: + which I shall set down as it there lies, together with Mr. Locke's + opinion of it:—<span class="tei tei-q">“Suppose a man born blind, + and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a + cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same + bigness, so as to tell when he felt one and the other, which is the + cube, and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed + on a table, and the blind man made to see: Quære, Whether by his + sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, + which is the globe, which the cube. To which the acute and + judicious proposer answers: Not. For, though he has obtained the + experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has + not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch so or + so must affect his sight so or so: or that a protuberant angle in + the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye + as it doth in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom + I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem; + and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be + able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube, + whilst he only saw them.”</span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on Human + Understanding</span></span>, B. ii. ch. 9. s. 8.)</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">133. Now, if a + square surface perceived by touch be of the same sort with a square + surface perceived by sight, it is certain the blind man here + mentioned might know a square surface as soon as he saw it. It is + no more but introducing into his mind, by a new inlet, an idea he + has been already well acquainted with. Since therefore he is + supposed to have known by his touch that a cube is a body + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page194">[pg 194]</span><a name= + "Pg194" id="Pg194" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> terminated by square + surfaces; and that a sphere is not terminated by square + surfaces—upon the supposition that a visible and tangible square + differ only <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">in numero</span></span>, it + follows that he might know, by the unerring mark of the square + surfaces, which was the cube, and which not, while he only saw + them. We must therefore allow, either that visible extension and + figures are specifically distinct from tangible extension and + figures, or else, that the solution of this problem, given by those + two [very<a id="noteref_439" name="noteref_439" href= + "#note_439"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">439</span></span></a>] + thoughtful and ingenious men, is wrong.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">134. Much more + might be laid together in proof of the proposition I have advanced. + But, what has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to + convince any one that shall yield a reasonable attention. And, as + for those that will not be at the pains of a little thought, no + multiplication of words will ever suffice to make them understand + the truth, or rightly conceive my meaning<a id="noteref_440" name= + "noteref_440" href="#note_440"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">440</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">135. I cannot + let go the above-mentioned problem without some reflection on it. + It hath been made evident that a man blind from his birth would + not, at first sight, denominate anything he saw, by the names he + had been used to appropriate to ideas of touch. (Vid. sect. 106.) + Cube, sphere, table are words he has known applied to things + perceivable by touch, but to things perfectly intangible he never + knew them applied. Those words, in their wonted application, always + marked out to his mind bodies or solid things which were perceived + by the resistance they gave. But there is no solidity, no + resistance or protrusion, perceived by sight. In short, the ideas + of sight are all new perceptions, to which there be no names + annexed in his mind; he cannot therefore understand what is said to + him concerning them. And, to ask of the two bodies he saw placed on + the table, which was the sphere, which the cube, were to him a + question downright bantering and unintelligible; nothing he sees + being able to suggest to his thoughts the idea of body, distance, + or, in general, of anything he had already known.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">136. It is a + mistake to think the same<a id="noteref_441" name="noteref_441" + href="#note_441"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">441</span></span></a> thing + affects both sight and touch. If the same angle or square which is + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page195">[pg 195]</span><a name= + "Pg195" id="Pg195" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> object of touch be + also the object of vision, what should hinder the blind man, at + first sight, from knowing it? For, though the manner wherein it + affects the sight be different from that wherein it affected his + touch, yet, there being, beside this manner or circumstance, which + is new and unknown, the angle or figure, which is old and known, he + cannot choose but discern it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">137. Visible + figure and extension having been demonstrated to be of a nature + entirely different and heterogeneous from tangible figure and + extension, it remains that we inquire concerning motion. Now, that + visible motion is not of the same sort with tangible motion seems + to need no farther proof; it being an evident corollary from what + we have shewn concerning the difference there is betwixt visible + and tangible extension. But, for a more full and express proof + hereof, we need only observe that one who had not yet experienced + vision would not at first sight know motion<a id="noteref_442" + name="noteref_442" href="#note_442"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">442</span></span></a>. + Whence it clearly follows that motion perceivable by sight is of a + sort distinct from motion perceivable by touch. The antecedent I + prove thus—By touch he could not perceive any motion but what was + up or down, to the right or left, nearer or farther from him; + besides these, and their several varieties or complications, it is + impossible he should have any idea of motion. He would not + therefore think anything to be motion, or give the name motion to + any idea, which he could not range under some or other of those + particular kinds thereof. But, from sect. 95, it is plain that, by + the mere act of vision, he could not know motion upwards or + downwards, to the right or left, or in any other possible + direction. From which I conclude, he would not know motion at all + at first sight. As for the idea of motion in abstract, I shall not + waste paper about it, but leave it to my reader to make the best he + can of it. To me it is perfectly unintelligible<a id="noteref_443" + name="noteref_443" href="#note_443"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">443</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">138. The + consideration of motion may furnish a new field for inquiry<a id= + "noteref_444" name="noteref_444" href="#note_444"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">444</span></span></a>. But, + since the manner wherein the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page196">[pg 196]</span><a name="Pg196" id="Pg196" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> mind apprehends by sight the motion of + tangible objects, with the various degrees thereof, may be easily + collected from what has been said concerning the manner wherein + that sense doth suggest their various distances, magnitudes, and + situations, I shall not enlarge any farther on this subject, but + proceed to inquire what may be alleged, with greatest appearance of + reason, against the proposition we have demonstrated to be true; + for, where there is so much prejudice to be encountered, a bare and + naked demonstration of the truth will scarce suffice. We must also + satisfy the scruples that men may start in favour of their + preconceived notions, shew whence the mistake arises, how it came + to spread, and carefully disclose and root out those false + persuasions that an early prejudice might have implanted in the + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">139. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + therefore, it will be demanded how visible extension and figures + come to be called by the same name with tangible extension and + figures, if they are not of the same kind with them? It must be + something more than humour or accident that could occasion a custom + so constant and universal as this, which has obtained in all ages + and nations of the world, and amongst all ranks of men, the learned + as well as the illiterate.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">140. To which I + answer, we can no more argue a visible and tangible square to be of + the same species, from their being called by the same name, than we + can that a tangible square, and the monosyllable consisting of six + letters whereby it is marked, are of the same species, because they + are both called by the same name. It is customary to call written + words, and the things they signify, by the same name: for, words + not being regarded in their own nature, or otherwise than as they + are marks of things, it had been superfluous, and beside the design + of language, to have given them names distinct from those of the + things marked by them. The same reason holds here also. Visible + figures are the marks of tangible figures; and, from sect. 59, it + is plain that in themselves they are little regarded, or upon any + other score than for their connexion with tangible figures, which + by nature they are ordained to signify. And, because this language + of nature<a id="noteref_445" name="noteref_445" href= + "#note_445"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">445</span></span></a> does + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page197">[pg 197]</span><a name= + "Pg197" id="Pg197" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> not vary in + different ages or nations, hence it is that in all times and places + visible figures are called by the same names as the respective + tangible figures suggested by them; and not because they are alike, + or of the same sort with them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">141. But, say + you, surely a tangible square is liker to a visible square than to + a visible circle: it has four angles, and as many sides; so also + has the visible square—but the visible circle has no such thing, + being bounded by one uniform curve, without right lines or angles, + which makes it unfit to represent the tangible square, but very fit + to represent the tangible circle. Whence it clearly follows, that + visible figures are patterns of, or of the same species with, the + respective tangible figures represented by them; that they are like + unto them, and of their own nature fitted to represent them, as + being of the same sort; and that they are in no respect arbitrary + signs, as words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">142. I answer, + it must be acknowledged the visible square is fitter than the + visible circle to represent the tangible square, but then it is not + because it is liker, or more of a species with it; but, because the + visible square contains in it several distinct parts, whereby to + mark the several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square, + whereas the visible circle doth not. The square perceived by touch + hath four distinct equal sides, so also hath it four distinct equal + angles. It is therefore necessary that the visible figure which + shall be most proper to mark it contain four distinct equal parts, + corresponding to the four sides of the tangible square; as likewise + four other distinct and equal parts, whereby to denote the four + equal angles of the tangible square. And accordingly we see the + visible figures contain in them distinct visible parts, answering + to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified or + suggested by them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">143. But, it + will not hence follow that any visible figure is like unto or of + the same species with its corresponding tangible figure—unless it + be also shewn that not only the number, but also the kind of the + parts be the same in both. To illustrate this, I observe that + visible figures represent tangible figures much after the same + manner that written words do sounds. Now, in this respect, words + are not arbitrary; it not being indifferent what written word + stands <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page198">[pg + 198]</span><a name="Pg198" id="Pg198" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + for any sound. But, it is requisite that each word contain in it as + many distinct characters as there are variations in the sound it + stands for. Thus, the single letter <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></em> is + proper to mark one simple uniform sound; and the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">adultery</span></em> is accommodated to + represent the sound annexed to it—in the formation whereof there + being eight different collisions or modifications of the air by the + organs of speech, each of which produces a difference of sound, it + was fit the word representing it should consist of as many distinct + characters, thereby to mark each particular difference or part of + the whole sound. And yet nobody, I presume, will say the single + letter <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a</span></em>, or the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">adultery</span></em>, are alike unto or of the + same species with the respective sounds by them represented. It is + indeed arbitrary that, in general, letters of any language + represent sounds at all; but, when that is once agreed, it is not + arbitrary what combination of letters shall represent this or that + particular sound. I leave this with the reader to pursue, and apply + it in his own thoughts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">144. It must be + confessed that we are not so apt to confound other signs with the + things signified, or to think them of the same species, as we are + visible and tangible ideas. But, a little consideration will shew + us how this may well be, without our supposing them of a like + nature. These signs are constant and universal; their connexion + with tangible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance into the + world; and ever since, almost every moment of our lives, it has + been occurring to our thoughts, and fastening and striking deeper + on our minds. When we observe that signs are variable, and of human + institution; when we remember there was a time they were not + connected in our minds with those things they now so readily + suggest, but that their signification was learned by the slow steps + of experience: this preserves us from confounding them. But, when + we find the same signs suggest the same things all over the world; + when we know they are not of human institution, and cannot remember + that we ever learned their signification, but think that at first + sight they would have suggested to us the same things they do now: + all this persuades us they are of the same species as the things + respectively represented by them, and that it is by a natural + resemblance they suggest them to our minds.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">145. Add to this + that whenever we make a nice survey <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page199">[pg 199]</span><a name="Pg199" id="Pg199" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of any object, successively directing the + optic axis to each point thereof, there are certain lines and + figures, described by the motion of the head or eye, which, being + in truth perceived by feeling<a id="noteref_446" name="noteref_446" + href="#note_446"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">446</span></span></a>, do + nevertheless so mix themselves, as it were, with the ideas of sight + that we can scarce think but they appertain to that sense. Again, + the ideas of sight enter into the mind several at once, more + distinct and unmingled than is usual in the other senses beside the + touch. Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant, are apt + to coalesce, if I may so say, into one sound: but we can perceive, + at the same time, great variety of visible objects, very separate + and distinct from each other. Now, tangible<a id="noteref_447" + name="noteref_447" href="#note_447"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">447</span></span></a> + extension being made up of several distinct coexistent parts, we + may hence gather another reason that may dispose us to imagine a + likeness or analogy between the immediate objects of sight and + touch. But nothing, certainly, does more contribute to blend and + confound them together, than the strict and close connexion<a id= + "noteref_448" name="noteref_448" href="#note_448"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">448</span></span></a> they + have with each other. We cannot open our eyes but the ideas of + distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by them. So + swift, and sudden, and unperceived is the transit from visible to + tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the + immediate object of vision.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">146. The + prejudice<a id="noteref_449" name="noteref_449" href= + "#note_449"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">449</span></span></a> which + is grounded on these, and whatever other causes may be assigned + thereof, sticks so fast on our understandings, that it is + impossible, without obstinate striving and labour of the mind, to + get entirely clear of it. But then the reluctancy we find in + rejecting any opinion can be no argument of its truth, to whoever + considers what has been already shewn with regard to the prejudices + we entertain concerning the distance, magnitude, and situation of + objects; prejudices so familiar to our minds, so confirmed and + inveterate, as they will hardly give way to the clearest + demonstration.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">147. Upon the + whole, I think we may fairly conclude<a id="noteref_450" name= + "noteref_450" href="#note_450"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">450</span></span></a> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page200">[pg 200]</span><a name= + "Pg200" id="Pg200" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> that the proper + objects of Vision constitute the Universal Language of Nature; + whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions, in order to + attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and + well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful + and destructive of them. It is by their information that we are + principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life. + And the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the + objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages + and signs of human appointment; which do not suggest the things + signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an + habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between + them<a id="noteref_451" name="noteref_451" href= + "#note_451"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">451</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">148. Suppose one + who had always continued blind be told by his guide that after he + has advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a + precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must not this to him seem very + admirable and surprising? He cannot conceive how it is possible for + mortals to frame such predictions as these, which to him would seem + as strange and unaccountable as prophecy does to others. Even they + who are blessed with the visive faculty may (though familiarity + make it less observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration. + The wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those + ends and purposes for which it was apparently <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page201">[pg 201]</span><a name="Pg201" id="Pg201" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> designed; the vast extent, number, and + variety of objects that are at once, with so much ease, and + quickness, and pleasure, suggested by it—all these afford subject + for much and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us + some glimmering analogous prænotion of things, that are placed + beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of our present + state<a id="noteref_452" name="noteref_452" href= + "#note_452"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">452</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">149. I do not + design to trouble myself much with drawing corollaries from the + doctrine I have hitherto laid down. If it bears the test, others + may, so far as they shall think convenient, employ their thoughts + in extending it farther, and applying it to whatever purposes it + may be subservient to. Only, I cannot forbear making some inquiry + concerning the object of geometry, which the subject we have been + upon does naturally lead one to. We have shewn there is no such + idea as that of extension in abstract<a id="noteref_453" name= + "noteref_453" href="#note_453"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">453</span></span></a>; and + that there are two kinds of sensible extension and figures, which + are entirely distinct and heterogeneous from each other<a id= + "noteref_454" name="noteref_454" href="#note_454"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">454</span></span></a>. Now, + it is natural to inquire which of these is the object of + geometry<a id="noteref_455" name="noteref_455" href= + "#note_455"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">455</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">150. Some things + there are which, at first sight, incline one to think geometry + conversant about visible extension. The constant use of the eyes, + both in the practical and speculative parts of that science, doth + very much induce us thereto. It would, without doubt, seem odd to a + mathematician to go about to convince him the diagrams he saw upon + paper were not the figures, or even the likeness of the figures, + which make the subject of the demonstration—the contrary being held + an unquestionable truth, not only by mathematicians, but also by + those who apply themselves more particularly to the study of logic; + I mean who consider the nature of science, certainty, and + demonstration; it being by them assigned as one <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page202">[pg 202]</span><a name="Pg202" id="Pg202" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> reason of the extraordinary clearness + and evidence of geometry, that in that science the reasonings are + free from those inconveniences which attend the use of arbitrary + signs, the very ideas themselves being copied out, and exposed to + view upon paper. But, by the bye, how well this agrees with what + they likewise assert of abstract ideas being the object of + geometrical demonstration I leave to be considered.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">151. To come to + a resolution in this point, we need only observe what has been said + in sect. 59, 60, 61, where it is shewn that visible extensions in + themselves are little regarded, and have no settled determinate + greatness, and that men measure altogether by the application of + tangible extension to tangible extension. All which makes it + evident that visible extension and figures are not the object of + geometry.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">152. It is + therefore plain that visible figures are of the same use in + geometry that words are. And the one may as well be accounted the + object of that science as the other; neither of them being any + otherwise concerned therein than as they represent or suggest to + the mind the particular tangible figures connected with them. There + is, indeed, this difference betwixt the signification of tangible + figures by visible figures, and of ideas by words—that whereas the + latter is variable and uncertain, depending altogether on the + arbitrary appointment of men, the former is fixed, and immutably + the same in all times and places. A visible square, for instance, + suggests to the mind the same tangible figure in Europe that it + doth in America. Hence it is, that the voice of nature, which + speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation and + ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are unavoidably + subject to<a id="noteref_456" name="noteref_456" href= + "#note_456"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">456</span></span></a>. From + which may, in some measure, be derived that peculiar evidence and + clearness of geometrical demonstrations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">153. Though what + has been said may suffice to shew what ought to be determined with + relation to the object of geometry, I shall, nevertheless, for the + fuller illustration thereof, take into my thoughts the case of an + intelligence or unbodied spirit, which is supposed to see perfectly + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page203">[pg 203]</span><a name= + "Pg203" id="Pg203" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> well, i.e. to have a + clear perception of the proper and immediate objects of sight, but + to have no sense of touch<a id="noteref_457" name="noteref_457" + href="#note_457"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">457</span></span></a>. + Whether there be any such being in nature or no, is beside my + purpose to inquire; it suffices, that the supposition contains no + contradiction in it. Let us now examine what proficiency such a one + may be able to make in geometry. Which speculation will lead us + more clearly to see whether the ideas of sight can possibly be the + object of that science.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">154. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + then, it is certain the aforesaid intelligence could have no idea + of a solid or quantity of three dimensions, which follows from its + not having any idea of distance. We, indeed, are prone to think + that we have by sight the ideas of space and solids; which arises + from our imagining that we do, strictly speaking, see distance, and + some parts of an object at a greater distance than others; which + has been demonstrated to be the effect of the experience we have + had what ideas of touch are connected with such and such ideas + attending vision. But the intelligence here spoken of is supposed + to have no experience of touch. He would not, therefore, judge as + we do, nor have any idea of distance, outness, or profundity, nor + consequently of space or body, either immediately or by suggestion. + Whence it is plain he can have no notion of those parts of geometry + which relate to the mensuration of solids, and their convex or + concave surfaces, and contemplate the properties of lines generated + by the section of a solid. The conceiving of any part whereof is + beyond the reach of his faculties.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">155. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Farther</span></em>, he cannot comprehend the + manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle; the rule + and compass, with their use, being things of which it is impossible + he should have any notion. Nor is it an easier matter for him to + conceive the placing of one plane or angle on another, in order to + prove their equality; since that supposes some idea of distance, or + external space. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page204">[pg + 204]</span><a name="Pg204" id="Pg204" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + All which makes it evident our pure intelligence could never attain + to know so much as the first elements of plain geometry. And + perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be found he cannot even have + an idea of plain figures any more than he can of solids; since some + idea of distance is necessary to form the idea of a geometrical + plane, as will appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">156. All that is + properly perceived by the visive faculty amounts to no more than + colours with their variations, and different proportions of light + and shade—but the perpetual mutability and fleetingness of those + immediate objects of sight render them incapable of being managed + after the manner of geometrical figures; nor is it in any degree + useful that they should. It is true there be divers of them + perceived at once; and more of some, and less of others: but + accurately to compute their magnitude, and assign precise + determinate proportions between things so variable and inconstant, + if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be a very trifling + and insignificant labour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">157. I must + confess, it seems to be the opinion of some very ingenious men that + flat or plane figures are immediate objects of sight, though they + acknowledge solids are not. And this opinion of theirs is grounded + on what is observed in painting, wherein (say they) the ideas + immediately imprinted in the mind are only of planes variously + coloured, which, by a sudden act of the judgment, are changed into + solids: but, with a little attention, we shall find the planes here + mentioned as the immediate objects of sight are not visible but + tangible planes. For, when we say that pictures are planes, we mean + thereby that they appear to the touch smooth and uniform. But then + this smoothness and uniformity, or, in other words, this planeness + of the picture is not perceived immediately by vision; for it + appeareth to the eye various and multiform.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">158. From all + which we may conclude that planes are no more the immediate object + of sight than solids. What we strictly see are not solids, nor yet + planes variously coloured—they are only diversity of colours. And + some of these suggest to the mind solids, and others plane figures; + just as they have been experienced to be connected with the one or + the other: so that we see planes in the same way that we see + solids—both being equally suggested by the <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page205">[pg 205]</span><a name="Pg205" id="Pg205" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> immediate objects of sight, which accordingly + are themselves denominated planes and solids. But, though they are + called by the same names with the things marked by them, they are, + nevertheless, of a nature entirely different, as hath been + demonstrated<a id="noteref_458" name="noteref_458" href= + "#note_458"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">458</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">159. What has + been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to decide the question + we proposed to examine, concerning the ability of a pure spirit, + such as we have described, to know geometry. It is, indeed, no easy + matter for us to enter precisely into the thoughts of such an + intelligence; because we cannot, without great pains, cleverly + separate and disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of + sight from those of touch which are connected with them. This, + indeed, in a complete degree seems scarce possible to be performed; + which will not seem strange to us, if we consider how hard it is + for any one to hear the words of his native language, which is + familiar to him, pronounced in his ears without understanding them. + Though he endeavour to disunite the meaning from the sound, it will + nevertheless intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find it + extreme difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly in the + posture of a foreigner that never learnt the language, so as to be + affected barely with the sounds themselves, and not perceive the + signification annexed to them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">160. By this + time, I suppose, it is clear that neither abstract nor visible + extension makes the object of geometry; the not discerning of which + may, perhaps, have created some difficulty and useless labour in + mathematics. [<a id="noteref_459" name="noteref_459" href= + "#note_459"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">459</span></span></a>Sure I + am that somewhat relating thereto has occurred to my thoughts; + which, though after the most anxious and repeated examination I am + forced to think it true, doth, nevertheless, seem so far out of the + common road of geometry, that I know not whether it may not be + thought presumption if <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page206">[pg + 206]</span><a name="Pg206" id="Pg206" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> I + should make it public, in an age wherein that science hath received + such mighty improvements by new methods; great part whereof, as + well as of the ancient discoveries, may perhaps lose their + reputation, and much of that ardour with which men study the + abstruse and fine geometry be abated, if what to me, and those few + to whom I have imparted it, seems evidently true, should really + prove to be so.]</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page207">[pg 207]</span><a name= + "Pg207" id="Pg207" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc21" id="toc21"></a> <a name="pdf22" id="pdf22"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">An Appendix To The Essay On + Vision</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">This Appendix is + contained only in the second edition.</span></span>]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The censures + which, I am informed, have been made on the foregoing <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + inclined me to think I had not been clear and express enough in + some points; and, to prevent being misunderstood for the future, I + was willing to make any necessary alterations or additions in what + I had written. But that was impracticable, the present edition + having been almost finished before I received this information. + Wherefore, I think it proper to consider in this place the + principal objections that are come to my notice.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">first</span></em> place, it is objected, that + in the beginning of the Essay I argue either against all use of + lines and angles in optics, and then what I say is false; or + against those writers only who will have it that we can perceive by + sense the optic axes, angles, &c., and then it is + insignificant, this being an absurdity which no one ever held. To + which I answer that I argue only against those who are of opinion + that we perceive the distance of objects by lines and angles, or, + as they term it, by a kind of innate geometry. And, to shew that + this is not fighting with my own shadow, I shall here set down a + passage from the celebrated Des Cartes<a id="noteref_460" name= + "noteref_460" href="#note_460"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">460</span></span></a>:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 60%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/vision-fig-5.png" alt="Illustration" /></div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Distantiam præterea discimus, per mutuam quandam + conspirationem oculorum. Ut enim cæcus noster duo bacilla tenens, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A + E</span></span> et <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">C E</span></span>, de quorum longitudine + incertus, solumque intervallum manuum <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A</span></span> et + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">C</span></span>, cum magnitudine <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page208">[pg 208]</span><a name="Pg208" id="Pg208" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> angulorum <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A C E</span></span>, + et <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">C A + E</span></span> exploratum habens, inde, ut ex Geometria quadam + omnibus innata, scire potest ubi sit punctum <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">E</span></span>. Sic + quum nostri oculi <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">R S T</span></span> et <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">r s t</span></span> + ambo, vertuntur ad <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">X</span></span>, magnitudo lineæ <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">S s</span></span>, et + angulorum <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">X S s</span></span> et <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">X s S</span></span>, + certos nos reddunt ubi sit punctum <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">X</span></span>. Et + idem opera alterutrius possumus indagare, loco illum movendo, ut si + versus <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">X</span></span> illum semper dirigentes, prime + sistamus in puncto <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">S</span></span>, et statim post in puncto + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">s</span></span>, hoc sufficiet ut magnitudo + lineæ <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">S + s</span></span>, et duorum angulorum <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">X S s</span></span> + et <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">X s + S</span></span> nostræ imaginationi simul occurrant, et distantiam + puncti <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">X</span></span> nos edoceant: idque per + actionem mentis, quæ licet simplex judicium esse videatur, + ratiocinationem tamen quandam involutam habet, similem illi, qua + Geometræ per duas stationes diversas, loca inaccessa + dimetiuntur.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 60%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/vision-fig-6.png" alt="Illustration" /></div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I might amass + together citations from several authors to the same purpose, but, + this being so clear in the point, and from an author of so great + note, I shall not trouble the reader with any more. What I have + said on this head was not for the sake of rinding fault with other + men; but, because I judged it necessary to demonstrate in the first + place that we neither see distance <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediately</span></em>, nor yet perceive it + by the mediation of anything that hath (as lines and angles) a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion with it. For + on the demonstration of this point the whole theory depends<a id= + "noteref_461" name="noteref_461" href="#note_461"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">461</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, it is objected, that the + explication I give of the appearance of the horizontal moon (which + may also be <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page209">[pg + 209]</span><a name="Pg209" id="Pg209" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + applied to the sun) is the same that Gassendus had given before. I + answer, there is indeed mention made of the grossness of the + atmosphere in both; but then the methods wherein it is applied to + solve the phenomenon are widely different, as will be evident to + whoever shall compare what I have said on this subject with the + following words of Gassendus:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Heinc dici posse videtur: solem humilem oculo + spectatum ideo apparere majorem, quam dum altius egreditur, quia + dum vicinus est horizonti prolixa est series vaporum, atque adeo + corpusculorum quæ solis radios ita retundunt, ut oculus minus + conniveat, et pupilla quasi umbrefacta longe magis amplificetur, + quam dum sole multum elato rari vapores intercipiuntur, solque ipse + ita splendescit, ut pupilla in ipsum spectans contractissima + efficiatur. Nempe ex hoc esse videtur, cur visibilis species ex + sole procedens, et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in retinam, + ampliorem in illa sedem occupet, majoremque proinde creet solis + apparentiam, quam dum per contractam pupillam eodem intromissa + contendit.”</span> Vid. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Epist. 1. De Apparente Magnitudine Solis + Humilis et Sublimis</span></span>, p. 6. This solution of Gassendus + proceeds on a false principle, to wit, that the pupil's being + enlarged augments the species or image on the fund of the eye.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thirdly</span></em>, against what is said in + Sect. 80, it is objected, that the same thing which is so small as + scarce to be discerned by a man, may appear like a mountain to some + small insect; from which it follows that the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> is not equal in + respect of all creatures<a id="noteref_462" name="noteref_462" + href="#note_462"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">462</span></span></a>. I + answer, if this objection be sounded to the bottom, it will be + found to mean no more than that the same particle of matter which + is marked to a man by one <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span>, exhibits to an insect a great number of + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minima visibilia</span></span>. But this does + not prove that one <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> of the insect is not equal to one + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> of the man. The + not distinguishing between the mediate and immediate objects of + sight is, I suspect, a cause of misapprehension in this matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Some other + misinterpretations and difficulties have been <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page210">[pg 210]</span><a name="Pg210" id="Pg210" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> made, but, in the points they refer to, + I have endeavoured to be so very plain that I know not how to + express myself more clearly. All I shall add is, that if they who + are pleased to criticise on my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + would but read the whole over with some attention, they might be + the better able to comprehend my meaning, and consequently to judge + of my mistakes.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am informed + that, soon after the first edition of this treatise, a man + somewhere near London was made to see, who had been born blind, and + continued so for about twenty years<a id="noteref_463" name= + "noteref_463" href="#note_463"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">463</span></span></a>. Such + a one may be supposed a proper judge to decide how far some tenets + laid down in several places of the foregoing Essay are agreeable to + truth; and if any curious person hath the opportunity of making + proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should gladly see my + notions either amended or confirmed by experience<a id= + "noteref_464" name="noteref_464" href="#note_464"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">464</span></span></a>.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page211">[pg 211]</span><a name= + "Pg211" id="Pg211" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc23" id="toc23"></a> <a name="pdf24" id="pdf24"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of + Human Knowledge</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<a id= + "noteref_465" name="noteref_465" href="#note_465"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">465</span></span></a>PART + I]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">WHEREIN THE CHIEF + CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS OF + SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, ARE INQUIRED INTO</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">First Published in + 1710</span></span></p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page213">[pg + 213]</span><a name="Pg213" id="Pg213" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc25" id="toc25"></a> <a name="pdf26" id="pdf26"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Editor's Preface To The Treatise + Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This book of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> contains the most + systematic and reasoned exposition of Berkeley's philosophy, in its + early stage, which we possess. Like the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, its tentative pioneer, it was prepared at + Trinity College, Dublin. Its author had hardly completed his + twenty-fifth year when it was published. The first edition of this + <span class="tei tei-q">“First Part”</span> of the projected + Treatise, <span class="tei tei-q">“printed by Aaron Rhames, for + Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row, Dublin,”</span> appeared + early in 1710. A second edition, with minor changes, and in which + <span class="tei tei-q">“Part I”</span> was withdrawn from the + title-page, was published in London in 1734, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“printed for Jacob Tonson”</span>—on the eve of + Berkeley's settlement at Cloyne. It was the last in the author's + lifetime. The projected <span class="tei tei-q">“Second + Part”</span> of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> was never given to + the world, and we can hardly conjecture its design. In a letter in + 1729 to his American friend, Samuel Johnson, Berkeley mentions that + he had <span class="tei tei-q">“made considerable progress on the + Second Part,”</span> but <span class="tei tei-q">“the + manuscript,”</span> he adds, <span class="tei tei-q">“was lost + about fourteen years ago, during my travels in Italy; and I never + had leisure since to do so <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page214">[pg 214]</span><a name="Pg214" id="Pg214" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the + same subject<a id="noteref_466" name="noteref_466" href= + "#note_466"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">466</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An edition of + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> appeared in London in + 1776, twenty-three years after Berkeley's death, with a running + commentary of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span> by the anonymous editor, + on the pages opposite the text, in which, according to the editor, + Berkeley's doctrines are <span class="tei tei-q">“carefully + examined, and shewn to be repugnant to fact, and his principles to + be incompatible with the constitution of human nature and the + reason and fitness of things.”</span> In this volume the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Dialogues + between Hylas and Philonous</span></span> are appended to the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, and a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Philosophical Discourse concerning the nature of Human + Being”</span> is prefixed to the whole, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“being a defence of Mr. Locke's principles, and some + remarks on Dr. Beattie's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Truth</span></span>,”</span> by the + author of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks on Berkeley's + Principles</span></span>. The acuteness of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span> + is not in proportion to their bulk and diffuseness: many popular + misconceptions of Berkeley are served up, without appreciation of + the impotence of matter, and of natural causation as only passive + sense-symbolism, which is at the root of the theory of the material + world against which the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span> are directed.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Kantian and + post-Kantian Idealism that is characteristic of the nineteenth + century has recalled attention to Berkeley, who had produced his + spiritual philosophy under the prevailing conditions of English + thought in the preceding age, when Idealism in any form was + uncongenial. In 1869 the book of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> was translated into + German, with annotations, by Ueberweg, professor of philosophy at + Königsberg, the university of Kant. The Clarendon Press edition of + the Collected Works of Berkeley followed in 1871. In 1874 an + edition of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, by Dr. Kranth, + Professor of Philosophy in the university of Pennsylvania, appeared + in America, with annotations drawn largely from <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page215">[pg 215]</span><a name="Pg215" id="Pg215" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the Clarendon Press edition and + Ueberweg. In 1878 Dr. Collyns Simon republished the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, with discussions + based upon the text, followed by an appendix of remarks on Kant and + Hume in their relation to Berkeley.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The book of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, as we have it, must + be taken as a systematic fragment of an incompletely developed + philosophy. Many years after its appearance, the author thus + describes the conditions:—<span class="tei tei-q">“It was published + when I was very young, and without doubt hath many defects. For + though the notions should be true (as I verily think they are), yet + it is difficult to express them clearly and consistently, language + being framed for common use and received prejudices. I do not + therefore pretend that my books can teach truth. All I hope for is + that they may be an occasion to inquisitive men of discovering + truth<a id="noteref_467" name="noteref_467" href= + "#note_467"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">467</span></span></a>.”</span> + Again:—<span class="tei tei-q">“I had no inclination to trouble the + world with large volumes. What I have done was rather with the view + of giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and curiosity to + go to the bottom of things, and pursue them in their own minds. Two + or three times reading these small tracts (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>), and making what is read the occasion of + thinking, would, I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to + the mind, and take off that shocking appearance which hath often + been observed to attend speculative truths<a id="noteref_468" name= + "noteref_468" href="#note_468"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">468</span></span></a>.”</span> + The incitements to further and deeper thought thus proposed have + met with a more sympathetic response in this generation than in the + lifetime of Berkeley.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is + internal evidence in the book of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> that its author had + been a diligent and critical student of Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>. + Like the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, it is dedicated to the + Earl of Pembroke. The word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> is not less characteristic + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page216">[pg 216]</span><a name= + "Pg216" id="Pg216" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> than of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, although Berkeley + generally uses it with a narrower application than Locke, confining + it to phenomena presented objectively to our senses, and their + subjective reproductions in imagination. With both Berkeley and + Locke objective phenomena (under the name of ideas) are the + materials supplied to man for conversion into natural science. + Locke's reduction of ideas into simple and complex, as well as some + of his subdivisions, reappear with modifications in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. Berkeley's account + of Substance and Power, Space and Time, while different from + Locke's, still bears marks of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>. + Concrete Substance, which in its ultimate meaning much perplexes + Locke, is identified with the personal pronouns <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“you”</span> by + Berkeley, and is thus spiritualised. Cause proper, or Power, he + finds only in the voluntary activity of persons. Space is presented + to us in our sensuous experience of resistance to organic + movements; while it is symbolised in terms of phenomena presented + to sight, as already explained in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>. Time is revealed in our actual experience of + change in the ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in + sense; length of time being calculated by the changes in the + adopted measure of duration. Infinite space and infinite time, + being necessarily incapable of finite ideation, are dismissed as + abstractions that for man must always be empty of realisable + meaning. Indeed, the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span> shews that + Locke influenced Berkeley as much by antagonism as otherwise. + <span class="tei tei-q">“Such was the candour of that great man + that I persuade myself, were he alive, he would not be offended + that I differed from him, seeing that in so doing I follow his + advice to use my own judgment, see with my own eyes and not with + another's.”</span> So he argues against Locke's opinions about the + infinity and eternity of space, and the possibility of matter + endowed with power to think, and urges his inconsistency in + treating some qualities <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page217">[pg + 217]</span><a name="Pg217" id="Pg217" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of matter as wholly material, while he insists that others, under + the name of <span class="tei tei-q">“secondary,”</span> are + necessarily dependent on sentient intelligence. Above all he + assails Locke's <span class="tei tei-q">“abstract ideas”</span> as + germs of scepticism—interpreting Locke's meaning paradoxically.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Next to Locke, + Descartes and Malebranche are prominent in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. Recognition of the + ultimate supremacy of Spirit, or the spiritual character of active + power and the constant agency of God in nature, suggested by + Descartes, was congenial to Berkeley, but he was opposed to the + mechanical conception of the universe found in the Cartesian + physical treatises. That thought is synonymous with existence is a + formula with which the French philosopher might make him familiar, + as well as with the assumption that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas + only</span></em> are immediate objects of human perception; an + assumption in which Descartes was followed by Locke, and + philosophical thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, + but under differing interpretations of the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Malebranche + appears less in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> than Locke and + Descartes. In early life, at any rate, Berkeley would be less at + home in the <span class="tei tei-q">“divine vision”</span> of + Malebranche than among the <span class="tei tei-q">“ideas”</span> + of Locke. The mysticism of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Recherche de la + Vérité</span></span> is unlike the transparent lucidity of + Berkeley's juvenile thought. But the subordinate place and office + of the material world in Malebranche's system, and his conception + of power as wholly spiritual, approached the New Principles of + Berkeley.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Plato and + Aristotle hardly appear, either by name or as characteristic + influence, in the book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, which in this + respect contrasts with the abundant references to ancient and + mediaeval thinkers in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, and to a less extent in + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span> and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Introduction + to the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> is a proclamation of + war against <span class="tei tei-q">“abstract ideas,”</span> which + is renewed in the body <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page218">[pg + 218]</span><a name="Pg218" id="Pg218" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of the work, and again more than once in the writings of Berkeley's + early and middle life, but is significantly withdrawn in his old + age. In the ardour of youth, his prime remedy for anarchy in + philosophy, and for the sceptical disposition which philosophy had + been apt to generate, was suppression of abstract ideas as + impossible ideas—empty names heedlessly accepted as ideas—an evil + to be counteracted by steady adherence to the concrete experience + found in our senses and inner consciousness. Never to lose our hold + of positive facts, and always to individualise general conceptions, + are regulative maxims by which Berkeley would make us govern our + investigation of ultimate problems. He takes up his position in the + actual universe of applied reason; not in the empty void of + abstract reason, remote from particulars and succession of change, + in which no real existence is found. All realisable ideas must be + either concrete data of sense, or concrete data of inward + consciousness. It is relations embodied in particular facts, not + pretended abstract ideas, that give fruitful meaning to common + terms. Abstract matter, abstract substance, abstract power, + abstract space, abstract time—unindividualisable in sense or in + imagination—must all be void of meaning; the issue of unlawful + analysis, which pretends to find what is real without the concrete + ideas that make the real, because percipient spirit is the + indispensable factor of all reality. The only lawful abstraction is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nominal</span></em>—the application, that is + to say, of a name in common to an indefinite number of things which + resemble one another. This is Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Nominalism.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley takes + Locke as the representative advocate of the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract ideas”</span> against which he wages war in + the Introduction to the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. Under cover of an + ambiguity in the term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, he is unconsciously fighting + against a man of straw. He supposes that Locke means by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> + only a concrete datum of sense, or of imagination; <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page219">[pg 219]</span><a name="Pg219" id="Pg219" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and he argues that we cannot without + contradiction abstract from all such data, and yet retain idea. But + Locke includes among <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">his</span></em> ideas intellectual + relations—what Berkeley himself afterwards distinguished as + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notions</span></em>, in contrast with ideas. + This polemic against Locke is therefore one of verbal confusion. In + later life he probably saw this, as he saw deeper into the whole + question involved. This is suggested by the omission of the + argument against abstract ideas, given in earlier editions of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, from the edition + published a year before he died. In his juvenile attack on + abstractions, his characteristic impetuosity seems to carry him to + the extreme of rejecting rational relations that are involved in + the objectivity of sensible things and natural order, thus resting + experience at last only on phenomena—particular and contingent.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A preparatory + draft of the Introduction to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, which I found in the + manuscript department of the library of Trinity College, Dublin, is + printed in the appendix to this edition of Berkeley's Philosophical + Works. The variations are of some interest, biographical and + philosophical. It seems to have been written in the autumn of 1708, + and it may with advantage be compared with the text of the finished + Introduction, as well as with numerous relative entries in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">After this + Introduction, the New Principles themselves are evolved, in a + corresponding spirit of hostility to empty abstractions. The + sections may be thus divided:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">i. Rationale of + the Principles (sect. 1-33).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">ii. Supposed + Objections to the Principles answered (sect. 34-84).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">iii. + Consequences and Applications of the Principles (sect. + 85-156).</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page220">[pg + 220]</span><a name="Pg220" id="Pg220" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> + <h3 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em"> + <span style="font-size: 120%">i. Rationale of the + Principles.</span></h3> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reader may + remember that one of the entries in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span> runs as follows:—<span class="tei tei-q">“To + begin the First Book, not with mention of sensation and + reflexion, but, instead of sensation, to use perception, or + thought in general.”</span> Berkeley seems there to be + oscillating between Locke and Descartes. He now adopts Locke's + account of the materials of which our concrete experience + consists (sect. 1). The data of human knowledge of existence are + accordingly found in the ideas, phenomena, or appearances + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a</span></span>) of which we are percipient + in the senses, and (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">b</span></span>) of which we are conscious + when we attend to our inward passions and operations—all which + make up the original contents of human experience, to be + reproduced in new forms and arrangements, (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">c</span></span>) in + memory and (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">d</span></span>) imagination and + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">e</span></span>) expectation. Those + materials are called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> because living mind or + spirit is the indispensable realising factor: they all presuppose + living mind, spirit, self, or ego to realise and elaborate them + (sect. 2). This is implied in our use of personal pronouns, which + signify, not ideas of any of the preceding kinds, but that which + is <span class="tei tei-q">“entirely distinct from them, wherein + they exist, or, which is the same thing, by which they are + perceived.”</span> In this fundamental presupposition Descartes + is more apparent than Locke, and there is even an unconscious + forecast of Kant and Hegel.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley next + faces a New Question which his New Principles are intended to + answer. How is the concrete world that is presented to our senses + related to Mind or Spirit? Is all or any of its reality + independent of percipient experience? Is it true that the + phenomena of which we are percipient in sense are ultimately + independent of all percipient and conscious life, and are even + the ultimate basis of all that is real? Must we recognise in the + phenomena of Matter the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> of what we call Mind? + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page221">[pg 221]</span><a name= + "Pg221" id="Pg221" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> For do we not + find, when we examine Body and Spirit mutually related in our + personality, that the latter is more dependent on the former, and + on the physical cosmos of which the former is a part, than our + body and its bodily surroundings are dependent on Spirit? In + short, is not the universe of existence, in its final form, only + lifeless Matter?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The claim of + Matter to be supreme is what Berkeley produces his Principles in + order to reduce. Concrete reality is self-evidently unreal, he + argues, in the total absence of percipient Spirit, for Spirit is + the one realising factor. Try to imagine the material world + unperceived and you are trying to picture empty abstraction. + Wholly material matter is self-evidently an inconceivable + absurdity; a universe emptied of all percipient life is an + impossible universe. The material world becomes real in being + perceived: it depends for its reality upon the spiritual + realisation. As colours in a dark room become real with the + introduction of light, so the material world becomes real in the + life and agency of Spirit. It must exist in terms of sentient + life and percipient intelligence, in order to rise into any + degree of reality that human beings at least can be at all + concerned with, either speculatively or practically. Matter + totally abstracted from percipient spirit must go the way of all + abstract ideas. It is an illusion, concealed by confused thought + and abuse of words; yet from obvious causes strong enough to + stifle faith in this latent but self-evident Principle—that the + universe of sense-presented phenomena can have concrete existence + only in and by sentient intelligence. It is the reverse of this + Principle that Berkeley takes to have been <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the chief source of all that scepticism and folly, + all those contradictions and inexplicable puzzling absurdities, + that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason<a id= + "noteref_469" name="noteref_469" href="#note_469"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">469</span></span></a>.”</span> + And indeed, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page222">[pg + 222]</span><a name="Pg222" id="Pg222" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + when it is fully understood, it is seen in its own light to be + the chief of <span class="tei tei-q">“those truths which are so + near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes + to see them. For such I take this important one to be—that all + the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a word, all + those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have + not any subsistence without a Mind”</span> (sect. 6). Living Mind + or Spirit is the indispensable factor of all realities that are + presented to our senses, including, of course, our own + bodies.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Yet this + Principle, notwithstanding its intuitive certainty, needs to be + evoked by reflection from the latency in which it lies concealed, + in the confused thought of the unreflecting. It is only + gradually, and with the help of reasoning, that the world + presented to the senses is distinctly recognised in this its + deepest and truest reality. And even when we see that the + phenomena <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediately</span></em> presented to our + senses need to be realised in percipient experience, in order to + be concretely real, we are ready to ask whether there may not be + substances <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">like</span></em> the things so presented, + which can exist <span class="tei tei-q">“without mind,”</span> or + in a wholly material way (sect. 8). Nay, are there not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">some</span></em> + of the phenomena immediately presented to our senses which do not + need living mind to make them real? It is allowed by Locke and + others that all those qualities of matter which are called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">secondary</span></em> cannot be wholly + material, and that living mind is indispensable for <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">their</span></em> + realisation in nature; but Locke and the rest argue, that this is + not so with the qualities which they call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">primary</span></em>, and which they regard + as of the essence of matter. Colours, sounds, tastes, smells are + all allowed to be not wholly material; but are not the size, + shape, situation, solidity, and motion of bodies qualities that + are real without need for the realising agency of any Mind or + Spirit in the universe, and which would continue to be what they + are now if all Spirit, divine or human, ceased to + exist?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page223">[pg + 223]</span><a name="Pg223" id="Pg223" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + supposition that some of the phenomena of what is called Matter + can be real, and yet wholly material, is discussed in sections + 9-15, in which it is argued that the things of sense cannot exist + really, in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">any</span></em> of their manifestations, + unless they are brought into reality in some percipient life and + experience. It is held impossible that any quality of matter can + have the reality which we all attribute to it, unless it is + spiritually realised (sect. 15).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But may Matter + not be real apart from all its so-called qualities, these being + allowed to be not wholly material, because real only within + percipient spirit? May not this wholly material Matter be + Something that, as it were, exists <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">behind</span></em> the ideas, phenomena, or + qualities that make their appearance to human beings? This + question, Berkeley would say, is a meaningless and wholly + unpractical one. Material substance that makes and can make no + real appearance—unphenomenal or unideal—stripped of all its + qualities—is only <span class="tei tei-q">“another name for + abstract Being,”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“the abstract + idea of Being appeareth to me the most incomprehensible of all + other. When I consider the two parts or branches which make up + the words <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material substance</span></em>, I am + convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them”</span> + (sect. 17). Neither Sense nor Reason inform us of the existence + of real material substances that exist <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstractly</span></em>, or out of all + relation to the secondary and primary qualities of which we are + percipient when we exercise our senses. By our senses we cannot + perceive more than ideas or phenomena, aggregated as individual + things that are presented to us: we cannot perceive substances + that make no appearance in sense. Then as for reason, unrealised + substances, abstracted from living Spirit, human or divine, being + altogether meaningless, can in no way explain the concrete + realisations of human experience. In short, if there are wholly + unphenomenal material substances, it is impossible that we should + ever discover <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page224">[pg + 224]</span><a name="Pg224" id="Pg224" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + them, or have any concern with them, speculative or practical; + and if there are not, we should have the same reason to assert + that there are which we have now (sect. 20). It is impossible to + put any meaning into wholly abstract reality. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“To me the words mean either a direct contradiction, + or nothing at all”</span> (sect. 24).</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Principle + that the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">esse</span></span> of + matter necessarily involves <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">percipi</span></span>, and its correlative + Principle that there is not any other substance than Spirit, + which is thus the indispensable factor of all reality, both lead + on to the more obviously practical Principle—that the material + world, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, is + wholly powerless, and that all changes in Nature are the + immediate issue of the agency of Spirit (sect. 25-27). Concrete + power, like concrete substance, is essentially spiritual. To be + satisfied that the whole natural world is only the passive + instrument and expression of Spiritual Power we are asked to + analyse the sensuous data of experience. We can find no reason + for attributing inherent power to any of the phenomena and + phenomenal things that are presented to our senses, or for + supposing that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">they</span></em> can be active causes, + either of the changes that are continuously in progress among + themselves, or of the feelings, perceptions, and volitions of + which spiritual beings are conscious. We find the ideas or + phenomena that pass in procession before our senses related to + one another as signs to their meanings, in a cosmical order that + virtually makes the material world a language and a prophecy: but + this cosmical procession is not found to originate in the ideas + or phenomena themselves, and there is reason for supposing it to + be maintained by ever-living Spirit, which thus not only + substantiates the things of sense, but explains their laws of + motion and their movements.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Yet the + universe of reality is not exclusively One Spirit. Experience + contradicts the supposition. I find <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page225">[pg 225]</span><a name="Pg225" id="Pg225" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> on trial that my personal power to produce + changes in the ideas or phenomena which my senses present to me + is a limited power (sect. 28-33). I can make and unmake my own + fancies, but I cannot with like freedom make and unmake + presentations of sense. When in daylight I open my eyes, it is + not in my power to determine whether I shall see or not; nor is + it in my power to determine what objects I shall see. The + cosmical order of sense-phenomena is independent of my will. When + I employ my senses, I find myself always confronted by sensible + signs of perfect Reason and omnipresent Will. But I also awake in + the faith that I am an individual person. And the sense-symbolism + of which the material world consists, while it keeps me in + constant and immediate relation to the Universal Spirit, whose + language it is, keeps me likewise in intercourse with other + persons, akin to myself, who are signified to me by their overt + actions and articulate words, which enter into my sensuous + experience. Sense-given phenomena thus, among their other + instrumental offices, are the medium of communication between + human beings, who by this means can find companions, and make + signs to them. So while, at <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">our</span></em> highest point of view, + Nature is Spirit, experience shews that there is room in the + universe for a plurality of persons, individual, and in a measure + free or morally responsible. If Berkeley does not say all this, + his New Principles tend thus.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">At any rate, + in his reasoned exposition of his Principles he is anxious to + distinguish those phenomena that are presented to the senses of + all mankind from the private ideas or fancies of individual men + (sect. 28-33). The former constitute the world which sentient + beings realise in common. He calls them <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + because they are unrealisable without percipient mind; but still + on the understanding that they are not to be confounded with the + chimeras of imagination. They are more deeply and truly real than + chimeras. The groups in which they are found <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page226">[pg 226]</span><a name="Pg226" id= + "Pg226" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to coexist are the individual + things of sense, whose fixed order of succession exemplifies what + we call natural law, or natural causation: the correlation of + their changes to our pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, + makes scientific knowledge of their laws practically important to + the life of man, in his embodied state.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Moreover, the + real ideas presented to our senses, unlike those of imagination, + Berkeley would imply, cannot be either representative or + misrepresentative. Our imagination may mislead us: the original + data of sense cannot: although we may, and often do, misinterpret + their relations to one another, and to our pleasures and pains + and higher faculties. The divine meaning with which they are + charged, of which science is a partial expression, they may + perhaps be said to represent. Otherwise representative + sense-perception is absurdity: the ideas of sense cannot be + representative in the way those of imagination are; for fancies + are faint representations of data of sense. The appearances that + sentient intelligence realises <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">are</span></em> + the things of sense, and we cannot go deeper. If we prefer + accordingly to call the material world a dream or a chimera, we + must understand that it is the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reasonable</span></em> dream in which all + sentient intelligence participates, and by which the embodied + life of man must be regulated.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Has Berkeley, + in his juvenile ardour, and with the impetuosity natural to him, + while seeking to demonstrate the impotence of matter, and the + omnipresent supremacy of Spirit, so spiritualised the material + world as to make it unfit for the symbolical office in the + universe of reality which he supposes it to discharge? Is its + potential existence in God, and its percipient realisation by me, + and presumably by innumerable other sentient beings, an adequate + account of the real material world existing in place and time? + Can this universal orderly dream experienced in sense involve the + objectivity implied in its being the reliable medium of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page227">[pg 227]</span><a name= + "Pg227" id="Pg227" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> social + intercourse? Does <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">such</span></em> a material world provide me + with a means of escape from absolute solitude? Nay, if Matter + cannot rise into reality without percipient spirit as realising + factor, can my individual percipient spirit realise <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">myself</span></em> without independent + Matter? Without intelligent life Matter is pronounced unreal. But + is it not also true that without Matter, and the special material + organism we call our body, percipient spirit is unreal? Does not + Nature seem as indispensable to Spirit as Spirit is to Nature? + Must we not assume at least their unbeginning and unending + coexistence, even if we recognise in Spirit the deeper and truer + reality? Do the New Principles explain the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">final</span></em> + ground of trust and certainty about the universe of change into + which I entered as a stranger when I was born? If they make all + that I have believed in as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">outward</span></em> to be in its reality + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inward</span></em>, do they not disturb the + balance that is necessary to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all</span></em> + human certainties, and leave me without any realities at all?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That Berkeley + at the age of twenty-five, and educated chiefly by Locke, had + fathomed or even entertained all these questions was hardly to be + looked for. How far he had gone may be gathered by a study of the + sequel of his book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> + <h3 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em"> + <span style="font-size: 120%">ii. Objections to the New + Principles answered (sect. 34-84).</span></h3> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The supposed + Objections, with Berkeley's answers, may be thus + interpreted:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 34-40.) The preceding Principles + banish all substantial realities, and substitute a universe of + chimeras.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> This objection is a play + upon the popular meaning of the word <span class= + "tei tei-q">“idea.”</span> That name is appropriate to the + phenomena presented in sense, because they become concrete + realities only in the experience of living <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page228">[pg 228]</span><a name="Pg228" id= + "Pg228" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Spirit; and so it is not + confined to the chimeras of individual fancy, which may + misrepresent the real ideas of sense that are presented in the + natural system independently of our will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Second + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles + abolish the distinction between Perception and + Imagination—between imagining one's self burnt and actually being + burnt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> Real fire differs from + fancied fire: as real pain does from fancied pain; yet no one + supposes that real pain any more than imaginary pain can exist + unfelt by a sentient intelligence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Third + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 42-44.) We actually <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">see</span></em> + sensible things existing at a distance from our bodies. Now, + whatever is seen existing at a distance must be seen as existing + external to us in our bodies, which contradicts the foregoing + Principles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> Distance, or outness, is + not visible. It is a conception which is suggested gradually, by + our experience of the connexion between visible colours and + certain visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one hand, + and our tactual experience, on the other—as was proved in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay + on Vision</span></span>, in which the ideality of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visible</span></em> world is + demonstrated<a id="noteref_470" name="noteref_470" href= + "#note_470"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">470</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Fourth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 45-48.) It follows from the New + Principles, that the material world must be undergoing continuous + annihilation and recreation in the innumerable sentient + experiences in which it becomes real.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer</span></em>. According to the New + Principles a thing may be realised in the sense-experience of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">other</span></em> minds, during intervals of + its perception by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">my</span></em> mind; for the Principles do + not affirm dependence only on this or that <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page229">[pg 229]</span><a name="Pg229" id= + "Pg229" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> mind, but on a living Mind. + If this implies a constant creation of the material world, the + conception of the universe as in a state of constant creation is + not new, and it signally displays Divine Providence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Fifth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 49.) If extension and extended + Matter can exist only <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in mind</span></em>, it follows that + extension is an attribute of mind—that mind is extended.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> Extension and other + sensible qualities exist in mind, not as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">modes</span></em> + of mind, which is unintelligible, but <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">as + ideas</span></em> of which Mind is percipient; and this is + absolutely inconsistent with the supposition that Mind is itself + extended<a id="noteref_471" name="noteref_471" href= + "#note_471"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">471</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Sixth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds on + the assumption that Matter is independent of percipient mind, and + it thus contradicts the New Principles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> On the contrary, + Matter—if it means what exists abstractly, or in independence of + all percipient Mind—is useless in natural philosophy, which is + conversant exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that compose + concrete things, not with empty abstractions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Seventh + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to + spiritual agents alone, and to regard the things of sense as + wholly impotent, thus discharging natural causes as the New + Principles do, is at variance with human language and with good + sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> While we may speak as + the multitude do, we should learn to think with the few who + reflect. We may still speak of <span class="tei tei-q">“natural + causes,”</span> even when, as philosophers, we recognise that all + true efficiency must be spiritual, and that the material world is + only a system of sensible symbols, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page230">[pg 230]</span><a name="Pg230" id="Pg230" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> regulated by Divine Will and revealing + Omnipresent Mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Eighth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men + seems inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> Not so when we consider + that men seldom comprehend the deep meaning of their practical + assumptions; and when we recollect the prejudices, once dignified + as good sense, which have successively surrendered to + philosophy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Ninth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is + inconsistent with our common faith in the existence of the + material world must be rejected.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> The fact that we are + conscious of not being ourselves the cause of changes perpetually + going on in our <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sense</span></em>-ideas, some of which we + gradually learn by experience to foresee, sufficiently accounts + for the common belief in the independence of those ideas, and is + what men truly mean by this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Tenth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles + concerning Matter and Spirit are inconsistent with the laws of + motion, and with other truths in mathematics and natural + philosophy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> The laws of motion, and + those other truths, may be all conceived and expressed in + consistency with the absence of independent substance and + causation in Matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Eleventh + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 60-66.) If, according to the + foregoing Principles, the material world is merely phenomena + presented by a Power not-ourselves to our senses, the elaborate + contrivances which we find in Nature are useless; for we might + have had all experiences that are needful without them, by the + direct agency of God.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> Elaborate contrivances + in Nature are relatively necessary as signs: they express to + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">us</span></em> the occasional presence and + some of the experience of other men, also the constant presence + and power of the Universal Spirit, while <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page231">[pg 231]</span><a name="Pg231" id="Pg231" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the scientific interpretation of + elaborately constituted Nature is a beneficial moral and + intellectual exercise.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Twelfth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 67-79.) Although the impossibility + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">active</span></em> Matter may be + demonstrable, this does not prove the impossibility of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inactive</span></em> Matter, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">neither solid nor + extended</span></em>, which may be the occasion of our having + sense-ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> This supposition is + unintelligible: the words in which it is expressed convey no + meaning.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Thirteenth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 80, 81.) Matter may be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">an unknowable + Somewhat</span></em>, neither substance nor accident, cause nor + effect, spirit nor idea: all the reasonings against Matter, + conceived as something positive, fail, when this wholly negative + notion is maintained.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> This is to use the word + <span class="tei tei-q">“Matter”</span> as people use the word + <span class="tei tei-q">“nothing”</span>: Unknowable Somewhat + cannot be distinguished from nothing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Fourteenth + objection.</span></em> (Sect. 82-84.) Although we cannot, in + opposition to the New Principles, infer scientifically the + existence of Matter, in abstraction from all realising percipient + life, or form any conception, positive or negative, of what + Matter is; yet Holy Scripture demands the faith of every + Christian in the independent reality of the material world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answer.</span></em> The <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">independent</span></em> reality of the + material world is nowhere affirmed in Scripture.</p> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> + <h3 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em"> + <span style="font-size: 120%">iii. Consequences and Applications + of the New Principles (sect. 85-156).</span></h3> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In this + portion of the Treatise, the New Principles, already guarded + against objections, are applied to enlighten and invigorate final + faith, often suffering from the paralysis of the scepticism + produced by materialism; also to improve the sciences, including + those which relate to Mind, in man and in God. They are + applied:—</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page232">[pg + 232]</span><a name="Pg232" id="Pg232" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">1. To the refutation of Scepticism as to the + reality of the world (sect. 85-91) and God (sect. + 92-96);</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">2. To the liberation of thought from the + bondage of unmeaning abstractions (sect. 97-100);</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, + by making it an interpretation of ideas of sense, simply in + their relations of coexistence and sequence, according to which + they constitute the Divine Language of Nature (sect. + 101-116);</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">4. To simplify Mathematics, by eliminating + infinites and other empty abstractions (sect. + 117-134);</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">5. To explain and sustain faith in the + Immortality of men (sect. 135-144);</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">6. To explain the belief which each man has in + the existence of other men; as signified to him in and through + sense-symbolism (sect. 145);</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">7. To vindicate faith in God, who is signified + in and through the sense-symbolism of universal nature (sect. + 146-156).</span></p> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It was only by + degrees that Berkeley's New Principles attracted attention. A new + mode of conceiving the world we live in, by a young and unknown + author, published at a distance from the centre of English + intellectual life, was apt to be overlooked. In connexion with + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span>, however, it + drew enough of regard to make Berkeley an object of interest to + the literary world on his first visit to London, three years + after its publication.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page233">[pg 233]</span><a name= + "Pg233" id="Pg233" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc27" id="toc27"></a> <a name="pdf28" id="pdf28"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Dedication</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">TO THE RIGHT + HONOURABLE</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">THOMAS, EARL OF + PEMBROKE<a id="noteref_472" name="noteref_472" href= + "#note_472"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">472</span></span></a>, + &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">KNIGHT OF THE + MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER + MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-variant: small-caps">My + Lord</span></span>,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">You will perhaps + wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known + to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. But + that a man who has written something with a design to promote + Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of + your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by any + one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of + the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an + ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have + induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page234">[pg 234]</span><a name= + "Pg234" id="Pg234" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> I not encouraged by + that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your + lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary + favour and bounty you have been pleased to shew towards our + Society<a id="noteref_473" name="noteref_473" href= + "#note_473"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">473</span></span></a> gave + me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of + one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this + treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was + ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most + profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the + world so justly admires in your lordship,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My Lord,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Your lordship's + most humble<br /> + and most devoted servant,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">GEORGE + BERKELEY.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page235">[pg 235]</span><a name= + "Pg235" id="Pg235" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc29" id="toc29"></a> <a name="pdf30" id="pdf30"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">The Preface</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What I here make + public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry<a id="noteref_474" + name="noteref_474" href="#note_474"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">474</span></span></a>, + seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known; + particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a + demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the + natural immortality of the Soul. Whether it be so or no I am + content the reader should impartially examine; since I do not think + myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written + than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may not + suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment + till he has once at least read the whole through, with that degree + of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to + deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, + are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross + misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, + which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to + follow from them; so likewise, though the whole should be read + over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very probable my + sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself + it will be throughout clear and obvious.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As for the + characters of novelty and singularity<a id="noteref_475" name= + "noteref_475" href="#note_475"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">475</span></span></a> which + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page236">[pg 236]</span><a name= + "Pg236" id="Pg236" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> some of the + following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make + any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or + very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth + that is capable of demonstration<a id="noteref_476" name= + "noteref_476" href="#note_476"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">476</span></span></a>, for + no other reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to the + prejudices of mankind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus much I + thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty + censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion + before they rightly comprehend it<a id="noteref_477" name= + "noteref_477" href="#note_477"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">477</span></span></a>.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page237">[pg 237]</span><a name= + "Pg237" id="Pg237" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc31" id="toc31"></a> <a name="pdf32" id="pdf32"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Introduction</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1. Philosophy + being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth<a id= + "noteref_478" name="noteref_478" href="#note_478"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">478</span></span></a>, it + may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and + pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a + greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed + with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet, so it is, we see + the illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the high-road of plain + common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the + most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar + appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not + of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger + of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and + instinct to follow the light of a superior principle—to reason, + meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand + scruples spring up in our minds, concerning those things which + before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of + sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, + endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn + into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which + multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation; till at + length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find + ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a + forlorn Scepticism<a id="noteref_479" name="noteref_479" href= + "#note_479"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">479</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page238">[pg 238]</span><a name="Pg238" id="Pg238" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2. The cause of + this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural + weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said the + faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the + support and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward + essence and constitution of things: besides, the mind of man being + finite, when it treats of things which partake of Infinity, it is + not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and + contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever + extricate itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not to be + comprehended by that which is finite<a id="noteref_480" name= + "noteref_480" href="#note_480"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">480</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3. But, perhaps, + we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally + in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. + It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true + principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be + maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt + more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong + desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their + reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of + Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the + creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly + made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am + inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those + difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked + up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. We have + first raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">4. My purpose + therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are + which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those + absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of + philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance + incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and + limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving + our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page239">[pg 239]</span><a name= + "Pg239" id="Pg239" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Principles of Human + Knowledge; to sift and examine them on all sides: especially since + there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and + difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after + truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the + objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from + false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been + avoided.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">5. How difficult + and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider what + a number of very great and extraordinary men have gone before me in + the like designs<a id="noteref_481" name="noteref_481" href= + "#note_481"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">481</span></span></a>, yet + I am not without some hopes; upon the consideration that the + largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is + short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, + perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had + escaped far better eyes.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">6. In order to + prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what + follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, + concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling + this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by + taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering + speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned + innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of + knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of + framing <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract</span></em> ideas or notions of + things<a id="noteref_482" name="noteref_482" href= + "#note_482"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">482</span></span></a>. He + who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of + philosophers must needs <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page240">[pg + 240]</span><a name="Pg240" id="Pg240" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract + ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object + of those sciences which go by the name of logic and metaphysics, + and of all that which passes under the notion of the most + abstracted and sublime learning; in all which one shall scarce find + any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their + existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with + them.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">7. It is agreed + on all hands that the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualities</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">modes</span></em> + of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and + separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended + together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind, + being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from + those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means + frame to itself <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract ideas</span></em>. For example, there + is conceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this + mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, + constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the + rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and + motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist + without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by + abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of + motion exclusive of both colour and extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">8. Again, the + mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by + sense there is something common and alike in all, and some other + things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which + distinguish them one from another, it considers apart, or singles + out by itself, that which is common; making thereof a most abstract + idea of extension; which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor + has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded + from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the + particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them + one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, + makes an idea of colour in abstract; which is neither red, nor + blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, in like + manner, by considering motion abstractedly, not only from the body + moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all + particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion + is <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page241">[pg 241]</span><a name= + "Pg241" id="Pg241" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> framed; which + equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may + be perceived by sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">9. And as the + mind frames to itself abstract ideas of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualities</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">modes</span></em>, + so does it, by the same precision, or mental separation, attain + abstract ideas of the more compounded <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">beings</span></em> + which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind + having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in + certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out + of the complex or compound idea it has of Peter, James, and any + other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining + only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea, wherein + all the particulars equally partake; abstracting entirely from and + cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might + determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it + is said we come by the abstract idea of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">man</span></em>, + or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true + there is included colour, because there is no man but has some + colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any + particular colour, because there is no one particular colour + wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but + then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle + stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the + rest. Moreover, there being a great variety of other creatures that + partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the + mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and + retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures, + frames the idea of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">animal</span></em>; which abstracts not only + from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and + insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are + body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">body</span></em> is + meant body without any particular shape or figure, there being no + one shape or figure common to all animals; without covering, either + of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, + feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties + of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract + idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion must be neither + walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but + what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page242">[pg 242]</span><a name="Pg242" id="Pg242" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">10. Whether + others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they + best can tell<a id="noteref_483" name="noteref_483" href= + "#note_483"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">483</span></span></a>. For + myself, [<a id="noteref_484" name="noteref_484" href= + "#note_484"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">484</span></span></a>I dare + be confident I have it not.] I find indeed I have a faculty of + imagining or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular + things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing + them. I can imagine a man with two heads; or the upper parts of a + man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the + eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest + of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine<a id= + "noteref_485" name="noteref_485" href="#note_485"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">485</span></span></a>, it + must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of + man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, + or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a + middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the + abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me + to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, + and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; + and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas + whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one + sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities + separated from others, with which, though they are united in some + object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But + I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive + separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so + separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting + from particulars in the manner aforesaid—which last are the two + proper acceptations of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstraction</span></em>. And there is ground + to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The + generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to + abstract notions<a id="noteref_486" name="noteref_486" href= + "#note_486"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">486</span></span></a>. It + is said they are difficult, and not to be attained without pains + and study. We may <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page243">[pg + 243]</span><a name="Pg243" id="Pg243" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are + confined only to the learned.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">11. I proceed to + examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of + abstraction<a id="noteref_487" name="noteref_487" href= + "#note_487"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">487</span></span></a>, and + try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of + speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as + that seems to be. There has been a late [<a id="noteref_488" name= + "noteref_488" href="#note_488"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">488</span></span></a>excellent + and] deservedly esteemed philosopher<a id="noteref_489" name= + "noteref_489" href="#note_489"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">489</span></span></a> who, + no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think + the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest + difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. + <span class="tei tei-q">“The having of general ideas,”</span> saith + he, <span class="tei tei-q">“is that which puts a perfect + distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the + faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident + we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for + universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they + have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since + they have no use of words, or any other general signs.”</span> And + a little after:—<span class="tei tei-q">“Therefore, I think, we may + suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are + discriminated from man: and it is that proper difference wherein + they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a + distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare + machines (as some would have them<a id="noteref_490" name= + "noteref_490" href="#note_490"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">490</span></span></a>), we + cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me + that they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that + they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they + receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up + within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty + to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.”</span>—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on Human + Understanding</span></span>, B. II. ch. 11. § 10 and 11. I readily + agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by + no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the + distinguishing property of that sort <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page244">[pg 244]</span><a name="Pg244" id="Pg244" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of animals, I fear a great many of those that + pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is + here assigned, why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract + general ideas, is, that we observe in them no use of words, or any + other general signs; which is built on this supposition, to wit, + that the making use of words implies having general ideas. From + which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or + generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the + author will further appear by his answering the question he in + another place puts: <span class="tei tei-q">“Since all things that + exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?”</span> + His answer is: <span class="tei tei-q">“Words become general by + being made the signs of general ideas.”</span>—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on Human + Understanding</span></span>, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But it seems that + a word<a id="noteref_491" name="noteref_491" href= + "#note_491"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">491</span></span></a> + becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general + idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it + indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said + <span class="tei tei-q">“the change of motion is proportional to + the impressed force,”</span> or that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“whatever has extension is divisible,”</span> these + propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in + general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to + my thoughts an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em><a id="noteref_492" name= + "noteref_492" href="#note_492"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">492</span></span></a> of + motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and + velocity; or that I must conceive an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract general + idea</span></em> of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor + solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any + other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever + particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, + perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the + axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every + particular extension; it matters not whether line, surface, or + solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure<a id= + "noteref_493" name="noteref_493" href="#note_493"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">493</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page245">[pg 245]</span><a name="Pg245" id="Pg245" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">12. By observing + how ideas become general, we may the better judge how words are + made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely + there are <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">general ideas</span></em>, but only that there + are any <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract general ideas</span></em>. For, in + the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general + ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction, + after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9<a id="noteref_494" + name="noteref_494" href="#note_494"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">494</span></span></a>. Now, + if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we + can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which + considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made + to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same + sort<a id="noteref_495" name="noteref_495" href= + "#note_495"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">495</span></span></a>. To + make this plain by an example. Suppose a geometrician is + demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He + draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which + in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">with regard to its + signification</span></em> general; since, as it is there used, it + represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is + demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other + words, of a line in general<a id="noteref_496" name="noteref_496" + href="#note_496"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">496</span></span></a>. And, + as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">that + particular line</span></em> becomes general by being made a sign, + so the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">name</span></em> line, which taken absolutely + is particular, by being a sign, is made general. And as the former + owes its generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or + general line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly + exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from + the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it + indifferently denotes.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">13. To give the + reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the + uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage + out of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Human Understanding</span></span>, + which is as follows:—<span class="tei tei-q">“Abstract ideas are + not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as + particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because + by constant and familiar use <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page246">[pg 246]</span><a name="Pg246" id="Pg246" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect + upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and + contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do + not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For + example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the + general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, + comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor + rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all + and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, + that cannot exist; an idea<a id="noteref_497" name="noteref_497" + href="#note_497"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">497</span></span></a> + wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are + put together. It is true the mind, in this imperfect state, has + need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the + conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both + which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to + suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is + enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not + those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor + such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about.”</span>—B. iv. + ch. 7. § 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such + an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to + pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I + desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself + whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no + hard task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one + to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he + has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the + description that is here given of the general idea of a + triangle—which is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, + equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">14. Much is here + said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the + pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all + hands agreed that there is <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page247">[pg 247]</span><a name="Pg247" id="Pg247" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> need of great toil and labour of the mind, to + emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to + those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract + ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, + that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not + necessary for <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">communication</span></em>, which is so easy + and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem + obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and + familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time + it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and + furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It + cannot be when they are grown up; for then it seems they are not + conscious of any such painstaking. It remains therefore to be the + business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied + labour of framing abstract notions<a id="noteref_498" name= + "noteref_498" href="#note_498"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">498</span></span></a> will + be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to + imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their + sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till + they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so + framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to + every common name they make use of?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">15. Nor do I + think them a whit more needful for the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">enlargement of + knowledge</span></em> than for communication. It is, I know, a + point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are + about universal notions, to which I fully agree. But then it does + not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in + the manner premised—<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">universality</span></em>, so far as I can + comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or + conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the + particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is + that things, names, or notions<a id="noteref_499" name= + "noteref_499" href="#note_499"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">499</span></span></a>, + being in their own nature <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">particular</span></em>, are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">rendered + universal</span></em>. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition + concerning triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page248">[pg 248]</span><a name= + "Pg248" id="Pg248" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> universal idea of a + triangle: which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em><a id="noteref_500" name= + "noteref_500" href="#note_500"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">500</span></span></a> of a + triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor + equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, + whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for + and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that + sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to include any + difficulty in it<a id="noteref_501" name="noteref_501" href= + "#note_501"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">501</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">16. But here it + will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all + particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of + the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, + because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one + particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally + belongs to any other triangle which in all respects is not the same + with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of + an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I + cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other + triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It + seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally + true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every + particular triangle, which is impossible; or once for all + demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the + particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all + equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I + have in view<a id="noteref_502" name="noteref_502" href= + "#note_502"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">502</span></span></a> + whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an + isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate + length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other + rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that + because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate + length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It + is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars; + but then there is not the least mention made of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">them</span></em> in + the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are + equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page249">[pg 249]</span><a name= + "Pg249" id="Pg249" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> angle, or because + the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which + sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique, + and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held + good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of + any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a + particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because I + demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. + [<a id="noteref_503" name="noteref_503" href= + "#note_503"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">503</span></span></a>And + here it must be acknowledged that a man may <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">consider</span></em> a figure merely as + triangular; without attending to the particular qualities of the + angles, or relations of the sides. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">So far he may + abstract.</span></em> But this will never prove that he can frame + an abstract, general, inconsistent <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of + a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as + man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned + abstract idea, either of man or of animal; inasmuch as all that is + perceived is not considered.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">17. It were an + endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those + great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable + labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract + natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings + and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about + those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence + derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to + need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of + that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed + profession of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and + parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation + and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this + the far greater part of them remain full of darkness and + uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end; and + even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and + cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly + irreconcilable to the understandings of men; and that, taking all + together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit + to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page250">[pg 250]</span><a name= + "Pg250" id="Pg250" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and amusement<a id= + "noteref_504" name="noteref_504" href="#note_504"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">504</span></span></a>—I + say, the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a + despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps + cease upon a view of the false Principles that have obtained in the + world; amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide + influence<a id="noteref_505" name="noteref_505" href= + "#note_505"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">505</span></span></a> over + the thoughts of speculative men than this of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract general + ideas</span></em>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">18. I come now + to consider the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">source</span></em> of this prevailing notion, + and that seems to me to be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">language</span></em>. And surely nothing of + less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an + opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from + other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest + patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in + order to naming; from which it is clear consequence that if there + had been no such thing as speech or universal signs, there never + had been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and + elsewhere of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Human + Understanding</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Let us examine + the manner wherein Words have contributed to the origin of that + mistake.—First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to + have, one only precise and settled signification; which inclines + men to think there are certain abstract determinate ideas that + constitute the true and only immediate signification of each + general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract + ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. + Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and + definite signification annexed to any general name, they all + signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All + which does evidently follow from what has been already said, and + will clearly appear to any one by a little reflexion. To this it + will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby + restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is + defined to be <span class="tei tei-q">“a plain surface comprehended + by three right lines”</span>; by which that name is limited to + denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in + the definition it is not <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page251">[pg + 251]</span><a name="Pg251" id="Pg251" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor + whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with + what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may + be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea + which limits the signification of the word triangle. It is one + thing for to keep a name constantly to the same <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">definition</span></em>, and another to make it + stand everywhere for the same <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em><a id="noteref_506" name= + "noteref_506" href="#note_506"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">506</span></span></a>: the + one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">19. But, to give + a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of + abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion + that language has no other end but the communicating ideas, and + that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and + it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought + altogether insignificant do not always mark out particular + conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for + abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst + speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate, + particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will + deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary + (even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which + stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the + understanding the ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and + discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in + Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each + letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step + each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it + was appointed to stand for<a id="noteref_507" name="noteref_507" + href="#note_507"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">507</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">20. Besides, the + communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only + end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as + the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an + action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to + which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes + entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page252">[pg 252]</span><a name="Pg252" id="Pg252" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> it, as I think doth<a id="noteref_508" + name="noteref_508" href="#note_508"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">508</span></span></a> not + unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the + reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often + happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions + of fear, love, hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise + immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, + without any ideas<a id="noteref_509" name="noteref_509" href= + "#note_509"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">509</span></span></a> + coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned + ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I + mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown + familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is + oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were + wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite + omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good + thing</span></em>, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is + not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, + though we think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor + yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one + shall join ever so little reflection of his own to what has been + said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general + names are often used in the propriety of language without the + speakers designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he + would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names + themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into + our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be + marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Aristotle hath said it,”</span> all I conceive he + means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the + deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And + this effect may be so instantly produced in the minds of those who + are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that + philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, + writings, or reputation should go before. [<a id="noteref_510" + name="noteref_510" href="#note_510"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">510</span></span></a>So + close and immediate a connexion may custom establish <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page253">[pg 253]</span><a name="Pg253" id="Pg253" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> betwixt the very word Aristotle<a id= + "noteref_511" name="noteref_511" href="#note_511"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">511</span></span></a> and + the motions of assent and reverence in the minds of some men.] + Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I + insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt + not, plentifully suggest unto him?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">21. We have, I + think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have + considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and + endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those ends to which they + are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the + source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be + Language.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It cannot be + denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all + that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint + labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn + into the view and made the possession of one single person. But + [<a id="noteref_512" name="noteref_512" href= + "#note_512"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">512</span></span></a>at the + same time it must be owned that] most parts of knowledge have been + [<a id="noteref_513" name="noteref_513" href= + "#note_513"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">513</span></span></a>so] + strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general + ways of speech wherein they are delivered, [that it may almost be + made a question whether language has contributed more to the + hindrance or advancement of the sciences<a id="noteref_514" name= + "noteref_514" href="#note_514"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">514</span></span></a>]. + Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, [I + am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as + possibly I can<a id="noteref_515" name="noteref_515" href= + "#note_515"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">515</span></span></a>:] + whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and + naked into my view; keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am + able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly + united with them. From which I may expect to derive the following + advantages:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">22. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal, + the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been + a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, this seems to be a sure + way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page254">[pg 254]</span><a name= + "Pg254" id="Pg254" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of abstract ideas, + which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; + and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the + finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the + deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thirdly</span></em>, so long as I confine my + thoughts to my own ideas<a id="noteref_516" name="noteref_516" + href="#note_516"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">516</span></span></a>, + divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The + objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be + deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not + possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or + unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or + disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are + included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more + requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own + understanding.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">23. But the + attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire + deliverance from the deception of words; which I dare hardly + promise myself, so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so + early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words + and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased + by the doctrine of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstraction</span></em>. For, so long as men + thought <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract</span></em> ideas were annexed to + their words, it does not seem strange that they should use words + for ideas; it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the + word, and retain the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract</span></em> idea in the mind; which + in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the + principal cause why those who have so emphatically recommended to + others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and + contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it + themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd + opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of + words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well<a id= + "noteref_517" name="noteref_517" href="#note_517"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">517</span></span></a>, that + we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from + the words which signify them<a id="noteref_518" name="noteref_518" + href="#note_518"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">518</span></span></a>. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page255">[pg 255]</span><a name= + "Pg255" id="Pg255" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> But, how good soever + this advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could + not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the + only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the + immediate signification of every general name was a determinate + abstract idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">24. But these + being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his + being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">particular</span></em> ideas, will not puzzle + himself in vain to find out and conceive the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract</span></em> idea annexed to any name. + And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas<a id= + "noteref_519" name="noteref_519" href="#note_519"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">519</span></span></a> will + spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none + to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that every one would + use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he + would consider; separating from them all that dress and incumbrance + of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide + the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and + pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the + writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. + We need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree + of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our + hand.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">25. Unless we + take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the + embarras and delusion of Words, we may make infinite reasonings + upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from + consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall + only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper + entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs + to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page256">[pg 256]</span><a name="Pg256" id="Pg256" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> would make my words the occasion of his + own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in + reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy + for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be + out of all danger of being deceived by my words. And I do not see + how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, + undisguised ideas<a id="noteref_520" name="noteref_520" href= + "#note_520"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">520</span></span></a>.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page257">[pg 257]</span><a name= + "Pg257" id="Pg257" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc33" id="toc33"></a> <a name="pdf34" id="pdf34"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Part First</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1. It is evident + to any one who takes a survey of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">objects of human + knowledge</span></em>, that they are either <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by + attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> formed by help of memory and + imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing + those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have + the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and + variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, + motion and resistance; and of all these more and less either as to + quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate + with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their + variety of tone and composition<a id="noteref_521" name= + "noteref_521" href="#note_521"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">521</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page258">[pg 258]</span><a name="Pg258" id="Pg258" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And as several + of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be + marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing</span></em>. + Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and + consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one + distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of + ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible + things; which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the + passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth<a id= + "noteref_522" name="noteref_522" href="#note_522"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">522</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2. But, besides + all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is + likewise Something which knows or perceives them; and exercises + divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. + This perceiving, active being is what I call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mind</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">soul</span></em>, + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">myself</span></em>. By which words I do not + denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from + them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they + are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being + perceived<a id="noteref_523" name="noteref_523" href= + "#note_523"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">523</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3. That neither + our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, + exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it + seems no less evident that the various sensations, or ideas + imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that + is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in + a mind perceiving them<a id="noteref_524" name="noteref_524" href= + "#note_524"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">524</span></span></a>. I + think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one + that shall attend to what is meant by the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">exist</span></em> + when applied to <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page259">[pg + 259]</span><a name="Pg259" id="Pg259" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + sensible things<a id="noteref_525" name="noteref_525" href= + "#note_525"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">525</span></span></a>. The + table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I + were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that + if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit + actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was + smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or + figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I + can understand by these and the like expressions<a id="noteref_526" + name="noteref_526" href="#note_526"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">526</span></span></a>. For + as to what is said of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute</span></em> existence of unthinking + things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to + me perfectly unintelligible. Their <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">esse</span></span> is <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">percipi</span></span>; nor is it possible they + should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which + perceive them<a id="noteref_527" name="noteref_527" href= + "#note_527"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">527</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">4. It is indeed + an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, + mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an + existence, natural or real<a id="noteref_528" name="noteref_528" + href="#note_528"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">528</span></span></a>, + distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with + how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principle may + be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to + call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a + manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but + the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides + our own<a id="noteref_529" name="noteref_529" href= + "#note_529"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">529</span></span></a> ideas + or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of + these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">5. If we + thoroughly examine this tenet<a id="noteref_530" name="noteref_530" + href="#note_530"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">530</span></span></a> it + will, perhaps, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page260">[pg + 260]</span><a name="Pg260" id="Pg260" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract + ideas</span></em>. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction + than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their + being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived<a id= + "noteref_531" name="noteref_531" href="#note_531"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">531</span></span></a>? + Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures—in a word + the things we see and feel—what are they but so many sensations, + notions<a id="noteref_532" name="noteref_532" href= + "#note_532"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">532</span></span></a>, + ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, + even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might + as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my + thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which + perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the + trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a + rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, + I can abstract; if that may properly be called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstraction</span></em> which extends only to + the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really + exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or + imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real + existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see + or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is + it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing + or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. [<a id= + "noteref_533" name="noteref_533" href="#note_533"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">533</span></span></a>In + truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing, and cannot + therefore be abstracted from each other.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">6. Some truths + there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open + his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. + that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word + all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have + not any subsistence without a mind; that their <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being</span></em> + is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are + not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or that + of any other created spirit, they must either <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page261">[pg 261]</span><a name="Pg261" id="Pg261" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> have no existence at all, or else + subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly + unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to + attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a + spirit. [<a id="noteref_534" name="noteref_534" href= + "#note_534"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">534</span></span></a>To be + convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to + separate in his own thoughts the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being</span></em> + of a sensible thing from its <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">being perceived</span></em>.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">7. From what has + been said it is evident there is not any other Substance than + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em>, or that which + perceives<a id="noteref_535" name="noteref_535" href= + "#note_535"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">535</span></span></a>. But, + for the fuller proof<a id="noteref_536" name="noteref_536" href= + "#note_536"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">536</span></span></a> of + this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, + figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas + perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving + thing is a manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one + as to perceive: that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like + qualities exist must perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be + no unthinking substance or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of those ideas.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">8. But, say you, + though the ideas themselves<a id="noteref_537" name="noteref_537" + href="#note_537"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">537</span></span></a> do + not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, + whereof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist without + the mind, in an unthinking substance<a id="noteref_538" name= + "noteref_538" href="#note_538"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">538</span></span></a>. I + answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure + can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but + never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for + us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I + ask whether those supposed <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">originals</span></em>, or external things, of + which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves + perceivable or <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page262">[pg + 262]</span><a name="Pg262" id="Pg262" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + no? If they are, then <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">they</span></em> are ideas, and we have gained + our point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether + it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is + invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so + of the rest.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">9. Some there + are who make a distinction betwixt <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">primary</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">secondary</span></em> qualities<a id= + "noteref_539" name="noteref_539" href="#note_539"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">539</span></span></a>. By + the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or + impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other + sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The + ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to be the + resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived; + but they will have our ideas of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">primary + qualities</span></em> to be patterns or images of things which + exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call + Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert<a id= + "noteref_540" name="noteref_540" href="#note_540"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">540</span></span></a>, + senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do + actually subsist. But it is evident, from what we have already + shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing + in the mind<a id="noteref_541" name="noteref_541" href= + "#note_541"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">541</span></span></a>, and + that an idea can be like nothing but another idea; and that + consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an + unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of + what is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">corporeal + substance</span></em>, involves a contradiction in it. [<a id= + "noteref_542" name="noteref_542" href="#note_542"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">542</span></span></a>Insomuch + that I should not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing + its absurdity. But, because the tenet of the existence of + Matter<a id="noteref_543" name="noteref_543" href= + "#note_543"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">543</span></span></a> seems + to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and + draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be + thought prolix and tedious than omit anything that might conduce to + the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">10. They who + assert that figure, motion, and the rest of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page263">[pg 263]</span><a name="Pg263" id="Pg263" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the primary or original qualities<a id= + "noteref_544" name="noteref_544" href="#note_544"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">544</span></span></a> do + exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same + time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike + secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us are sensations, + existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by + the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of + matter<a id="noteref_545" name="noteref_545" href= + "#note_545"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">545</span></span></a>. This + they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond + all exception. Now, if it be certain that those <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">original</span></em> qualities are inseparably + united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, + capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">they</span></em> exist only in the mind. But I + desire any one to reflect, and try whether he can, by any + abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body + without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see + evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body + extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other + sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. + In short, extension, figure and motion, abstracted from all other + qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible + qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and + nowhere else<a id="noteref_546" name="noteref_546" href= + "#note_546"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">546</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">11. Again, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">great</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">small</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">swift</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">slow</span></em>, + are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind<a id="noteref_547" + name="noteref_547" href="#note_547"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">547</span></span></a>; + being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of + the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists + without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither + swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, + they are extension in general, and motion in general. Thus we see + how much the tenet of extended moveable substances existing without + the mind depends on that strange doctrine of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract + ideas</span></em>. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the + vague and indeterminate description <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page264">[pg 264]</span><a name="Pg264" id="Pg264" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of Matter, or corporeal substance, which the + modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles + that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">materia prima</span></span>, to be met with in + Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be + conceived: since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists + not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of + solidity<a id="noteref_548" name="noteref_548" href= + "#note_548"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">548</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">12. That + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">number</span></em> is entirely the creature of + the mind<a id="noteref_549" name="noteref_549" href= + "#note_549"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">549</span></span></a>, even + though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be + evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different + denomination of number as the mind views it with different + respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, + according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a + foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on + men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should + give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, + one page, one line, &c.; all these are equally units, though + some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is + plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">arbitrarily</span></em> put together by the + mind<a id="noteref_550" name="noteref_550" href= + "#note_550"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">550</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">13. Unity I know + some<a id="noteref_551" name="noteref_551" href= + "#note_551"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">551</span></span></a> will + have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other + ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unity</span></em> I do not find; and if I had, + methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary, it should be + the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to + accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page265">[pg 265]</span><a name= + "Pg265" id="Pg265" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> sensation and + reflexion. To say no more, it is an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract + idea</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">14. I shall + farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers + prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or + without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all + other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said + that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all + patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which + excite them; for that the same body which appears cold to one hand + seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that + figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities + existing in Matter; because to the same eye at different stations, + or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear + various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and + determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is + not really in the sapid thing; because the thing remaining + unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a + fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say + that motion is not without the mind; since if the succession of + ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, + shall appear slower, without any alteration in any external + object<a id="noteref_552" name="noteref_552" href= + "#note_552"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">552</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">15. In short, + let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly + to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he + shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same + thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed + this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no + extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by + sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the + arguments foregoing<a id="noteref_553" name="noteref_553" href= + "#note_553"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">553</span></span></a> + plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at + all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an + unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth that there should + be any such thing as an outward object<a id="noteref_554" name= + "noteref_554" href="#note_554"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">554</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page266">[pg 266]</span><a name="Pg266" id="Pg266" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">16. But let us + examine a little the received opinion. It is said extension is a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mode</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">accident</span></em> of Matter, and that + Matter is the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> that supports it. Now I + desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">supporting</span></em> extension. Say you, I + have no idea of Matter; and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, + though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, + you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know + not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it + bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is + evident <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">support</span></em> cannot here be taken in + its usual or literal sense, as when we say that pillars support a + building. In what sense therefore must it be taken? [<a id= + "noteref_555" name="noteref_555" href="#note_555"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">555</span></span></a> For + my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can be + applicable to it.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">17. If we + inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves + to mean by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material substance</span></em>, we shall find + them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds + but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion + of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to + me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for + its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, + cannot be understood in the common sense of those words: it must + therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do + not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches + which make the signification of the words <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em>, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning + annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, + in discussing this material <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> or support of figure + and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they + have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct + repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">18. But, though + it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist + without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet + how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by + Sense or by Reason<a id="noteref_556" name="noteref_556" href= + "#note_556"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">556</span></span></a>. As + for our senses, by them we <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page267">[pg 267]</span><a name="Pg267" id="Pg267" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> have the knowledge only of our sensations, + ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, + call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things + exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are + perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.—It remains + therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, + it must be by reason inferring their existence from what is + immediately perceived by sense. But (<a id="noteref_557" name= + "noteref_557" href="#note_557"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">557</span></span></a>I do + not see) what reason can induce us to believe the existence of + bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very + patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary + connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all + hands (and what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it + beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all + the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without resembling + them<a id="noteref_558" name="noteref_558" href= + "#note_558"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">558</span></span></a>. + Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies<a id= + "noteref_559" name="noteref_559" href="#note_559"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">559</span></span></a> is + not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they + are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in + the same order we see them in at present, without their + concurrence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">19. But, though + we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps + it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of + their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness + rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there + are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But + neither can this be said. For, though we give the materialists + their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the + nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own + themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon + spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the + mind<a id="noteref_560" name="noteref_560" href= + "#note_560"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">560</span></span></a>. + Hence <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page268">[pg 268]</span><a name= + "Pg268" id="Pg268" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> it is evident the + production of ideas or sensations in our minds<a id="noteref_561" + name="noteref_561" href="#note_561"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">561</span></span></a>, can + be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal + substances<a id="noteref_562" name="noteref_562" href= + "#note_562"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">562</span></span></a>; + since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or + without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies + to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be a + very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason + at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely + useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">20. In short, if + there were external bodies<a id="noteref_563" name="noteref_563" + href="#note_563"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">563</span></span></a>, it + is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were + not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that + we have now. Suppose—what no one can deny possible—an intelligence, + without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same + train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same + order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that + intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of + Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them + in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same + thing? Of this there can be no question. Which one consideration + were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of + whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence + of bodies without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">21. Were it + necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of + Matter<a id="noteref_564" name="noteref_564" href= + "#note_564"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">564</span></span></a>, + after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors + and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from + that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes + in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But + I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well + because I think arguments <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span> are unnecessary for confirming what has + been, if I mistake not, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page269">[pg + 269]</span><a name="Pg269" id="Pg269" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + sufficiently demonstrated <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to + speak somewhat of them.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">22. I am afraid + I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this + subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be + demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one + that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your + own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible + for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the + mind or unperceived. This easy trial<a id="noteref_565" name= + "noteref_565" href="#note_565"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">565</span></span></a> may + perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright + contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon + this issue:—If you can but conceive it possible for one extended + moveable substance, or in general for any one idea, or anything + like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it<a id= + "noteref_566" name="noteref_566" href="#note_566"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">566</span></span></a>, I + shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of + external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, + though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it + exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I + say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass + for an argument that it is so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">23. But, say + you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, + for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody + by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty + in it. But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in + your mind certain ideas which you call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">books</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">trees</span></em>, and at the same time + omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But + do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This + therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the + power of imagining, or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not + shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought + may exist without the mind<a id="noteref_567" name="noteref_567" + href="#note_567"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">567</span></span></a>. To + make out this, it is necessary that <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page270">[pg 270]</span><a name="Pg270" id="Pg270" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> you conceive them existing unconceived or + unthought of; which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost + to conceive the existence of external bodies<a id="noteref_568" + name="noteref_568" href="#note_568"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">568</span></span></a>, we + are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, + taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does + conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though + at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself. A + little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of + what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other + proofs against the existence of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">24. [<a id= + "noteref_569" name="noteref_569" href="#note_569"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">569</span></span></a>Could + men but forbear to amuse themselves with words, we should, I + believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] It is very + obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know + whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute + existence of sensible objects in themselves</span></em>, or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">without + the mind</span></em><a id="noteref_570" name="noteref_570" href= + "#note_570"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">570</span></span></a>. To + me it is evident those words mark out either a direct + contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of + this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would + calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the + emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely + nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is on this + therefore that I insist, to wit, that the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute existence + of unthinking things</span></em> are words without a meaning, or + which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, + and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the + reader.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">25. All our + ideas, sensations, notions<a id="noteref_571" name="noteref_571" + href="#note_571"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">571</span></span></a>, or + the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be + distinguished, are visibly inactive: there is nothing of power or + agency <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page271">[pg + 271]</span><a name="Pg271" id="Pg271" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot + produce or make any alteration in another<a id="noteref_572" name= + "noteref_572" href="#note_572"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">572</span></span></a>. To + be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite + but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part + of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in + them but what is perceived; but whoever shall attend to his ideas, + whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power + or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. + A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an + idea implies passiveness and inertness in it; insomuch that it is + impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be + the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern + of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly + follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of + our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of + powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size + of corpuscles<a id="noteref_573" name="noteref_573" href= + "#note_573"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">573</span></span></a>, must + certainly be false.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">26. We perceive + a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited, others are + changed or totally disappear. There is therefore <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">some</span></em> + cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and + changes them<a id="noteref_574" name="noteref_574" href= + "#note_574"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">574</span></span></a>. That + this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, is clear from the preceding + section. It must therefore be a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>; but it has been shewn + that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains + therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active + substance or Spirit<a id="noteref_575" name="noteref_575" href= + "#note_575"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">575</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page272">[pg 272]</span><a name="Pg272" id="Pg272" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">27. A Spirit is + one simple, undivided active being—as it perceives ideas it is + called the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understanding</span></em>, and as it produces + or otherwise operates about them it is called the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>. + Hence there can be no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> formed of a soul or spirit; + for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid. sect. 25), + they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that + which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that + to have an idea which shall be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">like</span></em> + that active Principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely + impossible. Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that + it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it + produceth<a id="noteref_576" name="noteref_576" href= + "#note_576"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">576</span></span></a>. If + any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him + but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active + being; and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by + the names <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understanding</span></em>, distinct from each + other, as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in + general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the + subject of the aforesaid powers—which is signified by the name + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>. + This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>, [<a id="noteref_577" name= + "noteref_577" href="#note_577"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">577</span></span></a><em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">understanding</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mind</span></em>,] <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">soul</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, do not stand for different + ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which + is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be + like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [<a id= + "noteref_578" name="noteref_578" href="#note_578"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">578</span></span></a>Though + it must be owned at the same time that we have some <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em> + of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, + loving, hating—inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of + these words.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">28. I find I can + excite ideas<a id="noteref_579" name="noteref_579" href= + "#note_579"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">579</span></span></a> in my + mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think + fit. It is no more than <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">willing</span></em>, and straightway this or + that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is + obliterated and <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page273">[pg + 273]</span><a name="Pg273" id="Pg273" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very + properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and + grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or + of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves + with words<a id="noteref_580" name="noteref_580" href= + "#note_580"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">580</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">29. But, + whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas + actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">my</span></em> will. When in broad daylight I + open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see + or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present + themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other + senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my</span></em> + will<a id="noteref_581" name="noteref_581" href= + "#note_581"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">581</span></span></a>. + There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces + them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">30. The ideas of + Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the + Imagination<a id="noteref_582" name="noteref_582" href= + "#note_582"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">582</span></span></a>; they + have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not + excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills + often are, but in a regular train or series—the admirable connexion + whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its + Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind + we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the laws + of nature</span></em>; and these we learn by experience, which + teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such + other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">31. This gives + us a sort of foresight, which enables us to regulate our actions + for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at + a loss: we could not know <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page274">[pg + 274]</span><a name="Pg274" id="Pg274" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or + remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep + refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the + way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or + such ends, such or such means are conducive—all this we know, not + by discovering any <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary connexion</span></em> between our + ideas, but only by the observation of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">settled + laws</span></em> of nature; without which we should be all in + uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to + manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just + born<a id="noteref_583" name="noteref_583" href= + "#note_583"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">583</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">32. And yet this + consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the + Goodness and Wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes + the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, + that it rather sends them wandering after second causes<a id= + "noteref_584" name="noteref_584" href="#note_584"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">584</span></span></a>. For, + when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by + other ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith + attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one + the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and + unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we + perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure, we at the same + time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do + from thence conclude the sun to be the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em> + of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of + bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the + latter the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">effect</span></em> of the former<a id= + "noteref_585" name="noteref_585" href="#note_585"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">585</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">33. The ideas + imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real + things</span></em>: and those excited in the imagination, being + less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">images + of</span></em> things, which <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page275">[pg 275]</span><a name="Pg275" id="Pg275" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> they copy and represent. But then our + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensations</span></em>, be they never so vivid + and distinct, are nevertheless ideas<a id="noteref_586" name= + "noteref_586" href="#note_586"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">586</span></span></a>: that + is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the + ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have + more reality<a id="noteref_587" name="noteref_587" href= + "#note_587"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">587</span></span></a> in + them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the + creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist + without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit or + thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited + by the will of another and more powerful Spirit; yet still they are + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>: and certainly no idea, + whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind + perceiving it<a id="noteref_588" name="noteref_588" href= + "#note_588"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">588</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">34. Before we + proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering + Objections<a id="noteref_589" name="noteref_589" href= + "#note_589"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">589</span></span></a> which + may probably be made against the Principles we have hitherto laid + down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick + apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since all men do not + equally apprehend things of this nature; and I am willing to be + understood by every one.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that + is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and + instead thereof a chimerical scheme of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + takes place. All things that exist exist only in the mind; that is, + they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, + and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, + stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page276">[pg 276]</span><a name= + "Pg276" id="Pg276" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> chimeras and + illusions on the fancy?—To all which, and whatever else of the same + sort may be objected, I answer, that by the Principles premised we + are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, + hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as + ever, and is as real as ever. There is a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rerum natura</span></span>, and the + distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. + This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what + is meant by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real things</span></em>, in opposition to + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">chimeras</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas of our own + framing</span></em>; but then they both equally exist in the mind, + and in that sense<a id="noteref_590" name="noteref_590" href= + "#note_590"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">590</span></span></a> are + alike <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">35. I do not + argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, + either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes + and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the + least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that + which <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">philosophers</span></em> call Matter or + corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done + to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The + Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his + impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a + great handle for trifling and disputation. [<a id="noteref_591" + name="noteref_591" href="#note_591"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">591</span></span></a>But + that is all the harm that I can see done.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">36. If any man + thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is + very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest + terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been + said:—There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which + will or excite ideas<a id="noteref_592" name="noteref_592" href= + "#note_592"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">592</span></span></a> in + themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in + respect of others they perceive by sense: which, being impressed + upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak + themselves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than human + spirits<a id="noteref_593" name="noteref_593" href= + "#note_593"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">593</span></span></a>. + These latter are said to have <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">more reality</span></em><a id="noteref_594" + name="noteref_594" href="#note_594"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">594</span></span></a> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page277">[pg 277]</span><a name= + "Pg277" id="Pg277" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in them than the + former;—by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, + and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving + them<a id="noteref_595" name="noteref_595" href= + "#note_595"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">595</span></span></a>. And + in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that + which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense + here given of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>, it is evident that every + vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane + system, is as much a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real being</span></em> by our principles as by + any other. Whether others mean anything by the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">reality</span></em> + different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own + thoughts and see.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">37. It will be + urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away + all <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corporeal substances</span></em>. To this my + answer is, that if the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> be taken in the vulgar + sense, for a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">combination</span></em> of sensible qualities, + such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like—this we cannot be + accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense, + for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind—then + indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to + take away that which never had any existence, not even in the + imagination<a id="noteref_596" name="noteref_596" href= + "#note_596"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">596</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">38. But after + all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, + and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so—the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> not being used in common + discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities + which are called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">things</span></em>; and it is certain that any + expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem + harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the + proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are + fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by + our senses<a id="noteref_597" name="noteref_597" href= + "#note_597"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">597</span></span></a>. The + hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, and + suchlike qualities, which combined together<a id="noteref_598" + name="noteref_598" href="#note_598"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">598</span></span></a> + constitute the several sorts of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page278">[pg 278]</span><a name="Pg278" id="Pg278" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> victuals and apparel, have been shewn to + exist only in the mind that perceives them: and this is all that is + meant by calling them <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>; which word, if it was as + ordinarily used as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></em>, would sound no harsher nor + more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the + propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree + with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate + objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the + mind, I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to + custom that they should be called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + rather than <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">39. If it be + demanded why I make use of the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + and do not rather in compliance with custom call them <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em>; + I answer, I do it for two reasons:—First, because the term + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></em>, in contradistinction to + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, is generally supposed to + denote somewhat existing without the mind: Secondly, because + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></em> hath a more comprehensive + signification than <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, including spirits, or + thinking things<a id="noteref_599" name="noteref_599" href= + "#note_599"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">599</span></span></a>, as + well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in + the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark + them by the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>; which implies those + properties<a id="noteref_600" name="noteref_600" href= + "#note_600"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">600</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">40. But, say + what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still + believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible + soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the + evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the + same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, + is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But + I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof + for the existence of anything which is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">not</span></em> + perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn sceptic and + disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress + and assurance imaginable; nor are there <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page279">[pg 279]</span><a name="Pg279" id="Pg279" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> any principles more opposite to Scepticism + than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly + shewn<a id="noteref_601" name="noteref_601" href= + "#note_601"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">601</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">41. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, it will be objected that + there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the + idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and + actually being so. [<a id="noteref_602" name="noteref_602" href= + "#note_602"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">602</span></span></a>If you + suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put + your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness.] This + and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets.—To all which + the answer is evident from what hath been already said<a id= + "noteref_603" name="noteref_603" href="#note_603"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">603</span></span></a>; and + I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different + from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions + very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will + pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an + unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its + idea<a id="noteref_604" name="noteref_604" href= + "#note_604"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">604</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">42. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thirdly</span></em>, it will be objected that + we see things actually without or at a distance from us, and which + consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those + things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as + near to us as our own thoughts<a id="noteref_605" name= + "noteref_605" href="#note_605"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">605</span></span></a>.—In + answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do + oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet + for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence + only in the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">43. But, for the + fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider + how it is that we perceive distance, and things placed at a + distance, by sight. For, that we should in truth <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">see</span></em> + external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, + others farther off, seems to carry <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page280">[pg 280]</span><a name="Pg280" id="Pg280" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> with it some opposition to what hath been + said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration + of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay towards a New + Theory of Vision</span></span>, which was published not long + since<a id="noteref_606" name="noteref_606" href= + "#note_606"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">606</span></span></a>. + Wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately + of itself perceived by sight<a id="noteref_607" name="noteref_607" + href="#note_607"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">607</span></span></a>, nor + yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that + hath a necessary connexion with it<a id="noteref_608" name= + "noteref_608" href="#note_608"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">608</span></span></a>; but + that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas, + and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no + manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things + placed at a distance<a id="noteref_609" name="noteref_609" href= + "#note_609"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">609</span></span></a>; but, + by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify and + suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any + language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for<a id= + "noteref_610" name="noteref_610" href="#note_610"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">610</span></span></a>. + Insomuch that a man born blind, and afterwards made to see, would + not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his + mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the + forementioned treatise.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">44. The ideas of + sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and + heterogeneous<a id="noteref_611" name="noteref_611" href= + "#note_611"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">611</span></span></a>. The + former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper + objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor are the images + of external things, was shewn even in that treatise<a id= + "noteref_612" name="noteref_612" href="#note_612"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">612</span></span></a>. + Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">tangible + objects</span></em>;—not that to suppose that vulgar error was + necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but + because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it, in a + discourse concerning <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Vision</span></em>. So that in strict truth + the ideas of sight<a id="noteref_613" name="noteref_613" href= + "#note_613"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">613</span></span></a>, when + we apprehend by them distance, and things placed at a distance, do + not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a + distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch<a id= + "noteref_614" name="noteref_614" href="#note_614"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">614</span></span></a> will + be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and + in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident, from + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page281">[pg 281]</span><a name= + "Pg281" id="Pg281" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> what has been said + in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and + elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are + the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs + us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we + excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller + information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">45. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Fourthly</span></em>, it will be objected that + from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment + annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when + they are perceived: the trees therefore are in the garden, or the + chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to + perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room + is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again + created<a id="noteref_615" name="noteref_615" href= + "#note_615"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">615</span></span></a>.—In + answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in + sect. 3, 4, &c.; and desire he will consider whether he means + anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being + perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am + not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; + and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and + not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it + possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without + being perceived, then I give up the cause. But if he cannot, he + will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence + of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity, + the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no + meaning in them<a id="noteref_616" name="noteref_616" href= + "#note_616"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">616</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page282">[pg 282]</span><a name="Pg282" id="Pg282" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">46. It will not + be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy + are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is + thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the + visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is + not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on + all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and + immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no + longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem + very incredible that things should be every moment creating; yet + this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the + Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter<a id= + "noteref_617" name="noteref_617" href="#note_617"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">617</span></span></a>, and + that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless + of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation; + which by them is expounded to be a continual creation<a id= + "noteref_618" name="noteref_618" href="#note_618"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">618</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">47. Farther, a + little thought will discover to us that, though we allow the + existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably + follow, from the principles which are now generally admitted, that + the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist + whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident, from sect. 11 + and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers contend + for is an incomprehensible Somewhat, which hath <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page283">[pg 283]</span><a name="Pg283" id="Pg283" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> none of those particular qualities + whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one + from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked + that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally + allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable + philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond + all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of + parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived by + sense<a id="noteref_619" name="noteref_619" href= + "#note_619"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">619</span></span></a>. The + reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite + magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, + not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an + infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough + to discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered + more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, + that is, the object appears greater; and its figure varies, those + parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing + now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those + perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes + of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute, the + body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration + in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered + in itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all + shape and figure. From which it follows that, though we should + grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is + withal as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own + principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular + bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without + the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to + them infinite and shapeless; and it is the mind that frames all + that variety of bodies which compose the visible world, any one + whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">48. But, after + all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not + be found reasonably charged on the Principles we have premised, so + as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, + though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page284">[pg 284]</span><a name= + "Pg284" id="Pg284" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> ideas which cannot + exist unperceived, yet we may not hence conclude they have no + existence except only while they are perceived by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">us</span></em>; + since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we + do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the + mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular + mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from + the foregoing Principles that bodies are annihilated and created + every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">our</span></em> perception of them.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">49. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Fifthly</span></em>, it may perhaps be + objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it + follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a + mode or attribute which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated + of the subject in which it exists.—I answer, those qualities are in + the mind only as they are perceived by it;—that is, not by way of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mode</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attribute</span></em>, but only by way of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em><a id="noteref_620" name= + "noteref_620" href="#note_620"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">620</span></span></a>. And + it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension + exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because + those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and + nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that + seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this + proposition <span class="tei tei-q">“a die is hard, extended, and + square,”</span> they will have it that the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">die</span></em> + denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, + extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they + exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing + distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. + And, to say a die is hard, extended, and <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page285">[pg 285]</span><a name="Pg285" id="Pg285" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> square is not to attribute those qualities to + a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an + explication of the meaning of the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">die</span></em>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">50. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Sixthly</span></em>, you will say there have + been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away + these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and + undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with + so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever + advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, + in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that + corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist.—To this I answer + that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition + which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be + made appear by an induction of particulars. To explain the + phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such occasions, + we are affected with such and such ideas. But how Matter should + operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no + philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there + can be no use of Matter<a id="noteref_621" name="noteref_621" href= + "#note_621"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">621</span></span></a> in + natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things + do it, not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other + qualities; which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and + therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already + shewn. See sect. 25.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">51. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Seventhly</span></em>, it will upon this be + demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural + causes<a id="noteref_622" name="noteref_622" href= + "#note_622"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">622</span></span></a>, and + ascribe everything to the immediate operation of spirits? We must + no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water + cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be + deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner?—I answer, + he would so: in such things we ought to think with the learned and + speak with the vulgar. They who to demonstration are convinced of + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page286">[pg 286]</span><a name= + "Pg286" id="Pg286" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> truth of the + Copernican system do nevertheless say <span class="tei tei-q">“the + sun rises,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“the sun sets,”</span> + or <span class="tei tei-q">“comes to the meridian”</span>; and if + they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without + doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here + said will make it manifest that the common use of language would + receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission + of our tenets<a id="noteref_623" name="noteref_623" href= + "#note_623"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">623</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">52. In the + ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as + they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such + a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they + may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is + unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language + is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the + truest. Hence it is impossible—even in the most rigid, philosophic + reasonings—so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we + speak as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend + difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader + will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a + discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech + which use has made inevitable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">53. As to the + opinion that there are no corporeal causes, this has been + heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by + others among the modern philosophers; who though they allow Matter + to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient + cause of all things<a id="noteref_624" name="noteref_624" href= + "#note_624"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">624</span></span></a>. + These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none + which had any power or activity included in it; and that by + consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page287">[pg 287]</span><a name="Pg287" id="Pg287" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> they supposed to exist without the + mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they + should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which + they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in + nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since + God might have done everything as well without them—this I say, + though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very + unaccountable and extravagant supposition<a id="noteref_625" name= + "noteref_625" href="#note_625"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">625</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">54. In the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eighth</span></em> place, the universal + concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible + argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external + things<a id="noteref_626" name="noteref_626" href= + "#note_626"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">626</span></span></a>. Must + we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause + can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?—I + answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be + found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of + Matter or things without the mind<a id="noteref_627" name= + "noteref_627" href="#note_627"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">627</span></span></a>. + Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, + or has no meaning in it<a id="noteref_628" name="noteref_628" href= + "#note_628"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">628</span></span></a>, is + impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that + sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one + sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists; that + is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which + affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were + some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly + apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a + settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. + This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, + by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often + heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in + them.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page288">[pg + 288]</span><a name="Pg288" id="Pg288" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">55. But + secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so + universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak + argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of + prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the + utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far + greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and + motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even + by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small proportion + they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day + those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the + world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">56. But it is + demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and account for + its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing they + perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were, not the + authors<a id="noteref_629" name="noteref_629" href= + "#note_629"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">629</span></span></a>, as + not being excited from within, nor depending on the operation of + their wills, this made them maintain <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">those</span></em> + ideas or objects of perception, had an existence independent of and + without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was + involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that + the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, + they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar<a id= + "noteref_630" name="noteref_630" href="#note_630"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">630</span></span></a>; but + at the same time run into another, which seems no less absurd, to + wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the + mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of + which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those + objects on the mind<a id="noteref_631" name="noteref_631" href= + "#note_631"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">631</span></span></a>. And + this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause + with the former, namely, their being conscious that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">they</span></em> + were not the authors of their own sensations; which <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page289">[pg 289]</span><a name="Pg289" id="Pg289" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> they evidently knew were imprinted from + without, and which therefore must have <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">some</span></em> + cause, distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">57. But why they + should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in + their likeness, and not rather have recourse to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em>, + which alone can act, may be accounted for. First, because they were + not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things + like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them + power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which + excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to + our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as + human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And + thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever + the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to + own the presence of a Superior Agent. But, when we see things go on + in the ordinary course, they do not excite in us any reflexion; + their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the + greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator, is yet so + constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them the + immediate effects of a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Free Spirit</span></em>; especially since + inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an + imperfection, is looked on as a mark of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">freedom</span></em><a id="noteref_632" name= + "noteref_632" href="#note_632"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">632</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">58. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Tenthly</span></em>, it will be objected that + the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths + in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth + is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on + the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing + Principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an + idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not: but the + motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.—I answer, That + tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the + Principles we have premised: for, the question <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page290">[pg 290]</span><a name="Pg290" id="Pg290" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> whether the earth moves or no amounts + in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to + conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we + were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a + position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should + perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and + appearing in all respects like one of them: and this, by the + established rules of nature, which we have no reason to mistrust, + is reasonably collected from the phenomena.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">59. We may, from + the experience we have had of the train and succession of + ideas<a id="noteref_633" name="noteref_633" href= + "#note_633"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">633</span></span></a> in + our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but + sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be + affected with pursuant to a great train of actions; and be enabled + to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case + we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in + at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may + preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath + been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of + the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any + other discoveries in astronomy or nature.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">60. In the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eleventh</span></em> place, it will be + demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of + plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals. Might not + vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals + perform all their motions, as well without as with all that variety + of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together;—which, + being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have + any <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">necessary</span></em> connexion with the + effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately + produces every effect by a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">fiat</span></span>, + or act of his will<a id="noteref_634" name="noteref_634" href= + "#note_634"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">634</span></span></a>, we + must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of + man or nature, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page291">[pg + 291]</span><a name="Pg291" id="Pg291" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath made + the spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted + them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he + designed; yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that + it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the + hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">his</span></em> being at the pains of making + the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case + serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass, that whenever + there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some + corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being + mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said + of all the Clockwork of Nature, great part whereof is so + wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best + microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our Principles, + any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of + an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the + most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very + apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of + phenomena?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">61. To all which + I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties relating + to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to + the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the + foregoing Principles, yet this objection could be of small weight + against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, with the utmost + evidence and rigour of demonstration<a id="noteref_635" name= + "noteref_635" href="#note_635"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">635</span></span></a>. + Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the + like difficulties; for, it may still be demanded to what end God + should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by + instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been + effected by the mere command of His will, without all that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">apparatus</span></em>. Nay, if we narrowly + consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with + greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines + without the mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page292">[pg 292]</span><a name= + "Pg292" id="Pg292" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> figure, motion, and + the like have no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">activity</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">efficacy</span></em> in them, so as to be + capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. + Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the supposition + possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no + purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist + unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which + in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">62. But, to come + nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the + fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely + necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the + producing of things in a constant regular way, according to the + laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the + whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the + observation and study of nature, and are by men applied, as well to + the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as + to the explaining the various phenomena. Which explication consists + only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to + the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in + discovering the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">uniformity</span></em> there is in the + production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall + attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to + account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">use</span></em> in these regular constant + methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in + sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, + motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not + absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it + according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for + instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that + sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were + minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the + dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements + and put them in it. But yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules + of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in + the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, + whereby <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">he</span></em> makes the movements and rightly + adjusts them, precede the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page293">[pg + 293]</span><a name="Pg293" id="Pg293" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in + them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder + in the movements, which being once corrected all is right + again<a id="noteref_636" name="noteref_636" href= + "#note_636"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">636</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">63. It may + indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature + display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of + the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general + rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an + acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used + but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail + of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our + reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so + much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain + indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than + to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and + surprising events<a id="noteref_637" name="noteref_637" href= + "#note_637"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">637</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">64. To set this + matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been + objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than + this:—<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em><a id="noteref_638" name= + "noteref_638" href="#note_638"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">638</span></span></a> are + not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and + connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect: there are + also several combinations of them, made in a very regular and + artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand + of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a + secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on + the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the + curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the + cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And since + those instruments, being barely <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inefficacious</span></em> perceptions in the + mind, are not subservient <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page294">[pg + 294]</span><a name="Pg294" id="Pg294" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are + made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God + should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so + great variety of ideas, so artfully laid together, and so much + according to rule; it not being [<a id="noteref_639" name= + "noteref_639" href="#note_639"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">639</span></span></a> + credible] that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of + all that art and regularity to no purpose?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">65. To all which + my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas<a id="noteref_640" + name="noteref_640" href="#note_640"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">640</span></span></a> does + not imply the relation of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cause</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">effect</span></em>, + but only of a mark or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sign</span></em> with the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing + signified</span></em>. The fire which I see is not the cause of the + pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns + me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of + this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the + sign thereof<a id="noteref_641" name="noteref_641" href= + "#note_641"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">641</span></span></a>. + Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, + artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for + combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made + to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary + they be variously combined together. And to the end their use be + permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rule</span></em>, and with <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">wise + contrivance</span></em>. By this means abundance of information is + conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and + such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for the + exciting such and such ideas<a id="noteref_642" name="noteref_642" + href="#note_642"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">642</span></span></a>. + Which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when + it is said<a id="noteref_643" name="noteref_643" href= + "#note_643"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">643</span></span></a> that, + by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward + parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to + know the several uses <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page295">[pg + 295]</span><a name="Pg295" id="Pg295" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">66. Hence, it is + evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause + co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are + altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities, may be + very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use + assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs + for <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">our</span></em> information. And it is the + searching after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I + may so call it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the + employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to + explain things by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corporeal</span></em> causes, which doctrine + seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that Active + Principle, that supreme and wise Spirit <span class="tei tei-q">“in + whom we live, move, and have our being.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">67. In the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">twelfth</span></em> place, it may perhaps be + objected that—though it be clear from what has been said that there + can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, + figured, moveable Substance, existing without the mind, such as + philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any man shall leave out of + his idea of Matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, + solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an + inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or + unperceived, which is the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em> of our ideas, or at the + presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us—it doth not + appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist.—In + answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to + suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose + accidents without a substance<a id="noteref_644" name="noteref_644" + href="#note_644"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">644</span></span></a>. But + secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may + possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists + not in the mind<a id="noteref_645" name="noteref_645" href= + "#note_645"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">645</span></span></a> is + agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain, since + all place or extension <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page296">[pg + 296]</span><a name="Pg296" id="Pg296" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + exists only in the mind<a id="noteref_646" name="noteref_646" href= + "#note_646"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">646</span></span></a>, as + hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists + nowhere at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">68. Let us + examine a little the description that is here given us of Matter. + It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: for this is all + that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown + substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, + excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or + supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing + at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nonentity</span></em> I desire may be + considered. But, say you, it is the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">unknown + occasion</span></em><a id="noteref_647" name="noteref_647" href= + "#note_647"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">647</span></span></a>, at + the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. + Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is + neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of + producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath + any form, nor exists in any place. The words <span class= + "tei tei-q">“to be present,”</span> when thus applied, must needs + be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not + able to comprehend.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">69. Again, let + us examine what is meant by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em>. So far as I can gather + from the common use of language, that word signifies either the + agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed + to accompany or go before it, in the ordinary course of things. + But, when it is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be + taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive + and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also + unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so + cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense; as + when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain + that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">matter</span></em> + an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em>? This term is either used + in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received + signification.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">70. You will + perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is + nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of + exciting ideas in our minds<a id="noteref_648" name="noteref_648" + href="#note_648"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">648</span></span></a>. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page297">[pg 297]</span><a name= + "Pg297" id="Pg297" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> For, say you, since + we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and + constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain + constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to + say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of + Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not + excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as + being altogether passive, and unperceivable to us, they are + nevertheless to God, by whom they <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">are</span></em> + perceived<a id="noteref_649" name="noteref_649" href= + "#note_649"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">649</span></span></a>, as + it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to + imprint on our minds: that so things may go on in a constant + uniform manner.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">71. In answer to + this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the + question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct + from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not + certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the mind of God, which + are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce + sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method: much + after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of + music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound + which is called a tune; though they who hear the music do not + perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this + notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that + I can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems too + extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no + objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no + senseless unperceived substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">72. If we follow + the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of + our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who + excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see + reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that + the being of a Spirit—infinitely wise, good, and powerful—is + abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of + nature<a id="noteref_650" name="noteref_650" href= + "#note_650"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">650</span></span></a>. But, + as for <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inert, senseless Matter</span></em>, nothing + that <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page298">[pg 298]</span><a name= + "Pg298" id="Pg298" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> I perceive has any + the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I + would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature + by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of + probability, that he can have for its existence; or even make any + tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its + being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with + regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must + be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and + what this amounts to we have just now seen.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">73. It is worth + while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to + suppose the existence of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material substance</span></em>; that so having + observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or + reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was + grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, + figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or + accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason + it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> or substance wherein + they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist by + themselves<a id="noteref_651" name="noteref_651" href= + "#note_651"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">651</span></span></a>. + Afterwards, in process of time, men<a id="noteref_652" name= + "noteref_652" href="#note_652"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">652</span></span></a> being + convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, + secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they + stripped this <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> or material substance + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">those</span></em> qualities, leaving only the + primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike; which they still + conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in + need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none + even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind + which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reason + to suppose the being of Matter<a id="noteref_653" name= + "noteref_653" href="#note_653"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">653</span></span></a>, nay, + that it is <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page299">[pg + 299]</span><a name="Pg299" id="Pg299" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + utterly impossible there should be any such thing;—so long as that + word is taken to denote an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unthinking substratum</span></em> of qualities + or accidents, wherein they exist without the mind<a id= + "noteref_654" name="noteref_654" href="#note_654"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">654</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">74. But—though + it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was + thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the + reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should + naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of + what was solely grounded thereon: yet the prejudice is riveted so + deeply in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how to part with it, + and are therefore inclined, since the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing</span></em> + itself is indefensible, at least to retain the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">name</span></em>; + which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">being</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em>, though without any shew + of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our + part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, + notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or + reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, + thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the + part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should + make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion + to excite ideas in our minds?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">75. It is a very + extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be + lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against + all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Somewhat</span></em>, by the interposition + whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of + God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, + though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter; + though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our + opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge + ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by + reason to make out that poor possibility; yet the upshot of all + is—that there are certain <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unknown</span></em> Ideas in the mind of God; + for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em> with regard to God. And + this at the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page300">[pg + 300]</span><a name="Pg300" id="Pg300" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the + name<a id="noteref_655" name="noteref_655" href= + "#note_655"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">655</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">76. Whether + therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">they</span></em> may be called by the name + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, I shall not dispute<a id= + "noteref_656" name="noteref_656" href="#note_656"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">656</span></span></a>. But, + if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of + extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is + most evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since it + is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in, or be + supported by, an unperceiving substance<a id="noteref_657" name= + "noteref_657" href="#note_657"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">657</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">77. But, say + you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of + extension, and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, + yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of some other + qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born + blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had + a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">their</span></em> + existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of + light and colours.—I answer, first, if what you mean by the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> be only the unknown support + of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing + or no, since it no way concerns us. And I do not see the advantage + there is in disputing about what we know not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what</span></em>, + and we know not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">78. But, + secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only furnish us with new + ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason + against <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">their</span></em> existing in an unperceiving + substance that has been already offered with <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page301">[pg 301]</span><a name="Pg301" id="Pg301" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> relation to figure, motion, colour, and + the like. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Qualities</span></em>, as hath been shewn, are + nothing else but <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensations</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, + which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not + only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise + of all possible ideas whatsoever<a id="noteref_658" name= + "noteref_658" href="#note_658"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">658</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">79. But you will + insist, What if I have no reason to believe the existence of + Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it, or explain anything + by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is + no contradiction to say that Matter <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">exists</span></em>, + and that this Matter is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in general</span></em> a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">occasion of + ideas</span></em>; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning, + or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be + attended with great difficulties.—I answer, when words are used + without a meaning, you may put them together as you please, without + danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, + that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">twice two</span></em> is equal to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">seven</span></em>; + so long as you declare you do not take the words of that + proposition in their usual acceptation, but for marks of you know + not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert + thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the occasion of + our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition + as the other.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">80. In the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">last</span></em> place, you will say, What if + we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that + Matter is an unknown <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Somewhat</span></em>—neither substance nor + accident, spirit nor idea—inert, thoughtless, indivisible, + immoveable, unextended, existing in no place? For, say you, + whatever may be urged against <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em>, or any other positive or + relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this + negative definition of Matter is adhered to.—I answer, You may, if + so it shall seem good, use the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">matter</span></em> + in the same sense as other men use <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nothing</span></em>, and so make those terms + convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to + me to be the result of that definition; the parts whereof, when I + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page302">[pg 302]</span><a name= + "Pg302" id="Pg302" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> consider with + attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do + not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my + mind, different from what is excited by the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nothing</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">81. You will + reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is included what + doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing—the positive abstract + idea of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quiddity</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">entity</span></em>, + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>. I own, indeed, that + those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas + do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most + abstract and general notion of all: that is to me the most + incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of + spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties, both + in number and extent, are far exceeding those the Author of my + being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to + pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of + perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme + Spirit may imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly and + presumption. Since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable + sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and + from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds<a id= + "noteref_659" name="noteref_659" href="#note_659"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">659</span></span></a>. But, + how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my + comprehension, with regard to the endless variety of spirits and + ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em> of Entity or Existence, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracted</span></em> from <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, from perceived and being + perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with + words.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It remains that + we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part + of Religion.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">82. Some there + are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of + bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to + demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, + as will <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page303">[pg + 303]</span><a name="Pg303" id="Pg303" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + sufficiently convince every good Christian, that bodies do really + exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy + Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality + of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human + bodies<a id="noteref_660" name="noteref_660" href= + "#note_660"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">660</span></span></a>—To + which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or + profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar + acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of + having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all + those things do really exist; that there are bodies, even corporeal + substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be + agreeable to our principles: and the difference betwixt <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">realities</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">chimeras</span></em>, has been distinctly + explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think + that either what philosophers call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, + or the existence of objects without the mind<a id="noteref_661" + name="noteref_661" href="#note_661"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">661</span></span></a>, is + anywhere mentioned in Scripture.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">83. Again, + whether there be or be not external things<a id="noteref_662" name= + "noteref_662" href="#note_662"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">662</span></span></a>, it + is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">our</span></em> conceptions, or things only as + they are known and perceived by us: whence it plainly follows, that + in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with + the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of + what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains + undisturbed. But all this seems so very manifest, from what has + been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to + insist any farther on it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">84. But, it will + be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and + import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was it + not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">really</span></em> turned into a serpent? or + was there only a change of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> in the minds of the + spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at + the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and + taste of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page304">[pg + 304]</span><a name="Pg304" id="Pg304" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of + wine? The same may be said of all other miracles: which, in + consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only + as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy.—To this I reply, that the + rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. + That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere + said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imaginary</span></em> has been already so + plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the + difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone + before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to + resume the explication of it in this place. I shall only observe + that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and + taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there + could be no doubt of its reality<a id="noteref_663" name= + "noteref_663" href="#note_663"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">663</span></span></a>. So + that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at + all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently + makes rather for than against what has been said.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">85. Having done + with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest + light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed + in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their + Consequences<a id="noteref_664" name="noteref_664" href= + "#note_664"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">664</span></span></a>. Some + of these appear at first sight—as that several difficult and + obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been + thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. Whether + corporeal substance can think? Whether Matter be infinitely + divisible? And how it operates on spirit?—these and the like + inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all + ages. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page305">[pg 305]</span><a name= + "Pg305" id="Pg305" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> But, depending on + the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our + Principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to + religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce + from what has been premised. But this will appear more plainly in + the sequel.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">86. From the + Principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may + naturally be reduced to two heads—that of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + and that of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spirits</span></em>. Of each of these I shall + treat in order.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And First as to + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">unthinking + things</span></em>. Our knowledge of these has been very much + obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous + errors, by supposing a two-fold existence of sense—the one + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">intelligible</span></em> or in the mind, the + other <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> and without the mind<a id= + "noteref_665" name="noteref_665" href="#note_665"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">665</span></span></a>. + Whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence + of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, + which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless + and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as + men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that + their knowledge was only so far forth <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> as + it was <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">conformable to real things</span></em>, it + follows they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge + at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived + are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without + the mind<a id="noteref_666" name="noteref_666" href= + "#note_666"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">666</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">87. Colour, + figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensations</span></em> in the mind, are + perfectly known; there being nothing in them which is not + perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred + to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">things</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">archetypes existing + without the mind</span></em>, then are we involved all in + scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities + of things. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page306">[pg + 306]</span><a name="Pg306" id="Pg306" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and + absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only + the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things + remaining the same, our ideas vary; and which of them, or even + whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really + existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So + that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only + phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things + existing in <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">rerum natura</span></span>. + All this scepticism<a id="noteref_667" name="noteref_667" href= + "#note_667"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">667</span></span></a> + follows from our supposing a difference between <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, and that the former have a + subsistence without the mind, or unperceived. It were easy to + dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments urged by + sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects. + [<a id="noteref_668" name="noteref_668" href= + "#note_668"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">668</span></span></a>But + this is too obvious to need being insisted on.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">88. So long as + we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from + their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know + with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even + that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their + senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of + everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And after + all their labouring and struggle of thought, they are forced to own + we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of + the existence of sensible things<a id="noteref_669" name= + "noteref_669" href="#note_669"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">669</span></span></a>. But, + all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind + and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes + if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with + the terms <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">external</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">exist</span></em>, + and such like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of + my own being as of the being of those things which I actually + perceive by sense: it being a manifest contradiction that any + sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, + and at the same time have no existence in nature; since the very + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page307">[pg 307]</span><a name= + "Pg307" id="Pg307" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> existence of an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unthinking being</span></em> consists in + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being + perceived</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">89. Nothing + seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound + and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of + Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what is + meant</span></em> by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>; for in vain shall we + dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any + knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of + those words. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thing</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being</span></em> + is the most general name of all: it comprehends under it two kinds, + entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common + but the name, viz. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirits</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>. + The former are active, indivisible, [<a id="noteref_670" name= + "noteref_670" href="#note_670"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">670</span></span></a>incorruptible] + substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, [<a id="noteref_671" + name="noteref_671" href="#note_671"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">671</span></span></a>perishable + passions,] or dependent beings; which subsist not by + themselves<a id="noteref_672" name="noteref_672" href= + "#note_672"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">672</span></span></a>, but + are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<a id= + "noteref_673" name="noteref_673" href="#note_673"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">673</span></span></a>We + comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and + that of other spirits by reason<a id="noteref_674" name= + "noteref_674" href="#note_674"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">674</span></span></a>. We + may be said to have some knowledge or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em><a id="noteref_675" name= + "noteref_675" href="#note_675"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">675</span></span></a> of + our own minds, of spirits and active beings; whereof in a strict + sense we have not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>. In like manner, we know and + have a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em> of relations between things + or ideas; which relations are distinct from the ideas or things + related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our + perceiving the former. To me it seems that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirits</span></em>, and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relations</span></em> are all in their + respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of + discourse; and that the term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> would be improperly extended + to signify <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">everything</span></em> we know or have any + notion of<a id="noteref_676" name="noteref_676" href= + "#note_676"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">676</span></span></a>.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">90. Ideas + imprinted on the senses are <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> things, or do really + exist<a id="noteref_677" name="noteref_677" href= + "#note_677"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">677</span></span></a>: this + we do not deny; but we deny they <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">can</span></em> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page308">[pg 308]</span><a name= + "Pg308" id="Pg308" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> subsist without the + minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any + archetypes existing without the mind<a id="noteref_678" name= + "noteref_678" href="#note_678"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">678</span></span></a>; + since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being + perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the + things perceived by sense may be termed <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">external</span></em>, with regard to their + origin; in that they are not generated from within by the mind + itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which + perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be + <span class="tei tei-q">“without the mind”</span> in another sense, + namely when they exist in some other mind. Thus, when I shut my + eyes, the things I saw may still exist; but it must be in another + mind<a id="noteref_679" name="noteref_679" href= + "#note_679"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">679</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">91. It were a + mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from + the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received + principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible + qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by + themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be + nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently + cannot subsist by themselves<a id="noteref_680" name="noteref_680" + href="#note_680"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">680</span></span></a>. Thus + far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things + perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or + support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the + received opinion of their <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>, and are guilty of no + innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according + to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence + distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any + other substance than those unextended indivisible substances, or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirits</span></em>, which act, and think and + perceive them. Whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible + qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving Substance, + which they call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, to which they attribute a + natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct + from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page309">[pg 309]</span><a name="Pg309" id="Pg309" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> even the Eternal Mind of the Creator; + wherein they suppose only Ideas of the corporeal substances<a id= + "noteref_681" name="noteref_681" href="#note_681"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">681</span></span></a> + created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be at all <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">created</span></em><a id="noteref_682" name= + "noteref_682" href="#note_682"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">682</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">92. For, as we + have shewn the doctrine of Matter or Corporeal Substance to have + been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon + the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of + Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been + thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most + celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who + maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated + and co-eternal with Him<a id="noteref_683" name="noteref_683" href= + "#note_683"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">683</span></span></a>. How + great a friend <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material substance</span></em> has been to + Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous + systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it, that when + this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose + but fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no longer worth while + to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every + wretched sect of Atheists<a id="noteref_684" name="noteref_684" + href="#note_684"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">684</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">93. That impious + and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which + favour their inclinations, by deriding <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">immaterial + substance</span></em>, and supposing the soul to be divisible, and + subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, + intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead + thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root + and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who + deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page310">[pg 310]</span><a name="Pg310" id="Pg310" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> over the affairs of the world, + attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or + fatal necessity, arising from the impulse of one body on + another—all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men + of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a + stress on <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unthinking Matter</span></em>, and all of them + use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it; + methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand + support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your + Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a + pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the + world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">94. The + existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the + main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle + doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but + consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of + the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have + no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would + never fall down and worship <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">their own ideas</span></em>; but rather + address their homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which produces + and sustains all things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">95. The same + absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our + faith, hath occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For + example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections + have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most + plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is + denominated the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em>, with regard not to the form, + or that which is perceived by sense<a id="noteref_685" name= + "noteref_685" href="#note_685"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">685</span></span></a>, but + the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? + Take away this <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material substance</span></em>—about the + identity whereof all the dispute is—and mean by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">body</span></em> + what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that + which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of + sensible qualities or ideas: and then their most unanswerable + objections come to nothing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">96. Matter<a id= + "noteref_686" name="noteref_686" href="#note_686"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">686</span></span></a> being + once expelled out of nature drags <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page311">[pg 311]</span><a name="Pg311" id="Pg311" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> with it so many sceptical and impious + notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling + questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well + as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that + if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to + demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all + friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they + were.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">97. Beside the + external<a id="noteref_687" name="noteref_687" href= + "#note_687"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">687</span></span></a> + existence of the objects of perception, another great source of + errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the + doctrine of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract ideas</span></em>, such as it hath + been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the + world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly + know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely + difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in + particular or concrete, are what everybody knows; but, having + passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too + abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid + your servant meet you at such a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">time</span></em>, + in such a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">place</span></em>, and he shall never stay to + deliberate on the meaning of those words. In conceiving that + particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get + thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">time</span></em> be + taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that + diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or + duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a + philosopher to comprehend it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">98. For my own + part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">time</span></em>, + abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows + uniformly, and is participated by all beings, I am lost and + embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at + all: only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak + of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my + existence: since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity + of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a + thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life: + both <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page312">[pg 312]</span><a name= + "Pg312" id="Pg312" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which seem equally + absurd<a id="noteref_688" name="noteref_688" href= + "#note_688"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">688</span></span></a>. Time + therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in + our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must + be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each + other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence + that the soul always thinks. And in truth whoever shall go about to + divide in his thoughts or abstract the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em> of a spirit from its + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cogitation</span></em>, will, I believe, find + it no easy task<a id="noteref_689" name="noteref_689" href= + "#note_689"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">689</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">99. So likewise + when we attempt to abstract <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motion</span></em> + from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we + presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. + [<a id="noteref_690" name="noteref_690" href= + "#note_690"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">690</span></span></a> Hence + spring those odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot, nor the wall + white; or that heat and colour are in the objects nothing but + figure and motion.] All which depend on a twofold abstraction: + first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be + abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and, secondly, that + the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. + But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he + says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible + qualities are alike <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensations</span></em>, and alike <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em>; + that where the extension is, there is the colour too, to wit, in + his mind<a id="noteref_691" name="noteref_691" href= + "#note_691"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">691</span></span></a>, and + that their archetypes can exist only in <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page313">[pg 313]</span><a name="Pg313" id="Pg313" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> some other <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mind</span></em>: + and that the objects of sense<a id="noteref_692" name="noteref_692" + href="#note_692"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">692</span></span></a> are + nothing but those sensations, combined, blended, or (if one may so + speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to + exist unperceived. [<a id="noteref_693" name="noteref_693" href= + "#note_693"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">693</span></span></a> And + that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended, and + in the same sense.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">100. What it is + for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he + knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from + all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is + good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be + just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and + virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general + notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems + to have rendered morality difficult, and the study thereof of less + use to mankind. [<a id="noteref_694" name="noteref_694" href= + "#note_694"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">694</span></span></a>And in + effect one may make a great progress in school ethics without ever + being the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave + himself in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or + his neighbours than he did before.] And in effect the doctrine of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstraction</span></em> has not a little + contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of + knowledge.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">101. The two + great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas + received from sense and their relations, are Natural Philosophy and + Mathematics. With regard to each of these I shall make some + observations.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And first I + shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is + that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce + to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and + low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are + under an invincible blindness as to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">true</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> nature of things. This they + exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say + they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and shew of + things. The real <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page314">[pg + 314]</span><a name="Pg314" id="Pg314" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the + meanest object, is hid from our view: something there is in every + drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of + human understanding to fathom or comprehend<a id="noteref_695" + name="noteref_695" href="#note_695"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">695</span></span></a>. But, + it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is + groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that + degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of + those things which we perfectly comprehend.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">102. One great + inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of + things is, the current opinion that every thing includes <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">within + itself</span></em> the cause of its properties: or that there is in + each object an inward essence, which is the source whence its + discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have + pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities; but of + late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the + figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible + particles<a id="noteref_696" name="noteref_696" href= + "#note_696"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">696</span></span></a>: + whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, it being evident that + motion, as well as all other <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, is perfectly inert. See + sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours + or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs + be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind + are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those + instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of + another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are + left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by this + doctrine<a id="noteref_697" name="noteref_697" href= + "#note_697"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">697</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">103. The great + mechanical principle now in vogue is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attraction</span></em>. That a stone falls to + the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear + sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being + told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the + manner of the tendency, and that it is by the <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page315">[pg 315]</span><a name="Pg315" id="Pg315" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> mutual drawing of bodies instead of + their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But nothing + is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for + aught we know) be termed <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">impulse</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">protrusion</span></em>, as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attraction</span></em>. Again, the parts of + steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for + by attraction; but, in this, as in the other instances, I do not + perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for + as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause + which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">104. Indeed, if + we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, + we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For + example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of + the sea towards the moon, in cohesion and crystallization, there is + something alike; namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So + that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or + surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the + effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, + or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our + observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the + earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every + moment of our lives. But that they should have a like gravitation + towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to + most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a + philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, + having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the + heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a + mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general + name <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attraction</span></em>, whatever can be + reduced to that, he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains + the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the + moon; which to him doth not appear odd or anomalous, but only a + particular example of a general rule or law of nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">105. If + therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural + philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the + phenomena, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter knowledge + of the efficient cause that produces them—for that can be no other + than the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page316">[pg 316]</span><a name="Pg316" id="Pg316" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">of a + spirit</span></em>—but only in a greater largeness of + comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are + discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects + explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62: which + rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the + production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after + by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is + present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable + conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great + distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come: + which sort of endeavour towards Omniscience is much affected by the + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">106. But we + should proceed warily in such things: for we are apt to lay too + great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour + that eagerness of the mind, whereby it is carried to extend its + knowledge into general theorems. For example, gravitation or mutual + attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are + straightway for pronouncing <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">universal</span></em>; and that to attract and + be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent + in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars + have no such tendency towards each other; and, so far is that + gravitation from being <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">essential</span></em> to bodies that in some + instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in + the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. + There is nothing necessary or essential in the case<a id= + "noteref_698" name="noteref_698" href="#note_698"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">698</span></span></a>; but + it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit<a id= + "noteref_699" name="noteref_699" href="#note_699"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">699</span></span></a>, who + causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other + according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed + distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly + asunder, just as He sees convenient.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">107. After what + has been premised, I think we may lay down the following + conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page317">[pg 317]</span><a name="Pg317" id="Pg317" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> amuse themselves in vain, when they + enquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mind</span></em> or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>. Secondly, considering the + whole creation is the workmanship of a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">wise and good + Agent</span></em>, it should seem to become philosophers to employ + their thoughts (contrary to what some hold<a id="noteref_700" name= + "noteref_700" href="#note_700"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">700</span></span></a>) + about the final causes of things. [<a id="noteref_701" name= + "noteref_701" href="#note_701"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">701</span></span></a> For, + besides that this would prove a very pleasing entertainment to the + mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not only discovers + to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also direct us in + several instances to the proper uses and applications of things.] + And I must confess I see no reason why pointing out the various + ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were + originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought + one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a + philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised, no reason can be + drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, and + observations and experiments made; which, that they are of use to + mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the + result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things + themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the + administration of the world. See sects. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a + diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may + discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce other + phenomena. I do not say <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">demonstrate</span></em>; for all deductions of + that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of Nature always + operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">we</span></em> take for principles, which we + cannot evidently know<a id="noteref_702" name="noteref_702" href= + "#note_702"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">702</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">108. It appears + from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent methods of nature + may not unfitly be styled the Language of its Author, whereby He + discovers His attributes to our view and directs us how to act for + the convenience and felicity of life. Those men who frame<a id= + "noteref_703" name="noteref_703" href="#note_703"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">703</span></span></a> + general rules from the phenomena, and afterwards derive<a id= + "noteref_704" name="noteref_704" href="#note_704"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">704</span></span></a> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page318">[pg 318]</span><a name= + "Pg318" id="Pg318" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the phenomena from + those rules, seem to consider signs<a id="noteref_705" name= + "noteref_705" href="#note_705"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">705</span></span></a> + rather than causes. <a id="noteref_706" name="noteref_706" href= + "#note_706"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">706</span></span></a>A man + may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or + being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is + very possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance + of general grammar-rules; so, in arguing from general laws of + nature, it is not impossible we may extend<a id="noteref_707" name= + "noteref_707" href="#note_707"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">707</span></span></a> the + analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">109. [<a id= + "noteref_708" name="noteref_708" href="#note_708"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">708</span></span></a> To + carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other books a wise man + will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, + rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; + so, in perusing the volume of nature, methinks it is beneath the + dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each + particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows + from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, such as to + recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, + extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, + to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of + the Creator: and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, + so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed + for—God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and + fellow-creatures.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">110. [<a id= + "noteref_709" name="noteref_709" href="#note_709"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">709</span></span></a> The + best key for the aforesaid analogy, or natural Science, will be + easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mechanics</span></span>.] In the entrance of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page319">[pg 319]</span><a name= + "Pg319" id="Pg319" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which justly admired + treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relative</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">true</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">apparent</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mathematical</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">vulgar</span></em>: + which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does + suppose those quantities to have an existence without the mind: and + that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible + things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no + relation at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">III. As for + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Time</span></em>, as it is there taken in an + absolute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of + the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it + after what has been already said on that subject. Sects. 97 and 98. + For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute + Space</span></em>, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in + itself similar and immoveable; and relative space to be the measure + thereof, which, being moveable and defined by its situation in + respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Place</span></em> he defines to be that part + of space which is occupied by any body: and according as the space + is absolute or relative so also is the place. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Absolute + Motion</span></em> is said to be the translation of a body from + absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one + relative place to another. And because the parts of absolute space + do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use + their sensible measures; and so define both place and motion with + respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable. But it is said, in + philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses; since it + may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are + truly so; and the same thing which is moved relatively may be + really at rest. As likewise one and the same body may be in + relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative + motions at the same time, according as its place is variously + defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent + motions; but not at all in the true or absolute, which should + therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true we are told + are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the + following properties. First, in true or absolute motion, all parts + which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake + of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page320">[pg 320]</span><a name= + "Pg320" id="Pg320" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which is placed + therein is also moved: so that a body moving in a place which is in + motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true + motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force + impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always + changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular + motion, barely relative, there is no centrifugal force, which + nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to + the quantity of motion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">112. But, + notwithstanding what hath been said, I must confess it does not + appear to me that there can be any motion other than <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relative</span></em><a id="noteref_710" name= + "noteref_710" href="#note_710"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">710</span></span></a>: so + that to conceive motion there must be conceived at least two + bodies; whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is + varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not + possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of + motion doth necessarily include relation.—[<a id="noteref_711" + name="noteref_711" href="#note_711"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">711</span></span></a>Whether + others can conceive it otherwise, a little attention may satisfy + them.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">113. But, though + in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, + yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the + force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies + is impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as + to term that body <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">moved</span></em> which changes its distance + from some other body, whether the force [<a id="noteref_712" name= + "noteref_712" href="#note_712"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">712</span></span></a>or + action] causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet, as + relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded + in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of + common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, + I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the + streets, the stones he passes over may be said to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">move</span></em>, + because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that + though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it + is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from + it. As a man may think of somewhat which does <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page321">[pg 321]</span><a name="Pg321" id="Pg321" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> not think, so a body may be moved to or + from another body which is not therefore itself in motion, [<a id= + "noteref_713" name="noteref_713" href="#note_713"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">713</span></span></a> I + mean relative motion, for other I am not able to conceive.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">114. As the + place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related + to it varies<a id="noteref_714" name="noteref_714" href= + "#note_714"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">714</span></span></a>. A + man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the + sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he + may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of + the other. In the common affairs of life, men never go beyond the + Earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in + respect of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">that</span></em> is accounted <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolutely</span></em> to be so. But + philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster + notions of the system of things, discover even the Earth itself to + be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions, they seem to + conceive the Corporeal World as finite, and the utmost unmoved + walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true + motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all + the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no + other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already + observed, absolute motion, exclusive of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all</span></em> + external relation, is incomprehensible: and to this kind of + relative motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and + effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be + found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that + it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see + how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. + See Newton's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, + in Schol. Def. VIII</span></span>. For the water in the vessel, at + that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular + motion, hath, I think, no motion at all: as is plain from the + foregoing section.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">115. For, to + denominate a body <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">moved</span></em>, it is requisite, first, + that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other + body: and secondly, that the force occasioning that change be + applied to<a id="noteref_715" name="noteref_715" href= + "#note_715"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">715</span></span></a> it. + If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to + the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page322">[pg 322]</span><a name= + "Pg322" id="Pg322" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> can be said to be in + motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body, + which we see change its distance from some other, to be moved, + though it have no force applied to<a id="noteref_716" name= + "noteref_716" href="#note_716"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">716</span></span></a> it + (in which sense there may be apparent motion); but then it is + because the force causing the change<a id="noteref_717" name= + "noteref_717" href="#note_717"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">717</span></span></a> of + distance is imagined by us to be [<a id="noteref_718" name= + "noteref_718" href="#note_718"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">718</span></span></a>applied + or] impressed on that body thought to move. Which indeed shews we + are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and + that is all. [<a id="noteref_719" name="noteref_719" href= + "#note_719"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">719</span></span></a>But it + does not prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body is + moved merely because it changes distance from another; since as + soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving force was not + communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So, on the + other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof preserve a given + position between themselves) is imagined to exist, some there are + who think that it can be moved all manner of ways, though without + any change of distance or situation to any other bodies; which we + should not deny, if they meant only that it might have an impressed + force, which, upon the bare creation of other bodies, would produce + a motion of some certain quantity and determination. But that an + actual motion (distinct from the impressed force, or power, + productive of change of place in case there were bodies present + whereby to define it) can exist in such a single body, I must + confess I am not able to comprehend.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">116. From what + has been said, it follows that the philosophic consideration of + motion doth not imply the being of an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute + Space</span></em>, distinct from that which is perceived by sense, + and related to bodies: which that it cannot exist without the mind + is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all + other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we + shall find we cannot even frame an idea of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure Space + exclusive of all body</span></em>. This I must confess seems + impossible<a id="noteref_720" name="noteref_720" href= + "#note_720"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">720</span></span></a>, as + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page323">[pg 323]</span><a name= + "Pg323" id="Pg323" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> being a most + abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if + it be free or without resistance, I say there is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Space</span></em>. + But if I find a resistance, then I say there is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Body</span></em>: + and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, + I say the space is more or less <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure</span></em>. + So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be + supposed that the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">space</span></em> stands for an idea distinct + from, or conceivable without, body and motion. Though indeed we are + apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that + may be separated from all others; which hath occasioned infinite + mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be + annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure + Space</span></em>; thereby nothing else is meant but only that I + conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all + sides without the least resistance: but if that too were + annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no + Space<a id="noteref_721" name="noteref_721" href= + "#note_721"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">721</span></span></a>. + Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with + the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere + shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by + that sense. See the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay concerning Vision</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">117. What is + here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and + difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the + nature of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pure Space</span></em>. But the chief + advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous + dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that + subject imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that + Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which + is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which + may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain + that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, + have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or + annihilation of space, concluded it must be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">divine</span></em>. + And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew that the + incommunicable attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how + unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page324">[pg 324]</span><a name="Pg324" id="Pg324" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> I must confess I do not see how we can + get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received + opinions<a id="noteref_722" name="noteref_722" href= + "#note_722"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">722</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">118. Hitherto of + Natural Philosophy. We come now to make some inquiry concerning + that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, + Mathematics<a id="noteref_723" name="noteref_723" href= + "#note_723"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">723</span></span></a>. + These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and + certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be + found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from + mistakes, if in their principles there lurks some secret error + which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest + of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from + a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are limited + by the consideration of Quantity. And they do not ascend into any + inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all + the particular sciences; each part whereof, Mathematics not + excepted, doth consequently participate of the errors involved in + them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and + their way of deduction from those principles clear and + incontestible, we do not deny. But we hold there may be certain + erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, + and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly + supposed, throughout the whole progress of that science; and that + the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused + through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the + mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other men in the + errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the + existence of objects without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">119. Arithmetic + hath been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">number</span></em>. Of which to understand the + properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of + speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual + nature of numbers in abstract has made them <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page325">[pg 325]</span><a name="Pg325" id="Pg325" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in esteem with those philosophers who + seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of + thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical + speculations, which in practice are of no use, but serve only for + amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the minds of some, + that they have dreamed of mighty <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mysteries</span></em> involved in numbers, and + attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we + narrowly inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been + premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high + flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries about numbers + only as so many <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">difficiles + nugae</span></span>, so far as they are not subservient to + practice, and promote the benefit of life.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">120. Unity in + abstract we have before considered in sect. 13; from which, and + what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is + not any such idea. But, number being defined a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">collection of + units</span></em>, we may conclude that, if there be no such thing + as unity, or unit in abstract, there are no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + of number in abstract, denoted by the numeral names and figures. + The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from + the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as + well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to + have nothing at all for their object. Hence we may see how entirely + the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune + and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere + speculation<a id="noteref_724" name="noteref_724" href= + "#note_724"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">724</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">121. However, + since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of + discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical + theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss + if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence. + And this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its + infancy, and observing what it was that originally put men on the + study of that science, and to what scope they directed it. It is + natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of + computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, + points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e. + some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page326">[pg 326]</span><a name="Pg326" id="Pg326" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> reckon. Afterwards they found out the + more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of + several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the + Arabians or Indians came into use; wherein, by the repetition of a + few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each + figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most + aptly expressed. Which seems to have been done in imitation of + language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation + by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine + first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to + denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of + the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of + finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures + and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vice versa</span></span>. And having found the + sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, + it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes + perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is + said to be known, when we know the name or figures (with their due + arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. + For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of + arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums + signified by them; and thus computing in signs, (because of the + connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of + things, whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly + to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we + intend to number.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">122. In + Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + but the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">signs</span></em>; which nevertheless are not + regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act + with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, + agreeably to what we have before observed of Words in general + (sect. 19, Introd.), it happens here likewise, that abstract ideas + are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while + they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I + shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on + this subject; but only observe that it is evident from what has + been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page327">[pg 327]</span><a name= + "Pg327" id="Pg327" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> theorems concerning + numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from + particular numerable things; except only names and characters, + which originally came to be considered on no other account but + their being <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">signs</span></em>, or capable to represent + aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it + follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as + wise, and to as good purpose, as if a man, neglecting the true use + or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend + his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and + controversies purely verbal<a id="noteref_725" name="noteref_725" + href="#note_725"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">725</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">123. From + numbers we proceed to speak of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">extension</span></em><a id="noteref_726" + name="noteref_726" href="#note_726"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">726</span></span></a>, + which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. The + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">infinite</span></em> divisibility of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">finite</span></em> extension, though it is not + expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements + of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed, + and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with + the principles and demonstrations in Geometry that mathematicians + never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And as + this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing + geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the + plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much + reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so is it the + principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty, which + renders the study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. + Hence, if we can make it appear that no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">finite</span></em> + extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, + it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from + a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever + been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the + attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it + hitherto hath been.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">124. Every + particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our + thought is an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> existing only in the mind; + and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, + therefore, I cannot <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perceive</span></em> innumerable parts in any + finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not + contained in it. But it is evident that <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page328">[pg 328]</span><a name="Pg328" id="Pg328" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any + particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by + sense, or figure to myself in my mind. Wherefore I conclude they + are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the + extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is + no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an + infinite number of other ideas; that is, that they are not + infinitely divisible<a id="noteref_727" name="noteref_727" href= + "#note_727"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">727</span></span></a>. If + by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">finite + extension</span></em> be meant something distinct from a finite + idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or + deny anything of it. But if the terms <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">parts</span></em>, + and the like, are taken in any sense conceivable—that is, for + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>,—then to say a finite + quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so + manifest and glaring a contradiction, that every one at first sight + acknowledges it to be so. And it is impossible it should ever gain + the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by + gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile<a id="noteref_728" + name="noteref_728" href="#note_728"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">728</span></span></a> to + the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do + often pass into principles. And those propositions which once + obtain the force and credit of a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principle</span></em>, are not only + themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought + privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so + gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to + swallow<a id="noteref_729" name="noteref_729" href= + "#note_729"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">729</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">125. He whose + understanding is prepossessed with the doctrine of abstract general + ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of + sense) <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension in abstract</span></em> is + infinitely divisible. And one who thinks the objects of sense exist + without the mind will perhaps, in virtue thereof, be brought to + admit<a id="noteref_730" name="noteref_730" href= + "#note_730"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">730</span></span></a> that + a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts really + existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page329">[pg 329]</span><a name= + "Pg329" id="Pg329" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> grafted as well in + the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like + influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to + shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the + infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. [<a id= + "noteref_731" name="noteref_731" href="#note_731"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">731</span></span></a> But + this, if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper + place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present we shall only + observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond + and tenacious of that doctrine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">126. It has been + observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in + Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.): + where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood, to + wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are + supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in + other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their + magnitude: which doth not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but + only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether + great or small, but looks on that as a thing indifferent to the + demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an + inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand + parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; + and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">represents</span></em> innumerable lines + greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand + parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">it</span></em>. + After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a + very usual figure) transferred to the sign; and thence, through + mistake, thought to appertain to it considered in its own + nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">127. Because + there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may + be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts + more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch + taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, + not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a + belief that the small particular line described on paper contains + in itself parts innumerable. There <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page330">[pg 330]</span><a name="Pg330" id="Pg330" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> is no such thing as the ten thousandth part + of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which + may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a + triangle on paper, and take one side, not above an inch for example + in length, to be the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 + or 100,000 parts, or more. For, though the ten thousandth part of + that line considered in itself, is nothing at all, and consequently + may be neglected without any error or inconveniency, yet these + described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, + whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable, it + follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius + must be taken of 10,000 parts, or more.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">128. From what + has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem may + become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines + described on paper as though they contained parts which really they + do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly, we + shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as + consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only + some other line which is far greater than an inch, and represented + by it; and that when we say a line is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">infinitely + divisible</span></em>, we must mean<a id="noteref_732" name= + "noteref_732" href="#note_732"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">732</span></span></a> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a line + which is infinitely great</span></em>. What we have here observed + seems to be the chief cause, why to suppose the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">infinite</span></em> divisibility of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">finite + extension</span></em> has been thought necessary in geometry.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">129. The several + absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false + principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many + demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is + held that proofs <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> + are not to be admitted against propositions relating to Infinity. + As though it were not impossible even for an Infinite Mind to + reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant + could have a necessary connexion with truth, or flow from it. But + whoever considers the weakness of this pretence, will think it was + contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind, which had + rather acquiesce in an <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page331">[pg + 331]</span><a name="Pg331" id="Pg331" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a + severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for + true.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">130. Of late the + speculations about Infinites have run so high, and grown to such + strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes + among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great + note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided + into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain, that + each of those Infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an + infinity of other parts, or Infinitesimals of a second order, and + so on <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>. + These, I say, assert there are Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals of + Infinitesimals, without ever coming to an end. So that according to + them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, + but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span> of parts. Others + there be who hold all orders of Infinitesimals below the first to + be nothing at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine + there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though + multiplied infinitely, can ever equal the smallest given extension. + And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the + square, cube, or other power of a positive real root, should itself + be nothing at all; which they who hold Infinitesimals of the first + order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to + maintain.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">131. Have we not + therefore reason to conclude they are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">both</span></em> in + the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts + infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any + finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it + will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and + those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a + height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To + this it may be replied, that whatever is useful in geometry, and + promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and + unshaken on our Principles; that science considered as practical + will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been + said. But to set this in a due light,[<a id="noteref_733" name= + "noteref_733" href="#note_733"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">733</span></span></a> and + shew how lines and figures may be <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page332">[pg 332]</span><a name="Pg332" id="Pg332" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> measured, and their properties investigated, + without supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible,] may + be the proper business of another place<a id="noteref_734" name= + "noteref_734" href="#note_734"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">734</span></span></a>. For + the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate + and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off + without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will + be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were + highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate + application<a id="noteref_735" name="noteref_735" href= + "#note_735"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">735</span></span></a> would + draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in + the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or + have a more direct influence on the manners.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">132. If it be + said that several theorems, undoubtedly true, are discovered by + methods in which Infinitesimals are made use of, which could never + have been if their existence included a contradiction in it:—I + answer, that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that + in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">infinitesimal</span></em> parts of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">finite</span></em> + lines, or even quantities less than the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum sensibile</span></span>: nay, it will + be evident this is never done, it being impossible. [<a id= + "noteref_736" name="noteref_736" href="#note_736"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">736</span></span></a> And + whatever mathematicians may think of Fluxions, or the Differential + Calculus, and the like, a little reflexion will shew them that, in + working by those methods, they do not conceive or imagine lines or + surfaces less than what are perceivable to sense. They may indeed + call those little and almost insensible quantities Infinitesimals, + or Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals, if they please. But at bottom + this is all, they being in truth finite; nor does the solution of + problems require the supposing any other. But this will be more + clearly made out hereafter.]</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">133. By what we + have hitherto said, it is plain that very numerous and important + errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were + impugned in the foregoing parts of this Treatise; and the opposites + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page333">[pg 333]</span><a name= + "Pg333" id="Pg333" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of those erroneous + tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from + whence do flow innumerable consequences, highly advantageous to + true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + absolute</span><a id="noteref_737" name="noteref_737" href= + "#note_737"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">737</span></span></a><span style="font-style: italic">existence + of corporeal objects</span></em>, hath been shewn to be that + wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, + whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and + confidence. And surely if by distinguishing the real existence of + unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a + subsistence of their own, out of the minds of spirits, no one thing + is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many + inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter<a id= + "noteref_738" name="noteref_738" href="#note_738"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">738</span></span></a> is + barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single + reason; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination + and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general + pretence of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">infinites being incomprehensible</span></em>; + if withal the removal of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">this</span></em> Matter be not attended with + the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, + but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, + lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon + supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is + perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion: methinks we may + expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were + proposed only as an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">hypothesis</span></em>, and the existence of + Matter had been allowed possible; which yet I think we have + evidently demonstrated that it is not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">134. True it is + that, in consequence of the foregoing Principles, several disputes + and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning are + rejected as useless [<a id="noteref_739" name="noteref_739" href= + "#note_739"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">739</span></span></a> and + in effect conversant about nothing at all]. But how great a + prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who + have already been deeply engaged, and made large advances in + studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be + thought <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page334">[pg + 334]</span><a name="Pg334" id="Pg334" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid + down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make human + sciences more clear, compendious, and attainable than they were + before.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">135. Having + despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, the method we proposed + leads us in the next place to treat of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirits</span></em><a id="noteref_740" name= + "noteref_740" href="#note_740"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">740</span></span></a>: with + regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is + vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being + thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits is our not having an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of it. But, surely it ought + not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it + does not perceive the idea of Spirit, if it is manifestly + impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not + has been demonstrated in section 27. To which I shall here add that + a Spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein + unthinking beings or ideas can exist: but that this <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> which supports or + perceives ideas should itself be an idea, or like an idea, is + evidently absurd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">136. It will + perhaps be said that we want a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sense</span></em> + (as some have imagined<a id="noteref_741" name="noteref_741" href= + "#note_741"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">741</span></span></a>) + proper to know substances withal; which, if we had, we might know + our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that in case we + had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby + some new <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensations</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas of + sense</span></em>. But I believe nobody will say that what he means + by the terms <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> is only some particular + sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things + duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties + defective, in that they do not furnish us with an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of + Spirit, or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should + blame them for not being able to comprehend a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">round + square</span></em><a id="noteref_742" name="noteref_742" href= + "#note_742"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">742</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page335">[pg 335]</span><a name="Pg335" id="Pg335" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">137. From the + opinion that Spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or + sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much + scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that + this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any + soul at all distinct from their body; since upon inquiry they could + not find they had an idea of it. That an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being + perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting + by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending + to what is meant by those words. But perhaps you will say that + though an idea cannot resemble a Spirit in its thinking, acting, or + subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is + not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the + original.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">138. I answer, + If it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should + represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of + willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing + else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em> we mean only that which + thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the + signification of that term. If therefore it is impossible that any + degree of those powers should be represented in an idea [<a id= + "noteref_743" name="noteref_743" href="#note_743"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">743</span></span></a>or + notion], it is evident there can be no idea [or notion] of a + Spirit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">139. But it will + be objected that, if there is no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> + signified by the terms <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>, they are wholly + insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do + mean or signify a real thing; which is neither an idea nor like an + idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about + them. What I am <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">myself</span></em>, that which I denote by the + term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">I</span></em>, is the same with what is meant + by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spiritual + substance</span></em>. [<a id="noteref_744" name="noteref_744" + href="#note_744"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">744</span></span></a>But if + I should say that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">I</span></em> was nothing, or that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">I</span></em> was + an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em>, + nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these + propositions.] If it be said that <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page336">[pg 336]</span><a name="Pg336" id="Pg336" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> this is only quarrelling at a word, and that, + since the immediate significations of other names are by common + consent called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, no reason can be assigned + why that which is signified by the name <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em> + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em> may not partake in the same + appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree + in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists + only in being perceived: whereas a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">soul</span></em> or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em> is an active being, whose + existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas + and thinking<a id="noteref_745" name="noteref_745" href= + "#note_745"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">745</span></span></a>. It + is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and + confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we + distinguish between <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>. + See sect. 27.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">140. In a large + sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea [<a id="noteref_746" + name="noteref_746" href="#note_746"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">746</span></span></a>or + rather a notion] of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>. That is, we understand the + meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything + of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of + other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be + resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by means of our own + soul: which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a + like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived + has to those ideas perceived by another<a id="noteref_747" name= + "noteref_747" href="#note_747"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">747</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">141. [<a id= + "noteref_748" name="noteref_748" href="#note_748"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">748</span></span></a>The + natural immortality of the soul is a necessary consequence of the + foregoing doctrine. But before we attempt to prove this, it is fit + that we explain the meaning of that tenet.] It must not be supposed + that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul<a id= + "noteref_749" name="noteref_749" href="#note_749"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">749</span></span></a> are + of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by + the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only + that it is not liable to be broken or <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page337">[pg 337]</span><a name="Pg337" id="Pg337" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or + motion They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital + flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and + corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily + dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible + should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is inclosed. + And this notion hath been greedily embraced and cherished by the + worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all + impressions of virtue and religion. But it hath been made evident + that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive + ideas in the mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from + them than light is from darkness<a id="noteref_750" name= + "noteref_750" href="#note_750"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">750</span></span></a>. We + have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended; + and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than + that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly + see befal natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">course of + nature</span></em>) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, + uncompounded substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble by + the force of nature; that is to say, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the soul of + man</span></em> is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">naturally immortal</span></em><a id= + "noteref_751" name="noteref_751" href="#note_751"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">751</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">142. After what + has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be + known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Spirits</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> are things so wholly + different, that when we say <span class="tei tei-q">“they + exist,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“they are known,”</span> or + the like, these words <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page338">[pg + 338]</span><a name="Pg338" id="Pg338" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + must not be thought to signify anything common to both + natures<a id="noteref_752" name="noteref_752" href= + "#note_752"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">752</span></span></a>. + There is nothing alike or common in them; and to expect that by any + multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled + to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we + should hope to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">see a sound</span></em>. This is inculcated + because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several + important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors + concerning the nature of the soul.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<a id= + "noteref_753" name="noteref_753" href="#note_753"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">753</span></span></a>We may + not, I think, strictly be said to have an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of + an active being, or of an action; although we may be said to have a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em> of them. I have some + knowledge or notion of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">my mind</span></em>, and its acts about ideas; + inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What + I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em> + may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet + it conduceth to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish things + very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, + all <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relations</span></em> including an act of the + mind<a id="noteref_754" name="noteref_754" href= + "#note_754"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">754</span></span></a>, we + cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion, of + the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern + way<a id="noteref_755" name="noteref_755" href= + "#note_755"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">755</span></span></a>, the + word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> is extended to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirits</span></em>, and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relations</span></em>, and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">acts</span></em>, + this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">143. It will not + be amiss to add, that the doctrine of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract + ideas</span></em> has had no small share in rendering those + sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant + about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract + notions of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">powers</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">acts</span></em> of + the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or + spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence + a great number of dark and ambiguous <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page339">[pg 339]</span><a name="Pg339" id="Pg339" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> terms, presumed to stand for abstract + notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality; and + from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst + the learned<a id="noteref_756" name="noteref_756" href= + "#note_756"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">756</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">144. But, + nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in + controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations + of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms + borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motion</span></em> of the soul: this infuses a + belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and + determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by + the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of + dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be + cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but + philosophers be prevailed on to [<a id="noteref_757" name= + "noteref_757" href="#note_757"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">757</span></span></a>depart + from some received prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into + themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning. [<a id= + "noteref_758" name="noteref_758" href="#note_758"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">758</span></span></a>But + the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular + disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise.]</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">145. From what + hath been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">other + spirits</span></em> otherwise than by their operations, or the + ideas by them, excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, + and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain + particular agents, like myself, which accompany them, and concur in + their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is + not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on + the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits + distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs<a id= + "noteref_759" name="noteref_759" href="#note_759"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">759</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page340">[pg 340]</span><a name="Pg340" id="Pg340" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">146. But, though + there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned + in producing them, yet it is evident to every one that those things + which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part + of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">not</span></em> + produced by, or dependent on, the wills of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">men</span></em>. + There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is + repugnant<a id="noteref_760" name="noteref_760" href= + "#note_760"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">760</span></span></a> that + they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we + attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and + concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, + beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance + of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact + harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the + never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts + or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals;—I say + if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the + meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, + Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to + the aforesaid Spirit, <span class="tei tei-q">“who works all in + all”</span> and <span class="tei tei-q">“by whom all things + consist.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">147. Hence, it + is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any + other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from ourselves. We may + even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently + perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature + are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed + to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or + effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the + being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature<a id="noteref_761" + name="noteref_761" href="#note_761"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">761</span></span></a>. For + it is evident that, in affecting other persons, the will of man + hath no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his + body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page341">[pg 341]</span><a name= + "Pg341" id="Pg341" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> any idea in the mind + of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it + is who, <span class="tei tei-q">“upholding all things by the word + of His power,”</span> maintains that intercourse between spirits + whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other<a id= + "noteref_762" name="noteref_762" href="#note_762"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">762</span></span></a>. And + yet this pure and clear Light which enlightens everyone is itself + invisible [<a id="noteref_763" name="noteref_763" href= + "#note_763"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">763</span></span></a>to the + greatest part of mankind].</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">148. It seems to + be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">see</span></em> God. Could we but see Him, say + they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing + obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the + Sovereign Lord of all things, with a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">more</span></em> + full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not + that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and + immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by + seeing that which represents them in the essence of God; which + doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible<a id= + "noteref_764" name="noteref_764" href="#note_764"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">764</span></span></a>. But + I shall explain my meaning. A human spirit or person is not + perceived by sense, as not being an idea. When therefore we see the + colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only + certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these + being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve + to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits + like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man, if by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">man</span></em> is meant, that which lives, + moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: but only such a certain + collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct + principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying + and represented by it. And after the same manner we see + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page342">[pg 342]</span><a name= + "Pg342" id="Pg342" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> God: all the + difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage + of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct + our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest + tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise + perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as + is our perception of those very motions which are produced by + men<a id="noteref_765" name="noteref_765" href= + "#note_765"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">765</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">149. It is + therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is + capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a + Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them + all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect + us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short + <span class="tei tei-q">“in whom we live, and move, and have our + being.”</span> That the discovery of this great truth, which lies + so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the + reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and + inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear + manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them + that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light<a id= + "noteref_766" name="noteref_766" href="#note_766"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">766</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">150. But you + will say—Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, + and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation + of God? I answer, If by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nature</span></em> is meant only the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">visible + series</span></em> of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds + according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that + Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all<a id= + "noteref_767" name="noteref_767" href="#note_767"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">767</span></span></a>. But + if by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nature</span></em> is meant some being + distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature and things + perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty + sound, without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in + this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens + who had not just notions of the omnipresence <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page343">[pg 343]</span><a name="Pg343" id="Pg343" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and infinite perfection of God. But it + is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, + professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe + those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen + philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The Lord, He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh + lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of His + treasures.”</span> Jerem. x. 13. <span class="tei tei-q">“He + turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day + dark with night.”</span> Amos v. 8. <span class="tei tei-q">“He + visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth + the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so + that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are + covered over with corn.”</span> See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding + that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know + not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so + nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great + distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His + stead; though (if we may believe Saint Paul) <span class= + "tei tei-q">“He be not far from every one of us.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">151. It will, I + doubt not, be objected that the slow, gradual, and roundabout + methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to + have for their cause the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediate</span></em> hand of an Almighty + Agent: besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the + blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human + life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of + nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of + infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is + in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the + aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to + working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady + and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of + God<a id="noteref_768" name="noteref_768" href= + "#note_768"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">768</span></span></a>. + [<a id="noteref_769" name="noteref_769" href= + "#note_769"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">769</span></span></a>For, + it doth hence follow that the finger of God is not so conspicuous + to the resolved and careless sinner; which gives him an opportunity + to harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect. + 57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page344">[pg 344]</span><a name= + "Pg344" id="Pg344" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> machine of Nature + that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our + senses, the Hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable + to men of flesh and blood. <span class="tei tei-q">“Verily”</span> + (saith the prophet) <span class="tei tei-q">“thou art a God that + hidest thyself.”</span> Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the Lord + conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not + be at the least expense of thought<a id="noteref_770" name= + "noteref_770" href="#note_770"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">770</span></span></a>, yet + to an unbiassed and attentive mind, nothing can be more plainly + legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who + fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of Being. It is + clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating + according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our + guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of + nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human + sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose. It were + even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the + mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances + whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise<a id= + "noteref_771" name="noteref_771" href="#note_771"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">771</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">152. We should + further consider, that the very blemishes and defects of nature are + not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of + variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as + shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more + enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine, whether + our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental + destruction of plants and animals before they come to full + maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the + effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and + saving mortals. In <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">man</span></em> indeed a thrifty management of + those things which he cannot procure without much pains and + industry may be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine that the + inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great + Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble + does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can + indifferently <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page345">[pg + 345]</span><a name="Pg345" id="Pg345" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + produce everything by a mere <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">fiat</span></span> or act of his will. Hence + it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should + not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the Agent who + produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches + of His power.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">153. As for the + mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to + the general laws of Nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect + Spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably + necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We + take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our + thoughts, and account it <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">evil</span></em>. Whereas, if we enlarge our + view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and + dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions + we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human + freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we + shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, + considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of + good, when considered as linked with the whole system of + beings<a id="noteref_772" name="noteref_772" href= + "#note_772"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">772</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">154. From what + hath been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that + it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind + that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to + be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the + works of Providence; the beauty and order whereof they have not + capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend<a id= + "noteref_773" name="noteref_773" href="#note_773"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">773</span></span></a>. But + those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and + are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the + divine traces <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page346">[pg + 346]</span><a name="Pg346" id="Pg346" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the economy of Nature. + But what truth is there which glares so strongly on the mind that, + by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may + not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the + generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and + little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have + all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be + expected in reasonable creatures<a id="noteref_774" name= + "noteref_774" href="#note_774"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">774</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">155. We should + rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than + that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and + momentous truth<a id="noteref_775" name="noteref_775" href= + "#note_775"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">775</span></span></a>. And + yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live + in Christian countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful + negligence, sunk into a sort of Atheism. [<a id="noteref_776" name= + "noteref_776" href="#note_776"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">776</span></span></a>They + cannot say there is not a God, but neither are they convinced that + there is. For what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some + secret misgivings of mind with regard to the existence and + attributes of God, which permits sinners to grow and harden in + impiety?] Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and + enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, + and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless + violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate + and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain + conviction without all scruple <span class="tei tei-q">“that the + eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the + good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we + go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on;”</span> that + He is present and conscious <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page347">[pg 347]</span><a name="Pg347" id="Pg347" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> to our innermost thoughts; and, that we have + a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of + which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful + circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to + Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">156. For, after + all, what deserves the first place in our studies is, the + consideration of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">God</span></span> and our <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Duty</span></span>; which to promote, as + it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem + them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I + cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of + God; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren + speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the + better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of + the Gospel; which to know and to practise is the highest perfection + of human nature.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page349">[pg 349]</span><a name= + "Pg349" id="Pg349" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc35" id="toc35"></a> <a name="pdf36" id="pdf36"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Three Dialogues Between Hylas And + Philonous The Design Of Which Is Plainly To Demonstrate The Reality + And Perfection Of Human Knowledge, The Incorporeal Nature Of The + Soul, And The Immediate Providence Of A Deity, In Opposition To + Sceptics And Atheists, Also To Open A Method For Rendering The + Sciences More Easy, Useful, And Compendious</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">First published in + 1713</span></span></p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page351">[pg + 351]</span><a name="Pg351" id="Pg351" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc37" id="toc37"></a> <a name="pdf38" id="pdf38"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Editor's Preface</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This work is the + gem of British metaphysical literature. Berkeley's claim to be the + great modern master of Socratic dialogue rests, perhaps, upon + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, which surpasses the + conversations between Hylas and Philonous in expression of + individual character, and in dramatic effect. Here conversation is + adopted as a convenient way of treating objections to the + conception of the reality of Matter which had been unfolded + systematically in the book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. But the lucid + thought, the colouring of fancy, the glow of human sympathy, and + the earnestness that pervade the subtle reasonings pursued through + these dialogues, are unique in English metaphysical literature. + Except perhaps Hume and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art + of uniting metaphysical thought with easy, graceful, and + transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are increased when + we recollect that this charming production of reason and + imagination came from Ireland, at a time when that country was + scarcely known in the world of letters and philosophy.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The immediate + impression produced by the publication <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page352">[pg 352]</span><a name="Pg352" id="Pg352" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, is shewn in + Berkeley's correspondence with Sir John Percival. Berkeley was + eager to hear what people had to say for or against what looked + like a paradox apt to shock the reader; but in those days he was + not immediately informed by professional critics. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“If when you receive my book”</span>—he wrote from + Dublin in July, 1710, to Sir John Percival<a id="noteref_777" name= + "noteref_777" href="#note_777"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">777</span></span></a>, then + in London,—<span class="tei tei-q">“you can procure me the opinion + of some of your acquaintances who are thinking men, addicted to the + study of natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely + obliged to you.”</span> In the following month he was informed by + Sir John that it was <span class="tei tei-q">“incredible what + prejudice can work in the best geniuses, even in the lovers of + novelty. For I did but name the subject matter of your book of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> to some ingenious + friends of mine and they immediately treated it with ridicule, at + the same time refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to + do. A physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your + person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to + take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of starting + something new should put you upon such an undertaking. Another told + me that you are not gone so far as a gentleman in town, who asserts + not only that there is no such thing as Matter, but that we + ourselves have no being at all.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's reply + is interesting. <span class="tei tei-q">“I am not + surprised,”</span> he says, <span class="tei tei-q">“that I should + be ridiculed by those who won't take the pains to understand me. If + the raillery and scorn of those who criticise what they will not be + at the pains to understand had been sufficient to deter men from + making any attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of + mankind, we should not have been troubled with some very fair + improvements in knowledge. The common <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page353">[pg 353]</span><a name="Pg353" id="Pg353" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> cry's being against any opinion seems to me, + so far from proving false, that it may with as good reason pass for + an argument of its truth. However, I imagine that whatever doctrine + contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need be introduced with + great caution into the world. For this reason it was that I omitted + all mention of the non-existence of Matter in the title-page, + dedication, preface and introduction to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise on the + Principles of Human Knowledge</span></span>; that so the notion + might steal unawares upon the reader, who probably might never have + meddled with the book if he had known that it contained such + paradoxes.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">With + characteristic fervour he disclaims <span class= + "tei tei-q">“variety and love of paradox”</span> as motives of the + book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, and professes faith + in the unreality of abstract unperceived Matter, a faith which he + has held for some years, <span class="tei tei-q">“the conceit being + at first warm in my imagination, but since carefully examined, both + by my own judgment and that of ingenious friends.”</span> What he + especially complained of was <span class="tei tei-q">“that men who + have never considered my book should confound me with the sceptics, + who doubt the existence of sensible things, and are not positive as + to any one truth, no, not so much as their own being—which I find + by your letter is the case of some wild visionist now in London. + But whoever reads my book with attention will see that there is a + direct opposition between the principles that are contained in it + and those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence of + anything we perceive by our senses. I do not deny the existence of + the sensible things which Moses says were created by God. They + existed from all eternity, in the Divine Intellect; and they became + perceptible (i.e. were created) in the same manner and order as is + described in Genesis. For I take creation to belong to things only + as they respect finite spirits; there being nothing new to God. + Hence it follows that the act of creation consists in <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page354">[pg 354]</span><a name="Pg354" id="Pg354" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> God's willing that those things should + become perceptible to other spirits which before were known only to + Himself. Now both reason and scripture assure us that there + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">are</span></em> other spirits besides men, + who, 'tis possible, might have perceived this visible world as it + was successively exhibited to their view before man's creation. + Besides, for to agree with the Mosaic account of the creation, it's + sufficient if we suppose that a man, in case he was existing at the + time of the chaos of sensible things, might have perceived all + things formed out of it, in the very order set down in scripture; + all which is in no way repugnant to my principles.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sir John in his + next letter, written from London in October, 1716, reports that the + book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> had fallen into the + hands of the highest living English authority in metaphysical + theology, Samuel Clarke, who had produced his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Demonstration of the + Being and Attributes of God</span></span> four years before. The + book had also been read by Whiston, Newton's successor at + Cambridge. <span class="tei tei-q">“I can only report at + second-hand,”</span> he says, <span class="tei tei-q">“that they + think you a fair arguer, and a clear writer; but they say your + first principles you lay down are false. They look upon you as an + extraordinary genius, ranking you with Father Malebranche, Norris, + and another whose name I forget, all of whom they think + extraordinary men, but of a particular turn of mind, and their + labours of little use to mankind, on account of their abstruseness. + This may arise from these gentlemen not caring to think after a new + manner, which would oblige them to begin their studies anew; or + else it may be the strength of prejudice.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley was + vexed by this treatment on the part of Clarke and Whiston. He sent + under Sir John's care a letter to each of them, hoping through him + to discover <span class="tei tei-q">“their reasons against his + notions, as truth is his sole aim.”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“As to what is said of ranking me with Father + Malebranche <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page355">[pg + 355]</span><a name="Pg355" id="Pg355" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and Mr. Norris, whose writings are thought to be too fine-spun to + be of any great use to mankind, I have this answer, that I think + the notions I embrace are not in the least agreeing with theirs, + but indeed plainly inconsistent with them in the main points, + inasmuch as I know few writers I take myself at bottom to differ + more from than from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what on all + occasions I declare against, and if any one shall shew anything of + that sort in my Treatise I will willingly correct it.”</span> Sir + John delivered the letters to two friends of Clarke and Whiston, + and reported that <span class="tei tei-q">“Dr. Clarke told his + friend in reply, that he did not care to write you his thoughts, + because he was afraid it might draw him into a dispute upon a + matter which was already clear to him. He thought your first + principles you go on are false; but he was a modest man, his friend + said, and uninclined to shock any one whose opinions on things of + this nature differed from his own.”</span> This was a + disappointment to the ardent Berkeley. <span class="tei tei-q">“Dr. + Clarke's conduct seems a little surprising,”</span> he replies. + <span class="tei tei-q">“That an ingenious and candid person (as I + take him to be) should refuse to shew me where my error lies is + something unaccountable. I never expected that a gentleman + otherwise so well employed as Dr. Clarke should think it worth his + while to enter into a dispute with me concerning any notions of + mine. But, seeing it was clear to him I went upon false principles, + I hoped he would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point them out to + me, that so I may more closely review and examine them. If he but + once did me this favour, he need not apprehend I should give him + any further trouble. I should be glad if you have opportunity that + you would let his friend know this. There is nothing that I more + desire than to know thoroughly all that can be said against what I + take for truth.”</span> Clarke, however, was not to be drawn. The + incident is thus referred to by Whiston, in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Memoirs</span></span> + of Clarke. <span class="tei tei-q">“Mr. Berkeley,”</span> he + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page356">[pg 356]</span><a name= + "Pg356" id="Pg356" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> says, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“published in 1710, at Dublin, the metaphysical notion, + that matter was not a real thing<a id="noteref_778" name= + "noteref_778" href="#note_778"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">778</span></span></a>; nay, + that the common opinion of its reality was groundless, if not + ridiculous. He was pleased to send Mr. Clarke and myself each of us + a book. After we had perused it, I went to Mr. Clarke to discourse + with him about it, to this effect, that I, being not a + metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. Berkeley's subtle + premises, though I did not believe his absurd conclusions. I + therefore desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties, but did + not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's conclusion, would answer him. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Which + task he declined</span></em>.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What Clarke's + criticism of Berkeley might have been is suggested by the following + sentences in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks on Human Liberty</span></span>, + published seven years after this correspondence: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The case as to the proof of our free agency is exactly + the same as in that notable question, whether the [material] world + exists or no? There is no demonstration of it from experience. + There always remains a bare possibility that the Supreme Being may + have so framed my mind, that I shall always be necessarily deceived + in every one of my perceptions as in a dream—though possibly there + be no material world, nor any other creature existing besides + myself. And yet no man in his senses argues from thence, that + experience is no proof to us of the existence of things. The bare + physical possibility too of our being so framed by the Author of + Nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by every + experience of every action we perform, is no more any ground to + doubt the truth of our liberty, than the bare natural possibility + of our being all our lifetime in a dream, deceived in our [natural] + belief of the existence of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page357">[pg 357]</span><a name="Pg357" id="Pg357" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the material world, is any just ground to + doubt the reality of its existence.”</span> Berkeley would hardly + have accepted this analogy. Does the conception of a material world + being dependent on percipient mind for its reality imply <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">deception</span></em> on the part of the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Supreme Being”</span>? <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Dreams,”</span> in ordinary language, may signify + illusory fancies during sleep, and so understood the term is + misapplied to a universally mind-dependent universe with its steady + natural order. Berkeley disclaims emphatically any doubt of the + reality of the sensible world, and professes only to shew in what + its reality consists, or its dependence upon percipient life as the + indispensable realising factor. To suppose that we can be + <span class="tei tei-q">“necessarily deceived in every one of our + perceptions”</span> is to interpret the universe atheistically, and + virtually obliges us in final nescience to acknowledge that it is + wholly uninterpretable; so that experience is impossible, because + throughout unintelligible. The moral trustworthiness or perfect + goodness of the Universal Power is I suppose the fundamental + postulate of science and human life. If all our temporal experience + can be called a dream it must at any rate be a dream of the sort + supposed by Leibniz. <span class="tei tei-q">“Nullo argumento + absolute demonstrari potest, dari corpora; nec quidquam prohibet + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">somnia + quædam bene ordinata</span></em> menti nostræ, objecta esse, quæ a + nobis vera judicentur, et ob consensum inter se quoad usum veris + equivalent<a id="noteref_779" name="noteref_779" href= + "#note_779"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">779</span></span></a>.”</span></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The three + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> discuss what Berkeley + regarded as the most plausible Objections, popular and + philosophical, to his account of living Mind or Spirit, as the + indispensable factor and final cause of the reality of the material + world.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The principal + aim of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">First Dialogue</span></span> is to illustrate + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page358">[pg 358]</span><a name= + "Pg358" id="Pg358" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the contradictory or + unmeaning character and sceptical tendency of the common + philosophical opinion—that we perceive in sense a material world + which is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> only in as far as it can + exist in absolute independence of perceiving mind. The + impossibility of any of the qualities in which Matter is manifested + to man—the primary qualities not less than the secondary—having + real existence in a mindless or unspiritual universe is argued and + illustrated in detail. Abstract Matter, unrealised in terms of + percipient life, is meaningless, and the material world becomes + real only in and through living perception. And Matter, as an + abstract substance without qualities, cannot, without a + contradiction, it is also argued, be presented or represented, in + sense. What is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">matter</span></em> is thus melted in a + spiritual solution, from which it issues the flexible and + intelligible medium of intercourse for spiritual beings such as men + are; whose faculties moreover are educated in interpreting the + cosmical order of the phenomena presented to their senses.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Second + Dialogue</span></span> is in the first place directed against + modifications of the scholastic account of Matter, which attributes + our knowledge of it to inference, founded on sense-ideas assumed to + be representative, or not presentative of the reality. The + advocates of Matter independent and supreme, are here assailed in + their various conjectures—that this Matter may be the active Cause, + or the Instrument, or the Occasion of our sense-experience; or that + it is an Unknowable Something somehow connected with that + experience. It is argued in this and in the preceding Dialogue, by + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philonous</span></span> (who personates + Berkeley), that unrealised Matter—intending by that term either a + qualified substance, or a Something of which we cannot affirm + anything—is not merely unproved, but a proved impossibility: it + must mean nothing, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page359">[pg + 359]</span><a name="Pg359" id="Pg359" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + or it must mean a contradiction, which comes to the same thing. It + is not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perceived</span></em>; nor can it be + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suggested</span></em> by what we perceive; nor + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">demonstrated</span></em> by reasoning; nor + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">believed + in</span></em> as an article in the fundamental faith of intuitive + reason. The only consistent theory of the universe accordingly + implies that concrete realities must all be either (a) phenomena + presented to the senses, or else (b) active spirits percipient of + presented phenomena. And neither of these two sorts of concrete + realities is strictly speaking independent of the other; although + the latter, identical amid the variations of the sensuous + phenomena, are deeper and more real than the mere data of the + senses. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Second Dialogue</span></span> ends by + substituting, as concrete and intelligible Realism, the universal + and constant dependence of the material world upon active living + Spirit, in place of the abstract hypothetical and unintelligible + Realism, which defends Matter unrealised in percipient life, as the + type of reality.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Third + Dialogue</span></span> plausible objections to this conception of + what the reality of the material world means are discussed.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is it said that + the new conception is sceptical, and Berkeley another Protagoras, + on account of it? His answer is, that the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">reality</span></em> + of sensible things, as far as man can in any way be concerned with + them, does not consist in what cannot be perceived, suggested, + demonstrated, or even conceived, but in phenomena actually seen and + touched, and in the working faith that future sense-experience may + be anticipated by the analogies of present sense-experience.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But is not this + negation of the Matter that is assumed to be real and independent + of Spirit, an unproved conjecture? It is answered, that the + affirmation of this abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture, + and one self-convicted <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page360">[pg + 360]</span><a name="Pg360" id="Pg360" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + by its implied contradictions, while its negation is only a simple + falling back on the facts of experience, without any attempt to + explain them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Again, is it + objected that the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em> of sensible things + involves their continued reality during intervals of our perception + of them? It is answered, that sensible things are indeed + permanently dependent on Mind, but not on this, that, or the other + finite embodied spirit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is it further + alleged that the reality of Spirit or Mind is open to all the + objections against independent Matter; and that, if we deny + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">this</span></em> Matter, we must in + consistency allow that Spirit can be only a succession of isolated + feelings? The answer is, that there is no parity between + self-conscious Spirit, and Matter out of all relation to any + Spirit. We find, in memory, our own personality and identity; that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">we</span></em> are not our ideas, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“but somewhat else”</span>—a thinking, active + principle, that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas, + and that is revealed as continuously real. Each person is conscious + of himself; and may reasonably infer the existence of other + self-conscious persons, more or less like what he is conscious of + in himself. A universe of self-conscious persons, with their common + sensuous experiences all under cosmical order, is not open to the + contradictions involved in a pretended universe of Matter, + independent of percipient realising Spirit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is it still said + that sane people cannot help distinguishing between the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real + existence</span></em> of a thing and its <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being + perceived</span></em>? It is answered, that all they are entitled + to mean is, to distinguish between being perceived exclusively by + me, and being independent of the perception of all sentient or + conscious beings.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Does an objector + complain that this ideal realism dissolves the distinction between + facts and fancies? He is reminded of the meaning of the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>. That term <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page361">[pg 361]</span><a name="Pg361" id="Pg361" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is not limited by Berkeley to chimeras + of fancy: it is applied also to the objective phenomena of our + sense-experience.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is the + supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause of all changes in + nature declaimed against as baseless? It is answered, that the + supposition of unthinking Power at the heart of the cosmos of + sensible phenomena is absurd.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is the negation + of Abstract Matter repugnant to the common belief of mankind? It is + argued in reply, that this unrealised Matter is foreign to common + belief, which is incapable of even entertaining the conception; and + which only requires to reflect upon what it does entertain to be + satisfied with a relative or ideal reality for sensible things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But, if sensible + things are the real things, the real moon, for instance, it is + alleged, can be only a foot in diameter. It is maintained, in + opposition to this, that the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real + moon</span></em> is applied only to what is an inference from the + moon, one foot in diameter, which we immediately perceive; and that + the former is a part of our previsive or mediate inference, due to + what is perceived.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The dispute, + after all, is merely verbal, it is next objected; and, since all + parties refer the data of the senses and the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + which they compose to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a</span></em> Power external to each finite + percipient, why not call that Power, whatever it may be, Matter, + and not Spirit? The reply is, that this would be an absurd + misapplication of language.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But may we not, + it is next suggested, assume the possibility of a third + nature—neither idea nor Spirit? Not, replies Philonous, if we are + to keep to the rule of having meaning in the words we use. We know + what is meant by a spirit, for each of us has immediate experience + of one; and we know what is meant by sense-ideas and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page362">[pg 362]</span><a name="Pg362" id="Pg362" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> sensible things, for we have immediate + and mediate experience of them. But we have no immediate, and + therefore can have no mediate, experience of what is neither + perceived by our senses, nor realised in inward consciousness: + moreover, <span class="tei tei-q">“entia non sunt multiplicanda + praeter necessitatem.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Again, this + conception of the realities implies, it is said, imperfection, + because sentient experience, in God. This objection, it is + answered, implies a confusion between being actually sentient and + merely conceiving sensations, and employing them, as God does, as + signs for expressing His conceptions to our minds.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Further, the + negation of independent powerful Matter seems to annihilate the + explanations of physical phenomena given by natural philosophers. + But, to be assured that it does not, we have only to recollect what + physical explanation means—that it is the reference of an + apparently irregular phenomenon to some acknowledged general rule + of co-existence or succession among sense-ideas. It is + interpretation of sense-signs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Is the proposed + ideal Realism summarily condemned as a novelty? It can be answered, + that all discoveries are novelties at first; and moreover that this + one is not so much a novelty as a deeper interpretation of the + common faith.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Yet it seems, at + any rate, it is said, to change real things into mere ideas. Here + consider on the contrary what we mean when we speak of sensible + things as real. The changing appearances of which we are percipient + in sense, united objectively in their cosmical order, are what is + truly meant by the realities of sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But this reality + is inconsistent with the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">continued identity</span></em> of material + things, it is complained, and also with the fact that different + persons can be percipient of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">same</span></em> + thing. Not so, Berkeley explains, when we attend to the true + meaning of the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em>, and dismiss from + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page363">[pg 363]</span><a name= + "Pg363" id="Pg363" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> our thoughts a + supposed abstract idea of identity which is nonsensical.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But some may + exclaim against the supposition that the material world exists in + mind, regarding this as an implied assertion that mind is extended, + and therefore material. This proceeds, it is replied, on + forgetfulness of what <span class="tei tei-q">“existence in + mind”</span> means. It is intended to express the fact that matter + is real in being an objective appearance of which a living mind is + sensible.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lastly, is not + the Mosaic account of the creation of Matter inconsistent with the + perpetual dependence of Matter for its reality upon percipient + Spirit? It is answered that the conception of creation being + dependent on the existence of finite minds is in perfect harmony + with the Mosaic account: it is what is seen and felt, not what is + unseen and unfelt, that is created.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Third + Dialogue</span></span> closes with a representation of the new + principle regarding Matter being the harmony of two apparently + discordant propositions—the one-sided proposition of ordinary + common sense; and the one-sided proposition of the philosophers. It + agrees with the mass of mankind in holding that the material world + is actually presented to our senses, and with the philosophers in + holding that this same material world is realised only in and + through the percipient experience of living Spirit.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Most of the + objections to Berkeley's conception of Matter which have been urged + in the last century and a half, by its British, French, and German + critics, are discussed by anticipation in these <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>. The history of + objections is very much a history of misconceptions. Conceived or + misconceived, it has tacitly simplified and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page364">[pg 364]</span><a name="Pg364" id="Pg364" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> purified the methods of physical + science, especially in Britain and France.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The first + elaborate criticism of Berkeley by a British author is found in + Andrew Baxter's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry into the Nature of the Human + Soul</span></span>, published in 1735, in the section entitled + <span class="tei tei-q">“Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the + existence of Matter examined, and shewn to be inconclusive.”</span> + Baxter alleges that the new doctrine tends to encourage scepticism. + To deny Matter, for the reasons given, involves, according to this + critic, denial of mind, and so a universal doubt. Accordingly, a + few years later, Hume sought, in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise of Human + Nature</span></span>, to work out Berkeley's negation of abstract + Matter into sceptical phenomenalism—against which Berkeley sought + to guard by anticipation, in a remarkable passage introduced in his + last edition of these <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In Scotland the + writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, + and Sir W. Hamilton form a magazine of objections. Reid—who + curiously seeks to refute Berkeley by refuting, not more clearly + than Berkeley had done before him, the hypothesis of a wholly + representative sense-perception—urges the spontaneous belief or + common sense of mankind, which obliges us all to recognise a direct + presentation of the external material world to our senses. He + overlooks what with Berkeley is the only question in debate, + namely, the meaning of the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">external</span></em>; for, Reid and Berkeley + are agreed in holding to the reality of a world regulated + independently of the will of finite percipients, and is + sufficiently objective to be a medium of social intercourse. With + Berkeley, as with Reid, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">this</span></em> is practically self-evident. + The same objection, more scientifically defined—that we have a + natural belief in the existence of Matter, and in our own immediate + perception of its qualities—is Sir W. Hamilton's assumption against + Berkeley; but Hamilton does not explain the reality thus + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page365">[pg 365]</span><a name= + "Pg365" id="Pg365" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> claimed for it. + <span class="tei tei-q">“Men naturally believe,”</span> he says, + <span class="tei tei-q">“that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">they themselves</span></em> exist—because they + are conscious of a Self or Ego; they believe that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">something different + from themselves</span></em> exists—because they believe that they + are conscious of this Not-self or Non-ego.”</span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discussions</span></span>, p. 193.) Now, the + existence of a Power that is independent of each finite Ego is at + the root of Berkeley's principles. According to Berkeley and + Hamilton alike, we are immediately percipient of solid and extended + phenomena; but with Berkeley the phenomena are dependent on, at the + same time that they are <span class="tei tei-q">“entirely + distinct”</span> from, the percipient. The Divine and finite + spirits, signified by the phenomena that are presented to our + senses in cosmical order, form Berkeley's external world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That Berkeley + sows the seeds of Universal Scepticism; that his conception of + Matter involves the Panegoism or Solipsism which leaves me in + absolute solitude; that his is virtually a system of Pantheism, + inconsistent with personal individuality and moral + responsibility—these are probably the three most comprehensive + objections that have been alleged against it. They are in a measure + due to Berkeley's imperfect criticism of first principles, in his + dread of a departure from the concrete data of experience in quest + of empty abstractions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In England and + France, Berkeley's criticism of Matter, taken however only on its + negative side, received a countenance denied to it in Germany. + Hartley and Priestley shew signs of affinity with Berkeley. Also an + anonymous <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on the Nature and Existence of the + Material World</span></span>, dedicated to Dr. Priestley and Dr. + Price, which appeared in 1781, is an argument, on empirical + grounds, which virtually makes the data of the senses at last a + chaos of isolated sensations. The author of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + is said to have been a certain <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page366">[pg 366]</span><a name="Pg366" id="Pg366" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> Russell, who died in the West Indies in the + end of the eighteenth century. A tendency towards Berkeley's + negations, but apart from his synthetic principles, appears in + James Mill and J.S. Mill. So too with Voltaire and the + Encyclopedists.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Dialogues between + Hylas and Philonous</span></span> were published in London in 1713, + <span class="tei tei-q">“printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, + at the Half-Moon, in St. Paul's churchyard,”</span> unlike the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span> and the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, which first appeared + in Dublin. The second edition, which is simply a reprint, issued in + 1725, <span class="tei tei-q">“printed for William and John Innys, + at the West End of St. Paul's.”</span> A third, the last in the + author's lifetime, <span class="tei tei-q">“printed by Jacob + Tonson,”</span> which contains some important additions, was + published in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> were reprinted in + 1776, in the same volume with the edition of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles, with + Remarks</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> have been translated + into French and German. The French version appeared at Amsterdam in + 1750. The translator's name is not given, but it is attributed to + the Abbé Jean Paul de Gua de Malves<a id="noteref_780" name= + "noteref_780" href="#note_780"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">780</span></span></a>, by + Barbier, in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dictionnaire des Ouvrages anonymes et + pseudonymes</span></span>, tom. i. p. 283. It contains a Prefatory + Note by the translator, with three curious vignettes (given in the + note below) meant to symbolise the leading thought in each + Dialogue<a id="noteref_781" name="noteref_781" href= + "#note_781"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">781</span></span></a>. A + German translation, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page367">[pg + 367]</span><a name="Pg367" id="Pg367" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + by John Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy in Rostock, + was published at Rostock in 1756. It forms the larger part of a + volume entitled <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Sammlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die + die Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Körpers und der ganzen Körperwelt + läugnen</span></span>. This professed Collection of the most + eminent authors <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page368">[pg + 368]</span><a name="Pg368" id="Pg368" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies and of the + whole material world, consists of Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues,</span></span> and Arthur Collier's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Clavis + Universalis</span></span>, or <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Demonstration of the Non-existence or + Impossibility of an</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page369">[pg 369]</span><a name="Pg369" id="Pg369" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">External + World</span></span>. The volume contains some annotations, and an + Appendix in which a counter-demonstration of the existence of + Matter is attempted. Eschenbach's principal argument is indirect, + and of the nature of a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">reductio ad + absurdum</span></span>. He argues (as others have done) that the + reasons produced against the independent reality of Matter are + equally conclusive against the independent reality of Spirit.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">An interesting + circumstance connected with the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Dialogues between + Hylas and Philonous</span></span> was the appearance, also in 1713, + of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Clavis Universalis</span></span>, or + demonstration of the impossibility of Matter, of Arthur Collier, in + which the merely ideal existence of the sensible world is + maintained. The production, simultaneously, without concert, of + conceptions of the material world which verbally at least have much + in common, is a curious coincidence. It shews that the intellectual + atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in England contained elements + favourable to a reconsideration of the ultimate meaning of Matter. + They are both the genuine produce of the age of Locke and + Malebranche. Neither Berkeley nor Collier were, when they published + their books, familiar with ancient Greek speculations; those of + modern Germany had only begun to loom in the distance. Absolute + Idealism, the Panphenomenalism of Auguste Comte, and the modern + evolutionary conception of nature, have changed the conditions + under which the universal problem is studied, and are making + intelligible to this generation a manner of conceiving the Universe + which, for nearly a century and a half, the British and French + critics of Berkeley were unable to entertain.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> appeared three years + before the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Clavis Universalis</span></span>. Yet Collier + tells us that it was <span class="tei tei-q">“after a ten years' + pause and deliberation,”</span> that, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“rather than the world should finish its course without + once offering to inquire in what manner it exists,”</span> he had + <span class="tei tei-q">“resolved <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page370">[pg 370]</span><a name="Pg370" id="Pg370" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> to put himself upon the trial of the common + reader, without pretending to any better art of gaining him than + dry reason and metaphysical demonstration.”</span> Mr. Benson, his + biographer, says that it was in 1703, at the age of twenty-three, + that Collier came to the conclusion that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“there is no such thing as an external world”</span>; + and he attributes the premises from which Collier drew this + conclusion to his neighbour, John Norris. Among Collier's MSS., + there remains the outline of an essay, in three chapters, dated + January, 1708, on the non-externality of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">visible</span></em> + world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There are + several coincidences between Berkeley and Collier. Berkeley + virtually presented his new theory of Vision as the first + instalment of his explanation of the Reality of Matter. The first + of the two Parts into which Collier's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Clavis</span></span> + is divided consists of proofs that the Visible World is not, and + cannot be, external. Berkeley, in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>, explains the reality + of Matter. In like manner the Second Part of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Clavis</span></span> + consists of reasonings in proof of the impossibility of an external + world independent of Spirit. Finally, in his full-blown theory, as + well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted, as + intuitively known, the existence of sensible Matter; meaning by + this, its relative existence, or dependence on living Mind. The + third proposition of Collier's system asserts the real existence of + visible matter in particular, and of sensible matter in + general.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The invisibility + of distances, as well as of real magnitudes and situations, and + their suggestion by interpretation of visual symbols, propositions + which occupy so large a space in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, have + no counterpart in Collier. His proof of the non-externality of the + visible world consists of an induction of instances of visible + objects that are allowed by all not to be external, although they + seem to be as much so as any that are called external. His + Demonstration consists of nine proofs, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page371">[pg 371]</span><a name="Pg371" id="Pg371" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> which may be compared with the reasonings and + analyses of Berkeley. Collier's Demonstration concludes with + answers to objections, and an application of his account of the + material world to the refutation of the Roman doctrine of the + substantial existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The universal + sense-symbolism of Berkeley, and his pervading recognition of the + distinction between physical or symbolical, and efficient or + originative causation, are wanting in the narrow reasonings of + Collier. Berkeley's more comprehensive philosophy, with its human + sympathies and beauty of style, is now recognised as a striking + expression and partial solution of fundamental problems, while + Collier is condemned to the obscurity of the Schools<a id= + "noteref_782" name="noteref_782" href="#note_782"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">782</span></span></a>.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page373">[pg 373]</span><a name= + "Pg373" id="Pg373" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc39" id="toc39"></a> <a name="pdf40" id="pdf40"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Dedication</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">TO THE RIGHT + HONOURABLE THE LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON<a id="noteref_783" name= + "noteref_783" href="#note_783"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">783</span></span></a>,</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF + IRELAND, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS + OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.</span> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-variant: small-caps">My + Lord</span></span>,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The virtue, + learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish your + character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men + naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and + honour: and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great + Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of + your sovereign, and the honours she has conferred upon you, have + not been owing to any application from your lordship, but entirely + to her majesty's own thought, arising from a sense of your personal + merit, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page374">[pg + 374]</span><a name="Pg374" id="Pg374" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is prefixed to + this treatise with an intention to do honour to myself alone, I + shall only say that I am encouraged by the favour you have treated + me with to address these papers to your lordship. And I was the + more ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise + could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of + your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable + distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of + Philosophy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I am, with the + greatest respect,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">My Lord,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Your lordship's + most obedient and<br /> + most humble servant,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">GEORGE + BERKELEY.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page375">[pg 375]</span><a name= + "Pg375" id="Pg375" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc41" id="toc41"></a> <a name="pdf42" id="pdf42"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">The Preface</span><a id="noteref_784" + name="noteref_784" href="#note_784"><span class="tei tei-noteref" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">784</span></span></a></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Though it seems + the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of nature + and providence, that the end of speculation be Practice, or the + improvement and regulation of our lives and actions; yet those who + are most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of + another mind. And indeed if we consider the pains that have been + taken to perplex the plainest things, that distrust of the senses, + those doubts and scruples, those abstractions and refinements that + occur in the very entrance of the sciences; it will not seem + strange that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out + in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the practical + parts of life, or informing themselves in the more necessary and + important parts of knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Upon the common + principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of + things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish + their <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> nature from that which falls + under our senses. Hence arise scepticism and paradoxes. It is not + enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its + true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For, + though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it + inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason + defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those things which + other men evidently know, and believing those things which they + laugh at and despise.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In order, + therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches, it + seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities; + and, if possible, to <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page376">[pg + 376]</span><a name="Pg376" id="Pg376" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them, together + with their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves + for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits + it is engaged in. Which, with a plain demonstration of the + Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural + Immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, as + well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of + virtue.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This design I + proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles of Human Knowledge</span></span>, + published in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to publish the + Second Part<a id="noteref_785" name="noteref_785" href= + "#note_785"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">785</span></span></a>, I + thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain + Principles laid down in the First, and to place them in a new + light. Which is the business of the following <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In this + Treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader any knowledge of + what was contained in the former, it has been my aim to introduce + the notions I advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar + manner; especially because they carry with them a great opposition + to the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed + against the common sense and natural notions of mankind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If the + Principles which I here endeavour to propagate are admitted for + true, the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence + are, that Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many + intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several + useless parts of science retrenched, speculation referred to + practice, and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And although it + may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion to some, that when they have + taken a circuit through so many refined and unvulgar notions, they + should at last come to think like other men; yet, methinks, this + return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wandered + through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like + coming home from a long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure on the + many difficulties <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page377">[pg + 377]</span><a name="Pg377" id="Pg377" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, and + enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As it was my + intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels by reason, so it has + been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of + reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest + that the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation + of Immortality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical + application of thought: whatever may be the result of that loose, + rambling way, not altogether improperly termed Free-thinking by + certain libertines in thought, who can no more endure the + restraints of logic than those of religion or government.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It will perhaps + be objected to my design that, so far as it tends to ease the mind + of difficult and useless inquiries, it can affect only a few + speculative persons. But if, by their speculations rightly placed, + the study of morality and the law of nature were brought more into + fashion among men of parts and genius, the discouragements that + draw to Scepticism removed, the measures of right and wrong + accurately defined, and the principles of Natural Religion reduced + into regular systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected as + those of some other sciences; there are grounds to think these + effects would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the + too much defaced sense of virtue in the world, but also, by shewing + that such parts of revelation as lie within the reach of human + inquiry are most agreeable to right reason, would dispose all + prudent, unprejudiced persons to a modest and wary treatment of + those sacred mysteries which are above the comprehension of our + faculties.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It remains that + I desire the reader to withhold his censure of these <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> till he has read them + through. Otherwise, he may lay them aside in a mistake of their + design, or on account of difficulties or objections which he would + find answered in the sequel. A Treatise of this nature would + require to be once read over coherently, in order to comprehend its + design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the connexion and + disposition of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a second + reading, this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page378">[pg 378]</span><a name= + "Pg378" id="Pg378" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Especially if + recourse be had to an Essay I wrote some years since upon + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Vision</span></span>, and the Treatise + concerning the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles of Human Knowledge</span></span>; + wherein divers notions advanced in these <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> are farther pursued, + or placed in different lights, and other points handled which + naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page379">[pg 379]</span><a name= + "Pg379" id="Pg379" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc43" id="toc43"></a> <a name="pdf44" id="pdf44"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">The First Dialogue</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philonous.</span></span> Good morrow, Hylas: I + did not expect to find you abroad so early.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hylas.</span></span> + It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up + with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I + could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the + garden.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable + pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of + the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, + those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the + trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these + and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with + secret transports; its faculties too being at this time fresh and + lively, are fit for those meditations, which the solitude of a + garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. But + I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed very intent + on something.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me + to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive + myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in + conversation <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page380">[pg + 380]</span><a name="Pg380" id="Pg380" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that you + would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if you + had not prevented me.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, + through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or + some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe + nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the + world. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and + scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general + disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here; that when men + of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole + time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of + all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and + commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain + suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had + hitherto held sacred and unquestionable<a id="noteref_786" name= + "noteref_786" href="#note_786"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">786</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected + doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I + am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have + quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools + for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word; since this + revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature + and common sense<a id="noteref_787" name="noteref_787" href= + "#note_787"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">787</span></span></a>, I + find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now + easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery + and riddle.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of + you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray, what were those?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who + maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the + mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em> in the world.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page381">[pg 381]</span><a name="Pg381" id="Pg381" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That there is no such thing as what <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">philosophers</span></em> call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em>, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were + made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then + have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to + reject the contrary opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common + Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe + there is no such thing as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">matter</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold + there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and + maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who + believe no such thing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as + that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be + obliged to give up my opinion in this point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which + upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and + remote from Scepticism?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about the + plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you + have to say.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sceptic</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + mean what all men mean—one that doubts of everything.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + He then who entertains no doubt concerning some particular point, + with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree with you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or + negative side of a question?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> In + neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">doubting</span></em> signifies a suspense + between both.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, + than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a + sceptic than the other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge it.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page382">[pg + 382]</span><a name="Pg382" id="Pg382" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sceptic</span></em>, because I deny what you + affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can + tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your + affirmation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but + every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. + I said indeed that a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sceptic</span></em> was one who doubted of + everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and + truth of things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? + But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and + consequently independent of Matter. The denial therefore of this + doth not imply the denying them<a id="noteref_788" name= + "noteref_788" href="#note_788"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">788</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of + distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible + things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this + sufficient to denominate a man a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sceptic</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the + reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of + them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the + greatest <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sceptic</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is what I desire.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What mean you by Sensible Things?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine + that I mean anything else?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your + notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to + ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by + the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things + properly be said to be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensible</span></em> which are perceived + mediately, or not without the intervention of others?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do not sufficiently understand you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + In reading a book, what I immediately perceive <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page383">[pg 383]</span><a name="Pg383" id="Pg383" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> are the letters; but mediately, or by + means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, + virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible + things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know + whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, certainly: it were absurd to think <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">God</span></em> or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">virtue</span></em> sensible things; though + they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, + with which they have an arbitrary connexion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then, that by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensible things</span></em> you mean those + only which can be perceived <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediately</span></em> by sense?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky + red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently + conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet + that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by + the sense of seeing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + doth.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be + said to hear the causes of those sounds?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I + cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of + its heat or weight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, + that by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensible things</span></em> I mean those only + which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive + nothing which they do not perceive <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediately</span></em>: for they make no + inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from + effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, + entirely relates to reason<a id="noteref_789" name="noteref_789" + href="#note_789"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">789</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + This point then is agreed between us—That <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sensible things are + those only which are immediately perceived by sense</span></em>. + You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by + sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures<a id= + "noteref_790" name="noteref_790" href="#note_790"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">790</span></span></a>; or + by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside + tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than + tangible qualities.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page384">[pg + 384]</span><a name="Pg384" id="Pg384" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> We + do not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, + there remains nothing sensible?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + grant it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible + qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Nothing else.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Heat</span></em> then is a sensible thing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Certainly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Doth the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em> of sensible things consist + in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being + perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">exist</span></em> is one thing, and to be + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perceived</span></em> is another.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, + whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to + the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation + to, their being perceived.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without + the mind<a id="noteref_791" name="noteref_791" href= + "#note_791"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">791</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + must.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all + degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we + should attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there + be, pray let me know that reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the + same exists in the object that occasions it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What! the greatest as well as the least?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They + are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is + more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any + difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can + be of the reality of a lesser degree.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very + great pain?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page385">[pg + 385]</span><a name="Pg385" id="Pg385" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> No + one can deny it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, certainly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed + with sense and perception?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is senseless without doubt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> By + no means.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you + acknowledge this to be no small pain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + grant it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material + Substance, or no?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in + it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a + material substance? I desire you would clear this point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a + pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from + heat, and the consequence or effect of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple + uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But one simple sensation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is not the heat immediately perceived?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And the pain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same + time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded + idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense + heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that + the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a + particular sort of pain.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + seems so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement + sensation to be without pain or pleasure.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page386">[pg 386]</span><a name="Pg386" id="Pg386" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure + in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, + tastes, smells? &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span>—I + do not find that I can.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing + distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a very + great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between + affirming and denying?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful + heat cannot exist without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It hath not therefore, according to you, any <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> + being?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really + hot?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say, there + is no such thing as an intense real heat.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally + real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more + undoubtedly real than the lesser?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there + is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it + is this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind + of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving + being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an + unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no reason why we + should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a + substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which + exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist + unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists + only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing + obliges us to think the same of them.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page387">[pg 387]</span><a name="Pg387" id="Pg387" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of + pleasure, any more than of pain.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + did.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes + uneasiness, a pleasure?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What then?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving + substance, or body.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> So + it seems.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not + painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; + may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable + of any degree of heat whatsoever?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> On + second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a + pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a + pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves + to make good my conclusion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + could rather call it an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">indolence</span></em>! It seems to be nothing + more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a + quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I + hope you will not deny.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of + heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than + by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; + for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: + it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of + cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we + perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a + moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose + application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have + cold in them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They must.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an + absurdity?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without doubt it cannot.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page388">[pg 388]</span><a name="Pg388" id="Pg388" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at + the same time both cold and warm?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that + they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an + intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and + warm to the other<a id="noteref_792" name="noteref_792" href= + "#note_792"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">792</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is + really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to + your own concession, to believe an absurdity?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + confess it seems so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have + granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">there is no heat in + the fire</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases + exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> We + ought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the + fibres of your flesh?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + doth.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + doth not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned + by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should not, + conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation + occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and + acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our + minds. But there still remain qualities enough to secure the + reality of external things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is + the same with regard to all other sensible <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page389">[pg 389]</span><a name="Pg389" id="Pg389" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> qualities<a id="noteref_793" name= + "noteref_793" href="#note_793"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">793</span></span></a>, and + that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than + heat and cold?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that + is what I despair of seeing proved.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Let us examine them in order. What think you of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tastes</span></em>—do they exist without the + mind, or no?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood + bitter?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or + pleasant sensation, or is it not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + grant it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances + existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that + is, pleasure and pain, agree to them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this time. + You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not + particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which I answered simply, + that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished:—those + qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains; but not as + existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude + absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the + sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not + in the fire or sugar. What say you to this?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded + altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + things we immediately perceive by our senses</span></em>. Whatever + other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, I + know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in + dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain + qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible + qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this + to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then + once more, do you acknowledge that heat and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page390">[pg 390]</span><a name="Pg390" id="Pg390" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning + those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist + without the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as to + those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say + that sugar is not sweet.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that + which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, + appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons + perceive different tastes in the same food; since that which one + man delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the + taste was something really inherent in the food?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge I know not how.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + In the next place, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">odours</span></em> are to be considered. And, + with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said + of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many + pleasing or displeasing sensations?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an + unperceiving thing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute + animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which + we perceive in them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> By + no means.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other + forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a + perceiving substance or mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + think so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Then as to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sounds</span></em>, what must we think of + them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or + not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence: + because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump + sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the + subject of sound.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What reason is there for that, Hylas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound + greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some + motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And granting that we never hear a sound but when <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page391">[pg 391]</span><a name="Pg391" id="Pg391" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> some motion is produced in the air, yet + I do not see how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself + is in the air.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is this very motion in the external air that produces in the mind + the sensation of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sound</span></em>. For, striking on the drum + of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves + being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected + with the sensation called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sound</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What! is sound then a sensation?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And can any sensation exist without the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, certainly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">air</span></em> you mean a senseless substance + existing without the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived + by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between + the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without + us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the + latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + thought I had already obviated that distinction, by the answer I + gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say + no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but + motion?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + am.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be + attributed to motion?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + may.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is then good sense to speak of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motion</span></em> + as of a thing that is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">loud, sweet, acute, or grave</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident those + accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sound</span></em> + in the common acceptation of the word, but not to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sound</span></em> + in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, + is nothing but a certain motion of the air?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then there are two sorts of sound—the one vulgar, or that + which is heard, the other philosophical and real?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Even so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And the latter consists in motion?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page392">[pg 392]</span><a name="Pg392" id="Pg392" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + told you so before.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of + motion belongs? to the hearing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may + possibly be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">seen</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">felt</span></em>, + but never <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">heard</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my + opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, + indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but + common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of the + vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted to + exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained + no small point, since you make so light of departing from common + phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to + examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most + repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it + no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real sounds are + never heard</span></em>, and that the idea of them is obtained by + some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature + and the truth of things?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions + already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real + being without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">colours</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be + plainer than that we see them on the objects?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances + existing without the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And have true and real colours inhering in them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + There is not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive + immediately?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page393">[pg + 393]</span><a name="Pg393" id="Pg393" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, + we do not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is + anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible + qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be + informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or + made up of sensible qualities?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What a question that is! who ever thought it was?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + My reason for asking was, because in saying, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">each visible object + hath that colour which we see in it</span></em>, you make visible + objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either that + corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is + something beside sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as + this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained + by you, it is a clear consequence, that your <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">corporeal + substance</span></em> is nothing distinct from <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sensible + qualities</span></em><a id="noteref_794" name="noteref_794" href= + "#note_794"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">794</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and + endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never + persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own + meaning.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are + unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I + shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, + whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or + some other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The very same.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds + really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other + form than that of a dark mist or vapour?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds as + they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent + colours.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Apparent</span></em> call you them? how shall + we distinguish these apparent colours from real?</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page394">[pg 394]</span><a name="Pg394" id="Pg394" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only + at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered + by the most near and exact survey.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a + microscope, or by the naked eye?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> By + a microscope, doubtless.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different + from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had + microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that + no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same + colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that + there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by + artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, that + all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as + those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and + accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then, as + to what you say by way of prevention: I ask you whether the real + and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp + and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> By + the former without doubt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not plain from <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dioptrics</span></span> that microscopes make + the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would + appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most + exquisite sharpness?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that + which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is + in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine + and real than those perceived otherwise.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + confess there is something in what you say.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually + are animals whose eyes are by nature framed <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page395">[pg 395]</span><a name="Pg395" id="Pg395" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to perceive those things which by + reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of + those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? Must we + suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be + imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their + bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? + And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles less than + their own bodies; which will present them with a far different view + in each object from that which strikes our senses<a id= + "noteref_795" name="noteref_795" href="#note_795"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">795</span></span></a>? Even + our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same + manner. In the jaundice every one knows that all things seem + yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose + eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours, and + whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the same + colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not + seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none + of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward + object?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + should.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case + colours were real properties or affections inherent in external + bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change + wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from + what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a + change happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of + distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing + itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally + disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change + but the situation of some objects, and they shall present different + colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object + in various degrees of light. And what is more known than that the + same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from what + they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism + which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the + colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a + deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether you are + still of opinion <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page396">[pg + 396]</span><a name="Pg396" id="Pg396" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if + you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain + distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and + formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for + ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent + ones.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally apparent, + and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in + external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what + confirms me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light + colours are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, + then are there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are + colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to + perceive them? For no external body affects the mind, unless it + acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is + motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by + impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye; nor + consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. + Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous + substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of + colours: and such is light.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How! is light then a substance?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid + substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk + motion, and in various manners reflected from the different + surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate different + motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to the brain, + cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with the + sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic + nerves.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Nothing else.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind is + affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And these sensations have no existence without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They have not.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page397">[pg + 397]</span><a name="Pg397" id="Pg397" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">light</span></em> you understand a corporeal + substance external to the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot + exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions + and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate + objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving + substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is what I say.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible + qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, + you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of + the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">them</span></em>; + only I would advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering + the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm—<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the red and blue + which we see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions and + figures which no man ever did or can see are truly so</span></em>. + Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject to as many + ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged to renounce before + in the case of sounds?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out any longer. + Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">secondary + qualities</span></em>, have certainly no existence without the + mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate + anything from the reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it + is no more than several philosophers maintain<a id="noteref_796" + name="noteref_796" href="#note_796"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">796</span></span></a>, who + nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For + the clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities + are by philosophers divided into <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Primary</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondary</span></em><a id="noteref_797" name= + "noteref_797" href="#note_797"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">797</span></span></a>. The + former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; + and these they hold exist really in Bodies. The latter are those + above enumerated; or, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page398">[pg + 398]</span><a name="Pg398" id="Pg398" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + briefly, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">all sensible qualities beside the + Primary</span></em>; which they assert are only so many sensations + or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt + not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time + sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers, but + was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You are still then of opinion that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">figures</span></em> + are inherent in external unthinking substances?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + am.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary + Qualities will hold good against these also?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive + by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the + figure and extension which they see and feel?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all + animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they + given to men alone for this end?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + make no question but they have the same use in all other + animals.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to + perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of + harming them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Certainly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> A + mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things + equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable + dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce + discernible, or at best as so many visible points<a id= + "noteref_798" name="noteref_798" href="#note_798"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">798</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + cannot deny it.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page399">[pg + 399]</span><a name="Pg399" id="Pg399" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely + minute animal appear as some huge mountain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + All this I grant.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of + different dimensions?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That were absurd to imagine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the + extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, + as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them + the true extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own + principles you are led into an absurdity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + There seems to be some difficulty in the point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of + any object can be changed without some change in the thing + itself?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + have.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible + extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times + greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence + likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own I am at a loss what to think.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to think + as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the + rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor + cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold + to the other?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + was.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no + extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem + little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the + other, great, uneven, and angular?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You may at any time make the experiment, by <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page400">[pg 400]</span><a name="Pg400" id="Pg400" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> looking with one eye bare, and with the + other through a microscope.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension</span></em>, I see so many odd + consequences following upon such a concession.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will + stick at nothing for its oddness. [<a id="noteref_799" name= + "noteref_799" href="#note_799"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">799</span></span></a> But, + on the other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general + reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities did not also + include extension? If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything like + an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it + follows that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can either + perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent + in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in + conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from + extension, to be the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of extension. Be the + sensible quality what it will—figure, or sound, or colour, it seems + alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive + it.]</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to + retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false + step in my progress to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being + despatched, we proceed next to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motion</span></em>. + Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time both + very swift and very slow?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the + time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that + describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would + in case it described only a mile in three hours.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree with you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our + minds?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as + fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of + another kind?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page401">[pg + 401]</span><a name="Pg401" id="Pg401" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its + motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the + same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to + say, according to your principles (since the motions perceived are + both really in the object) it is possible one and the same body + shall be really moved the same way at once, both very swift and + very slow. How is this consistent either with common sense, or with + what you just now granted?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + have nothing to say to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Then as for <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">solidity</span></em>; either you do not mean + any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: + or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both + the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it being + evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to + another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it + less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own the very <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensation</span></em> of resistance, which is + all you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cause</span></em> of that sensation is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately + perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had + been already determined.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed: + I know not how to quit my old notions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + To help you out, do but consider that if <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension</span></em> be once acknowledged to + have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be + granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently + suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire + particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you + have denied them all to have any real existence<a id="noteref_800" + name="noteref_800" href="#note_800"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">800</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers + who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should yet + attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between + them, how can this be accounted for?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page402">[pg 402]</span><a name="Pg402" id="Pg402" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is not my business to account for every opinion of the + philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for + this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed + to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and + smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than + the ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it + being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an + unperceiving Substance, men are more easily weaned from believing + the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. + You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect + the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree + of heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to + the other. But, after all, there is no rational ground for that + distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensation is as truly + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a + sensation</span></em> as one more pleasing or painful; and + consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in + an unthinking subject.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard + of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension<a id= + "noteref_801" name="noteref_801" href="#note_801"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">801</span></span></a>. Now, + though it be acknowledged that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">great</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">small</span></em>, consisting merely in the + relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own + bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet + nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute + extension</span></em>, which is something abstracted from + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">great</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">small</span></em>, + from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to + motion; <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">swift</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">slow</span></em> + are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own + minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of + motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion + abstracted from them doth not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of + extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some + degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure + peculiar to each?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page403">[pg + 403]</span><a name="Pg403" id="Pg403" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + think so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties, + are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools + call them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in + general.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Let it be so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But it is a universally received maxim that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Everything which + exists is particular</span></em><a id="noteref_802" name= + "noteref_802" href="#note_802"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">802</span></span></a>. How + then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any + corporeal substance?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + will take time to solve your difficulty.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you + can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am + content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your + thoughts a distinct <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract idea</span></em> of motion or + extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, + great and small, round and square, and the like, which are + acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point + you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your + side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion<a id= + "noteref_803" name="noteref_803" href="#note_803"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">803</span></span></a> + of.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + confess ingenuously, I cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the + ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction + term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">secondary</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by + themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how + do the mathematicians treat of them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general + propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without + mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of + them abstractedly<a id="noteref_804" name="noteref_804" href= + "#note_804"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">804</span></span></a>. But, + how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motion</span></em> by itself, I can form the + idea of it in my mind exclusive <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page404">[pg 404]</span><a name="Pg404" id="Pg404" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of body? or, because theorems may be made of + extension and figures, without any mention of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">great</span></em> + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">small</span></em>, or any other sensible mode + or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of + extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible + quality<a id="noteref_805" name="noteref_805" href= + "#note_805"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">805</span></span></a>, + should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? + Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other + sensible qualities it is attended with, as being altogether + indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the + words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, + they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But what say you to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pure intellect</span></em>? May not abstracted + ideas be framed by that faculty?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot + frame them by the help of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pure intellect</span></em>; whatsoever faculty + you understand by those words<a id="noteref_806" name="noteref_806" + href="#note_806"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">806</span></span></a>. + Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its + spiritual objects, as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">virtue</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">reason</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">God</span></em>, or the like, thus much seems + manifest—that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or + represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, + being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure + intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame + the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of + size, or even from other sensible qualities.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span>Let + me think a little——I do not find that I can.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature + which implies a repugnancy in its conception?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> By + no means.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the + ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, + doth it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the + other exist likewise?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + should seem so.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page405">[pg + 405]</span><a name="Pg405" id="Pg405" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as + conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther + application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will + trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, + or to them appear as being in the same place? Do they ever + represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other + visible and tangible qualities?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no + secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">all</span></em> sensible qualities are alike + to be denied existence without the mind<a id="noteref_807" name= + "noteref_807" href="#note_807"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">807</span></span></a>. But, + my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, + or overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time + to think.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in + reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to + recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have + omitted which makes for your first opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + One great oversight I take to be this—that I did not sufficiently + distinguish the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">object</span></em> from the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensation</span></em><a id="noteref_808" name= + "noteref_808" href="#note_808"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">808</span></span></a>. Now, + though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not + thence follow that the former cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What object do you mean? the object of the senses?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The same.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is then immediately perceived?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately + perceived and a sensation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides + which, there is something perceived; and this I call the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">object</span></em>. + For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the + act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the + tulip.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The same.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page406">[pg + 406]</span><a name="Pg406" id="Pg406" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension<a id= + "noteref_809" name="noteref_809" href="#note_809"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">809</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Nothing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent + with the extension; is it not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the + mind, in some unthinking substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. + Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of + your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the + senses—that is, any idea, or combination of ideas—should exist in + an unthinking substance, or exterior to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all</span></em> + minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how + this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and + yellow were on the tulip <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">you saw</span></em>, since you do not pretend + to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">see</span></em> that unthinking substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from + the subject.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to your + distinction between <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensation</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">object</span></em>; + if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two + things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking + thing<a id="noteref_810" name="noteref_810" href= + "#note_810"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">810</span></span></a>; but, + whatever beside is implied in a perception may?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is my meaning.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it + were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking + substance?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a + perception.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When is the mind said to be active?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an + act of the will?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + cannot.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page407">[pg + 407]</span><a name="Pg407" id="Pg407" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The mind therefore is to be accounted <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">active</span></em> + in its perceptions so far forth as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">volition</span></em> is included in them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion + of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in + applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so + rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can + this be called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">smelling</span></em>: for, if it were, I + should smell every time I breathed in that manner?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more + there is—as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell + at all—this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether + passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, the very same.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or + keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without doubt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, doth it in like manner depend on <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">your</span></em> + will that in looking on this flower you perceive <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">white</span></em> + rather than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards + yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is + light or darkness the effect of your volition?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, certainly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You are then in these respects altogether passive?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + am.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Tell me now, whether <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">seeing</span></em> consists in perceiving + light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without doubt, in the former.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours + altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking + of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow + from your own concessions, that the perception of light and + colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving + substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page408">[pg 408]</span><a name="Pg408" id="Pg408" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + know not what to think of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Besides, since you distinguish the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">active</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">passive</span></em> in every perception, you + must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it + as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving + substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess + ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are + not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed + call them <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">external objects</span></em>, and give them in + words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, + and then tell me whether it be not as I say?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what + passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a + thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it + possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an + unperceiving substance.—But then, on the other hand, when I look on + sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many + modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substratum</span></em>, without which they cannot be conceived to + exist<a id="noteref_811" name="noteref_811" href= + "#note_811"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">811</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Material + substratum</span></em> call you it? Pray, by which of your senses + came you acquainted with that being?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being + perceived by the senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea + of it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do not pretend to any proper positive <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of + it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be + conceived to exist without a support.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then you have only a relative <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em> + of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the + relation it bears to sensible qualities?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation + consists.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page409">[pg + 409]</span><a name="Pg409" id="Pg409" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> Is + it not sufficiently expressed in the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + If so, the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> should import that it + is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And consequently under extension?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from + extension?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that + supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is + different from the thing supporting?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is + supposed to be the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of extension?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Just so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is + not the idea of extension necessarily included in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spreading</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in + itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under + which it is spread?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + must.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of extension, must have + in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>: and so on to infinity? + And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to + what you granted just now, to wit, that the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> was something distinct + from and exclusive of extension?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spread</span></em> in a gross literal sense + under extension. The word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> is used only to express + in general the same thing with <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">substance</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>. Is it not that it + stands under accidents?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The very same.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not + be extended?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + must.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with + the former?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page410">[pg + 410]</span><a name="Pg410" id="Pg410" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, + Philonous.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to + explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand + something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under + accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No; that is the literal sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you + understand it in.—How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well + enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, + the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I + find that I know nothing of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor + positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor + what relation it bears to accidents?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or + accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time + a material support of them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + did.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That is to say, when you conceive the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> + existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you + cannot conceive?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. + Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the + ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by + itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist + without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can + figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several + qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, + nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist + without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though + indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, + yet my arguments, or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to + prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page411">[pg 411]</span><a name= + "Pg411" id="Pg411" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> itself; but, that + they were not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">at all</span></em> without the mind. Indeed, + in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist + without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to + separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them + existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument + made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been + hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I + am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it + possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any + sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will + grant it actually to be so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> If + it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy + than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent + of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present + time conceive them existing after that manner.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time + unseen?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No, that were a contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">conceiving</span></em> a thing which is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unconceived</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by + you?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + How should it be otherwise?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And what is conceived is surely in the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing + independent and out of all minds whatsoever?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me + into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a + tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, + methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or + unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the + while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in + my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a + tree, or a house, or a mountain, but <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page412">[pg 412]</span><a name="Pg412" id="Pg412" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> that is all. And this is far from proving + that I can conceive them <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existing out of the minds of all + Spirits</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one + corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you + cannot so much as conceive?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples + remain with me. Is it not certain I <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">see things at a + distance</span></em>? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for + example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the + senses?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They have.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be + without the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> By + no means.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are + without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are + perceived.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those + cases?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, + neither sense nor reason informs you that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">it</span></em> + actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you + are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, + &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests + something of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">outness</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">distance</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure + change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all + distances?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are in a continual change.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the + visible object you immediately perceive <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page413">[pg 413]</span><a name="Pg413" id="Pg413" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> exists at a distance<a id="noteref_812" name= + "noteref_812" href="#note_812"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">812</span></span></a>, or + will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a + continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during + the whole time of your approach.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I + shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no + matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still + something of distance suggested in the case.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me + whether there be any more in it than this: From the ideas you + actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to + collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order + of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of + time and motion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a + sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what + may be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suggested</span></em> by sight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance + annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of + sensations, existing only in his mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is undeniable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, to make it still more plain: is not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">distance</span></em> a line turned endwise to + the eye<a id="noteref_813" name="noteref_813" href= + "#note_813"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">813</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and + immediately perceived by sight?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + should seem so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance<a id= + "noteref_814" name="noteref_814" href="#note_814"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">814</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same + place with extension and figures?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page414">[pg 414]</span><a name="Pg414" id="Pg414" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, + when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being + the very same with regard to both?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + know not what to answer.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by + the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the + mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea<a id= + "noteref_815" name="noteref_815" href="#note_815"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">815</span></span></a>: and + can any idea exist out of the mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we + perceive or know nothing beside our ideas<a id="noteref_816" name= + "noteref_816" href="#note_816"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">816</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that is beside + our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you + perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask + you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your + own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the + course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but + you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you + then thought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of + objects:—the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>; the other are real things + or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are + their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not exist + without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I + did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have + cut short your discourse.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Are those external objects perceived by sense, or by some other + faculty?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are perceived by sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How! Is there anything perceived by sense which is not immediately + perceived?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on + a picture or statue of Julius Cæsar, I may <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page415">[pg 415]</span><a name="Pg415" id="Pg415" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> be said after a manner to perceive him + (though not immediately) by my senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately + perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also + are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or + resemblance to our ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is my meaning.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And, in the same way that Julius Cæsar, in himself invisible, is + nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves + imperceptible, are perceived by sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> In + the very same.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Cæsar, do you + see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a + certain symmetry and composition of the whole?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Nothing else.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Cæsar + see as much?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> He + would.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a + degree as you?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree with you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman + emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations + or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you + have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem + therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + should.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything + is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived. Though I + grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible + things mediately by sense: that is, when, from a frequently + perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suggests</span></em> to the mind others, + perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected + with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the + streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the + experience I have had <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page416">[pg + 416]</span><a name="Pg416" id="Pg416" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the + coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, + nothing can be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">heard</span></em> but <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sound</span></em>; + and the coach is not properly perceived by sense, but suggested + from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar + of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of + sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure + which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things + alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would + have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first + conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only + suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former + perceptions. But, to return to your comparison of Cæsar's picture, + it is plain, if you keep to that, you must hold the real things, or + archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some + internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would + therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the + existence of what you call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real things</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + objects</span></em>. Or, whether you remember to have seen them + formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read + of any one that did.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never + convince me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material beings</span></em>. Whatever we + perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by sense, or by + reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me + what reason you have to believe their existence; or what <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">medium</span></em> + you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your + own understanding.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not + find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seem + pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may really + exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I + am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons to the + contrary.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What! Is it come to this, that you only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">believe</span></em> + the existence of material objects, and that your belief is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page417">[pg 417]</span><a name= + "Pg417" id="Pg417" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> founded barely on + the possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring + reasons against it: though another would think it reasonable the + proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, + this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any + reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this + discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this; + if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without + the mind, but that they are copies, images, or representations, of + certain originals that do?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You take me right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + They are then like external things<a id="noteref_817" name= + "noteref_817" href="#note_817"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">817</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our + senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any + motions in our bodies—suspending, exerting, or altering, our + faculties or organs of sense?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which + remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in + the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the + ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same + effect on things existing without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and + variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed + and constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as + size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually + changing, upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or + instruments of sensation; how can any determinate material objects + be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct + things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, + if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be + able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to + this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But neither is this all. Which are material objects in + themselves—perceptible or imperceptible?</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page418">[pg 418]</span><a name="Pg418" id="Pg418" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All + material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be + perceived only by our ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals + insensible?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But how can that which is sensible be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">like</span></em> + that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">invisible</span></em>, be like a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">colour</span></em>; + or a real thing, which is not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">audible</span></em>, be like a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sound</span></em>? + In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another + sensation or idea?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + must own, I think not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do you not + perfectly know your own ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be no + part of my idea<a id="noteref_818" name="noteref_818" href= + "#note_818"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">818</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be + anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can + conceive anything like them existing without the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or + understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is + most evident that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">no idea can exist without the + mind</span></em><a id="noteref_819" name="noteref_819" href= + "#note_819"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">819</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em> of sensible things; since + you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the + mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained + my point, which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least + silenced.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect + conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all + manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and + insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce + anything you had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not + everything you could say been heard and examined with <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page419">[pg 419]</span><a name="Pg419" id="Pg419" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> all the fairness imaginable? In a word, + have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? + And, if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former + concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new + distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not produce + it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> A + little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see myself + ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have + drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should + find my way out. You must give me time to look about me and + recollect myself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Hark; is not this the college bell?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + rings for prayers.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again to-morrow + morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this + morning's discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or + invent any new means to extricate yourself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Agreed.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page420">[pg 420]</span><a name= + "Pg420" id="Pg420" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc45" id="toc45"></a> <a name="pdf46" id="pdf46"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">The Second Dialogue</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hylas.</span></span> + I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All this + morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had + not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything + else.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philonous.</span></span> I am glad you were so + intent upon it, in hopes if there were any mistakes in your + concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now + discover them to me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search + after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely + examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in + vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear still + more clear and evident; and, the more I consider them, the more + irresistibly do they force my assent.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that they + proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and + beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both + off to advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise + cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be more + entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long + as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these + are out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something + so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of + explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + know not what way you mean.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page421">[pg 421]</span><a name="Pg421" id="Pg421" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How is that?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, + from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to + all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different + impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain + vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with + spirits propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, + according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the + brain, is variously affected with ideas<a id="noteref_820" name= + "noteref_820" href="#note_820"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">820</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are + affected with ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You + make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of + our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">brain</span></em> + you mean any sensible thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What else think you I could mean?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things + which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only + in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since + agreed to.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do not deny it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists + only in the mind<a id="noteref_821" name="noteref_821" href= + "#note_821"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">821</span></span></a>. Now, + I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that + one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas. + And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of + that primary idea or brain itself?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is + perceivable to sense—this being itself only a combination of + sensible ideas—but by another which I imagine.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page422">[pg 422]</span><a name="Pg422" id="Pg422" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But are not things imagined as truly <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in the + mind</span></em> as things perceived<a id="noteref_822" name= + "noteref_822" href="#note_822"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">822</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + must confess they are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all this + while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the + brain; that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or + imaginable it matters not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + begin to suspect my hypothesis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. + When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in + the brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you + talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is + absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead + of forming a reasonable hypothesis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of + explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any + reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the + nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how + is it possible these should be the effect of that?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to + have.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have + a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is too plain to be denied.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is + there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and + clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the + soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge + mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy + forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in + rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a + pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To + preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page423">[pg 423]</span><a name= + "Pg423" id="Pg423" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> alternately drawn + over her face, and doth she not change her dress with the seasons? + How aptly are the elements disposed! What variety and use [<a id= + "noteref_823" name="noteref_823" href="#note_823"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">823</span></span></a>in the + meanest productions of nature!] What delicacy, what beauty, what + contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies! How exquisitely are + all things suited, as well to their particular ends, as to + constitute opposite parts of the whole! And, while they mutually + aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each + other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those + glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion + and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and + order? Were those (miscalled <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">erratic</span></em>) globes once known to + stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do + they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the + times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which the unseen + Author of nature actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant is + the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that + negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered + throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, + it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked + eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view + immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk in the abyss + of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The feeble + narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the + central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect + Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination + are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its + glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain + each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a + surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose this + mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret + mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence + and intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was + almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is + not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression + and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers + deserve, who would, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page424">[pg + 424]</span><a name="Pg424" id="Pg424" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>? How should those + Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible + beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can + you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought + extravagantly absurd by all men of sense?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have + nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a + sceptic as I am.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now + deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by + myself which you led me into? This surely is not fair.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to + Scepticism. You indeed said the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">reality</span></em> + of sensible things consisted in an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute existence + out of the minds of spirits</span></em>, or distinct from their + being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">you</span></em> are + obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is, + according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. + But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was + to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident, for the + reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise + than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no + real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and + have an existence distinct from being perceived by me<a id= + "noteref_824" name="noteref_824" href="#note_824"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">824</span></span></a>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">there + must be some other Mind wherein they exist</span></em>. As sure, + therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an + infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all + others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and + comprehends all things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all + things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the + being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and + necessarily conclude the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page425">[pg + 425]</span><a name="Pg425" id="Pg425" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by + Him<a id="noteref_825" name="noteref_825" href= + "#note_825"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">825</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it + how we come by that belief?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, + though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by + God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct + from their being perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. + Besides, is there no difference between saying, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">There is a God, + therefore He perceives all things</span></em>; and saying, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Sensible + things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are + necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an + infinite Mind, or God</span><a id="noteref_826" name="noteref_826" + href="#note_826"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">826</span></span></a><span style="font-style: italic">?</span></em> + This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from + a most evident principle, of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being of a + God</span></em>. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all + controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of + the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that—setting + aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all + contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of + things—an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from<a id= + "noteref_827" name="noteref_827" href="#note_827"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">827</span></span></a> the + bare <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence of the sensible world</span></em>, + is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: + That the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several + senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; + and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than + in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the + sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of + discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for + Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession + of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of + atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a + word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, + by this <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page426">[pg + 426]</span><a name="Pg426" id="Pg426" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, + or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible + world, to exist without a Mind? Let any one of those abettors of + impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can + conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused + jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or + imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no + farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than + to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to + see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true + in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence<a id= + "noteref_828" name="noteref_828" href="#note_828"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">828</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion + in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a + notion entertained by some eminent moderns<a id="noteref_829" name= + "noteref_829" href="#note_829"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">829</span></span></a>, of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">seeing + all things in God</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of + being united with material things, so as to perceive them in + themselves; but that she perceives them by her union with the + substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely + intelligible, or capable of being the immediate object of a + spirit's thought. Besides, the Divine essence contains in it + perfections correspondent to each created being; and which are, for + that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether + passive and inert<a id="noteref_830" name="noteref_830" href= + "#note_830"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">830</span></span></a>, can + be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or + substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, pure, active + being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur + at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page427">[pg 427]</span><a name= + "Pg427" id="Pg427" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> add, that it is + liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a + created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Beside + all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that + material world serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good + argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they + suppose Nature, or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or + do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been + performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we + think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in + vain?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things + in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + [<a id="noteref_831" name="noteref_831" href= + "#note_831"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">831</span></span></a>Few + men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are + superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which + in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be + confounded with each other, by those who do not consider them + attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine + that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am + very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, + which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, + which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and + know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended + beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the + whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his + and mine. It must be owned that] I entirely agree with what the + holy Scripture saith, 'That in God we live and move and have our + being.' But that we see things in His essence, after the manner + above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my + meaning:—It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, + and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less + plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves + or their archetypes, exist independently of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my</span></em> + mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of + my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be + affected with <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page428">[pg + 428]</span><a name="Pg428" id="Pg428" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + upon opening my eyes or ears<a id="noteref_832" name="noteref_832" + href="#note_832"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">832</span></span></a>: they + must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they + should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived + are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any + idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind + or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable<a id="noteref_833" name= + "noteref_833" href="#note_833"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">833</span></span></a>. And + to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it + not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without doubt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should + exist in and be produced by a Spirit; since this is no more than I + daily experience in myself<a id="noteref_834" name="noteref_834" + href="#note_834"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">834</span></span></a>, + inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, + can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my + imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the + fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and + permanent, as those perceived by my senses—which latter are called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real + things</span></em>. From all which I conclude, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">there is a Mind + which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I + perceive</span></em>. And, from the variety, order, and manner of + these, I conclude <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and + good, beyond comprehension</span></em>. Mark it well; I do not say + I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the + intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, + the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and + produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this + most plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what a little + observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not + only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to + acknowledge?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + think I understand you very clearly; and own proof you give of a + Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing + that God is the supreme and universal Cause of all things, yet, may + there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page429">[pg 429]</span><a name= + "Pg429" id="Pg429" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> not admit a + subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there + not for all that be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things + immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; + but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived + immediately; therefore there is nothing sensible that exists + without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on + is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be + discovered by reason<a id="noteref_835" name="noteref_835" href= + "#note_835"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">835</span></span></a>, and + not by sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You are in the right.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded + on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + find myself affected with various ideas whereof I know I am not the + cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, + or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether + inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">some</span></em> cause distinct from me and + them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the cause of my + ideas</span></em>. And this thing whatever it be, I call + Matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current + proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For + example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain + country men pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining + himself, you found he meant by the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">fire</span></em> + that which others call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">water</span></em>. Or, if he should assert + that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the + term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">trees</span></em>. Would you think this + reasonable?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of + propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking + improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to + a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes where there + is no difference in opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And doth not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, in the common current + acceptation of the word, signify an extended solid moveable, + unthinking, inactive Substance?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + doth.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page430">[pg + 430]</span><a name="Pg430" id="Pg430" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And, hath it not been made evident that no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">such</span></em> + substance can possibly exist<a id="noteref_836" name="noteref_836" + href="#note_836"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">836</span></span></a>? And, + though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inactive</span></em> be a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em>; + or that which is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unthinking</span></em> be a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause of + thought</span></em>? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the + word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> a contrary meaning to what + is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it, an + unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our + ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into + that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by + no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a</span></em> cause from the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomena</span></em>: but I deny that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the</span></em> cause deducible by reason can + properly be termed Matter<a id="noteref_837" name="noteref_837" + href="#note_837"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">837</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid you do + not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be + thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme + Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the + Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, + which <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">concurs</span></em> in the production of our + ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that + kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motion</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded + conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, + existing without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you + were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat what has been + said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still + to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged + to have no being. But, not to insist farther on what has been so + largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly + passive and inert, including nothing of action in them<a id= + "noteref_838" name="noteref_838" href="#note_838"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">838</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page431">[pg 431]</span><a name="Pg431" id="Pg431" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + How often have I acknowledged that they are not.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But is not <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motion</span></em> a sensible quality?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently it is no action?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my + finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion + is active.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being + allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides + volition: and, in the second place, whether to say something and + conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense<a id="noteref_839" name= + "noteref_839" href="#note_839"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">839</span></span></a>: and, + lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not + perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our + ideas, other than <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em>, is highly absurd and + unreasonable?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, + yet what hinders its being an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">instrument</span></em>, subservient to the + supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, + wheels, and motions, of that instrument?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its + qualities being entirely unknown to me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that + it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being + already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an + unperceiving substance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of + all sensible qualities, even extension itself?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + do not pretend to have any notion of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable + Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well + without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such + thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page432">[pg 432]</span><a name="Pg432" id="Pg432" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what + reasons have you not to believe it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of + anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist + on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what it + is</span></em> you would have me believe; since you say you have no + manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider + whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common + sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you know not + why.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">instrument</span></em>, I do not mean + altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of + instrument; but, however, I have some notion of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">instrument in + general</span></em>, which I apply to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the + most general notion of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">instrument</span></em>, as taken in a distinct + sense from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cause</span></em>, which makes the use of it + inconsistent with the Divine attributes?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Make that appear and I shall give up the point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What mean you by the general nature or notion of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">instrument</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the + general notion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the + doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act + of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move + my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I should use one + if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. + Are you of the same mind? Or, can you shew any example where an + instrument is made use of in producing an effect <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediately</span></em> depending on the will + of the agent?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own I cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose + Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should + need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use + of it? Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a + lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page433">[pg 433]</span><a name= + "Pg433" id="Pg433" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> perfection of God; + that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + doth not readily occur what I can answer you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has + been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite + powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an + instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's + prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, + and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that + the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The + will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, + without the application of means; which, if they are employed by + inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that + is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely + in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions + prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all + limitation or prescription whatsoever<a id="noteref_840" name= + "noteref_840" href="#note_840"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">840</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I + would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, + notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em><a id="noteref_841" name= + "noteref_841" href="#note_841"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">841</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be + proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, + to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may + justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of + the principal term)—I would fain know what you mean by affirming + that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. + And, when you have shewn in what sense you understand <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em>, pray, in the next place, + be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is + such an occasion of our ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> As + to the first point: by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em> I mean an inactive + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page434">[pg 434]</span><a name= + "Pg434" id="Pg434" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> unthinking being, at + the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + know nothing of its nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we + should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown + thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and + constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and + regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and + that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is my opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He + perceives.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of + acting.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or + answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable + to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the + series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently + accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth + not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, + directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an + unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all + you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not + being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an + unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, can be + inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived + by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing + ideas in us?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occasion</span></em> seeming now altogether as + groundless as the rest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Do you not at length perceive that in all these different + acceptations of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, you have been only + supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no + kind of use?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page435">[pg + 435]</span><a name="Pg435" id="Pg435" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so + accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused + perception that there is such a thing as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately. + If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive + it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from + those things which you perceive immediately. So much for the + perception. Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>, cause, instrument, or + occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your + notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then + in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and + rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would + gladly hear it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am + at a loss what more to urge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make + you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been + hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon + supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you + should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether + it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same + ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to + believe its existence that you now can have<a id="noteref_842" + name="noteref_842" href="#note_842"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">842</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we + do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I + conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our + minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that + it is impossible there should be such a thing as Matter in any of + the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that + there is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> in some sense or other. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">What that + is</span></em> I do not indeed pretend to determine.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown + being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if + so, whether you can <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page436">[pg + 436]</span><a name="Pg436" id="Pg436" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it + to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what + those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's supporting + them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> We + have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. + But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present + understand by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> neither substance nor + accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, + nor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all + these<a id="noteref_843" name="noteref_843" href= + "#note_843"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">843</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing + but the general abstract idea of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">entity</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Nothing else; save only that I superadd to this general idea the + negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that + I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> Oh + Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it + exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, + since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. + But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it + exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative + answer for you. And you must expect no other to all the questions + you put for the future about Matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me + after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its + existence?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion + or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my + ignorance. I know not what is meant by its <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>, or how it exists.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me + sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in + general, prescinded from and exclusive of <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page437">[pg 437]</span><a name="Pg437" id="Pg437" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> all thinking and corporeal beings<a id= + "noteref_844" name="noteref_844" href="#note_844"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">844</span></span></a>, all + particular things whatsoever.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Hold, let me think a little——I profess, Philonous, I do not find + that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy + notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it + hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more + am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative + answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive + knowledge or conception of Matter, its <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">where</span></em>, + its <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">how</span></em>, its <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">entity</span></em>, + or anything belonging to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not + any notion in your mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + None at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray tell me if the case stands not thus:—At first, from a belief + of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects + existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then + causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">something in + general</span></em>, which being interpreted proves <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nothing</span></em>. So Matter comes to + nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your + whole proceeding?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> Be + that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">our</span></em> not + being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its + existence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance, + there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not + immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue + against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and + positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of + all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe + the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion + of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being + perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much + as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to—I will not indeed + thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of + anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; + that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page438">[pg 438]</span><a name="Pg438" id="Pg438" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> any design or signification whatsoever. + And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be + treated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves + unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to + produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which + attends demonstration<a id="noteref_845" name="noteref_845" href= + "#note_845"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">845</span></span></a>. I + find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not + what, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">matter</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to + take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a + visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is + any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed + towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though a + demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, + if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the + understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, + and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and + pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent + repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in + different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still + repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, + in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what + reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any + art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">so</span></em> barefacedly groundless and + unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common + conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; + though at the same time you neither know <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what is + meant</span></em> by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, or by its <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>. This indeed is + surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary + [<a id="noteref_846" name="noteref_846" href= + "#note_846"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">846</span></span></a> and + of your own <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page439">[pg + 439]</span><a name="Pg439" id="Pg439" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + head], you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge + you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain + or account for it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em> of things cannot be + maintained without supposing the existence of Matter. And is not + this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its + defence?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Sensible things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + My glove for example?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient + evidence to me of the existence of this <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">glove</span></em>, + that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, + how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this + thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some + unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an + unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can + the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that + anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, + that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is + imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I + shall think nothing too hard for you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of Matter is + highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it + does not appear to me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, + it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a + centaur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that + which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, evidently + proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common + sense of the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, is there any more implied + than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing + without the mind? And have not you acknowledged, over and over, + that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of + such a substance?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True, but that is only one sense of the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page440">[pg 440]</span><a name="Pg440" id="Pg440" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if + Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be + thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could + anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any + proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to + unsettle and change the common signification of words?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than + the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation + of a term.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But this now mentioned is the common received sense among + philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not + been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you + not used this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely + changing, at others leaving out, or putting into the definition of + it whatever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to + all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not this + shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an + unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined, and + by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any + more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, + than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that + either you or any one else understands it in?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the + impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and + indefinite sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When is a thing shewn to be impossible?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in + its definition.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be + demonstrated between ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree with you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the + word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, it is plain, by your own + confession, there was included no idea at all, no sense except an + unknown sense; which is the same thing as none. You are not, + therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, + where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in + an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unknown</span></em> sense, that is, no sense + at all. My business was only to shew you meant <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page441">[pg 441]</span><a name="Pg441" id="Pg441" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nothing</span></em>; and this you were brought + to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed + either to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And + if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I + desire you will let me know what is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I see + what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that + I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none + could be more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now + seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think + we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. The + remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in running over + in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation, + and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same + time.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + will not fail to attend you.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page442">[pg 442]</span><a name= + "Pg442" id="Pg442" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc47" id="toc47"></a> <a name="pdf48" id="pdf48"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">The Third Dialogue</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philonous.</span></span> <a id="noteref_847" + name="noteref_847" href="#note_847"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">847</span></span></a>Tell + me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation? Has it + confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or have you + since seen cause to change your opinion?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hylas.</span></span> + Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and + uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a + stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, + when, alas! we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it + possible for us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties + are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for + speculation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the + real nature, or what it is in itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but + this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your + own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of + sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you + are utterly in the dark as to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">that</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that + which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Know?</span></em> No, it is impossible you or + any man alive should know it. All you know is, that you have such a + certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to + the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page443">[pg 443]</span><a name="Pg443" id="Pg443" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> figure, and hardness, which you + perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least + like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or + corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of + them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us + perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know + anything of them, as they are in their own nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: + and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own + ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, + think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to + the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. And in + pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the + appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that + should conclude two men were of a different species, because their + clothes were not of the same colour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of + things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the + cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Even so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, + and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how + it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the + offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really + knew the things they are conversant about.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a + nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their + mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle through the + affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You mean, they <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">know</span></em> that they <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">know + nothing</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously + persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are + going to write, would you <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page444">[pg + 444]</span><a name="Pg444" id="Pg444" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not + know what it is you call for?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any + one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of + pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true + nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with + regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are + not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even + of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such + certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from + thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must, + agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is + impossible any <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> corporeal thing should exist + in nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the + notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into + all these extravagances by the belief of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em>? This makes you dream of those unknown + natures<a id="noteref_848" name="noteref_848" href= + "#note_848"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">848</span></span></a> in + everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing between the + reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are + indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly + well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature + of everything, but you know not whether anything really exists, or + whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you + attribute to your material beings an absolute or external + existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you + are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either + a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are + obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and + positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. + And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable + scepticism that ever man was<a id="noteref_849" name="noteref_849" + href="#note_849"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">849</span></span></a>. Tell + me, Hylas, is it not as I say?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page445">[pg 445]</span><a name="Pg445" id="Pg445" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree with you. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Material substance</span></em> was no more + than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no + longer spend my breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis + you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its + stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but + be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you + in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as + many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of + scepticism that I myself am in at present.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at + all<a id="noteref_850" name="noteref_850" href= + "#note_850"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">850</span></span></a>. I am + of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave + things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real + things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive<a id= + "noteref_851" name="noteref_851" href="#note_851"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">851</span></span></a> by my + senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities + and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any + other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, + would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of + that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is + likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are + on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is + white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">snow</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">fire</span></em> mean certain external, + unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny + whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">them</span></em>. + But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am + obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with + regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their + existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my + senses<a id="noteref_852" name="noteref_852" href= + "#note_852"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">852</span></span></a>, and + at <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page446">[pg 446]</span><a name= + "Pg446" id="Pg446" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the same time not + really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot + prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible + thing from its being perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, + iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are + things that I know. And I should not have known them but that I + perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are + immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; + and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore + consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually + perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with + all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. + What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of + sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of + God<a id="noteref_853" name="noteref_853" href= + "#note_853"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">853</span></span></a>; or + to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or + demonstration<a id="noteref_854" name="noteref_854" href= + "#note_854"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">854</span></span></a>! I + might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those + things I actually see and feel.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible + things should exist without the mind. Do you not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible + that things perceivable by sense may still exist<a id="noteref_855" + name="noteref_855" href="#note_855"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">855</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible + things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in + particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence + exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be + independent of it<a id="noteref_856" name="noteref_856" href= + "#note_856"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">856</span></span></a>. + There <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page447">[pg 447]</span><a name= + "Pg447" id="Pg447" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is therefore some + other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the + times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, + and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is + true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it + necessarily follows there is an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">omnipresent eternal + Mind</span></em>, which knows and comprehends all things, and + exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such + rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">laws of + nature</span></em><a id="noteref_857" name="noteref_857" href= + "#note_857"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">857</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or + have they any agency included in them?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + They are altogether passive and inert<a id="noteref_858" name= + "noteref_858" href="#note_858"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">858</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + And is not God an agent, a being purely active?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + acknowledge it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> No + idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of + God?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It cannot.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Since therefore you have no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of the mind of God, how can + you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, + if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, + why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, + notwithstanding I have no idea of it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + As to your first question: I own I have properly no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot + be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do + nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, + exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist<a id="noteref_859" + name="noteref_859" href="#note_859"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">859</span></span></a>. + Farther, I know what I mean by the terms <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">I</span></em> and + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">myself</span></em>; and I know this + immediately or intuitively, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page448">[pg 448]</span><a name="Pg448" id="Pg448" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> though I do not perceive it as I perceive a + triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that + indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I + say <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">indivisible</span></em>, because unextended; + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unextended</span></em>, because extended, + figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, + which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an + idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort + of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my + soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> in a large sense, my soul may + be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness + of God—though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I + have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening + its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, + though not an inactive idea, yet in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">myself</span></em> + some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I + perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him + by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an + immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately + apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and + ideas<a id="noteref_860" name="noteref_860" href= + "#note_860"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">860</span></span></a>. + Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in + myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason<a id="noteref_861" + name="noteref_861" href="#note_861"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">861</span></span></a>, + necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things + in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For the + second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you + neither perceive Matter<a id="noteref_862" name="noteref_862" href= + "#note_862"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">862</span></span></a> + objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as + you do yourself, by a reflex act<a id="noteref_863" name= + "noteref_863" href="#note_863"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">863</span></span></a>; + neither do <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page449">[pg + 449]</span><a name="Pg449" id="Pg449" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the + other<a id="noteref_864" name="noteref_864" href= + "#note_864"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">864</span></span></a>; nor + yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know + immediately<a id="noteref_865" name="noteref_865" href= + "#note_865"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">865</span></span></a>. All + which makes the case of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> widely different from that + of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Deity</span></em>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">[<a id= + "noteref_866" name="noteref_866" href="#note_866"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">866</span></span></a><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or + image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, + properly speaking, no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of your own soul. You even + affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from + ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have + therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there + is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you + deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you + have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act + consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What + say you to this?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of + material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but + because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, + because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many + things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any + other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then + those things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must + be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we + believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not + believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for + such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of + Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I + immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or + passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive + Substance—either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. + Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or + thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion<a id= + "noteref_867" name="noteref_867" href="#note_867"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">867</span></span></a>. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page450">[pg 450]</span><a name= + "Pg450" id="Pg450" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> You will forgive me + if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In + the very notion or definition of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + Substance</span></em>, there is included a manifest repugnance and + inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. + That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced + by what doth not act, is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say + that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an + active thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither an + immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence + of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such + spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the + one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the + other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is a + probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating + distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom + whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, + that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly + speaking, an idea of it<a id="noteref_868" name="noteref_868" href= + "#note_868"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">868</span></span></a>. I do + not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by + reflexion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according + to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own + principles, it should follow that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">you</span></em> are + only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support + them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is + no more meaning in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spiritual Substance</span></em> than in + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + Substance</span></em>, the one is to be exploded as well as the + other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own + being; and that I <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">myself</span></em> am not my ideas, but + somewhat else<a id="noteref_869" name="noteref_869" href= + "#note_869"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">869</span></span></a>, a + thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and + operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, + perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a + sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual + principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same + reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page451">[pg 451]</span><a name= + "Pg451" id="Pg451" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> But, I am not in + like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of + Matter<a id="noteref_870" name="noteref_870" href= + "#note_870"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">870</span></span></a>. On + the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that + the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know + what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or + support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. + But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an + unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either + ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole + no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.]</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think + the real existence of sensible things consists in their being + actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind + distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall + tell you, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">to be perceived</span></em> is one thing, and + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">to + exist</span></em> is another.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for + the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder + cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he + sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his + senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and + he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he + perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">is</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">exists;</span></em> + but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no + being.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists + in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without + being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed + between us.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it + is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men<a id= + "noteref_871" name="noteref_871" href="#note_871"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">871</span></span></a>. Ask + the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: + what answer think you he would make?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page452">[pg 452]</span><a name="Pg452" id="Pg452" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of + his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to + say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and + comprehended by (that is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">exists in</span></em>) the infinite mind of + God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and + immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a + tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. + But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between the + Materialists and me is not, whether things have a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> + existence out of the mind of this or that person<a id="noteref_872" + name="noteref_872" href="#note_872"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">872</span></span></a>, but, + whether they have an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute</span></em> existence, distinct from + being perceived by God, and exterior to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all</span></em> + minds<a id="noteref_873" name="noteref_873" href= + "#note_873"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">873</span></span></a>. This + indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever + entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures + will be of another opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, according to your notions, what difference is there between + real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions + of a dream—since they are all equally in the mind<a id= + "noteref_874" name="noteref_874" href="#note_874"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">874</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they + have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas + perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; + and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have + not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger + of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of + confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, + irregular, and confused. And, though they should happen to be never + so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of + apiece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, + they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by + whatever method you distinguish <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">chimeras</span></em> on your scheme, the same, + it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I + presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving + you of any one thing that you perceive.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page453">[pg 453]</span><a name="Pg453" id="Pg453" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the world but spirits and ideas. And + this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + own the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, not being commonly used for + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></em>, sounds something out of the + way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to + the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now + commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of + the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in + words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its + sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that + there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that + every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of + its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created + mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom 'we live, + and move, and have our being.' Is this as strange as to say, the + sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be + sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their real + natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all + our senses?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such + things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the + immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be + anything more extravagant than this?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a thing which is + inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause + of our perceptions, [<a id="noteref_875" name="noteref_875" href= + "#note_875"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">875</span></span></a>without + any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Nothing + can give to another that which it hath not itself</span></em>]. + Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so + extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred + places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author + of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont + to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking + principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that + it were needless to confirm it by citations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page454">[pg 454]</span><a name="Pg454" id="Pg454" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the immediate Author of all the motions + in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, + and the like heinous sins.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt + is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an + instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the + mediation of an instrument, or occasion, called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, + you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the + immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to + Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not + consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the + internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and + religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, + or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; + though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of + murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical + action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is + not making Him the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that + God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is + true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but + this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, + in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately + indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of + their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the + guilt of their actions<a id="noteref_876" name="noteref_876" href= + "#note_876"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">876</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is + the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to + the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined + by most voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without + gathering the votes.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the + judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices + of a learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his + senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and + entertains <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page455">[pg + 455]</span><a name="Pg455" id="Pg455" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + no doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all + your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I + shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent + person. That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside + spirit is to me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived + are ideas, is on all hands agreed<a id="noteref_877" name= + "noteref_877" href="#note_877"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">877</span></span></a>. And + that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one + can deny. It is therefore evident there can be no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of those qualities but + spirit; <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in</span></em> which they exist, not by way of + mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives + it<a id="noteref_878" name="noteref_878" href= + "#note_878"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">878</span></span></a>. I + deny therefore that there is any unthinking <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> of the objects of + sense, and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in that acceptation</span></em> that there is + any material substance. But if by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em> is meant only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sensible + body</span></em>—that which is seen and felt (and the + unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more)—then I + am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other + philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the + generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse: it is a + misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as + it is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in + truth their aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do + therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that + there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I + perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of + mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all + concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and philosophical + quiddities, which some men are so fond of.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the + reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in + thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; + or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one + end in the water, crooked?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, + but in the inferences he makes from <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page456">[pg 456]</span><a name="Pg456" id="Pg456" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of + the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly + crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude + that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the + same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked + things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if + he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in + case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be + affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies + not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a + manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) + but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he + apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, + concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he + imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the + same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive + any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, + that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we + are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its + motion<a id="noteref_879" name="noteref_879" href= + "#note_879"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">879</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough. + But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, + Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, + as you are now that it does not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was + founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after + inquiry, upon evidence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. + We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected + with ideas <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">from without</span></em> is evident; and it is + no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) + Powers without the mind<a id="noteref_880" name="noteref_880" href= + "#note_880"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">880</span></span></a>, + corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist + by themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be + admitted; which I call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, and you call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em>. + This is all the difference.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page457">[pg 457]</span><a name="Pg457" id="Pg457" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, + extended?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea + of extension,</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is therefore itself unextended?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + grant it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not also active?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Now let me ask you two questions: <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">First</span></em>, + Whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or + others to give the name <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> to an unextended active + being? And, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Secondly</span></em>, Whether it be not + ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of + language?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, + but some <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Third Nature</span></em> distinct from Matter + and Spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit? + Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as + active and unextended?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of + meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct + from volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but + in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am + obliged to mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a + thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, + if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. To make you + comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible. I assert + as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must + allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So + far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this + powerful Being<a id="noteref_881" name="noteref_881" href= + "#note_881"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">881</span></span></a>. I + will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may + add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be + Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are + actions; and, because <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page458">[pg + 458]</span><a name="Pg458" id="Pg458" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be + a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>. Again, the things I perceive + must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my</span></em> + mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist + otherwise than in an understanding; there is therefore an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understanding</span></em>. But will and + understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. + The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety + of speech a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, + little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a + contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection + in God?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Without a doubt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> To + suffer pain is an imperfection?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some + other Being?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + We are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that + Spirit God?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + grant it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without + are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and + uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that + is to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, + you acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain + contradiction<a id="noteref_882" name="noteref_882" href= + "#note_882"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">882</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among + other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, + and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no + question. But, that God, though He knows and sometimes causes + painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively + deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to + impressions of sense, the effects of an external Agent, which, + being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. + But God, whom no external <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page459">[pg + 459]</span><a name="Pg459" id="Pg459" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose + will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to + be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being as + this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful + sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a + body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal + motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every + alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which + sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of + such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being + perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with + corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order + of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately + perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such + sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with + the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything + knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or + feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, + agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but + His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not + distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you + fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of + Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of + bodies<a id="noteref_883" name="noteref_883" href= + "#note_883"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">883</span></span></a>. And + what can withstand demonstration?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Let me see how you demonstrate that point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of + motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the + velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where + the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly as + the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience that + all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising from the + resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion + therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, + which <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page460">[pg 460]</span><a name= + "Pg460" id="Pg460" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is the cause or + principle of that motion, is proportional to the quantity of + Matter; which was to be demonstrated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of + motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> + taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from + whence the existence of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> is inferred. Pray is not + this arguing in a circle?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> In + the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the + velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that + gravity is proportional to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, in your philosophic sense + of the word; except you take it for granted that unknown <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>, or whatever else you + call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to + suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude + and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; + as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I + will not dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by + us, or the powers producing them, do exist in a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substratum</span></em>; this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, + but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you + shall persuade me the natural philosophers have been dreaming all + this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and + explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of + Matter<a id="noteref_884" name="noteref_884" href= + "#note_884"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">884</span></span></a>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What mean you, Hylas, by the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomena</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + have told you so a hundred times.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew how we come to be + affected with ideas, in that manner and<a id="noteref_885" name= + "noteref_885" href="#note_885"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">885</span></span></a> order + wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page461">[pg + 461]</span><a name="Pg461" id="Pg461" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the + production of any one idea in our minds by the help of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em><a id="noteref_886" name= + "noteref_886" href="#note_886"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">886</span></span></a>, I + shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said + against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the + explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and + will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that + a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be + able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, + this I can never understand. This I say, though we had some + positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and + could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining + things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. + And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have + been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the + connexion of ideas<a id="noteref_887" name="noteref_887" href= + "#note_887"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">887</span></span></a>, they + discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part of + knowledge both useful and entertaining.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you + imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being + of Matter, if there was no such thing?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion, + or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I + believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, + it must be either because He has discovered it to us by + supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural + faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is + impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the + revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of + Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">taken for something + distinct from what we perceive by our senses</span></em>, is + thought to exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by any except a few + philosophers, who do not know what <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page462">[pg 462]</span><a name="Pg462" id="Pg462" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> they would be at? Your question supposes + these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall + think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, + let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived + mankind at all.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New + notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's + minds, and nobody knows where they will end.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, + or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle + the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, + I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are + dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is + there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? + The making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation + in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men + would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it + is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That + the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not + believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of + things, and can never be assured even of their existence: that real + colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and + motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: + that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any + particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, + and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a + body contains innumerable extended parts:—these are the novelties, + these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted + judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the + mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these + and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It + is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some + <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ambages</span></span>, and ways of speech not + common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that + which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount + to no more than this:—that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain + contradiction, to suppose <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page463">[pg + 463]</span><a name="Pg463" id="Pg463" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a + Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be + so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> As + for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out + of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. + Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things + into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">scepticism</span></em>. This is so plain, + there is no denying it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather + ideas into things<a id="noteref_888" name="noteref_888" href= + "#note_888"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">888</span></span></a>; + since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to + you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things + themselves<a id="noteref_889" name="noteref_889" href= + "#note_889"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">889</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you + leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only + which strikes the senses.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the + very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise + than upon your supposition—that Matter<a id="noteref_890" name= + "noteref_890" href="#note_890"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">890</span></span></a> is an + essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree + in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we + differ—you will have them to be empty appearances, I real beings. + In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that + in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the + true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence + comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other + sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why should we + use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, + if it were discoverable to the naked eye?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we + feel<a id="noteref_891" name="noteref_891" href= + "#note_891"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">891</span></span></a>; + neither is the same object perceived <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page464">[pg 464]</span><a name="Pg464" id="Pg464" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> by the microscope which was by the naked + eye<a id="noteref_892" name="noteref_892" href= + "#note_892"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">892</span></span></a>. But, + in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new + kind or individual, the endless number or confusion of names would + render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as + other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men + combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by + the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, + but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either + with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to + one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I + examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in + order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by + sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other + senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may + perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes; + the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the + former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are + connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of + ideas<a id="noteref_893" name="noteref_893" href= + "#note_893"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">893</span></span></a>, the + more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, + if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all + circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not + thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are + inconsistent either with themselves or anything else: except it be + with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, + unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which + prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly + understanding the common language of men, speaking of several + distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, + there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the + philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to + build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were + framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the + common actions of life, without any regard to speculation<a id= + "noteref_894" name="noteref_894" href="#note_894"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">894</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page465">[pg 465]</span><a name="Pg465" id="Pg465" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl</span></span>. + Methinks I apprehend your meaning.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real + things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is + no farther real than as our ideas are the true <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">representations</span></em> of those + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">originals</span></em>. But, as these supposed + originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how + far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at + all<a id="noteref_895" name="noteref_895" href= + "#note_895"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">895</span></span></a>. We + cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge<a id= + "noteref_896" name="noteref_896" href="#note_896"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">896</span></span></a>. + Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in + the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be + true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is + impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this + plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty<a id="noteref_897" name= + "noteref_897" href="#note_897"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">897</span></span></a>. + Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, + or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of + a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any + real thing in nature<a id="noteref_898" name="noteref_898" href= + "#note_898"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">898</span></span></a>. The + result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless + and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you, First, + Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing + unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of + all this scepticism<a id="noteref_899" name="noteref_899" href= + "#note_899"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">899</span></span></a>? + Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason<a id= + "noteref_900" name="noteref_900" href="#note_900"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">900</span></span></a>, of + the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page466">[pg 466]</span><a name="Pg466" id="Pg466" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> you are not, whether it be not absurd + to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is + anything distinctly conceived or meant by the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute or + external existence of unperceiving substances</span></em><a id= + "noteref_901" name="noteref_901" href="#note_901"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">901</span></span></a>? + Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way + to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious + thought about unknown natures or substances<a id="noteref_902" + name="noteref_902" href="#note_902"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">902</span></span></a>, + admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by + the senses?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I + would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are + not the objects perceived by the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">senses</span></em> + of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a + hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and + flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner + affected with the ideas I frame in my <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imagination</span></em>. Does not this make a + difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the + objects of sense and those of imagination<a id="noteref_903" name= + "noteref_903" href="#note_903"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">903</span></span></a>. But + what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible + objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into + another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only + the ideas existing in our minds?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + It is.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> idea which is in my mind + cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore + follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same + thing<a id="noteref_904" name="noteref_904" href= + "#note_904"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">904</span></span></a>? And + is not this highly absurd?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + If the term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> be taken in the vulgar + acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the + principles <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page467">[pg + 467]</span><a name="Pg467" id="Pg467" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> I + maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or + the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of + arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> where no distinction or + variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their + perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">several saw the + same thing</span></em>, so they may, upon like occasions, still + continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from + propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> be used in the acceptation of + philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, + then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it + is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it + may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same + thing<a id="noteref_905" name="noteref_905" href= + "#note_905"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">905</span></span></a>. But + whether philosophers shall think fit to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">call</span></em> a + thing the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> or no, is, I conceive, of + small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued + with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by + their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they + would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though + perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the + uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">same</span></em> + thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who + perceived, might choose the denomination of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">different</span></em> things. But who sees not + that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is + perceived by different persons may yet have the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">same</span></em> + applied to it<a id="noteref_906" name="noteref_906" href= + "#note_906"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">906</span></span></a>? Or, + suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, + the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their + place; and that you should call this the <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page468">[pg 468]</span><a name="Pg468" id="Pg468" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em>, and I should say it was not + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> house:—would we not, for all + this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in + itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you + should say, We differed in our notions; for that you superadded to + your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, + whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracted idea of identity</span></em>; and + should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you + understood yourself.——Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet + satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any + real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from + names? Take this farther reflexion with you—that whether Matter be + allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the + point in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we + immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your + difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes + equally against the Materialists and me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + [<a id="noteref_907" name="noteref_907" href= + "#note_907"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">907</span></span></a>Ay, + Philonous,] But they suppose an external archetype, to which + referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive + the same thing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may + you suppose an external archetype on my principles;—<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">external, I mean, + to your own mind</span></em>: though indeed it must be supposed to + exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this + serves all the ends of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">identity,</span></em> as well as if it existed + out of a mind<a id="noteref_908" name="noteref_908" href= + "#note_908"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">908</span></span></a>. And + I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that there is no + difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes + equally against both opinions.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page469">[pg 469]</span><a name="Pg469" id="Pg469" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can + be a proof against neither.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + acknowledge it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But, after all, + Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you advance + against <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Scepticism</span></em>, it amounts to no more + than this:—We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, + that we are affected with sensible impressions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And how are <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">we</span></em> concerned any farther? I see + this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nothing</span></em> + cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em>. + Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, + and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from + sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible + impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are + united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, + because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the + palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is + affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, + &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry + certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its + reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those + sensations. But if by the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cherry</span></em> + you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible + qualities, and by its <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em> something distinct from + its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor + any one else, can be sure it exists.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same + reasons against the existence of sensible things <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in a + mind</span></em> which you have offered against their existing + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in a + material substratum</span></em>?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to + them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> Is + the mind extended or unextended?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Unextended, without doubt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> Do + you say the things you perceive are in your mind?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + They are.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible + impressions?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page470">[pg + 470]</span><a name="Pg470" id="Pg470" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + believe you may.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be + room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can + extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are + we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You + cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or + that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. + In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? + Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer all + those queries you formerly put to me about my <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, + or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross + literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a + seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the + mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from + without, or by some being distinct from itself<a id="noteref_909" + name="noteref_909" href="#note_909"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">909</span></span></a>. This + is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make + your tenet of an unperceiving material <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em> intelligible, I would + fain know.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of + it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is + the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, + than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the + understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is there anything + in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; + most part of the mental operations being signified by words + borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">comprehend</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reflect</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">discourse</span></em>, &c., which, being + applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original + sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still + remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get + over. And, indeed, it is of such importance <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page471">[pg 471]</span><a name="Pg471" id="Pg471" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> that if you could solve all others, + without being able to find a solution for this, you must never + expect to make me a proselyte to your principles.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Let me know this mighty difficulty.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly + irreconcilable with your notions<a id="noteref_910" name= + "noteref_910" href="#note_910"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">910</span></span></a>. + Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No, + certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal + substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall + perhaps agree with you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and + animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning + created by God, I make no question. If by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + you mean fictions and fancies of the mind<a id="noteref_911" name= + "noteref_911" href="#note_911"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">911</span></span></a>, then + these are no ideas. If by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> you mean immediate objects + of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist + unperceived, or out of a mind<a id="noteref_912" name="noteref_912" + href="#note_912"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">912</span></span></a>, then + these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, it matters little. The + difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained + or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues + the same. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, but <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em>. + Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any + absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for + a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of + things, of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> things. Neither is this in + the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what + I have now said; and would have been evident to you without this, + if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. But as + for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to shew where Moses + makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by him, + or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to + shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for + things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic<a id= + "noteref_913" name="noteref_913" href="#note_913"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">913</span></span></a> + acceptation, for Matter, or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">an unknown</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page472">[pg 472]</span><a name="Pg472" id="Pg472" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">quiddity, + with an absolute existence</span></em>. When you have proved these + points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of + Moses into our dispute.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> It + is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer + it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some + peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and + your notions?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of + Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any + other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is + no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, + besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of + these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the + mind.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should + have seen things produced into being—that is become perceptible—in + the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before + believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no + alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to + begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to + God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, + which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but + when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of + God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative + existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore + the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several + parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, + endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, + they were in truth perceived by them<a id="noteref_914" name= + "noteref_914" href="#note_914"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">914</span></span></a>. This + is the literal obvious sense <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page473">[pg 473]</span><a name="Pg473" id="Pg473" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> suggested to me by the words of the Holy + Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>, instrument, occasion, + or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be + found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never + think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you + may understand it in, you only can tell.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created + things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently + hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition there were + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">men</span></em> to perceive them; without + which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein + creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, + plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should + precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the + Mosaic account?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to + exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You + will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses + and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of + finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case + we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of + plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, + in a desert where nobody was present—that this way of explaining or + conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive + you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly + suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; + that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and + consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is + possible that important article of our faith should have in making + men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [<a id="noteref_915" + name="noteref_915" href="#note_915"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">915</span></span></a>great] + Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, + divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you + call the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">actuality of absolute existence</span></em>. + You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our + dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your + own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and + unintelligible jargon.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page474">[pg + 474]</span><a name="Pg474" id="Pg474" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you + to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist + in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the + mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, + according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created + in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from + eternity?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + am.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + This I acknowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be, + in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + What shall we make then of the creation?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite + spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to + begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should + become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and + manner which He then established, and we now call the laws of + nature? You may call this a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relative</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">hypothetical + existence</span></em> if you please. But, so long as it supplies us + with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic + history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious + ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no + other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is + it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making + everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it + is for the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible + and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute + existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds + of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the + immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and + immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not rather + seem to derogate from those attributes?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things + perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page475">[pg 475]</span><a name="Pg475" id="Pg475" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> plain, God did either execute that + decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will + what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? + If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of + existence, in finite things<a id="noteref_916" name="noteref_916" + href="#note_916"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">916</span></span></a>. If + the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the + Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues + imperfection.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection + concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against + every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? + None of which can <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">we</span></em> conceive, otherwise than as + performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of + transcendent and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is + incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be + expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, + should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and + ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me, + your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our + conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any + scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one + word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are + such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are + peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot + by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar + repugnancy between the creation and your opinion; though indeed + where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of + things—the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and + eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from + everlasting in the mind of God<a id="noteref_917" name= + "noteref_917" href="#note_917"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">917</span></span></a>. Is + not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any + more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you + suspect some peculiar <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page476">[pg + 476]</span><a name="Pg476" id="Pg476" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away all + possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point. + Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any hypothesis + whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint + against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to + conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby + nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed + the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, + therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or + mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses; + whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still + with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by + other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if + it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and + so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain + that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown + and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, + I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of + Matter<a id="noteref_918" name="noteref_918" href= + "#note_918"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">918</span></span></a> doth + not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it + inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of + the creation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed + of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but + you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you + expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, + to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there + is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and + the inspired writings?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + And so I am.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain + obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the + way?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> In + the plain sense, doubtless.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been + created by God; think you not the sensible <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page477">[pg 477]</span><a name="Pg477" id="Pg477" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> things commonly signified by those words are + suggested to every unphilosophical reader?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + cannot help thinking so.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a + real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + This I have already acknowledged.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of + things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain + unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation + might terminate?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + True.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the + plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly + inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; + something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + cannot contradict you.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown + quiddities, of occasions, or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>? No, certainly; but of + things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with + your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + see you can assault me with my own weapons.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Then as to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute existence</span></em>; was there ever + known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted + and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not + conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing Matter + to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be as clear as + light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible? + Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages + with the most plausible arguments against a creation? That a + corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the + minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere + will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to + all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most + celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian + philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity<a id= + "noteref_919" name="noteref_919" href="#note_919"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">919</span></span></a>. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page478">[pg 478]</span><a name= + "Pg478" id="Pg478" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Lay these things + together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to + believe the creation of things.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">creation</span></em> is the last objection I + can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently + answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome + but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself + towards your notions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the + question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of + prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And + indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have + very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a + learned education.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + confess it seems to be as you say.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw + into the scale the great advantages<a id="noteref_920" name= + "noteref_920" href="#note_920"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">920</span></span></a> that + arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion + and human learning. The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the + soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved with + the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a + God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof we + have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of the + word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, + omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the + existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the + fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no + more reason to doubt than of our own being.—Then, with relation to + human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what + obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men + into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, + continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.—do they not + pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, + according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to + comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page479">[pg 479]</span><a name="Pg479" id="Pg479" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> admitting there was no difficulty in + reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in + conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another; + yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, + have they been able to reach the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mechanical</span></em> production of any one + animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, + for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course + of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the + aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of + the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, and + admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all + the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomena</span></em> are nothing else but + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>; God is a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, + but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they + demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and + omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and + usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is + infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all + contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Physics</span></em>. Not to mention that the + apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a + negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more + cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and + acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or + unthinking second causes.—Then in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Metaphysics</span></em>: what difficulties + concerning entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic + principles, plastic natures,<a id="noteref_921" name="noteref_921" + href="#note_921"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">921</span></span></a> + substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of + Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent + substances so widely different as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, should mutually operate on + each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, + concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we + escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?—Even the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mathematics</span></em> themselves, if we take + away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more + clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate + speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite + divisibility of finite <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page480">[pg + 480]</span><a name="Pg480" id="Pg480" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + extension; which depends on that supposition.—But what need is + there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition + to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern + Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much + as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in + behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth + not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute + existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the + change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the + broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these + and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of + absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in + ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;—however, not changed at + random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein + consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the + concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> + from the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">irregular visions</span></em> of the + fancy<a id="noteref_922" name="noteref_922" href= + "#note_922"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">922</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can + incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see + it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a + mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what + labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean + of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Immaterialism</span></em>!</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may + remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon + examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote + from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is that which denies + Matter, or the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute</span></em> existence of corporeal + things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several + ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and + all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence + of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a + true opinion and yet be false?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page481">[pg 481]</span><a name="Pg481" id="Pg481" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, + what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full + assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or + difficulty will occur hereafter?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently + proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or + difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend + the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of + contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to + make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will you + disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some + particular things which <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">you</span></em> know not how to reconcile with + it? If there are difficulties attending <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Immaterialism</span></em>, there are at the + same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of + Matter<a id="noteref_923" name="noteref_923" href= + "#note_923"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">923</span></span></a> there + is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable + objections lie against it. But where are those mighty difficulties + you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something + which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient + pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield + it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly + and solidly soever demonstrated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + You have satisfied me, Philonous.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: + That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be + proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, + try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Materialists</span></em>. Be not deceived by + words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive + it easier by the help of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Materialism</span></em>, it is plain it can be + no objection against <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Immaterialism</span></em>. Had you proceeded + all along by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself + abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I + challenge you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which + is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and + consequently makes rather <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">against</span></em> than <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">for</span></em> it. + You should consider, in each <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page482">[pg 482]</span><a name="Pg482" id="Pg482" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> particular, whether the difficulty arises + from the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">non-existence of Matter</span></em>. If it + doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of + extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty + against <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Immaterialism</span></em>. And yet, upon + recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if + not always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on + a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">petitio + principii</span></span>. One is apt to say—The unknown substances + ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in our + minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may + concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? + But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such + external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the + question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on + yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ignoratio clenchi</span></span>. You talked + often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible + Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of + their existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have + said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or + any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a + real being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for + is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">somewhat</span></em>), which is quite stripped + of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, + nor apprehended by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any + object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or + square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though + indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; + or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these + points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. + Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; + without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and, + instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they + have been) against your own notions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from + agreeing with you more than this same <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mistaking the + question</span></em>. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am + tempted to imagine you deny the things <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page483">[pg 483]</span><a name="Pg483" id="Pg483" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find + there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining + the name <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, and applying it to + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sensible + things</span></em>? This may be done without any change in your + sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling + them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in + words than in opinion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + With all my heart: retain the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter,</span></em> + and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you + do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being + perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em>, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, + as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence + distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by + common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects + of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all + particular things, with the terms <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensible</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">body</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">stuff</span></em>, and the like, are retained, + the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> should be never missed in + common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way + to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing + that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the + mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused + term.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> + Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an + unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to + deny me the privilege of using the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> + as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities + subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other + substance, in a strict sense, than <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em>. + But I have been so long accustomed to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">term + Matter</span></em> that I know not how to part with it: to say, + there is no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> in the world, is still + shocking to me. Whereas to say—There is no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>, + if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without + the mind; but if by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> is meant some sensible + thing, whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em>:—this distinction gives it + quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small + difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, + the controversy about <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Matter</span></em> in the strict acceptation + of it, lies altogether <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page484">[pg + 484]</span><a name="Pg484" id="Pg484" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, + are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of + mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either + desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some + part of our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, + joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or + with unknown entities, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracted from all relation to + us</span></em>? It is evident, things regard us only as they are + pleasing or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so + far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not + concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet + still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do + not now think with the philosophers; nor yet altogether with the + vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that respect; + precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former + notions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> I + do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend + only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was + before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:—the former + being of opinion, that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">those things they immediately perceive are the + real things</span></em>; and the latter, that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the things + immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only in the + mind</span></em><a id="noteref_924" name="noteref_924" href= + "#note_924"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">924</span></span></a>. + Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the + substance of what I advance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Hyl.</span></span> I + have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw things + by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are + removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am + clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am + no longer in pain about their <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unknown natures</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolute + existence</span></em>. This is the state I find myself in at + present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page485">[pg 485]</span><a name= + "Pg485" id="Pg485" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> yet thoroughly + comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that Academics, + Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it + looked as if you were advancing their philosophical Scepticism: + but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to + theirs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Phil.</span></span> + You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced + upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it + breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its + ascent, as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or + principle of gravitation. Just so, the same Principles which, at + first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring + men back to Common Sense.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page487">[pg 487]</span><a name= + "Pg487" id="Pg487" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc49" id="toc49"></a> <a name="pdf50" id="pdf50"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">De Motu: Sive; De Motus Principio Et + Natura, Et De Causa Communicationis Motuum</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">First published in + 1721</span></span></p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page489">[pg + 489]</span><a name="Pg489" id="Pg489" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc51" id="toc51"></a> <a name="pdf52" id="pdf52"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Editor's Preface To De + Motu</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This Latin + dissertation on Motion, or change of place in the component atoms + of the material world, was written in 1720, when Berkeley was + returning to Ireland, after he had spent some years in Italy, on + leave of absence from Trinity College. A prize for an essay on the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Cause of Motion,”</span> had, it seems, + been offered in that year by the Paris Academy of Sciences. The + subject suggested an advance on the line of thought pursued in + Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>. The mind-dependent + reality of the material world, prominent in those works, was in + them insisted on, not as a speculative paradox, but mainly in order + to shew the spiritual character of the Power that is continually at + work throughout the universe. This essay on what was thus a + congenial subject was finished at Lyons, and published early in + 1721, soon after Berkeley arrived in London. It was reprinted in + his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Miscellany</span></span> in 1752. I have not + found evidence that it was ever submitted to the French Academy. At + any rate the prize was awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician + and professor of philosophy at Lausanne.</p><span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page490">[pg 490]</span><a name="Pg490" id="Pg490" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span> + is interesting biographically as well as philosophically, as a + revelation of Berkeley's way of thinking about the causal relations + of Matter and Spirit seven years after the publication of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>. In 1713 his + experience of life was confined to Ireland. Now, after months in + London, in the society of Swift, and Pope, and Addison, he had + observed nature and men in France and Italy. His eager temperament + and extraordinary social charm opened the way in those years of + travel to frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the time, + superseded controversy with materialism and scepticism, and + diverted his enthusiasm to nature and high art. One likes to see + how he handles the old questions as they now arise in the + philosophical treatment of motion in space, which was regarded by + many as the key to all other phenomena presented in the material + world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For one thing, + the unreality of the data of sense after total abstraction of + living mind, the chief Principle in the earlier works, lies more in + the background in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span>. Yet it is tacitly + assumed, as the basis of an argument for the powerlessness of all + sensible things, and for refunding all active power in the universe + into conscious agency. <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Mens agitat + molem</span></span> might be taken as a motto for the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>. Then there is more frequent reference to + scientific and philosophical authorities than in his more juvenile + treatises. Plato and Aristotle are oftener in view. Italy seems to + have introduced him to the physical science of Borelli and + Torricelli. Leibniz, who died in 1716, when Berkeley was in Italy, + is named by him for the first time in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>. Perhaps he had learned something when he was + abroad about the most illustrious philosopher of the time. And it + is interesting by the way to find in one of those years what is, I + think, the only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It is contained in + one of the German philosopher's letters to Des Bosses, in 1715. + <span class="tei tei-q">“Qui in Hybernia corporum <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page491">[pg 491]</span><a name="Pg491" id="Pg491" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> realitatem impugnat,”</span> Leibniz + writes, <span class="tei tei-q">“videtur nec rationes afferre + idoneas, nee mentem suam satis explicare. Suspicor esse ex eo + hominum genere qui per Paradoxa cognosci volunt.”</span> This + sentence is interesting on account of the writer, although it + suggests vague, and perhaps second-hand knowledge of the Irishman + and his principles. The name of Hobbes does not appear in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>. Yet one might have expected it, in + consideration of the supreme place which motion takes in his + system, which rests upon the principle that all changes in the + universe may be resolved into change of place.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span> the favourite language of ideal realism is + abandoned for the most part. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Bodies,”</span> not <span class="tei tei-q">“ideas of + sense,”</span> are contrasted with mind or spirit, although body + still means significant appearance presented to the senses. Indeed + the term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> occurs less often in this and + the subsequent writings of Berkeley.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I will now give + some account of salient features in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Like the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> the tract opens with + a protest against the empty abstractions, and consequent frivolous + discussions, which even mechanical science had countenanced + although dealing with matters so obvious to sense as the phenomena + of motion. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Force</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">effort</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">solicitation of gravity</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nisus</span></em>, are examples of abstract + terms connected with motion, to which nothing in what is presented + to the senses is found to correspond. Yet corporeal power is spoken + of as if it were something perceptible by sense, and so found + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">within</span></em> the bodies we see and touch + (sect. 1-3).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But it turns out + differently when philosophers and naturalists try to imagine the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">physical + force</span></em> that is supposed to inhabit bodies, and to + explain their motions. The conception of motion has been the parent + of innumerable paradoxes and seeming contradictions among ancient + Greek thinkers; for it presents, in a striking form, the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page492">[pg 492]</span><a name= + "Pg492" id="Pg492" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> metaphysical + difficulties in the way of a reconciliation of the One and the + Many—difficulties which Berkeley had already attributed to perverse + abstractions, with which philosophers amused themselves and blocked + up the way to concrete knowledge; first wantonly raising a dust, + and then complaining that they could not see. Nor has modern + mechanical science in this respect fared better than the old + philosophies. Even its leaders, Torricelli, for instance, and + Leibniz, offer us scholastic shadows—empty metaphysical + abstractions—when they speak about an active power that is supposed + to be lodged within the things of sense. Torricelli tells us that + the forces within the things around us, and within our own bodies, + are <span class="tei tei-q">“subtle quintessences, enclosed in a + corporeal substance as in the enchanted vase of Circe”</span>; and + Leibniz speaks of their active powers as their <span class= + "tei tei-q">“substantial form,”</span> whatever that can be + conceived to mean. Others call the power to which change of place + is due, the hylarchic principle, an appetite in bodies, a + spontaneity inherent in them; or they assume that, besides their + extension, solidity, and other qualities which appear in sense, + there is also something named force, latent in them if not + patent—in all which we have a flood of words, empty of concrete + thought. At best the language is metaphorical (sect. 2-9).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For showing the + active cause at work in the production of motion in bodies, it is + of no avail to name, as if it were a datum of sense, what is not + presentable to our senses. Let us, instead, turn to the only other + sort of data in realised experience. For we find only two sorts of + realities in experience, the one sort revealed by our senses, the + other by inward consciousness. We can affirm nothing about the + contents of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bodies</span></em> except what our senses + present, namely, concrete things, extended, figured, solid, having + also innumerable other qualities, which seem all to depend upon + change of place in the things, or in their constituent particles. + The contents <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page493">[pg + 493]</span><a name="Pg493" id="Pg493" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mind</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, + on the other hand, are disclosed to inner consciousness, which + reveals a sentient Ego that is actively percipient and exertive. + And it must be in the second of these two concrete revelations of + reality, that active causation, on which motion and all other + change depends, is to be found—not in empty abstractions, covered + by words like <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">power</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">force</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nisus</span></em>, + which correspond to nothing perceived by the senses (sect. 21).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">So that which we + call body presents <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">within itself</span></em> nothing in which + change of place or state can originate causally. Extension, figure, + solidity, and all the other perceptible constituents of bodies are + appearances only—passive phenomena, which succeed one another in an + orderly cosmical procession, on which doubtless our pains and + pleasures largely depend. But there is no sensibly perceptible + power found among those sensuous appearances. They can only be + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">caused + causes</span></em>, adapted, as we presuppose, to signify to us + what we may expect to follow that appearance. The reason of their + significance, i.e. of the constancy of their sequences and + coexistences, must be sought for <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">outside of + themselves</span></em>. Experimental research may discover new + terms among the correlated cosmical sequences or coexistences, but + the newly discovered terms must still be only passive phenomena + previously unperceived. Body means only what is presentable to the + senses. Those who attribute to it something not perceptible by + sense, which they call the force or power in which its motions + originate, say in other words that the origin of motion is + unknowable by sense (sect. 22-24).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Turn now from + things of sense, the data of perception, to Mind or Spirit, as + revealed in inner consciousness. Here we have a deeper and more + real revelation of what underlies, or is presupposed in, the + passive cosmical procession that is presented to the senses. Our + inward consciousness plainly shews the thinking being actually + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page494">[pg 494]</span><a name= + "Pg494" id="Pg494" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">exercising</span></em> power to move its + animated body. We find that we can, by a causal exertion of which + we are distinctly conscious, either excite or arrest movements in + bodies. In voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example of + force or power, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">producing</span></em> and not merely + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">followed + by</span></em> motion. In the case of human volition this is no + doubt conditioned power; nevertheless it exemplifies Power on a + greater scale than human, even Divine power, universally and + continuously operative, in all natural motions, and in the cosmical + laws according to which they proceed (sect. 25-30).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus those who + pretend to find force or active causation <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">within</span></em> + bodies, pretend to find what their sensuous experience does not + support, and they have to sustain their pretence by unintelligible + language. On the other hand, those who explain motion by referring + it to conscious exertion of personal agents, say what is supported + by their own consciousness, and confirmed by high authorities, + including Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Newton, + demonstrating that in Spirit only do we find power to change its + own state, as well as the states and mutual relations of bodies. + Motion in nature is God continuously acting (sect. 31-34). But + physical science is conveniently confined to the order of the + passive procession of sensuous appearances, including experiments + in quest of the rules naturally exemplified in the motions of + bodies: reasoning on mathematical and mechanical principles, it + leaves the contemplation of active causation to a more exalted + science (sect. 35-42).</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In all this it + can hardly be said that Berkeley has in this adequately sounded the + depths of Causation. He proclaims inability to find through his + senses more than sequence of significant sensuous appearances, + which are each and all empty of active power; while he apparently + insists that he <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">has</span></em> found active power in the mere + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">feeling</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page495">[pg 495]</span><a name="Pg495" id="Pg495" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">of + exertion</span></em>; which after all, as such, is only one sort of + antecedent sign of the motion that is found to follow it. This is + still only sequence of phenomena; not active power. But is not + causation a relation that cannot be truly presented empirically, + either in outer or inner consciousness? And is not the Divine order + that is presupposed by us in all change, a presupposition that is + inevitable in trustworthy intercourse with a changing universe; + unless we are to confess <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">atheistically</span></em>, that our whole + sensuous experience may in the end put us to utter confusion? The + passive, uneasy feeling of strain, more or less involved in the + effort to move our bodies and their surroundings, is no doubt apt + to be confused with active causation; for as David Hume remarks, + <span class="tei tei-q">“the animal <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nisus</span></em> + which we experience, though it can afford no accurate precise idea + of power, enters very much into the vulgar, inaccurate idea which + is formed of it.”</span> So when Berkeley supposes that he has + found a concrete example of originating power in the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nisus</span></em> + of which we are conscious when we move our bodies, he is surely too + easily satisfied. The <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nisus</span></em> followed by motion is, + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, only a natural sequence, + a caused cause, which calls for an originating cause that is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolutely</span></em> responsible for the + movement. Is not the index to this absolutely responsible agency an + ethical one, which points to a free moral agent as alone + necessarily connected with, or responsible for, the changes which + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">he + can</span></em> control? Persons are causally responsible for their + own actions; and are accordingly pronounced good or evil on account + of acts of will that are not mere caused causes—passively dependent + terms in the endless succession of cosmical change. They must + originate in self, be absolutely self-referable, in a word + supernatural issues of the personality. Moral reason implies that + they are not determined <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ab + extra</span></span>, and so points to moral agents as our only + concrete examples of independent power; but this only so far as + those issues go for which they are morally <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page496">[pg 496]</span><a name="Pg496" id="Pg496" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> responsible. Is not faith in the Universal + Power necessarily faith-venture in the absolutely perfect and + trustworthy moral agency of God?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">While the + principle of Causation, in its application to change of place on + the part of bodies and their constituent atoms, is the leading + thought in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span>, this essay also + investigates articulately the nature of the phenomenon which we + call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motion</span></em> (sect. 43-66). It assumes + that motion is only an effect, seeing that no one who reflects can + doubt that what is presented to our senses in the case of motion is + altogether passive: there is nothing in the successive appearance + of the same body in different places that involves action on the + part of either of the moving or the moved body, or that can be more + than inert effect (sect. 49). And all concrete motion, it is + assumed, must be something that can be perceived by our senses. + Accordingly it must be a perceptible <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">relation between + bodies</span></em>, as far as it is bodily: it could make no + appearance at all if space contained only one solitary body: a + plurality of bodies is indispensable to its appearance. Absolute + motion of a solitary body, in otherwise absolutely empty space, is + an unmeaning abstraction, a collocation of empty words. This leads + into an inquiry about relative space as well as relative place, and + the intelligibility of absolute space, place, and motion (sect. + 52-64).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Local motion is + unintelligible unless we understand the meaning of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">space</span></em>. + Now some philosophers distinguish between absolute space, which + with them is ultimately the only real space, and that which is + conditioned by the senses, or relative. The former is said to be + boundless, pervading and embracing the material world, but not + itself presentable to our senses; the other is the space marked out + or differentiated by bodies contained in it, and it is in this way + exposed to our senses (sect. 52). What must remain after the + annihilation of all bodies in the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page497">[pg 497]</span><a name="Pg497" id="Pg497" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> universe is relativeless, undifferentiated, + absolute space, of which all attributes are denied, even its + so-called extension being neither divisible nor measurable; + necessarily imperceptible by sense, unimaginable, and + unintelligible, in every way unrealisable in experience; so that + the words employed about it denote <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nothing</span></em> + (sect. 53).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It follows that + we must not speak of the real space which a body occupies as part + of a space that is necessarily abstracted from all sentient + experience; nor of real motion as change within absolute space, + without any relation between bodies, either perceived or conceived. + All change of place in one body must be relative to other bodies, + among which the moving body is supposed to change its place—our own + bodies which we animate being of course recognised among the + number. Motion, it is argued, is unintelligible, as well as + imperceptible and unimaginable, without some relation between the + moving body and at least one other body: the truth of this is + tested when we try to suppose the annihilation of all other bodies, + our own included, and retain only a solitary globe: absolute motion + is found unthinkable. So that, on the whole, to see what motion + means we must rise above the mathematical postulates that are found + convenient in mechanical science; we must beware of empty + abstractions; we must treat motion as something that is real only + so far as it is presented to our senses, and remain modestly + satisfied with the perceived relations under which it then appears + (sect. 65-66).</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Finally, is + motion, thus explained, something that can be spoken of as an + entity communicable from one body to another body? May we think of + it as a datum of sense existing in the striking body, and then + passing from it into the struck body, the one losing exactly as + much as the other receives? (sect. 67). Deeper thought finds in + those questions only a revival of the previously <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page498">[pg 498]</span><a name="Pg498" id="Pg498" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> exploded postulate of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“force”</span> as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">something sensible</span></em>, yet distinct + from all the significant appearances sense presents. The language + used may perhaps be permitted in mathematical hypotheses, or + postulates of mechanical science, in which we do not intend to go + to the root of things. But the obvious fact is, that the moving + body shews less perceptible motion, and the moved body more. To + dispute whether the perceptible motion acquired is numerically the + same with that lost leads into frivolous verbal controversy about + Identity and Difference, the One and the Many, which it was + Berkeley's aim to expel from science, and so to simplify its + procedure and result. Whether we say that motion passes from the + striking body into the struck, or that it is generated anew within + the struck body and annihilated in the striking, we make virtually + the same statement. In each way of expression the facts remain, + that the one body presents perceptible increase of its motion and + the other diminution. Mind or Spirit is the active cause of all + that we then see. Yet in mechanical science—which explains things + only physically, by shewing the significant connexion of events + with their mechanical rules—terms which seem to imply the + conveyance of motion out of one body into another may be pardoned, + in consideration of the limits within which physical science is + confined, and its narrower point of view. In physics we confine + ourselves to the sensuous signs which arise in experience, and + their natural interpretation, in all which mathematical hypotheses + are found convenient; so that gravitation, for example, and other + natural rules of procedure, are spoken of as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">causes</span></em> + of the events which conform to them, no account being taken of the + Active Power that is ultimately responsible for the rules. For the + Active Power in which we live, move, and have our being, is not a + datum of sense; meditation brings it into light. But to pursue this + thought would carry us beyond the physical laws of Motion (sect. + 69-72).</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page499">[pg + 499]</span><a name="Pg499" id="Pg499" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span> + may be compared with what we found in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 25-28 and + 101-117. The total powerlessness of the significant appearances + presented to the senses, and the omnipotence of Mind in the economy + of external nature, is its chief philosophical lesson.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page501">[pg 501]</span><a name= + "Pg501" id="Pg501" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc53" id="toc53"></a> <a name="pdf54" id="pdf54"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">De Motu</span></h2> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">1. Ad veritatem + inveniendam præcipuum est cavisse ne voces males intellectæ<a id= + "noteref_925" name="noteref_925" href="#note_925"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">925</span></span></a> nobis + officiant: quod omnes fere monent philosophi, pauci observant. + Quanquam id quidem haud adeo difficile videtur, in rebus præsertim + physicis tractandis, ubi locum habent sensus, experientia, et + ratiocinium geometricum. Seposito igitur, quantum licet, omni + præjudicio, tam a loquendi consuetudine quam a philosphorum + auctoritate nato, ipsa rerum natura diligenter inspicienda. Neque + enim cujusquam auctoritatem usque adeo valere oportet, ut verba + ejus et voces in pretio sint, dummodo nihil clari et certi iis + subesse comperiatur.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">2. Motus + contemplatio mire torsit veterum philosophorum<a id="noteref_926" + name="noteref_926" href="#note_926"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">926</span></span></a> + mentes, unde natæ sunt variæ opiniones supra modem difficiles, ne + dicam absurdæ; quæ, quum jam fere in desuetudinem abierint, haud + merentur ut iis discutiendis nimio studio immoremur. Apud + recentiores autem et saniores hujus ævi philosophos<a id= + "noteref_927" name="noteref_927" href="#note_927"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">927</span></span></a>, ubi + de Motu agitur, vocabula haud pauca abstractæ nimium et obscuræ + significationis occurrunt, cujusmodi sunt <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">solicitatio + gravitatis</span></em>, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">conatus</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">vires + mortuæ</span></em>, &c., quæ scriptis, alioqui doctissimis, + tenebras offundunt, sententiisque non minus a vero, quam a sensu + hominum communi abhorrentibus, ortum præbent. <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page502">[pg 502]</span><a name="Pg502" id="Pg502" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Hæc vero necesse est ut, veritatis + gratia, non alios refellendi studio, accurate discutiantur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">3. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Solicitatio</span></em> et <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nisus</span></em>, + sive <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">conatus</span></em>, rebus solummodo animatis + revera competunt<a id="noteref_928" name="noteref_928" href= + "#note_928"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">928</span></span></a>. Cum + aliis rebus tribuuntur, sensu metaphorico accipiantur necesse est. + A metaphoris autem abstinendum philosopho. Porro, seclusa omni tarn + animæ affectione quam corporis motione, nihil clari ac distincti + iis vocibus significari, cuilibet constabit qui modo rem serio + perpenderit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">4. Quamdiu + corpora gravia a nobis sustinentur, sentimus in nobismet ipsis + nisum, fatigationem, et molestiam. Percipimus etiam in gravibus + cadentibus motum acceleratum versus centrum telluris; ope sensuum + præterea nihil. Ratione tamen colligitur causam esse aliquam vel + principium horum phænomenon; illud autem <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">gravitas</span></em> vulgo nuncupatur. Quoniam + vero causa descensus gravium cæca sit et incognita, gravitas ea + acceptione proprie dici nequit qualitas sensibilis; est igitur + qualitas occulta. Sed vix, et ne vix quidem, concipere licet quid + sit qualitas occulta, aut qua ratione qualitas ulla agere aut + operari quidquam possit. Melius itaque foret, si, missa qualitate + occulta, homines attenderent solummodo ad effectus sensibiles; + vocibusque abstractis (quantumvis illæ ad disserendum utiles sint) + in meditatione omissis, mens in particularibus et concretis, hoc + est in ipsis rebus, defigeretur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">5. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Vis</span></em><a id="noteref_929" name= + "noteref_929" href="#note_929"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">929</span></span></a> + similiter corporibus tribuitur: usurpatur autem vocabulum illud, + tanquam significaret qualitatem cognitam, distinctamque tarn a + motu, figura, omnique alia re sensibili, quam ab omni animalis + affectione: id vero nihil aliud esse quam qualitatem <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occultam</span></em>, rem acrius rimanti + constabit. Nisus animalis et motus corporeus vulgo spectantur + tanquam symptomata et mensuræ hujus qualitatis occultæ.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">6. Patet igitur + gravitatem aut vim frustra poni pro principio<a id="noteref_930" + name="noteref_930" href="#note_930"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">930</span></span></a> + motus: nunquid enim principium illud clarius <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page503">[pg 503]</span><a name="Pg503" id="Pg503" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> cognosci potest ex eo quod dicatur + qualitas occulta? Quod ipsum occultum est, nihil explicat: ut + omittamus causam agentem incognitam rectius dici posse substantiam + quam qualitatem. Porro <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vis</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">gravitas</span></em>, et istiusmodi voces, + sæpius, nec inepte, in concreto usurpantur; ita ut connotent corpus + motum, difficultatem resistendi, &c. Ubi vero a philosophis + adhibentur ad significandas naturas quasdam, ab hisce omnibus + præcisas et abstractas, quæ nec sensibus subjiciuntur, nec ulla + mentis vi intelligi nec imaginatione effingi<a id="noteref_931" + name="noteref_931" href="#note_931"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">931</span></span></a> + possunt, turn demum errores et confusionem pariunt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">7. Multos autem + in errorem ducit, quod voces generales et abstractas in disserendo + utiles esse videant, nec tamen earum vim satis capiant. Partim vero + a consuetudine vulgari inventæ sunt illæ ad sermonem abbreviandum, + partim a philosophis ad docendum excogitatæ; non quod ad naturas + rerum accommodatas sint, quæ quidem singulares et concretæ + existunt; sed quod idoneæ ad tradendas disciplinas, propterea quod + faciant notiones, vel saltem propositiones, universales<a id= + "noteref_932" name="noteref_932" href="#note_932"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">932</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">8. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Vim + corpoream</span></em> esse aliquid conceptu facile plerumque + existimamus. Ii tamen qui rem accuratius inspexerunt in diversa + sunt opinione; uti apparet ex mira verborum obscuritate qua + laborant, ubi illam explicare conantur. Torricellius ait vim et + impetum esse res quasdam abstractas subtilesque et quintessentias, + quæ includuntur in substantia corporea, tanquam in vase magico + Circes<a id="noteref_933" name="noteref_933" href= + "#note_933"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">933</span></span></a>. + Leibnitius item in naturæ vi explicanda hæc habet—<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Vis activa, + primitiva, quæ est ἐντελέχεια πρώτη, animæ vel formæ + substantiali</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page504">[pg + 504]</span><a name="Pg504" id="Pg504" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style= + "font-style: italic">respondet</span></em>. Vide <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Acta Erudit. + Lips.</span></span> Usque adeo necesse est ut vel summi viri, + quamdiu abstractionibus indulgent, voces nulla certa significatione + præditas, et meras scholasticorum umbras sectentur. Alia ex + neotericorum scriptis, nec pauca quidem ea, producere liceret; + quibus abunde constaret, metaphysicas abstractiones non usquequaque + cessisse mechanicæ et experimentis, sed negotium inane philosophis + etiamnum facessere.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">9. Ex illo fonte + derivantur varia absurda, cujus generis est illud, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">vim percussionis, + utcunque exiguæ, esse infinite magnam</span></em>. Quod sane + supponit, gravitatem esse qualitatem quandam realem ab aliis + omnibus diversam; et gravitationem esse quasi actum hujus + qualitatis, a motu realiter distinctum: minima autem percussio + producit effectum majorem quam maxima gravitatio sine motu; ilia + scilicet motum aliquem edit, hæc nullum. Unde sequitur, vim + percussionis ratione infinita excedere vim gravitationis, hoc est, + esse infinite magnam<a id="noteref_934" name="noteref_934" href= + "#note_934"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">934</span></span></a>. + Videantur experimenta Galilæi, et quæ de definita vi percussionis + scripserunt Torricellius, Borellus, et alii.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">10. Veruntamen + fatendum est vim nullam per se immediate sentiri; neque aliter quam + per effectum<a id="noteref_935" name="noteref_935" href= + "#note_935"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">935</span></span></a> + cognosci et mensurari. Sed vis mortuæ, seu gravitationis simplicis, + in corpore quiescente subjecto, nulla facta mutatione, effectus + nullus est; percussionis autem, effectus aliquis. Quoniam, ergo, + vires sunt effectibus proportionales, concludere licet vim + mortuam<a id="noteref_936" name="noteref_936" href= + "#note_936"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">936</span></span></a> esse + nullam. Neque tamen propterea vim percussionis esse infinitam: non + enim oportet quantitatem ullam positivam habere pro infinita, + propterea quod ratione infinita superet quantitatem nullam sive + nihil.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page505">[pg + 505]</span><a name="Pg505" id="Pg505" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">11. Vis + gravitationis a momento secerni nequit; momentum autem sine + celeritate nullum est, quum sit moles in celeritatem ducta: porro + celeritas sine motu intelligi non potest; ergo nec vis + gravitationis. Deinde vis nulla nisi per actionem innotescit, et + per eandem mensuratur; actionem autem corporis a motu præscindere + non possumus; ergo quamdiu corpus grave plumbi subjecti vel chordæ + figuram mutat, tamdiu movetur; ubi vero quiescit, nihil agit, vel, + quod idem est, agere prohibetur. Breviter, voces istæ <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">vis + mortua</span></em> et <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">gravitatio</span></em>, etsi per abstractionem + metaphysicam aliquid significare supponuntur diversum a movente, + moto, motu et quiete, revera tamen id totum nihil est.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">12. Siquis + diceret pondus appensum vel impositum agere in chordam, quoniam + impedit quominus se restituat vi elastica: dico, pari ratione + corpus quodvis inferum agere in superius incumbens, quoniam illud + descendere prohibet: dici vero non potest actio corporis, quod + prohibeat aliud corpus existere in eo loco quern occupat.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">13. Pressionem + corporis gravitantis quandoque sentimus. Verum sensio ista molesta + oritur ex motu corporis istius gravis fibris nervisque nostri + corporis communicato, et eorundem situm immutante; adeoque + percussioni accepta referri debet. In hisce rebus multis et + gravibus præjudiciis laboramus, sed illa acri atque iterata + meditatione subigenda sunt<a id="noteref_937" name="noteref_937" + href="#note_937"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">937</span></span></a>, vel + potius penitus averruncanda.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">14. Quo probetur + quantitatem ullam esse infinitam, ostendi oportet partem aliquam + finitam homogeneam in ea infinities contineri. Sed vis mortua se + habet ad vim percussionis, non ut pars ad totum, sed ut punctum ad + lineam, juxta ipsos vis infinitæ percussionis auctores. Multa in + hanc rem adjicere liceret, sed vereor ne prolixus sim.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">15. Ex + principiis præmissis lites insignes solvi possunt, quæ viros doctos + multum exercuerunt. Hujus rei exemplum sit controversia illa de + proportione virium. Una pars dum concedit, momenta, motus, impetus, + data mole, esse simpliciter ut velocitates, affirmat vires esse ut + quadrata velocitatum. Hanc autem sententiam supponere vim + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page506">[pg 506]</span><a name= + "Pg506" id="Pg506" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> corporis + distingui<a id="noteref_938" name="noteref_938" href= + "#note_938"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">938</span></span></a> a + momento, motu, et impetu; eaque suppositione sublata corruere, nemo + non videt.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">16. Quo clarius + adhuc appareat, confusionem quandam miram per abstractiones + metaphysicas in doctrinam de motu introductam esse, videamus + quantum intersit inter notiones virorum celebrium de vi et impetu. + Leibnitius impetum cum motu confundit. Juxta Newtonum<a id= + "noteref_939" name="noteref_939" href="#note_939"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">939</span></span></a> + impetus revera idem est cum vi inertiæ. Borellus<a id="noteref_940" + name="noteref_940" href="#note_940"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">940</span></span></a> + asserit impetum non aliud esse quam gradum velocitatis. Alii + impetum et conatum inter se differre, alii non differre volunt. + Plerique vim motricem motui proportionalem intelligunt. Nonnulli + aliam aliquam vim præter motricem, et diversimode mensurandam, + utpote per quadrata velocitatum in moles, intelligere <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">præ</span></em> se + ferunt. Sed infinitum esset hæc prosequi.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">17. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Vis</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">gravitas</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attractio</span></em>, et hujusmodi voces, + utiles<a id="noteref_941" name="noteref_941" href= + "#note_941"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">941</span></span></a> sunt + ad ratiocinia et computationes de motu et corporibus motis; sed non + ad intelligendam simplicem ipsius motus naturam, vel ad qualitates + totidem distinctas designandas. Attractionem certe quod attinet, + patet illam ab Newtono adhiberi, non tanquam qualitatem veram et + physicam, sed solummodo ut hypothesin mathematicam<a id= + "noteref_942" name="noteref_942" href="#note_942"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">942</span></span></a>. + Quinetiam Leibnitius, nisum elementarem seu solicitationem ab + impetu distinguens, fatetur illa entia non re ipsa inveniri in + rerum natura, sed abstractione facienda esse.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">18. Similis + ratio est compositionis et resolutionis virium quarumcunque + directarum in quascunque obliquas, per diagonalem et latera + parallelogrammi. Hæc mechanicæ et computationi inserviunt: sed + aliud est computationi et demonstrationibus mathematicis inservire, + aliud rerum naturam exhibere.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">19. Ex + recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione, ut putent <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page507">[pg 507]</span><a name="Pg507" id="Pg507" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> motum neque destrui nec de novo gigni, + sed eandem<a id="noteref_943" name="noteref_943" href= + "#note_943"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">943</span></span></a> + semper motus quantitatem permanere. Aristoteles etiam dubium illud + olim proposuit—utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab + æterno? <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Phys.</span></span> lib. viii. Quod vero motus + sensibilis pereat, patet sensibus: illi autem eundem impetum, + nisum, aut summam virium eandem manere velle videntur. Unde + affirmat Borellus, vim in percussione non imminui, sed expandi; + impetus etiam contrarios suscipi et retineri in eodem corpore. Item + Leibnitius nisum ubique et semper esse in materia, et ubi non patet + sensibus, ratione intelligi contendit.—Hæc autem nimis abstracta + esse et obscura, ejusdemque fere generis cum formis substantialibus + et entelechiis, fatendum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">20. Quotquot ad + explicandam motus causam atque originem, vel principio hylarchico, + vel naturæ indigentia, vel appetitu, aut denique instinctu naturali + utuntur, dixisse aliquid potius quam cogitasse censendi sunt. Neque + ab hisce multum absunt qui supposuerint<a id="noteref_944" name= + "noteref_944" href="#note_944"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">944</span></span></a> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">partes + terræ esse se moventes, aut etiam spiritus iis implantatos ad + instar formæ</span></em>, ut assignent causam accelerationis + gravium cadentium: aut qui dixerit<a id="noteref_945" name= + "noteref_945" href="#note_945"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">945</span></span></a>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in + corpore præter solidam extensionem debere etiam poni aliquid unde + virium consideratio oriatur</span></em>. Siquidem hi omnes vel + nihil particulare et determinatum enuntiant; vel, si quid sit, tarn + difficile erit illud explicare, quam id ipsum cujus explicandi + causa adducitur<a id="noteref_946" name="noteref_946" href= + "#note_946"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">946</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">21. Frustra ad + naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea quæ nec sensibus patent, nec + ratione intelligi possunt. Videndum ergo quid sensus, quid + experientia, quid demum ratio iis innixa, suadeat. Duo sunt summa + rerum genera—<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corpus</span></em> et <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">anima</span></em>. + Rem extensam, solidam, mobilem, figuratam, aliisque qualitatibus + quæ sensibus occurrunt præditam, ope sensuum; rem vero sentientem, + percipientem, intelligentem, conscientia quadam interna cognovimus. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page508">[pg 508]</span><a name= + "Pg508" id="Pg508" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Porro, res istas + plane inter se diversas esse, longeque heterogeneas, cernimus. + Loquor autem de rebus cognitis: de incognitis enim disserere nil + juvat<a id="noteref_947" name="noteref_947" href= + "#note_947"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">947</span></span></a>.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">22. Totum id + quod novimus, cui nomen <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corpus</span></em> indidimus, nihil <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in se</span></em> + continet quod motus principium seu causa efficiens esse possit. + Etenim impenetrabilitas, extensio, figura nullam includunt vel + connotant potentiam producendi motum; quinimo e contrario non modo + illas, verum etiam alias, quotquot sint, corporis qualitates + sigillatim percurrentes, videbimus omnes esse revera passivas, + nihilque iis activum inesse, quod ullo modo intelligi possit + tanquam fons et principium motus<a id="noteref_948" name= + "noteref_948" href="#note_948"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">948</span></span></a>. + Gravitatem quod attinet, voce illa nihil cognitum et ab ipso + effectu sensibili, cujus causa quæritur, diversum significari jam + ante ostendimus. Et sane quando corpus grave dicimus, nihil aliud + intelligimus, nisi quod feratur deorsum; de causa hujus effectus + sensibilis nihil omnino cogitantes.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">23. De corpore + itaque audacter pronunciare licet, utpote de re comperta, quod non + sit principium motus. Quod si quisquam, præter solidam extensionem + ejusque modificationes, vocem <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corpus</span></em> qualitatem etiam <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">occultam</span></em>, virtutem, formam, + essentiam complecti sua significatione contendat; licet quidem illi + inutili negotio sine ideis disputare, et nominibus nihil distincte + exprimentibus abuti. Cæterum sanior philosophandi ratio videtur ab + notionibus abstractis et generalibus (si modo notiones dici debent + quæ intelligi nequeunt) quantum fieri potest abstinuisse.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">24. Quicquid + continetur in idea corporis novimus; quod <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page509">[pg 509]</span><a name="Pg509" id="Pg509" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> vero novimus in corpore, id non esse + principium motus constat<a id="noteref_949" name="noteref_949" + href="#note_949"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">949</span></span></a>. Qui + præterea aliquid incognitum in corpore, cujus ideam nullam habent, + comminiscuntur, quod motus principium dicant, ii revera nihil aliud + quam <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium motus esse incognitum</span></em> + dicunt. Sed hujusmodi subtilitatibus diutius immorari piget.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">25. Præter res + corporeas alterum est <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">genus rerum cogitantium</span></em><a id= + "noteref_950" name="noteref_950" href="#note_950"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">950</span></span></a>. In + iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi, propria experientia + didicimus<a id="noteref_951" name="noteref_951" href= + "#note_951"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">951</span></span></a>; + quandoquidem anima nostra pro lubitu possit ciere et sistere + membrorum motus, quacunque tandem ratione id fiat. Hoc certe + constat, corpora moveri ad nutum animæ; eamque proinde haud inepte + dici posse principium motus: particulare quidem et subordinatum, + quodque ipsum dependeat a primo et universali Principio<a id= + "noteref_952" name="noteref_952" href="#note_952"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">952</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">26. Corpora + gravia feruntur deorsum, etsi nullo impulsu apparente agitata; non + tamen existimandum propterea in iis contineri principium motus: + cujus rei hanc rationem assignat Aristoteles<a id="noteref_953" + name="noteref_953" href="#note_953"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">953</span></span></a>;—<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Gravia + et levia</span></em> (inquit) <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">non moventur a seipsis; id enim vitale esset, + et se sistere possent</span></em>. Gravia omnia una eademque certa + et constanti lege centrum telluris petunt, neque in ipsis + animadvertitur principium vel facultas ulla motum istum sistendi, + minuendi, vel, nisi pro rata proportione, augendi, aut denique ullo + modo immutandi: habent adeo se passive. Porro idem, stricte et + accurate loquendo, dicendum de corporibus percussivis. Corpora ista + quamdiu moventur, ut et in ipso percussionis momento, si gerunt + passive, perinde scilicet atque cum quiescunt. Corpus iners tam + agit quam corpus motum, si <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page510">[pg 510]</span><a name="Pg510" id="Pg510" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> res ad verum exigatur: id quod agnoscit + Newtonus, ubi ait, vim inertiæ esse eandem cum impetu<a id= + "noteref_954" name="noteref_954" href="#note_954"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">954</span></span></a>. + Corpus autem iners et quietum nihil agit, ergo nee motum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">27. Revera + corpus æque perseverat in utrovis statu, vel motus vel quietis. + Ista vero perseverantia non magis dicenda est actio corporis, quam + existentia ejusdem actio diceretur. Perseverantia nihil aliud est + quam continuatio in eodem modo existendi, quæ proprie dici actio + non potest. Cæterum resistentiam, quam experimur in sistendo + corpore moto, ejus actionem esse fingimus vana specie delusi. + Revera enim ista resistentia quam sentimus<a id="noteref_955" name= + "noteref_955" href="#note_955"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">955</span></span></a>, + passio est in nobis, neque arguit corpus agere, sed nos pati: + constat utique nos idem passuros fuisse, sive corpus illud a se + moveatur, sive ab alio principio impellatur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">28. Actio et + reactio dicuntur esse in corporibus: nec incommode ad + demonstrationes mechanicas<a id="noteref_956" name="noteref_956" + href="#note_956"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">956</span></span></a>. Sed + cavendum, ne propterea supponamus virtutem aliquam realem, quæ + motus causa sive principium sit, esse in iis. Etenim voces illæ + eodem modo intelligendæ sunt ac vox <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attractio</span></em>; et quemadmodum hæc est + hypothesis solummodo mathematica<a id="noteref_957" name= + "noteref_957" href="#note_957"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">957</span></span></a>, non + autem qualitas physica: idem etiam de illis intelligi debet, et ob + eandem rationem. Nam sicut veritas et usus theorematum de mutua + corporum attractione in philosophia mechanica stabiles manent, + utpote unice fundati in motu corporum, sive motus iste causari + supponatur per actionem corporum se mutuo attrahentium, sive per + actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus diversi impellentis et + moderantis corpora; pari ratione, quæcunque tradita sunt de regulis + et legibus motuum, simul ac theoremata inde deducta, manent + inconcussa, dum modo concedantur effectus sensibiles, et ratiocinia + iis innixa; sive supponamus actionem ipsam, aut vim horum effectuum + causatricem, esse in corpore, sive in agente incorporeo.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">29. Auferantur + ex idea corporis extensio, soliditas, figura, remanebit nihil<a id= + "noteref_958" name="noteref_958" href="#note_958"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">958</span></span></a>. Sed + qualitates istæ sunt ad motum <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page511">[pg 511]</span><a name="Pg511" id="Pg511" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> indifferentes, nec in se quidquam habent quod + motus principium dici possit. Hoc ex ipsis ideis nostris perspicuum + est. Si igitur voce <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corpus</span></em> significatur id quod + concipimus, plane constat inde non peti posse principium motus: + pars scilicet nulla aut attributum illius causa efficiens vera est, + quæ motum producat. Vocem autem proferre, et nihil concipere, id + demum indignum esset philosopho.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">30. Datur res + cogitans, activa, quam principium motus ... in nobis + experimur<a id="noteref_959" name="noteref_959" href= + "#note_959"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">959</span></span></a>. Hanc + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">animam</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mentem</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spiritum</span></em> ... Datur etiam res + extensa, iners, impenetrabilis, ... quæ a priori toto cœlo differt, + novumque genus<a id="noteref_960" name="noteref_960" href= + "#note_960"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">960</span></span></a> ... + Quantum intersit inter res cogitantes et extensas, primus omnium + deprehendens Anaxagoras, vir longe sapientissimus, asserebat mentem + nihil habere cum corporibus commune, id quod constat ex primo libro + Aristotelis <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Anima</span></span><a id="noteref_961" + name="noteref_961" href="#note_961"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">961</span></span></a>. Ex + neotericis idem optime animadvertit Cartesius<a id="noteref_962" + name="noteref_962" href="#note_962"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">962</span></span></a>. Ab + eo alii<a id="noteref_963" name="noteref_963" href= + "#note_963"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">963</span></span></a> rem + satis claram vocibus obscuris impeditam ac difficilem + reddiderunt.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">31. Ex dictis + manifestum est eos qui vim activam, actionem, motus principium, in + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">corporibus</span></em> revera inesse + affirmant, sententiam nulla experientia fundatam amplecti, eamque + terminis obscuris et generalibus adstruere, nec <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page512">[pg 512]</span><a name="Pg512" id="Pg512" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> quid sibi velint satis intelligere. E + contrario, qui <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mentem</span></em> esse principium motus + volunt, sententiam propria experientia munitam proferunt, + hominumque omni ævo doctissimorum suffragiis comprobatam.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">32. Primus + Anaxagoras<a id="noteref_964" name="noteref_964" href= + "#note_964"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">964</span></span></a> τὸν + νοῦν introduxit, qui motum inerti materiæ imprimeret. Quam quidem + sententiam probat etiam Aristoteles<a id="noteref_965" name= + "noteref_965" href="#note_965"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">965</span></span></a>, + pluribusque confirmat, aperto pronuncians primum movens esse + immobile, indivisibile, et nullam habens magnitudinem. Dicere + autem, omne me vum esse mobile, recte animadvertit idem esse ac s + diceret, omne ædificativum esse ædificabile, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Physic</span></span>, + lib Plato insuper in Timæo<a id="noteref_966" name="noteref_966" + href="#note_966"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">966</span></span></a> + tradit machinam hanc corpo seu mundum visibilem, agitari et animari + a mente, sensum omnem fugiat. Quinetiam hodie philosophi + siani<a id="noteref_967" name="noteref_967" href= + "#note_967"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">967</span></span></a> + principium motuum naturalium Deum agnoscun. Et Newtonus<a id= + "noteref_968" name="noteref_968" href="#note_968"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">968</span></span></a> + passim nec obscure innuit, non solummodo motum ab initio a numine + profectum esse, verum adhuc systema mundanum ab eodem actu moveri. + Hoc sacris literis consonum est: hoc scholasticorum calculo + comprobatur. Nam etsi Peripatetici naturam tradant esse principium + motus et quietis, interpretantur tamen naturam naturantem esse + Deum<a id="noteref_969" name="noteref_969" href= + "#note_969"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">969</span></span></a>. + Intelligunt nimirum corpora omnia systematis hujusce mundani a + mente præpotenti juxta certam et constantem rationem<a id= + "noteref_970" name="noteref_970" href="#note_970"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">970</span></span></a> + moveri.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">33. Cæterum qui + principium vitale corporibus tribuunt, obscurum aliquid et rebus + parum conveniens fingunt. Quid enim aliud est vitali principio + præditum esse quam <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page513">[pg + 513]</span><a name="Pg513" id="Pg513" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + vivere? aut vivere quam se movere, sistere, et statum suum mutare? + Philosophi autem hujus sæculi doctissimi pro principio indubitato + ponunt, omne corpus perseverare in statu suo, vel quietis vel motus + uniformis in directum, nisi quatenus aliunde cogitur statum ilium + mutare: e contrario, in anima sentimus esse facultatem tam statum + suum quam aliarum rerum mutandi; id quod proprie dicitur vitale, + animamque a corporibus longe discriminat.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">34. Motum et + quietem in corporibus recentiores considerant velut duos status + existendi, in quorum utrovis corpus omne sua natura iners + permaneret<a id="noteref_971" name="noteref_971" href= + "#note_971"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">971</span></span></a>, + nulla vi externa urgente. Unde colligere licet, eandem esse causam + motus et quietis, quæ est existentiæ corporum. Neque enim quærenda + videtur alia causa existentiæ corporis successivæ in diversis + partibus spatii, quam illa unde derivatur existentia ejusdem + corporis successiva in diversis partibus temporis. De Deo autem + Optimo Maximo rerum omnium Conditore et Conservatore tractare, et + qua ratione res cunctæ a summo et vero Ente pendeant demonstrare, + quamvis pars sit scientiæ humanæ præcellentissima, spectat tamen + potius ad philosophiam primam<a id="noteref_972" name="noteref_972" + href="#note_972"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">972</span></span></a>, seu + metaphysicam et theologiam, quam ad philosophiam naturalem, quæ + hodie fere omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica. Itaque + cognitionem de Deo vel supponit philosophia naturalis, vel mutuatur + ab aliqua scientia superiori. Quanquam verissimum sit, naturæ + investigationem scientiis altioribus argumenta egregia ad + sapientiam, bonitatem, et potentiam Dei illustrandam et probandam + undequaque subministrare.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">35. Quod hæc + minus intelligantur, in causa est, cur nonnulli immerito repudient + physicæ principia mathematica, eo scilicet nomine quod illa causas + rerum efficientes non assignant: quum tamen revera ad physicam aut + mechanicam spectet regulas<a id="noteref_973" name="noteref_973" + href="#note_973"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">973</span></span></a> + solummodo, non causas efficientes, impulsionum attractionumve, et + ut verbo dicam, motuum leges tradere; ex iis vero positis + phænomenon particularium solutionem, non autem causam efficientem + assignare.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page514">[pg + 514]</span><a name="Pg514" id="Pg514" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">36. Multum + intererit considerasse quid proprie sit principium, et quo sensu + intelligenda sit vox illa apud philosophos<a id="noteref_974" name= + "noteref_974" href="#note_974"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">974</span></span></a>. + Causa quidem vera efficiens et conservatrix rerum omnium jure + optimo appellatur fons et principium earundem. Principia vero + philosophiæ experimentalis proprie dicenda sunt fundamenta quibus + illa innititur, seu fontes unde derivatur, (non dico existentia, + sed) cognitio rerum corporearum, sensus utique ex experientia. + Similiter, in philosophia mechanica, principia dicenda sunt, in + quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina, leges illæ + motuum primariæ, quæ experimentis comprobatæ, ratiocinio etiam + excultæ sunt et redditæ universales<a id="noteref_975" name= + "noteref_975" href="#note_975"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">975</span></span></a>. Hæ + motuum leges commode dicuntur principia, quoniam ab iis tam + theoremata mechanica generalia quam particulares τῶν φαινομένων + explicationes derivantur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">37. Tum nimirum + dici potest quidpiam explicari mechanice, cum reducitur ad ista + principia simplicissima et universalissima, et per accuratum + ratiocinium, cum iis consentaneum et connexum esse ostenditur. Nam + inventis semel naturæ legibus, deinceps monstrandum est philosopho, + ex constanti harum legum observatione, hoc est, ex iis principiis + phænomenon quodvis necessario consequi: id quod est phænomena + explicare et solvere, causamque, id est rationem cur fiant, + assignare.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">38. Mens humana + gaudet scientiam suam extendere et dilatare. Ad hoc autem notiones + et propositiones generales efformandæ sunt, in quibus quodam modo + continentur propositiones et cognitiones particulares, quæ turn + demum intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis continuo nexu + deducuntur. Hoc geometris notissimum est. In mechanica etiam + præmittuntur notiones, hoc est definitiones, et enunciationes de + motu primæ et generales, ex quibus <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page515">[pg 515]</span><a name="Pg515" id="Pg515" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> postmodum methodo mathematica conclusiones + magis remotæ et minus generales colliguntur. Et sicut per + applicationem theorematum geometricorum, corporum particularium + magnitudines mensurantur; ita etiam per applicationem theorematum + mechanices universalium, systematis mundani partium quarumvis + motus, et phænomena inde pendentia, innotescunt et determinantur: + ad quem scopum unice collineandum physico.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">39. Et + quemadmodum geometræ, disciplinæ causa, multa comminiscuntur, quæ + nec ipsi describere possunt, nec in rerum natura invenire; simili + prorsus ratione mechanicus voces quasdam abstractas et generales + adhibet, fingitque in corporibus <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">vim</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">actionem</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attractionem</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">solicitationem</span></em>, &c. quæ ad + theorias et enunciationes, ut et computationes de motu apprime + utiles sunt, etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate et corporibus actu + existentibus frustra quærerentur, non minus quam quæ a geometris + per abstractionem mathematicam finguntur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">40. Revera ope + sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates sensibiles, et res + corporeas omnino passivas, sive in motu sint sive in quiete, + percipimus: ratioque et experientia activum nihil præter mentem aut + animam esse suadet. Quidquid ultra fingitur, id ejusdem generis + esse cum aliis hypothesibus et abstractionibus mathematicis + existimandum: quod penitu sanimo infigere oportet. Hoc ni fiat, + facile in obscuram scholasticorum subtilitatem, quæ per tot sæcula, + tanquam dira quædam pestis, philosophiam corrupit, relabi + possumus.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">41. Principia + mechanica legesque motuum aut naturæ universales, sæculo ultimo + feliciter inventæ, et subsidio geometriæ tractatæ et applicatæ, + miram lucem in philosophiam intulerunt. Principia vero metaphysica + causæque reales efficientes motus et existentiæ corporum + attributorumve corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut experimenta + pertinent; neque eis lucem dare possunt, nisi quatenus, velut + præcognita, inserviant ad limites physicæ præfiniendos, eaque + ratione ad tollendas difficultates quæstionesque peregrinas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">42. Qui a + spiritibus motus principium petunt, ii vel rem corpoream vel + incorpoream voce <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spiritus</span></em> intelligunt. Si rem + corpoream, quantumvis tenuem, tamen redit difficultas: si + incorpoream, quantumvis id verum sit, attamen ad <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page516">[pg 516]</span><a name="Pg516" id="Pg516" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> physicam non proprie pertinet. Quod si + quis philosophiam naturalem ultra limites experimentorum et + mechanicæ extenderit, ita ut rerum etiam incorporearum, et + inextensarum cognitionem complectatur, latior quidem illa vocis + acceptio tractationem de anima, mente, seu principio vitali + admittit. Cæterum commodius erit, juxta usum jam fere receptum, ita + distinguere inter scientias, ut singulæ propriis circumscribantur + cancellis, et philosophus naturalis totus sit in experimentis, + legibusque motuum, et principiis mechanicis, indeque depromptis + ratiociniis; quidquid autem de aliis rebus protulerit, id superiori + alicui scientiæ acceptum referat. Etenim ex cognitis naturæ legibus + pulcherrimæ theoriæ, praxes etiam mechanicæ ad vitam utiles + consequuntur. Ex cognitione autem ipsius naturæ Auctoris + considerationes longe præstantissimæ quidem illæ, sed metaphysicæ, + theologicæ, morales oriuntur.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">43. De + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principiis</span></em> hactenus: nunc dicendum + de <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">natura</span></em> motus<a id="noteref_976" + name="noteref_976" href="#note_976"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">976</span></span></a>. + Atque is quidem, cum sensibus clare percipiatur, non tam natura + sua, quam doctis philosophorum commentis obscuratus est. Motus + nunquam in sensus nostros incurrit sine mole corporea, spatio, et + tempore. Sunt tamen qui motum, tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et + abstractam, atque ab omnibus aliis rebus sejunctam, contemplari + student. Verum idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima<a id= + "noteref_977" name="noteref_977" href="#note_977"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">977</span></span></a> + intellectus aciem eludit: id quod quilibet secum meditando experiri + potest. Hinc nascuntur magnæ difficultates de natura motus, et + definitiones, ipsa re quam illustrare debent longe obscuriores. + Hujusmodi sunt definitiones illæ Aristotelis et + Scholasticorum<a id="noteref_978" name="noteref_978" href= + "#note_978"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">978</span></span></a>, qui + motum dicunt esse <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page517">[pg + 517]</span><a name="Pg517" id="Pg517" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">actum + mobilis quatenus est mobile, vel actum entis in potentia quatenus + in potentia</span></em>. Hujusmodi etiam est illud viri<a id= + "noteref_979" name="noteref_979" href="#note_979"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">979</span></span></a> inter + recentiores celebris, qut asserit <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nihil in motu esse + reale præter momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente + constitui debet</span></em>. Porro constat, horum et similium + definitionum auctores in animo habuisse abstractam motus naturam, + seclusa omni temporis et spatii consideratione, explicare: sed qua + ratione abstracta ilia motus quintessentia (ut ita dicam) intelligi + possit, non video.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">44. Neque hoc + contenti, ulterius pergunt, partesque ipsius motus a se invicem + dividunt et secernunt, quarum ideas distinctas, tanquam entium + revera distinctorum, efformare conantur. Etenim sunt qui motionem a + motu distinguant, illam velut instantaneum motus elementum + spectantes. Velocitatem insuper, conatum, vim, impetum totidem res + essentia diversas esse volunt, quarum quæque per propriam atque ab + aliis omnibus segregatam et abstractam ideam intellectui + objiciatur. Sed in hisce rebus discutiendis, stantibus iis quæ + supra disseruimus<a id="noteref_980" name="noteref_980" href= + "#note_980"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">980</span></span></a>, non + est cur diutius immoremur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">45. Multi etiam + per <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">transitum</span></em><a id="noteref_981" name= + "noteref_981" href="#note_981"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">981</span></span></a> motum + definiunt, obliti, scilicet, transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi + non posse, et per motum definiri oportere. Verissimum adeo est + definitiones, sicut nonnullis rebus lucem, ita vicissim aliis + tenebras afferre. Et profecto, quascumque res sensu percipimus, eas + clariores aut notiores definiendo efficere vix quisquam potuerit. + Cujus rei vana spe allecti res faciles difficillimas<a id= + "noteref_982" name="noteref_982" href="#note_982"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">982</span></span></a> + reddiderunt philosophi, mentesque suas difficultatibus, quas ut + plurimum ipsi peperissent, implicavere. Ex hocce definiendi, simul + ac abstrahendi studio, multæ tam de motu quam de aliis rebus natæ + subtilissimæ quæstiones, eædemque nullius utilitatis, hominum + ingenia frustra torserunt; adeo ut Aristoteles ultro et sæpius + fateatur motum esse <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">actum quendam cognitu + difficilem</span></em><a id="noteref_983" name="noteref_983" href= + "#note_983"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">983</span></span></a>, et + nonnulli ex veteribus usque eo nugis exercitati deveniebant, ut + motum omnino esse negarent<a id="noteref_984" name="noteref_984" + href="#note_984"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">984</span></span></a>.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page518">[pg 518]</span><a name="Pg518" id="Pg518" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">46. Sed + hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget. Satis sit fontes solutionum + indicasse: ad quos etiam illud adjungere libet: quod ea quæ de + infinita divisione temporis et spatii in mathesi traduntur, ob + congenitam rerum naturam paradoxa et theorias spinosas (quales sunt + illæ omnes in quibus agitur de infinito<a id="noteref_985" name= + "noteref_985" href="#note_985"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">985</span></span></a>) in + speculationes de motu intulerunt. Quidquid autem hujus generis sit, + id omne motus commune habet cum spatio et tempore, vel potius ad ea + refert acceptum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">47. Et + quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio seu divisio rerum vere + inseparabilium, ita ab altera parte compositio seu potius confusio + rerum diversissimarum motus naturam perplexam reddidit. Usitatum + enim est motum cum causa motus efficiente confundere<a id= + "noteref_986" name="noteref_986" href="#note_986"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">986</span></span></a>. Unde + accidit ut motus sit quasi biformis, unam faciem sensibus obviam, + alteram caliginosa nocte obvolutam habens. Inde obscuritas et + confusio, et varia de motu paradoxa originem trahunt, dum effectui + perperam tribuitur id quod revera causæ solummodo competit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">48. Hinc oritur + opinio illa, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eandem</span></em> semper motus quantitatem + conservari<a id="noteref_987" name="noteref_987" href= + "#note_987"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">987</span></span></a>. + Quod, nisi intelligatur de vi et potentia causæ, sive causa ilia + dicatur natura, sive νοῦς, vel quodcunque tandem agens sit, falsum + esse cuivis facile constabit. Aristoteles<a id="noteref_988" name= + "noteref_988" href="#note_988"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">988</span></span></a> + quidem l. viii. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Physicorum</span></span>, ubi quærit utrum + motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab æterno tanquam vita + immortalis insit rebus omnibus, vitale principium potius, quam + effectum externum, sive mutationem loci<a id="noteref_989" name= + "noteref_989" href="#note_989"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">989</span></span></a>, + intellexisse videtur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">49. Hinc etiam + est, quod multi suspicantur motum non esse meram passionem in + corporibus. Quod si intelligamus id quod in motu corporis sensibus + objicitur, quin omnino passivum sit nemo dubitare potest. Ecquid + enim in se habet successiva corporis existentia in diversis locis, + quod actionem referat, aut aliud sit quam nuduset iners + effectus?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page519">[pg + 519]</span><a name="Pg519" id="Pg519" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">50. + Peripatetici, qui dicunt motum esse actum unum utriusque, moventis + et moti<a id="noteref_990" name="noteref_990" href= + "#note_990"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">990</span></span></a>, non + satis discriminant causam ab effectu. Similiter, qui nisum aut + conatum in motu fingunt, aut idem corpus simul in contrarias partes + ferri putant, eadem idearum confusione, eadem vocum ambiguitate + ludificari videntur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">51. Juvat + multum, sicut in aliis omnibus, ita in scientia de motu accuratam + diligentiam adhibere, tam ad aliorum conceptus intelligendos quam + ad suos enunciandos: in qua re nisi peccatum esset, vix credo in + disputationem trahi potuisse, utrum corpus indifferens sit ad motum + et ad quietem, necne. Quoniam enim experientia constat, esse legem + naturæ primariam, ut corpus perinde perseveret in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">statu motus ac + quietis, quamdiu aliunde nihil accidat ad statum istum + mutandum</span></em>; et propterea vim inertiæ sub diverso respectu + esse vel resistentiam, vel impetum, colligitur: hoc sensu profecto + corpus dici potest sua natura indifferens ad motum vel quietem. + Nimirum tam difficile est quietem in corpus motum, quam motum in + quiescens inducere: cum vero corpus pariter conservet statum + utrumvis, quidni dicatur ad utrumvis se habere indifferenter?</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">52. Peripatetici + pro varietate mutationum, quas res aliqua subire potest, varia + motus genera distinguebant. Hodie de motu agentes intelligunt + solummodo <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motum localem</span></em><a id="noteref_991" + name="noteref_991" href="#note_991"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">991</span></span></a>. + Motus autem localis intelligi nequit nisi simul intelligatur quid + sit <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">locus</span></em>: is vero a neotericis<a id= + "noteref_992" name="noteref_992" href="#note_992"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">992</span></span></a> + definitur <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pars spatii quam corpus occupat</span></em>: + unde dividitur in relativum et absolutum pro ratione spatii. + Distinguunt enim inter spatium absolutum sive verum, ac relativum + sive apparens. Volunt scilicet dari spatium undequaque immensum, + immobile, insensibile, corpora universa permeans et continens, quod + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page520">[pg 520]</span><a name= + "Pg520" id="Pg520" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> vocant spatium + absolutum. Spatium autem a corporibus comprehensum vel definitum, + sensibusque adeo subjectum, dicitur spatium relativum, apparens, + vulgare.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">53. Fingamus + itaque corpora cuncta destrui, et in nihilum redigi. Quod reliquum + est vocant spatium absolutum, omni relatione quæ a situ et + distantiis corporum oriebatur, simul cum ipsis corporibus, sublata. + Porro spatium illud est infinitum, immobile, indivisibile, + insensibile, sine relatione et sine distinctione. Hoc est, omnia + ejus attributa sunt privativa vel negativa: videtur igitur esse + merum nihil<a id="noteref_993" name="noteref_993" href= + "#note_993"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">993</span></span></a>. + Parit solummmodo difficultatem aliquam quod extensum sit. Extensio + autem est qualitas positiva. Verum qualis tandem extensio est illa + quæ nec dividi potest, nec mensurari, cujus nullam partem, nec + sensu percipere, nec imaginatione depingere possumus? Etenim nihil + in imaginationem cadit, quod, ex natura rei, non possibile est ut + sensu percipiatur; siquidem <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imaginatio</span></em><a id="noteref_994" + name="noteref_994" href="#note_994"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">994</span></span></a> nihil + aliud est quam facultas representatrix rerum sensibilium, vel actu + existentium, vel saltem possibilium. Fugit insuper <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">intellectum + purum</span></em>, quum facultas illa versetur tantum circa res + spirituales et inextensas, cujusmodi sunt mentes nostræ, earumque + habitus, passiones, virtutes, et similia. Ex spatio igitur absoluto + auferamus modo vocabula, et nihil remanebit in sensu, imaginatione, + aut intellectu: nihil aliud ergo iis designatur, quam pura privatio + aut negatio, hoc est, merum nihil.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">54. Confitendum + omnino est nos circa hanc rem gravissimis præjudiciis teneri, a + quibus ut liberemur, omnis animi vis exercenda. Etenim multi, + tantum abest quod spatium absolutum pro nihilo ducant, ut rem esse + ex omnibus (Deo excepto) unicam existiment, quæ annihilari non + possit: statuantque illud suapte natura necessario existere, + æternumque esse et increatum, atque adeo attributorum divinorum + particeps<a id="noteref_995" name="noteref_995" href= + "#note_995"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">995</span></span></a>. + Verum enimvero quum certissimum sit, res omnes, quas nominibus + designamus, per qualitates <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page521">[pg 521]</span><a name="Pg521" id="Pg521" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> aut relationes, vel aliqua saltem ex parte + cognosci (ineptum enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil, + nihil notionis, ideæ vel conceptus subjiceretur), inquiramus + diligenter, utrum formare liceat <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideam</span></em> + ullam spatii illius puri, realis, absoluti, quod post omnium + corporum annihilationem perseveret existere. Ideam porro talem + paulo acrius intuens, reperio ideam esse nihili purissimam, si modo + idea appellanda sit. Hoc ipse summa adhibita diligentia expertus + sum: hoc alios pari adhibita diligentia experturos reor.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">55. Decipere nos + nonnunquam solet, quod aliis omnibus corporibus imaginatione + sublatis, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nostrum</span></em><a id="noteref_996" name= + "noteref_996" href="#note_996"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">996</span></span></a> tamen + manere supponimus. Quo supposito, motum membrorum ab omni parte + liberrimum imaginamur. Motus autem sine spatio concipi non potest. + Nihilominus si rem attento animo recolamus, constabit primo concipi + spatium relativum partibus nostri corporis definitum: 2°. movendi + membra potestatem liberrimam nullo obstaculo retusam: et præter hæc + duo nihil. Falso tamen credimus tertium aliquod, spatium videlicet + immensum, realiter existere, quod liberam potestatem nobis faciat + movendi corpus nostrum: ad hoc enim requiritur absentia solummodo + aliorum corporum. Quam absentiam, sive privationem corporum, nihil + esse positivum fateamur necesse est<a id="noteref_997" name= + "noteref_997" href="#note_997"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">997</span></span></a>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">56. Cæterum + hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine perspexerit, verba et + voces parum valent. Meditanti vero, et rationes secum reputanti, ni + fallor, manifestum erit, quæcunque de spatio puro et absoluto + prædicantur, ea omnia de nihilo prædicari posse. Qua ratione mens + humana facillime liberatur a magnis difficultatibus simulque ab ea + absurditate tribuendi existentiam necessariam<a id="noteref_998" + name="noteref_998" href="#note_998"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">998</span></span></a> ulli + rei præterquam soli Deo optimo maximo.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">57. In proclivi + esset sententiam nostram argumentis a posteriori (ut loquuntur) + ductis confirmare, quæstiones de spatio absoluto proponendo; + exempli gratia, utrum sit substantia vel accidens? utrum creatum + vel increatum? <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page522">[pg + 522]</span><a name="Pg522" id="Pg522" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + et absurditates ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando. Sed + brevitati consulendum. Illud tamen omitti non debet, quod + sententiam hancce Democritus olim calculo suo comprobavit, uti + auctor est Aristoteles 1. i. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Phys.</span></span><a id="noteref_999" name= + "noteref_999" href="#note_999"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">999</span></span></a> ubi + hæc habet: <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Democritus solidum et inane ponit principia, + quorum aliud quidem ut quod est, aliud ut quod non est esse + dicit.</span></em> Scrupulum si forte injiciat, quod distinctio + illa inter spatium absolutum et relativum a magni nominis + philosophis usurpetur, eique quasi fundamento inædificentur multa + præclara theoremata, scrupulum istum vanum esse, ex iis quæ + secutura sunt, apparebit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">58. Ex præmissis + patet, non convenire ut definiamus locum verum corporis esse partem + spatii absoluti quam occupat corpus, motumque verum seu absolutum + esse mutationem loci veri et absoluti. Siquidem omnis locus est + relativus, ut et omnis motus. Veruntamen ut hoc clarius appareat, + animadvertendum est, motum nullum intelligi posse sine + determinatione aliqua seu directione, quæ quidem intelligi nequit, + nisi praeter corpus motum, nostrum etiam corpus, aut aliud aliquod, + simul intelligatur existere. Nam sursum, deorsum, sinistrorsum, + dextrorsum, omnesque plagæ et regiones in relatione aliqua + fundantur, et necessario corpus a moto diversum connotant et + supponunt. Adeo ut, si reliquis corporibus in nihilum redactis, + globus, exempli gratia, unicus existere supponatur; in illo motus + nullus concipi possit: usque adeo necesse est, ut detur aliud + corpus, cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur. Hujus sententiæ + veritas clarissime elucebit, modo corporum omnium tam nostri quam + aliorum, præter globum istum unicum, annihilationem recte + supposuerimus.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">59. Concipiantur + porro duo globi, et præterea nil corporeum, existere. Concipiantur + deinde vires quomodocunque applicari: quicquid tandem per + applicationem virium intelligamus, motus circularis duorum globorum + circa commune centrum nequit per imaginationem concipi. Supponamus + deinde cœlum fixarum creari: subito ex concepto appulsu globorum ad + diversas cœli istius partes motus concipietur. Scilicet cum motus + natura sua sit relativus, concipi non potuit priusquam darentur + corpora correlata. Quemadmodum nec ulla relatio alia sine + correlatis concipi potest.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page523">[pg 523]</span><a name="Pg523" id="Pg523" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">60. Ad motum + circularem quod attinet, putant multi, crescente motu vero + circulari, corpus necessario magis semper magisque ab axe niti. Hoc + autem ex eo provenit, quod, cum motus circularis spectari possit + tanquam in omni momento a duabus directionibus ortum trahens, una + secundum radium, altera secundum tangentem; si in hac ultima tantum + directione impetus augeatur, tum a centro recedet corpus motum, + orbita vero desinet esse circularis. Quod si æqualiter augeantur + vires in utraque directione, manebit motus circularis, sed + acceleratus conatu, qui non magis arguet vires recedendi ab axe, + quam accedendi ad eundem, auctas esse. Dicendum igitur, aquam in + situla circumactam ascendere ad latera vasis, propterea quod, + applicatis novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quamvis + particulam aquæ, eodem instanti non applicentur novæ vires æquales + centripetæ. Ex quo experimento nullo modo sequitur, motum absolutum + circularem per vires recedendi ab axe motus necessario dignosci. + Porro qua ratione intelligendæ sunt voces istæ, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">vires corporum et + conatus</span></em>, ex præmissis satis superque innotescit.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">61. Quo modo + curva considerari potest tanquam constans ex rectis infinitis, + etiamsi revera ex illis non constet, sed quod ea hypothesis ad + geometriam utilis sit, eodem modo motus circularis spectari potest + tanquam a directionibus rectilineis infinitis ortum ducens, quæ + suppositio utilis est in philosophia mechanica. Non tamen ideo + affirmandum, impossibile esse, ut centrum gravitatis corporis + cujusvis successive existat in singulis punctis peripheriae + circularis, nulla ratione habita directionis ullius rectilineæ, + sive in tangente sive in radio.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">62. Haud + omittendum est, motum lapidis in funda, aut aquæ in situla + circumacta, dici non posse motum vere circularem, juxta mentem + eorum qui per partes spatii absoluti definiunt loca vera corporum; + cum sit mire compositus ex motibus non solum situlæ vel fundæ, sed + etiam telluris diurno circa proprium axem, menstruo circa commune + centrum gravitatis terræ et lunæ, et annuo circa solem: et + propterea particula quævis lapidis vel aquæ describat lineam a + circulari longe abhorrentem. Neque revera est, qui creditur, + conatus axifugus, quoniam non respicit unum aliquem axem ratione + spatii absoluti, supposito quod detur tale spatium: proinde non + video quomodo appellari possit <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page524">[pg 524]</span><a name="Pg524" id="Pg524" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> conatus unicus, cui motus vere circularis + tanquam proprio et adaequato effectui respondet.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">63. Motus nullus + dignosci potest, aut mensurari, nisi per res sensibiles. Cum ergo + spatium absolutum nullo modo in sensus incurrat, necesse est ut + inutile prorsus sit ad distinctionem motuum. Præterea determinatio + sive directio motui essentialis est, ilia vero in relatione + consistit. Ergo impossibile est ut motus absolutus concipiatur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">64. Porro + quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit motus ejusdem + corporis, quinimo uno respectu moveri, altero quiescere dici + quidpiam possit<a id="noteref_1000" name="noteref_1000" href= + "#note_1000"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1000</span></span></a>; ad + determinandum motum verum et quietem veram, quo scilicet tollatur + ambiguitas, et consulatur mechanicæ philosophorum, qui systema + rerum latius contemplantur, satis fuerit spatium relativum fixarum + cœlo, tanquam quiescente spectato, conclusum adhibere, loco spatii + absoluti. Motus autem et quies tali spatio relativo definiti, + commode adhiberi possunt loco absolutorum, qui ab illis nullo + symptomate discerni possunt. Etenim imprimantur utcunque vires, + sint quicunque conatus, concedamus motum distingui per actiones in + corpora exercitas; nunquam tamen inde sequetur, dari spatium illud + et locum absolutum, ejusque mutationem esse locum verum.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">65. Leges + motuum, effectusque, et theoremata eorundem proportiones et + calculos continentia, pro diversis viarum figuris, accelerationibus + itidem et directionibus diversis, mediisque plus minusve + resistentibus, hæc omnia constant sine calculatione motus absoluti. + Uti vel ex eo patet quod, quum secundum illorum principia qui motum + absolutum inducunt, nullo symptomate scire liceat, utrum integra + rerum compages quiescat, an moveatur uniformiter in directum, + perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis cognosci posse.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">66. Ex dictis + patet ad veram motus naturam perspiciendam summopere juvaturum, 1°. + Distinguere inter hypotheses mathematicas et naturas rerum: 2°. + Cavere ab abstractionibus: 3°. Considerare motum tanquam aliquid + sensibile, vel saltem imaginabile; mensurisque relativis esse + contentos. Quæ si fecerimus, simul clarissima quæque <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page525">[pg 525]</span><a name="Pg525" id="Pg525" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> philosophiæ mechanicæ theoremata, + quibus reserantur naturæ recessus, mundique systema calculis + humanis subjicitur, manebunt intemerata, et motus contemplatio a + mille minutiis, subtilitatibus, ideisque abstractis libera evadet. + Atque hæc de natura motus dicta sufficiant.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">67. Restat, ut + disseramus de causa communicationis motuum<a id="noteref_1001" + name="noteref_1001" href="#note_1001"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1001</span></span></a>. + Esse autem vim impressam in corpus mobile causam motus in eo, + plerique existimant. Veruntamen illos non assignare causam motus + cognitam, et a corpore motuque distinctam, ex præmissis constat. + Patet insuper vim non esse rem certam et determinatam, ex eo quod + viri summi de ilia multum diversa, immo contraria, proferant, salva + tamen in consequentiis veritate. Siquidem Newtonus<a id= + "noteref_1002" name="noteref_1002" href="#note_1002"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1002</span></span></a> ait + vim impressam consistere in actione sola, esseque actionem + exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus mutandum, nee post actionem + manere. Torricellius<a id="noteref_1003" name="noteref_1003" href= + "#note_1003"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1003</span></span></a> + cumulum quendam sive aggregatum virium impressarum per percussionem + in corpus mobile recipi, ibidemque manere atque impetum constituere + contendit. Idem fere Borellus<a id="noteref_1004" name= + "noteref_1004" href="#note_1004"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1004</span></span></a> + aliique prædicant. At vero, tametsi inter se pugnare videantur + Newtonus et Torricellius, nihilominus, dum singuli sibi consentanea + proferunt, res satis commode ab utrisque explicatur. Quippe vires + omnes corporibus attributæ tam sunt hypotheses mathematicæ quam + vires attractivæ in planetis et sole. Cæterum entia mathematica in + rerum natura stabilem essentiam non habent: pendent autem a notione + definientis; unde eadem res diversimode explicari potest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">68. Statuamus + motum novum in corpore percusso conservari, sive per vim insitam, + qua corpus quodlibet perseverat in statu suo vel motus vel quietis + uniformis in directum; sive per vim impressam, durante percussione + in corpus percussum receptam ibidemque permanentem; idem erit quoad + rem, differentia existente in nominibus tantum. Similiter, ubi + mobile percutiens perdit, et <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page526">[pg 526]</span><a name="Pg526" id="Pg526" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> percussum acquirit motum, parum refert + disputare, utrum motus acquisitus sit idem numero cum motu perdito, + ducit enim in minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de + identitate. Itaque sive dicamus motum transire a percutiente in + percussum, sive in percusso motum de novo generari, destrui autem + in percutiente, res eodem recidit. Utrobique intelligitur unum + corpus motum perdere, alterum acquirere, et præterea nihil.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">69. Mentem, quæ + agitat et continet universam hancce molem corpoream, estque causa + vera efficiens motus, eandem esse, proprie et stricte loquendo, + causam communicationis ejusdem haud negaverim. In philosophia tamen + physica, causas et solutiones phænomenon a principiis mechanicis + petere oportet. Physice igitur res explicatur non assignando ejus + causam vere agentem et incorpoream, sed demonstrando ejus + connexionem cum principiis mechanicis: cujusmodi est illud, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">actionem + et reactionem esse semper contrarias et æquales</span></em><a id= + "noteref_1005" name="noteref_1005" href="#note_1005"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1005</span></span></a>, a + quo, tanquam fonte et principio primario, eruuntur regulæ de motuum + communicatione, quæ a neotericis, magno scientiarum bono, jam ante + repertæ sunt et demonstratæ.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">70. Nobis satis + fuerit, si innuamus principium illud alio modo declarari potuisse. + Nam si vera rerum natura potius quam abstracta mathesis spectetur, + videbitur rectius dici, in attractione vel percussione passionem + corporum, quam actionem, esse utrobique æqualem. Exempli gratia, + lapis fune equo alligatus tantum trahitur versus equum, quantum + equus versus lapidem: corpus etiam motum in aliud quiescens + impactum, patitur eandem mutationem cum corpore quiescente. Et + quoad effectum realem, percutiens est item percussum, percussumque + percutiens. Mutatio autem illa est utrobique, tam in corpore equi + quam in lapide, tam in moto quam in quiescente, passio mera. Esse + autem vim, virtutem, aut actionem corpoream talium effectuum vere + et proprie causatricem non constat. Corpus motum in quiescens + impingitur; loquimur tamen active, dicentes illud hoc impellere: + nec absurde in mechanicis, ubi ideæ mathematicæ potius quam veræ + rerum naturæ spectantur.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">71. In physica, + sensus et experientia, quæ ad effectus <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page527">[pg 527]</span><a name="Pg527" id="Pg527" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> apparentes solummodo pertingunt, locum + habent; in mechanica, notiones abstractæ mathematicorum + admittuntur. In philosophia prima, seu metaphysica, agitur de rebus + incorporeis, de causis, veritate, et existentia rerum. Physicus + series sive successiones rerum sensibilium contemplatur, quibus + legibus connectuntur, et quo ordine, quid præcedit tanquam causa, + quid sequitur tanquam effectus, animadvertens.<a id="noteref_1006" + name="noteref_1006" href="#note_1006"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1006</span></span></a> + Atque hac ratione dicimus corpus motum esse causam motus in altero, + vel ei motum imprimere, trahere etiam, aut impellere. Quo sensu + causæ secundæ corporeæ intelligi debent, nulla ratione habita veræ + sedis virium, vel potentiarum actricum, aut causæ realis cui + insunt. Porro dici possunt causæ vel principia mechanica, ultra + corpus, figuram, motum, etiam axiomata scientiæ mechanicæ primaria, + tanquam causæ consequentium spectata.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">72. Causæ vere + activæ meditatione tantum et ratiocinio e tenebris erui quibus + involvuntur possunt, et aliquatenus cognosci. Spectat autem ad + philosophiam primam, seu metaphysicam, de iis agere. Quodsi cuique + scientiæ provincia sua<a id="noteref_1007" name="noteref_1007" + href="#note_1007"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1007</span></span></a> + tribuatur, limites assignentur, principia et objecta accurate + distinguantur, quæ ad singulas pertinent, tractare licuerit majore, + cum facilitate, tum perspicuitate.</p> + </div> + </div> + </div> + <hr class="doublepage" /> + + <div class="tei tei-back" style= + "margin-bottom: 2.00em; margin-top: 6.00em"> + <div id="footnotes" class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc55" id="toc55"></a> <a name="pdf56" id="pdf56"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Footnotes</span></h1> + + <dl class="tei tei-list-footnotes"> + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1" name="note_1" href= + "#noteref_1">1.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophy of Theism</span></span>: The + Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in + 1894-96. (Second Edition, 1899.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_2" name="note_2" href= + "#noteref_2">2.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span>, sect. 147, + 148.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_3" name="note_3" href= + "#noteref_3">3.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 6.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_4" name="note_4" href= + "#noteref_4">4.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Preface to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Three Dialogues + between Hylas and Philonous</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_5" name="note_5" href= + "#noteref_5">5.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">By Anthony Collins.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_6" name="note_6" href= + "#noteref_6">6.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See vol. III, Appendix B.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_7" name="note_7" href= + "#noteref_7">7.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Murdoch Martin, a native of Skye, + author of a <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Voyage to St. Kilda</span></span> (1698), and + a <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Description of the Western Islands of + Scotland</span></span> (1703).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_8" name="note_8" href= + "#noteref_8">8.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Stewart's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Works</span></span> + (ed. Hamilton), vol. I. p. 161. There is a version of this story by + DeQuincey, in his quaint essay on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Murder considered as + one of the Fine Arts.</span></span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_9" name="note_9" href= + "#noteref_9">9.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sir John became Lord Percival in that + year.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_10" name="note_10" href= + "#noteref_10">10.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">A place more than once visited by + Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_11" name="note_11" href= + "#noteref_11">11.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Bakewell's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Memoirs of the Court + of Augustus</span></span>, vol. II. p. 177.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_12" name="note_12" href= + "#noteref_12">12.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">A letter in Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life and + Letters</span></span>, p. 93, which led me to a different opinion, + I have now reason to believe was not written by him, nor was it + written in 1721. The research of Dr. Lorenz, confirmed by internal + evidence, shews that it was written in October, 1684, before + Berkeley the philosopher was born, and when the Duke of Ormond was + Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The writer was probably the Hon. and + Rev. George Berkeley, a Prebendary of Westminster in 1687, who died + in 1694. The wife of the <span class="tei tei-q">“pious Robert + Nelson”</span> was a daughter of Earl Berkeley, and this + <span class="tei tei-q">“George”</span> was her younger + brother.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_13" name="note_13" href= + "#noteref_13">13.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Percival MSS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_14" name="note_14" href= + "#noteref_14">14.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For the letter, see Editor's Preface + to the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Proposal for a College in + Bermuda</span></span>, vol. IV. pp. 343-44.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_15" name="note_15" href= + "#noteref_15">15.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Afterwards Sir John James.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_16" name="note_16" href= + "#noteref_16">16.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Smibert the artist, who made a picture + of Berkeley in 1725, and afterwards in America of the family party + then at Gravesend.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_17" name="note_17" href= + "#noteref_17">17.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Historical Register</span></span>, vol. XIII, + p. 289 (1728).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_18" name="note_18" href= + "#noteref_18">18.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New England Weekly Courier</span></span>, Feb. + 3, 1729.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_19" name="note_19" href= + "#noteref_19">19.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For valuable information about Rhode + Island, reproduced in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Berkeley's Life and + Correspondence</span></span> and here, I am indebted to Colonel + Higginson, to whom I desire to make this tardy but grateful + acknowledgement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_20" name="note_20" href= + "#noteref_20">20.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">James, Dalton, and Smibert.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_21" name="note_21" href= + "#noteref_21">21.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Whitehall, having fallen into decay, + has been lately restored by the pious efforts of Mrs. Livingston + Mason, in concert with the Rev. Dr. E. E. Hale, and others. This + good work was completed in the summer of 1900; and the house is now + as nearly as possible in the state in which Berkeley left it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_22" name="note_22" href= + "#noteref_22">22.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See vol. III, Appendix C.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_23" name="note_23" href= + "#noteref_23">23.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Three Men of Letters</span></span>, by Moses + Coit Tyler (New York, 1895). He records some of the American + academical and other institutions that are directly or indirectly, + due to Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_24" name="note_24" href= + "#noteref_24">24.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The thought implied in this paragraph + is pursued in my <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophy of Theism</span></span>, in which + the ethical perfection of the Universal Mind is taken as the + fundamental postulate in all human experience. If the Universal + Mind is not ethically perfect, the universe (including our + spiritual constitution) is radically untrustworthy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_25" name="note_25" href= + "#noteref_25">25.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Life and Letters of Berkeley</span></span>, p. + 222.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_26" name="note_26" href= + "#noteref_26">26.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The third Earl of Shaftesbury, the + pupil of Locke, and author of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Characteristics</span></span>. In addition to + the well-known biography by Dr. Fowler, the present eminent + Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Shaftesbury has been interpreted in two + other lately published works—a <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life</span></span> by + Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. (1900), and an edition of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Characteristics</span></span>, with an + Introduction and Notes, by John M. Robertson (1900).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_27" name="note_27" href= + "#noteref_27">27.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The title of this book is—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Things Divine and + Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and + Human</span></span>, by the Author of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">The Procedure, Extent + and Limits of the Human Understanding</span></span>. The + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Divine + Analogy</span></span> appeared in 1733, and the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Procedure</span></span> in 1728.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_28" name="note_28" href= + "#noteref_28">28.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Spinoza argues that what is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">called</span></em> + <span class="tei tei-q">“understanding”</span> and <span class= + "tei tei-q">“will”</span> in God, has no more in common with human + understanding and will than the dog-star in the heavens has with + the animal we call a dog. See Spinoza's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Ethica</span></span>, + I. 17, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Scholium</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_29" name="note_29" href= + "#noteref_29">29.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The question of the knowableness of + God, or Omnipotent Moral Perfection in the concrete, enters into + recent philosophical and theological discussion in Britain. + Calderwood, in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophy of the Infinite</span></span> + (1854), was one of the earliest, and not the least acute, of + Hamilton's critics in this matter. The subject is lucidly treated + by Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Lectures on + Theism</span></span> (1897) and in a supplement to Calderwood's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Life</span></span> (1900). So also Huxley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">David + Hume</span></span> and Professor Iverach's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Is God + Knowable?</span></span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_30" name="note_30" href= + "#noteref_30">30.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Stewart's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Works</span></span>. + vol. I. pp. 350-1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_31" name="note_31" href= + "#noteref_31">31.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley MSS. possessed by Archdeacon + Rose.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_32" name="note_32" href= + "#noteref_32">32.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Pope's poetic + tribute to Berkeley belongs to this period—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Even in a bishop I can spy desert;<br /> + Secker is decent; Rundle has a heart:<br /> + Manners with candour are to Benson given,<br /> + To Berkeley—every virtue under heaven.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Epilogue to the + Satires.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Also his + satirical tribute to the critics of Berkeley—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Truth's sacred fort th' exploded laugh shall + win;<br /> + And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Satire,</span></span> Part II.</p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_33" name="note_33" href= + "#noteref_33">33.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life and + Letters</span></span>, p. 210.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_34" name="note_34" href= + "#noteref_34">34.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Bacon's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Novuin + Organum</span></span>. Distributio Operis.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_35" name="note_35" href= + "#noteref_35">35.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Section 141.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_36" name="note_36" href= + "#noteref_36">36.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class="tei tei-q">“Editor's + Preface to Alciphron.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_37" name="note_37" href= + "#noteref_37">37.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Compare Essay II in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Guardian</span></span> with this.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_38" name="note_38" href= + "#noteref_38">38.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Taylor, in later life, conformed to + the Anglican Church.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_39" name="note_39" href= + "#noteref_39">39.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life and + Letters</span></span>, chap. viii.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_40" name="note_40" href= + "#noteref_40">40.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Primacy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_41" name="note_41" href= + "#noteref_41">41.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This seems to have been his eldest + son, Henry.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_42" name="note_42" href= + "#noteref_42">42.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">His son George was already settled at + Christ Church. Henry, the eldest son, born in Rhode Island, was + then <span class="tei tei-q">“abroad in the south of France for his + health,”</span> as one of his brother George's letters tells us, + found among the Johnson MSS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_43" name="note_43" href= + "#noteref_43">43.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Appendix D. Reid, like Berkeley, + held that <span class="tei tei-q">“matter cannot be the cause of + anything,”</span> but this not as a consequence of the new + conception of the world presented to the senses, through which + alone Berkeley opens <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">his</span></em> way to its powerlessness; + although Reid supposes that in his youth he followed Berkeley in + this too. See <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thomas Reid</span></span> (1898), in + <span class="tei tei-q">“Famous Scots Series,”</span> where I have + enlarged on this.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_44" name="note_44" href= + "#noteref_44">44.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Johnson MSS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_45" name="note_45" href= + "#noteref_45">45.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That Berkeley + was buried in Oxford is mentioned in his son's letter to Johnson, + in which he says : <span class="tei tei-q">“His remains are + interred in the Cathedral of Christ Church, and next week a + monument to his memory will be erected with an inscription by Dr. + Markham, a Student of this College.”</span> As the son was + present at, and superintended the arrangements for his father's + funeral, it can be no stretch of credulity to believe that he + knew where his father was buried. It may be added that Berkeley + himself had provided in his Will <span class="tei tei-q">“that my + body be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which I + die.”</span> The Will, dated July 31, 1752, is given <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in extenso</span></span> in my <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life and + Letters</span></span> of Berkeley, p. 345. We have also the + record of burial in the Register of Christ Church Cathedral, + which shews that <span class="tei tei-q">“on January ye + 20<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "vertical-align: super">th</span></span> 1753, ye Right Reverend + John (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sic</span></span>) Berkley, L<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">d</span></span> + Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed”</span> there. This disposes of the + statement on p. 17 of Diprose's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Account of the + Parish of Saint Clement Danes</span></span> (1868), that Berkeley + was buried in that church.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I may add that + a beautiful memorial of Berkeley has lately been placed in the + Cathedral of Cloyne, by subscriptions in this country and largely + in America.</p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_46" name="note_46" href= + "#noteref_46">46.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“General + ideas,”</span> i.e. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract</span></em> general ideas, + distinguished, in Berkeley's nominalism, from <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">concrete</span></em> general ideas, or from + general names, which are signs of any one of an indefinite number + of individual objects. Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles,</span></span> Introduction, sect. + 16.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_47" name="note_47" href= + "#noteref_47">47.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Introduction to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles of Human + Knowledge</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_48" name="note_48" href= + "#noteref_48">48.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“co-existing + ideas,”</span> i.e. phenomena presented in uniform order to the + senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_49" name="note_49" href= + "#noteref_49">49.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Newton postulates a world of matter + and motion, governed mechanically by laws within itself: Berkeley + finds himself charged with New Principles, demanded by reason, with + which Newton's postulate is inconsistent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_50" name="note_50" href= + "#noteref_50">50.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He attempts this in many parts of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>. He recognises the + difficulty of reconciling his New Principles with the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">identity</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">permanence</span></em> of sensible + things.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_51" name="note_51" href= + "#noteref_51">51.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He contemplated thus early + applications of his New Principles to Mathematics, afterwards made + in his book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 118-32.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_52" name="note_52" href= + "#noteref_52">52.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What Berkeley calls <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + are either perceptible by the senses or imagined: either way they + are concrete: <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract ideas</span></em> are empty + words.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_53" name="note_53" href= + "#noteref_53">53.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. the existence of bodies and + qualities independently of—in abstraction from—all percipient mind. + While the spiritual theism of Descartes is acceptable, he rejects + his mechanical conception of the material world.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_54" name="note_54" href= + "#noteref_54">54.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“house”</span> or a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“church”</span> includes more than <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">visible</span></em> + ideas, so that we cannot, strictly speaking, be said to see it. We + see immediately only visible signs of its invisible qualities.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_55" name="note_55" href= + "#noteref_55">55.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is added in the margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_56" name="note_56" href= + "#noteref_56">56.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The total impotence of Matter, and the + omnipotence of Mind or Spirit in Nature, is thus early becoming the + dominant thought with Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_57" name="note_57" href= + "#noteref_57">57.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This refers to an objection to the New + Principles that is apparently reinforced by recent discoveries in + geology. But if these contradict the Principles, so does the + existence of a table while I am only seeing it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_58" name="note_58" href= + "#noteref_58">58.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Existence, in short, can be realised + only in the form of living percipient mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_59" name="note_59" href= + "#noteref_59">59.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley hardly distinguishes + uncontingent mathematical <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relations</span></em>, to which the sensible + ideas or phenomena in which the relations are concretely manifested + must conform.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_60" name="note_60" href= + "#noteref_60">60.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">M. T. = matter tangible; M. V. = + matter visible; M. . = matter sensible. The distinctions n question + were made prominent in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span>. See sect. 1, + 121-45.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_61" name="note_61" href= + "#noteref_61">61.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Which the common supposition regarding + primary qualities seems to contradict.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_62" name="note_62" href= + "#noteref_62">62.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[That need not have been blotted + out—'tis good sense, if we do but determine w<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="vertical-align: super">t</span></span> we + mean by <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></span>.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on blank page of + the MS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_63" name="note_63" href= + "#noteref_63">63.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises attempts to define motion, + as involving a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">petitio</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_64" name="note_64" href= + "#noteref_64">64.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">George Cheyne, the physician (known + afterwards as author of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">English Malady</span></span>), published in + 1705 a work on Fluxions, which procured him admission to the Royal + Society. He was born in 1670.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_65" name="note_65" href= + "#noteref_65">65.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This reminds us of Hume, and inclines + towards the empirical notion of Causation, as merely constancy in + sequence—not even continuous metamorphosis.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_66" name="note_66" href= + "#noteref_66">66.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is Berkeley's objection to + abstract, i.e. unperceived, quantities and infinitesimals—important + in the sequel.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_67" name="note_67" href= + "#noteref_67">67.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The <span class="tei tei-q">“lines and + figures”</span> of pure mathematics, that is to say; which he + rejects as meaningless, in his horror unrealisable + abstractions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_68" name="note_68" href= + "#noteref_68">68.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Things really exist, that is to say, + in degrees, e.g. in a lesser degree, when they are imagined than + when they are actually perceived by our senses; but, in this wide + meaning of existence, they may in both cases be said to exist.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_69" name="note_69" href= + "#noteref_69">69.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Added on blank page of the MS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_70" name="note_70" href= + "#noteref_70">70.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In Berkeley's limitation of the term + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> to what is presented + objectively in sense, or represented concretely in imagination. + Accordingly <span class="tei tei-q">“an infinite idea”</span> would + be an idea which transcends ideation—an express contradiction.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_71" name="note_71" href= + "#noteref_71">71.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Does the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">human</span></em> + spirit depend on <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensible</span></em> ideas as much as they + depend on spirit? Other orders of spiritual beings may be + percipient of other sorts of phenomena than those presented in + those few senses to which man is confined, although self-conscious + activity abstracted from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">all</span></em> sorts of presented phenomena + seems impossible. But a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily + dependent on <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">our</span></em> material world or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">our</span></em> + sense experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_72" name="note_72" href= + "#noteref_72">72.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[This I do not altogether approve + of.]—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_73" name="note_73" href= + "#noteref_73">73.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He afterwards guarded the difference, + by contrasting <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to our + senses, or represented in sensuous imagination, and applying the + former to intellectual apprehension of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“operations of the mind,”</span> and of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“relations”</span> among ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_74" name="note_74" href= + "#noteref_74">74.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 89.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_75" name="note_75" href= + "#noteref_75">75.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is thought, then, independent of + language? Can we realise thought worthy of the name without use of + words? This is Berkeley's excessive juvenile reaction against + verbal abstractions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_76" name="note_76" href= + "#noteref_76">76.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Every general notion is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideally + realisable</span></em> in one or other of its possible concrete or + individual applications.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_77" name="note_77" href= + "#noteref_77">77.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is the germ of Berkeley's notion + of the objectivity of the material world to individual percipients + and so of the rise of individual self-consciousness.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_78" name="note_78" href= + "#noteref_78">78.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Added by Berkeley on blank page of the + MS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_79" name="note_79" href= + "#noteref_79">79.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. p. <a href="#Pg420" class= + "tei tei-ref">420</a>, note 2. Bishop Sprat's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">History of the Royal + Society</span></span> appeared in 1667.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_80" name="note_80" href= + "#noteref_80">80.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Much need; for what he means by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> has not been attended to by + his critics.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_81" name="note_81" href= + "#noteref_81">81.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What <span class="tei tei-q">“Second + Book”</span> is this? Does he refer to the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Second Part”</span> of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, which never + appeared? God is the culmination of his philosophy, in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_82" name="note_82" href= + "#noteref_82">82.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is Berkeley's material substance. + Individual material substances are for him, steady aggregates of + sense-given phenomena, having the efficient and final cause of + their aggregation in eternally active Mind—active mind, human and + Divine, being essential to their realisation for man.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_83" name="note_83" href= + "#noteref_83">83.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Introduction to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, especially sect. + 18-25.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_84" name="note_84" href= + "#noteref_84">84.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Stillingfleet charges Locke with + <span class="tei tei-q">“discarding substance out of the reasonable + part of the world.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_85" name="note_85" href= + "#noteref_85">85.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The philosophers supposed the real + things to exist behind our ideas, in concealment: Berkeley was now + beginning to think that the objective ideas or phenomena presented + to the senses, the existence of which needs no proof, were + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">themselves</span></em> the significant and + interpretable realities of physical science.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_86" name="note_86" href= + "#noteref_86">86.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">If the material world can be + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real</span></em> only in and through a + percipient intelligence, as the realising factor.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_87" name="note_87" href= + "#noteref_87">87.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 13, 119-122, + which deny the possibility of an idea or mental picture + corresponding to abstract number.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_88" name="note_88" href= + "#noteref_88">88.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Præcedaneous,”</span> i.e. precedent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_89" name="note_89" href= + "#noteref_89">89.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Who refunds human as well as natural + causation into Divine agency.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_90" name="note_90" href= + "#noteref_90">90.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In which Locke treats <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Of the Reality of Knowledge,”</span> including + questions apt to lead Berkeley to inquire, Whether we could in + reason suppose reality in the absence of all realising mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_91" name="note_91" href= + "#noteref_91">91.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract idea”</span> is misconceived and caricatured + by Berkeley in his impetuosity.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_92" name="note_92" href= + "#noteref_92">92.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This and other passages refer to the + scepticism, that is founded on the impossibility of our comparing + our ideas of things with unperceived real things; so that we can + never escape from the circle of subjectivity. Berkeley intended to + refute this scepticism.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_93" name="note_93" href= + "#noteref_93">93.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Probably Samuel Madden, who afterwards + edited the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Querist</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_94" name="note_94" href= + "#noteref_94">94.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This <span class="tei tei-q">“First + Book”</span> seems to be <span class="tei tei-q">“Part I”</span> of + the projected <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>—the only Part ever + published. Here he inclines to <span class="tei tei-q">“perception + or thought in general,”</span> in the language of Descartes; but in + the end he approximates to Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“sensation and reflection.”</span> See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 1, and + notes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_95" name="note_95" href= + "#noteref_95">95.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Does he mean, like Hume afterwards, + that ideas or phenomena constitute the ego, so that I am only the + transitory conscious state of each moment?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_96" name="note_96" href= + "#noteref_96">96.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Consciousness”</span>—a term rarely used by Berkeley + or his contemporaries.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_97" name="note_97" href= + "#noteref_97">97.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This too, if strictly interpreted, + looks like an anticipation of Hume's reduction of the ego into + successive <span class= + "tei tei-q">“impressions”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“nothing + but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed + one another with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual + flux and movement.”</span> See Hume's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise</span></span>, Part IV. sect. 6.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_98" name="note_98" href= + "#noteref_98">98.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What <span class="tei tei-q">“Third + Book”</span> is here projected? Was a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Third Part”</span> of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> then in embryo?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_99" name="note_99" href= + "#noteref_99">99.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is scarcely done in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Introduction”</span> to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_100" name="note_100" + href="#noteref_100">100.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley, as we find in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>, is fond of + conjecturing how a man all alone in the world, freed from the + abstractions of language, would apprehend the realities of + existence, which he must then face directly, without the use or + abuse of verbal symbols.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_101" name="note_101" + href="#noteref_101">101.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This <span class="tei tei-q">“N. + B.”</span> is expanded in the Introduction to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_102" name="note_102" + href="#noteref_102">102.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 4.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_103" name="note_103" + href="#noteref_103">103.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What is immediately realised in our + percipient experience must be presumed or trusted in as real, if we + have any hold of reality, or the moral right to postulate that our + universe is fundamentally trustworthy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_104" name="note_104" + href="#noteref_104">104.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But he distinguishes, in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and elsewhere, + between an idea of sense and a percipient ego.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_105" name="note_105" + href="#noteref_105">105.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">They reappear in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_106" name="note_106" + href="#noteref_106">106.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In one of Berkeley's letters to + Johnson, a quarter of a century after the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span>, when he was in America, he observes that + <span class="tei tei-q">“the mechanical philosophers pretend to + demonstrate that matter is proportional to gravity. But their + argument concludes nothing, and is a mere circle”</span>—as he + proceeds to show.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_107" name="note_107" + href="#noteref_107">107.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 1-33, he seeks + to fulfil the expository part of this intention; in sect. 33-84, + also in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues between Hylas and + Philonous</span></span>, he is <span class="tei tei-q">“particular + in answering objections.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_108" name="note_108" + href="#noteref_108">108.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">If Matter is arbitrarily credited with + omnipotence.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_109" name="note_109" + href="#noteref_109">109.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On freedom as implied in a moral and + responsible agent, cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 257 and note.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_110" name="note_110" + href="#noteref_110">110.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is not this one way of expressing the + Universal Providence and constant uniting agency of God in the + material world?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_111" name="note_111" + href="#noteref_111">111.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> + seems to be used in its wider signification, including <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_112" name="note_112" + href="#noteref_112">112.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“infinitely + greater”</span>—Does infinity admit of imaginable degrees?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_113" name="note_113" + href="#noteref_113">113.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">'embrangled'—perplexed—involved in + disputes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_114" name="note_114" + href="#noteref_114">114.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 24.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_115" name="note_115" + href="#noteref_115">115.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“homonymy,”</span> i.e. equivocation.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_116" name="note_116" + href="#noteref_116">116.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Voluntary or responsible activity is + not an idea or datum of sense, nor can it be realised in sensuous + imagination. He uses <span class="tei tei-q">“thing”</span> in the + wide meaning which comprehends persons.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_117" name="note_117" + href="#noteref_117">117.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Voluntary or responsible activity is + not an idea or datum of sense, nor can it be realised in sensuous + imagination. He uses <span class="tei tei-q">“thing”</span> in the + wide meaning which comprehends persons.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_118" name="note_118" + href="#noteref_118">118.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is this consistent with other + entries?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_119" name="note_119" + href="#noteref_119">119.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. + 9-19.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_120" name="note_120" + href="#noteref_120">120.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is one way of meeting the + difficulty of supposed interruptions of conscious or percipient + activity.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_121" name="note_121" + href="#noteref_121">121.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This seems to imply that voluntary + action is mysteriously self-originated.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_122" name="note_122" + href="#noteref_122">122.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“perception.”</span> He does not include the + percipient.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_123" name="note_123" + href="#noteref_123">123.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“without,”</span> i.e. unrealised by any + percipient.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_124" name="note_124" + href="#noteref_124">124.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This would make <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> + the term only for what is imagined, as distinguished from what is + perceived in sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_125" name="note_125" + href="#noteref_125">125.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In a strict use of words, only + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">persons</span></em> exercise will—not + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">things</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_126" name="note_126" + href="#noteref_126">126.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As we must do in imagination, which + (unlike sense) is representative; for the mental images represent + original data of sense-perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_127" name="note_127" + href="#noteref_127">127.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Does he not allow that we have + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">meaning</span></em>, if not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, + when we use the terms virtue and vice and moral action?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_128" name="note_128" + href="#noteref_128">128.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As Locke says we are.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_129" name="note_129" + href="#noteref_129">129.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Existence</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">unity</span></em> + are ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object + without and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we + consider that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">they</span></em> exist.”</span> Locke's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. + 7.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_130" name="note_130" + href="#noteref_130">130.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. of Existence in the + abstract—unperceived and unperceiving—realised neither in + percipient life nor in moral action.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_131" name="note_131" + href="#noteref_131">131.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This suggests that God knows sensible + things without being sentient of any.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_132" name="note_132" + href="#noteref_132">132.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introd., sect. + 1-5.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_133" name="note_133" + href="#noteref_133">133.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Preface to <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>; also to <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_134" name="note_134" + href="#noteref_134">134.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. that ethics was a science of + phenomena or ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_135" name="note_135" + href="#noteref_135">135.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">independent</span></em> existence of + Matter.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_136" name="note_136" + href="#noteref_136">136.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">'bodies'—i.e. sensible things—not + unrealised Matter.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_137" name="note_137" + href="#noteref_137">137.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 13.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_138" name="note_138" + href="#noteref_138">138.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke died in October, 1704.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_139" name="note_139" + href="#noteref_139">139.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“without the + mind,”</span> i.e. abstracted from all active percipient life.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_140" name="note_140" + href="#noteref_140">140.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. secondary qualities of sensible + things, in which pleasure and pain are prominent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_141" name="note_141" + href="#noteref_141">141.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. primary qualities, in which + pleasure and pain are latent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_142" name="note_142" + href="#noteref_142">142.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II. ch. 13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV. ch. 3. § 6; also + his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding the possibility + of Matter thinking. With Berkeley real space is a finite creature, + dependent for realisation on living percipient Spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_143" name="note_143" + href="#noteref_143">143.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But what of the origination of the + volition itself?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_144" name="note_144" + href="#noteref_144">144.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See + also Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Letters</span></span> to Stillingfleet.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_145" name="note_145" + href="#noteref_145">145.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is, according to Berkeley, the + steady union or co-existence of a group of sense-phenomena.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_146" name="note_146" + href="#noteref_146">146.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. i. § 10—where + he argues for interruptions of consciousness. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Men think not always.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_147" name="note_147" + href="#noteref_147">147.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, the material world is + wholly impotent: all activity in the universe is spiritual.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_148" name="note_148" + href="#noteref_148">148.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On the order of its four books and the + structure of Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, see the Prolegomena in my + edition of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, pp. liv-lviii.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_149" name="note_149" + href="#noteref_149">149.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. independent imperceptible + Matter.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_150" name="note_150" + href="#noteref_150">150.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What of the earliest geological + periods, asks Ueberweg? But is there greater difficulty in such + instances than in explaining the existence of a table or a house, + while one is merely seeing, without touching?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_151" name="note_151" + href="#noteref_151">151.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke explains <span class= + "tei tei-q">“substance”</span> as <span class="tei tei-q">“an + uncertain supposition of we know not what.”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. I. ch. 4. § 18.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_152" name="note_152" + href="#noteref_152">152.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke makes certainty consist in the + agreement of <span class="tei tei-q">“our ideas with the reality of + things.”</span> See <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. IV. ch. 4. § 18. Here + the sceptical difficulty arises, which Berkeley meets under his + Principle. If we have no perception of reality, we cannot compare + our ideas with it, and so cannot have any criterion of + reality.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_153" name="note_153" + href="#noteref_153">153.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[This seems wrong. Certainty, real + certainty, is of sensible ideas. I may be certain without + affirmation or negation.—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author.</span></span>] This needs + further explanation.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_154" name="note_154" + href="#noteref_154">154.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This entry and the preceding tends to + resolve all judgments which are not what Kant calls analytical into + contingent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_155" name="note_155" + href="#noteref_155">155.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. IV. ch. 1, §§ 3-7, and ch. 3. §§ 7-21. The stress Berkeley lays + on <span class="tei tei-q">“co-existence”</span> is + significant.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_156" name="note_156" + href="#noteref_156">156.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. we must not doubt the reality of + the immediate data of sense but accept it, as <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the mob”</span> do.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_157" name="note_157" + href="#noteref_157">157.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But is imagination different from + actual perception only in <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">degree</span></span> of reality?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_158" name="note_158" + href="#noteref_158">158.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 13, 120; also + Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. + 7.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_159" name="note_159" + href="#noteref_159">159.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_160" name="note_160" + href="#noteref_160">160.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's aim evidently is to deliver + men from empty abstractions, by a return to more reasonably + interpreted common-sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_161" name="note_161" + href="#noteref_161">161.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The sort of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">external</span></em> world that is + intelligible to us is that of which <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">another + person</span></em> is percipient, and which is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objective</span></em> to me, in a percipient + experience foreign to mine.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_162" name="note_162" + href="#noteref_162">162.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Arithmetica</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Miscellanea + Mathematica</span></span>, published while he was making his + entries in this <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_163" name="note_163" + href="#noteref_163">163.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Minima sensibilia?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_164" name="note_164" + href="#noteref_164">164.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Pleasures, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">quâ</span></span> + pleasures, are natural causes of correlative desires, as pains or + uneasinesses are of correlative aversions. This is implied in the + very nature of pleasure and pain.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_165" name="note_165" + href="#noteref_165">165.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here we have his explanation of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_166" name="note_166" + href="#noteref_166">166.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Absent things.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_167" name="note_167" + href="#noteref_167">167.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here, as elsewhere, he resolves + geometry, as strictly demonstrable, into a reasoned system of + analytical or verbal propositions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_168" name="note_168" + href="#noteref_168">168.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Compare this with note 3, p. 34; also + with the contrast between Sense and Reason, in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>. + Is the statement consistent with implied assumptions even in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, apart from which + they could not cohere?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_169" name="note_169" + href="#noteref_169">169.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">To have an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> of + God—as Berkeley uses idea—would imply that God is an immediately + perceptible, or at least an imaginable object.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_170" name="note_170" + href="#noteref_170">170.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 89.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_171" name="note_171" + href="#noteref_171">171.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ch. 11. § 5.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_172" name="note_172" + href="#noteref_172">172.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Why add—<span class="tei tei-q">“or + perception”</span>?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_173" name="note_173" + href="#noteref_173">173.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here we have Berkeley's favourite + thought of the divine arbitrariness of the constitution of Nature, + and of its laws of change.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_174" name="note_174" + href="#noteref_174">174.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This suggests the puzzle, that the + cause of every volition must be a preceding volition, and so on + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_175" name="note_175" + href="#noteref_175">175.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, I. 19.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_176" name="note_176" + href="#noteref_176">176.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. of his own individual mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_177" name="note_177" + href="#noteref_177">177.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></em> + percipient mind, but not necessarily to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mine</span></em>; + for natural laws are independent of individual will, although the + individual participates in perception of the ordered changes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_178" name="note_178" + href="#noteref_178">178.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Arithmetica</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_179" name="note_179" + href="#noteref_179">179.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. which are not phenomena. This + recognition of originative Will even then distinguished + Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_180" name="note_180" + href="#noteref_180">180.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is this Part II of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, which was lost in + Italy?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_181" name="note_181" + href="#noteref_181">181.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The thought of articulate <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relations</span></em> to which real existence + must conform, was not then at least in Berkeley's mind. Hence the + empiricism and sensationalism into which he occasionally seems to + rush in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>, in his + repulsion from empty abstractions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_182" name="note_182" + href="#noteref_182">182.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is the essence of Berkeley's + philosophy—<span class="tei tei-q">“a blind agent is a + contradiction.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_183" name="note_183" + href="#noteref_183">183.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is the basis of Berkeley's + reasoning for the necessarily <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unrepresentative</span></em> character of the + ideas or phenomena that are presented to our senses. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">They</span></em> + are the originals.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_184" name="note_184" + href="#noteref_184">184.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's horror of abstract or + unperceived space and atoms is partly explained by dogmas in + natural philosophy that are now antiquated.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_185" name="note_185" + href="#noteref_185">185.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ralph [?] Raphson, author of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Demonstratio de Deo</span></span> (1710), and + also of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Spatio Reali, seu ente Infinito: conamen + mathematico-metaphysicum</span></span> (1697), to which Berkeley + refers in one of his letters to Johnson. See also Green's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles of Natural Philosophy</span></span> + (1712). The immanence of omnipotent goodness in the material world + was unconsciously Berkeley's presupposition. In God we have our + being.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_186" name="note_186" + href="#noteref_186">186.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Note here Berkeley's version of the + causal principle, which is really the central presupposition of his + whole philosophy—viz. every event in the material world must be the + issue of acting Will.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_187" name="note_187" + href="#noteref_187">187.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Locke on an ideally perfect memory. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_188" name="note_188" + href="#noteref_188">188.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">John Sergeant was the author of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Solid + Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the + Ideists</span></span> (London, 1697); also of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">the Method to + Science</span></span> (1696). He was a deserter from the Church of + England to the Church of Rome, and wrote several pieces in defence + of Roman theology—some of them in controversy with Tillotson.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_189" name="note_189" + href="#noteref_189">189.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Spirit and Matter are mutually + dependent; but Spirit is the realising factor and real agent in the + universe.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_190" name="note_190" + href="#noteref_190">190.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Descartes, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Meditations</span></span>, III; Spinoza, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Epist.</span></span> II, ad Oldenburgium.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_191" name="note_191" + href="#noteref_191">191.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_192" name="note_192" + href="#noteref_192">192.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is <span class= + "tei tei-q">“inclusion”</span> here virtually a synonym for verbal + definition?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_193" name="note_193" + href="#noteref_193">193.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 2. The + universe of Berkeley consists of Active Spirits that perceive and + produce motion in impotent ideas or phenomena, realised in the + percipient experience of persons. All supposed powers in Matter are + refunded into Spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_194" name="note_194" + href="#noteref_194">194.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">When self-conscious agents are + included among <span class="tei tei-q">“things.”</span> We can have + no sensuous image, i.e. idea, of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>, + although he maintains we can use the word intelligently.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_195" name="note_195" + href="#noteref_195">195.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley insists that we should + individualise our thinking—<span class="tei tei-q">“ipsis + consuescere rebus,”</span> as Bacon says,—to escape the dangers of + artificial signs. This is the drift of his assault on abstract + ideas, and his repulsion from what is not concrete. He would even + dispense with words in his meditations in case of being + sophisticated by abstractions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_196" name="note_196" + href="#noteref_196">196.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Nature or the phenomenal world in + short is the revelation of perfectly reasonable Will.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_197" name="note_197" + href="#noteref_197">197.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_198" name="note_198" + href="#noteref_198">198.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Are the things of sense only modes in + which percipient persons exist?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_199" name="note_199" + href="#noteref_199">199.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_200" name="note_200" + href="#noteref_200">200.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Time being relative to the capacity of + the percipient.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_201" name="note_201" + href="#noteref_201">201.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_202" name="note_202" + href="#noteref_202">202.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">To perceive what is not an idea (as + Berkeley uses idea) is to perceive what is not realised, and + therefore not real.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_203" name="note_203" + href="#noteref_203">203.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So things have a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">potential</span></em> objective existence in + the Divine Will.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_204" name="note_204" + href="#noteref_204">204.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">With Berkeley, change is time, and + time, abstracted from all changes, is meaningless.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_205" name="note_205" + href="#noteref_205">205.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Could he know, by seeing only, even + that he <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">had</span></em> a body?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_206" name="note_206" + href="#noteref_206">206.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the ideas + attending these impressions,”</span> i.e. the ideas that are + correlatives of the (by us unperceived) organic impressions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_207" name="note_207" + href="#noteref_207">207.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Italian physical and metaphysical + philosopher Fardella (1650-1718) maintained, by reasonings akin to + those of Malebranche, that the existence of the material world + could not be scientifically proved, and could only be maintained by + faith in authoritative revelation. See his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Universæ Philosophiæ + Systema</span></span> (1690), and especially his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Logica</span></span> + (1696).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_208" name="note_208" + href="#noteref_208">208.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. IV. ch. 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_209" name="note_209" + href="#noteref_209">209.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What does he mean by <span class= + "tei tei-q">“unknown substratum”</span>?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_210" name="note_210" + href="#noteref_210">210.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He gets rid of the infinite in + quantity, because it is incapable of concrete manifestation to the + senses. When a phenomenon given in sense reaches the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum sensibile</span></span>, it reaches + what is for us the margin of realisable existence: it cannot be + infinitely little and still a phenomenon: insensible phenomena of + sense involve a contradiction. And so too of the infinitely + large.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_211" name="note_211" + href="#noteref_211">211.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In short he would idealise the visible + world but not the tangible world. In the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Berkeley idealises + both.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_212" name="note_212" + href="#noteref_212">212.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 149-59, where he concludes that + <span class="tei tei-q">“neither abstract nor visible extension + makes the object of geometry.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_213" name="note_213" + href="#noteref_213">213.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">By the adult, who has learned to + interpret its visual signs.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_214" name="note_214" + href="#noteref_214">214.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Inasmuch as no physical consequences + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">follow</span></em> the volition; which however + is still self-originated.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_215" name="note_215" + href="#noteref_215">215.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“A succession + of ideas I take to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">constitute</span></em> time, and not to be + only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others + think.”</span> (Berkeley's letter to Johnson.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_216" name="note_216" + href="#noteref_216">216.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II. ch. 16, sect. 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_217" name="note_217" + href="#noteref_217">217.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 67-77.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_218" name="note_218" + href="#noteref_218">218.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 88-120.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_219" name="note_219" + href="#noteref_219">219.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is of the essence of Berkeley's + philosophy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_220" name="note_220" + href="#noteref_220">220.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But in moral freedom originates in the + agent, instead of being <span class= + "tei tei-q">“consecutive”</span> to his voluntary acts or found + only in their consequences.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_221" name="note_221" + href="#noteref_221">221.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Strigose”</span> (strigosus)—meagre.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_222" name="note_222" + href="#noteref_222">222.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As he afterwards expresses it, we have + intelligible <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notions</span></em>, but not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>—sensuous pictures—of the + states or acts of our minds.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_223" name="note_223" + href="#noteref_223">223.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[<span class="tei tei-q">“Omnes reales + rerum proprietates continentur in Deo.”</span> What means Le Clerc + &c. by this? Log. I. ch. 8.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_224" name="note_224" + href="#noteref_224">224.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Si non rogas + intelligo.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_225" name="note_225" + href="#noteref_225">225.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This way of winning others to his own + opinions is very characteristic of Berkeley. See p. <a href= + "#Pg092" class="tei tei-ref">92</a> and note.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_226" name="note_226" + href="#noteref_226">226.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Third + Dialogue</span></span>, on <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sameness</span></em> in things and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sameness</span></em> in persons, which it + puzzles him to reconcile with his New Principles.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_227" name="note_227" + href="#noteref_227">227.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 52-61.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_228" name="note_228" + href="#noteref_228">228.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 101-134.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_229" name="note_229" + href="#noteref_229">229.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“distance”</span>—on opposite page in the MS. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 140.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_230" name="note_230" + href="#noteref_230">230.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Direct perception of phenomena is + adequate to the perceived phenomena; indirect or scientific + perception is inadequate, leaving room for faith and trust.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_231" name="note_231" + href="#noteref_231">231.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 107-8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_232" name="note_232" + href="#noteref_232">232.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Divine Ideas of Malebranche and + the sensuous ideas of Berkeley differ.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_233" name="note_233" + href="#noteref_233">233.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 71.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_234" name="note_234" + href="#noteref_234">234.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Malebranche, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, Bk. I. c. 6. That and + the following chapters seem to have been in Berkeley's mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_235" name="note_235" + href="#noteref_235">235.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He here assumes that extension + (visible) is implied in the visible idea we call colour.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_236" name="note_236" + href="#noteref_236">236.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This strikingly illustrates Berkeley's + use of <span class="tei tei-q">“idea,”</span> and what he intends + when he argues against <span class="tei tei-q">“abstract”</span> + ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_237" name="note_237" + href="#noteref_237">237.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">An interesting autobiographical fact. + From childhood he was indisposed to take things on trust.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_238" name="note_238" + href="#noteref_238">238.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay on Vision</span></span>, sect. + 88-119.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_239" name="note_239" + href="#noteref_239">239.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“thoughts,”</span> i.e. ideas of sense?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_240" name="note_240" + href="#noteref_240">240.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This, in a crude way, is the + distinction of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. It helps to explain Berkeley's + meaning, when he occasionally speaks of the ideas or phenomena that + appear in the sense experience of different persons as if they were + absolutely independent entities.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_241" name="note_241" + href="#noteref_241">241.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">To be <span class="tei tei-q">“in an + unperceiving thing,”</span> i.e. to be real, yet unperceived. + Whatever is perceived is, because realised only through a + percipient act, an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>—in Berkeley's use of the + word.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_242" name="note_242" + href="#noteref_242">242.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This as to the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Platonic strain”</span> is not in the tone of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_243" name="note_243" + href="#noteref_243">243.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">John Keill (1671-1721), an eminent + mathematician, educated at the University of Edinburgh; in 1710 + Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford, and the first to teach + the Newtonian philosophy in that University. In 1708 he was engaged + in a controversy in support of Newton's claims to the discovery of + the method of fluxions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_244" name="note_244" + href="#noteref_244">244.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This suggests a negative argument for + Kant's antinomies, and for Hamilton's law of the conditioned.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_245" name="note_245" + href="#noteref_245">245.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Newton became Sir Isaac on April 16, + 1705. Was this written before that date?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_246" name="note_246" + href="#noteref_246">246.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">These may be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">considered</span></em> separately, but not + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pictured</span></em> as such.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_247" name="note_247" + href="#noteref_247">247.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In as far as they have not been + sensibly realised in finite percipient mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_248" name="note_248" + href="#noteref_248">248.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[Or rather that invisible length does + exist.]—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_249" name="note_249" + href="#noteref_249">249.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647), the + Italian mathematician. His <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Geometry of Indivisibles</span></span> (1635) + prepared the way for the Calculus.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_250" name="note_250" + href="#noteref_250">250.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[By <span class="tei tei-q">“the + excuse”</span> is meant the finiteness of our mind—making it + possible for contradictions to appear true to us.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_251" name="note_251" + href="#noteref_251">251.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He allows elsewhere that words with + meanings not realisable in imagination, i.e. in the form of idea, + may discharge a useful office. See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 20.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_252" name="note_252" + href="#noteref_252">252.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">We do not perceive unperceived matter, + but only matter realised in living perception—the percipient act + being the factor of its reality.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_253" name="note_253" + href="#noteref_253">253.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The secondary qualities of + things.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_254" name="note_254" + href="#noteref_254">254.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Because, while dependent on percipient + sense, they are independent of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my</span></em> + personal will, being determined to appear under natural law, by + Divine agency.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_255" name="note_255" + href="#noteref_255">255.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Keill's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Introductio ad veram + Physicam</span></span> (Oxon. 1702)—Lectio 5—a curious work, + dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_256" name="note_256" + href="#noteref_256">256.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[Extension without breadth—i. e. + insensible, intangible length—is not conceivable. 'Tis a mistake we + are led into by the doctrine of abstraction.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin of + MS.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_257" name="note_257" + href="#noteref_257">257.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here <span class="tei tei-q">“Sir + Isaac.”</span> Hence written after April, 1705.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_258" name="note_258" + href="#noteref_258">258.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. IV. ch. iv. sect. 18; + ch. v. sect. 3, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_259" name="note_259" + href="#noteref_259">259.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He applies <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing</span></em> + to self-conscious persons as well as to passive objects of + sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_260" name="note_260" + href="#noteref_260">260.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Scaligerana Secunda</span></span>, p. + 270.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_261" name="note_261" + href="#noteref_261">261.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[These arguments must be proposed + shorter and more separate in the Treatise.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_262" name="note_262" + href="#noteref_262">262.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Idea”</span> + here used in its wider meaning—for <span class= + "tei tei-q">“operations of mind,”</span> as well as for sense + presented phenomena that are independent of individual will. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_263" name="note_263" + href="#noteref_263">263.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“sensations,”</span> i.e. objective phenomena presented + in sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_264" name="note_264" + href="#noteref_264">264.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_265" name="note_265" + href="#noteref_265">265.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_266" name="note_266" + href="#noteref_266">266.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">An <span class= + "tei tei-q">“unperceiving thing”</span> cannot be the factor of + material reality.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_267" name="note_267" + href="#noteref_267">267.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[To the utmost accuracy, wanting + nothing of perfection. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Their</span></em> solutions of problems, + themselves must own to fall infinitely short of + perfection.]—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author</span></span>, on margin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_268" name="note_268" + href="#noteref_268">268.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Jean de Billy and René de Billy, + French mathematicians—the former author of <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Nova Geometriæ + Clavis</span></span> and other mathematical works.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_269" name="note_269" + href="#noteref_269">269.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">According to Baronius, in the fifth + volume of his <span class="tei tei-q">“Annals,”</span> Ficinus + appeared after death to Michael Mercatus—agreeably to a promise he + made when he was alive—to assure him of the life of the human + spirit after the death of the body.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_270" name="note_270" + href="#noteref_270">270.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So far as we are factors of their + reality, in sense and in science, or can be any practical way + concerned with them.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_271" name="note_271" + href="#noteref_271">271.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 101-34.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_272" name="note_272" + href="#noteref_272">272.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“something,”</span> i.e. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract</span></em> something.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_273" name="note_273" + href="#noteref_273">273.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Lord Pembroke (?)—to whom the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> were dedicated, and + to whom Locke dedicated his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_274" name="note_274" + href="#noteref_274">274.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is an interesting example of a + feature that is conspicuous in Berkeley—the art of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“humoring an opponent in his own way of + thinking,”</span> which it seems was an early habit. It is thus + that he insinuates his New Principles in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, and so prepares to unfold and defend them in + the book of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> and the three + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>—straining language to + reconcile them with ordinary modes of speech.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_275" name="note_275" + href="#noteref_275">275.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In Diderot's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Lettre sur les + aveugles, à l'usage de ceux qui voient</span></span>, where + Berkeley, Molyneux, Condillac, and others are mentioned. Cf. also + Appendix, pp. 111, 112; and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theory of Vision Vindicated</span></span>, + sect. 71, with the note, in which some recorded experiments are + alluded to.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_276" name="note_276" + href="#noteref_276">276.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Anima</span></span>, II. 6, III. 1, &c. + Aristotle assigns a pre-eminent intellectual value to the sense of + sight. See, for instance, his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Metaphysics</span></span>, I. 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_277" name="note_277" + href="#noteref_277">277.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Sir A. Grant, + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Ethics + of Aristotle</span></span>, vol. II. p. 172) remarks, as to the + doctrine that the Common Sensibles are apprehended concomitantly + by the senses, that: <span class="tei tei-q">“this is surely the + true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the + like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own + forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It + would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from + the mind; the senses and the mind each contribute an element to + every knowledge. Aristotle's doctrine of κοινὴ αἴσθησις would go + far, if carried out, to modify his doctrine of the simple and + innate character of the senses, e.g. sight (cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Eth.</span></span> + II. 1, 4), and would prevent its collision with Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory + of Vision</span></span>.”</span>—See also Sir W. Hamilton, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Reid's + Works</span></span>, pp. 828-830.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Dugald Stewart + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Collected Works</span></span>, vol. I. p. + 341, note) quotes Aristotle's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ethics</span></span>, II. 1, as evidence + that Berkeley's doctrine, <span class="tei tei-q">“with respect + to the acquired perceptions of sight, was quite unknown to the + best metaphysicians of antiquity.”</span></p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_278" name="note_278" + href="#noteref_278">278.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">A work resembling Berkeley's in its + title, but in little else, appeared more than twenty years before + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>—the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Nova Visionis + Theoria</span></span> of Dr. Briggs, published in 1685.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_279" name="note_279" + href="#noteref_279">279.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise on the + Eye</span></span>, vol. II. pp. 299, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_280" name="note_280" + href="#noteref_280">280.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Reid's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, ch. v. §§ 3, 5, 6, 7; + ch. vi. § 24, and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essays on the Intellectual + Powers</span></span>, II. ch. 10 and 19.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_281" name="note_281" + href="#noteref_281">281.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">While Sir W. Hamilton (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Lectures on + Metaphysics</span></span>, lxxviii) acknowledges the scientific + validity of Berkeley's conclusions, as to the way we judge of + distances, he complains, in the same lecture, that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the whole question is thrown into doubt by the analogy + of the lower animals,”</span> i.e. by their probable <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">visual + instinct</span></em> of distances; and elsewhere (Reid's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Works</span></span>, p. 137, note) he seems to + hesitate about Locke's Solution of Molyneux's Problem, at least in + its application to Cheselden's case. Cf. Leibniz, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Nouveaux + Essais</span></span>, Liv. II. ch. 9, in connexion with this + last.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_282" name="note_282" + href="#noteref_282">282.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">An almost solitary exception in + Britain to this unusual uniformity on a subtle question in + psychology is found in Samuel Bailey's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Review of Berkeley's + Theory of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that + celebrated Speculation</span></span>, which appeared in 1842. It + was the subject of two interesting rejoinders—a well-weighed + criticism, in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Westminster Review</span></span>, by J.S. + Mill, since republished in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Discussions</span></span>; + and an ingenious Essay by Professor Ferrier, in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Blackwood's + Magazine</span></span>, republished in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Philosophical + Remains</span></span>. The controversy ended on that occasion with + Bailey's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Letter to a Philosopher in reply to some + recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision, and in + further elucidation of its unsoundness</span></span>, and a reply + to it by each of his critics. It was revived in 1864 by Mr. Abbott + of Trinity College, Dublin, whose essay on <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Sight and + Touch</span></span> is <span class="tei tei-q">“an attempt to + disprove the received (or Berkeleian) Theory of + Vision.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_283" name="note_283" + href="#noteref_283">283.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Afterwards (in 1733) Earl of Egmont. + Born about 1683, he succeeded to the baronetcy in 1691, and, after + sitting for a few years in the Irish House of Commons, was in 1715 + created Baron Percival, in the Irish peerage. In 1732 he obtained a + charter to colonise the province of Georgia in North America. His + name appears in the list of subscribers to Berkeley's Bermuda + Scheme in 1726. He died in 1748. He corresponded frequently with + Berkeley from 1709 onwards.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_284" name="note_284" + href="#noteref_284">284.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Similar terms are applied to the sense + of seeing by writers with whom Berkeley was familiar. Thus Locke + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, II. ix. 9) refers to + sight as <span class="tei tei-q">“the most comprehensive of all our + senses.”</span> Descartes opens his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dioptrique</span></span> by designating it as + <span class="tei tei-q">“le plus universal et le plus noble de nos + sens;”</span> and he alludes to it elsewhere (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Princip.</span></span> IV. 195) as + <span class="tei tei-q">“le plus subtil de tous les sens.”</span> + Malebranche begins his analysis of sight (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, I. 6) by describing + it as <span class="tei tei-q">“le premier, le plus noble, et le + plus étendu de tous les sens.”</span> The high place assigned to + this sense by Aristotle has been already alluded to. Its office, as + the chief organ through which a conception of the material universe + as placed in ambient space is given to us, is recognised by a + multitude of psychologists and metaphysicians.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_285" name="note_285" + href="#noteref_285">285.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On Berkeley's originality in his + Theory of Vision see the Editor's Preface.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_286" name="note_286" + href="#noteref_286">286.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the first edition alone this + sentence followed:—<span class="tei tei-q">“In treating of all + which, it seems to me, the writers of Optics have proceeded on + wrong principles.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_287" name="note_287" + href="#noteref_287">287.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 2-51 explain the way in which we + learn in seeing to judge of Distance or Outness, and of objects as + existing remote from our organism, viz. by their association with + what we see, and with certain muscular and other sensations in the + eye which accompany vision. Sect. 2 assumes, as granted, the + invisibility of distance in the line of sight. Cf. sect. 11 and + 88—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">First + Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous—Alciphron</span></span>, IV. + 8—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory + of Vision Vindicated and Explained</span></span>, sect. 62-69.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_288" name="note_288" + href="#noteref_288">288.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. outness, or distance outward from + the point of vision—distance in the line of sight—the third + dimension of space. Visible distance is visible space or interval + between two points (see sect. 112). We can be sensibly percipient + of it only when <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">both</span></em> points are seen.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_289" name="note_289" + href="#noteref_289">289.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This section is adduced by some of + Berkeley's critics as if it were the evidence discovered by him for + his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theory</span></span>, instead of being, as it + is, a passing reference to the scientific ground of the already + acknowledged invisibility of outness, or distance in the line of + sight. See, for example, Bailey's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Review of Berkeley's + Theory of Vision</span></span>, pp. 38-43, also his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of + Reasoning</span></span>, p. 179 and pp. 200-7—Mill's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Discussions</span></span>, vol. II. p. + 95—Abbott's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Sight and Touch</span></span>, p. 10, where + this sentence is presented as <span class="tei tei-q">“the sole + positive argument advanced by Berkeley.”</span> The invisibility of + outness is not Berkeley's discovery, but the way we learn to + interpret its visual signs, and what these are.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_290" name="note_290" + href="#noteref_290">290.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. aerial and linear perspective are + acknowledged signs of remote distances. But the question, in this + and the thirty-six following sections, concerns the visibility of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">near</span></em> distances only—a few yards in + front of us. It was <span class="tei tei-q">“agreed by all”</span> + that beyond this limit distances are suggested by our experience of + their signs.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_291" name="note_291" + href="#noteref_291">291.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. this and the four following + sections with the quotations in the Editor's Preface, from + Molyneux's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Treatise of Dioptrics</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_292" name="note_292" + href="#noteref_292">292.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the author's last edition we have + this annotation: <span class="tei tei-q">“See what Des Cartes and + others have written upon the subject.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_293" name="note_293" + href="#noteref_293">293.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the first edition this section + opens thus: <span class="tei tei-q">“I have here set down the + common current accounts that are given of our perceiving near + distances by sight, which, though they are unquestionably received + for true by mathematicians, and accordingly made use of by them in + determining the apparent places of objects, do + nevertheless,”</span> &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_294" name="note_294" + href="#noteref_294">294.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the author's last + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_295" name="note_295" + href="#noteref_295">295.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. although immediately invisible, + it is mediately seen. Mark, here and elsewhere, the ambiguity of + the term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perception</span></em>, which now signifies + the act of being conscious of sensuous phenomena, and again the act + of inferring phenomena of which we are at the time insentient; + while it is also applied to the object perceived instead of to the + percipient act; and sometimes to imagination, and the higher acts + of intelligence.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_296" name="note_296" + href="#noteref_296">296.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Some + men”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“mathematicians,”</span> in + first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_297" name="note_297" + href="#noteref_297">297.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mediate</span></em> + perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_298" name="note_298" + href="#noteref_298">298.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“any + man”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“all the mathematicians in the + world,”</span> in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_299" name="note_299" + href="#noteref_299">299.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the author's last + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_300" name="note_300" + href="#noteref_300">300.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the author's last + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_301" name="note_301" + href="#noteref_301">301.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 3, 9.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_302" name="note_302" + href="#noteref_302">302.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Observe the first introduction by + Berkeley of the term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suggestion</span></em>, used by him to express + a leading factor in his account of the visible world, and again in + his more comprehensive account of our knowledge of the material + universe in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>. It had been employed + occasionally, among others, by Hobbes and Locke. There are three + ways in which the objects we have an immediate perception of in + sight may be supposed to conduct us to what we do not immediately + perceive: (1) Instinct, or what Reid calls <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">original suggestion</span></em>”</span> + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, ch. VI. sect. 20-24); + (2) Custom; (3) Reasoning from accepted premisses. Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-q">“suggestion”</span> corresponds to the + second. (Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theory of Vision Vindicated</span></span>, + sect. 42.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_303" name="note_303" + href="#noteref_303">303.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 66, it is added that this + <span class="tei tei-q">“sensation”</span> belongs properly to the + sense of touch. Cf. also sect. 145 of this <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_304" name="note_304" + href="#noteref_304">304.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here <span class= + "tei tei-q">“natural”</span>=<span class= + "tei tei-q">“necessary”</span>: elsewhere=divinely arbitrary + connexion.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_305" name="note_305" + href="#noteref_305">305.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That our <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mediate</span></em> + vision of outness and of objects as thus external, is due to media + which have a contingent or arbitrary, instead of a necessary, + connexion with the distances which they enable us to see, or of + which they are the signs, is a cardinal part of his argument.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_306" name="note_306" + href="#noteref_306">306.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_307" name="note_307" + href="#noteref_307">307.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here, as generally in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + the appeal is to our inward experience, not to phenomena observed + by our senses in the organism.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_308" name="note_308" + href="#noteref_308">308.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See sect. 35 for the difference + between confused and faint vision. Cf. sect. 32-38 with this + section. Also <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theory of Vision Vindicated</span></span>, + sect. 68.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_309" name="note_309" + href="#noteref_309">309.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See sect. 6.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_310" name="note_310" + href="#noteref_310">310.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">These sections presuppose previous + contiguity as an associative law of mental phenomena.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_311" name="note_311" + href="#noteref_311">311.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Reid's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, ch. vi. sect. 22.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_312" name="note_312" + href="#noteref_312">312.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 16-27.—For the signs of remote + distances, see sect. 3.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_313" name="note_313" + href="#noteref_313">313.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">These are muscular sensations felt in + the organ, and degrees of confusion in a visible idea. Berkeley's + <span class="tei tei-q">“arbitrary”</span> signs of distance, near + and remote, are either (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a</span></span>) invisible states of the + visual organ, or (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">b</span></span>) visible appearances.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_314" name="note_314" + href="#noteref_314">314.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In Molyneux's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise of + Dioptrics</span></span>, Pt. I. prop. 31, sect. 9, Barrow's + difficulty is stated. Cf. sect. 40 below.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_315" name="note_315" + href="#noteref_315">315.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Christopher Scheiner, a German + astronomer, and opponent of the Copernican system, born 1575, died + 1650.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_316" name="note_316" + href="#noteref_316">316.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Andrea Tacquet, a mathematician, born + at Antwerp in 1611, and referred to by Molyneux as <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the ingenious Jesuit.”</span> He published a number of + scientific treatises, most of which appeared after his death, in a + collected form, at Antwerp in 1669.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_317" name="note_317" + href="#noteref_317">317.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In what follows Berkeley tries to + explain by his visual theory seeming contradictions which puzzled + the mathematicians.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_318" name="note_318" + href="#noteref_318">318.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is offered as a verification of + the theory that near distances are suggested, according to the + order of nature, by non-resembling visual signs, contingently + connected with real distance.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_319" name="note_319" + href="#noteref_319">319.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 78; also <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 31.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_320" name="note_320" + href="#noteref_320">320.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley here passes from his proof of + visual <span class="tei tei-q">“suggestion”</span> of all outward + distances—i.e. intervals between extremes in the line of sight—by + means of arbitrary signs, and considers the nature of visible + externality. See note in Hamilton's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Reid</span></span>, + p. 177, on the distinction between perception of the external world + and perception of distance through the eye.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_321" name="note_321" + href="#noteref_321">321.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Descartes, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dioptrique</span></span>, VI—Malebranche, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, Liv. I. ch. 9, + 3—Reid's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, VI. 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_322" name="note_322" + href="#noteref_322">322.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley here begins to found, on the + experienced connexion between extension and colour, and between + visible and tangible extension, a proof that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">outness</span></em> + is invisible. From Aristotle onwards it has been assumed that + colour is the only phenomenon of which we are immediately + percipient in seeing. Visible extension, visible figure, and + visible motion are accordingly taken to be dependent on the + sensation of colour.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_323" name="note_323" + href="#noteref_323">323.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In connexion with this and the next + illustration, Berkeley seems to argue that we are not only unable + to see distance in the line of sight, but also that we do not see a + distant object in its <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">real visible</span></em> magnitude. But + elsewhere he affirms that only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">tangible</span></em> + magnitude is entitled to be called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em>. + Cf. sect. 55, 59, 61.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_324" name="note_324" + href="#noteref_324">324.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The sceptical objections to the + trustworthiness of the senses, proposed by the Eleatics and others, + referred to by Descartes in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Meditations</span></span>, and by Malebranche + in the First Book of his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, may have suggested + the illustrations in this section. Cf. also Hume's Essay + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">On the + Academical or Sceptical Philosophy</span></span>. The sceptical + difficulty is founded on the assumption that the object seen at + different distances is the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same visible object</span></em>: it is really + different, and so the difficulty vanishes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_325" name="note_325" + href="#noteref_325">325.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here Berkeley expressly introduces + <span class="tei tei-q">“touch”</span>—a term which with him + includes, not merely organic sense of contact, but also muscular + and locomotive sense-experience. After this he begins to unfold the + antithesis of visual and tactual phenomena, whose subsequent + synthesis it is the aim of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span> to explain. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles of Human + Knowledge</span></span>, sect. 43—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 22 and 25. Note here Berkeley's + reticence of his idealization of Matter—tangible as well as + visible. Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 44.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_326" name="note_326" + href="#noteref_326">326.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This connexion of our knowledge of + distance with our locomotive experience points to a theory which + ultimately resolves space into experience of unimpeded + locomotion.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_327" name="note_327" + href="#noteref_327">327.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Introduction, § 8) takes <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> vaguely as <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the term which serves best to stand whatsoever is the + object of the understanding when a man thinks.”</span> Oversight of + what Berkeley intends the term idea has made his whole conception + of nature and the material universe a riddle to many, of which + afterwards.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_328" name="note_328" + href="#noteref_328">328.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The expressive term <span class= + "tei tei-q">“outness,”</span> favoured by Berkeley, is here first + used.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_329" name="note_329" + href="#noteref_329">329.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“We get the + idea of Space,”</span> says Locke, <span class="tei tei-q">“both by + our sight and touch”</span> (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, II. 13. § 2). Locke did + not contemplate Berkeley's antithesis of visible and tangible + extension, and the consequent ambiguity of the term extension; + which sometimes signifies <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">coloured</span></em>, and at others <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">resistant</span></em> experience in + sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_330" name="note_330" + href="#noteref_330">330.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For an explanation of this difficulty, + see sect. 144.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_331" name="note_331" + href="#noteref_331">331.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“object”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“thing,”</span> + in the earlier editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_332" name="note_332" + href="#noteref_332">332.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is the issue of the analytical + portion of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_333" name="note_333" + href="#noteref_333">333.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 139-40.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_334" name="note_334" + href="#noteref_334">334.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here the question of externality, + signifying independence of all percipient life, is again mixed up + with that of the invisibility of distance outwards in the line of + sight.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_335" name="note_335" + href="#noteref_335">335.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in author's last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_336" name="note_336" + href="#noteref_336">336.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. including muscular and locomotive + experience as well as sense of contact. But what are the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tangibilia</span></span> themselves? Are they + also significant, like <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visibilia</span></span>, of a still ulterior + reality? This is the problem of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles of Human + Knowledge</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_337" name="note_337" + href="#noteref_337">337.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In this section the conception of a + natural Visual Language, makes its appearance, with its implication + that Nature is (for us) virtually Spirit. Cf. sect. 140, + 147—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. + 44—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues of Hylas and + Philonous</span></span>—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, IV. 8, 11—and + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of + Vision Vindicated</span></span>, passim.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_338" name="note_338" + href="#noteref_338">338.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 52-87 treat of the invisibility + of real, i.e. tactual, Magnitude. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 54-61.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_339" name="note_339" + href="#noteref_339">339.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 8-15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_340" name="note_340" + href="#noteref_340">340.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 41, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_341" name="note_341" + href="#noteref_341">341.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Molyneux's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise on + Dioptrics</span></span>, B. I. prop. 28.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_342" name="note_342" + href="#noteref_342">342.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See sect. 122-126.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_343" name="note_343" + href="#noteref_343">343.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In short there is a point at which, + with our limited sense, we cease to be percipient of colour, in + seeing; and of resistance, in locomotion. Though Berkeley regards + all visible extensions as sensible, and therefore dependent for + their reality on being realised by sentient mind, he does not mean + that mind or consciousness is extended. With him, extension, though + it exists only in mind,—i.e. as an idea seen, in the case of + visible extension, and as an idea touched, in the case of tangible + extension,—is yet no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">property</span></em> of mind. Mind can exist + without being percipient of extension, although extension cannot be + realised without mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_344" name="note_344" + href="#noteref_344">344.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But this is true, though less + obviously, of tangible as well as of visible objects.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_345" name="note_345" + href="#noteref_345">345.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 49.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_346" name="note_346" + href="#noteref_346">346.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 139, 140, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_347" name="note_347" + href="#noteref_347">347.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“situation”</span>—not in the earlier editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_348" name="note_348" + href="#noteref_348">348.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 55.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_349" name="note_349" + href="#noteref_349">349.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the author's last + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_350" name="note_350" + href="#noteref_350">350.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ordinary sight is virtually foresight. + Cf. sect. 85.—See also Malebranche on the external senses, as given + primarily for the urgent needs of embodied life, not to immediately + convey scientific knowledge, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, Liv. I. ch. 5, 6, 9, + &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_351" name="note_351" + href="#noteref_351">351.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 44.—See also sect. 55, and + note.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_352" name="note_352" + href="#noteref_352">352.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This supposes <span class= + "tei tei-q">“settled”</span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tangibilia</span></span>, but not <span class= + "tei tei-q">“settled”</span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visibilia</span></span>. Yet the sensible + extension given in touch and locomotive experience is also + relative—an object being <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">felt</span></em> as larger or smaller + according to the state of the organism, and the other conditions of + our embodied perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_353" name="note_353" + href="#noteref_353">353.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows, to end of sect. 63, + added in the author's last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_354" name="note_354" + href="#noteref_354">354.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“outward + objects,”</span> i.e. objects of which we are percipient in tactual + experience, taken in this <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> provisionally as the real + external objects. See <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 44.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_355" name="note_355" + href="#noteref_355">355.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 144. Note, in this and the + three preceding sections, the stress laid on the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">arbitrariness</span></em> of the connexion + between the signs which suggest magnitudes, or other modes of + extension, and their significates. This is the foundation of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory</span></span>; which thus resolves <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">physical</span></em> causality into a relation + of signs to what they signify and predict—analogous to the relation + between words and their accepted meanings.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_356" name="note_356" + href="#noteref_356">356.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In sect. 67-78, Berkeley attempts to + verify the foregoing account of the natural signs of Size, by + applying it to solve a phenomenon, the cause of which had been long + debated among men of science—the visible magnitude of heavenly + bodies when seen in the horizon.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_357" name="note_357" + href="#noteref_357">357.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 10.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_358" name="note_358" + href="#noteref_358">358.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the author's last edition. + Cf sect. 76, 77.—The explanation in question is attributed to + Alhazen, and by Bacon to Ptolemy, while it is sanctioned by eminent + scientific names before and since Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_359" name="note_359" + href="#noteref_359">359.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Fourthly”</span> in the second edition. Cf. what + follows with sect. 74. Why <span class= + "tei tei-q">“lesser”</span>?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_360" name="note_360" + href="#noteref_360">360.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">When Berkeley, some years afterwards, + visited Italy, he remarked that distant objects appeared to him + much nearer than they really were—a phenomenon which he attributed + to the comparative purity of the southern air.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_361" name="note_361" + href="#noteref_361">361.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. the original perception, apart + from any synthetic operation of suggestion and inferential thought, + founded on visual signs.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_362" name="note_362" + href="#noteref_362">362.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In Riccioli's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Almagest</span></span>, II. lib. X. sect. 6. + quest. 14, we have an account of many hypotheses then current, in + explanation of the apparent magnitude of the horizontal moon.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_363" name="note_363" + href="#noteref_363">363.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Gassendi's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Epistolæ quatuor de apparente magnitudine solis + humilis et sublimis.”</span>—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Opera</span></span>, tom. III pp. 420-477. Cf. + Appendix to this <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, p. 110.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_364" name="note_364" + href="#noteref_364">364.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dioptrique</span></span>, VI.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_365" name="note_365" + href="#noteref_365">365.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Opera Latina</span></span>, vol. I, p. 376, + vol. II, pp. 26-62; <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">English Works</span></span>, vol. I. p. 462. + (Molesworth's Edition.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_366" name="note_366" + href="#noteref_366">366.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The paper in the Transactions is by + Molyneux.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_367" name="note_367" + href="#noteref_367">367.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Smith's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Optics</span></span>, + pp. 64-67, and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span>, pp. 48, &c. At p. + 55 Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory</span></span> is referred to, and + pronounced to be at variance with experience. Smith concludes by + saying, that in <span class="tei tei-q">“the second edition of + Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, and also in a Vindication + and Explanation of it (called the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Visual + Language</span></span>), very lately published, the author has made + some additions to his solution of the said phenomenon; but seeing + it still involves and depends on the principle of faintness, I may + leave the rest of it to the reader's consideration.”</span> This, + which appeared in 1738, is one of the very few early references to + Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_368" name="note_368" + href="#noteref_368">368.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 2-51.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_369" name="note_369" + href="#noteref_369">369.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the + author's last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_370" name="note_370" + href="#noteref_370">370.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows to the end of this + section is not contained in the first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_371" name="note_371" + href="#noteref_371">371.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. tangible.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_372" name="note_372" + href="#noteref_372">372.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 38; and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 31.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_373" name="note_373" + href="#noteref_373">373.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Never”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“hardly,”</span> + in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_374" name="note_374" + href="#noteref_374">374.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Appendix, p. <a href="#Pg208" + class="tei tei-ref">208</a>.—See Smith's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Optics</span></span>, + B. I. ch. v, and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span>, p. 56, in which he + <span class="tei tei-q">“leaves it to be considered, whether the + said phenomenon is not as clear an instance of the insufficiency of + faintness”</span> as of mathematical computation.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_375" name="note_375" + href="#noteref_375">375.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">A favourite doctrine with Berkeley, + according to whose theory of visibles there can be no absolute + visible magnitude, the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum</span></em> being the least that is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perceivable</span></em> by each seeing + subject, and thus relative to his visual capacity. This section is + thus criticised, in January, 1752, in a letter signed <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Anti-Berkeley,”</span> in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Gent. + Mag.</span></span> (vol. XXII, p. 12): <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Upon what his lordship asserts with respect to the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span>, I would + observe that it is certain that there are infinite numbers of + animals which are imperceptible to the naked eye, and cannot be + perceived but by the help of a microscope; consequently there are + animals whose whole bodies are far less than the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> of a man. + Doubtless these animals have eyes, and, if their <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minimum visibile</span></span> were equal to + that of a man, it would follow that they cannot perceive anything + but what is much larger than their whole body; and therefore their + own bodies must be invisible to them, because we know they are so + to men, whose <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minimum + visibile</span></span> is asserted by his lordship to be equal to + theirs.”</span> There is some misconception in this. Cf. Appendix + to <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, p. 209.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_376" name="note_376" + href="#noteref_376">376.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Those two defects belong to human + consciousness. See Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, II. 10, on the defects of + human memory. It is this imperfection which makes reasoning + needful—to assist finite intuition. Reasoning is the sign at once + of our dignity and our weakness.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_377" name="note_377" + href="#noteref_377">377.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 59.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_378" name="note_378" + href="#noteref_378">378.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 80-82.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_379" name="note_379" + href="#noteref_379">379.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 88-119 relate to the nature, + invisibility, and arbitrary visual signs of Situation, or of the + localities of tangible things. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 44-53.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_380" name="note_380" + href="#noteref_380">380.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 2, 114, 116, 118.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_381" name="note_381" + href="#noteref_381">381.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This illustration is taken from + Descartes. See Appendix.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_382" name="note_382" + href="#noteref_382">382.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 10 and 19.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_383" name="note_383" + href="#noteref_383">383.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 2-51.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_384" name="note_384" + href="#noteref_384">384.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in author's last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_385" name="note_385" + href="#noteref_385">385.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is Berkeley's universal solvent + of the psychological difficulties involved in + visual-perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_386" name="note_386" + href="#noteref_386">386.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 103, 106, 110, 128, &c. + Berkeley treats this case hypothetically in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + in defect of actual experiments upon the born-blind, since + accumulated from Cheselden downwards. See however the Appendix, and + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of + Vision Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 71.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_387" name="note_387" + href="#noteref_387">387.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. tangible things. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 44.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_388" name="note_388" + href="#noteref_388">388.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The <span class= + "tei tei-q">“prejudice,”</span> to wit, which Berkeley would + dissolve by his introspective analysis of vision. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 35.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_389" name="note_389" + href="#noteref_389">389.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Thus forming individual concrete + things out of what is perceived separately through different + senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_390" name="note_390" + href="#noteref_390">390.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This briefly is Berkeley's solution of + <span class="tei tei-q">“the knot about inverted images,”</span> + which long puzzled men of science.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_391" name="note_391" + href="#noteref_391">391.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. perceive <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mediately</span></em>—visible objects, + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, having no tactual + situation. Pure vision, he would say, has nothing to do with + <span class="tei tei-q">“high”</span> and <span class= + "tei tei-q">“low,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“great”</span> + and <span class="tei tei-q">“inverted,”</span> in the real or + tactual meaning of those terms.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_392" name="note_392" + href="#noteref_392">392.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. tangible.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_393" name="note_393" + href="#noteref_393">393.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“extension,”</span> which, according to Berkeley, is an + equivocal term, common (in its different meanings) to <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visibilia</span></span> and <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tangibilia</span></span>. Cf. sect. 139, + 140.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_394" name="note_394" + href="#noteref_394">394.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 93, 106, 110, 128.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_395" name="note_395" + href="#noteref_395">395.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. real or tangible head.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_396" name="note_396" + href="#noteref_396">396.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 140, 143. In the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Gent. + Mag.</span></span> (vol. XXII. p. 12), <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Anti-Berkeley”</span> thus argues the case of one born + blind. <span class="tei tei-q">“This man,”</span> he adds, + <span class="tei tei-q">“would, by being accustomed to feel one + hand with the other, have perceived that the extremity of the hand + was divided into fingers—that the extremities of these fingers were + distinguished by certain hard, smooth surfaces, of a different + texture from the rest of the fingers—and that each finger had + certain joints or flexures. Now, if this man was restored to sight, + and immediately viewed his hand before he touched it again, it is + manifest that the divisions of the extremity of the hand into + fingers would be visibly perceived. He would note too the small + spaces at the extremity of each finger, which affected his sight + differently from the rest of the fingers; upon moving his fingers + he would see the joints. Though therefore, by means of this lately + acquired sense of seeing, the object affected his mind in a new and + different manner from what it did before, yet, as by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">touch</span></em> + he had acquired the knowledge of these several divisions, marks, + and distinctions of the hand, and, as the new object of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sight</span></em> + appeared to be divided, marked, and distinguished in a similar + manner, I think he would certainly conclude, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">before he touched + his hand</span></em>, that the thing which he now saw was + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + same</span></em> which he had felt before and called his + hand.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_397" name="note_397" + href="#noteref_397">397.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + II. 8, 16. Aristotle regards number as a Common + Sensible.—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Anima</span></span>, II. 6, III. 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_398" name="note_398" + href="#noteref_398">398.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“If the + visible appearance of two shillings had been found connected from + the beginning with the tangible idea of one shilling, that + appearance would as naturally and readily have signified the unity + of the (tangible) object as it now signifies its duplicity.”</span> + Reid, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, VI. 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_399" name="note_399" + href="#noteref_399">399.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here again note Berkeley's + inconvenient reticence of his full theory of matter, as dependent + on percipient life for its reality. Tangible things are meantime + granted to be real <span class="tei tei-q">“without mind.”</span> + Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 43, 44. + <span class="tei tei-q">“Without the mind”</span>—in contrast to + sensuous phenomenon only.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_400" name="note_400" + href="#noteref_400">400.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 131.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_401" name="note_401" + href="#noteref_401">401.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 2, 88, 116, 118.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_402" name="note_402" + href="#noteref_402">402.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In short, we <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">see</span></em> + only <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quantities of colour</span></em>—the real or + tactual distance, size, shape, locality, up and down, right and + left, &c., being gradually associated with the various visible + modifications of colour.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_403" name="note_403" + href="#noteref_403">403.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. tangible.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_404" name="note_404" + href="#noteref_404">404.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 41-44.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_405" name="note_405" + href="#noteref_405">405.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. tangible things.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_406" name="note_406" + href="#noteref_406">406.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. visible.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_407" name="note_407" + href="#noteref_407">407.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 41-44. The <span class= + "tei tei-q">“eyes”</span>—visible and tangible—are themselves + objects of sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_408" name="note_408" + href="#noteref_408">408.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 21-25.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_409" name="note_409" + href="#noteref_409">409.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Visible + ideas”</span>—including sensations muscular and locomotive, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">felt</span></em> in the organ of vision. Sect. + 16, 27, 57.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_410" name="note_410" + href="#noteref_410">410.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. objects which, in this tentative + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, are granted, for + argument's sake, to be external, or independent of percipient + mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_411" name="note_411" + href="#noteref_411">411.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. to inquire whether there are, in + this instance, Common Sensibles; and, in particular, whether an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">extension</span></em> of the same kind at + least, if not numerically the same, is presented in each. The + Kantian theory of an <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> intuition of space, the common condition of + tactual and visual experience, because implied in sense-experience + as such, is not conceived by Berkeley. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_412" name="note_412" + href="#noteref_412">412.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the following reasoning against + abstract, as distinguished from concrete or sense presented + (visible or tangible) extension, Berkeley urges some of his + favourite objections to <span class="tei tei-q">“abstract + ideas,”</span> fully unfolded in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 6-20.—See also <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, VII. + 5-8.—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Defence of Free Thinking in + Mathematics</span></span>, sect. 45-48.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_413" name="note_413" + href="#noteref_413">413.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> + are concrete or particular—immediate data of sense or + imagination.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_414" name="note_414" + href="#noteref_414">414.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. it cannot be individualized, + either as a perceived or an imagined object.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_415" name="note_415" + href="#noteref_415">415.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 105.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_416" name="note_416" + href="#noteref_416">416.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Endeavours”</span> in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_417" name="note_417" + href="#noteref_417">417.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. a mental image of an abstraction, + an impossible image, in which the extension and comprehension of + the notion must be adequately pictured.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_418" name="note_418" + href="#noteref_418">418.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“deservedly + admired author,”</span> in the first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_419" name="note_419" + href="#noteref_419">419.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“this + celebrated author,”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“that great + man”</span> in second edition. In assailing Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract idea,”</span> he discharges the meaning which + Locke intended by the term, and then demolishes his own + figment.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_420" name="note_420" + href="#noteref_420">420.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the author's last + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_421" name="note_421" + href="#noteref_421">421.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_422" name="note_422" + href="#noteref_422">422.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_423" name="note_423" + href="#noteref_423">423.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_424" name="note_424" + href="#noteref_424">424.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, passim.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_425" name="note_425" + href="#noteref_425">425.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in author's last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_426" name="note_426" + href="#noteref_426">426.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He probably has Locke in his eye.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_427" name="note_427" + href="#noteref_427">427.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On Berkeley's theory, space without + relation to bodies (i.e. insensible or abstract space) would not be + extended, as not having parts; inasmuch as parts can be assigned to + it only with relation to bodies. Berkeley does not distinguish + space from sensible extension. Cf. Reid's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Works</span></span>, + p. 126, note—in which Sir W. Hamilton suggests that one may have an + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> conception of pure + space, and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">also</span></em> an <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span> perception of finite, concrete space.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_428" name="note_428" + href="#noteref_428">428.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 121. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_429" name="note_429" + href="#noteref_429">429.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. there are no Common Sensibles: + from which it follows that we can reason from the one sense to the + other only by founding on the constant connexion of their + respective phenomena, under a natural yet (for us) contingent law. + Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory of Vision Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 27, 28.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_430" name="note_430" + href="#noteref_430">430.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_431" name="note_431" + href="#noteref_431">431.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 93, 103, 106, 110.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_432" name="note_432" + href="#noteref_432">432.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_433" name="note_433" + href="#noteref_433">433.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 43, 103, &c. A plurality + of co-existent <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">minima</span></span> of + coloured points constitutes Berkeley's visible extension; while a + plurality of successively experienced <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">minima</span></span> of resistant points + constitutes his tactual extension. Whether we can perceive visible + extension without experience of muscular movement at least in the + eye, he does not here say.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_434" name="note_434" + href="#noteref_434">434.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_435" name="note_435" + href="#noteref_435">435.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Real distance belongs originally, + according to the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, to our tactual experience + only—in the wide meaning of touch, which includes muscular and + locomotive perceptions, as well as the simple perception of + contact.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_436" name="note_436" + href="#noteref_436">436.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Added in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_437" name="note_437" + href="#noteref_437">437.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_438" name="note_438" + href="#noteref_438">438.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See also Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Correspondence”</span> with Molyneux, in Locke's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Works</span></span>, vol. IX. p. 34.—Leibniz, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Nouveaux + Essais</span></span>, Liv. II. ch. 9, who, so far granting the + fact, disputes the heterogeneity.—Smith's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Optics.</span></span>—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span>, §§ 161-170.—Hamilton's + Reid, p. 137, note, and <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Lect. Metaph.</span></span> II. p. 176.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_439" name="note_439" + href="#noteref_439">439.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_440" name="note_440" + href="#noteref_440">440.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 70.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_441" name="note_441" + href="#noteref_441">441.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 49, 146, &c. Here + <span class="tei tei-q">“same”</span> includes <span class= + "tei tei-q">“similar.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_442" name="note_442" + href="#noteref_442">442.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. visible and tangible motions + being absolutely heterogeneous, and the former, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">at man's point of + view</span></em>, only contingent signs of the latter, we should + not, at first sight, be able to interpret the visual signs of + tactual phenomena.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_443" name="note_443" + href="#noteref_443">443.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 122-125.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_444" name="note_444" + href="#noteref_444">444.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 111-116; also + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span>, query 12. On Berkeley's + system space in its three dimensions is unrealisable without + experience of motion.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_445" name="note_445" + href="#noteref_445">445.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here the term <span class= + "tei tei-q">“language of nature”</span> makes its appearance, as + applicable to the ideas or visual signs of tactual realities.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_446" name="note_446" + href="#noteref_446">446.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 16, 27, 97.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_447" name="note_447" + href="#noteref_447">447.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is <span class= + "tei tei-q">“tangible”</span> here used in its narrow + meaning—excluding muscular and locomotive experience?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_448" name="note_448" + href="#noteref_448">448.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. as natural signs, divinely + associated with their thus implied meanings.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_449" name="note_449" + href="#noteref_449">449.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 35.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_450" name="note_450" + href="#noteref_450">450.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley, in this section, enunciates + the principal conclusion in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + which conclusion indeed forms his new theory of Vision.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_451" name="note_451" + href="#noteref_451">451.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">A suggestion thus due to natural laws + of association. The explanation of the fact that we apprehend, by + those ideas or phenomena which are objects of sight, certain other + ideas, which neither resemble them, nor efficiently cause them, nor + are so caused by them, nor have any necessary connexion with them, + comprehends, according to Berkeley, the whole Theory of Vision. + <span class="tei tei-q">“The imagination of every thinking + person,”</span> remarks Adam Smith, <span class="tei tei-q">“will + supply him with instances to prove that the ideas received by any + one of the senses do readily excite such other ideas, either of the + same sense or of any other, as have habitually been associated with + them. So that if, on this account, we are to suppose, with a late + ingenious writer, that the ideas of sight constitute a Visual + Language, because they readily suggest the corresponding ideas of + touch—as the terms of a language excite the ideas answering to + them—I see not but we may, for the same reason, allow of a + tangible, audible, gustatory, and olefactory language; though + doubtless the Visual Language will be abundantly more copious than + the rest.”</span> Smith's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Optics</span></span>.—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span>, p. 29.—And into this + conception of a universal sense symbolism, Berkeley's theory of + Vision ultimately rises.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_452" name="note_452" + href="#noteref_452">452.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, Dialogue IV. sect. + 11-15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_453" name="note_453" + href="#noteref_453">453.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 122-125.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_454" name="note_454" + href="#noteref_454">454.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 127-138.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_455" name="note_455" + href="#noteref_455">455.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Some modern metaphysicians would say, + that neither tangible nor visible extension is the object geometry, + but abstract extension; and others that space is a necessary + implicate of sense-experience, rather than, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, an object of any single + sense. Cf. Kant's explanation of the origin of our mathematical + knowledge, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Kritik der reinen Vernunft</span></span>. + Elementarlehre, I.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_456" name="note_456" + href="#noteref_456">456.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 51-66, 144.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_457" name="note_457" + href="#noteref_457">457.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is a conjecture, not as to the + probable ideas of one born blind, but as to the ideas of an + <span class="tei tei-q">“unbodied”</span> intelligence, whose + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">only</span></em> sense was that of seeing. See + Reid's speculation (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, VI. 9) on the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Geometry of Visibles,”</span> and the + mental experience of Idomenians, or imaginary beings supposed to + have no ideas of the material world except those got by + seeing.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_458" name="note_458" + href="#noteref_458">458.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 130, and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 57. Does Berkeley, in this and the + two preceding sections, mean to hint that the only proper object of + sight is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unextended</span></em> colour; and that, apart + from muscular movement in the eye or other locomotion, <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visibilia</span></span> resolve into + unextended mathematical points? This question has not escaped more + recent British psychologists, including Stewart, Brown, Mill, and + Bain, who seem to hold that unextended colour is perceivable and + imaginable.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_459" name="note_459" + href="#noteref_459">459.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The bracketed sentence is not retained + in the author's last edition, in which the first sentence of sect. + 160 is the concluding one of sect. 159, and of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_460" name="note_460" + href="#noteref_460">460.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This passage is contained in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dioptrices</span></span> of Descartes, VI. 13; + see also VI. 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_461" name="note_461" + href="#noteref_461">461.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The arbitrariness or contingency—as + far as our knowledge carries us—of the connexion between the visual + phenomena, as signs, on the one hand, and actual distance, as + perceived through this means, on the other.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_462" name="note_462" + href="#noteref_462">462.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 80-83.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_463" name="note_463" + href="#noteref_463">463.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The reference here seems to be to the + case described in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Tatler</span></span> (No. 55) of August 16, + 1709, in which William Jones, born blind, had received sight after + a surgical operation, at the age of twenty, on the 29th of June + preceding. A medical narrative of this case appeared, entitled + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">A full + and true account of a miraculous cure of a Young Man in Newington, + who was born blind, and was in five minutes brought to perfect + sight, by Mr. Roger Grant, oculist</span></span>. London, + 1709.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_464" name="note_464" + href="#noteref_464">464.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 71, with the relative note.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_465" name="note_465" + href="#noteref_465">465.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted on the title-page in the + second edition, but retained in the body of the work.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_466" name="note_466" + href="#noteref_466">466.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Beardsley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life and + Correspondence of Samuel Johnson, D.D., First President of King's + College, New York</span></span>, p. 72 (1874).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_467" name="note_467" + href="#noteref_467">467.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Beardsley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life of + Johnson</span></span>, pp. 71, 72.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_468" name="note_468" + href="#noteref_468">468.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Chandler's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Life of + Johnson</span></span>, Appendix, p. 161.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_469" name="note_469" + href="#noteref_469">469.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book.</span></span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_470" name="note_470" + href="#noteref_470">470.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Moreover, even if the outness or + distance of things <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">were</span></em> visible, it would not follow + that either they or their distances could be real if unperceived. + On the contrary, Berkeley implies that they <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">are</span></em> + perceived <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">visually</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_471" name="note_471" + href="#noteref_471">471.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is also to be remembered that + sensible things exist <span class="tei tei-q">“in mind,”</span> + without being exclusively <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mine</span></em>, as creatures of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my + will</span></em>. In one sense, that only is mine in which my will + exerts itself. But, in another view, my involuntary states of + feeling and imagination are <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mine</span></em>, because their existence + depends on my consciousness of them; and even sensible things are + so far <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mine</span></em>, because, though present in + many minds in common, they are, for me, dependent on <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my</span></em> + percipient mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_472" name="note_472" + href="#noteref_472">472.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl of + Pembroke and fifth Earl of Montgomery, was the correspondent and + friend of Locke—who dedicated his famous <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span> + to him, as a work <span class="tei tei-q">“having some little + correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of + the sciences your lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive + a draft of.”</span> He represents a family renowned in English + political and literary history. He was born in 1656; was a nobleman + of Christ Church, Oxford, in 1672; succeeded to his titles in 1683; + was sworn of the Privy Council in 1689; and made a Knight of the + Garter in 1700. He filled some of the highest offices in the state, + in the reigns of William and Mary, and of Anne. He was Lord + Lieutenant of Ireland in 1707, having previously been one of the + Commissioners by whom the union between England and Scotland was + negotiated. He died in January 1733.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_473" name="note_473" + href="#noteref_473">473.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Trinity College, Dublin.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_474" name="note_474" + href="#noteref_474">474.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span> Berkeley seems to refer his speculations to his + boyhood. The conception of the material world propounded in the + following Treatise was in his view before the publication of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory of Vision</span></span>, which was intended to prepare the + way for it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_475" name="note_475" + href="#noteref_475">475.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Locke, in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Epistle Dedicatory”</span> of his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>. + Notwithstanding the <span class="tei tei-q">“novelty”</span> of the + New Principles, viz. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">negation</span></em> of abstract or + unperceived Matter, Space, Time, Substance, and Power; and + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">affirmation</span></em> of Mind, as the + Synthesis, Substance, and Cause of all—much in best preceding + philosophy, ancient and modern, was a dim anticipation of it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_476" name="note_476" + href="#noteref_476">476.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c., in + illustration of the demonstrative claim of Berkeley's initial + doctrine.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_477" name="note_477" + href="#noteref_477">477.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley entreats his reader, here and + throughout, to take pains to understand his meaning, and especially + to avoid confounding the ordered ideas or phenomena, objectively + presented to our senses, with capricious chimeras of + imagination.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_478" name="note_478" + href="#noteref_478">478.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Philosophy is + nothing but the true knowledge of things.”</span> Locke.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_479" name="note_479" + href="#noteref_479">479.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The purpose of those early essays of + Berkeley was to reconcile philosophy with common sense, by + employing reflection to make <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">latent</span></em> common sense, or common + reason, reveal itself in its genuine integrity. Cf. the closing + sentences in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Third Dialogue between Hylas and + Philonous</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_480" name="note_480" + href="#noteref_480">480.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Introduction, sect. 4-7; Bk. II. ch. 23, § 12, &c. Locke (who + is probably here in Berkeley's eye) attributes the perplexities of + philosophy to our narrow faculties, which are meant to regulate our + lives, not to remove all mysteries. See also Descartes, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, I. 26, 27, &c.; + Malebranche, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, III. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_481" name="note_481" + href="#noteref_481">481.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">His most significant forerunners were + Descartes in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, and Locke in his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_482" name="note_482" + href="#noteref_482">482.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here <span class= + "tei tei-q">“idea”</span> and <span class= + "tei tei-q">“notion”</span> seem to be used convertibly. See sect. + 142. Cf. with the argument against <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract + ideas</span></em>, unfolded in the remainder of the Introduction, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 97-100, + 118-132, 143; <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision</span></span>, sect. + 122-125; <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, Dial. vii. 5-7; + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Defence + of Free Thinking in Mathematics</span></span>, sect. 45-48. Also + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 323, 335, &c., + where he distinguishes Idea in a higher meaning from his sensuous + ideas. As mentioned in my Preface, the third edition of + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, published in 1752, + the year before Berkeley died, omits the three sections of the + Seventh Dialogue which repeat the following argument against + abstract ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_483" name="note_483" + href="#noteref_483">483.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As in Derodon's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Logica</span></span>, + Pt. II. c. 6, 7; <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophia Contracta</span></span>, I. i. §§ + 7-11; and Gassendi, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Leg. Instit.</span></span>, I. 8; also + Cudworth, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Eternal and Immutable Morality</span></span>, + Bk. IV.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_484" name="note_484" + href="#noteref_484">484.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_485" name="note_485" + href="#noteref_485">485.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">We must remember that what Berkeley + intends by an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> is either a percept of sense, + or a sensuous imagination; and his argument is that none of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">these</span></em> can be an abstraction. We + can neither perceive nor imagine what is not concrete and part of a + succession.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_486" name="note_486" + href="#noteref_486">486.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“abstract + notions”</span>—here used convertibly with <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract ideas.”</span> Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 89 and 142, on + the special meaning of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_487" name="note_487" + href="#noteref_487">487.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Supposed by Berkeley to mean, that we + can imagine, in abstraction from all phenomena presented in + concrete experience, e.g. imagine <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em>, in abstraction from all + phenomena in which it manifests itself to us; or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">matter</span></em>, + stripped of all the phenomena in which it is realised in + sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_488" name="note_488" + href="#noteref_488">488.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_489" name="note_489" + href="#noteref_489">489.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_490" name="note_490" + href="#noteref_490">490.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Descartes, who regarded brutes as + (sentient?) machines.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_491" name="note_491" + href="#noteref_491">491.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“To this I + cannot assent, being of opinion that a word,”</span> &c.—in + first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_492" name="note_492" + href="#noteref_492">492.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“an + idea,”</span> i.e. a concrete mental picture.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_493" name="note_493" + href="#noteref_493">493.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So that <span class= + "tei tei-q">“generality”</span> in an idea is our <span class= + "tei tei-q">“consideration”</span> of a particular idea (e.g. a + <span class="tei tei-q">“particular motion”</span> or a + <span class="tei tei-q">“particular extension”</span>) not + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, but under general + relations, which that particular idea exemplifies, and which, as he + shews, may be signified by a corresponding word. All ideas (in + Berkeley's confined meaning of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“idea”</span>) are particular. We rise above particular + ideas by an intellectual apprehension of their relations; not by + forming <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstract pictures</span></em>, which are + contradictory absurdities.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_494" name="note_494" + href="#noteref_494">494.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke is surely misconceived. He does + not say, as Berkeley seems to suppose, that in forming <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract ideas,”</span> we are forming abstract mental + images—pictures in the mind that are not individual pictures.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_495" name="note_495" + href="#noteref_495">495.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Does Locke intend more than this, + although he expresses his meaning in ambiguous words?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_496" name="note_496" + href="#noteref_496">496.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is a particular idea, but + considered relatively—a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">significant</span></em> particular idea, in + other words. We realise our notions in examples, and these must be + concrete.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_497" name="note_497" + href="#noteref_497">497.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“ideas”</span> in Locke's meaning of idea, under which + he comprehends, not only the particular ideas of sense and + imagination—Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-q">“ideas”</span>—but + these considered relatively, and so seen intellectually, when Locke + calls them abstract, general, or universal. Omniscience in its + all-comprehensive intuition may not require, or even admit, such + general ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_498" name="note_498" + href="#noteref_498">498.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here and in what follows, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em>,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“universal <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em>,”</span> instead of + abstract <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>. Notion seems to be here a + synonym for idea, and not taken in the special meaning which he + afterwards attached to the term, when he contrasted it with + idea.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_499" name="note_499" + href="#noteref_499">499.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“notions,”</span> again synonymous with ideas, which + are all particular or concrete, in his meaning of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + when he uses it strictly.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_500" name="note_500" + href="#noteref_500">500.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, i.e. individual mental + picture.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_501" name="note_501" + href="#noteref_501">501.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In all this he takes no account of the + intellectual relations necessarily embodied in concrete knowledge, + and without which experience could not cohere.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_502" name="note_502" + href="#noteref_502">502.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“have in + view,”</span> i.e. actually realise in imagination.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_503" name="note_503" + href="#noteref_503">503.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows, to the end of this + section, was added in the second or 1734 edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_504" name="note_504" + href="#noteref_504">504.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Bacon in many passages of his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Augmentis Scientiarium</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Novum + Organum</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_505" name="note_505" + href="#noteref_505">505.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“wide + influence,”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“wide and extended + sway”</span>—in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_506" name="note_506" + href="#noteref_506">506.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“idea,”</span> + i.e. individual datum of sense or of imagination.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_507" name="note_507" + href="#noteref_507">507.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Leibniz on Symbolical Knowledge + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Opera + Philosophica</span></span>, pp. 79, 80, Erdmann), and Stewart in + his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Elements</span></span>, vol. I. ch. 4, § 1, on + our habit of using language without realising, in individual + examples or ideas, the meanings of the common terms used.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_508" name="note_508" + href="#noteref_508">508.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“doth”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“does,”</span> + here and elsewhere in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_509" name="note_509" + href="#noteref_509">509.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“ideas,”</span> i.e. representations in imagination of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">any</span></em> of the individual objects to + which the names are applicable. The sound or sight of a verbal sign + may do duty for the concrete idea in which the notion signified by + the word might be exemplified.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_510" name="note_510" + href="#noteref_510">510.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the second + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_511" name="note_511" + href="#noteref_511">511.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Elsewhere he mentions Aristotle as + <span class="tei tei-q">“certainly a great admirer and promoter of + the doctrine of abstraction,”</span> and quotes his statement that + there is hardly anything so incomprehensible to men as notions of + the utmost universality; for they are the most remote from sense. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Metaph.</span></span>, Bk. I. ch. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_512" name="note_512" + href="#noteref_512">512.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Added in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_513" name="note_513" + href="#noteref_513">513.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_514" name="note_514" + href="#noteref_514">514.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_515" name="note_515" + href="#noteref_515">515.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_516" name="note_516" + href="#noteref_516">516.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“my own + ideas,”</span> i.e. the concrete phenomena which I can realise as + perceptions of sense, or in imagination.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_517" name="note_517" + href="#noteref_517">517.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He probably refers to Locke.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_518" name="note_518" + href="#noteref_518">518.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">According to Locke, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“that which has most contributed to hinder the due + tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and + agreements or disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, + the ill use of words. It is impossible that men should ever truly + seek, or certainly discover, the agreement or disagreement of ideas + themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only in + sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians, + abstracting their thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves + to set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would + consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a + great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion which has + so much hindered men's progress in other parts of + knowledge.”</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. IV. ch. 3, § 30. See + also Bk. III. ch. 10, 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_519" name="note_519" + href="#noteref_519">519.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">General names involve in their + signification intellectual relations among ideas or phenomena; but + the relations, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, are + unimaginable.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_520" name="note_520" + href="#noteref_520">520.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The rough + draft of the Introduction, prepared two years before the + publication of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> (see Appendix, vol. + III), should be compared with the published version. He there + tells that <span class="tei tei-q">“there was a time when, being + bantered and abused by words,”</span> he <span class= + "tei tei-q">“did not in the least doubt”</span> that he was + <span class="tei tei-q">“able to abstract his ideas”</span>; + adding that <span class="tei tei-q">“after a strict survey of my + abilities, I not only discovered my own deficiency on this point, + but also cannot conceive it possible that such a power should be + even in the most perfect and exalted understanding.”</span> What + he thus pronounces <span class="tei tei-q">“impossible,”</span> + is a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensuous</span></em> perception or + imagination of an intellectual relation, as to which most + thinkers would agree with him. But in so arguing, he seems apt to + discard the intellectual relations themselves that are + necessarily embodied in experience.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">David Hume + refers thus to Berkeley's doctrine about <span class= + "tei tei-q">“abstract ideas”</span>:—<span class="tei tei-q">“A + great philosopher has asserted that all general ideas are nothing + but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a + more extensive signification. I look upon this to be one of the + greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late + years in the republic of letters.”</span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Treatise of H. + N.</span></span> Pt. I, sect. 7.)</p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_521" name="note_521" + href="#noteref_521">521.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This resembles Locke's account of the + ideas with which human knowledge is concerned. They are all + originally presented to the senses, or got by reflexion upon the + passions and acts of the mind; and the materials contributed in + this external and internal experience are, with the help of memory + and imagination, elaborated by the human understanding in ways + innumerable, true and false. See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II, ch. 1, §§ 1-5; ch. 10, 11, 12.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_522" name="note_522" + href="#noteref_522">522.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The ideas or phenomena of which we are + percipient in our five senses make their appearance, not isolated, + but in individual masses, constituting the things, that occupy + their respective places in perceived ambient space. It is as + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualities</span></em> of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">things</span></em> + that the ideas or phenomena of sense arise in human + experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_523" name="note_523" + href="#noteref_523">523.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is an advance upon the language + of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Commonplace Book</span></span>, in which + <span class="tei tei-q">“mind”</span> is spoken of as only a + <span class="tei tei-q">“congeries of perceptions.”</span> Here it + is something <span class="tei tei-q">“entirely distinct”</span> + from ideas or perceptions, in which they exist and are perceived, + and on which they ultimately depend. Spirit, intelligent and + active, presupposed with its implicates in ideas, thus becomes the + basis of Berkeley's philosophy. Is this subjective idealism only? + Locke appears in sect. 1, Descartes, if not Kant by anticipation, + in sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_524" name="note_524" + href="#noteref_524">524.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence expresses Berkeley's New + Principle, which filled his thoughts in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Commonplace + Book</span></span>. Note <span class="tei tei-q">“in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></em> + mind,”</span> not necessarily in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">my</span></em> + mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_525" name="note_525" + href="#noteref_525">525.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That is to say, one has only to put + concrete meaning into the terms <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">existence</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>, in order to have + <span class="tei tei-q">“an intuitive knowledge”</span> that matter + depends for its real existence on percipient spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_526" name="note_526" + href="#noteref_526">526.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, the things of sense + become real, only in the concrete experience of living mind, which + gives them the only reality we can conceive or have any sort of + concern with. Extinguish Spirit and the material world necessarily + ceases to be real.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_527" name="note_527" + href="#noteref_527">527.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">esse</span></span> is <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">percipi</span></span> is Berkeley's initial + Principle, called <span class="tei tei-q">“intuitive”</span> or + self-evident.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_528" name="note_528" + href="#noteref_528">528.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Mark that it is the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“natural or real existence”</span> of the material + world, in the absence of all realising Spirit, that Berkeley + insists is impossible—meaningless.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_529" name="note_529" + href="#noteref_529">529.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“our + own”</span>—yet not exclusively <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mine</span></em>. + They depend for their reality upon <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></em> + percipient, not on <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">my</span></em> perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_530" name="note_530" + href="#noteref_530">530.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“this + tenet,”</span> i.e. that the concrete material world could still be + a reality after the annihilation of all realising spiritual life in + the universe—divine or other.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_531" name="note_531" + href="#noteref_531">531.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“existing + unperceived,”</span> i.e. existing without being realised in any + living percipient experience—existing in a totally abstract + existence, whatever that can mean.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_532" name="note_532" + href="#noteref_532">532.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“notions”</span>—a term elsewhere (see sect. 27, 89, + 142) restricted, is here applied to the immediate data of the + senses—the ideas of sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_533" name="note_533" + href="#noteref_533">533.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the second + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_534" name="note_534" + href="#noteref_534">534.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the first edition, instead of this + sentence, we have the following: <span class="tei tei-q">“To make + this appear with all the light and evidence of an Axiom, it seems + sufficient if I can but awaken the reflexion of the reader, that he + may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and turn his + thoughts upon the subject itself; free and disengaged from all + embarras of words and prepossession in favour of received + mistakes.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_535" name="note_535" + href="#noteref_535">535.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, active percipient + Spirit is at the root of all intelligible trustworthy + experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_536" name="note_536" + href="#noteref_536">536.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">'proof'—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“demonstration”</span> in first edition; yet he calls + it <span class="tei tei-q">“intuitive.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_537" name="note_537" + href="#noteref_537">537.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the ideas + themselves,”</span> i.e. the phenomena immediately presented in + sense, and that are thus realised in and through the percipient + experience of living mind, as their factor.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_538" name="note_538" + href="#noteref_538">538.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As those say who assume that + perception is ultimately only representative of the material + reality, the very things themselves not making their appearance to + us at all.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_539" name="note_539" + href="#noteref_539">539.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He refers especially to Locke, whose + account of Matter is accordingly charged with being + incoherent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_540" name="note_540" + href="#noteref_540">540.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“inert.”</span> See the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_541" name="note_541" + href="#noteref_541">541.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“ideas + existing in the mind,”</span> i.e. phenomena of which <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">some</span></em> + mind is percipient; which are realised in the sentient experience + of a living spirit, human or other.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_542" name="note_542" + href="#noteref_542">542.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows to the end of the section + is omitted in the second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_543" name="note_543" + href="#noteref_543">543.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the existence + of Matter,”</span> i.e. the existence of the material world, + regarded as a something that does not need to be perceived in order + to be real.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_544" name="note_544" + href="#noteref_544">544.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sometimes called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objective</span></em> qualities, because they + are supposed to be realised in an abstract objectivity, which + Berkeley insists is meaningless.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_545" name="note_545" + href="#noteref_545">545.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II, ch. 8, §§ 13, 18; ch. 23, § 11; Bk. IV, ch. 3, § 24-26. + Locke suggests this relation between the secondary and the primary + qualities of matter only hypothetically.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_546" name="note_546" + href="#noteref_546">546.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“in the mind, + and nowhere else,”</span> i.e. perceived or conceived, but in no + other manner can they be real or concrete.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_547" name="note_547" + href="#noteref_547">547.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“without the + mind,”</span> i.e. independently of all percipient experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_548" name="note_548" + href="#noteref_548">548.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Extension is thus the distinguishing + characteristic of the material world. Geometrical and physical + solidity, as well as motion, imply extension.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_549" name="note_549" + href="#noteref_549">549.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“number is the + creature of the mind,”</span> i.e. is dependent on being realised + in percipient experience. This dependence is here illustrated by + the relation of concrete number to the point of view of each mind; + as the dependence of the other primary qualities was illustrated by + their dependence on the organisation of the percipient. In this, + the preceding, and the following sections, Berkeley argues the + inconsistency of the abstract reality attributed to the primary + qualities with their acknowledged dependence on the necessary + conditions of sense perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_550" name="note_550" + href="#noteref_550">550.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 109.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_551" name="note_551" + href="#noteref_551">551.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. Locke, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II, ch. 7, § 7; ch. 16, § 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_552" name="note_552" + href="#noteref_552">552.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“without any + alteration in any external object”</span>—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“without any external alteration”</span>—in first + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_553" name="note_553" + href="#noteref_553">553.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">These arguments, founded on the + mind-dependent nature of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">all</span></em> the qualities of matter, are + expanded in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">First Dialogue between Hylas and + Philonous</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_554" name="note_554" + href="#noteref_554">554.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“an outward + object,”</span> i.e. an object wholly abstract from living + Mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_555" name="note_555" + href="#noteref_555">555.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the second + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_556" name="note_556" + href="#noteref_556">556.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“reason,”</span> i.e. reasoning. It is argued, in this + and the next section, that a reality unrealised in percipient + experience cannot be proved, either by our senses or by + reasoning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_557" name="note_557" + href="#noteref_557">557.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the second edition, and the + sentence converted into a question.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_558" name="note_558" + href="#noteref_558">558.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But the ideas of which we are + cognizant in waking dreams, and dreams of sleep, differ in + important characteristics from the external ideas of which we are + percipient in sense. Cf. sect. 29-33.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_559" name="note_559" + href="#noteref_559">559.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“external + bodies,”</span> i.e. bodies supposed to be real independently of + all percipients in the universe.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_560" name="note_560" + href="#noteref_560">560.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. they cannot shew how their + unintelligible hypothesis of Matter accounts for the experience we + have, or expect to have; or which we believe other persons have, or + to be about to have.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_561" name="note_561" + href="#noteref_561">561.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the + production,”</span> &c., i.e. the fact that we and others have + percipient experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_562" name="note_562" + href="#noteref_562">562.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Mind-dependent Matter he not only + allows to exist, but maintains its reality to be intuitively + evident.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_563" name="note_563" + href="#noteref_563">563.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. bodies existing in abstraction + from living percipient spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_564" name="note_564" + href="#noteref_564">564.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Matter,”</span> i.e. abstract Matter, unrealised in + sentient intelligence.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_565" name="note_565" + href="#noteref_565">565.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The appeal here and elsewhere is to + consciousness—directly in each person's experience, and indirectly + in that of others.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_566" name="note_566" + href="#noteref_566">566.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. otherwise than in the form of an + idea or actual appearance presented to our senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_567" name="note_567" + href="#noteref_567">567.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This implies that the material world + may be realised in imagination as well as in sensuous perception, + but in a less degree of reality; for reality, he assumes, admits of + degrees.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_568" name="note_568" + href="#noteref_568">568.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“to conceive + the existence of external bodies,”</span> i.e. to conceive bodies + that are not conceived—that are not ideas at all, but which exist + in abstraction. To suppose what we conceive to be unconceived, is + to suppose a contradiction.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_569" name="note_569" + href="#noteref_569">569.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the second + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_570" name="note_570" + href="#noteref_570">570.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“The existence + of things without mind,”</span> or in the absence of all spiritual + life and perception, is what Berkeley argues against, as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">meaningless</span></em>, if not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">contradictory</span></em>; not the existence + of a material world, when this means the realised order of nature, + regulated independently of individual will, and to which our + actions must conform if we are to avoid physical pain.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_571" name="note_571" + href="#noteref_571">571.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here again <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em> + is undistinguished from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_572" name="note_572" + href="#noteref_572">572.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This and the three following sections + argue for the essential impotence of matter, and that, as far as we + are concerned, so-called <span class="tei tei-q">“natural + causes”</span> are only <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">signs</span></em> which foretell the + appearance of their so-called effects. The material world is + presented to our senses as a procession of orderly, and therefore + interpretable, yet in themselves powerless, ideas or phenomena: + motion is always an effect, never an originating active cause.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_573" name="note_573" + href="#noteref_573">573.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As Locke suggests.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_574" name="note_574" + href="#noteref_574">574.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This tacitly presupposes the necessity + in reason of the Principle of Causality, or the ultimate need for + an efficient cause of every change. To determine the sort of + Causation that constitutes and pervades the universe is the aim of + his philosophy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_575" name="note_575" + href="#noteref_575">575.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, the material world is + not only real in and through percipient spirit, but the changing + forms which its phenomena assume, in the natural evolution, are the + issue of the perpetual activity of in-dwelling Spirit. The argument + in this section requires a deeper criticism of its premisses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_576" name="note_576" + href="#noteref_576">576.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, an agent cannot, as + such, be perceived or imagined, though its effects can. The + spiritual term <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">agent</span></em> is not meaningless; yet we + have no <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensuous idea</span></em> of its meaning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_577" name="note_577" + href="#noteref_577">577.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_578" name="note_578" + href="#noteref_578">578.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is not contained in the + first edition. It is remarkable for first introducing the term + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em>, to signify <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idealess + meaning</span></em>, as in the words soul, active power, &c. + Here he says that <span class="tei tei-q">“the operations of the + mind”</span> belong to notions, while, in sect. 1, he speaks of + <span class="tei tei-q">“<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> perceived by attending to + the <span class="tei tei-q">‘operations’</span> of the + mind.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_579" name="note_579" + href="#noteref_579">579.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“ideas,”</span> i.e. fancies of imagination; as + distinguished from the more real ideas or phenomena that present + themselves objectively to our senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_580" name="note_580" + href="#noteref_580">580.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">With Berkeley the world of external + ideas is distinguished from Spirit by its essential passivity. + Active power is with him the essence of Mind, distinguishing me + from the changing ideas of which I am percipient. We must not + attribute free agency to phenomena presented to our senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_581" name="note_581" + href="#noteref_581">581.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In this and the four following + sections, Berkeley mentions <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">marks</span></em> by which the ideas or + phenomena that present themselves to the senses may be + distinguished from all other ideas, in consequence of which they + may be termed <span class="tei tei-q">“external,”</span> while + those of feeling and imagination are wholly subjective or + individual.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_582" name="note_582" + href="#noteref_582">582.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This mark—the superior strength and + liveliness of the ideas or phenomena that are presented to the + senses—was afterwards noted by Hume. See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Inquiry concerning + Human Understanding</span></span>, sect. II.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_583" name="note_583" + href="#noteref_583">583.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley here and always insists on + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">arbitrary</span></em> character of + <span class="tei tei-q">“settled laws”</span> of change in the + world, as contrasted with <span class="tei tei-q">“necessary + connexions”</span> discovered in mathematics. The material world is + thus virtually an interpretable natural language, constituted in + what, at our point of view, is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">arbitrariness</span></em> + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">contingency</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_584" name="note_584" + href="#noteref_584">584.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Under this conception of the universe, + <span class="tei tei-q">“second causes”</span> are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">divinely + established signs</span></em> of impending changes, and are only + metaphorically called <span class="tei tei-q">“causes.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_585" name="note_585" + href="#noteref_585">585.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Schiller, in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Don + Carlos</span></span>, Act III, where he represents sceptics as + failing to see the God who veils Himself in everlasting laws. But + in truth God is eternal law or order vitalised and moralised.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_586" name="note_586" + href="#noteref_586">586.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensations</span></em>,”</span> with Berkeley, + are not mere feelings, but in a sense external appearances.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_587" name="note_587" + href="#noteref_587">587.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">more</span></em> + reality.”</span> This implies that reality admits of degrees, and + that the difference between the phenomena presented to the senses + and those which are only imagined is a difference in degree of + reality.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_588" name="note_588" + href="#noteref_588">588.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the preceding sections, two + relations should be carefully distinguished—that of the material + world to percipient mind, in which it becomes <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em>; + and that between changes in the world and spiritual agency. These + are Berkeley's two leading Principles. The first conducts to and + vindicates the second—inadequately, however, apart from explication + of their root in moral reason. The former gives a relation + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sui generis</span></span>. The latter gives + our only example of active causality—the natural order of phenomena + being the outcome of the causal energy of intending Will.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_589" name="note_589" + href="#noteref_589">589.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 34-84 contain Berkeley's answers + to supposed <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objections</span></em> to the foregoing + Principles concerning Matter and Spirit in their mutual + relations.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_590" name="note_590" + href="#noteref_590">590.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">To be an <span class= + "tei tei-q">“idea”</span> is, with Berkeley, to be the imaginable + object of a percipient spirit. But he does not define precisely the + relation of ideas to mind. <span class="tei tei-q">“Existence in + mind”</span> is existence <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in this relation</span></em>. His question + (which he determines in the negative) is, the possibility of + concrete phenomena, naturally presented to sense, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">yet out of all + relation to living mind</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_591" name="note_591" + href="#noteref_591">591.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_592" name="note_592" + href="#noteref_592">592.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. of imagination. Cf. sect. + 28-30.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_593" name="note_593" + href="#noteref_593">593.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 29.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_594" name="note_594" + href="#noteref_594">594.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“more + reality.”</span> This again implies that reality admits of degrees. + What is perceived in sense is more real than what is imagined, and + eternal realities are more deeply real than the transitory things + of sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_595" name="note_595" + href="#noteref_595">595.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 33. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Not fictions,”</span> i.e. they are presentative, and + therefore cannot misrepresent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_596" name="note_596" + href="#noteref_596">596.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">With Berkeley <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> is either (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></span>) + active reason, i.e. spirit—substance proper, or (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">b</span></span>) an + aggregate of sense-phenomena, called a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“sensible thing”</span>—substance conventionally and + superficially.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_597" name="note_597" + href="#noteref_597">597.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">And which, because realised in living + perception, are called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>—to remind us that reality is + attained in and through percipient mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_598" name="note_598" + href="#noteref_598">598.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“combined + together,”</span> i.e. in the form of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“sensible things,”</span> according to natural laws. + Cf. sect. 33.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_599" name="note_599" + href="#noteref_599">599.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“thinking + things”</span>—more appropriately called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">persons</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_600" name="note_600" + href="#noteref_600">600.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley uses the word idea to mark + the fact, that sensible things are real only as they manifest + themselves in the form of passive objects, presented to + sense-percipient mind; but he does not, as popularly supposed, + regard <span class="tei tei-q">“sensible things”</span> as created + and regulated by the activity of his own individual mind. They are + perceived, but are neither created nor regulated, by the individual + percipient, and are thus <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">practically external</span></em> to each + person.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_601" name="note_601" + href="#noteref_601">601.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 87-91, against the + scepticism which originates in alleged fallacy of sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_602" name="note_602" + href="#noteref_602">602.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_603" name="note_603" + href="#noteref_603">603.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is always to be remembered that + with Berkeley ideas or phenomena presented to sense are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">themselves</span></em> the real things, whilst + ideas of imagination are representative (or + misrepresentative).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_604" name="note_604" + href="#noteref_604">604.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here feelings of pleasure or pain are + spoken of, without qualification, as in like relation to living + mind as sensible things or ideas are.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_605" name="note_605" + href="#noteref_605">605.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That the ideas of sense should be seen + <span class="tei tei-q">“at a distance of several miles”</span> + seems not inconsistent with their being dependent on a percipient, + if ambient space is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">itself</span></em> (as Berkeley asserts) + dependent on percipient experience. Cf. sect. 67.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_606" name="note_606" + href="#noteref_606">606.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the preceding year.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_607" name="note_607" + href="#noteref_607">607.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_608" name="note_608" + href="#noteref_608">608.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. sect. 11-15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_609" name="note_609" + href="#noteref_609">609.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. sect. 16-28.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_610" name="note_610" + href="#noteref_610">610.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. sect. 51.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_611" name="note_611" + href="#noteref_611">611.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. sect. 47-49, 121-141.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_612" name="note_612" + href="#noteref_612">612.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. sect. 43.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_613" name="note_613" + href="#noteref_613">613.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. what we are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediately</span></em> percipient of in + seeing.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_614" name="note_614" + href="#noteref_614">614.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Touch is here and elsewhere taken in + its wide meaning, and includes our muscular and locomotive + experience, all which Berkeley included in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“tactual”</span> meaning of distance.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_615" name="note_615" + href="#noteref_615">615.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">To explain the condition of sensible + things <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">during the intervals of our perception of + them</span></em>, consistently with the belief of all sane persons + regarding the material world, is a challenge which has been often + addressed to the advocates of ideal Realism. According to Berkeley, + there are no intervals in the existence of sensible things. They + are permanently perceivable, under the laws of nature, though not + always perceived by this, that or the other individual percipient. + Moreover they always exist <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">really</span></em> in the Divine Idea, and + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">potentially</span></em>, in relation to finite + minds, in the Divine Will.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_616" name="note_616" + href="#noteref_616">616.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley allows to bodies unperceived + by me potential, but (for me) not real existence. When I say a body + exists thus conditionally, I mean that if, in the light, I open my + eyes, I shall see it, and that if I move my hand, I must feel + it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_617" name="note_617" + href="#noteref_617">617.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. unperceived material + substance.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_618" name="note_618" + href="#noteref_618">618.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley remarks, in a letter to the + American Samuel Johnson, that <span class="tei tei-q">“those who + have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged that + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">natura naturans</span></span> (to use the + language of the Schoolmen) is God; and that the Divine conservation + of things is equipollent to, and in fact the same thing with, a + continued repeated creation;—in a word, that conservation and + creation differ only as the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">terminus a + quo</span></span>. These are the common opinions of Schoolmen; and + Durandus, who held the world to be a machine, like a clock made up + and put in motion by God, but afterwards continued to go of itself, + was therein particular, and had few followers. The very poets teach + a doctrine not unlike the Schools—<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mens agitat molem</span></span> (Virgil, + Æneid, VI). The Stoics and Platonists are everywhere full of the + same notion. I am not therefore singular in this point itself, so + much as in my way of proving it.”</span> Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, Dial. IV. sect. 14; + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Vindication of New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 8, 17, &c.; <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">passim</span></span>, but especially in the + latter part. See also <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Correspondence between Clarke and + Leibniz</span></span> (1717). Is it not possible that the universe + of things and persons is in continuous natural creation, + unbeginning and unending?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_619" name="note_619" + href="#noteref_619">619.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 123-132.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_620" name="note_620" + href="#noteref_620">620.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He distinguishes <span class= + "tei tei-q">“idea”</span> from <span class="tei tei-q">“mode or + attribute.”</span> With Berkeley, the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“substance”</span> of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">matter</span></em> + (if the term is still to be applied to sensible things) is the + naturally constituted aggregate of phenomena of which each + particular thing consists. Now extension, and the other qualities + of sensible things, are not, Berkeley argues, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in mind”</span> either (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">a</span></span>) + according to the abstract relation of substance and attribute of + which philosophers speak; nor (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">b</span></span>) as + one idea or phenomenon is related to another idea or phenomenon, in + the natural aggregation of sense-phenomena which constitute, with + him, the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em> of a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">material</span></em> thing. Mind and its + <span class="tei tei-q">“ideas”</span> are, on the contrary, + related as percipient to perceived—in whatever <span class= + "tei tei-q">“otherness”</span> that altogether <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sui generis</span></span> relation + implies.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_621" name="note_621" + href="#noteref_621">621.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Matter,”</span> i.e. abstract material Substance, as + distinguished from the concrete things that are realised in living + perceptions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_622" name="note_622" + href="#noteref_622">622.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“take away + natural causes,”</span> i.e. empty the material world of all + originative power, and refer the supposed powers of bodies to the + constant and omnipresent agency of God.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_623" name="note_623" + href="#noteref_623">623.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Some philosophers have treated the + relation of Matter to Mind in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perception</span></em> as one of cause and + effect. This, according to Berkeley, is an illegitimate analysis, + which creates a fictitious duality. On his New Principles, + philosophy is based on a recognition of the fact, that perception + is neither the cause nor the effect of its object, but in a + relation to it that is altogether <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sui generis</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_624" name="note_624" + href="#noteref_624">624.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He refers to Descartes, and perhaps + Geulinx and Malebranche, who, while they argued for material + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>, denied the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">causal + efficiency</span></em> of sensible things. Berkeley's new + Principles are presented as the foundation in reason for this + denial, and for the essential spirituality of all active power in + the universe.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_625" name="note_625" + href="#noteref_625">625.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On the principle, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter + necessitatem.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_626" name="note_626" + href="#noteref_626">626.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“external + things,”</span> i.e. things in the abstract.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_627" name="note_627" + href="#noteref_627">627.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That the unreflecting part of mankind + should have a confused conception of what should be meant by the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">external + reality</span></em> of matter is not wonderful. It is the office of + philosophy to improve their conception, making it deeper and truer, + and this was Berkeley's preliminary task; as a mean for shewing the + impotence of the things of sense, and conclusive evidence of + omnipresent spiritual activity.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_628" name="note_628" + href="#noteref_628">628.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_629" name="note_629" + href="#noteref_629">629.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. their <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sense-ideas</span></em>.—Though sense-ideas, + i.e. the appearances presented to the senses, are independent of + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> of the individual percipient, + it does not follow that they are independent of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all + perception</span></em>, so that they can be real in the absence of + realising percipient experience. Cf. sect. 29-33.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_630" name="note_630" + href="#noteref_630">630.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">By shewing that what we are percipient + of in sense must be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, or that it is immediately + known by us only as sensuous appearance.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_631" name="note_631" + href="#noteref_631">631.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“imprinted”</span> by unperceived Matter, which, on + this dogma of a representative sense-perception, was assumed to + exist behind the perceived ideas, and to be the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em> + of their appearance. Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Third Dialogue between Hylas and + Philonous</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_632" name="note_632" + href="#noteref_632">632.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Hence the difficulty men have in + recognising that Divine Reason and Will, and Law in Nature, are + coincident. But the advance of scientific discovery of the laws + which express Divine Will in nature, instead of narrowing, extends + our knowledge of God. And <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">divine</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">absolutely + reasonable</span></em> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“arbitrariness”</span> is not caprice.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_633" name="note_633" + href="#noteref_633">633.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“ideas,”</span> i.e. ideas of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sense</span></em>. + This <span class="tei tei-q">“experience”</span> implied an + association of sensuous ideas, according to the divine or + reasonable order of nature.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_634" name="note_634" + href="#noteref_634">634.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 25-33, and other passages in + Berkeley's writings in which he insists upon the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">arbitrariness</span></em>—divine or + reasonable—of the natural laws and sense-symbolism.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_635" name="note_635" + href="#noteref_635">635.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 3, 4, 6, 22-24, 26, in which + he proceeds upon the intuitive certainty of his two leading + Principles, concerning <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Reality</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Causation</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_636" name="note_636" + href="#noteref_636">636.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In short, what is virtually the + language of universal natural order is the divine way of revealing + omnipresent Intelligence; nor can we conceive how this revelation + could be made through a capricious or chaotic succession of + changes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_637" name="note_637" + href="#noteref_637">637.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He here touches on moral purpose in + miraculous phenomena, but without discussing their relation to the + divine, or perfectly reasonable, order of the universe. Relatively + to a fine knowledge of nature, they seem anomalous—exceptions from + general rules, which nevertheless express, immediately and + constantly, perfect active Reason.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_638" name="note_638" + href="#noteref_638">638.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“ideas,”</span> i.e. the phenomena presented to the + senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_639" name="note_639" + href="#noteref_639">639.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“imaginable”</span>—in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_640" name="note_640" + href="#noteref_640">640.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the connexion + of ideas,”</span> i.e. the presence of law or reasonable uniformity + in the coexistence and succession of the phenomena of sense; which + makes them interpretable signs.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_641" name="note_641" + href="#noteref_641">641.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">According to Berkeley, it is by an + abuse of language that the term <span class= + "tei tei-q">“power”</span> is applied to those ideas which are + invariable antecedents of other ideas—the prior forms of their + existence, as it were.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_642" name="note_642" + href="#noteref_642">642.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley, in meeting this objection, + thus implies Universal Natural Symbolism as the essential character + of the sensible world, in its relation to man.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_643" name="note_643" + href="#noteref_643">643.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. IV, ch. 3, § 25-28, &c., in which he suggests that the + secondary qualities of bodies may be the natural issue of the + different relations and modifications of their primary + qualities.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_644" name="note_644" + href="#noteref_644">644.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">With Berkeley, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em> is merely the natural combination of + sense-presented phenomena, which, under a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">divine</span></em> + or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reasonable</span></em> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“arbitrariness,”</span> constitute a concrete thing. + Divine Will, or Active Reason, is the constantly sustaining cause + of this combination or substantiation.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_645" name="note_645" + href="#noteref_645">645.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. that it is not realised in a + living percipient experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_646" name="note_646" + href="#noteref_646">646.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For <span class= + "tei tei-q">“place”</span> is realised only as perceived—percipient + experience being its concrete existence. Living perception is, with + Berkeley, the condition of the possibility of concrete + locality.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_647" name="note_647" + href="#noteref_647">647.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So in the Cartesian theory of + occasional causes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_648" name="note_648" + href="#noteref_648">648.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Geulinx and Malebranche.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_649" name="note_649" + href="#noteref_649">649.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As known in Divine intelligence, they + are accordingly <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Divine Ideas</span></em>. And, if this means + that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which + are its ultimate archetype—that the Ideas of God are symbolised to + our senses, and then interpreted (or misinterpreted) by human + minds, this allies itself with Platonic Idealism.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_650" name="note_650" + href="#noteref_650">650.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“It seems to + me,”</span> Hume says, <span class="tei tei-q">“that this theory of + the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">too + bold</span></em> ever to carry conviction with it to a mind + sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the + narrow limits to which it is confined in all its + operations.”</span> But is it not virtually presupposed in the + assumed trustworthiness of our experience of the universe?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_651" name="note_651" + href="#noteref_651">651.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Accordingly we are led to ask, what + the deepest support of their reality must be. Is it found in living + Spirit, i.e. Active Reason, or in blind Matter?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_652" name="note_652" + href="#noteref_652">652.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, + &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_653" name="note_653" + href="#noteref_653">653.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In short, if we mean by Matter, + something unrealised in percipient experience of sense, what is + called its <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em> is something + unintelligible.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_654" name="note_654" + href="#noteref_654">654.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">And if sensible phenomena are + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sufficiently</span></em> externalised, when + regarded as regulated by Divine Reason.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_655" name="note_655" + href="#noteref_655">655.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Twenty years after the publication of + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, in a letter to his + American friend Johnson, Berkeley says:—<span class="tei tei-q">“I + have no objection against calling the Ideas in the mind of God + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">archetypes</span></em> of ours. But I object + against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real + things, and so to have an absolute rational existence distinct from + their being perceived by any mind whatsoever; it being the opinion + of all materialists that an ideal existence in the Divine Mind is + one thing, and the real existence of material things + another.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_656" name="note_656" + href="#noteref_656">656.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's philosophy is not + inconsistent with Divine Ideas which receive expression in the laws + of nature, and of which human science is the imperfect + interpretation. In this view, assertion of the existence of Matter + is simply an expression of faith that the phenomenal universe into + which we are born is a reasonable and interpretable universe; and + that it would be fully interpreted, if our notions could be fully + harmonised with the Divine Ideas which it expresses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_657" name="note_657" + href="#noteref_657">657.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 3-24.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_658" name="note_658" + href="#noteref_658">658.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So that superhuman persons, endowed + with a million senses, would be no nearer this abstract Matter than + man is, with his few senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_659" name="note_659" + href="#noteref_659">659.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Matter and physical science is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relative</span></em>, so far that we may + suppose in other percipients than men, an indefinite number of + additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of qualities + in things, of course inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an + intelligence destitute of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">all our</span></em> senses, and so in a + material world wholly different in its appearances from ours.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_660" name="note_660" + href="#noteref_660">660.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The authority of Holy Scripture, added + to our natural tendency to believe in external reality, are grounds + on which Malebranche and Norris infer a material world. Berkeley's + material world claims no logical proof of its reality. His is not + to prove the reality of the world, but to shew what we should mean + when we affirm its reality, and the basis of its explicability in + science.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_661" name="note_661" + href="#noteref_661">661.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. existing unrealised in any + intelligence—human or Divine.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_662" name="note_662" + href="#noteref_662">662.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“external + things,”</span> i.e. things existing really, yet out of all + relation to active living spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_663" name="note_663" + href="#noteref_663">663.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Simultaneous + perception of the <span class="tei tei-q">“same”</span> + (similar?) <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sense</span></em>-ideas, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">by different + persons</span></em>, as distinguished from purely individual + consciousness of feelings and fancies, is here taken as a test of + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">virtually external reality</span></em> of + the former.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Berkeley does + not ask whether the change of the rod into a serpent, or of the + water into wine, is the issue of divine agency and order, + otherwise than as all natural evolution is divinely + providential.</p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_664" name="note_664" + href="#noteref_664">664.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Some of the Consequences of adoption + of the New Principles, in their application to the physical + sciences and mathematics, and then to psychology and theology, are + unfolded in the remaining sections of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_665" name="note_665" + href="#noteref_665">665.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley disclaims the supposed + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">representative</span></em> character of the + ideas given in sensuous perception, and recognises as the real + object only what is ideally presented in consciousness.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_666" name="note_666" + href="#noteref_666">666.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who all + see in a wholly representative sense-perception, with its double + object, the germ of total scepticism. Berkeley claims that, under + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">his</span></em> interpretation of what the + reality of the material world means, immediate knowledge of + mind-dependent matter is given in sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_667" name="note_667" + href="#noteref_667">667.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“scepticism”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“sceptical + cant”</span> in the first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_668" name="note_668" + href="#noteref_668">668.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the second + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_669" name="note_669" + href="#noteref_669">669.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's argument against a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">finally + representative</span></em> perception so far resembles that + afterwards employed by Reid and Hamilton. They differ as regards + the dependence of the sensible object upon percipient spirit for + its reality.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_670" name="note_670" + href="#noteref_670">670.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_671" name="note_671" + href="#noteref_671">671.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_672" name="note_672" + href="#noteref_672">672.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But whilst unthinking things depend on + being perceived, do not our spirits depend on ideas of some sort + for their percipient life?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_673" name="note_673" + href="#noteref_673">673.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The important passage within brackets + was added in the second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_674" name="note_674" + href="#noteref_674">674.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“reason,”</span> i.e. reasoning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_675" name="note_675" + href="#noteref_675">675.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Notion,”</span> in its stricter meaning, is thus + confined by Berkeley to apprehension of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Ego</span></em>, + and intelligence of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relations</span></em>. The term <span class= + "tei tei-q">“notion,”</span> in this contrast with <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">his</span></em> + <span class="tei tei-q">“idea,”</span> becomes important in his + vocabulary, although he sometimes uses it vaguely.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_676" name="note_676" + href="#noteref_676">676.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Locke uses <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> in + this wider signification.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_677" name="note_677" + href="#noteref_677">677.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Inasmuch as they are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> in + and through living percipient mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_678" name="note_678" + href="#noteref_678">678.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unthinking</span></em> archetypes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_679" name="note_679" + href="#noteref_679">679.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In this section Berkeley explains what + he means by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">externality</span></em>. Men cannot act, + cannot live, without assuming an external world—in some meaning of + the term <span class="tei tei-q">“external.”</span> It is the + business of the philosopher to explicate its true meaning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_680" name="note_680" + href="#noteref_680">680.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. they are not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substances</span></em> in the truest or + deepest meaning of the word.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_681" name="note_681" + href="#noteref_681">681.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Ideas of the + corporeal substances.”</span> Berkeley might perhaps say—Divine + Ideas which are <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">themselves</span></em> our world of sensible + things in its ultimate form.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_682" name="note_682" + href="#noteref_682">682.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On the scheme of ideal Realism, + <span class="tei tei-q">“creation”</span> of matter is presenting + to finite minds sense-ideas or phenomena, which are, as it were, + letters of the alphabet, in that language of natural order which + God employs for the expression of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">His</span></em> + Ideas to us.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_683" name="note_683" + href="#noteref_683">683.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">independent</span></em> eternity of Matter + must be distinguished from an unbeginning and endless <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">creation</span></em> of sensible ideas or + phenomena, in percipient spirits, according to divine natural law + and order, with implied immanence of God.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_684" name="note_684" + href="#noteref_684">684.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Because the question at issue with + Atheism is, whether the universe of things and persons is finally + substantiated and evolved in unthinking Matter or in the perfect + Reason of God.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_685" name="note_685" + href="#noteref_685">685.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Of which Berkeley does <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">not</span></em> + predicate a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">numerical</span></em> identity. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Third + Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_686" name="note_686" + href="#noteref_686">686.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“matter,”</span> i.e. matter abstracted from all + percipient life and voluntary activity.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_687" name="note_687" + href="#noteref_687">687.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“external”</span>—not in Berkeley's meaning of + externality. Cf. sect. 90, note 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_688" name="note_688" + href="#noteref_688">688.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Si + non rogas, intelligo.</span></span> Berkeley writes long after this + to Johnson thus:—<span class="tei tei-q">“A succession of ideas + (phenomena) I take to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">constitute</span></em> time, and not to be + only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think. + But in these matters every man is to think for himself, and speak + as he finds. One of my earliest inquiries was about <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">time</span></em>; + which led me into several paradoxes that I did not think it fit or + necessary to publish, particularly into the notion that the + resurrection follows the next moment after death. We are confounded + and perplexed about time—supposing a succession in God; that we + have an abstract idea of time; that time in one mind is to be + measured by succession of ideas in another mind: not considering + the true use of words, which as often terminate in the will as in + the understanding, being employed to excite and direct action + rather than to produce clear and distinct ideas.”</span> Cf. + Introduction, sect. 20.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_689" name="note_689" + href="#noteref_689">689.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">esse</span></span> of unthinking things is + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">percipi</span></span>, according to Berkeley, + so the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">esse</span></span> of persons + is <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">percipere</span></span>. The + real existence of individual Mind thus depends on having ideas of + some sort: the real existence of matter depends on a + percipient.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_690" name="note_690" + href="#noteref_690">690.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence is omitted in the second + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_691" name="note_691" + href="#noteref_691">691.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 43.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_692" name="note_692" + href="#noteref_692">692.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“objects of + sense,”</span> i.e. sensible things, practically external to each + person. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing</span></em>, + as distinct from the distinguishable ideas or phenomena that are + naturally aggregated in the form of concrete things.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_693" name="note_693" + href="#noteref_693">693.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_694" name="note_694" + href="#noteref_694">694.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_695" name="note_695" + href="#noteref_695">695.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With + Berkeley, the real essence of sensible things is given in + perception—so far as our perceptions carry us.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_696" name="note_696" + href="#noteref_696">696.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. IV. ch. 3.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_697" name="note_697" + href="#noteref_697">697.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley advocates a Realism, which + eliminates effective causation from the material world, + concentrates it in Mind, and in physical research seeks among data + of sense for their divinely maintained natural laws.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_698" name="note_698" + href="#noteref_698">698.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In interpreting the data of sense, we + are obliged to assume that every <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">new</span></em> + phenomenon must have previously existed in some equivalent form—but + not necessarily in this or that particular form, for a knowledge of + which we are indebted to inductive comparisons of experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_699" name="note_699" + href="#noteref_699">699.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The preceding forms of new phenomena, + being finally determined by Will, are, in that sense, arbitrary; + but not capricious, for the Will is perfect Reason. God is the + immanent cause of the natural order.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_700" name="note_700" + href="#noteref_700">700.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He probably refers to Bacon.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_701" name="note_701" + href="#noteref_701">701.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_702" name="note_702" + href="#noteref_702">702.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What we are able to discover in the + all-comprehensive order may be subordinate and provisional only. + Nature in its deepest meaning explains itself in the Divine + Omniscience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_703" name="note_703" + href="#noteref_703">703.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. inductively.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_704" name="note_704" + href="#noteref_704">704.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. deductively.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_705" name="note_705" + href="#noteref_705">705.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“seem to + consider signs,”</span> i.e. to be grammarians rather than + philosophers: physical sciences deal with the grammar of the divine + language of nature.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_706" name="note_706" + href="#noteref_706">706.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“A man may be + well read in the language of nature without understanding the + grammar of it, or being able to say,”</span> &c.—in first + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_707" name="note_707" + href="#noteref_707">707.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“extend”</span>—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“stretch”</span>—in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_708" name="note_708" + href="#noteref_708">708.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_709" name="note_709" + href="#noteref_709">709.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the first edition, the section + commences thus: <span class="tei tei-q">“The best grammar of the + kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a + treatise of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mechanics</span></em>, demonstrated and + applied to Nature, by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation, whom + all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on + the performance of that extraordinary person: only some things he + has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto + laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due to the + authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of + them.”</span> He refers, of course, to Newton. The first edition of + Berkeley's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> was published in + Ireland—hence <span class="tei tei-q">“neighbouring nation.”</span> + Newton's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span> appeared in 1687.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_710" name="note_710" + href="#noteref_710">710.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Motion,”</span> in various aspects, is treated + specially in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span>. An imagination of + trinal space presupposes locomotive experience—unimpeded, in + contrast with—impeded locomotion. Cf. sect. 116.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_711" name="note_711" + href="#noteref_711">711.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_712" name="note_712" + href="#noteref_712">712.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Added in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_713" name="note_713" + href="#noteref_713">713.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_714" name="note_714" + href="#noteref_714">714.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_715" name="note_715" + href="#noteref_715">715.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“applied + to”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“impressed on”</span>—in first + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_716" name="note_716" + href="#noteref_716">716.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“applied + to”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“impressed on”</span>—in first + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_717" name="note_717" + href="#noteref_717">717.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">force</span></em> causing the + change”</span>—which <span class="tei tei-q">“force,”</span> + according to Berkeley, can only be attributed metaphorically to the + so-called impelling body; inasmuch as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bodies</span></em>, + or the data of sense, can only be signs of their consequent events, + not efficient causes of change.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_718" name="note_718" + href="#noteref_718">718.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Added in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_719" name="note_719" + href="#noteref_719">719.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows to the end of this + section is omitted in the second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_720" name="note_720" + href="#noteref_720">720.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“seems + impossible”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“is above my + capacity”</span>—in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_721" name="note_721" + href="#noteref_721">721.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In short, empty Space <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">is</span></em> the + sensuous idea of unresisted motion. This is implied in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory of Vision</span></span>. He minimises Space, treating it as + a datum of sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_722" name="note_722" + href="#noteref_722">722.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He probably refers to Samuel Clarke's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of + God</span></span>, which appeared in 1706, and a treatise + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Spatio + Reali</span></span>, published in the same year.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_723" name="note_723" + href="#noteref_723">723.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 118-132 are accordingly + concerned with the New Principles in their application to + Mathematics. The foundation of the mathematical sciences engaged + much of Berkeley's thought in early life and in his later years. + See his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_724" name="note_724" + href="#noteref_724">724.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Numerical relations are <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">realised</span></em> only in concrete + experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_725" name="note_725" + href="#noteref_725">725.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 107, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_726" name="note_726" + href="#noteref_726">726.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_727" name="note_727" + href="#noteref_727">727.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">An infinitely divided extension, being + unperceived, must be unreal—if its existence is made real only in + and through actual perception, or at least imagination. The only + possible extension is, accordingly, sensible extension, which could + not be infinitely divided without the supposed parts ceasing to be + perceived or real.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_728" name="note_728" + href="#noteref_728">728.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“converted + Gentile”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“pagan convert”</span>—in + first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_729" name="note_729" + href="#noteref_729">729.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Locke's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. I, ch. 3, § 25.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_730" name="note_730" + href="#noteref_730">730.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“will perhaps + in virtue thereof be brought to admit,”</span> &c.—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“will not stick to affirm,”</span> &c.—in first + edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_731" name="note_731" + href="#noteref_731">731.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition. See the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_732" name="note_732" + href="#noteref_732">732.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“we must + mean”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“we mean (if we mean + anything)”</span>—in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_733" name="note_733" + href="#noteref_733">733.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in the second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_734" name="note_734" + href="#noteref_734">734.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Does this refer to the intended + <span class="tei tei-q">“Part II”</span> of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_735" name="note_735" + href="#noteref_735">735.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“men of great + abilities and obstinate application,”</span> &c.—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“men of the greatest abilities and most obstinate + application,”</span> &c.—in first edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_736" name="note_736" + href="#noteref_736">736.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows to the end of this + section is omitted in the second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_737" name="note_737" + href="#noteref_737">737.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“absolute,”</span> i.e. abstract, independent, + irrelative existence—as something of which there can be no sensuous + perception or conception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_738" name="note_738" + href="#noteref_738">738.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Matter unrealised in perception—not + the material world that is realised in percipient experience of + sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_739" name="note_739" + href="#noteref_739">739.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_740" name="note_740" + href="#noteref_740">740.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 135-156 treat of consequences of + the New Principles, in their application to sciences concerned with + our notions of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Spirit</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Mind</span></em>; + as distinguished from sciences of ideas in external Nature, and + their mathematical relations. Individual mind, with Berkeley, needs + data of sense in order to its realisation in consciousness; while + it is dependent on God, in a relation which he does not define + distinctly.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_741" name="note_741" + href="#noteref_741">741.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. Locke suggests this.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_742" name="note_742" + href="#noteref_742">742.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is this analogy applicable?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_743" name="note_743" + href="#noteref_743">743.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition, as he had + previously learned to distinguish <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em> + from <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>. Cf. sect. 89, 142.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_744" name="note_744" + href="#noteref_744">744.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Ibid. In the omitted passage it will + be seen that he makes <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">notion</span></em> + synonymous.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_745" name="note_745" + href="#noteref_745">745.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is the reality of mind as dependent on + having ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind; although mind is + more deeply and truly real than its ideas are?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_746" name="note_746" + href="#noteref_746">746.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Introduced in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_747" name="note_747" + href="#noteref_747">747.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">We know <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">other finite + persons</span></em> through sense-presented phenomena, but not as + themselves phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It is a mediate knowledge that + we have of other persons. The question about the individuality of + finite egos, as distinguished from God, Berkeley has not + touched.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_748" name="note_748" + href="#noteref_748">748.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">These sentences are omitted in the + second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_749" name="note_749" + href="#noteref_749">749.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the + soul,”</span> i.e. the individual Ego.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_750" name="note_750" + href="#noteref_750">750.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 2; 25-27.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_751" name="note_751" + href="#noteref_751">751.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is Berkeley's application of his + new conception of the reality of matter, to the final human + question of the self-conscious existence of the individual human + Ego, after physical death. Philosophers and theologians were + accustomed in his generation to ground their argument for a future + life on the metaphysical assumption of the physical indivisibility + of our self-conscious spirit, and on our contingent connexion with + the body. <span class="tei tei-q">“Our bodies,”</span> says Bishop + Butler, <span class="tei tei-q">“are no more <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ourselves</span></em>, or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">part of + ourselves</span></em>, than any other matter around us.”</span> + This train of thought is foreign to us at the present day, when men + of science remind us that self-conscious life is found only in + correlation with corporeal organisation, whatever may be the + abstract possibility. Hope of continued life after physical death + seems to depend on ethical considerations more than on metaphysical + arguments, and on what is suggested by faith in the final outcome + of personal life in a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">divinely</span></em> constituted + universe.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_752" name="note_752" + href="#noteref_752">752.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Mind and the ideas presented to the + senses are at opposite poles of existence. But he does not say + that, thus opposed, they are each independent of the other.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_753" name="note_753" + href="#noteref_753">753.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows was introduced in the + second edition, in which <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notion</span></em> is contrasted with + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_754" name="note_754" + href="#noteref_754">754.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here is a germ of Kantism. But + Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind which constitutes + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">relation</span></em>, nor systematically + unfolded the relations involved in the rational constitution of + experience. There is more disposition to this in <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_755" name="note_755" + href="#noteref_755">755.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As with Locke, for example.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_756" name="note_756" + href="#noteref_756">756.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Note this condemnation of the tendency + to substantiate <span class="tei tei-q">“powers of + mind.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_757" name="note_757" + href="#noteref_757">757.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition. Berkeley + was after all reluctant to <span class="tei tei-q">“depart from + received modes of speech,”</span> notwithstanding their often + misleading associations.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_758" name="note_758" + href="#noteref_758">758.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_759" name="note_759" + href="#noteref_759">759.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is one of the notable sections in + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, as it suggests the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rationale</span></em> of Berkeley's rejection + of Panegoism or Solipsism. Is this consistent with his conception + of the reality of the material world? It is objected (e.g. by Reid) + that ideal realism dissolves our faith in the existence of other + persons. The difficulty is to shew how appearances presented to my + senses, which are sensuous and subjective, can be media of + communication between persons. The question carries us back to the + theistic presupposition in the trustworthiness of experience—which + is adapted to deceive if I am the only person existing. With + Berkeley a chief function of ideas of sense is to signify other + persons to each person. See <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, Dial. IV; + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New + Theory of Vision Vindicated</span></span>, and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_760" name="note_760" + href="#noteref_760">760.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“repugnant”</span>—for it would involve thought in + incoherence, by paralysis of its indispensable causal + presupposition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_761" name="note_761" + href="#noteref_761">761.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is not God the indispensable + presupposition of trustworthy experience, rather than an empirical + inference?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_762" name="note_762" + href="#noteref_762">762.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This suggests an explanation of the + objective reality and significance of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas of + sense</span></em>; through which they become media of social + intercourse in the fundamentally divine universe. God so regulates + the sense-given ideas of which human beings are individually + percipient, as that, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">while numerically different, as in each + mind</span></em>, those ideas are nevertheless a sufficient medium + for social intercourse, if the Power universally at work is morally + trustworthy. Unless our God-given experience is deceiving, + Solipsism is not a necessary result of the fact that no one but + myself can be percipient of my sensuous experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_763" name="note_763" + href="#noteref_763">763.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_764" name="note_764" + href="#noteref_764">764.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Malebranche, as understood by + Berkeley. See <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, Liv. III. p. ii. ch. + 6, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_765" name="note_765" + href="#noteref_765">765.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For all finite persons <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">somehow</span></em> + live, and move, and have their being <span class="tei tei-q">“in + God.”</span> The existence of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eternal</span></em> living Mind, and the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">present</span></em> existence of other men, + are both <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inferences</span></em>, resting on the same + foundation, according to Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_766" name="note_766" + href="#noteref_766">766.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The theistic trust in which our + experience is rooted remaining latent, or being unintelligent.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_767" name="note_767" + href="#noteref_767">767.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66. His + conception of Divine causation in Nature, as the constant + omnipresent agency in all natural law, is the deepest part of his + philosophy. It is pursued in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_768" name="note_768" + href="#noteref_768">768.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is not the unbeginning and unending + natural evolution, an articulate revelation of Eternal Spirit or + Active Reason at the heart of the whole?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_769" name="note_769" + href="#noteref_769">769.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_770" name="note_770" + href="#noteref_770">770.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Pascal in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Pensées</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_771" name="note_771" + href="#noteref_771">771.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Divine reason ever active in Nature is + the necessary correlate to reason in man; inasmuch as otherwise the + changing universe in which we live would be unfit to be reasoned + about or acted in.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_772" name="note_772" + href="#noteref_772">772.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The existence of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">moral</span></em> + evil, or what ought not to exist, is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the</span></em> + difficulty which besets faith in the fundamental divinity or + goodness of the universe. Yet that faith is presupposed in + interpretation of nature, which proceeds on the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">postulate</span></em> of universal order; and + this implies the moral trustworthiness of the world which we begin + to realise when we begin to be conscious. That we are living and + having our being in omnipotent goodness is thus not an inference, + but the implied basis of all real inferences. I have expanded this + thought in my <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philosophy of Theism</span></span>. We cannot + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">prove</span></em> God, for we must assume God, + as the basis of all proof. Faith even in the uniformity of nature + is virtually faith in omnipotent goodness immanent in the + universe.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_773" name="note_773" + href="#noteref_773">773.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Leibniz in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theodicée</span></span>, which was published + in the same year as Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_774" name="note_774" + href="#noteref_774">774.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The divine presupposition, latent in + all human reasoning and experience, is hid from the unreflecting, + in whom the higher life is dormant, and the ideal in the universe + is accordingly undiscerned. Unless the universe is assumed to be + physically and morally trustworthy, i.e. unless God is presupposed, + even natural science has no adequate foundation.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_775" name="note_775" + href="#noteref_775">775.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Our necessarily incomplete knowledge + of the Universe in which we find ourselves is apt to disturb the + fundamental faith, that the phenomena presented to us are + significant of God. Yet we <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tacitly assume</span></em> that they are thus + significant when we interpret real experience, physical or + moral.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_776" name="note_776" + href="#noteref_776">776.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_777" name="note_777" + href="#noteref_777">777.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For the following extracts from + previously unpublished correspondence of Berkeley and Sir John + Percival, I am indebted to the kindness of his descendant, the late + Lord Egmont.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_778" name="note_778" + href="#noteref_778">778.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What Berkeley seeks to shew is, not + that the world of the senses is unreal, but in what its reality + consists. Is it inexplicable chaos, or explicable expression of + ever active Intelligence, more or less interpreted in natural + science?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_779" name="note_779" + href="#noteref_779">779.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Leibniz: <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De modo distinguendi + Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis</span></span> (1707).</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_780" name="note_780" + href="#noteref_780">780.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">For some information relative to Gua + de Malves, see Querard's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">La France Littéraire,</span></span> tom. iii. + p. 494.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_781" name="note_781" + href="#noteref_781">781.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The following + is the translator's Prefatory Note, on the objects of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues,</span></span> and in explanation + of the three illustrative vignettes:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“L'Auteur expose dans le premier Dialogue le + sentiment du Vulgaire et celui des Philosophes, sur les qualités + secondaires et premieres, la nature et l'existence des corps; et + il prétend prouver en même tems l'insuffisance de l'un et de + l'autre. La Vignette qu'on voit à la téte du Dialogue, fait + allusion à cet objet. Elle représente un Philosophe dans son + cabinet, lequel est distrait de son travail par un enfant qu'il + appercoit se voyant lui-méme dans un miroir, en tendant les mains + pour embrasser sa propre image. Le Philosophe rit de l'erreur où + il croit que tombe l'enfant; tandis qu'on lui applique à lui-même + ces mots tirés d'Horace:</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Quid rides?....de + te</span><br /> + <span style="font-style: italic">Fabula + narratur.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Le second Dialogue est employé à exposer le + sentiment de l'Auteur sur le même sujet, sçavoir, que les choses + corporelles ont une existence réelle dans les esprits qui les + apperçoivent; mais qu'elles ne sçauroient exister hors de tous + les esprits à la fois, même de l'esprit infini de Dieu; et que + par conséquent la Matière, prise suivant l'acception ordinaire du + mot, non seulement n'existe point, mais seroit même absolument + impossible. On a taché de représenter aux yeux ce sentiment dans + la Vignette du Dialogue. Le mot grec νοῦς qui signifie <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">âme</span></em>, + désigne l'àme: les rayons qui en partent marquent l'attention que + l'âme donne à des idées ou objets; les tableaux qu'on a placés + aux seuls endroits où les rayons aboutissent, et dont les sujets + sont tirés de la description des beautés de la nature, qui se + trouve dans le livre, représentent les idées ou objets que l'âme + considère, pas le secours des facultes qu'elle a reçues de Dieu; + et l'action de l'Étre suprème sur l'âme est figurée par un trait, + qui, partant d'un triangle, symbole de la Divinité, et perçant + les nuages dont le triangle est environné. s'étend jusqu'à l'âme + pour la vivifier; enfin, on a fait en sorte de rendre le même + sentiment par ces mots:</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Quæ noscere cumque + Deus det,</span><br /> + <span style="font-style: italic">Esse puta.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“L'objet du troisième Dialogue est de répondre aux + difficultés auxquelles le sentiment qu'on a établi dans les + Dialogues précédens, peut être sujet, de l'éclaircir en cette + sorte de plus, d'en développer toutes les heureuses conséquences, + enfin de faire voir, qu'étant bien entendu, il revient aux + notions les plus communes. Et comme l'Auteur exprime à la fin du + livre cette dernière pensée, en comparant ce qu'il vient de dire, + à l'eau que les deux Interlocuteurs sont supposés voir jaillir + d'un jet, et qu'il remarque que la même force de la gravité fait + élever jusqu'à une certaine hauteur et retomber ensuite dans le + bassin d'où elle étoit d'abord partie; on a pris cet emblême pour + le sujet de la Vignette de ce Dialogue; on a représenté en + conséquence dans cette dernière Vignette les deux Interlocuteurs, + se promenant dans le lieu où l'Auteur les suppose, et + s'entretenant là-dessus, et pour donner au Lecteur l'explication + de l'emblême, on a mis au bas le vers suivant:</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-q"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Urget aquas vis sursum, eadem flectitque + deorsum.</span></span>”</span></p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_782" name="note_782" + href="#noteref_782">782.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Collier never came fairly in sight of + the philosophical public of last century. He is referred to in + Germany by Bilfinger, in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dilucidationes Philosophicæ</span></span> + (1746), and also in the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ada Eruditorum</span></span>, Suppl. VI. 244, + &c., and in England by Corry in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Reflections on + Liberty and Necessity</span></span> (1761), as well as in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Remarks</span></span> on the Reflections, and + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Answers</span></span> to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8 + (1763), where he is described as <span class="tei tei-q">“a weak + reasoner, and a very dull writer also.”</span> Collier was dragged + from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essays on the + Intellectual Powers</span></span>, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a + subject of correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at + Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity to Dugald Stewart. + A beautiful reprint of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Clavis</span></span> (of the original edition + of which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in + Edinburgh in 1836; and in the following year it was included in a + collection of <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of + the Eighteenth Century</span></span>, prepared for the press by Dr. + Parr.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_783" name="note_783" + href="#noteref_783">783.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">William, fourth Lord Berkeley of + Stratton, born about 1663, succeeded his brother in 1697, and died + in 1741 at Bruton in Somersetshire. The Berkeleys of Stratton were + descended from a younger son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley of Berkeley + Castle, who died in 1326. His descendant, Sir John Berkeley of + Bruton, a zealous Royalist, was created first Lord Berkeley of + Stratton in 1658, and in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an + office which he held till 1672, when he was succeeded by the Earl + of Essex (see Burke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Extinct Peerages</span></span>). It is said + that Bishop Berkeley's father was related to him. The Bishop + himself was introduced by Dean Swift, in 1713, to the Lord Berkeley + of Stratton, to whom the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span> are dedicated, as + <span class="tei tei-q">“a cousin of his Lordship.”</span> The + title of Berkeley of Stratton became extinct on the death of the + fifth Lord in 1773.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_784" name="note_784" + href="#noteref_784">784.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This interesting Preface is omitted in + his last edition of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_785" name="note_785" + href="#noteref_785">785.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Second Part of the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span> was never published, + and only in part written. See Editor's Preface to the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_786" name="note_786" + href="#noteref_786">786.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_787" name="note_787" + href="#noteref_787">787.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's philosophy is professedly a + <span class="tei tei-q">“revolt”</span> from abstract ideas to an + enlightened sense of concrete realities. In these Dialogues + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Philonous</span></span> personates the revolt, + and represents Berkeley. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Hylas</span></span> vindicates the uncritical + conception of independent Matter.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_788" name="note_788" + href="#noteref_788">788.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's zeal against Matter in the + abstract, and all abstract ideas of concrete things, is therefore + not necessarily directed against <span class="tei tei-q">“universal + intellectual notions”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“the + principles and theorems of sciences.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_789" name="note_789" + href="#noteref_789">789.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Here <span class= + "tei tei-q">“reason”</span> means reasoning or inference. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Theory of + Vision Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 42, including the + distinction between <span class="tei tei-q">“suggestion”</span> and + <span class="tei tei-q">“inference.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_790" name="note_790" + href="#noteref_790">790.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“figure”</span> as well as colour, is here included + among the original data of sight.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_791" name="note_791" + href="#noteref_791">791.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“without the + mind,”</span> i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_792" name="note_792" + href="#noteref_792">792.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 14.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_793" name="note_793" + href="#noteref_793">793.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 14, 15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_794" name="note_794" + href="#noteref_794">794.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Sensible + qualities,”</span> i.e. the significant appearances presented in + sense.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_795" name="note_795" + href="#noteref_795">795.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 80-86.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_796" name="note_796" + href="#noteref_796">796.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Descartes and Locke for example.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_797" name="note_797" + href="#noteref_797">797.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On Primary and Secondary Qualities of + Matter, and their mutual relations, cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 9-15. See also + Descartes, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Meditations</span></span>, III, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, I. sect. 69; + Malebranche, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherche</span></span>, Liv. VI. Pt. II. + sect. 2; Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_798" name="note_798" + href="#noteref_798">798.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 80.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_799" name="note_799" + href="#noteref_799">799.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">What follows, within brackets, is not + contained in the first and second editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_800" name="note_800" + href="#noteref_800">800.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Percipient mind is, in short, the + indispensable realising factor of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">all</span></em> the + qualities of sensible things.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_801" name="note_801" + href="#noteref_801">801.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 122-126; <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 123, &c.; + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 270, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_802" name="note_802" + href="#noteref_802">802.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 15.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_803" name="note_803" + href="#noteref_803">803.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is <span class= + "tei tei-q">“notion”</span> here a synonym for idea?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_804" name="note_804" + href="#noteref_804">804.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 16.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_805" name="note_805" + href="#noteref_805">805.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Size or + figure, or sensible quality”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“size, + color &c.,”</span> in the first and second editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_806" name="note_806" + href="#noteref_806">806.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In Berkeley's later and more exact + terminology, the data or implicates of pure intellect are called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">notions</span></em>, in contrast to his + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, which are concrete or + individual sensuous presentations.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_807" name="note_807" + href="#noteref_807">807.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">They need living percipient mind to + make them real.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_808" name="note_808" + href="#noteref_808">808.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">So Reid's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Inquiry</span></span>, ch. ii, sect. 8, 9; + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essays on + the Intellectual Powers</span></span>, II. ch. 16. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 8, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_809" name="note_809" + href="#noteref_809">809.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. figured or extended visible + colour. Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision</span></span>, sect. 43, + &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_810" name="note_810" + href="#noteref_810">810.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 25, 26.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_811" name="note_811" + href="#noteref_811">811.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">After maintaining, in the preceding + part of this Dialogue, the inevitable dependence of all the + qualities of Matter upon percipient Spirit, the argument now + proceeds to dispose of the supposition that Matter may still be an + unmanifested or unqualified <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substratum</span></em>, independent of living + percipient Spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_812" name="note_812" + href="#noteref_812">812.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[See the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay towards a New + Theory of Vision</span></span>, and its <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Vindication</span></span>.] Note by the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Author</span></span> in the 1734 edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_813" name="note_813" + href="#noteref_813">813.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay on + Vision</span></span>, sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_814" name="note_814" + href="#noteref_814">814.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 43.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_815" name="note_815" + href="#noteref_815">815.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“an + idea,”</span> i.e. a phenomenon present to our senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_816" name="note_816" + href="#noteref_816">816.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This was Reid's fundamental question + in his criticism of Berkeley.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_817" name="note_817" + href="#noteref_817">817.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_818" name="note_818" + href="#noteref_818">818.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 25, 26.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_819" name="note_819" + href="#noteref_819">819.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, the percipient + activity of a living spirit is the necessary condition of the real + existence of all ideas or phenomena immediately present to our + senses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_820" name="note_820" + href="#noteref_820">820.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">An <span class= + "tei tei-q">“explanation”</span> afterwards elaborately developed + by Hartley, in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Observations on Man</span></span> (1749). + Berkeley has probably Hobbes in view.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_821" name="note_821" + href="#noteref_821">821.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The brain with the human body in which + it is included constitutes a part of the material world, and must + equally with the rest of the material world depend for its + realisation upon percipient Spirit as the realising factor.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_822" name="note_822" + href="#noteref_822">822.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 23.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_823" name="note_823" + href="#noteref_823">823.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“in stones and + minerals”</span>—in first and second editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_824" name="note_824" + href="#noteref_824">824.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 29-33; also + sect. 90.—The <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">permanence</span></em> of a thing, during + intervals in which it may be unperceived and unimagined by human + beings, is here assumed, as a natural conviction.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_825" name="note_825" + href="#noteref_825">825.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In other words, men are apt to treat + the omniscience of God as an inference from the dogmatic assumption + that God exists, instead of seeing that our cosmic experience + necessarily presupposes omnipotent and omniscient Intelligence at + its root.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_826" name="note_826" + href="#noteref_826">826.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 90. A + permanent material world is grounded on Divine Mind, because it + cannot but depend on Mind, while its reality is only partially and + at intervals sustained by finite minds.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_827" name="note_827" + href="#noteref_827">827.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“necessarily + inferred from”</span>—rather necessarily presupposed in.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_828" name="note_828" + href="#noteref_828">828.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The present reality of Something + implies the eternal existence of living Mind, if Something + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">must</span></em> exist eternally, and if real + or concrete existence involves living Mind. Berkeley's conception + of material nature presupposes a theistic basis.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_829" name="note_829" + href="#noteref_829">829.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He refers of course to Malebranche and + his Divine Vision.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_830" name="note_830" + href="#noteref_830">830.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But Malebranche uses <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> in + a higher meaning than Berkeley does—akin to the Platonic, and in + contrast to the sensuous phenomena which Berkeley calls ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_831" name="note_831" + href="#noteref_831">831.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The passage within brackets first + appeared in the third edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_832" name="note_832" + href="#noteref_832">832.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 25-33.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_833" name="note_833" + href="#noteref_833">833.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_834" name="note_834" + href="#noteref_834">834.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">I <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">can</span></em> + represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving things; + because I have an example of this my own conscious life. I + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cannot</span></em> represent to myself + sensible things existing totally unperceived and unimagined; + because I cannot, without a contradiction, have an example of this + in my own experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_835" name="note_835" + href="#noteref_835">835.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“reason,”</span> i.e. by reasoning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_836" name="note_836" + href="#noteref_836">836.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley's <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">material + substance</span></em> is a natural or divinely ordered aggregate of + sensible qualities or phenomena.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_837" name="note_837" + href="#noteref_837">837.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it + must be a living Spirit, and it would be an abuse of language to + call this Matter.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_838" name="note_838" + href="#noteref_838">838.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 25, 26.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_839" name="note_839" + href="#noteref_839">839.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is here argued that as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">volition</span></em> is the only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">originative</span></em> cause implied in our + experience, and which consequently alone puts true meaning into the + term Cause, to apply that term to what is not volition is to make + it meaningless, or at least to misapply it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_840" name="note_840" + href="#noteref_840">840.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">While thus arguing against the need + for independent matter, as an instrument needed by God, Berkeley + fails to explain how dependent matter can be a medium of + intercourse between persons. It must be more than a subjective + dream, however well ordered, if it is available for this purpose. + Unless the visible and audible ideas or phenomena presented to me + are actually seen and heard by other men, how can they be + instrumental in intercommunication?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_841" name="note_841" + href="#noteref_841">841.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 68-79.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_842" name="note_842" + href="#noteref_842">842.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 20.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_843" name="note_843" + href="#noteref_843">843.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 80, 81.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_844" name="note_844" + href="#noteref_844">844.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. all Spirits and their dependent + ideas or phenomena.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_845" name="note_845" + href="#noteref_845">845.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This, according to Hume (who takes for + granted that Berkeley's reasonings can produce no conviction), is + the natural effect of Berkeley's philosophy.—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“Most of the writings of that very ingenious author + (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be + found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not + excepted.... That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, + are, in reality, merely sceptical, appear from this—<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">that they admit of + no answer, and produce no conviction</span></em>. Their only effect + is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and + confusion, which is the result of scepticism.”</span> (Hume's + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essays</span></span>, vol. II. Note N, p. + 554.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_846" name="note_846" + href="#noteref_846">846.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_847" name="note_847" + href="#noteref_847">847.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Tell me, + Hylas,”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“So Hylas”</span>—in first + and second editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_848" name="note_848" + href="#noteref_848">848.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Variously called <span lang="el" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="el"><span style= + "font-style: italic">noumena</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“things-in-themselves,”</span> absolute substances, + &c.—which Berkeley's philosophy banishes, on the ground of + their unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther questions + concerning them. Questions about existence are thus confined within + the concrete or realising experiences of living spirits.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_849" name="note_849" + href="#noteref_849">849.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley claims that his doctrine + supersedes scepticism, and excludes the possibility of fallacy in + sense, in excluding an ultimately representative perception of + Matter. He also assumes the reasonableness of faith in the reality + and constancy of natural law. When we see an orange, the visual + sense guarantees only colour. The other phenomena, which we + associate with this colour—the other <span class= + "tei tei-q">“qualities”</span> of the orange—are, when we only + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">see</span></em> the orange, matter of faith. + We believe them to be realisable.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_850" name="note_850" + href="#noteref_850">850.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He accepts the common belief on which + interpretation of sense symbols proceeds—that sensible phenomena + are evolved in rational order, under laws that are independent of, + and in that respect external to, the individual percipient.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_851" name="note_851" + href="#noteref_851">851.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Mediately as well as immediately.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_852" name="note_852" + href="#noteref_852">852.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">We can hardly be said to have an + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediate</span></em> sense-perception of an + individual <span class="tei tei-q">“thing”</span>—meaning by + <span class="tei tei-q">“thing”</span> a congeries of sense-ideas + or phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately + perceive some of them, and believe in the others, which those + suggest. See the last three notes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_853" name="note_853" + href="#noteref_853">853.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He probably refers to Descartes, who + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">argues</span></em> for the trustworthiness of + our faculties from the veracity of God; thus apparently arguing in + a circle, seeing that the existence of God is manifested to us only + through our suspected faculties. But is not confidence in the + trustworthiness of the Universal Power at the heart of the + universe, the fundamental <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">presupposition</span></em> of all human + experience, and God thus the basis and end of philosophy and of + experience?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_854" name="note_854" + href="#noteref_854">854.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As Locke does. See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. IV. ch. 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_855" name="note_855" + href="#noteref_855">855.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles of Human + Knowledge</span></span>, sect. 45-48.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_856" name="note_856" + href="#noteref_856">856.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">And to be thus external to individual + minds.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_857" name="note_857" + href="#noteref_857">857.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is here that Berkeley differs, for + example, from Hume and Comte and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given + phenomena, and assume the constancy of their orderly reappearances, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">as a + matter of fact</span></em>, while they confess total ignorance of + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cause</span></em> of natural order. (Thus + ignorant, why do they assume reason or order in nature?) The ground + of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine Power, Mill + expresses by the term <span class="tei tei-q">“<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">permanent + possibility</span></em> of sensation.”</span> (See his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Examination of + Hamilton</span></span>, ch. 11.) Our belief in the continued + existence of a sensible thing <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in our absence</span></em> merely means, with + him, our conviction, derived from custom, that we should perceive + it under inexplicable conditions which determine its + appearance.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_858" name="note_858" + href="#noteref_858">858.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 25, 26.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_859" name="note_859" + href="#noteref_859">859.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_860" name="note_860" + href="#noteref_860">860.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Inasmuch as I am conscious of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">myself</span></em>, I can gather, through the + sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my + own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of + another person.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_861" name="note_861" + href="#noteref_861">861.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“reason,”</span> i.e. reasoning or necessary + inference—founded here on our sense of personal dependence; not + merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the interpretability of + the sensible world. Our belief in the existence of finite minds, + external to our own, is, with Berkeley, an application of this + faith.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_862" name="note_862" + href="#noteref_862">862.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Matter,”</span> i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 135-138.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_863" name="note_863" + href="#noteref_863">863.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Does this imply that with Berkeley, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">self</span></em>, as distinguished from the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomena</span></em> of which the material + world consists, is not a necessary presuppostion of experience? He + says in many places—I am <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">conscious</span></em> of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“my own being,”</span> and that my mind is myself. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect, 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_864" name="note_864" + href="#noteref_864">864.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_865" name="note_865" + href="#noteref_865">865.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 20</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_866" name="note_866" + href="#noteref_866">866.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This important passage, printed within + brackets, is not found in the first and second editions of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Dialogues</span></span>. It is, by + anticipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the + objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the + reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, + as identical amid the changes of its successive states.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_867" name="note_867" + href="#noteref_867">867.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See note 4 on preceding page.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_868" name="note_868" + href="#noteref_868">868.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 142.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_869" name="note_869" + href="#noteref_869">869.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume + that he exists when he is not conscious of ideas—sensible or other? + Or, does he deny that he is ever unconscious?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_870" name="note_870" + href="#noteref_870">870.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That is of matter supposed to exist + independently of any mind. Berkeley speaks here of a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">consciousness</span></em> of matter. Does he + mean consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_871" name="note_871" + href="#noteref_871">871.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 54-57.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_872" name="note_872" + href="#noteref_872">872.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Which he does not doubt.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_873" name="note_873" + href="#noteref_873">873.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This sentence expresses the whole + question between Berkeley and his antagonists.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_874" name="note_874" + href="#noteref_874">874.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 29-41.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_875" name="note_875" + href="#noteref_875">875.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The words within brackets are omitted + in the third edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_876" name="note_876" + href="#noteref_876">876.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The index pointing to the originative + causes in the universe is thus the ethical judgment, which fastens + upon the free voluntary agency of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">persons</span></em>, as absolutely responsible + causes, not merely caused causes.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_877" name="note_877" + href="#noteref_877">877.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That only ideas or phenomena are + presented to our senses may be assented to by those who + nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience implies + more than the sensuous or empirical data.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_878" name="note_878" + href="#noteref_878">878.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 49.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_879" name="note_879" + href="#noteref_879">879.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 58.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_880" name="note_880" + href="#noteref_880">880.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“without the + mind,”</span> i.e. without the mind of each percipient person.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_881" name="note_881" + href="#noteref_881">881.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is the gist of the whole + question. According to the Materialists, sense-presented phenomena + are due to unpresented, unperceived, abstract Matter; according to + Berkeley, to living Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their + origin is unknowable, yet (incoherently) they claim that we + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">can</span></em> interpret them—in physical + science.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_882" name="note_882" + href="#noteref_882">882.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">A similar objection is urged by + Erdmann, in his criticism of Berkeley in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Grundriss der + Geschichte der Philosophie</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_883" name="note_883" + href="#noteref_883">883.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 50; + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 319.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_884" name="note_884" + href="#noteref_884">884.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 58.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_885" name="note_885" + href="#noteref_885">885.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“order”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“series,”</span> + in first and second editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_886" name="note_886" + href="#noteref_886">886.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Matter,”</span> i.e. when the reality of <span class= + "tei tei-q">“matter”</span> is supposed to signify what Berkeley + argues cannot be; because really meaningless.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_887" name="note_887" + href="#noteref_887">887.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the connexion + of ideas,”</span> i.e. the physical coexistences and sequences, + maintained in constant order by Power external to the individual, + and which are disclosed in the natural sciences.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_888" name="note_888" + href="#noteref_888">888.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 38. Berkeley + is not for making things <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">subjective</span></em>, but for recognising + ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objective</span></em>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_889" name="note_889" + href="#noteref_889">889.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">They are not mere illusory appearances + but are the very things themselves making their appearance, as far + as our limited senses allow them to be realised for us.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_890" name="note_890" + href="#noteref_890">890.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. abstract Matter.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_891" name="note_891" + href="#noteref_891">891.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 49; and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of Vision + Vindicated</span></span>, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_892" name="note_892" + href="#noteref_892">892.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">New Theory of + Vision</span></span>, sect. 84-86.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_893" name="note_893" + href="#noteref_893">893.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“the connexion + of ideas,”</span> i.e. the order providentially maintained in + nature.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_894" name="note_894" + href="#noteref_894">894.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introduction, sect. + 23-25.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_895" name="note_895" + href="#noteref_895">895.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 8-10, 86, + 87.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_896" name="note_896" + href="#noteref_896">896.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This difficulty is thus pressed by + Reid:—<span class="tei tei-q">“The ideas in my mind cannot be the + same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if the objects I + perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that two or more such + minds can perceive the same thing. Thus there is one unconfutable + consequence of Berkeley's system, which he seems not to have + attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at all + possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this—that, + although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it + seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent + beings like ourselves. What I call a father, or a brother, or a + friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they cannot + possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to + mine, any more than the pain felt by me can be the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">individual + pain</span></em> felt by another. I am thus left alone as the only + creature of God in the universe”</span> (Hamilton's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Reid</span></span>, + pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or Panegoism is thus charged + against Berkeley, unless his conception of the material world is + further guarded.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_897" name="note_897" + href="#noteref_897">897.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Reid and Hamilton argue in like manner + against a fundamentally representative sense-perception.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_898" name="note_898" + href="#noteref_898">898.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 6.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_899" name="note_899" + href="#noteref_899">899.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_900" name="note_900" + href="#noteref_900">900.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ibid., sect. 18.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_901" name="note_901" + href="#noteref_901">901.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 24.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_902" name="note_902" + href="#noteref_902">902.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“unknown,”</span> i.e. unrealised in percipient + life.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_903" name="note_903" + href="#noteref_903">903.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 28-33.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_904" name="note_904" + href="#noteref_904">904.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See also Collier's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Clavis + Universalis</span></span>, p. 6: <span class="tei tei-q">“Two or + more persons who are present at a concert of music may indeed in + some measure be said to hear the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">same</span></em> + notes; yet the sound which the one hears is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">not the very + same</span></em> with the sound which another hears, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">because the souls + or persons are supposed to be different</span></em>.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_905" name="note_905" + href="#noteref_905">905.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley seems to hold that in + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">things</span></em> there is no identity other + than perfect similarity—only in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">persons</span></em>. And even as to personal + identity he is obscure. Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 347, &c.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_906" name="note_906" + href="#noteref_906">906.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">But the question is, whether the very + ideas or phenomena that are perceived by me <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">can</span></em> be + also perceived by other persons; and if not, how I can discover + that <span class="tei tei-q">“other persons”</span> exist, or that + any finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if + the sort of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sameness</span></em> that Berkeley advocates + is all that can be predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus + only <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">similar</span></em>, or generically the same. + Unless the ideas are <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">numerically</span></em> the same, can + different persons make signs to one another through them?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_907" name="note_907" + href="#noteref_907">907.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omitted in author's last edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_908" name="note_908" + href="#noteref_908">908.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This seems to imply that intercourse + between finite persons is maintained through ideas or phenomena + presented to the senses, under a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed + correspondence between the phenomena of which I am conscious, and + the phenomena of which my neighbour is conscious; so that they are + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">practically</span></em> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“the same.”</span> If we are living in a fundamentally + divine, and therefore absolutely trustworthy, universe, the + phenomena presented to my senses, which I attribute to the agency + of another person, are so attributed rightly. For if not, the + so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_909" name="note_909" + href="#noteref_909">909.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This explanation is often overlooked + by Berkeley's critics.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_910" name="note_910" + href="#noteref_910">910.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 82-84.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_911" name="note_911" + href="#noteref_911">911.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. if you take the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> in + its wholly subjective and popular meaning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_912" name="note_912" + href="#noteref_912">912.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">i.e. if you take the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em> in + its objective meaning.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_913" name="note_913" + href="#noteref_913">913.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“philosophic,”</span> i.e. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pseudo</span></em>-philosophic, against which + he argues.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_914" name="note_914" + href="#noteref_914">914.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Had this their relative existence—this + realisation of the material world through finite percipient and + volitional life—any beginning? May not God have been eternally + presenting phenomena to the senses of percipient beings in cosmical + order, if not on this planet yet elsewhere, perhaps under other + conditions? Has there been any beginning in the succession of + finite persons?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_915" name="note_915" + href="#noteref_915">915.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In the first and second editions + only.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_916" name="note_916" + href="#noteref_916">916.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Is <span class= + "tei tei-q">“creation”</span> by us distinguishable from continuous + evolution, unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; + and is there a distinction between creation or evolution of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">things</span></em> and creation or evolution + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">persons</span></em>?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_917" name="note_917" + href="#noteref_917">917.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, + sect. 347-349.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_918" name="note_918" + href="#noteref_918">918.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Matter,”</span> i.e. Matter in this + pseudo-philosophical meaning of the word.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_919" name="note_919" + href="#noteref_919">919.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Thus Origen in the early Church. That + <span class="tei tei-q">“Matter”</span> is co-eternal with God + would mean that God is eternally making things real in the + percipient experience of persons.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_920" name="note_920" + href="#noteref_920">920.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 85-156, in + which the religious and scientific advantages of the new conception + of matter and the material cosmos are illustrated, when it is + rightly understood and applied.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_921" name="note_921" + href="#noteref_921">921.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“substance and + accident”</span>—<span class="tei tei-q">“subjects and + adjuncts,”</span>—in the first and the second edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_922" name="note_922" + href="#noteref_922">922.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 28-42. In + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 294-297, 300-318, + 335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism, + if not to Hegelianism.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_923" name="note_923" + href="#noteref_923">923.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Matter,”</span> i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, + finite or Divine.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_924" name="note_924" + href="#noteref_924">924.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">These two propositions are a summary + of Berkeley's conception of the material world. With him, the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immediate</span></em> objects of sense, + realise in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perception</span></em>, are independent of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> of the percipient, and are + thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“material world”</span> of enlightened Common Sense, + resulting from two factors, Divine and human, is independent of + each finite mind; but not independent of all living Mind.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_925" name="note_925" + href="#noteref_925">925.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“voces male + intellectæ.”</span> Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles of Human Knowledge</span></span>, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Introduction,”</span> sect. 6, 23-25, on + the abuse of language, especially by abstraction.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_926" name="note_926" + href="#noteref_926">926.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“veterum + philosophorum.”</span> The history of ancient speculations about + motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a + history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the + material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to + Spirit.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_927" name="note_927" + href="#noteref_927">927.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“hujus ævi + philosophos.”</span> As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions + raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the + following sections.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_928" name="note_928" + href="#noteref_928">928.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the + principle of Causality, exemplified in the motion, or change of + place and state, that is continually going on in the material + world, and which was supposed by some to explain all the phenomena + of the universe.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_929" name="note_929" + href="#noteref_929">929.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“vis.”</span> + The assumption that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">active power</span></em> is an immediate datum + of sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract + words. He proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is + meaningless.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_930" name="note_930" + href="#noteref_930">930.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“principio”</span>—the ultimate explanation or + originating cause. Cf. sect. 36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, + are accepted for explanations, it is argued, when <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bodily</span></em> + power or force, in any form, e.g. gravitation, is taken as the real + cause of motion. To call these <span class="tei tei-q">“occult + causes”</span> is to say nothing that is intelligible. The + perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we + know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_931" name="note_931" + href="#noteref_931">931.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 53, where <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sense</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imagination</span></em>, and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">intelligence</span></em> are + distinguished.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_932" name="note_932" + href="#noteref_932">932.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, Introd. 16, 20, 21; + also <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Alciphron</span></span>, Dial. VII. sect. 8, + 17.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_933" name="note_933" + href="#noteref_933">933.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[La Materia altro non è che un vaso di + Circe incantato, il quale serve per ricettacolo della forza et de' + momenti dell' impeto. La forzae l'impeti sono astratti tanto + sottili, sono quintessenze tanto spiritose, che in altre ampolle + non si possono racchiudere, fuor che nell' intima corpulenza de' + solidi naturali, Vide <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Lezioni + Accademiche</span></span>.]—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author.</span></span> Torricelli + (1608-47), the eminent Italian physicist, and professor of + mathematics at Florence, who invented the barometer.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_934" name="note_934" + href="#noteref_934">934.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor + of mathematics at Pisa, and then of medicine at Florence; see his + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Vi + Percussionis</span></span>, cap. XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. + XXVII.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_935" name="note_935" + href="#noteref_935">935.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“per + effectum,”</span> i.e. by its sensible effects—real power or active + force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual + efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_936" name="note_936" + href="#noteref_936">936.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“vim + mortuam.”</span> The only power we can find is the living power of + Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible + through the senses, and revealed to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">them</span></em> + only in its sensible effects. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Power,”</span> e.g. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“gravitation,”</span> in things, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per se</span></span>, is distinguished from + perceived <span class="tei tei-q">“motion”</span> only through + illusion due to misleading abstraction. There is no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">physical</span></em> power, intermediate + between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes + we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_937" name="note_937" + href="#noteref_937">937.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“meditatione + subigenda sunt.”</span> Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Theory of Vision Vindicated</span></span>, + sect. 35, 70.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_938" name="note_938" + href="#noteref_938">938.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“distingui.”</span> It is here argued that so-called + power within the things of sense is not distinguishable from the + sensibly perceived sequences. To the meaningless supposition that + it is, he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the + learned mentioned in the following section. The province of natural + philosophy, according to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are + under which sensible effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 236, 247, 249.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_939" name="note_939" + href="#noteref_939">939.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia Math.</span></span> Def. III.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_940" name="note_940" + href="#noteref_940">940.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Vi Percussionis</span></span>, cap. I.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_941" name="note_941" + href="#noteref_941">941.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“utiles.”</span> Such words as <span class= + "tei tei-q">“force,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“power,”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“gravity,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“attraction,”</span> are held to be convenient in + physical reasonings about the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomena</span></em> of motion, but worthless + as philosophical expressions of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em> + of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical science. Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 234, 235.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_942" name="note_942" + href="#noteref_942">942.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 67.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_943" name="note_943" + href="#noteref_943">943.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“candem.”</span> So in recent discussions on the + conservation of force.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_944" name="note_944" + href="#noteref_944">944.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[Borellus.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author.</span></span> See <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Vi + Percussionis</span></span>, cap. XXIII.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_945" name="note_945" + href="#noteref_945">945.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[Leibnitius.]—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author.</span></span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_946" name="note_946" + href="#noteref_946">946.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On Berkeley's reasoning all terms + which involve the assumption that real causality is something + presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness. Only + through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real + meaning enter into the portion of language which deals with active + causation. This is argued in detail in sect. 21-35.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_947" name="note_947" + href="#noteref_947">947.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Our concrete experience is assumed to + be confined to (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a</span></span>) <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bodies</span></em>, + i.e. the data of the senses, and (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">b</span></span>) + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mind</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">spirit</span></em>—sentient, intelligent, + active—revealed by internal consciousness. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 1, 2, in which + experience is resolved into <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> and the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">active + intelligence</span></em> which they presuppose. Here the word idea + disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“bodies”</span> is still regarded as aggregates of + external phenomena, the passive subjects of changes of place and + state: the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied, + but not obtruded.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_948" name="note_948" + href="#noteref_948">948.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“nihilque,”</span> &c. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Principles of Human + Knowledge</span></span>, e.g. sect. 26, 65, 66. where the essential + passivity of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em> presented to the senses, + i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal principle—on + the positive ground of our percipient experience of sensible + things. To speak of the cause of motion as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">something + sensible</span></em>, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that + we know nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_949" name="note_949" + href="#noteref_949">949.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The phenomena that can be presented to + the senses are taken as the measure of what can be attributed to + the material world; and as the senses present <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">only</span></em> + conditioned change of place in bodies, we must look for the active + cause in the invisible world which internal consciousness presents + to us.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_950" name="note_950" + href="#noteref_950">950.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">genus rerum + cogitantium.</span></em>”</span> Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 2.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_951" name="note_951" + href="#noteref_951">951.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“experientia + didicimus.”</span> Can the merely empirical data even of internal + consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and + bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_952" name="note_952" + href="#noteref_952">952.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“a primo et + universali Principio”</span> i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in + whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a way + which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and + exhaustively in philosophical system.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_953" name="note_953" + href="#noteref_953">953.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Phys.</span></span> θ. 4. 255 a 5-7.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_954" name="note_954" + href="#noteref_954">954.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Princip. Math.</span></span> Def. III.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_955" name="note_955" + href="#noteref_955">955.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“resistentia.”</span> Our muscular <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensation</span></em> of resistance is apt to + be accepted empirically as itself <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">active power in the + concrete</span></em>, entering very much, as has been said, into + the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed. See Editor's + Preface.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_956" name="note_956" + href="#noteref_956">956.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“nec + incommode.”</span> Cf. sect. 17, and note.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_957" name="note_957" + href="#noteref_957">957.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“hypothesis + mathematica.”</span> Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, sect. 250-251.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_958" name="note_958" + href="#noteref_958">958.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“nihil.”</span> This section sums up Berkeley's + objections to crediting <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">matter</span></em> with real power; the senses + being taken as the test of what is contained in matter. It may be + compared with David Hume, Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. + Berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit, + while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable + sequence.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_959" name="note_959" + href="#noteref_959">959.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Can the data presented to us reveal + more than sequence, in the relation between our volitions and the + corresponding movements of our bodies? Is not the difference found + in the moral presupposition, which <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">supernaturalises</span></em> man in his + voluntary or morally responsible activity? This obliges us to see + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ourselves</span></em> as absolutely original + causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally + approved or blamed.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_960" name="note_960" + href="#noteref_960">960.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“novumque + genus.”</span> Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley's antithesis of + mind and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the + senses—persons in contrast to passive ideas.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_961" name="note_961" + href="#noteref_961">961.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Anima</span></span>, I. ii. 13, 22, + 24.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_962" name="note_962" + href="#noteref_962">962.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“Cartesius.”</span> The antithesis of extended things + and thinking things pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, + on the foundation of the new conception of what is truly meant by + matter or sensible things. See e.g. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, P. I. §§ 63, 64.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_963" name="note_963" + href="#noteref_963">963.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“alii.”</span> + Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of matter + thinking?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_964" name="note_964" + href="#noteref_964">964.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Aristotle, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Anima</span></span>, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. + 6.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_965" name="note_965" + href="#noteref_965">965.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nat. Ausc.</span></span> VIII. 15; also + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Anima</span></span>, III, x. 7.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_966" name="note_966" + href="#noteref_966">966.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Hardly any passage in the <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Timæus</span></span> + exactly corresponds to this. The following is, perhaps, the most + pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν + ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle + quotes the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Timæus</span></span> in the same connexion, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Anima</span></span>, I. iii. ii.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_967" name="note_967" + href="#noteref_967">967.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“philosophi + Cartesiani.”</span> Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium + motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Physica</span></span>, I. ix. 30.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_968" name="note_968" + href="#noteref_968">968.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia Mathematica</span></span>—Scholium + Generale.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_969" name="note_969" + href="#noteref_969">969.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“naturam + naturantem esse Deum”</span>—as we might say, God considered as + imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Opera</span></span>, vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. + 27.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_970" name="note_970" + href="#noteref_970">970.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“juxta certam + et constantem rationem.”</span> While all changes in Nature are + determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The + so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to + us, and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality + expresses Perfect Reason.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_971" name="note_971" + href="#noteref_971">971.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“permaneret.”</span> Cf. sect. 51.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_972" name="note_972" + href="#noteref_972">972.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“spectat + potius ad philosophiam primam.”</span> The drift of the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Motu</span></span> is to distinguish the physical sequences of + molecular motion, which the physical sciences articulate, from the + Power with which metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which + we approach through consciousness.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_973" name="note_973" + href="#noteref_973">973.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“regulas.”</span> Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, + sect. 231-235.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_974" name="note_974" + href="#noteref_974">974.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Having, in the preceding sections, + contrasted perceived motions and their immanent originating + Power—matter and mind—physics and metaphysics—he proceeds in this + and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha + means by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium</span></em> and also the two + meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">solutio</span></em>. By <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium</span></em>, in philosophy, he + understands universally efficient supersensible Power. In natural + philosophy the term is applied to the orderly sequences manifested + to our senses, not to the active cause of the order.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_975" name="note_975" + href="#noteref_975">975.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“ratiocinio + ... redditæ universales.”</span> Relations of the data of sense to + universalising reason are here recognised.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_976" name="note_976" + href="#noteref_976">976.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“natura + motus.”</span> Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">effect</span></em>—i.e. perceptible motion, as + distinguished from its true causal origin (<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium</span></em>) in mind or spirit. The + origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; its nature, as dependent + on percipient experience, belongs to physics. Is motion independent + of a plurality of bodies; or does it involve bodies in relation to + other bodies, so that absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 111-116.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_977" name="note_977" + href="#noteref_977">977.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“idea illa + tenuissima et subtilissima.”</span> The difficulty as to definition + of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the inclination of the + scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete experience.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_978" name="note_978" + href="#noteref_978">978.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Motion is thus defined by + Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. + Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Physica</span></span>, I. ix.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_979" name="note_979" + href="#noteref_979">979.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Newton.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_980" name="note_980" + href="#noteref_980">980.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. sect. 3-42.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_981" name="note_981" + href="#noteref_981">981.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Descartes, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, P. II. § 25; also + Borellus, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Vi Percussionis</span></span>, p. 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_982" name="note_982" + href="#noteref_982">982.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“res faciles + difficillimas.”</span> Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Introduction,”</span> sect. 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_983" name="note_983" + href="#noteref_983">983.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν + τί ἐστίν. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nat. Ausc.</span></span> III. ii.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_984" name="note_984" + href="#noteref_984">984.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument + against the possibility of motion, referred to as a signal example + of fallacy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_985" name="note_985" + href="#noteref_985">985.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“de infinite, + &c.”</span> Cf. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 130-132, and + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Analyst</span></span> passim, for Berkeley's + treatment of infinitesimals.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_986" name="note_986" + href="#noteref_986">986.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“confundere.”</span> Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations + of this confusion.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_987" name="note_987" + href="#noteref_987">987.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The modern conception of the + <span class="tei tei-q">“conservation of force.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_988" name="note_988" + href="#noteref_988">988.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Aristotle states the question in + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Nat. + Ausc.</span></span> VIII. cap. i, and solves it in cap. iv.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_989" name="note_989" + href="#noteref_989">989.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“mutatio + loci”</span> is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; + <span class="tei tei-q">“vitale principium”</span> the real cause, + i.e. vital rational agency.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_990" name="note_990" + href="#noteref_990">990.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“moventis et + moti,”</span> i.e. as concauses.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_991" name="note_991" + href="#noteref_991">991.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“motum + localem.”</span> Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or + empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception + of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute + space and motion is argued. Cf. <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>, sect. 116, 117. See + Locke's <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; + also <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Papers which passed between Mr. Leibnitz and + Dr. Clarke in 1715-16</span></span>, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, + &c. Leibniz calls absolute space <span class="tei tei-q">“an + ideal of some modern Englishman.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_992" name="note_992" + href="#noteref_992">992.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Newton's <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, Def. Sch. III. See + also Derodon, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Physica</span></span>, P. I. cap. vi. § + 1.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_993" name="note_993" + href="#noteref_993">993.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the + <span class="tei tei-q">“possibility of space existing without + matter,”</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, Bk. II. ch. 13.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_994" name="note_994" + href="#noteref_994">994.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Note the account here given of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imagination</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">intellect</span></em>, as distinguished from + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sense</span></em>, which may be compared with + αἴσθησις, φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian psychology.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_995" name="note_995" + href="#noteref_995">995.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“attributorum + divinorum particeps.”</span> See Samuel Clarke, in his <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Demonstration</span></span>, and in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Papers + between Clarke and Leibnitz</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_996" name="note_996" + href="#noteref_996">996.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-q">“nostrum,”</span> sc. corpus. When we imagine space + emptied of bodies, we are apt to forget that our own bodies are + part of the material world.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_997" name="note_997" + href="#noteref_997">997.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">[Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum + disseruntur in libro <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Principiis Cognitionis + Humanæ</span></span>, idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis + edito.]—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Author.</span></span> He refers to sect. + 116 of the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principles</span></span>.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_998" name="note_998" + href="#noteref_998">998.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">He treats absolute space as nothing, + and relative space as dependent on Perception and Will.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_999" name="note_999" + href="#noteref_999">999.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Phys.</span></span> α. 5. 188a. 22, 23.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1000" name="note_1000" + href="#noteref_1000">1000.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See Locke, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Essay</span></span>, + Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1001" name="note_1001" + href="#noteref_1001">1001.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed + ejection of motion from the striking body into the body struck. Is + this only metaphorical? Is the motion received by the latter to be + supposed identical with, or equivalent to, that given forth by the + former?</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1002" name="note_1002" + href="#noteref_1002">1002.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Principia</span></span>, Def. IV.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1003" name="note_1003" + href="#noteref_1003">1003.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Lezioni Accademiche.</span></span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1004" name="note_1004" + href="#noteref_1004">1004.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Vi Percussionis</span></span>, cap. + IX.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1005" name="note_1005" + href="#noteref_1005">1005.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Newton's third law of motion.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1006" name="note_1006" + href="#noteref_1006">1006.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Berkeley sees in motion only a link in + the chain which connects the sensible and intelligible worlds—a + conception unfolded in his <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Siris</span></span>, more than twenty years + later.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1007" name="note_1007" + href="#noteref_1007">1007.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“provincia + sua.”</span> The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Motu</span></span>, so far as it treats of + motion perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in + contrast to theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active + causation.</dd> + </dl> + </div> + <hr class="doublepage" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <div id="pgfooter" class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <pre class="pre tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY. 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