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diff --git a/39746-tei/39746-tei.tei b/39746-tei/39746-tei.tei new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e43a64 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/39746-tei.tei @@ -0,0 +1,33901 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> + +<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "http://www.gutenberg.org/tei/marcello/0.4/dtd/pgtei.dtd" [ + +<!ENTITY u5 "http://www.tei-c.org/Lite/"> + +]> + +<TEI.2 lang="en"> +<teiHeader> + <fileDesc> + <titleStmt> + <title>The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.</title> + <author><name reg="Berkeley, George">George Berkeley</name></author> + <respStmt><resp>Edited by</resp> <name>Alexander Campbell Fraser</name></respStmt> + </titleStmt> + <editionStmt> + <edition n="1">Edition 1</edition> + </editionStmt> + <publicationStmt> + <publisher>Project Gutenberg</publisher> + <date>May 20, 2012</date> + <idno type="etext-no">39746</idno> + <availability> + <p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and + with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it + away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg + License online at www.gutenberg.org/license</p> + </availability> + </publicationStmt> + <sourceDesc> + <bibl> + Created electronically. + </bibl> + </sourceDesc> + </fileDesc> + <encodingDesc> + </encodingDesc> + <profileDesc> + <langUsage> + <language id="en"></language> + <language id="la"></language> + <language id="el"></language> + </langUsage> + </profileDesc> + <revisionDesc> + <change> + <date value="2012-05-20">May 20, 2012</date> + <respStmt> + <name> + Produced by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Online + Distributed Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + </name> + </respStmt> + <item>Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1</item> + </change> + </revisionDesc> +</teiHeader> + +<pgExtensions> + <pgStyleSheet> + .boxed { x-class: boxed } + .shaded { x-class: shaded } + .rules { x-class: rules; rules: all } + .indent { margin-left: 2 } + .bold { font-weight: bold } + .italic { font-style: italic } + .smallcaps { font-variant: small-caps } + </pgStyleSheet> + + <pgCharMap formats="txt.iso-8859-1"> + <char id="U0x2014"> + <charName>mdash</charName> + <desc>EM DASH</desc> + <mapping>--</mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2003"> + <charName>emsp</charName> + <desc>EM SPACE</desc> + <mapping> </mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2026"> + <charName>hellip</charName> + <desc>HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS</desc> + <mapping>...</mapping> + </char> + </pgCharMap> +</pgExtensions> + +<text lang="en"> + <front> + <div> + <divGen type="pgheader" /> + </div> + <div> + <divGen type="encodingDesc" /> + </div> + + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">The Works of George Berkeley D.D.</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Formerly Bishop of Cloyne</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Including his Posthumous Works</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">With Prefaces, Annotations, Appendices, and An Account of his Life, by</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Alexander Campbell Fraser</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Hon. D.C.L., Oxford</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Hon. LL.D. Glasgow and Edinburgh; Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">In Four Volumes</p> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Vol. 1: Philosophical Works, 1705-21</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Oxford</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">At the Clarendon Press</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">1901</p> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <head>Contents</head> + <divGen type="toc" /> + </div> + + </front> +<body> + +<pb n='v'/><anchor id='Pgv'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Preface</head> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/frontispiece.png' rend='width:50%'> + <figDesc>Frontispiece</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +More than thirty years ago I was honoured by a +request to prepare a complete edition of the Works +of Bishop Berkeley, with Notes, for the Clarendon +Press, Oxford. That edition, which contains many +of his writings previously unpublished, appeared in +1871. It was followed in 1874 by a volume of +annotated Selections from his philosophical works; +and in 1881 I prepared a small volume on <q>Berkeley</q> +for Blackwood's <q>Philosophical Classics.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The 1871 edition of the Works originated, I believe, +in an essay on <q>The Real World of Berkeley,</q> +which I gave to <hi rend='italic'>Macmillan's Magazine</hi> in 1862, +followed by another in 1864, in the <hi rend='italic'>North British +Review</hi>. These essays suggested advantages to +contemporary thought which might be gained by a +consideration of final questions about man and the +universe, in the form in which they are presented +by a philosopher who has suffered more from +misunderstanding than almost any other modern +thinker. During a part of his lifetime, he was the +foremost metaphysician in Europe in an unmetaphysical +generation. And in this country, after +a revival of philosophy in the later part of the +eighteenth century, <emph>idea</emph>, <emph>matter</emph>, <emph>substance</emph>, <emph>cause</emph>, +and other terms which play an important part in +his writings, had lost the meaning that he intended; +<pb n='vi'/><anchor id='Pgvi'/> +while in Germany the sceptical speculations +of David Hume gave rise to a reconstructive +criticism, on the part of Kant and his successors, +which seemed at the time to have little concern +with the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> methods and the principles of +Berkeley. +</p> + +<p> +The success of the attempt to recall attention +to Berkeley has far exceeded expectation. Nearly +twenty thousand copies of the three publications +mentioned above have found their way into the hands +of readers in Europe and America; and the critical +estimates of Berkeley, by eminent writers, which have +appeared since 1871, in Britain, France, Germany, +Denmark, Holland, Italy, America, and India, confirm +the opinion that his Works contain a word in +season, even for the twentieth century. Among +others who have delivered appreciative criticisms of +Berkeley within the last thirty years are J.S. Mill, +Mansel, Huxley, T.H. Green, Maguire, Collyns +Simon, the Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, Mr. Leslie +Stephen, Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Professor T.K. +Abbott, Professor Van der Wyck, M. Penjon, Ueberweg, +Frederichs, Ulrici, Janitsch, Eugen Meyer, +Spicker, Loewy, Professor Höffding of Copenhagen, +Dr. Lorenz, Noah Porter, and Krauth, besides essays +in the chief British, Continental, and American reviews. +The text of those Works of Berkeley which +were published during his lifetime, enriched with a +biographical Introduction by Mr. A.J. Balfour, carefully +edited by Mr. George Sampson, appeared in +1897. In 1900 Dr. R. Richter, of the University of +Leipsic, produced a new translation into German of +the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous</hi>, with an +<pb n='vii'/><anchor id='Pgvii'/> +excellent Introduction and notes. These estimates +form a remarkable contrast to the denunciations, +founded on misconception, by Warburton and Beattie +in the eighteenth century. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In 1899 I was unexpectedly again asked by the +Delegates of the Oxford University Press to prepare +a New Edition of Berkeley's Works, with some +account of his life, as the edition of 1871 was out of +print; a circumstance which I had not expected to +occur in my lifetime. It seemed presumptuous to +undertake what might have been entrusted to some +one probably more in touch with living thought; and +in one's eighty-second year, time and strength are +wanting for remote research. But the recollection +that I was attracted to philosophy largely by Berkeley, +in the morning of life more than sixty years ago, +combined with the pleasure derived from association +in this way with the great University in which he +found an academic home in his old age, moved me +in the late evening of life to make the attempt. And +now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, I +offer these volumes, which still imperfectly realise my +ideal of a final Oxford edition of the philosopher +who spent his last days in Oxford, and whose mortal +remains rest in its Cathedral. +</p> + +<p> +Since 1871 materials of biographical and philosophical +interest have been discovered, in addition +to the invaluable collection of MSS. which Archdeacon +Rose then placed at my disposal, and which +were included in the supplementary volume of <hi rend='italic'>Life +and Letters</hi>. Through the kindness of the late Earl +of Egmont I had access, some years ago, to a large +<pb n='viii'/><anchor id='Pgviii'/> +number of letters which passed between his ancestor, +Sir John (afterwards Lord) Percival, and Berkeley, +between 1709 and 1730. I have availed myself freely +of this correspondence. +</p> + +<p> +Some interesting letters from and concerning +Berkeley, addressed to his friend Dr. Samuel Johnson +of Stratford in Connecticut, afterwards President +of King's College in New York, appeared in +1874, in Dr. Beardsley's <hi rend='italic'>Life of Johnson</hi>, illustrating +Berkeley's history from 1729 till his death. For +these and for further information I am indebted to +Dr. Beardsley. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In the present edition of Berkeley's Works, the +Introductions and the annotations have been mostly +re-written. A short account of his romantic life is +prefixed, intended to trace its progress in the gradual +development and application of his initial Principle; +and also the external incidents of his life in their +continuity, with the help of the new material in +the Percival MSS. and the correspondence with +Johnson. It forms a key to the whole. This +biography is not intended to supersede the <hi rend='italic'>Life +and Letters</hi> of Berkeley that accompanied the 1871 +edition, which remains as a magazine of facts for +reference. +</p> + +<p> +The rearrangement of the Works is a feature in +the present edition. Much of the new material that +was included in the 1871 edition reached me when +the book was far advanced in the press, and thus the +chronological arrangement, strictly followed in the +present edition, was not possible. A chronological +arrangement is suggested by Berkeley himself. <q>I +<pb n='ix'/><anchor id='Pgix'/> +could wish that all the things I have published +on these philosophical subjects were read in the +order wherein I published them,</q> are his words +in one of his letters to Johnson; <q>and a second +time with a critical eye, adding your own thought +and observation upon every part as you went +along.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The first three volumes in this edition contain the +Philosophical Works exclusively; arranged in chronological +order, under the three periods of Berkeley's +life. The First Volume includes those of his early +life; the Second those produced in middle life; +and the Third those of his later years. The Miscellaneous +Works are presented in like manner in the +Fourth Volume. +</p> + +<p> +The four little treatises in which Berkeley in early +life unfolded his new thought about the universe, +along with his college <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> published +in 1871, which prepared the way for them, form, along +with the Life, the contents of the First Volume. It +is of them that the author writes thus, in another +of his letters to Johnson:—<q>I do not indeed wonder +that on first reading what I have written men are not +thoroughly convinced. On the contrary, I should +very much wonder if prejudices which have been +many years taking root should be extirpated in a few +hours' reading. I had no inclination to trouble the +world with large volumes. What I have done was +rather with a view of giving hints to thinking men, +who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of +things, and pursue them in their own minds. Two +or three times reading these small tracts, and making +what is read the occasion of thinking, would, I believe, +<pb n='x'/><anchor id='Pgx'/> +render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and +take off that shocking appearance which hath often +been observed to attend speculative truths.</q> Except +Johnson, none of Berkeley's eighteenth-century critics +seem to have observed this rule. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher</hi>, with its supplement +in the <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Visual Language Vindicated</hi>, +being the philosophical works of his middle life, associated +with its American enterprise, form the Second +Volume. In them the conception of the universe +that was unfolded in the early writings is applied, in +vindication of religious morality and Christianity, +against the Atheism attributed to those who called +themselves Free-thinkers; who were treated by +Berkeley as, at least by implication, atheistic. +</p> + +<p> +The Third Volume contains the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, +which belong to his later life, <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> being especially +characteristic of its serene quiet. In both there is +a deepened sense of the mystery of the universe, and +in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> especially a more comprehensive conception +of the final problem suggested by human life. But +the metaphysics of the one is lost in mathematical +controversy; that of the other in medical controversy, +and in undigested ancient and mediæval learning. +The metaphysical importance of <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> was long +unrecognised, although in it Berkeley's thought +culminates, not in a paradox about Matter, but in the +conception of God as the concatenating principle of +the universe; yet this reached through the conception +of Matter as real only in and through living Mind. +</p> + +<p> +The Miscellaneous Works, after the two juvenile +Latin tracts in mathematics, deal with observations +of nature and man gathered in his travels, questions +<pb n='xi'/><anchor id='Pgxi'/> +of social economy, and lessons in religious life. +Several are posthumous, and were first published +in the 1871 edition. Of these, perhaps the most +interesting is the <hi rend='italic'>Journal in Italy</hi>. The <hi rend='italic'>Discourse on +Passive Obedience</hi> is the nearest approach to ethical +theory which Berkeley has given to us, and as such it +might have taken its place in the First Volume; but +on the whole it seemed more appropriately placed +in the Fourth, where it is easily accessible for those +who prefer to read it immediately after the book of +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +I have introduced, in an Appendix to the Third +Volume, some matter of philosophical interest for +which there was no place in the editorial Prefaces +or in the annotations. The historical significance of +Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards, as pioneers +of American philosophy, and also advocates of the +new conception of the material world that is associated +with Berkeley, is recognised in Appendix C. +Illustrations of the misinterpretation of Berkeley by +his early critics are presented in Appendix D. A +lately discovered tractate by Berkeley forms Appendix +E. In the Fourth Volume, numerous queries +contained in the first edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Querist</hi>, and omitted +in the later editions, are given in an Appendix, +which enables the reader to reconstruct that interesting +tract in the form in which it originally appeared. +</p> + +<p> +The present edition is thus really a new work, +which possesses, I hope, a certain philosophical unity, +as well as pervading biographical interest. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +As Berkeley is the immediate successor of Locke, +and as he was educated by collision with the <hi rend='italic'>Essay +<pb n='xii'/><anchor id='Pgxii'/> +on Human Understanding</hi>, perhaps Locke ought to +have had more prominence in the editorial portion +of this book. Limitation of space partly accounts +for the omission; and I venture instead to refer the +reader to the Prolegomena and notes in my edition +of Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, which was published by the +Clarendon Press in 1894. I may add that an expansion +of thoughts which run through the Life and +many of the annotations, in this edition of Berkeley, +may be found in my <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of Theism</hi><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of Theism</hi>: The +Gifford Lectures delivered before +the University of Edinburgh in +1894-96. (Second Edition, 1899.)</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The reader need not come to Berkeley in the expectation +of finding in his Works an all-comprehensive +speculative system like Spinoza's, or a reasoned +articulation of the universe of reality such as Hegel +is supposed to offer. But no one in the succession +of great English philosophers has, I think, proposed +in a way more apt to invite reflexion, the final alternative +between Unreason, on the one hand, and Moral +Reason expressed in Universal Divine Providence, +on the other hand, as the root of the unbeginning +and endless evolution in which we find ourselves +involved; as well as the further question, Whether +this tremendous practical alternative <emph>can</emph> be settled +by any means that are within the reach of man? +His Philosophical Works, taken collectively, may +encourage those who see in a reasonable <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>via media</foreign> +between Omniscience and Nescience the true path +of progress, under man's inevitable venture of reasonable +Faith. +</p> + +<p> +One is therefore not without hope that a fresh +<pb n='xiii'/><anchor id='Pgxiii'/> +impulse may be given to philosophy and religious +thought by this reappearance of George Berkeley, +under the auspices of the University of Oxford, at +the beginning of the twentieth century. His readers +will at any rate find themselves in the company of +one of the most attractive personalities of English +philosophy, who is also among the foremost of those +thinkers who are masters in English literature—Francis +Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, George Berkeley +and David Hume. +</p> + +<p> +A. Campbell Fraser. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Gorton, Hawthornden, Midlothian</hi>,<lb/> +<hi rend='italic'>March, 1901</hi>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='xxiii'/><anchor id='Pgxxiii'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>George Berkeley, By The Editor</head> + +<div> +<head>I. Early Life (1685-1721).</head> + +<p> +Towards the end of the reign of Charles the Second +a certain William Berkeley, according to credible tradition, +occupied a cottage attached to the ancient Castle of Dysert, +in that part of the county of Kilkenny which is watered by +the Nore. Little is known about this William Berkeley +except that he was Irish by birth and English by descent. +It is said that his father went over to Ireland soon after +the Restoration, in the suite of his reputed kinsman, +Lord Berkeley of Stratton, when he was Lord Lieutenant. +William Berkeley's wife seems to have been of Irish +blood, and in some remote way related to the family of +Wolfe, the hero of Quebec. It was in the modest abode +in the valley of the Nore that George, the eldest of their +six sons, was born, on March 12, 1685. +</p> + +<p> +There is nothing in the recorded family history of these +Dysert Berkeleys that helps to explain the singular personality +and career of the eldest son. The parents have +left no mark, and make no appearance in any extant +records of the family. They probably made their way +to the valley of the Nore among families of English connexion +who, in the quarter of a century preceding the birth +of George Berkeley, were finding settlements in Ireland. +The family, as it appears, was not wealthy, but was +recognised as of gentle blood. Robert, the fifth son, +<pb n='xxiv'/><anchor id='Pgxxiv'/> +became rector of Middleton and vicar-general of Cloyne; +and another son, William, held a commission in the army. +According to the Register of Trinity College, one of the +sons was born <q>near Thurles,</q> in 1699, and Thomas, +the youngest, was born in Tipperary, in 1703, so that +the family may have removed from Dysert after the birth +of George. In what can be gleaned of the younger sons, +one finds little appearance of sympathy with the religious +and philosophical genius of the eldest. +</p> + +<p> +Regarding this famous eldest son in those early days, +we have this significant autobiographical fragment in his +<hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>: <q>I was distrustful at eight years +old, and consequently by nature disposed for the new +doctrines.</q> In his twelfth year we find the boy in Kilkenny +School. The register records his entrance there in +the summer of 1696, when he was placed at once in the +second class, which seems to imply precocity, for it is +almost a solitary instance. He spent the four following +years in Kilkenny. The School was in high repute for +learned masters and famous pupils; among former pupils +were the poet Congreve and Swift, nearly twenty years +earlier than George Berkeley; among his school-fellows +was Thomas Prior, his life-long friend and correspondent. +In the days of Berkeley and Prior the head master was +Dr. Hinton, and the School was still suffering from the +consequences of <q>the warre in Ireland</q> which followed +the Revolution. +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley in Kilkenny School is hardly visible, and we +have no means of estimating his mental state when he left +it. Tradition says that in his school-days he was wont +to feed his imagination with airy visions and romance, +a tradition which perhaps originated long after in popular +misconceptions of his idealism. Dimly discernible at +Kilkenny, only a few years later he was a conspicuous +figure in an island that was then beginning to share in +the intellectual movement of the modern world, taking +<pb n='xxv'/><anchor id='Pgxxv'/> +his place as a classic in English literature, and as the +most subtle and ardent of contemporary English-speaking +thinkers. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In March, 1700, at the age of fifteen, George Berkeley +entered Trinity College, Dublin. This was his home for +more than twenty years. He was at first a mystery to the +ordinary undergraduate. Some, we are told, pronounced +him the greatest dunce, others the greatest genius in the +College. To hasty judges he seemed an idle dreamer; +the thoughtful admired his subtle intelligence and the +beauty of his character. In his undergraduate years, +a mild and ingenuous youth, inexperienced in the ways +of men, vivacious, humorous, satirical, in unexpected ways +inquisitive, often paradoxical, through misunderstandings +he persisted in his own way, full of simplicity and enthusiasm. +In 1704 (the year in which Locke died) he +passed Bachelor of Arts, and became Master in 1707, +when he was admitted to a Fellowship, <q>the only reward +of learning which that kingdom had to bestow.</q> +</p> + +<p> +In Trinity College the youth found himself on the tide +of modern thought, for the <q>new philosophy</q> of Newton +and Locke was then invading the University. Locke's +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, published in 1690, was already in vogue. This +early recognition of Locke in Dublin was chiefly due to +William Molyneux, Locke's devoted friend, a lawyer and +member of the Irish Parliament, much given to the +experimental methods. Descartes, too, with his sceptical +criticism of human beliefs, yet disposed to spiritualise +powers commonly attributed to matter, was another accepted +authority in Trinity College; and Malebranche was +not unknown. Hobbes was the familiar representative +of a finally materialistic conception of existence, reproducing +in modern forms the atomism of Democritus and +the ethics of Epicurus. Above all, Newton was acknowledged +master in physics, whose <hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, issued three +<pb n='xxvi'/><anchor id='Pgxxvi'/> +years sooner than Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, was transforming the +conceptions of educated men regarding their surroundings, +like the still more comprehensive law of physical evolution +in the nineteenth century. +</p> + +<p> +John Toland, an Irishman, one of the earliest and +ablest of the new sect of Free-thinkers, made his appearance +at Dublin in 1696, as the author of <hi rend='italic'>Christianity not +Mysterious</hi>. The book was condemned by College dignitaries +and dignified clergy with even more than Irish +fervour. It was the opening of a controversy that lasted +over half of the eighteenth century in England, in which +Berkeley soon became prominent; and it was resumed +later on, with greater intellectual force and in finer literary +form, by David Hume and Voltaire. The collision with +Toland about the time of Berkeley's matriculation may have +awakened his interest. Toland was supposed to teach +that matter is eternal, and that motion is its essential +property, into which all changes presented in the outer +and inner experience of man may at last be resolved. +Berkeley's life was a continual protest against these +dogmas. The Provost of Trinity College in 1700 was +Dr. Peter Browne, who had already entered the lists +against Toland; long after, when Bishop of Cork, he was +in controversy with Berkeley about the nature of man's +knowledge of God. The Archbishop of Dublin in the +early years of the eighteenth century was William King, +still remembered as a philosophical theologian, whose book +on the <hi rend='italic'>Origin of Evil</hi>, published in 1702, was criticised +by Boyle and Leibniz. +</p> + +<p> +Dublin in those years was thus a place in which a +studious youth, who had been <q>distrustful at eight years +old,</q> might be disposed to entertain grave questions about +the ultimate meaning of his visible environment, and of +the self-conscious life to which he was becoming awake. +Is the universe of existence confined to the visible world, +and is matter the really active power in existence? Is God +<pb n='xxvii'/><anchor id='Pgxxvii'/> +the root and centre of all that is real, and if so, what is +meant by God? Can God be good if the world is a mixture +of good and evil? Questions like these were ready +to meet the inquisitive Kilkenny youth in his first years +at Dublin. +</p> + +<p> +One of his earliest interests at College was mathematical. +His first appearance in print was as the anonymous author +of two Latin tracts, <hi rend='italic'>Arithmetica</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Miscellanea Mathematica</hi>, +published in 1707. They are interesting as an +index of his intellectual inclination when he was hardly +twenty; for he says they were prepared three years before +they were given to the world. His disposition to curious +questions in geometry and algebra is further shewn in his +College <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +This lately discovered <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> throws a flood +of light upon Berkeley's state of mind between his twentieth +and twenty-fourth year. It is a wonderful revelation; +a record under his own hand of his thoughts and +feelings when he first came under the inspiration of a new +conception of the nature and office of the material world. +It was then struggling to find adequate expression, +and in it the sanguine youth seemed to find a spiritual +panacea for the errors and confusions of philosophy. It +was able to make short work, he believed, with atheistic +materialism, and could dispense with arguments against +sceptics in vindication of the reality of experience. The +mind-dependent existence of the material world, and its +true function in the universe of concrete reality, were to +be disclosed under the light of a new transforming self-evident +Principle. <q>I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering +the obvious and amazing truth. I rather wonder +at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before—'tis +no witchcraft to see.</q> The pages of the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace +Book</hi> give vent to rapidly forming thoughts about +the things of sense and the <q>ambient space</q> of a youth +entering into reflective life, in company with Descartes +<pb n='xxviii'/><anchor id='Pgxxviii'/> +and Malebranche, Bacon and Hobbes, above all, Locke and +Newton; who was trying to translate into reasonableness +his faith in the reality of the material world and God. +Under the influence of this new conception, he sees the +world like one awakening from a confused dream. The +revolution which he wanted to inaugurate he foresaw +would be resisted. Men like to think and speak about +things as they have been accustomed to do: they are +offended when they are asked to exchange this for what +appears to them absurdity, or at least when the change +seems useless. But in spite of the ridicule and dislike of +a world long accustomed to put empty words in place +of living thoughts, he resolves to deliver himself of his +burden, with the politic conciliation of a skilful advocate +however; for he characteristically reminds himself that one +who <q>desires to bring another over to his own opinions +must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him +in his own way of talking.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In 1709, when he was twenty-four years old, Berkeley +presented himself to the world of empty verbal reasoners +as the author of what he calls modestly <hi rend='italic'>An Essay towards +a New Theory of Vision</hi>. It was dedicated to Sir John +Percival, his correspondent afterwards for more than +twenty years; but I have not discovered the origin of their +friendship. The <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> was a pioneer, meant to open the +way for the disclosure of the Secret with which he was +burdened, lest the world might be shocked by an abrupt +disclosure. In this prelude he tries to make the reader +recognise that in ordinary seeing we are always interpreting +visual signs; so that we have daily presented to +our eyes what is virtually an intelligible natural language; +so that in all our intercourse with the visible world we +are in intercourse with all-pervading active Intelligence. +We are reading absent data of touch and of the other +senses in the language of their visual signs. And the +<pb n='xxix'/><anchor id='Pgxxix'/> +visual signs themselves, which are the immediate objects +of sight, are necessarily dependent on sentient and percipient +mind; whatever may be the case with the tangible +realities which the visual data signify, a fact evident +by our experience when we make use of a looking-glass. +The material world, so far at least as it presents +itself visibly, is <emph>real</emph> only in being <emph>realised</emph> by living +and seeing beings. The mind-dependent <emph>visual</emph> signs +of which we are conscious are continually speaking to us +of an invisible and distant world of <emph>tangible</emph> realities; +and through the natural connexion of the visual signs +with their tactual meanings, we are able in seeing practically +to perceive, not only what is distant in space, but +also to anticipate the future. The Book of Vision is in +literal truth a Book of Prophecy. The chief lesson of the +tentative <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi> is thus summed up:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that +the proper objects of Vision constitute the Universal +Language of Nature; whereby we are instructed how to +regulate our actions in order to attain those things that +are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our +bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and +destructive of them. And the manner wherein they +signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a +distance is the same with that of languages and signs of +human appointment; which do not suggest the things +signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only +by an habitual connexion that experience has made us +to observe between them. Suppose one who had always +continued blind be told by his guide that after he has +advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of +a precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must not this to +him seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot +conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such +predictions as these, which to him would seem as strange +and unaccountable as prophecy does to others. Even +<pb n='xxx'/><anchor id='Pgxxx'/> +they who are blessed with the visive faculty may (though +familiarity make it less observed) find therein sufficient +cause of admiration. The wonderful art and contrivance +wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for +which it was apparently designed; the vast extent, number, +and variety of objects that are at once, with so much ease +and quickness and pleasure, suggested by it—all these +afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, and +may, if anything, give us some glimmering analogous +prænotion of things that are placed beyond the certain +discovery and comprehension of our present state<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 147, 148.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley took orders in the year in which his <hi rend='italic'>Essay on +Vision</hi> was published. On February 1, 1709, he was +ordained as deacon, in the chapel of Trinity College, by +Dr. George Ashe, Bishop of Clogher. Origen and Augustine, +Anselm and Aquinas, Malebranche, Fenelon, and +Pascal, Cudworth, Butler, Jonathan Edwards, and Schleiermacher, +along with Berkeley, are among those who are +illustrious at once in the history of philosophy and of the +Christian Church. The Church, it has been said, has been +for nearly two thousand years the great Ethical Society +of the world, and if under its restrictions it has been less +conspicuous on the field of philosophical criticism and free +inquiry, these names remind us of the immense service it +has rendered to meditative thought. +</p> + +<p> +The light of the Percival correspondence first falls on +Berkeley's life in 1709. The earliest extant letters from +Berkeley to Sir John Percival are in September, October, +and December of that year, dated at Trinity College. In +one of them he pronounces Socrates <q>the best and most +admirable man that the heathen world has produced.</q> +Another letter, in March, 1710, accompanies a copy of the +second edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>. <q>I have made +some alterations and additions in the body of the treatise,</q> +he says, <q>and in the appendix have endeavoured to meet the +<pb n='xxxi'/><anchor id='Pgxxxi'/> +objections of the Archbishop of Dublin;</q> whose sermon +he proceeds to deprecate, for <q>denying that goodness and +understanding are more to be affirmed of God than feet +or hands,</q> although all these may, in a metaphorical sense. +How far, or whether at all, God is knowable by man, +was, as we shall see, matter of discussion and controversy +with Berkeley in later life; but this shews that the +subject was already in his thoughts. Returning to the +<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, he tells Sir John that <q>there remains +one objection, that with regard to the uselessness of that +book of mine; but in a little time I hope to make what is +there laid down appear subservient to the ends of morality +and religion, in a <hi rend='italic'>Treatise</hi> I have in the press, the design +of which is to demonstrate the existence and attributes of +God, the immortality of the soul, the reconciliation of +God's foreknowledge and the freedom of man; and by +shewing the emptiness and falsehood of several parts of +the speculative sciences, to induce men to the study of +religion and things useful. How far my endeavours will +prove successful, and whether I have been all this time in +a dream or no, time will shew. I do not see how it is +possible to demonstrate the being of a God on the principles +of the Archbishop—that strictly goodness and understanding +can no more be assumed of God than that He has feet +or hands; there being no argument that I know for God's +existence which does not prove Him at the same time to +be an understanding and benevolent being, in the strict, +literal, and proper meaning of these words.</q> He adds, +<q>I have written to Mr. Clarke to give me his thoughts on +the subject of God's existence, but have got no answer.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The work foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the +summer of 1710, as the <q>First part</q> of a <hi rend='italic'>Treatise concerning +the Principles of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief causes +of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of +Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquired into</hi>. In +this fragment of a larger work, never finished, Berkeley's +<pb n='xxxii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxii'/> +spiritual conception of matter and cosmos is unfolded, +defended, and applied. According to the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, +the world, as far as it is visible, is dependent on living +mind. According to this book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> the whole +material world, as far as it can have any practical concern +with the knowings and doings of men, is real only by being +realised in like manner in the percipient experience of +some living mind. The concrete world, with which alone +we have to do, could not exist in its concrete reality +if there were no living percipient being in existence to +actualise it. To suppose that it could would be to submit +to the illusion of a metaphysical abstraction. Matter +unrealised in its necessary subordination to some one's +percipient experience is the chief among the illusions +which philosophers have been too ready to encourage, and +which the mass of mankind, who accept words without +reflecting on their legitimate meanings, are ready to accept +blindly. But we have only to reflect in order to see the +absurdity of a material world such as we have experience +of existing without ever being realised or made concrete +in any sentient life. Try to conceive an eternally dead +universe, empty for ever of God and all finite spirits, +and you find you cannot. Reality can be real only in a +living form. Percipient life underlies or constitutes all +that is real. The <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign> of the concrete material world +is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipi</foreign>. This was the <q>New Principle</q> with which the +young Dublin Fellow was burdened—the Secret of the +universe which he had been longing to discharge upon +mankind for their benefit, yet without sign of desire to +gain fame for himself as the discoverer. It is thus that +he unfolds it:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind +that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such +I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir of +heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies +which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not +<pb n='xxxiii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxiii'/> +any subsistence without a Mind; that their <emph>being</emph> is to be +perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are +not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, +or that of any other created spirit, they must either have +no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some +Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving +all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any +single part of them an existence independent of a Spirit<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 6.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This does not mean denial of the existence of the world +that is daily presented to our senses and which includes +our own bodies. On the contrary, it affirms, as intuitively +true, the existence of the only real matter which our +senses present to us. The only material world of which +we have any experience consists of the appearances (misleadingly +called <emph>ideas</emph> of sense by Berkeley) which are +continually rising as real objects in a passive procession +of interpretable signs, through means of which each finite +person realises his own individual personality; also the +existence of other finite persons; and the sense-symbolism +that is more or less interpreted in the natural sciences; +all significant of God. So the material world of concrete +experience is presented to us as mind-dependent and in +itself powerless: the deepest and truest reality must +always be spiritual. Yet this mind-dependent material +world is the occasion of innumerable pleasures and pains +to human percipients, in so far as they conform to or +contradict its customary laws, commonly called the laws +of nature. So the sense-symbolism in which we live is +found to play an important part in the experience of +percipient beings. But it makes us sceptics and atheists +when, in its name, we put a supposed dead abstract +matter in room of the Divine Active Reason of which all +natural order is the continuous providential expression. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly, God must exist, because the material +world, in order to be a real world, needs to be continually +<pb n='xxxiv'/><anchor id='Pgxxxiv'/> +realised and regulated by living Providence; and we +have all the certainty of sense and sanity that there <emph>is</emph> a +(mind-dependent) material world, a boundless and endlessly +evolving sense-symbolism. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In the two years after the disclosure of his New Principle +we see Berkeley chiefly through his correspondence with +Percival. He was eager to hear the voice of criticism; +but the critics were slow to speak, and when they did +speak they misconceived the question, and of course his +answer to it. <q>If when you receive my book,</q> he writes +from Dublin, in July, 1710, to Sir John, who was then in +London, <q>you can procure me the opinion of some of your +acquaintances who are thinking men, addicted to the study +of natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely +obliged to you.</q> He also asks Percival to present the +book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> to Lord Pembroke, to whom he had +ventured to dedicate it, as Locke had done his <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. +The reply was discouraging. +</p> + +<p> +<q>I did but name the subject-matter of your book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +to some ingenuous friends of mine,</q> Percival says, <q>and +they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time +refusing to read it; which I have not yet got one to do. +A physician of my acquaintance undertook to describe +your person, and argued you must needs be mad, and +that you ought to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, +that a desire and vanity of starting something new should +put you upon such an undertaking; and when I justified +you in that part of your character, and added other deserving +qualities you have, he could not tell what to think of you. +Another told me an ingenious man ought not to be discouraged +from exerting his wit, and said Erasmus was +not worse thought of for writing in praise of folly; but +that you are not gone as far as a gentleman in town, who +asserts not only that there is no such thing as Matter, but +that we ourselves have no being at all.</q> +</p> + +<pb n='xxxv'/><anchor id='Pgxxxv'/> + +<p> +It is not surprising that a book which was supposed to +deny the existence of all that we see and touch should be +ridiculed, and its author called a madman. What vexed +the author was, <q>that men who had never considered my +book should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the +existence of sensible things, and are not positive of any +one thing, not even of their own being. But whoever +reads my book with attention will see that I question not +the existence of anything we perceive by our senses. +Fine spun metaphysics are what on all occasions I declaim +against, and if any one shall shew anything of that +sort in my <hi rend='italic'>Treatise</hi> I will willingly correct it.</q> A material +world that was real enough to yield physical science, to +make known to us the existence of other persons and of +God, and which signified in very practical ways happiness +or misery to sentient beings, seemed to him sufficiently real +for human science and all other purposes. Nevertheless, +in the ardour of youth Berkeley had hardly fathomed the +depths into which his New Principle led, and which he +hoped to escape by avoiding the abstractions of <q>fine-spun +metaphysics.</q> +</p> + +<p> +In December Percival writes from London that he has +<q>given the book to Lord Pembroke,</q> who <q>thought the +author an ingenious man, and to be encouraged</q>; but for +himself he <q>cannot believe in the non-existence of Matter</q>; +and he had tried in vain to induce Samuel Clarke, the +great English metaphysician, either to refute or to accept +the New Principle. In February Berkeley sends an +explanatory letter for Lord Pembroke to Percival's care. +In a letter in June he turns to social questions, and suggests +that if <q>some Irish gentlemen of good fortune and +generous inclinations would constantly reside in England, +there to watch for the interests of Ireland, they might +bring far greater advantage than they could by spending +their incomes at home.</q> And so 1711 passes, with responses +of ignorant critics; vain endeavours to draw +<pb n='xxxvi'/><anchor id='Pgxxxvi'/> +worthy criticism from Samuel Clarke; the author all the +while doing work as a Tutor in Trinity College on a modest +income; now and then on holidays in Meath or elsewhere +in Ireland. Three discourses on <hi rend='italic'>Passive Obedience</hi> in the +College Chapel in 1712, misinterpreted, brought on him +the reproach of Jacobitism. Yet they were designed +to shew that society rests on a deeper foundation than +force and calculations of utility, and is at last rooted in +principles of an immutable morality. Locke's favourite +opinion, that morality is a demonstrable, seems to weigh +with him in these <hi rend='italic'>Discourses</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +But Berkeley was not yet done with the exposition and +vindication of his new thought, for it seemed to him +charged with supreme practical issues for mankind. In +the two years which followed the publication of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +he was preparing to reproduce his spiritual conception +of the universe, in the dramatic form of dialogue, +convenient for dealing popularly with plausible objections. +The issue was the <hi rend='italic'>Three Dialogues between Hylas and +Philonous</hi>, in which Philonous argues for the absurdity of +an abstract matter that is unrealised in the experience of +living beings, as against Hylas, who is put forward to justify +belief in this abstract reality. The design of the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> +is to present in a familiar form <q>such principles as, by +an easy solution of the perplexities of philosophers, +together with their own native evidence, may at once +recommend themselves as genuine to the mind, and rescue +philosophy from the endless pursuits it is engaged in; +which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence +of an all-seeing God, should seem the readiest +preparation, as well as the strongest motive to the study +and practice of virtue<note place='foot'>Preface to the <hi rend='italic'>Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous</hi>.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +When the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> were completed, at the end of +1712, Berkeley resolved to visit London, as he told +Percival, <q>in order to print my new book of Dialogues, +<pb n='xxxvii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxvii'/> +and to make acquaintance with men of merit.</q> He got +leave of absence from his College <q>for the recovery of his +health,</q> which had suffered from study, and perhaps too +he remembered that Bacon commends travel as <q>to the +younger sort a part of education.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Berkeley made his appearance in London in January, +1713. On the 26th of that month he writes to Percival +that he <q>had crossed the Channel from Dublin a few days +before,</q> describes adventures on the road, and enlarges +on the beauty of rural England, which he liked more than +anything he had seen in London. <q>Mr. Clarke</q> had +already introduced him to Lord Pembroke. He had also +called on his countryman Richard Steele, <q>who desired to +be acquainted with him. Somebody had given him my +<hi rend='italic'>Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>, and that +was the ground of his inclination to my acquaintance.</q> +He anticipates <q>much satisfaction in the conversation of +Steele and his friends,</q> adding that <q>there is lately +published a bold and pernicious book, a <hi rend='italic'>Discourse on +Free-thinking</hi><note place='foot'>By Anthony Collins.</note>.</q> In February he <q>dines often with Steele +in his house in Bloomsbury Square,</q> and tells in March +<q>that you will soon hear of Mr. Steele under the character +of the <hi rend='italic'>Guardian</hi>; he designs his paper shall come +out every day as the <hi rend='italic'>Spectator</hi>.</q> The night before <q>a very +ingenious new poem upon <q>Windsor Forest</q> had been +given to him by the author, Mr. Pope. The gentleman is +a Papist, but a man of excellent wit and learning, one of +those Mr. Steele mentions in his last paper as having writ +some of the <hi rend='italic'>Spectator</hi>.</q> A few days later he has met +<q>Mr. Addison, who has the same talents as Steele in +a high degree, and is likewise a great philosopher, having +applied himself to the speculative studies more than any +of the wits I know. I breakfasted with him at Dr. Swift's +lodgings. His coming in while I was there, and the good +<pb n='xxxviii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxviii'/> +temper he showed, was construed by me as a sign of the +approaching coalition of parties. A play of Mr. Steele's, +which was expected, he has now put off till next winter. +But <hi rend='italic'>Cato</hi>, a most noble play of Mr. Addison, is to +be acted in Easter week.</q> Accordingly, on April 18, +he writes that <q>on Tuesday last <hi rend='italic'>Cato</hi> was acted for the +first time. I was present with Mr. Addison and two or +three more friends in a side box, where we had a talk +and two or three flasks of Burgundy and Champagne, +which the author (who is a very sober man) thought +necessary to support his spirits, and indeed it was a +pleasant refreshment to us all between the Acts. Some +parts of the prologue, written by Mr. Pope, a Tory and +even a Papist, were hissed, being thought to savour of +Whiggism; but the clap got much the better of the hiss. +Lord Harley, who sat in the next box to us, was observed +to clap as loud as any in the house all the time of the +play.</q> Swift and Pope have described this famous first +night of <hi rend='italic'>Cato</hi>; now for the first time we have Berkeley's +report. He adds, <q>This day I dined at Dr. Arbuthnot's +lodging in the Queen's Palace.</q> +</p> + +<p> +His countryman, Swift, was among the first to welcome +him to London, where Swift had himself been for four +years, <q>lodging in Bury Street,</q> and sending the daily +journal to Stella, which records so many incidents of that +memorable London life. Mrs. Vanhomrigh and her +daughter, the unhappy Vanessa, were living in rooms in +the same street as Swift, and there he <q>loitered, hot and +lazy, after his morning's work,</q> and <q>often dined out of +mere listlessness.</q> Berkeley was a frequent visitor at +Swift's house, and this Vanhomrigh connexion with Swift +had an influence on Berkeley's fortune long afterwards. +On a Sunday in April we find him at Kensington, at +the Court of Queen Anne, in the company of Swift. +<q>I went to Court to-day,</q> Swift's journal records, <q>on +purpose to present Mr. Berkeley, one of the Fellows of +<pb n='xxxix'/><anchor id='Pgxxxix'/> +Trinity. College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. That +Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man, and a great +philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the ministers, +and have given them some of his writings, and I will +favour him as much as I can.</q> In this, Swift was as good +as his word. <q>Dr. Swift,</q> he adds, <q>is admired both by +Steele and Addison, and I think Addison one of the best +natured and most agreeable men in the world.</q> +</p> + +<p> +One day about this time, at the instance of Addison, it +seems that a meeting was arranged between Berkeley and +Samuel Clarke, the metaphysical rector of St. James's in +Piccadilly, whose opinion he had in vain tried to draw +forth two years before through Sir John Percival. Berkeley's +personal charm was felt wherever he went, and even +<q>the fastidious and turbulent Atterbury,</q> after intercourse +with him, is reported to have said: <q>So much understanding, +so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, +I did not think had been the portion of any but angels till +I saw this gentleman.</q> Much was expected from the +meeting with Clarke, but Berkeley had again to complain +that although Clarke had neither refuted his arguments +nor disproved his premisses, he had not the candour to +accept his conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +It was thus that Berkeley became known to <q>men of +merit</q> in that brilliant society. He was also brought +among persons on whom he would hardly have conferred +this title. He tells Percival that he had attended several +free-thinking clubs, in the pretended character of a learner, +and that he there heard Anthony Collins, author of <q>the +bold and pernicious book on free-thinking,</q> boast <q>that +he was able to demonstrate that the existence of God is +an impossible supposition.</q> The promised <q>demonstration</q> +seems to have been Collins' <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry Concerning Human +Liberty</hi>, which appeared two years later, according to +which all that happens in mind and matter is the issue +of natural necessity. Steele invited Berkeley to contribute +<pb n='xl'/><anchor id='Pgxl'/> +to the <hi rend='italic'>Guardian</hi> during its short-lived existence between +March and September, 1713. He took the <hi rend='italic'>Discourse</hi> of +Collins for the subject of his first essay. Three other +essays are concerned with man's hope of a future life, +and are among the few passages in his writings in which +his philosophy is a meditation upon Death. +</p> + +<p> +In May, Percival writes to him from Dublin that he +hears the <q>new book of Dialogues is printed, though not +yet published, and that your opinion has gained ground +among the learned; that Mr. Addison has come over to +your view; and that what at first seemed shocking is +become so familiar that others envy you the discovery, +and make it their own.</q> In his reply in June, Berkeley +mentions that <q>a clergyman in Wiltshire has lately published +a treatise wherein he advances something published +three years ago in my <hi rend='italic'>Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>.</q> +The clergyman was Arthur Collier, author of the <hi rend='italic'>Clavis +Universalis</hi>, or demonstration of the impossibility of an +external world<note place='foot'>See vol. III, Appendix B.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Three Dialogues</hi> were published in June. +In the middle of that same month he was in Oxford, +<q>a most delightful place,</q> where he spent two months, +<q>witnessed the Act and grand performances at the theatre, +and a great concourse from London and the country, +amongst whom were several foreigners.</q> The Drury Lane +Company had gone down to Oxford, and <hi rend='italic'>Cato</hi> was on +the stage for several nights. The Percival correspondence +now first discloses this prolonged visit to Oxford in +the summer of 1713, that ideal home from whence, forty +years after, he departed on a more mysterious journey than +any on this planet. In a letter from thence to Percival, he +had claimed Arbuthnot as one of the converts to the <q>new +Principle.</q> Percival replied that Swift demurred to this, +on which Berkeley rejoins: <q>As to what you say of +Dr. Arbuthnot not being of my opinion, it is true there +<pb n='xli'/><anchor id='Pgxli'/> +has been some difference between us concerning some +notions relating to the necessity of the laws of nature; +but this does not touch the main points of the non-existence +of what philosophers call material substance; against +which he acknowledges he can assert nothing.</q> One +would gladly have got more than this from Berkeley, +about what touched his favourite conception of the <q>arbitrariness</q> +of law in nature, as distinguished from the +<q>necessity</q> which some modern physicists are ready +vaguely to take for granted. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The scene now changes. On October 15 Berkeley +suddenly writes from London: <q>I am on the eve of going +to Sicily, as chaplain to Lord Peterborough, who is Ambassador +Extraordinary on the coronation of the new king.</q> +He had been recommended by Swift to the Ambassador, +one of the most extraordinary characters then in Europe, +who a few years before had astonished the world in the +war of the Succession in Spain, and afterwards by his +genius as a diplomatist: in Holland, nearly a quarter +of a century before, he had formed an intimate friendship +with John Locke. Ten months in France and Italy in +the suite of Lord Peterborough brought the young Irish +metaphysician, who had lately been introduced to the wits +of London and the dons of Oxford, into a new world. +It was to him the beginning of a career of wandering +and social activity, which lasted, with little interruption, +for nearly twenty years, during which metaphysics and +authorship were in the background. On November 25 +we find him in Paris, writing letters to Percival and +Prior. <q>From London to Calais</q>, he tells Prior, <q>I came +in company of a Flamand, a Spaniard, a Frenchman, and +three English servants of my Lord. The three gentlemen, +being of three different nations, obliged me to speak the +French language (which is now familiar), and gave me +the opportunity of seeing much of the world in little +<pb n='xlii'/><anchor id='Pgxlii'/> +compass.... On November 1 (O.S.) I embarked in the +stage-coach, with a company that were all perfect strangers +to me. There were two Scotch, and one English gentleman. +One of the former happened to be the author of the +<hi rend='italic'>Voyage to St. Kilda</hi> and the <hi rend='italic'>Account of the Western Isles</hi><note place='foot'>Murdoch Martin, a native of +Skye, author of a <hi rend='italic'>Voyage to St. +Kilda</hi> (1698), and a <hi rend='italic'>Description of +the Western Islands of Scotland</hi> (1703).</note>. +We were good company on the road; and that day se'ennight +came to Paris. I have since been taken up in viewing +churches, convents, palaces, colleges, &c., which are very +numerous and magnificent in this town. The splendour +and riches of these things surpasses belief; but it were +endless to descend to particulars. I was present at a disputation +in the Sorbonne, which indeed had much of the +French fire in it. I saw the Irish and the English Colleges. +In the latter I saw, enclosed in a coffin, the body of the +late King James.... To-morrow I intend to visit Father +Malebranche, and discourse him on certain points.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The Abbé D'Aubigné, as he informs Percival, was to +introduce him to Malebranche, then the chief philosopher +of France, whose Vision of the world in God had some +affinity with Berkeley's own thought. Unfortunately we +have no record of the intended interview with the French +idealist, who fourteen years before had been visited by +Addison, also on his way to Italy, when Malebranche expressed +great regard for the English nation, and admiration +for Newton; but he shook his head when Hobbes was +mentioned, whom he ventured to disparage as a <q>poor +silly creature.</q> Malebranche died nearly two years after +Berkeley's proposed interview; and according to a story +countenanced by Dugald Stewart, Berkeley was the <q>occasional +cause</q> of his death. He found the venerable +Father, we are told, in a cell, cooking, in a pipkin, a medicine +for a disorder with which he was troubled. The conversation +naturally turned on Berkeley's system, of which +<pb n='xliii'/><anchor id='Pgxliii'/> +Malebranche had received some knowledge from a translation. +The issue of the debate proved tragical to poor +Malebranche. In the heat of disputation he raised his +voice so high, and gave way so freely to the natural impetuosity +of a man of genius and a Frenchman, that he +brought on a violent increase of his disorder, which carried +him off a few days after<note place='foot'>See Stewart's <hi rend='italic'>Works</hi> (ed. +Hamilton), vol. I. p. 161. There +is a version of this story by DeQuincey, +in his quaint essay on +<hi rend='italic'>Murder considered as one of the +Fine Arts.</hi></note>. This romantic tale is, I +suspect, mythical. The Percival correspondence shews +that Berkeley was living in London in October, 1715, the +month in which Malebranche died, and I find no trace +of a short sudden visit to Paris at that time. +</p> + +<p> +After a month spent in Paris, another fortnight carried +Berkeley and two travelling companions to Italy through +Savoy. They crossed Mont Cenis on New Year's Day +in 1714—<q>one of the most difficult and formidable parts +of the Alps which is ever passed over by mortal man,</q> +as he tells Prior in a letter from Turin. <q>We were carried +in open chairs by men used to scale these rocks and +precipices, which at this season are more slippery and +dangerous than at other times, and at the best are high, +craggy, and steep enough to cause the heart of the most +valiant man to melt within him.</q> At the end of other +six weeks we find him at Leghorn, where he spent three +months, <q>while my lord was in Sicily.</q> He <q>prefers +England or Ireland to Italy: the only advantage is in +point of air.</q> From Leghorn he writes in May a complimentary +letter to Pope, on the occasion of the <hi rend='italic'>Rape of +the Lock</hi>: <q>Style, painting, judgment, spirit, I had already +admired in your other writings; but in this I am charmed +with the magic of your invention, with all those images, +allusions, and inexplicable beauties which you raise so +surprisingly, and at the same time so naturally, out of +a trifle.... I remember to have heard you mention some +<pb n='xliv'/><anchor id='Pgxliv'/> +half-formed design of coming to Italy. What might we +not expect from a muse that sings so well in the bleak +climate of England, if she felt the same warm sun and +breathed the same air with Virgil and Horace.</q> In July +we find Berkeley in Paris on his way back to England. +He had <q>parted from Lord Peterborough at Genoa, where +my lord took post for Turin, and thence designed passing +over the Alps, and so through Savoy, on his way to +England.</q> In August they are in London, where the +aspect of English politics was changed by the death of +the Queen in that month. He seems to have had a +fever soon after his return. In October, Arbuthnot, in one +of his chatty letters to Swift, writes thus: <q>Poor philosopher +Berkeley has now the <emph>idea</emph> of health, which was +very hard to produce in him, for he had an <emph>idea</emph> of a +strange fever upon him, so strange that it was very hard +to destroy it by introducing a contrary one.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Our record of the two following years is a long blank, +first broken by a letter to Percival in July, 1715, dated +at London. Whether he spent any time at Fulham with +Lord Peterborough after their return from Italy does not +appear, nor whether he visited Ireland in those years, +which is not likely. We have no glimpses of brilliant +London society as in the preceding year. Steele was now +in Parliament. Swift had returned to Dublin, and Addison +was the Irish chief secretary. But Pope was still at +Binfield, among the glades of Windsor, and Berkeley +congratulated him after receiving the first volume of his +<hi rend='italic'>Homer</hi>. Of his own literary pursuits we hear nothing. +Perhaps the Second Part of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, which was +lost afterwards in his travels, engaged him. In the end +of July he wrote to Lord Percival<note place='foot'>Sir John became Lord Percival in that year.</note> from Flaxley<note place='foot'>A place more than once visited by Berkeley.</note> on +the Severn; and in August, September, October, and +November he wrote from London, chiefly interested in +<pb n='xlv'/><anchor id='Pgxlv'/> +reports about <q>the rebels in Scotland,</q> and <q>the forces +under Lord Mar, which no doubt will languish and disperse +in a little time. The Bishop of Bristol assured +me the other day that the Court expect that the Duke +of Orleans would, in case of need, supply them with +forces against the Pretender.</q> Our next glimpse of him +is in May, 1716, when he writes to Lord Percival that he +is <q>like soon to go to Ireland, the Prince of Wales having +recommended him to the Lords Justices for the living +of St. Paul's in Dublin.</q> This opening was soon closed, +and the visit to Ireland was abandoned. A groundless +suspicion of Jacobitism was not overcome by the interest +of Caroline, Princess of Wales. In June, 1716, Charles +Dering wrote from Dublin, that <q>the Lords Justices have +made a strong representation against him.</q> He had to +look elsewhere for the immediate future. +</p> + +<p> +We find him at Turin in November, 1716, with a fresh +leave of absence for two years from his College. It seems +that Ashe, Bishop of Clogher, had engaged him as travelling +tutor to his son, a means not then uncommon for +enabling young authors of moderate fortune to see new +countries and mix with society. Addison had visited Italy +in this way sixteen years before, and Adam Smith long +afterwards travelled with the young Duke of Buccleuch. +With young Ashe, Berkeley crossed Mont Cenis a second +time. They reached Rome at the beginning of 1717. +His <hi rend='italic'>Journal in Italy</hi> in that year, and occasional letters +to Percival, Pope, and Arbuthnot, shew ardent interest +in nature and art. With the widest views, <q>this very +great though singular sort of man descended into a +minute detail, and begrudged neither pains nor expense +for the means of information. He travelled through a +great part of Sicily on foot; clambered over the mountains +and crept into the caverns, to investigate its natural history +and discover the causes of its volcanoes; and I have known +him sit for hours in forges and foundries to inspect their +<pb n='xlvi'/><anchor id='Pgxlvi'/> +successive operations<note place='foot'>Bakewell's <hi rend='italic'>Memoirs of the Court of Augustus</hi>, vol. II. p. 177.</note>.</q> If the <hi rend='italic'>Journal</hi> had been transformed +by his own hand into a book, his letter to Pope +from Inarime shews that the book might have rivalled +Addison's <hi rend='italic'>Remarks on Parts of Italy</hi> in grace of style and +large human interest. +</p> + +<p> +In the summer of 1720 we find the travellers at Florence, +afterwards for some time at Lyons, and in London at the +beginning of the next year. On the way home his metaphysical +inspiration was revived. The <q>Cause of Motion</q> +had been proposed by the French Academy as the subject +of a prize dissertation. The subject gave an opportunity +for further unfolding his early thought. In the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +and the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> he had argued for the necessary dependence +of matter, for its concrete substantial reality, upon +living percipient mind. He would now shew its powerlessness +as it is presented to us in sense. The material world, +chiefly under the category of substance, inspired the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. +The material world, under the category of cause +or power, inspired the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. This Latin Essay sums +up the distinctive thought of Berkeley, as it appears in +the authorship of his early life. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Moles evolvit et agitat +mentes</foreign> might be taken as the formula of the materialism +which he sought to dissolve. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Mens percipit et agitat molem +significantem, cujus esse est percipi</foreign> expresses what Berkeley +would substitute for the materialistic formula. +</p> + +<p> +The end of the summer of 1721 found Berkeley still in +London. England was in the social agitation and misery +consequent upon the failure of the South Sea Company, +a gigantic commercial speculation connected with British +trade in America. A new inspiration took possession of +him. He thought he saw in this catastrophe signs of a +decline in public morals worse than that which followed +the Restoration. <q>Political corruption</q>, <q>decay of religion,</q> +<q>growth of atheism,</q> were descriptive words used by the +<pb n='xlvii'/><anchor id='Pgxlvii'/> +thoughtful. Berkeley's eager imagination was apt to exaggerate +the evil. He became inspired by social idealism, +and found vent for his fervour in <hi rend='italic'>An Essay towards preventing +the Ruin of Great Britain</hi>, which, as well as the +<hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>, made its appearance in 1721. This <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> is a +significant factor in his career. It was the Cassandra wail +of a sorrowful and indignant prophet, prepared to shake +the dust from his feet, and to transfer his eye of hope +to other regions, in which a nearer approach to Utopia +might be realised. The true personality of the individual +is unrealisable in selfish isolation. His favourite <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>non sibi, +sed toti mundo</foreign> was henceforward more than ever the ruling +maxim of his life. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>II. Middle Life (1722-34).</head> + +<p> +In October, 1721, Berkeley was in Dublin. The register +of the College shews that <q>on November 14, 1721, Mr. +Berkeley had the grace of the House for the Degree of +Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity.</q> There is no ground +for the report that he returned to Ireland at this time as +Chaplain to the Duke of Grafton, the Lord Lieutenant<note place='foot'>A letter in Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Life and +Letters</hi>, p. 93, which led me to +a different opinion, I have now +reason to believe was not written +by him, nor was it written in 1721. +The research of Dr. Lorenz, confirmed +by internal evidence, shews +that it was written in October, 1684, +before Berkeley the philosopher +was born, and when the Duke of +Ormond was Lord Lieutenant of +Ireland. The writer was probably +the Hon. and Rev. George Berkeley, +a Prebendary of Westminster +in 1687, who died in 1694. The +wife of the <q>pious Robert Nelson</q> +was a daughter of Earl Berkeley, +and this <q>George</q> was her younger +brother.</note>. +But preferment in the Church seemed within his reach. +<q>I had no sooner set foot on shore,</q> he wrote to Percival +in that October, <q>than I heard that the Deanery of Dromore +was vacant.</q> Percival used his influence with the Lord +Lieutenant, and in February, 1722, Berkeley's patent was +<pb n='xlviii'/><anchor id='Pgxlviii'/> +<q>passing the Seals for the Deanery of Dromore.</q> But the +Bishop of Dromore claimed the patronage, and this led to +a protracted and ineffectual lawsuit, which took Berkeley +to London in the following winter, <q>to see friends and +inform himself of points of law,</q> and he tells that <q>on the +way he was nearly drowned in crossing to Holyhead<note place='foot'>Percival MSS.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley's interest in church preferment was not personal. +He saw in it only means to an end. In March, +1723, he surprised Lord Percival by announcing, in a letter +from London, a project which it seems for some time had +occupied his thoughts. <q>It is now about ten months,</q> he +says, <q>since I have determined to spend the residue of my +days in Bermuda, where I trust in Providence I may be +the mean instrument of doing great good to mankind. +Whatever happens, go I am resolved, if I live. Half +a dozen of the most ingenious and agreeable men in our +College are with me in this project, and since I came +hither I have got together about a dozen Englishmen of +quality, who intend to retire to those islands.</q> He then +explains the project, opening a vision of Christian civilisation +radiating from those fair islands of the West, whose +idyllic bliss poets had sung, diffused over the New World, +with its magnificent possibilities in the future history of +mankind. +</p> + +<p> +I find no further record of the origin of this bright +vision. As it had become a practical determination <q>ten +months</q> before March, 1723, one is carried back to the +first months after his return to Dublin and to the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> +that was called forth by the South Sea catastrophe. One +may conjecture that despair of England and the Old +World—<q>such as Europe breeds in her decay</q>—led him +to look westward for the hopeful future of mankind, +moved, perhaps, by the connexion of the catastrophe with +America. His active imagination pictured a better Republic +than Plato's, and a grander Utopia than More's, +<pb n='xlix'/><anchor id='Pgxlix'/> +emanating from a College in the isles of which Waller had +sung. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime a curious fortune unexpectedly +favoured him. Swift's unhappy Vanessa, associated with +Bury Street in 1713, had settled on her property at +Marley Abbey near Dublin; and Swift had privately +married Stella, as she confessed to Vanessa, who thereafter +revoked the bequest of her fortune to Swift, and +left it to be divided between Berkeley and Marshal, +afterwards an Irish judge. Vanessa died in May, 1723. +A few days after Berkeley wrote thus to Lord Percival: +<q>Here is something that will surprise your lordship as +it doth me. Mrs. Hester Vanhomrigh, a lady to whom +I was a perfect stranger, having never in the whole +course of my life exchanged a word with her, died on +Sunday. Yesterday her Will was opened, by which it +appears that I am constituted executor, the advantage +whereof is computed by those who understand her affairs +to be worth £3000.... My Bermuda scheme is now +stronger in my mind than ever; this providential event +having made many things easy which were otherwise +before.</q> Lord Percival in reply concludes that he would +<q>persist more than ever in that noble scheme, which may +in some time exalt your name beyond that of St. Xavier +and the most famous missionaries abroad.</q> But he +warns him that, <q>without the protection of Government,</q> +he would encounter insurmountable difficulties. The +Vanessa legacy, and the obstructions in the way of the +Deanery of Dromore, were the subjects of a tedious correspondence +with his friend and business factotum, <q>Tom +Prior,</q> in 1724 and the three following years. In the end, +the debts of Vanessa absorbed most of the legacy. And as +to the Deanery of Dromore, he tells Percival, on September +19, 1723: <q>I despair of seeing it end to my advantage. +The truth is, my fixed purpose of going to Bermuda sets +me above soliciting anything with earnestness in this part +<pb n='l'/><anchor id='Pgl'/> +of the world. It can be of no use to me, but as it may +enable me the better to prosecute that design; and it +must be owned that the present possession of something +in the Church would make my application for an establishment +in those islands more considered.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, he got a Deanery at last. In May, 1724, +he informs Lord Percival from Trinity College: <q>Yesterday +I received my patent for the best Deanery in the +kingdom, that of Derry. It is said to be worth £1500 +per annum. But as I do not consider it with an eye +to enriching myself, so I shall be perfectly contented if it +facilitates and recommends my scheme of Bermuda, which +I am in hopes will meet with a better reception if it comes +from one possessed of so great a Deanery.</q> In September +he is on his way, not to Derry, but to London, <q>to raise +funds and obtain a Charter for the Bermuda College from +George the First,</q> fortified by a remarkable letter from +Swift to Lord Carteret, the new Lord Lieutenant, who +was then in Bath<note place='foot'>For the letter, see Editor's +Preface to the <hi rend='italic'>Proposal for a +College in Bermuda</hi>, vol. IV. pp. +343-44.</note>. As Swift predicted in this letter, Berkeley's +conquests spread far and fast in England, where he +organised his resources during the four following years. +Nothing shews more signally the magic of his personality +than the story of his life in London in those years of +negotiation and endeavour. The proposal met with a +response wonderful in a generation represented by +Walpole. The subscriptions soon reached five thousand +pounds, and Walpole was among the subscribers. The +Scriblerus Club, meeting at Lord Bathurst's, agreed to +rally Berkeley, who was among them, on his Bermuda +scheme. He asked to be heard in defence, and presented +the case with such force of enthusiasm that the company +<q>were struck dumb, and after a pause simultaneously +rose and asked leave to accompany him.</q> Bermuda +for a time inspired London. +</p> + +<pb n='li'/><anchor id='Pgli'/> + +<p> +Berkeley was not satisfied with this. He remembered +what Lord Percival had said about failure without help +from Government. Accordingly he obtained a Charter +from George the First early in 1726, and after canvassing +the House of Commons, secured a grant of £20,000, with +only two dissentient votes, in May of that year. This was +the beginning of his difficulties. Payment was indefinitely +delayed, and he was kept negotiating; besides, with +the help of Prior, he was unravelling legal perplexities in +which the Vanessa legacy was involved. It was in these +years that he was seen at the receptions of Caroline at +Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of Wales, and afterwards +at St. James's or at Kensington, when she became +Queen in 1727; not, he says, because he loved Courts, +but because he loved America. Clarke was still rector +of St. James's, and Butler had not yet migrated to his +parsonage at Stanhope; so their society was open to him. +The Queen liked to listen to a philosophical discussion. +Ten years before, as Princess of Wales, she had been a +royal go-between in the famous correspondence between +Clarke and Leibniz. And now, Berkeley being in London, +he too was asked to her weekly reunions, when she loved +to hear Clarke arguing with Berkeley, or Berkeley +arguing with Hoadley. Also in 1726 Voltaire made his +lengthened visit to England, a familiar figure in the +circle of Pope's friends, attracted to the philosophy of +Locke and Newton; and Voltaire mentions that he met +<q>the discoverer of the true theory of vision</q> during his +stay in London. +</p> + +<p> +From the summer of 1727 until the spring of 1728 there +is no extant correspondence either with Percival or <q>Tom +Prior</q> to throw light on his movements. In February, +1728, he was still in London, but he <q>hoped to set out +for Dublin in March, and to America in May.</q> There is +a mystery about this visit to Dublin. <q>I propose to set +out for Dublin about a month hence,</q> he writes to <q>dear +<pb n='lii'/><anchor id='Pglii'/> +Tom,</q> <q>but of this you must not give the least intimation +to anybody. It is of all things my earnest desire (and for +very good reasons) not to have it known that I am in +Dublin. Speak not, therefore, one syllable of it to any +mortal whatsoever. When I formerly desired you to take +a place for me near the town, you gave out that you were +looking for a retired lodging for a friend of yours; upon +which everybody surmised me to be the person. I must +beg you not to act in the like manner now, but to take for +me an entire house in your own name, and as for yourself; +for, all things considered, I am determined upon a whole +house, with no mortal in it but a maid of your own putting, +who is to look on herself as your servant. Let there be +two bed-chambers: one for you, another for me; and, +as you like, you may ever and anon lie there. I would +have the house, with necessary furniture, taken by the +month (or otherwise, as you can), for I propose staying +not beyond that time; and yet perhaps I may. Take it +as soon as possible.... Let me entreat you to say nothing +of this to anybody, but to do the thing directly.... I would +of all things ... have a proper place in a retired situation, +where I may have access to fields and sweet air provided +against the moment I arrive. I am inclined to think one +may be better concealed in the outermost skirt of the +suburbs, than in the country or within the town.... A house +quite detached in the country I should have no objection +to, provided you judge that I shall not be liable to +discovery in it. The place called Bermuda I am utterly +against. Dear Tom, do this matter cleanly and cleverly, +without waiting for further advice.... To the person from +whom you hire it (whom alone I would have you speak +of it to) it will not seem strange you should at this time +of the year be desirous, for your own convenience or +health, to have a place in a free and open air.</q> This +mysterious letter was written in April. From April till +September Berkeley again disappears. There is in all +<pb n='liii'/><anchor id='Pgliii'/> +this a curious secretiveness of which one has repeated +examples in his life. Whether he went to Dublin in that +spring, or why he wanted to go, does not appear. +</p> + +<p> +But in September he emerges unexpectedly at Gravesend, +newly married, and ready to sail for Rhode Island, +<q>in a ship of 250 tons which he had hired.</q> The marriage, +according to Stock, took place on August 1, whether in +Ireland or in England I cannot tell. The lady was Anne, +daughter of John Forster, late Chief Justice, and then +Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. She shared +his fortune when he was about to engage in the most +romantic, and ideally the grandest, Christian mission of +the eighteenth century. According to tradition she was a +devoutly religious mystic: Fénelon and Madame Guyon +were among her favourites. <q>I chose her,</q> he tells Lord +Percival, <q>for her qualities of mind and her unaffected +inclination to books. She goes with great thankfulness, +to live a plain farmer's life, and wear stuff of her own +spinning. I have presented her with a spinning-wheel.</q> +A letter to Prior, dated <q>Gravesend September 5, 1728,</q> +thus describes the little party on the eve of their departure:—<q>To-morrow, +with God's blessing, I set sail for +Rhode Island, with my wife and a friend of hers, my +Lady Handcock's daughter, who bears us company. +I am married since I saw you to Miss Forster, whose +humour and turn of mind pleases me beyond anything +that I know in her whole sex. Mr. James<note place='foot'>Afterwards Sir John James.</note>, Mr. Dalton, +and Mr. Smibert<note place='foot'>Smibert the artist, who made +a picture of Berkeley in 1725, +and afterwards in America of the +family party then at Gravesend.</note> go with us on this voyage. We are +now all together at Gravesend, and are engaged in one +view.</q> We are further told<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Historical Register</hi>, vol. XIII, +p. 289 (1728).</note> that they carried stores and +goods to a great value, and that the Dean <q>embarked 20,000 +books, besides what the two gentlemen carried. They +<pb n='liv'/><anchor id='Pgliv'/> +sailed in September for Rhode Island, where the Dean +intends to winter, and to purchase an estate, in order to +settle a correspondence and trade between that island and +Bermudas.</q> Berkeley was in his forty-fourth year, when, +full of glowing visions of Christian Empire in the West, +<q>Time's noblest offspring,</q> he left England, on his way to +Bermuda, with the promise of Sir Robert Walpole that +he should receive the promised grant after he had made +an investment. He bought land in America, but he never +reached Bermuda. +</p> + +<p> +Towards the end of January, in 1729, the little party, in +the <q>hired ship of 250 tons,</q> made their appearance in +Narragansett Bay, on the western side of Rhode Island. +<q>Blundering about the ocean,</q> they had touched at Virginia +on the way, whence a correspondent, sceptical of the enterprise, +informs Lord Percival that the Dean <q>had dined +with the Governor, and visited our College,</q> but thinks +that <q>when the Dean comes to put his visionary scheme +into practice, he will find it no better than a religious +frenzy,</q> and that <q>he is as much a Don Quixote in zeal +as that renowned knight was in chivalry. I wish the good +Dean may not find out at last that Waller really kidnapt +him over to Bermuda, and that the project he has been +drawn into may not prove in every point of it poetical.</q> +</p> + +<p> +We have a picture of the landing at Newport, on a +winter day early in 1729. <q>Yesterday arrived here Dean +Berkeley of Londonderry, in a pretty large ship. He is +a gentleman of middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, +and erect aspect. He was ushered into the town with +a great number of gentlemen, to whom he behaved himself +after a very complaisant manner. 'Tis said he proposes +to tarry here with his family about three months<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>New England Weekly Courier</hi>, Feb. 3, 1729.</note>.</q> Newport +was then a flourishing town, nearly a century old, +an emporium of American commerce, in those days the +rival of Boston and New York. He was <q>never more +<pb n='lv'/><anchor id='Pglv'/> +agreeably surprised,</q> he says, than <q>at the size of the +town and harbour.</q> Around him was some of the softest +rural and grandest ocean scenery in the world, which had +fresh charms even for one whose boyhood was spent in +the valley of the Nore, who had lingered in the Bay of +Naples, and wandered in Inarime and among the mountains +of Sicily. He was seventy miles from Boston, and about +as far from Newhaven and Yale College. A range of +hills crosses the centre of the island, whence meadows +slope to the rocky shore. The Gulf Stream tempers the +surrounding sea. <q>The people,</q> he tells Percival, <q>are +industrious; and though less orthodox have not less virtue, +and I am sure they have more regularity, than those I left +in Europe. They are indeed a strange medley of different +persuasions.</q> The gentry retained the customs of the +squires in England: tradition tells of a cheerful society: +the fox chase, with hounds and horses, was a favourite +recreation. The society, for so remote a region, was +well informed. The family libraries and pictures which +remain argue culture and refinement. Smibert, the artist +of the missionary party, who had moved to Boston, soon +found employment in America, and his pictures still adorn +houses in Rhode Island<note place='foot'>For valuable information about +Rhode Island, reproduced in +<hi rend='italic'>Berkeley's Life and Correspondence</hi> +and here, I am indebted to Colonel +Higginson, to whom I desire to +make this tardy but grateful acknowledgement.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +The Dean and his young wife lived in Newport for +some months after their arrival. Mr. Honeyman, a missionary +of the English Society, had been placed there, +in Trinity Church, in 1704. The church is still a conspicuous +object from the harbour. Berkeley preached in +it three days after his arrival, and occasionally afterwards. +Notes of his sermons are included in this edition among +his Miscellaneous Works. +</p> + +<p> +In the summer of 1729 he moved from Newport to +a quiet valley in the interior of the island, where he +<pb n='lvi'/><anchor id='Pglvi'/> +bought a farm, and built a house. In this island-home, +named Whitehall, he lived for more than two years—years +of domestic happiness, and of resumed study, much +interrupted since he left Dublin in 1713. The house +may still be seen, a little aside from the road that runs +eastward from Newport, about three miles from the town. +It is built of wood. The south-west room was probably +the library. The ocean is seen in the distance, while +orchards and groves offer the shade and silence which +soothed the thinker in his recluse life. No invitations +of the three companions of his voyage<note place='foot'>James, Dalton, and Smibert.</note>, who had migrated +to Boston, could allure him from this retreat, where he +diverted his anxieties about Bermuda by the thoughts +which found expression in the dialogues of <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, +redolent of Rhode Island and the invigorating breezes of +its ocean shore. Tradition tells that much of <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi> was +the issue of meditation in the open air, at a favourite retreat, +beneath the Hanging Rocks, which commands an extensive +view of the beach and the ocean; and the chair in which +he sat in this alcove is still preserved with veneration. +</p> + +<p> +While Berkeley loved domestic quiet at Whitehall<note place='foot'>Whitehall, having fallen into +decay, has been lately restored +by the pious efforts of Mrs. Livingston +Mason, in concert with the +Rev. Dr. E. E. Hale, and others. +This good work was completed +in the summer of 1900; and the +house is now as nearly as possible +in the state in which Berkeley left it.</note> and +the <q>still air of delightful studies,</q> he mixed occasionally +in the society of Newport. He found it not uncongenial, +and soon after he was settled at Whitehall he led the way +in forming a club, which held occasional meetings, the +germ of the Redwood Library, still a useful Newport +institution. His own house was a place of meeting for +the New England missionaries. +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/whitehall.png' rend='width:80%'> + <head>Whitehall, Berkeley's Residence in Rhode Island</head> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +Soon after his arrival in Rhode Island, Berkeley was +visited by the Reverend Samuel Johnson, missionary at +Stratford, an acute and independent thinker, one of the two +contemporary representatives of philosophy in America. +<pb n='lvii'/><anchor id='Pglvii'/> +The other was Jonathan Edwards, at that time Congregational +minister at Northampton on the Connecticut river. +They had both adopted a conception of the meaning and +office of the material world in the economy of existence that +was in many respects similar to Berkeley's<note place='foot'>See vol. III, Appendix C.</note>. It seems that +Berkeley's book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> had before this fallen into +Johnson's hands. He hastened to visit the author when he +heard of his arrival. A succession of visits and a life-long +correspondence followed. The <q>non-existence of Matter,</q> +interpreted as a whimsical and even insane paradox, +was found by Johnson to mean the absence of unrealisable +Substance behind the real material world that +is presented to our senses, and of unrealisable Power in +the successive sense-presented appearances of which alone +we are percipient. He came to see the real existence +of the things of sense in the constant order of the data +of sense, through which we gain our knowledge of the +existence of our fellow men, and of the omnipresent +constant Providence of God; whose Ideas are the true +archetypes of the visible world. He adopted and applied +this conception with a lucidity and force which give him +a high place among American thinkers. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +All the while a cloud darkened the recluse life at +Whitehall. In June, 1729, Berkeley explains to Percival +the circumstances and secrecy of his departure from +England:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>Before I left England I was reduced to a difficult +situation. Had I continued there, the report would have +obtained (which I had found beginning to spread) that +I had dropped the design, after it had cost me and my +friends so much trouble and expense. On the other +hand, if I had taken leave of my friends, even those who +assisted and approved my undertaking would have condemned +my coming abroad before the King's bounty was +<pb n='lviii'/><anchor id='Pglviii'/> +received. This obliged me to come away in the private +manner that I did, and to run the risque of a tedious +winter voyage. Nothing less would have convinced the +world that I was in earnest, after the report I knew was +growing to the contrary.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Months passed, and Walpole's promise was still unfulfilled. +<q>I wait here,</q> he tells Lord Percival in March, 1730, <q>with +all the anxiety that attends suspense, until I know what +I can depend upon, or what course I am to take. On +the one hand I have no notion that the Court would put +what men call a <emph>bite</emph> upon a poor clergyman, who depended +upon charters, grants, votes, and the like engagements. +On the other hand, I see nothing done towards payment +of the money.</q> Later on he writes—<q>As for the raillery +of European wits, I should not mind it, if I saw my +College go on and prosper; but I must own the disappointments +I have met with in this particular have +nearly touched me, not without affecting my health and +spirits. If the founding a College for the spread of +religion and learning in America had been a foolish project, +it cannot be supposed the Court, the Ministers, and the +Parliament would have given such public encouragement +to it; and if, after all that encouragement, they who engaged +to endow and protect it let it drop, the disappointment +indeed may be to me, but the censure, I think, will +light elsewhere.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The suspense was at last ended. Gibson, the Bishop of +London, pressed Walpole for a final answer. <q>If,</q> he +replied, <q>you put this question to me as a Minister, I must, +and can, assure you that the money shall most undoubtedly +be paid, as soon as suits with public convenience; but +if you ask me as a friend, whether Dean Berkeley should +continue in America expecting the payment of twenty +thousand pounds, I advise him by all means to return +home to Europe, and to give up his present expectations.</q> +It was thus that in 1731 the Prime Minister of England +<pb n='lix'/><anchor id='Pglix'/> +crushed the project conceived ten years before, and to which +the intervening period had, under his encouragement, been +devoted by the projector with a singular enthusiasm. +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/alcove.png' rend='width:80%'> + <head>Berkeley's Alcove, Rhode Island</head> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +A few months after this heavy blow, Berkeley, with his +wife, and Henry their infant child, bade farewell to the +island home. They sailed from Boston in the late autumn +of 1731, and in the following February we find them in +London. Thus ended the romantic episode of Rhode +Island, with its ideal of Christian civilisation, which so +moves the heart and touches the imagination in our retrospect +of the eighteenth century. Of all who have ever +landed on the American shore, none was ever moved by +a purer and more self-sacrificing spirit. America still +acknowledges that by Berkeley's visit on this mission it has +been invested with the halo of an illustrious name, and +associated with religious devotion to a magnificent ideal, +even if it was sought to be realised by impracticable means. +To reform the New World, and mankind at last, by a +College on an island in the Atlantic, six hundred miles +from America, the Indians whom it was intended to civilise +being mostly in the interior of the continent, and none in +Bermuda, was not unnaturally considered Quixotic; and +that it was at first supported by the British Court and +Parliament is a wonderful tribute to the persuasive genius +of the projector. Perhaps he was too much influenced by +Lord Percival's idea, that it could not be realised by +private benevolence, without the intervention of the Crown. +But the indirect influence of Berkeley's American inspiration +is apparent in many ways in the intellectual and +spiritual life of that great continent, during the last century +and a half, especially by the impulse given to academical +education. It is the testimony of an American +author that, <q>by methods different from those intended +by Berkeley, and in ways more manifold than even he +could have dreamed, he has since accomplished, and +through all coming time, by a thousand ineffaceable +<pb n='lx'/><anchor id='Pglx'/> +influences, he will continue to accomplish, some portion at +least of the results which he had aimed at in the founding +of his university. It is the old story over again; the +tragedy of a Providence wiser than man's foresight; God +giving the victory to His faithful servant even through +the bitterness of overruling him and defeating him<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Three Men of Letters</hi>, by Moses +Coit Tyler (New York, 1895). +He records some of the American +academical and other institutions +that are directly or indirectly, due +to Berkeley.</note>.</q> +American Empire, as we now see it with its boundless +beneficent influence, is at least an imperfect realisation +of Berkeley's dream. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Berkeley's head quarters were in London, in Green +Street, for more than two years after the return to England +in the beginning of 1732. Extant correspondence with +Lord Percival ends in Rhode Island, and our picture of +the two years in London is faintly formed by letters to +Prior and Johnson. These speak of ill-health, and breathe +a less sanguine spirit. The brilliant social life of former +visits was less attractive now, even if old friends had +remained. But Swift had quitted England for ever, and +Steele had followed Addison to the grave. Gay, the +common friend of Berkeley and Pope, died soon after the +return from Rhode Island, and Arbuthnot was approaching +his end at Hampstead. Samuel Clarke had passed away +when Berkeley was at Whitehall; but Seeker now held +the rectory of St. James's, and Butler was in studious +retirement on the Wear; while Pope was at Twickenham, +publishing his <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Man</hi>, receiving visits from +Bolingbroke, or visiting Lord Bathurst at Cirencester +Park. Queen Caroline, too, was holding her receptions at +Kensington; but <q>those who imagine (as you write),</q> he +tells Prior in January, 1734, <q>that I have been making my +court here all this time, would never believe (what is most +true) that I have not been at the Court or at the Minister's +but once these seven years. The care of my health and +<pb n='lxi'/><anchor id='Pglxi'/> +the love of retirement have prevailed over whatsoever +ambition might have come to my share.</q> There is a hint +of a visit to Oxford, at Commemoration in 1733, when his +friend Seeker received the honorary degree. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Soon after he had settled in London, the fruit of his +studies in Rhode Island was given to the world in the +Seven Dialogues of <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher</hi>. +Here the philosophical inspiration of his early years is +directed to sustain faith in Divine Moral Order, and in +the Christian Revelation. <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi> is the longest, and in +literary form perhaps the most finished of his works, unsurpassed +in lively strokes of irony and satire. Yet if it +is to be regarded as a philosophical justification of religion, +as against modern agnosticism, one may incline to the +judgment of Mr. Leslie Stephen, that it is <q>the least +admirable of all its author's admirable works.</q> As we have +seen, the sect of free-thinkers was early the object of Berkeley's +ridicule and sarcasm. They claimed for themselves +wide intellectual vision, yet they were blind to the deep +realities of the universe; they took exclusive credit for +freedom of thought, although their thinking was confined +within the narrow compass of our data in sense. The +book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>, and the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi> of +his early years, were designed to bring into clear light the +absolute dependence of the world that is presented to our +senses on Omnipresent Spirit; and the necessary subjection +of all changes in our surroundings to the immediate +agency or providence of God. Boasted <q>free-thinking</q> was +really a narrow atheism, so he believed, in which meaningless +Matter usurped the place that belonged in reason +to God, and he employed reason to disclose Omnipotent +Intelligence in and behind the phenomena that are presented +to the senses in impotent natural sequence. +</p> + +<p> +The causes of the widespread moral corruption of the +Old World, which had moved Berkeley so profoundly, +<pb n='lxii'/><anchor id='Pglxii'/> +seem to have been pondered anew during his recluse life +in Rhode Island. The decline of morals was explained +by the deification of Matter: consequent life of sensuous +pleasure accounted for decay of religion. That vice is hurtful +was argued by free-thinkers like Mandeville to be a +vulgar error, and a fallacious demonstration was offered +of its utility. That virtue is intrinsically beautiful was +taught by Shaftesbury; but Berkeley judged the abstract +beauty, with which <q>minute philosophers</q> were contented, +unfit to move ordinary human beings to self-sacrificing +action; for this involves devotion to a Perfect Person +by whom goodness is finally distributed. Religion alone +inspires the larger and higher life, in presenting distributive +justice personified on the throne of the universe, +instead of abstract virtue. +</p> + +<p> +The turning-point in <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi> is in man's vision of +God. This is pressed in the Fourth Dialogue. The +free-thinker asserts that <q>the notion of a Deity, or +some invisible power, is of all prejudices the most unconquerable; +the most signal example of belief without +reason for believing.</q> He demands proof—<q>such proof as +every man of sense requires of a matter of fact.... Should +a man ask, why I believe there is a king of Great Britain? +I might answer, Because I had seen him. Or a king of +Spain? Because I had seen those who saw him. But as +for this King of kings, I neither saw Him myself, nor any one +else that ever did see Him.</q> To which Euphranor replies, +<q>What if it should appear that God really speaks to man; +would this content you? What if it shall appear plainly that +God speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary, +outward, sensible signs, having no resemblance or necessary +connexion with the things they stand for and suggest; if +it shall appear that, by innumerable combinations of these +signs, an endless variety of things is discovered and made +known to us; and that we are thereby instructed or +informed in their different natures; that we are taught +<pb n='lxiii'/><anchor id='Pglxiii'/> +and admonished what to shun and what to pursue; and +are directed how to regulate our motions, and how to act +with respect to things distant from us, as well in time as +place: will this content you?</q> Euphranor accordingly +proceeds to shew that Visible Nature is a Language, in +which the Universal Power that is continually at work is +speaking to us all, in a way similar to that in which +our fellow men speak to us; so that we have as much +(even more) reason to believe in the existence of the +Universal Person who is the Speaker, as we have to +believe in the existence of persons around us; who become +known to us, when they too employ sense-symbols, in +the words and actions by which we discover that we +are not alone in the universe. For men are really living +spirits: their <emph>bodies</emph> are only the sign of their spiritual +personality. And it is so with God, who is also revealed +in the visible world as a Spirit. <q>In a strict sense,</q> +says Euphranor, <q>I do not see Alciphron, but only such +visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being +of that invisible thinking principle or soul. Even so, +in the self-same manner, it seems to me that, though I +cannot with eyes of flesh behold the invisible God, +yet I do, in the strictest sense, behold and perceive, +by all my senses, such signs and tokens ... as suggest, +indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God as certainly, +and with the same evidence, at least, as any +other signs, perceived by sense, do suggest to me the +existence of <emph>your</emph> soul, spirit, or thinking principle; which +I am convinced of only by a few signs or effects, and the +motions of one small organised body; whereas I do, at +all times, and in all places, perceive sensible signs which +evince the being of God.</q> In short, God is the living +Soul of the Universe; as you and I are the living souls +that keep our bodies and their organs in significant +motion. We can interpret the character of God in the +history of the universe, even as we can interpret the +<pb n='lxiv'/><anchor id='Pglxiv'/> +character of our neighbour by observing his words and +outward actions. +</p> + +<p> +This overwhelmed Alciphron. <q>You stare to find that +God is not far from any one of us, and that in Him we live +and move and have our being,</q> rejoins Euphranor. <q>You +who, in the beginning of this conference, thought it strange +that God should leave Himself without a witness, do now +think it strange the witness should be so full and clear.</q> +<q>I must own I do,</q> was the reply. <q>I never imagined it could +be pretended that we saw God with our fleshly eyes, as +plain as we see any human person whatsoever, and that He +daily speaks to our senses in a manifest and clear dialect.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Although this reasoning satisfied Alciphron, others may +think it inconclusive. How one is able to discover the existence +of other persons, and even the meaning of finite +personality, are themselves questions full of speculative +difficulty. But, waiving this, the analogy between the +relation of a human spirit to its body, and that of the +Omnipresent and Omnipotent Spirit to the Universe of +things and persons, fails in several respects. God is +supposed to be continually creating the world by constant +and continuous Providence, and His Omniscience is supposed +to comprehend all its concrete relations: a man's +body is not absolutely dependent on the man's own power +and providence; and even his scientific knowledge of it, in +itself and in its relations, is scanty and imperfect, as his +power over it is limited and conditioned. Then the little +that a man gradually learns of what is going on in the surrounding +universe is dependent on his senses: Omniscience +comprehends Immensity and Eternity (so we suppose) in a +single intuition. Our bodies, moreover, are visible things: +the universe, this organism of God, is crowded with <emph>persons</emph>, +to whom there is nothing corresponding within the +organism which reveals one man to another. +</p> + +<p> +But this is not all. After Euphranor has found that the +Universal Power is Universal Spirit, this is still an inadequate +<pb n='lxv'/><anchor id='Pglxv'/> +God; for what we want to know is what <emph>sort</emph> of +Spirit God is. Is God omnipotent or of limited power, +regarded ethically, fair or unfair in His treatment of persons; +good or evil, according to the highest yet attained +conception of goodness; a God of love, or a devil omnipotent? +I infer the <emph>character</emph> of my neighbour from his +words and actions, patent to sense in the gradual outward +evolution of his life. I am asked to infer the <emph>character</emph> +of the Omnipresent Spirit from <emph>His</emph> words and actions, +manifested in the universe of things and persons. But +we must not attribute to the Cause more than it reveals +of itself in its effects. God and men alike are known by +the effects they produce. The Universal Power is, on this +condition, righteous, fair, and loving to the degree in +which those conceptions are implied in His visible embodiment: +to affirm more or other than this, on the basis +of analogy <emph>alone</emph>, is either to indulge in baseless conjecture, +or to submit blindly to dogma and authority. +</p> + +<p> +Now the universe, as far as it comes within the range +of human experience on this planet, is full of suffering +and moral disorder. The <q>religious hypothesis</q> of a perfectly +righteous and benevolent God is here offered to +account for the appearances which the universe presents +to us. But do these signify exact distributive justice? +Is not visible nature apparently cruel and unrelenting? +If we infer cruelty in the character of a man, because his +bodily actions cause undeserved suffering, must we not, +by this analogy, infer in like manner regarding the character +of the Supreme Spirit, manifested in the progressive +evolution of the universal organism? +</p> + +<p> +We find it impossible to determine with absolute certainty +the character even of our fellow men, from their imperfectly +interpreted words and actions, so that each man +is more or less a mystery to his fellows. The mystery +deepens when we try to read the character of animals,—to +interpret the motives which determine the overt acts +<pb n='lxvi'/><anchor id='Pglxvi'/> +of dogs or horses. And if we were able to communicate by +visible signs with the inhabitants of other planets, with +how much greater difficulty should we draw conclusions +from their visible acts regarding <emph>their</emph> character? But if +this is so when we use the data of sense for reading +the character of finite persons, how infinite must be the +difficulty of reading the character of the Eternal Spirit, +in and through the gradual evolution of the universe of +things and persons, which in this reasoning is supposed +to be His body; and the history of that universe the facts +of His biography, in and by which He is eternally revealing +Himself! For we know nothing about the unbeginning +and unending. The universe of persons is assumed +to have no <emph>end</emph>; and I know not why its evolution must +be supposed to have had a <emph>beginning</emph>, or that there ever was +a time in which God was unmanifested, to finite persons. +</p> + +<p> +Shall we in these circumstances turn with Euphranor, +in the Fifth and Sixth Dialogues, to professed revelation of +the character of the Universal Mind presented in miraculous +revelation, by inspired prophets and apostles, who are +brought forward as authorities able to speak infallibly to +the <emph>character</emph> of God? If the whole course of nature, or +endless evolution of events, is the Divine Spirit revealed +in omnipresent activity, what room is there for any other less +regular revelation? The universe of common experience, +it is implied by Berkeley, is essentially miraculous, and +therefore absolutely perfect. Is it consistent with fairness, +and benevolence, and love of goodness in all moral agents +for its own sake, that the Christian revelation should +have been so long delayed, and be still so incompletely +made known? Is not the existence of wicked persons +on this or any other planet, wicked men or devils, a +dark spot in the visible life of God? Does not perfect +goodness in God mean restoration of goodness in men, +for its own sake, apart from their merit; and must not +Omnipotent Goodness, infinitely opposite to all evil, either +<pb n='lxvii'/><anchor id='Pglxvii'/> +convert to goodness all beings in the universe who have +made themselves bad, or else relieve the universe of their +perpetual presence in ever-increasing wickedness? +</p> + +<p> +Sceptical criticism of this sort has found expression +in the searching minute philosophy of a later day than +Berkeley's and Alciphron's; as in David Hume and +Voltaire, and in the agnosticism of the nineteenth century. +Was not Euphranor too ready to yield to the demand +for a visible God, whose character had accordingly to be +determined by what appears in nature and man, under +the conditions of our limited and contingent experience? Do +we not need to look below data of sensuous experience, and +among the presuppositions which must consciously or unconsciously +be taken for granted in all man's dealings +with the environment in which he finds himself, for the +root of <emph>trustworthy</emph> experience? On merely physical +reasoning, like that of Euphranor, the righteous love of +God is an unwarranted inference, and it even seems to be +contradicted by visible facts presented in the history of +the world. But if Omnipotent Goodness must <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> be +attributed to the Universal Mind, as an indispensable +condition for man's having reliable intercourse of any +sort with nature; if this is the primary postulate necessary +to the existence of truth of any kind—then the <q>religious +hypothesis</q> that God is Good, according to the highest +conception of goodness, is no groundless fancy, but the +fundamental faith-venture in which man has to live. It +<emph>must</emph> stand in reason; unless it can be <emph>demonstrated</emph> that +the mixture of good and evil which the universe presents, +necessarily contradicts this fundamental presupposition: +and if so, man is lost in pessimistic Pyrrhonism, and can +assert nothing about anything<note place='foot'>The thought implied in this +paragraph is pursued in my <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy +of Theism</hi>, in which the ethical +perfection of the Universal Mind is +taken as the fundamental postulate +in all human experience. If the +Universal Mind is not ethically perfect, +the universe (including our +spiritual constitution) is radically +untrustworthy.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +The religious altruism, however inadequate, which +<pb n='lxviii'/><anchor id='Pglxviii'/> +Berkeley offered in <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi> made some noise at the +time of its appearance, although its theistic argument +was too subtle to be popular. The conception of the +visible world as Divine Visual Language was <q>received +with ridicule by those who make ridicule the test of +truth,</q> although it has made way since. <q>I have not seen +Dean Berkeley,</q> Gay the poet writes to Swift in the +May following the Dean's return, and very soon after +the appearance of <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, <q>but I have been reading +his book, and like many parts of it; but in general think +with you that it is too speculative.</q> Warburton, with +admiration for Berkeley, cannot comprehend his philosophy, +and Hoadley shewed a less friendly spirit. <hi rend='italic'>A +Letter from a Country Clergyman</hi>, attributed to Lord +Hervey, the <q>Sporus</q> of Pope, was one of several ephemeral +attacks which the <hi rend='italic'>Minute Philosopher</hi> encountered in +the year after its appearance. Three other critics, more +worthy of consideration, are mentioned in one of Berkeley's +letters from London to his American friend Johnson at +Stratford: <q>As to the Bishop of Cork's book, and the +other book you allude to, the author of which is one +Baxter, they are both very little considered here; for which +reason I have taken no public notice of them. To answer +objections already answered, and repeat the same things, +is a needless as well as disagreeable task. Nor should +I have taken notice of that Letter about Vision, had it +not been printed in a newspaper, which gave it course, +and spread it through the kingdom. Besides, the theory +of Vision I found was somewhat obscure to most people; for +which reason I was not displeased at an opportunity to +explain it<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Life and Letters of Berkeley</hi>, +p. 222.</note>.</q> The explanation was given in <hi rend='italic'>The Theory +of Visual Language Vindicated</hi>, in January, 1733, as a +supplement to <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>. Its blot is a tone of polemical +bitterness directed against Shaftesbury<note place='foot'>The third Earl of Shaftesbury, +the pupil of Locke, and author +of the <hi rend='italic'>Characteristics</hi>. In addition +to the well-known biography by +Dr. Fowler, the present eminent +Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Shaftesbury +has been interpreted in two other lately published works—a +<hi rend='italic'>Life</hi> by Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. +(1900), and an edition of the +<hi rend='italic'>Characteristics</hi>, with an Introduction +and Notes, by John M. Robertson +(1900).</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='lxix'/><anchor id='Pglxix'/> + +<p> +Although Berkeley <q>took no public notice</q> of <q>the +Bishop of Cork's book<note place='foot'>The title of this book is—<hi rend='italic'>Things +Divine and Supernatural conceived +by Analogy with Things Natural +and Human</hi>, by the Author of <hi rend='italic'>The +Procedure, Extent and Limits of the +Human Understanding</hi>. The <hi rend='italic'>Divine +Analogy</hi> appeared in 1733, and +the <hi rend='italic'>Procedure</hi> in 1728.</note></q> it touched a great question, +which periodically has awakened controversy, and been +the occasion of mutual misunderstanding among the controversialists +in past ages. <q>Is God knowable by man; +or must religion be devotion to an object that is unknowable?</q> +In one of his first letters to Lord Percival, as we +saw, Berkeley animadverted on a sermon by the Archbishop +of Dublin, which seemed to deny that there was goodness, +or understanding God, any more than feet or hands. +An opinion somewhat similar had been attributed to Bishop +Browne, in his answer to Toland, and afterwards in 1728, +in his <hi rend='italic'>Procedure and Limits of Human Understanding</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +This touched to the quick Berkeley's ultimate conception +of the universe, as realisable only in, and therefore +necessarily dependent on, living mind. We are +reminded of the famous analogy of Spinoza<note place='foot'>Spinoza argues that what is +<emph>called</emph> <q>understanding</q> and <q>will</q> in +God, has no more in common with +human understanding and will than +the dog-star in the heavens has +with the animal we call a dog. See +Spinoza's <hi rend='italic'>Ethica</hi>, I. 17, <hi rend='italic'>Scholium</hi>.</note>. If the omnipresent +and omnipotent Mind, on which Euphranor rested, +can be called <q>mind</q> only metaphorically, and can be called +<q>good</q> only when the term is used without human meaning, +it may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we have +unknowable Matter or unknowable Mind at the root of +things and persons. Both are empty words. The Power +universally at work is equally unintelligible, equally unfit +to be the object of worship in the final venture of faith, +whether we use the term Matter or the term Mind. +<pb n='lxx'/><anchor id='Pglxx'/> +The universe is neither explained nor sustained by a +<q>mind</q> that is mind only metaphorically. To call this <q>God</q> +is to console us with an empty abstraction. The minutest +philosopher is ready to grant with Alciphron that <q>there +is a God in this indefinite sense</q>; since nothing can be +inferred from such an account of God about conduct +or religion. +</p> + +<p> +The Bishop of Cork replied to the strictures of +Euphranor in the <hi rend='italic'>Minute Philosopher</hi>. He qualified and +explained his former utterances in some two hundred +dull pages of his <hi rend='italic'>Divine Analogy</hi>, which hardly touch +the root of the matter. The question at issue is the +one which underlies modern agnosticism. It was raised +again in Britain in the nineteenth century, with deeper +insight, by Sir William Hamilton; followed by Dean Mansel, +in controversy with F. D. Maurice, at the point of view +of Archbishop King and Bishop Browne, in philosophical +vindication of the mysteries of Christian faith; by Mr. +Herbert Spencer and by Huxley in a minute philosophy +that has been deepened by Hume's criticism of the rationale +of theism in Berkeley<note place='foot'>The question of the knowableness +of God, or Omnipotent Moral +Perfection in the concrete, enters +into recent philosophical and +theological discussion in Britain. +Calderwood, in his <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of +the Infinite</hi> (1854), was one of the +earliest, and not the least acute, +of Hamilton's critics in this matter. +The subject is lucidly treated by +Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) +in his <hi rend='italic'>Lectures on Theism</hi> +(1897) and in a supplement to Calderwood's +<hi rend='italic'>Life</hi> (1900). So also +Huxley's <hi rend='italic'>David Hume</hi> and Professor +Iverach's <hi rend='italic'>Is God Knowable?</hi></note>. +</p> + +<p> +Andrew Baxter's <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry into the Nature of the Human +Soul</hi>, referred to in Berkeley's letter to Johnson, appeared in +1733. It has a chapter on <q>Dean Berkeley's Scheme against +the existence of Matter and a Material World,</q> which +is worthy of mention because it is the earliest elaborate +criticism of the New Principle, although it had then been +before the world for more than twenty years. The title +of the chapter shews Baxter's imperfect comprehension +of the proposition which he attempts to refute. It suggests +<pb n='lxxi'/><anchor id='Pglxxi'/> +that Berkeley argued for the non-existence of the things +we see and touch, instead of for their necessary dependence +on, or subordination to, realising percipient Mind, so far +as they are concrete realities. Baxter, moreover, was +a Scot; and his criticism is interesting as a foretaste +of the protracted discussion of the <q>ideal theory</q> by Reid +and his friends, and later on by Hamilton. But Baxter's +book was not the first sign of Berkeley's influence in +Scotland. We are told by Dugald Stewart, that <q>the +novelty of Berkeley's paradox attracted very powerfully +the attention of a set of young men who were then +prosecuting their studies at Edinburgh, who formed themselves +into a Society for the express purpose of soliciting +from him an explanation of some parts of his theory which +seemed to them obscurely or equivocally expressed. To +this correspondence the amiable and excellent prelate seems +to have given every encouragement; and I have been +told on the best authority that he was accustomed to say +that his reasoning had been nowhere better understood +than by this club of young Scotsmen<note place='foot'>Stewart's <hi rend='italic'>Works</hi>. vol. I. pp. 350-1.</note>.</q> Thus, and afterwards +through Hume and Reid, Berkeley is at the root +of philosophy in Scotland. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The two years of indifferent health and authorship in +London sum up what may be called the American period +of Berkeley's life. Early in 1734 letters to Prior open +a new vista in his history. He was nominated to the +bishopric of Cloyne in the south of Ireland, and we have +now to follow him to the remote region which was his +home for eighteen years. The interest of the philosophic +Queen, and perhaps some compensation for the Bermuda +disappointment, may explain the appearance of the metaphysical +and social idealist in the place where he shone +as a star of the first magnitude in the Irish Church of the +eighteenth century. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='lxxii'/><anchor id='Pglxxii'/> + +<div> +<head>III. Later Years (1734-53).</head> + +<p> +In May, 1734, Berkeley was consecrated as Bishop of +Cloyne, in St. Paul's Church, Dublin. Except occasional +visits, he had been absent from Ireland for more than +twenty years. He returned to spend eighteen years of +almost unbroken seclusion in his remote diocese. It suited +a growing inclination to a recluse, meditative life, which had +been encouraged by circumstances in Rhode Island. The +eastern and northern part in the county of Cork formed +his diocese, bounded on the west by Cork harbour, and +on the east by the beautiful Blackwater and the mountains +of Waterford; the sea, which was its southern boundary, +approached within two miles of the episcopal residence in +the village of Cloyne. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as he was settled, he resumed study <q>with +unabated attention,</q> but still with indifferent health. +Travelling had become irksome to him, and at Cloyne +he was almost as much removed as he had been in Rhode +Island from the thinking world. Cork took the place of +Newport; but Cork was twenty miles from Cloyne, while +Newport was only three miles from Whitehall. His episcopal +neighbour at Cork was Bishop Browne, the critic of +<hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>. Isaac Gervais, afterwards Dean of Tuam, +often enlivened the <q>manse-house</q> at Cloyne by his wit +and intercourse with the great world. Secker, the Bishop +of Bristol, and Benson, the Bishop of Gloucester, now +and then exchanged letters with him, and correspondence +was kept up as of old with Prior at Dublin and Johnson +at Stratford. But there is no trace of intercourse with +Swift, who was wearing out an unhappy old age, or with +Pope, almost the only survivor of the brilliant society of +other years. We are told, indeed, that the beauty of Cloyne +<pb n='lxxiii'/><anchor id='Pglxxiii'/> +was so described to the bard of Twickenham, by the pen +which in former days had described Ischia, that Pope +was almost moved to visit it. And a letter from Secker +in February, 1735<note place='foot'>Berkeley MSS. possessed by Archdeacon Rose.</note>, contains this scrap: <q>Your friend +Mr. Pope is publishing small poems every now and then, +full of much wit and not a little keenness<note place='foot'><p>Pope's poetic tribute to Berkeley belongs to this period— +</p> +<p> +<q>Even in a bishop I can spy desert;<lb/> +Secker is decent; Rundle has a heart:<lb/> +Manners with candour are to Benson given,<lb/> +To Berkeley—every virtue under heaven.</q> +</p> +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Epilogue to the Satires.</hi> +</p> +<p> +Also his satirical tribute to the critics of Berkeley— +</p> +<p> +<q>Truth's sacred fort th' exploded laugh shall win;<lb/> +And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.</q> +</p> +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Satire, </hi>Part II. +</p></note>.</q> <q>Our common +friend, Dr. Butler,</q> he adds, <q>hath almost completed a set +of speculations upon the credibility of religion from its +analogy to the constitution and course of nature, which +I believe in due time you will read with pleasure.</q> Butler's +<hi rend='italic'>Analogy</hi> appeared in the following year. But I have +found no remains of correspondence between Berkeley +and their <q>common friend</q>; the two most illustrious +religious thinkers of the Anglican communion. +</p> + +<p> +When he left London in 1734 Berkeley was on the eve +of what sounded like a mathematical controversy, although +it was in his intention metaphysical, and was suggested +by the Seventh Dialogue in <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>. In one of his letters +to Prior, early in that year, he told him that though he +<q>could not read, owing to ill health,</q> yet his thought was +as distinct as ever, and that for amusement <q>he passed his +early hours in thinking of certain mathematical matters +which may possibly produce something<note place='foot'>Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Life and Letters</hi>, p. 210.</note>.</q> This turned, it +seems, upon a form of scepticism among contemporary +mathematicians, occasioned by the presence of mysteries +of religion. The <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi> was the issue. It was followed +<pb n='lxxiv'/><anchor id='Pglxxiv'/> +by a controversy in which some of the most eminent +mathematicians took part. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Mathematica exeunt in mysteria</foreign> +might have been the motto of the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi>. The assumptions +in mathematics, it is argued, are as mysterious as +those of theologians and metaphysicians. Mathematicians +cannot translate into perfectly intelligible thought their +own doctrines in fluxions. If man's knowledge of God +is rooted in mystery, so too is mathematical analysis. +Pure science at last loses itself in propositions which +usefully regulate action, but which cannot be comprehended. +This is the drift of the argument in the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi>; +but perhaps Berkeley's inclination to extreme conclusions, +and to what is verbally paradoxical, led him into doubtful +positions in the controversy to which the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi> gave +rise. Instead of ultimate imperfect comprehensibility, he +seems to attribute absolute contradiction to the Newtonian +fluxions. Baxter, in his <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, had asserted that things +in Berkeley's book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> forced the author <q>to +suspect that even mathematics may not be very sound +knowledge at the bottom.</q> The metaphysical argument +of the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi> was obscured in a cloud of mathematics. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The social condition of Ireland attracted Berkeley almost +as soon as he was settled in Cloyne. He was surrounded +by a large native Irish population and a small group of +English colonists. The natives, long governed in the interest +of the stranger, had never learned to exert and govern +themselves. The self-reliance which Berkeley preached +fifteen years before, as a mean for <q>preventing the ruin +of Great Britain,</q> was more wanting in Ireland, where the +simplest maxims of social economy were neglected. It +was a state of things fitted to move one who was too +independent to permit his aspirations to be confined to the +ordinary routine of the Irish episcopate, and who could +not forget the favourite moral maxim of his life. +</p> + +<p> +The social chaos of Ireland was the occasion of what +<pb n='lxxv'/><anchor id='Pglxxv'/> +to some may be the most interesting of Berkeley's +writings. His thoughts found vent characteristically in +a series of penetrating practical queries. The First Part +of the <hi rend='italic'>Querist</hi> appeared in 1735, anonymously, edited by +Dr. Madden of Dublin, who along with Prior had lately +founded a Society for promoting industrial arts in Ireland. +The Second and Third Parts were published in the +two following years. <hi rend='italic'>A Discourse to Magistrates occasioned +by the Enormous Licence and Irreligion of the Times</hi>, +which appeared in 1736, was another endeavour, with +like philanthropic intention. And the only important +break in his secluded life at Cloyne, in eighteen years of +residence, was when he went for some months to Dublin +in 1737, to render social service to Ireland in the Irish +House of Lords. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +His metaphysic, at first encountered by ridicule, was +now beginning to receive more serious treatment. A +Scotsman had already recognised it. In 1739 another +and more famous Scotsman, David Hume, refers thus to +Berkeley in one of the opening sections of his <hi rend='italic'>Treatise of +Human Nature</hi>: <q>A very material question has been +started concerning abstract or general ideas—whether they +be general or particular in the mind's conception of them. +A great philosopher, Dr. Berkeley, has disputed the +received opinion in this particular, and has asserted that +all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed +to a certain term which gives them a more extensive +signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other +individuals which are similar to them. I look upon this +to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries +that has been made of late years in the republic of letters.</q> +It does not appear that Berkeley heard of Hume. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +A curious interest began to engage him about this time. +The years following 1739 were years of suffering in the +<pb n='lxxvi'/><anchor id='Pglxxvi'/> +Irish diocese. It was a time of famine followed by widespread +disease. His correspondence is full of allusions +to this. It had consequences of lasting importance. Surrounded +by disease, he pondered remedies. Experience in +Rhode Island and among American Indians suggested +the healing properties of tar. Further experiments in tar, +combined with meditation and much curious reading, deepened +and expanded his metaphysical philosophy. Tar +seemed to grow under his experiments, and in his thoughts, +into a Panacea for giving health to the organism on which +living mind in man is meanwhile dependent. This natural +dependence of health upon tar introduced thoughts of the +interdependence of all things, and then of the <emph>immediate</emph> +dependence of all in nature upon Omnipresent +and Omnipotent Mind. The living Mind that underlies +the phenomena of the universe began to be conceived +under a new light. Since his return to the life of thought +in Rhode Island, he had been immersed in Platonic and +Neoplatonic literature, and in books of mystical Divinity, +encouraged perhaps by the mystical disposition attributed +to his wife. An eccentric ingenuity connected the scientific +experiments and prescriptions with the Idealism of Plato +and Plotinus. The natural law according to which tar-water +was universally restorative set his mind to work +about the immanence of living Mind. He mused about +a medicine thus universally beneficial, and the thought +occurred that it must be naturally charged with 'pure +invisible fire, the most subtle and elastic of bodies, and +the vital element in the universe'; and water might be +the natural cause which enables this elementary fire to +be drawn out of tar and transferred to vegetable and +animal organisms. But the vital fire could be only a +natural cause; which in truth is no efficient cause at all, +but only a sign of divine efficiency transmitted through the +world of sense: the true cause of this and all other natural +effects must be the immanent Mind or Reason in which +<pb n='lxxvii'/><anchor id='Pglxxvii'/> +we all participate; for in God we live and move and have +our being. +</p> + +<p> +It is thus that Berkeley's thought culminates in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, +that <hi rend='italic'>Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning +the Virtues of Tar-water, and divers other subjects +connected together and arising one from another</hi>, which +appeared in 1744. This little book made more noise at +the time of its appearance than any of his books; but not +because of its philosophy, which was lost in its medicinal +promise to mankind of immunity from disease. Yet it was +Berkeley's last attempt to express his ultimate conception +of the universe in its human and divine relations. When +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> is compared with the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, the immense +difference in tone and manner of thought shews the +change wrought in the intervening years. The sanguine +argumentative gladiatorship of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> is exchanged +for pensive speculation, which acknowledges the weakness +of human understanding, when it is face to face with +the Immensities and Eternities. Compare the opening +sections of the Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> with the +closing sections of <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>. The contingent data of our experience +are now felt to be insufficient, and there is a more +or less conscious grounding of the Whole in the eternal +and immutable Ideas of Reason. <q>Strictly, the sense +knows nothing. We perceive, indeed, sounds by hearing +and characters by sight. But we are not therefore said to +understand them.... Sense and experience acquaint us +with the course and analogy of appearances and natural +effects: thought, reason, intellect, introduce us into the +knowledge of their causes.... The principles of science +are neither objects of sense nor imagination: intellect and +reason are alone the sure guides to truth.</q> So the shifting +basis of the earlier thought is found to need support in +the intellectual and moral faith that must be involved in +all reasonable human intercourse with the phenomena +presented in the universe. +</p> + +<pb n='lxxviii'/><anchor id='Pglxxviii'/> + +<p> +The inadequate thought of God, as only a Spirit or +Person supreme among the spirits or persons, in and +through whom the material world is realised, a thought +which pervades <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, makes way in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> for the +thought of God as the infinite omnipresent Ground, or +final sustaining Power, immanent in Nature and Man, +to which Berkeley had become accustomed in Neoplatonic +and Alexandrian metaphysics. <q>Comprehending God and +the creatures in One general notion, we may <emph>say</emph> that all +things together (God and the universe of Space and Time) +make One Universe, or τὸ Πᾶν. But if we should say that +all things make One God, this would be an erroneous +notion of God; but would not amount to atheism, as +long as Mind or Intellect was admitted to be τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, +or the governing part.... It will not seem just to +fix the imputation of atheism upon those philosophers who +hold the doctrine of τὸ Ἕν.</q> It is thus that he now regards +God. Metaphysics and theology are accordingly one. +</p> + +<p> +No attempt is made in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> to articulate the universe +in the light of unifying Mind or Reason. And we are still +apt to ask what the truth and goodness at the heart of all +really mean; seeing that, as conceived in human minds, +they vary in the gradual evolution of intellect and conscience +in men. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Omnia exeunt in mysteria</foreign> is the tone of +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> at the end. The universe of reality is too much +for our articulate intellectual digestion: it must be left +for omniscience; it transcends finite intelligence and +the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>via media</foreign> of human understanding. Man must be +satisfied to pass life, in the infinitesimal interval between +birth and death, as a faith-venture, which he may convert +into a growing insight, as the generations roll on, but +which can never be converted into complete knowledge. +<q>In this state we must be satisfied to make the best of +those glimpses within our reach. It is Plato's remark in +his <hi rend='italic'>Theætetus</hi>, that while we sit still we are never the +wiser; but going into the river, and moving up and down, +<pb n='lxxix'/><anchor id='Pglxxix'/> +is the way to discover its depths and shallows. If we +exercise and bestir ourselves, we may even here discover +something. The eye by long use comes to see even in the +darkest cavern; and there is no subject so obscure but we +may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it. +Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly +where it is the chief passion it doth not give way to vulgar +cares and views; nor is it contented with a little ardour in +the early time of life: a time perhaps to pursue, but not +so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real +progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as +his youth, the later growth as well as the first-fruits, at +the altar of Truth.</q> Such was Berkeley, and such were +his last words in philosophy. They may suggest the +attitude of Bacon when, at a different view-point, he +disclaims exhaustive system: <q>I have made a beginning +of the work: the fortune of the human race will give +the issue. For the matter in hand is no mere felicity +of speculation, but the real business and fortunes of the +human race<note place='foot'>Bacon's <hi rend='italic'>Novuin Organum</hi>. Distributio Operis.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +While Berkeley's central thought throughout his life is +concerned with God as the one omnipresent and omnipotent +Providential Agent in the universe, he says little +about the other final question, of more exclusively human +interest, which concerns the destiny of men. That men +are born into a universe which, as the visible expression +of Moral Providence, must be scientifically and +ethically trustworthy; certain not to put man to confusion +intellectually or morally, seeing that it could not +otherwise be trusted for such in our ultimate venture of +faith—this is one thing. That all persons born into it +are certain to continue living self-consciously for ever, +is another thing. This is not obviously implied in the +former presupposition, whether or not it can be deduced +<pb n='lxxx'/><anchor id='Pglxxx'/> +from it, or else discovered by other means. Although +man's environment is essentially Divine, and wholly in +its smallest details Providential, may not his body, in +its living organisation from physical birth until physical +death, be the measure of the continuance of his self-conscious +personality? Is each man's immortal existence, like +God's, indispensable? +</p> + +<p> +Doubt about the destiny of men after they die is, at +the end of the nineteenth century, probably more prevalent +than doubt about the underlying Providence of God, and +His constant creative activity; more perhaps than it was +in the days of Toland, and Collins, and Tindal. Future life +had been made so familiar to the imagination by the early +and mediaeval Church, and afterwards by the Puritans, +as in Milton, Bunyan, and Jonathan Edwards, that it then +seemed to the religious mind more real than anything +that is seen and touched. The habit wholly formed by +natural science is apt to dissipate this and to make a +human life lived under conditions wholly strange to its +<q>minute philosophy</q> appear illusory. +</p> + +<p> +A section in the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi><note place='foot'>Section 141.</note> in which the common +argument for the <q>natural immortality</q> of the human soul +is reproduced, strengthened by his new conception of +what the reality of body means, is Berkeley's metaphysical +contribution for determining between the awful alternatives +of annihilation or continued self-conscious life after physical +death. The subject is touched, in a less recondite way, +in two of his papers in the <hi rend='italic'>Guardian</hi>, and in the <hi rend='italic'>Discourse</hi> +delivered in Trinity College Chapel in 1708, in +which a revelation of the immortality of men is presented +as the special gospel of Jesus Christ. To argue, as +Berkeley does in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, that men cannot be annihilated +at death, because they are spiritual substances +having powers independent of the sequences of nature, +implies assumptions regarding finite persons which are +<pb n='lxxxi'/><anchor id='Pglxxxi'/> +open to criticism. The justification in reason for our +venture of faith that Omnipotent Goodness is at the +heart of the universe is—that without this presupposition +we can have no reasonable intercourse, scientific or otherwise, +with the world of things and persons in which +we find ourselves; for reason and will are then alike +paralysed by universal distrust. But it can hardly be +maintained <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> that men, or other spiritual beings in +the universe, are equally with God indispensable to its +natural order; so that when they have once entered on +conscious existence they must <emph>always</emph> continue to exist +consciously. Is not the philosophical justification of +man's hope of endless life ethical rather than metaphysical; +founded on that faith in the justice and goodness +of the Universal Mind which has to be taken for granted +in every attempt to interpret experience, with its mixture +of good and evil, in this evanescent embodied life? Can +a life such as this is be <emph>all</emph> for men, in a universe that, +because it is essentially Divine, must operate towards the +extinction of the wickedness which now makes it a mystery +of Omnipotent Goodness? +</p> + +<p> +A cheerful optimism appears in Berkeley's habit of +thought about death, as we have it in his essays in +the <hi rend='italic'>Guardian</hi>: a sanguine apprehension of a present +preponderance of good, and consequent anticipation of +greater good after death; unlike those whose pessimistic +temperament induces a lurid picture of eternal moral +disorder. But his otherwise active imagination seldom +makes philosophy a meditation upon death. He does not +seem to have exercised himself in the way those do who +find in the prospect of being in the twenty-first century +as they were in the first, what makes them appalled that +they have ever come at all into transitory percipient life; +or as those others who recoil from an unbodied life after +physical death, as infinitely more appalling than the thought +of being transported <emph>in this body</emph> into another planet, or +<pb n='lxxxii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxii'/> +even to a material world outside our solar system. In +one of his letters to Johnson<note place='foot'>See <q>Editor's Preface to Alciphron.</q></note> he does approach the +unbodied life, and in a characteristic way:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>I see no difficulty in conceiving a change of state, such +as is vulgarly called <emph>death</emph>, as well without as with material +substance. It is sufficient for that purpose that we allow +sensible bodies, i.e. such as are immediately perceived +by sight and touch; the existence of which I am so far +from questioning, as philosophers are used to do, that +I establish it, I think, upon evident principles. Now it +seems very easy to conceive the <emph>soul</emph> to exist in a separate +state (i.e. divested from those limits and laws of motion +and perception with which she is embarrassed here) and +to exercise herself on new ideas, without the intervention +of these tangible things we call <emph>bodies</emph>. It is +even very possible to apprehend how the soul may have +ideas of colour without an eye, or of sounds without +an ear<note place='foot'>Compare Essay II in the <hi rend='italic'>Guardian</hi> with this.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +But while we may thus be supposed to have all our +present sensuous experience in an unbodied state, this +does not enable one to conceive how unbodied persons +can communicate with one another in the absence of +<emph>all</emph> sense signs; whether of the sort derived from our +present senses, or from other senses of whose data we +can in this life have no imagination. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Berkeley's tar-water enthusiasm lasted throughout the +rest of his life, and found vent in letters and pamphlets +in support of his Panacea, from 1744 till 1752. Notwithstanding +this, he was not forgetful of other interests—ecclesiastical, +and the social ones which he included in +his large meaning of <q>ecclesiastical.</q> The Rising under +Charles Edward in 1745 was the occasion of a <hi rend='italic'>Letter to +the Roman Catholics of Cloyne</hi>, characteristically humane +<pb n='lxxxiii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxiii'/> +and liberal. It was followed in 1749 by an <hi rend='italic'>Exhortation +to the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland</hi> in a similar spirit; +and this unwonted courtesy of an Irish Protestant bishop +was received by those to whom it was addressed in a corresponding +temper. +</p> + +<p> +It is difficult to determine Berkeley's relation to rival +schools or parties in Church and State. His disposition +was too singular and independent for a partisan. Some +of his early writings, as we have seen, were suspected +of high Tory and Jacobite leanings; but his arguments +in the suspected <hi rend='italic'>Discourse</hi> were such as ordinary Tories +and Jacobites failed to understand, and the tenor of his +words and actions was in the best sense liberal. In religious +thought <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> might place him among latitudinarians; +perhaps in affinity with the Cambridge Platonists. +His true place is foremost among the religious philosophers +of the Anglican Church; the first to prepare the +religious problem for the light in which we are invited +to look at the universe by modern agnostics, and under +the modern conception of natural evolution. He is the +most picturesque figure in that Anglican succession which, +in the seventeenth century, includes Hooker and Cudworth; +in the eighteenth, Clarke and Butler; and in the +nineteenth, may we say Coleridge, in lack of a representative +in orders; although Mansel, Maurice, Mozley, and Jowett +are not to be forgotten, nor Isaac Taylor among laymen<note place='foot'>Taylor, in later life, conformed to the Anglican Church.</note>: +Newman and Arnold, illustrious otherwise, are hardly +representatives of metaphysical philosophy. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +A more pensive tone runs through the closing years at +Cloyne. Attempts were made in vain to withdraw him +from the <q>remote corner</q> to which he had been so long +confined. His friends urged his claims for the Irish +Primacy. <q>I am no man's rival or competitor in this matter,</q> +were his words to Prior. <q>I am not in love with feasts, +<pb n='lxxxiv'/><anchor id='Pglxxxiv'/> +and crowds, and visits, and late hours, and strange faces, +and a hurry of affairs often insignificant. For my own +private satisfaction, I had rather be master of my time than +wear a diadem.</q> Letters to his American friends, Johnson +and Clap, shew him still moved by the inspiration which +carried him over the Atlantic, and record his influence in the +development of American colleges<note place='foot'>See Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Life and Letters</hi>, chap. viii.</note>. The home education +of his three sons was another interest. We are told by +his widow that <q>he would not trust his sons to mercenary +hands. Though old and sickly, he performed the constant +tedious task himself.</q> Of the fruit of this home +education there is little to tell. The death of William, +his favourite boy, in 1751, <q>was thought to have struck +too close to his father's heart.</q> <q>I am a man,</q> so he writes, +<q>retired from the amusements, politics, visits, and what +the world calls pleasure. I had a little friend, educated +always under mine own eye, whose painting delighted me, +whose music ravished me, and whose lively gay spirit was +a continual feast. It has pleased God to take him hence.</q> +The eldest son, Henry, born in Rhode Island, did not long +survive his father. George, the third son, was destined +for Oxford, and this destiny was connected with a new +project. The <q>life academico-philosophical,</q> which he +sought in vain to realise in Bermuda, he now hoped to +find for himself in the city of colleges on the Isis. <q>The +truth is,</q> he wrote to Prior as early as September 1746, +<q>I have a scheme of my own for this long time past, in +which I propose more satisfaction and enjoyment to +myself than I could in that high station<note place='foot'>The Primacy.</note>, which I neither +solicited, nor so much as wished for. A greater income +would not tempt me to remove from Cloyne, and set +aside my Oxford scheme; which, though delayed by the +illness of my son<note place='foot'>This seems to have been his eldest son, Henry.</note>, yet I am as intent upon it and as much +resolved as ever.</q> +</p> + +<pb n='lxxxv'/><anchor id='Pglxxxv'/> + +<p> +The last of Berkeley's letters which we have is to Dean +Gervais. It expresses the feeling with which in April, +1752, he was contemplating life, on the eve of his departure +from Cloyne. +</p> + +<p> +<q>I submit to years and infirmities. My views in this +world are mean and narrow; it is a thing in which I have +small share, and which ought to give me small concern. +I abhor business, and especially to have to do with great +persons and great affairs. The evening of life I choose +to pass in a quiet retreat. Ambitious projects, intrigues +and quarrels of statesmen, are things I have formerly been +amused with, but they now seem to be a vain, fugitive +dream.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Four months after this, Berkeley saw Cloyne for the +last time. In August he quitted it for Oxford, which he +had long pictured in imagination as the ideal home of his +old age. When he left Cork in the vessel which carried +his wife, his daughter, and himself to Bristol, he was +prostrated by weakness, and had to be taken from +Bristol to Oxford on a horse-litter. It was late in August +when they arrived there<note place='foot'>His son George was already +settled at Christ Church. Henry, +the eldest son, born in Rhode +Island, was then <q>abroad in the +south of France for his health,</q> +as one of his brother George's +letters tells us, found among the +Johnson MSS.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Our picture of Berkeley at Oxford is dim. According +to tradition he occupied a house in Holywell Street, near +the gardens of New College and not far from the cloisters +of Magdalen. It was a changed world to him. While he +was exchanging Ireland for England, death was removing +old English friends. Before he left Cloyne he must have +heard of the death of Butler in June, at Bath, where +Benson, at the request of Secker, affectionately watched +the last hours of the author of the <hi rend='italic'>Analogy</hi>. Benson +followed Butler in August. +</p> + +<pb n='lxxxvi'/><anchor id='Pglxxxvi'/> + +<p> +We hear of study resumed in improved health in the +home in Holy well Street. In October a <hi rend='italic'>Miscellany, containing +several Tracts on various Subjects</hi>, <q>by the Bishop +of Cloyne,</q> appeared simultaneously in London and +Dublin. The Tracts were reprints, with the exception +of <hi rend='italic'>Further Thoughts on Tar-water</hi>, which may have been +written before he left Ireland. The third edition of +<hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi> also appeared in this autumn. But <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> +is the latest record of his philosophical thought. A +comparison of the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> and the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +with the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi> gives the measure of his +advancement. After the sanguine beginning perhaps the +comparison leaves a sense of disappointment, when we find +metaphysics mixed up with mathematics in the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi>, +and metaphysics obscurely mixed up with medicine in +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +It is curious that, although in 1752 David Hume's +<hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Human Nature</hi> had been before the world for +thirteen years and his <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry concerning Human Understanding</hi> +for four years, there is no allusion to Hume by +Berkeley. He was Berkeley's immediate successor in the +eighteenth-century evolution of European thought. The +sceptical criticism of Hume was applied to the dogmatic religious +philosophy of Berkeley, to be followed in its turn by +the abstractly rational and the moral reconstructive criticism +of Kant. <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi> is, however, expressly referred to by +Hume; indirectly, too, throughout the religious agnosticism +of his <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, also afterwards in the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues on Natural +Religion</hi>, in a vindication of minute philosophy by profounder +reasonings than those which satisfied Lysicles +and Alciphron. Berkeley, Hume, and Kant are the three +significant philosophical figures of their century, each +holding the supreme place successively in its beginning, +middle, and later years. Perhaps Reid in Scotland did +more than any other in his generation to make Berkeley +known; not, however, for his true work in constructive +<pb n='lxxxvii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxvii'/> +religious thought, but for his supposed denial of the +reality of the things we see and touch.<note place='foot'>See Appendix D. Reid, like +Berkeley, held that <q>matter cannot +be the cause of anything,</q> but this +not as a consequence of the new +conception of the world presented +to the senses, through which alone +Berkeley opens <emph>his</emph> way to its powerlessness; +although Reid supposes +that in his youth he followed Berkeley +in this too. See <hi rend='italic'>Thomas Reid</hi> +(1898), in <q>Famous Scots Series,</q> +where I have enlarged on this.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The ideal life in Oxford did not last long. On the +evening of Sunday, January 14, 1753, Berkeley was +suddenly confronted by the mystery of death. <q>As he +was sitting with my mother, my sister, and myself,</q> so his +son wrote to Johnson at Stratford, in October, <q>suddenly, +and without the least previous notice or pain, he was removed +to the enjoyment of eternal rewards; and although +all possible means were instantly used, no symptom of life +ever appeared after; nor could the physicians assign any +cause for his death. He arrived at Oxford on August 25, +and had received great benefit from the change of air, and +by God's blessing on tar-water, insomuch that for some +years he had not been in better health than he was the +instant before he left us<note place='foot'>Johnson MSS.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Six days later he was buried in Oxford, in the Cathedral +of Christ Church<note place='foot'><p>That Berkeley was buried in +Oxford is mentioned in his son's +letter to Johnson, in which he +says : <q>His remains are interred in +the Cathedral of Christ Church, +and next week a monument to +his memory will be erected with +an inscription by Dr. Markham, +a Student of this College.</q> As +the son was present at, and superintended +the arrangements for his +father's funeral, it can be no +stretch of credulity to believe that +he knew where his father was +buried. It may be added that +Berkeley himself had provided in +his Will <q>that my body be buried +in the churchyard of the parish +in which I die.</q> The Will, dated +July 31, 1752, is given <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in extenso</foreign> +in my <hi rend='italic'>Life and Letters</hi> of Berkeley, +p. 345. We have also the record of +burial in the Register of Christ +Church Cathedral, which shews +that <q>on January ye 20<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> 1753, ye +Right Reverend John (<hi rend='italic'>sic</hi>) Berkley, +L<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed</q> +there. This disposes of the statement +on p. 17 of Diprose's <hi rend='italic'>Account +of the Parish of Saint Clement +Danes</hi> (1868), that Berkeley was +buried in that church. +</p> +<p> +I may add that a beautiful memorial +of Berkeley has lately been +placed in the Cathedral of Cloyne, +by subscriptions in this country +and largely in America.</p></note>, where his tomb bears an appropriate inscription +by Dr. Markham, afterwards Archbishop of York. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='lxxxviii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxviii'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Errata</head> + +<div> +<head>Vol. I</head> + +<p> +Page 99, line 3 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> 149-80 <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> 149-60. +</p> + +<p> +Page 99, line 22 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi>—and to be <q>suggested,</q> not signified <hi rend='italic'>read</hi>—instead +of being only suggested. +</p> + +<p> +Page 100, line 10 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> hearing <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> seeing. +</p> + +<p> +Page 103, note, lines 5, 6 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> pp. 111, 112 <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> p. 210. +</p> + +<p> +Page 200, note, line 14 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> Adam <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> Robert. +</p> + +<p> +Page 364, line 8 from foot <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> which. +</p> + +<p> +Page 512, note 6, line 3 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> imminent <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> immanent. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>Vol. II</head> + +<p> +Page 194, note, line 3 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> Tyndal <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> Tindal. +</p> + +<p> +Page 207, line 1, insert 13. before <hi rend='italic'>Alc.</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +Page 377, line 6 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> antethesis <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> antithesis. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>Vol. IV</head> + +<p> +Page 285, lines 4, 5 <hi rend='italic'>for</hi> Thisus Alus Cujus, &c. <hi rend='italic'>read</hi> Ursus. Alus. +Cuius. &c. The inscription, strictly speaking, appears on the Palace of +the Counts Orsini, and is dated MD. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='001'/><anchor id='Pg001'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Commonplace Book. Mathematical, Ethical, Physical, And +Metaphysical</head> + +<p> +Written At Trinity College, Dublin, In 1705-8 +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>First published in 1871</hi> +</p> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Editor's Preface To The Commonplace Book</head> + +<p> +Berkeley's juvenile <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> is a small +quarto volume, in his handwriting, found among the +Berkeley manuscripts in possession of the late Archdeacon +Rose. It was first published in 1871, in my +edition of Berkeley's Works. It consists of occasional +thoughts, mathematical, physical, ethical, and metaphysical, +set down in miscellaneous fashion, for private use, +as they arose in the course of his studies at Trinity +College, Dublin. They are full of the fervid enthusiasm +that was natural to him, and of sanguine expectations of the +issue of the prospective authorship for which they record +preparations. On the title-page is written, <q>G. B. Trin. Dub. +alum.,</q> with the date 1705, when he was twenty years of +age. The entries are the gradual accumulation of the +next three years, in one of which the <hi rend='italic'>Arithmetica</hi> and the +<hi rend='italic'>Miscellanea Mathematica</hi> made their appearance. The +<hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, given to the world in 1709, was +evidently much in his mind, as well as the sublime conception +of the material world in its necessary subordination to +the spiritual world, of which he delivered himself in his +book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, in 1710. +</p> + +<pb n='002'/><anchor id='Pg002'/> + +<p> +This disclosure of Berkeley's thoughts about things, in +the years preceding the publication of his first essays, is +indeed a precious record of the initial struggles of ardent +philosophical genius. It places the reader in intimate +companionship with him when he was beginning to +awake into intellectual and spiritual life. We hear him +soliloquising. We see him trying to translate into reasonableness +our crude inherited beliefs about the material +world and the natural order of the universe, self-conscious +personality, and the Universal Power or Providence—all +under the sway of a new determining Principle which was +taking profound possession of his soul. He finds that he +has only to look at the concrete things of sense in the light +of this great discovery to see the artificially induced perplexities +of the old philosophers disappear, along with their +imposing abstractions, which turn out empty words. The +thinking is throughout fresh and sincere; sometimes impetuous +and one-sided; the outcome of a mind indisposed to +take things upon trust, resolved to inquire freely, a rebel +against the tyranny of language, morally burdened with +the consciousness of a new world-transforming conception, +which duty to mankind obliged him to reveal, although his +message was sure to offend. Men like to regard things +as they have been wont. This new conception of the +surrounding world—the impotence of Matter, and its subordinate +office in the Supreme Economy must, he foresees, +disturb those accustomed to treat outward things as the +only realities, and who do not care to ask what constitutes +reality. Notwithstanding the ridicule and ill-will that his +transformed material world was sure to meet with, amongst +the many who accept empty words instead of genuine +insight, he was resolved to deliver himself of his thoughts +through the press, but with the politic conciliation of a +persuasive Irish pleader. +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> steadily recognises the adverse +influence of one insidious foe. Its world-transforming-Principle +<pb n='003'/><anchor id='Pg003'/> +has been obscured by <q>the mist and veil of words.</q> +The abstractions of metaphysicians, which poison human +language, had to be driven out of the author's mind before +he could see the light, and must be driven out of the minds +of others before they could be got to see it along with +him: the concrete world as realisable only in percipient +mind is with difficulty introduced into the vacant place. +<q>The chief thing I pretend to is only to remove the +mist and veil of words.</q> He exults in the transformed +mental scene that then spontaneously rises before him. <q>My +speculations have had the same effect upon me as visiting +foreign countries,—in the end I return where I was before, +get my heart at ease, and enjoy myself with more satisfaction. +The philosophers lose their abstract matter; the +materialists lose their abstract extension; the profane lose +their extended deity. Pray what do the rest of mankind +lose?</q> This beneficent revolution seemed to be the issue +of a simple recognition of the fact, that the true way of regarding +the world we see and touch is to regard it as +consisting of ideas or phenomena that are presented to +human senses, somehow regularly ordered, and the occasions +of pleasure or pain to us as we conform to or rebel +against their natural order. This is the surrounding universe—at +least in its relations to us, and that is all in it that +we have to do with. <q>I know not,</q> he says, <q>what is meant +by things considered in themselves, i.e. in abstraction. This +is nonsense. Thing and idea are words of much about the +same extent and meaning. Existence is not conceivable +without perception and volition. I only declare the meaning +of the word <emph>existence</emph>, as far as I can comprehend it.</q> +</p> + +<p> +In the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> we see the youth at Trinity +College forging the weapons which he was soon to direct +against the materialism and scepticism of the generation +into which he was born. Here are rough drafts, crude +hints of intended arguments, probing of unphilosophical +mathematicians—even Newton and Descartes, memoranda +<pb n='004'/><anchor id='Pg004'/> +of facts, more or less relevant, on their way into the <hi rend='italic'>Essay +on Vision</hi> and the treatise on <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>—seeds of the philosophy +that was to be gradually unfolded in his life and +in his books. We watch the intrepid thinker, notwithstanding +the inexperience of youth, more disposed to give +battle to mathematicians and metaphysicians than to submit +even provisionally to any human authority. It does +not seem that his scholarship or philosophical learning +was extensive. Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke were +his intimates; Hobbes and Spinoza were not unknown to +him; Newton and some lesser lights among the mathematicians +are often confronted. He is more rarely in +company with the ancients or the mediaevalists. No deep +study of Aristotle appears, and there is even a disposition to +disparage Plato. He seeks for his home in the <q>new +philosophy</q> of experience; without anticipations of Kant, +as the critic of what is presupposed in the scientific reliability +of any experience, against whom his almost blind +zeal against abstractions would have set him at this early +stage. <q>Pure intellect I understand not at all,</q> is one of his +entries. He asks himself, <q>What becomes of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>aeternae +veritates</foreign>?</q> and his reply is, <q>They vanish.</q> When he tells +himself that <q>we must with the mob place certainty in the +senses,</q> the words are apt to suggest that the senses are +our only source of knowledge, but I suppose his meaning +is that the senses must be trustworthy, as 'the mob' +assume. Yet occasionally he uses language which looks +like an anticipation of David Hume, as when he calls +mind <q>a congeries of perceptions. Take away perceptions,</q> +he adds, <q>and you take away mind. Put the perceptions +and you put the mind. The understanding +seemeth not to differ from its perceptions and ideas.</q> He +seems unconscious of the total scepticism which such +expressions, when strictly interpreted, are found to involve. +But after all, the reader must not apply rigorous +rules of interpretation to random entries or provisional +<pb n='005'/><anchor id='Pg005'/> +memoranda, meant only for private use, by an enthusiastic +student who was preparing to produce books. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +I have followed the manuscript of the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace +Book</hi>, omitting a few repetitions of thought in the same +words. Here and there Berkeley's writing is almost +obliterated and difficult to decipher, apparently through +accident by water in the course of his travels, when, as +he mentions long after in one of his letters, several of his +manuscripts were lost and others were injured. +</p> + +<p> +The letters of the alphabet which are interpreted on +the first page, and prefixed on the margin to some of the +entries, may so far help to bring the apparent chaos of entries +under a few articulate heads. +</p> + +<p> +I have added some annotations here and there as they +happened to occur, and these might have been multiplied +indefinitely had space permitted. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='007'/><anchor id='Pg007'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Commonplace Book</head> + +<lg> +<l>I. = Introduction.</l> +<l>M. = Matter.</l> +<l>P. = Primary and Secondary qualities.</l> +<l>E. = Existence.</l> +<l>T. = Time.</l> +<l>S. = Soul—Spirit.</l> +<l>G. = God.</l> +<l>Mo. = Moral Philosophy.</l> +<l>N. = Natural Philosophy.</l> +</lg> + +<p> +Qu. If there be not two kinds of visible extension—one +perceiv'd by a confus'd view, the other by a distinct successive +direction of the optique axis to each point? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +No general ideas<note place='foot'><q>General ideas,</q> i.e. <emph>abstract</emph> +general ideas, distinguished, in +Berkeley's nominalism, from <emph>concrete</emph> +general ideas, or from general +names, which are signs of any one +of an indefinite number of individual +objects. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles,</hi> +Introduction, sect. 16.</note>. The contrary a cause of mistake or +confusion in mathematiques, &c. This to be intimated in +y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> Introduction<note place='foot'>Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles +of Human Knowledge</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +The Principle may be apply'd to the difficulties of +conservation, co-operation, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Trifling for the [natural] philosophers to enquire the +cause of magnetical attractions, &c. They onely search +after co-existing ideas<note place='foot'><q>co-existing ideas,</q> i.e. phenomena +presented in uniform order +to the senses.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Quæcunque in Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum, +militant pro me. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +All things in the Scripture w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> side with the vulgar +against the learned, side with me also. I side in all things +with the mob. +</p> + +<pb n='008'/><anchor id='Pg008'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me, +but yet I may expect to be supported by those whose +minds are not so far overgrown w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> madness. These are +far the greatest part of mankind—especially Moralists, +Divines, Politicians; in a word, all but Mathematicians +and Natural Philosophers. I mean only the hypothetical +gentlemen. Experimental philosophers have nothing +whereat to be offended in me. +</p> + +<p> +Newton begs his Principles; I demonstrate mine<note place='foot'>Newton postulates a world of +matter and motion, governed mechanically +by laws within itself: +Berkeley finds himself charged +with New Principles, demanded +by reason, with which Newton's +postulate is inconsistent.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +I must be very particular in explaining w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is meant +by things existing—in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.—w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> +not perceiv'd as well as w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> perceived; and shew +how the vulgar notion agrees with mine, when we +narrowly inspect into the meaning and definition of the +word <emph>existence</emph>, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>h</hi> is no simple idea, distinct from perceiving +and being perceived<note place='foot'>He attempts this in many parts +of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. He +recognises the difficulty of reconciling +his New Principles with the +<emph>identity</emph> and <emph>permanence</emph> of sensible +things.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +The Schoolmen have noble subjects, but handle them +ill. The mathematicians have trifling subjects, but reason +admirably about them. Certainly their method and arguing +are excellent. +</p> + +<p> +God knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings +may be enlarg'd from the Principles. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The reverse of the Principle I take to have been the +chief source of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions +and inextricable puzzling absurdities, that have +in all ages been a reproach to human reason, as well as of +that idolatry, whether of images or of gold, that blinds +the greatest part of the world, and that shamefull immorality +that turns us into beasts. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +היה Vixit & fuit. +</p> + +<p> +οὐσία, the name for substance, used by Aristotle, the +Fathers, &c. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques +much more easie and much more accurate, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> can be objected +to us<note place='foot'>He contemplated thus early applications of his New Principles to +Mathematics, afterwards made in +his book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 118-32.</note>? +</p> + +<pb n='009'/><anchor id='Pg009'/> + +<p> +We need not force our imagination to conceive such very +small lines for infinitesimals. They may every whit as +well be imagin'd big as little, since that the integer must +be infinite. +</p> + +<p> +Evident that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> has an infinite number of parts must be +infinite. +</p> + +<p> +We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great—therefore +absurd to talk or make propositions about it. +</p> + +<p> +We cannot imagine a line, space, &c., quovis lato majus. +Since y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> what we imagine must be datum aliquod; a thing +can't be greater than itself. +</p> + +<p> +If you call infinite that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is greater than any assignable +by another, then I say, in that sense there may be an infinite +square, sphere, or any other figure, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is absurd. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. if extension be resoluble into points it does not consist +of? +</p> + +<p> +No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas<note place='foot'>What Berkeley calls <emph>ideas</emph> are +either perceptible by the senses or +imagined: either way they are concrete: +<emph>abstract ideas</emph> are empty words.</note>; +therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals. +</p> + +<p> +No word to be used without an idea. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. +how shall we will in heaven? +</p> + +<p> +Bayle's, Malbranch's, &c. arguments do not seem to +prove against Space, but onely against Bodies. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +I agree in nothing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the Cartesians as to y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> existence +of Bodies & Qualities<note place='foot'>i.e. the existence of bodies and +qualities independently of—in +abstraction from—all percipient +mind. While the spiritual theism of +Descartes is acceptable, he rejects +his mechanical conception of the +material world.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed +to have been mistaken. +</p> + +<p> +Lines not proper for demonstration. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an +idea and nothing more. The house itself, the church +itself, is an idea, i.e. an object—immediate object—of +thought<note place='foot'>But a <q>house</q> or a <q>church</q> +includes more than <emph>visible</emph> ideas, so +that we cannot, strictly speaking, +be said to see it. We see immediately +only visible signs of its invisible +qualities.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='010'/><anchor id='Pg010'/> + +<p> +Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere<note place='foot'>This is added in the margin.</note>]. +The horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as +before. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, +but have not leisure. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my +doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +Angle not well defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by +Harris, &c. This one ground of trifling. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +One idea not the cause of another—one power not the +cause of another. The cause of all natural things is onely +God. Hence trifling to enquire after second causes. +This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divinity<note place='foot'>The total impotence of Matter, +and the omnipotence of Mind or +Spirit in Nature, is thus early +becoming the dominant thought +with Berkeley.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines +as speculative sciences. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes +for me. +</p> + +<p> +How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies +created before man<note place='foot'>This refers to an objection to +the New Principles that is apparently +reinforced by recent discoveries +in geology. But if these +contradict the Principles, so does +the existence of a table while I am +only seeing it.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Impossible anything besides that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> thinks and is +thought on should exist<note place='foot'>Existence, in short, can be +realised only in the form of living +percipient mind.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +That w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is visible cannot be made up of invisible things. +</p> + +<p> +M.S. is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable +sensible parts. Now how can that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> hath not sensible +parts be divided into sensible parts? If you say it may +be divided into insensible parts, I say these are nothings. +</p> + +<p> +Extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, +I grant; but then there is no such idea, as any one +may try<note place='foot'>Berkeley hardly distinguishes +uncontingent mathematical <emph>relations</emph>, +to which the sensible ideas or +phenomena in which the relations +are concretely manifested must conform.</note>. There is onely a considering the number of +points without the sort of them, & this makes more for me, +since it must be in a considering thing. +</p> + +<pb n='011'/><anchor id='Pg011'/> + +<p> +Mem. Before I have shewn the distinction between visible +& tangible extension, I must not mention them as distinct. +I must not mention M. T. & M. V., but in general +M. S., &c.<note place='foot'>M. T. = matter tangible; M. V. += matter visible; M. . = +matter sensible. The distinctions +n question were made prominent +in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>. See sect. +1, 121-45.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether a M. V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any +tangible quality? +</p> + +<p> +If visible extension be the object of geometry, 'tis that +which is survey'd by the optique axis. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +I may say the pain is <emph>in</emph> my finger, &c., according to my +doctrine<note place='foot'>Which the common supposition +regarding primary qualities seems +to contradict.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mem. Nicely to discuss w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is meant when we say a line +consists of a certain number of inches or points, &c.; a +circle of a certain number of square inches, points, &c. +Certainly we may think of a circle, or have its idea in our +mind, without thinking of points or square inches, &c.; +whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up +of the ideas of points, square inches, &c. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Is any more than this meant by the foregoing expressions, +viz. that squares or points may be perceived in +or made out of a circle, &c., or that squares, points, &c. are +actually in it, i.e. are perceivable in it? +</p> + +<p> +A line in abstract, or Distance, is the number of points +between two points. There is also distance between a +slave & an emperor, between a peasant & philosopher, +between a drachm & a pound, a farthing & a crown, &c.; in +all which Distance signifies the number of intermediate +ideas. +</p> + +<p> +Halley's doctrine about the proportion between infinitely +great quantities vanishes. When men speak of infinite +quantities, either they mean finite quantities, or else talk +of [that whereof they have<note place='foot'>[That need not have been +blotted out—'tis good sense, if we +do but determine w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> we mean by +<hi rend='italic'>thing</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>idea</hi>.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on +blank page of the MS.</note>] no idea; both which are +absurd. +</p> + +<p> +If the disputations of the Schoolmen are blam'd for intricacy, +triflingness, & confusion, yet it must be acknowledg'd +<pb n='012'/><anchor id='Pg012'/> +that in the main they treated of great & important +subjects. If we admire the method & acuteness of the +Math[ematicians]—the length, the subtilty, the exactness +of their demonstrations—we must nevertheless be forced +to grant that they are for the most part about trifling subjects, +and perhaps mean nothing at all. +</p> + +<p> +Motion on 2d thoughts seems to be a simple idea. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Motion distinct from y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> thing moved is not conceivable. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Mem. To take notice of Newton for defining it [motion]; +also of Locke's wisdom in leaving it undefin'd<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises attempts to +define motion, as involving a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio</foreign>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo +partium spatii. Moveantur hæ de locis suis, et movebuntur +(ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Truly number is immensurable. +That we will allow with Newton. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his +globules without colour. Pellucidness is a colour. The +colour of ordinary light of the sun is white. Newton in +the right in assigning colours to the rays of light. +</p> + +<p> +A man born blind would not imagine Space as we do. +We give it always some dilute, or duskish, or dark colour—in +short, we imagine it as visible, or intromitted by the +eye, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> he would not do. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Proinde vim inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce (v. +tempus, spatium, motus) de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi +interpretantur. Newton, p. 10. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +I differ from Newton, in that I think the recession ab +axe motus is not the effect, or index, or measure of motion, +but of the vis impressa. It sheweth not w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is truly moved, +but w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> has the force impressed on it, or rather that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +hath an impressed force. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>D</emph> and <emph>P</emph> are not proportional in all circles. <emph>d d</emph> is to +1/4<emph>d p</emph> as <emph>d</emph> to <emph>p</emph>/4; but <emph>d</emph> and <emph>p</emph>/4 are not in the same proportion +in all circles. Hence 'tis nonsense to seek the terms of +one general proportion whereby to rectify all peripheries, +or of another whereby to square all circles. +</p> + +<p> +N. B. If the circle be squar'd arithmetically, 'tis squar'd +geometrically, arithmetic or numbers being nothing but +lines & proportions of lines when apply'd to geometry. +</p> + +<pb n='013'/><anchor id='Pg013'/> + +<p> +Mem. To remark Cheyne<note place='foot'>George Cheyne, the physician +(known afterwards as author of the +<hi rend='italic'>English Malady</hi>), published in 1705 +a work on Fluxions, which procured +him admission to the Royal Society. +He was born in 1670.</note> & his doctrine of infinites. +</p> + +<p> +Extension, motion, time, do each of them include the +idea of succession, & so far forth they seem to be of +mathematical consideration. Number consisting in succession +& distinct perception, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> also consists in succession; +for things at once perceiv'd are jumbled and mixt +together in the mind. Time and motion cannot be conceiv'd +without succession; and extension, qua mathemat., +cannot be conceiv'd but as consisting of parts w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> may be +distinctly & successively perceiv'd. Extension perceived +at once & <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in confuso</foreign> does not belong to math. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The simple idea call'd Power seems obscure, or rather +none at all, but onely the relation 'twixt Cause and Effect. +When I ask whether A can move B, if A be an intelligent +thing, I mean no more than whether the volition of A that +B move be attended with the motion of B? If A be +senseless, whether the impulse of A against B be followed +by y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> motion of B<note place='foot'>This reminds us of Hume, and +inclines towards the empirical notion +of Causation, as merely constancy +in sequence—not even continuous +metamorphosis.</note>? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Barrow's arguing against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is +a petitio principii, for the Demonstration of Archimedes +supposeth the circumference to consist of more than 24 +points. Moreover it may perhaps be necessary to suppose +the divisibility <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, in order to demonstrate that +the radius is equal to the side of the hexagon. +</p> + +<p> +Shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not +go on some false supposition. +</p> + +<p> +A great number of insensibles—or thus, two invisibles, +say you, put together become visible; therefore that M. V. +contains or is made up of invisibles. I answer, the M. V. +does not comprise, is not composed of, invisibles. All the +matter amounts to this, viz. whereas I had no idea awhile +agoe, I have an idea now. It remains for you to prove +that I came by the present idea because there were two +invisibles added together. I say the invisibles are nothings, +cannot exist, include a contradiction<note place='foot'>This is Berkeley's objection to +abstract, i.e. unperceived, quantities +and infinitesimals—important +in the sequel.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='014'/><anchor id='Pg014'/> + +<p> +I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am +vain. Very well. I shall endeavour patiently to bear up +under the most lessening, vilifying appellations the pride +& rage of man can devise. But one thing I know I am not +guilty of. I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great +man. I act not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do +not adhere to any opinion because it is an old one, +a reviv'd one, a fashionable one, or one that I have spent +much time in the study and cultivation of. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be +employed about lines and figures, these being things +sensible; for as for those you call insensible, we have +proved them to be nonsense, nothing<note place='foot'>The <q>lines and figures</q> of pure +mathematics, that is to say; which +he rejects as meaningless, in his +horror unrealisable abstractions.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +If in some things I differ from a philosopher I profess to +admire, 'tis for that very thing on account whereof I admire +him, namely, the love of truth. This &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Whenever my reader finds me talk very positively, I +desire he'd not take it ill. I see no reason why certainty +should be confined to the mathematicians. +</p> + +<p> +I say there are no incommensurables, no surds. I say +the side of any square may be assign'd in numbers. Say +you assign unto me the side of the square 10. I ask w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> 10—10 +feet, inches, &c., or 10 points? If the later, I deny +there is any such square, 'tis impossible 10 points should +compose a square. If the former, resolve y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>r</hi> 10 square +inches, feet, &c. into points, & the number of points must +necessarily be a square number whose side is easily +assignable. +</p> + +<p> +A mean proportional cannot be found betwixt any two +given lines. It can onely be found betwixt those the +numbers of whose points multiply'd together produce +a square number. Thus betwixt a line of 2 inches & +a line of 5 inches a mean geometrical cannot be found, +except the number of points contained in 2 inches multiply'd +by y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> number of points contained in 5 inches make a square +number. +</p> + +<p> +If the wit and industry of the Nihilarians were employ'd +<pb n='015'/><anchor id='Pg015'/> +about the usefull & practical mathematiques, what advantage +had it brought to mankind! +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. E.</note> +You ask me whether the books are in the study now, +when no one is there to see them? I answer, Yes. You +ask me, Are we not in the wrong for imagining things +to exist when they are not actually perceiv'd by the senses? +I answer, No. The existence of our ideas consists in being +perceiv'd, imagin'd, thought on. Whenever they are +imagin'd or thought on they do exist. Whenever they +are mentioned or discours'd of they are imagin'd & +thought on. Therefore you can at no time ask me whether +they exist or no, but by reason of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> very question they +must necessarily exist. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +But, say you, then a chimæra does exist? I answer, it +doth in one sense, i.e. it is imagin'd. But it must be well +noted that existence is vulgarly restrain'd to actuall perception, +and that I use the word existence in a larger sense +than ordinary.<note place='foot'>Things really exist, that is to +say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser degree, +when they are imagined than +when they are actually perceived +by our senses; but, in this wide +meaning of existence, they may in +both cases be said to exist.</note> +</p> + +<p> +N. B.—According to my doctrine all things are <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>entia +rationis</foreign>, i.e. solum habent esse in intellectum. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +[<note place='foot'>Added on blank page of the MS.</note>According to my doctrine all are not <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>entia rationis</foreign>. +The distinction between <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ens rationis</foreign> and <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ens reale</foreign> is kept +up by it as well as any other doctrine.] +</p> + +<p> +You ask me whether there can be an infinite idea? +I answer, in one sense there may. Thus the visual sphere, +tho' ever so small, is infinite, i.e. has no end. But if by +infinite you mean an extension consisting of innumerable +points, then I ask y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>r</hi> pardon. Points, tho' never so many, +may be numbered. The multitude of points, or feet, +inches, &c., hinders not their numbrableness (i.e. hinders +not their being numerable) in the least. Many or most +are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, if by +infinite idea you mean an <emph>idea</emph> too great to be comprehended +or perceiv'd all at once, you must excuse me. +I think such an infinite is no less than a contradiction<note place='foot'>In Berkeley's limitation of the +term <emph>idea</emph> to what is presented +objectively in sense, or represented +concretely in imagination. Accordingly <q>an infinite idea</q> would be +an idea which transcends ideation—an +express contradiction.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='016'/><anchor id='Pg016'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me. +They commonly suppose a material world—figures, motions, +bulks of various sizes, &c.—according to their own +confession to no purpose. All our sensations may be, and +sometimes actually are, without them; nor can men so +much as conceive it possible they should concur in any +wise to the production of them. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Ask a man, I mean a philosopher, why he supposes this +vast structure, this compages of bodies? he shall be at +a stand; he'll not have one word to say. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> sufficiently +shews the folly of the hypothesis. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Or rather why he supposes all y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>s</hi> Matter? For bodies +and their qualities I do allow to exist independently of <emph>our</emph> mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. How is the soul distinguish'd from its ideas? +Certainly if there were no sensible ideas there could be no +soul, no perception, remembrance, love, fear, &c.; no +faculty could be exerted<note place='foot'>Does the <emph>human</emph> spirit depend +on <emph>sensible</emph> ideas as much as they +depend on spirit? Other orders +of spiritual beings may be percipient +of other sorts of phenomena +than those presented in those few +senses to which man is confined, +although self-conscious activity +abstracted from <emph>all</emph> sorts of presented +phenomena seems impossible. But +a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily +dependent on <emph>our</emph> material +world or <emph>our</emph> sense experience.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The soul is the Will, properly speaking, and as it is +distinct from ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The grand puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake, +easily solv'd. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Qu. Whether minima or meer minima may not be +compar'd by their sooner or later evanescence, as well as +by more or less points, so that one sensible may be greater +than another, though it exceeds it not by one point? +</p> + +<p> +Circles on several radius's are not similar figures, they +having neither all nor any an infinite number of sides. +Hence in vain to enquire after 2 terms of one and y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> same +proportion that should constantly express the reason of +the <hi rend='italic'>d</hi> to the <hi rend='italic'>p</hi> in all circles. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To remark Wallis's harangue, that the aforesaid +proportion can neither be expressed by rational numbers +nor surds. +</p> + +<pb n='017'/><anchor id='Pg017'/> + +<p> +We can no more have an idea of length without breadth +or visibility, than of a general figure. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +One idea may be like another idea, tho' they contain no +common simple idea<note place='foot'>[This I do not altogether approve +of.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on margin.</note>. Thus the simple idea red is in +some sense like the simple idea blue; 'tis liker it than sweet +or shrill. But then those ideas w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are so said to be alike, +agree both in their connexion with another simple idea, +viz. extension, & in their being receiv'd by one & the same +sense. But, after all, nothing can be like an idea but +an idea. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes +in my doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by +the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, +with many other the like absurditys. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether +those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my +doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and +neglected, as so many noughts or nothings. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and +their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they +can be of that green w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> seems to be compounded of yellow +and blue. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. Whether it were not better <emph>not</emph> to call the operations +of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible<note place='foot'>He afterwards guarded the +difference, by contrasting <emph>notion</emph> and +<emph>idea</emph>, confining the latter to phenomena +presented objectively to our +senses, or represented in sensuous +imagination, and applying the former +to intellectual apprehension of +<q>operations of the mind,</q> and of +<q>relations</q> among ideas.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient +philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny +the existence of motion, and of those other things they +perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their +not knowing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> Existence was, and wherein it consisted. +This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering +of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that +I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the +<pb n='018'/><anchor id='Pg018'/> +sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure +this is new to me<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 89.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and +that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, +which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him +intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply +it to the Mathematicians. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The +word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or +abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of +colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without +extension. +</p> + +<p> +Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: +one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. +'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to +ourselves, or in our private meditations<note place='foot'>Is thought, then, independent +of language? Can we realise +thought worthy of the name without +use of words? This is Berkeley's +excessive juvenile reaction against +verbal abstractions.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple +ideas may be connected with one & the same 3<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> simple idea, +or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd +in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently +no likeness. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? +It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all +ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means +conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to +abstract one concrete idea from another of a different +kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars +of the same kind<note place='foot'>Every general notion is <emph>ideally +realisable</emph> in one or other of its +possible concrete or individual applications.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental +philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? +Nothing but a being w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> wills, when the effect follows +the volition. Those things that happen from without +we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other +Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these +perceptions in us<note place='foot'>This is the germ of Berkeley's +notion of the objectivity of the material +world to individual percipients +and so of the rise of individual +self-consciousness.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='019'/><anchor id='Pg019'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +[<note place='foot'>Added by Berkeley on blank +page of the MS.</note>It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which +wills being unintelligible.] +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +One square cannot be double of another. Hence the +Pythagoric theorem is false. +</p> + +<p> +Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the +apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind +the eye. +</p> + +<p> +Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in +green. This may help to prove the composition of green. +</p> + +<p> +There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness +to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded. +</p> + +<p> +A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore +colours are all compounded that we see. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green. +</p> + +<p> +N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be +condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> their meeting +did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.<note place='foot'>Cf. p. <ref target='Pg420'>420</ref>, note 2. Bishop +Sprat's <hi rend='italic'>History of the Royal Society</hi> +appeared in 1667.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To premise a definition of idea<note place='foot'>Much need; for what he means +by <emph>idea</emph> has not been attended to by +his critics.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. Mo.</note> +The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God +& the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning +of the Second Book<note place='foot'>What <q>Second Book</q> is this? +Does he refer to the <q>Second Part</q> +of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, which never appeared? +God is the culmination of +his philosophy, in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa. +</p> + +<p> +Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has +nothing to do with circumferences containing less than +96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may +be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. +V. Barrow. +</p> + +<p> +Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. +Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope +you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring +of the circle as good and exact as the best. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be +<pb n='020'/><anchor id='Pg020'/> +any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in +that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is +extension, solidity, figure<note place='foot'>This is Berkeley's material +substance. Individual material +substances are for him, steady aggregates +of sense-given phenomena, +having the efficient and final cause +of their aggregation in eternally +active Mind—active mind, human +and Divine, being essential to their +realisation for man.</note>. Of general abstract body we +can have no idea. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the +endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by +words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be +done in the Introduction<note place='foot'>Cf. Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +especially sect. 18-25.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what +is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia +sunt. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & +whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve +line can possibly be equal to a right line? +</p> + +<p> +If w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> me you call those lines equal w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> contain an equal +number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That +curve is equal to a right line w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> contains the same points +as the right one doth. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused +of discarding substance out of the reasonable world<note place='foot'>Stillingfleet charges Locke +with <q>discarding substance out of +the reasonable part of the world.</q></note>. +I onely reject the philosophic sense (w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> in effect is no +sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with +their jargon w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he means by corporeal substance, or the +substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and +such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic +nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have +no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that +which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd +or conceiv'd. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real +or chimerical. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi>ever you can in any wise conceive or +imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, +much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll +never deprive you of it. +</p> + +<pb n='021'/><anchor id='Pg021'/> + +<p> +N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers<note place='foot'>The philosophers supposed the +real things to exist behind our ideas, +in concealment: Berkeley was now +beginning to think that the objective +ideas or phenomena presented to +the senses, the existence of which +needs no proof, were <emph>themselves</emph> +the significant and interpretable +realities of physical science.</note>. +They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but +we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer +distance. This evident in that there are curve lines. +</p> + +<p> +Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, +except we allow points. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be +they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple +clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool +shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that +seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge +anywhere rather than in their own understanding, +where 'tis to be found. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the +word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, +or thinking things ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake. +</p> + +<p> +Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently +of equality. They nowhere define w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they mean by that +word when apply'd to lines. +</p> + +<p> +Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension +and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are +any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms +such are complex ideas, as I have proved. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> do the mathematicians mean by considering curves +as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. +If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? +Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat +them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd +to use polygons in their stead. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is this but to pervert +language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to +it but to a different idea? +</p> + +<p> +The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ +<pb n='022'/><anchor id='Pg022'/> +congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by +bidding me put one triangle on another. The under +triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. +I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia +or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same +angle are equal, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> they will not acknowledge. Must +the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines +and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the +mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a +line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle. +</p> + +<p> +Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, +that they both take up equal spaces? But then +the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? +If you mean <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>spatia congruentia</foreign>, answer the above difficulty +truly. +</p> + +<p> +I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles +than triangles containing equal numbers of points. +</p> + +<p> +I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> 'tis +indifferent whether of them I take, lines in w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> I observe +by my senses no difference, & w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> therefore have the same +name. +</p> + +<p> +Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned +cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch +and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I +reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the +mind. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician +in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to +make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss +my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by +no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty +& submission to better judgments. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I lay before you +are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my +own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not +to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them +stand or fall by their own evidence. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of +bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. +Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension +may give us the idea of motion. +</p> + +<pb n='023'/><anchor id='Pg023'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities +but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but +meer idea—there is nothing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is not an <hi rend='italic'>ens rationis</hi>. +I answer, things are as real, and exist <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in rerum natura</foreign>, as +much as ever. The difference between <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>entia realia</foreign> & <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>entia +rationis</foreign> may be made as properly now as ever. Do but +think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend +my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal +essences. +</p> + +<p> +We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. +Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, +point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when +little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. +This must be well inculcated. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material +world<note place='foot'>If the material world can be <emph>real</emph> only in and through a percipient +intelligence, as the realising factor.</note>. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is +far more beautiful than this. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at +all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, +and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we +had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly +absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes +the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and +agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & +refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind +no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest. +</p> + +<p> +The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes +is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean +consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine +them,—we regarding them with relation to each other +only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations +of things before we study them absolutely and +in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations +of figures to one another, the relations also of number, +without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature +of extension and number in themselves. This we think +<pb n='024'/><anchor id='Pg024'/> +is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not +'tis of the last importance, +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt +profit and pleasure. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's +a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering +these things has been of ill consequence in morality. +</p> + +<p> +My positive assertions are no less modest than those +that are introduced with <q>It seems to me,</q> <q>I suppose,</q> +&c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think +is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns +no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. +This in the Preface. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings +one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations +of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words +as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their +signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a +determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either +of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All +this remedyed by studying the understanding. +</p> + +<p> +Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering +the word one. All number consists in relations<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 13, 119-122, +which deny the possibility of an idea +or mental picture corresponding +to abstract number.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the +Schoolemen. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other +things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous<note place='foot'><q>Præcedaneous,</q> i.e. precedent.</note>. To the +knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have +ideas or else we cannot think. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their +movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch<note place='foot'>Who refunds human as well +as natural causation into Divine +agency.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke<note place='foot'>In which Locke treats <q>Of the +Reality of Knowledge,</q> including +questions apt to lead Berkeley to +inquire, Whether we could in reason +suppose reality in the absence of +all realising mind.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the +doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. +Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to +<pb n='025'/><anchor id='Pg025'/> +their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my +definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> colours +are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in +other things. This to be heartily insisted on. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought +of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing +for abstract ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have +been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on +their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. +I only desire that men would think before they speak, +and settle the meaning of their words. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth +consists in the joining and separating of signs. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without +treating of words and propositions. This makes for +me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. +They have gone a great way. But none have gone +backward beyond the Principles. On that side there +lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered +by me. A vast field for invention. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because +a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought +of an inch. +</p> + +<p> +A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this +respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points. +</p> + +<p> +[Forasmuch as] to be used. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To mention somewhat w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> may encourage the +study of politiques, and testify of me y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I am well dispos'd +toward them. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +If men did not use words for ideas they would never +have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and +species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas +include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke<note place='foot'>Locke's <q>abstract idea</q> is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley +in his impetuosity.</note>, lib. 4. +c. 7. s. 9. +</p> + +<p> +A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a +various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the +<pb n='026'/><anchor id='Pg026'/> +definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must +be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end +definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according +to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple +ideas. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know +with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things +as well as my own soul. This is w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> Locke nor scarce +any other thinking philosopher will pretend to<note place='foot'>This and other passages refer +to the scepticism, that is founded +on the impossibility of our comparing +our ideas of things with +unperceived real things; so that we +can never escape from the circle of +subjectivity. Berkeley intended to +refute this scepticism.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all +the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to +language. +</p> + +<p> +Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas +by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Of great use & y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> last importance to contemplate a man +put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see +how after long experience he would know w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out words. +Such a one would never think of genera and species or +abstract general ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Wonderful in Locke that he could, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> advanced in years, +see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & +was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> +he did not see farther. +</p> + +<p> +Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either +as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such +as time, place, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, +wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. +'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance +encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. +The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative +good, discuss'd with French, Madden<note place='foot'>Probably Samuel Madden, who +afterwards edited the <hi rend='italic'>Querist</hi>.</note>, &c., to be noticed +as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To observe (w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> you talk of the division of ideas +into simple and complex) that there may be another cause +<pb n='027'/><anchor id='Pg027'/> +of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which +Locke gives; viz. the want of names. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Mem. To begin the First Book<note place='foot'>This <q>First Book</q> seems to be +<q>Part I</q> of the projected <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>—the +only Part ever published. +Here he inclines to <q>perception or +thought in general,</q> in the language +of Descartes; but in the end +he approximates to Locke's <q>sensation +and reflection.</q> See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 1, and notes.</note> not with mention of +sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use +perception or thought in general. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without +an idea, or an idea without perception. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should +exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses +amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians. +</p> + +<p> +They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an +equation. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> mean they by this? W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> would they signify +by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of +Euclid? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +We think we know not the Soul, because we have no +imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This +the effect of prejudice. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we +examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither +doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than +our not knowing a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul<note place='foot'>Does he mean, like Hume afterwards, +that ideas or phenomena +constitute the ego, so that I am +only the transitory conscious state +of each moment?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Consciousness<note place='foot'><q>Consciousness</q>—a term rarely +used by Berkeley or his contemporaries.</note>, perception, existence of ideas, seem to +be all one. +</p> + +<p> +Consult, ransack y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>r</hi> understanding. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> find you there +besides several perceptions or thoughts? W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> mean you +by the word mind? You must mean something that you +perceive, or y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> you do not perceive. A thing not perceived +is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not +perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter +strangely abused by words. +</p> + +<p> +Mind is a congeries of perceptions<note place='foot'>This too, if strictly interpreted, +looks like an anticipation of +Hume's reduction of the ego into +successive <q>impressions</q>—<q>nothing +but a bundle or collection of +different perceptions, which succeed +one another with inconceivable +rapidity, and are in a perpetual +flux and movement.</q> See Hume's +<hi rend='italic'>Treatise</hi>, Part IV. sect. 6.</note>. Take away perceptions +<pb n='028'/><anchor id='Pg028'/> +and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions +and you put the mind. +</p> + +<p> +Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing +which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words +<q>that a thing.</q> These are vague and empty words with us. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. +A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then +this imagination presupposeth perception. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +That w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> we +think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate +to be false in the Third Book<note place='foot'>What <q>Third Book</q> is here +projected? Was a <q>Third Part</q> of +the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> then in embryo?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. +I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from +natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, +yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations +might be built thereon; provided still that we define the +words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence +'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy +or monarchy to be established <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>jure Divino</foreign> to demonstrate +their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate +or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. +Here an implicit faith becomes us. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas +of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception +and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does +the perception of white differ from white men.... +</p> + +<p> +I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of +demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction<note place='foot'>This is scarcely done in the +<q>Introduction</q> to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>.</note>. +In that I must needs differ from Locke, +forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about +abstract ideas, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> I say we have not nor can have. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions +or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will +and passions? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +A good proof that Existence is nothing without or +<pb n='029'/><anchor id='Pg029'/> +distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering +a man put into the world without company<note place='foot'>Berkeley, as we find in the +<hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>, is fond of conjecturing +how a man all alone in the +world, freed from the abstractions +of language, would apprehend the +realities of existence, which he must +then face directly, without the use +or abuse of verbal symbols.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. +Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those +intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured +to him by his own ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining +clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, +& that because we imagine words stand for abstract +general ideas which are altogether inconceivable. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +<q>A stone is a stone.</q> This a nonsensical proposition, +and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor +do I believe he would ever think on this: <q>The whole is +equal to its parts,</q> &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only +declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend +it. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from +beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by +degrees of more and less. +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> means Locke by inferences in words, consequences +of words, as something different from consequences of +ideas? I conceive no such thing. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language<note place='foot'>This <q>N. B.</q> is expanded in the +Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless +Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., +but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But +even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> I come +to treat more particularly of Existence. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it +seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, +but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, +<pb n='030'/><anchor id='Pg030'/> +viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that +man, place, action, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> nothing appears to introduce them +into my thoughts, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> they have no perceivable connexion +with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +'Tis not to be imagin'd w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> a marvellous emptiness & +scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside +all use of words in his meditations. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper +to see substances with. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to +naming. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of +distance by angles<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 4.</note>, strengthens men in their prejudice +that they see things without and distant from their mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +I am persuaded, would men but examine w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they mean +by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me. +</p> + +<p> +c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the +mathematicians. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes +away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal +scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is +confin'd barely to our own ideas<note place='foot'>What is immediately realised +in our percipient experience must +be presumed or trusted in as real, +if we have any hold of reality, or +the moral right to postulate that +our universe is fundamentally trustworthy.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary +to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory +or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he +could scarce retain his knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +We read in history there was a time when fears and +jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and +such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, +were words of much sway. Also the words Church, +Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the +idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances<note place='foot'>But he distinguishes, in the +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> and elsewhere, between +an idea of sense and a percipient +ego.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest +<pb n='031'/><anchor id='Pg031'/> +argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be +conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for +that uneasiness may be without volition. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same +reason. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Also from uneasiness and idea together. +</p> + +<p> +The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions +or ideas. +</p> + +<p> +The Will not distinct from particular volitions. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, +may be without all volition or act. +</p> + +<p> +The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct +from y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> will. +</p> + +<p> +This allow'd hereafter. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd +question, for the word <emph>can</emph> presupposes volition. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, +plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish<note place='foot'>They reappear in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. +I think that's all<note place='foot'>In one of Berkeley's letters to +Johnson, a quarter of a century +after the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>, when +he was in America, he observes +that <q>the mechanical philosophers +pretend to demonstrate that matter +is proportional to gravity. But +their argument concludes nothing, +and is a mere circle</q>—as he proceeds +to show.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to +move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously +and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in +answering objections<note place='foot'>In the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 1-33, he +seeks to fulfil the expository part +of this intention; in sect. 33-84, +also in the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues between Hylas +and Philonous</hi>, he is <q>particular in +answering objections.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +To say y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an +act. This is idem per idem. +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate +them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine +them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking +substance. +</p> + +<pb n='032'/><anchor id='Pg032'/> + +<p> +An extended may have passive modes of thinking good +actions. +</p> + +<p> +There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there +might be the greatest uneasiness w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out any +volition, therefore the.... +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God +is not Matter<note place='foot'>If Matter is arbitrarily credited +with omnipotence.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, +if we but settle the signification of the word <emph>free</emph>—if we +had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate +that idea. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, +free, can, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident +by experience. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession +of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the +mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or +coincide w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. +I answer, tell me w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> you mean by the word free, and I +shall resolve you<note place='foot'>On freedom as implied in +a moral and responsible agent, cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 257 and note.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Qu. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> do men mean when they talk of one body's +touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, +or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say +touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were +improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind +those wh<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> now seem to touch. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to +confute the mathematicians w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the utmost civility & respect, +not to style them Nihilarians, &c. +</p> + +<p> +N. B. To rein in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> satyrical nature. +</p> + +<p> +Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some +latitude. 'Tis w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language +<pb n='033'/><anchor id='Pg033'/> +that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate +meaning of my words. +</p> + +<p> +Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something +unknown—w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> perceives, and supports, and ties together +the ideas<note place='foot'>Is not this one way of expressing +the Universal Providence and +constant uniting agency of God +in the material world?</note>. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it +and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away +anything I can see the least reason to think should exist. +</p> + +<p> +I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world +can be given why a man should use a word without an idea<note place='foot'>Here <emph>idea</emph> seems to be used in its +wider signification, including <emph>notion</emph>.</note>. +Certainly we shall find that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> ever word we make use of +in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat +idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we +take it in, must be compleatly known. +</p> + +<p> +'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine +anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever +says he does, banters himself with words. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of +knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The +like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or +infinitely greater<note place='foot'><q>infinitely greater</q>—Does infinity +admit of imaginable degrees?</note> difference. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +We find in our own minds a great number of different +ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. +that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable +in respect thereof. The words difference and number, +old and known, we apply to that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is unknown. But I +am embrangled<note place='foot'>'embrangled'—perplexed—involved +in disputes.</note> in words—'tis scarce possible it should be +otherwise. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove +the mist or veil of words<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 24.</note>. This has occasion'd ignorance +& confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, +lawyers and divines. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of +the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: +(to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, +and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in +<pb n='034'/><anchor id='Pg034'/> +truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tis <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto cælo</foreign> +different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. +If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I +answer, there is an homonymy<note place='foot'><q>homonymy,</q> i.e. equivocation.</note> in the word <emph>thing</emph>, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> +apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. +All ideas are passive<note place='foot'>Voluntary or responsible activity +is not an idea or datum of +sense, nor can it be realised in +sensuous imagination. He uses +<q>thing</q> in the wide meaning which +comprehends persons.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent +and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word +thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. +Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these +are no ideas<note place='foot'>Voluntary or responsible activity +is not an idea or datum of +sense, nor can it be realised in +sensuous imagination. He uses +<q>thing</q> in the wide meaning which +comprehends persons.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +There can be perception w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out volition. Qu. whether +there can be volition without perception? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not +distinguish'd therefrom. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight +and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this +diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes +in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, +whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, +it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the +idea of time—or <emph>is</emph> time itself. +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> would the solitary man think of number? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us<note place='foot'>Is this consistent with other +entries?</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Locke seems to be mistaken w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> he says thought is not +essential to the mind<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we +know this too. In sleep and trances the mind <emph>exists not</emph>—there +is no time, no succession of ideas<note place='foot'>This is one way of meeting +the difficulty of supposed interruptions +of conscious or percipient +activity.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, +nonsense, nothing. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Folly to inquire w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. +are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore +cannot determine the Will<note place='foot'>This seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously self-originated.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='035'/><anchor id='Pg035'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Again, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> mean you by determine? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, +&c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions +as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second +of time. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +'Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd, or +before perception, that made men think perception<note place='foot'><q>perception.</q> He does not +include the percipient.</note> was +somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> it was an +idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv'd was an idea +of sensation. I say, 'twas this made 'em think the understanding +took it in, receiv'd it from without; w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> could +never be did not they think it existed without<note place='foot'><q>without,</q> i.e. unrealised by +any percipient.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination's +making. This is y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> likeness of, and refer'd to the real idea, +or (if you will) thing<note place='foot'>This would make <emph>idea</emph> the +term only for what is imagined, +as distinguished from what is +perceived in sense.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. +An idea can resemble nothing but an idea. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +If you ask w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean +idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I +say, 'tis no thing at all that wills<note place='foot'>In a strict use of words, only +<emph>persons</emph> exercise will—not <emph>things</emph>.</note>. This how extravagant +soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated +by these general terms, thing, is, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, +I say nothing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is perceived or does perceive wills. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The referring ideas to things w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are not ideas, the using +the term <q>idea of<note place='foot'>As we must do in imagination, +which (unlike sense) is representative; +for the mental images represent +original data of sense-perception.</note>,</q> is one great cause of mistake, as in +other matters, so also in this. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Some words there are w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> do not stand for ideas, viz. +particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their +concomitant ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +There seem to be but two colours w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are simple ideas, +viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; +[the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed +by composition. +</p> + +<pb n='036'/><anchor id='Pg036'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither +has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all +sort of composition, tho' it must be granted they are not +made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another +sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things +compounded in which we do not actually discover the +component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded +of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into +view till after the dissolution of the bodies—w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> were not, +could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining +entire. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according +to Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is +evident. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> use then do we make of abstract general +ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +'Tis allow'd that particles stand not for ideas, and yet +they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The +truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. +volitions. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If +so, pray w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is the following ratiocination but a jumble of +words? <q>Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: +ergo omnis homo vivit.</q> It amounts (if you annex particular +ideas to the words <q>animal</q> and <q>vivit</q>) to no more than +this: <q>Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: +ergo, omnis homo est homo.</q> A mere sport and trifling +with sounds. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral +actions<note place='foot'>Does he not allow that we +have <emph>meaning</emph>, if not <emph>ideas</emph>, when +we use the terms virtue and vice +and moral action?</note>. Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are +capable of arriving at demonstration about them<note place='foot'>As Locke says we are.</note>, the +morality consisting in the volition chiefly. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their +idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from +perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of +sensation and reflection<note place='foot'><q><emph>Existence</emph> and <emph>unity</emph> are ideas +that are suggested to the understanding +by every object without +and every idea within. When +ideas are in our minds, we consider +that <emph>they</emph> exist.</q> Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, +Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7.</note>, methinks it should be most +familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it. +</p> + +<pb n='037'/><anchor id='Pg037'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence<note place='foot'>i.e. of Existence in the abstract—unperceived +and unperceiving—realised +neither in percipient life +nor in moral action.</note>, or annext +to the word Existence. And if others have that's nothing +to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple +ideas being incommunicable by language. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is +something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any +other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there +be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think +absurd. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such +as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and +stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. +All this is active. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence +of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv'd. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S. E.</note> +Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; +therefore neither is there existence without perception. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are +painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained +thereby<note place='foot'>This suggests that God knows +sensible things without being sentient +of any.</note>. Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of +a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N. Mo.</note> +Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & +moral. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: +of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in +morality. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be +acknowledged. Or rather thus: I am no more to be +reckon'd stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be +reckon'd stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off +the molehill w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> lay upon him, and the gyant could onely +shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in +the Preface. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those +shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something +like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introd., sect. 1-5.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='038'/><anchor id='Pg038'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he +would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand +me. In the Preface or Introduction<note place='foot'>Cf. Preface to <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>; also +to <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Doctrine of identity best explain'd by taking the Will +for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty +of consciousness of w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> are never acted surely solv'd +thereby. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers +who have gone before me. They have given good rules, +though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude +of adventurers, who, tho' they attained not the +desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the +rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is +made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions<note place='foot'>i.e. that ethics was a science +of phenomena or ideas.</note> has +render'd the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance +or image of an active thing. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the +word <hi rend='italic'>idea</hi>, viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution +must be added. +</p> + +<p> +Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs<note place='foot'>i.e. of the <emph>independent</emph> existence +of Matter.</note> with +Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension +to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps +men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so +thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +On second thoughts I am on t'other extream. I am +certain of that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the +existence of bodies<note place='foot'>'bodies'—i.e. sensible things—not +unrealised Matter.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. +&c.</note> +Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the +matter of abstraction to bring Locke's general triangle in +the last<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 13.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do +not always observe them. They speak much of clear and +distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general +abstract ideas, &c. I'll [instance] in Locke's opinion of +abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with. +</p> + +<pb n='039'/><anchor id='Pg039'/> + +<p> +Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade +myself, were he alive<note place='foot'>Locke died in October, 1704.</note>, he would not be offended that +I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow +his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my +own eyes, & not with another's. Introduction. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & +volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without +the mind<note place='foot'><q>without the mind,</q> i.e. abstracted +from all active percipient +life.</note>, mischievous and useless. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make +a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At +least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, according +to his own rule, trifling propositions. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P. S.</note> +Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly +allow'd by all to be onely in the mind<note place='foot'>e.g. secondary qualities of sensible +things, in which pleasure and +pain are prominent.</note>, and others as +generally taken to be without the mind<note place='foot'>e.g. primary qualities, in which +pleasure and pain are latent.</note>, if, according to +you, all are equally and only in the mind? Ans. Because +that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended +with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. +Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible +they should ever mistake, save only in matters of +fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive +& secure that anything was true w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> in truth is not +so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. +So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, +there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions +made by signs there may be slips of memory. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We +are only to be praised for those things which are our own, +or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences +of our volitions. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some +dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of +Space and the possibility of Matter's thinking<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. +13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV. +ch. 3. § 6; also his controversy +with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding +the possibility of Matter thinking. +With Berkeley real space is a finite +creature, dependent for realisation +on living percipient Spirit.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='040'/><anchor id='Pg040'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard +against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do +not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common +dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let +him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions +of bringing into his mind determin'd significations. So +far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve +not the name of language. I desire & warn him +not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but +in his own mind. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi>ever I see myself 'tis impossible +I can paint it out in words. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +N. B. To consider well w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is meant by that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> Locke +saith concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate +ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same +use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Homo</foreign> is not proved to be <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vivens</foreign> by means of any +intermediate idea. I don't fully agree w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> Locke in w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he +says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas +in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as +if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging +demonstrative knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There +may be volition without power. But there can be no power +without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same +time a connotation of the effects following the volition<note place='foot'>But what of the origination of +the volition itself?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +We have assuredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd +of Locke<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See +also Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Letters</hi> to Stillingfleet.</note> to think we had a name without a meaning. +This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +The substance of Body we know<note place='foot'>It is, according to Berkeley, +the steady union or co-existence of +a group of sense-phenomena.</note>. The substance of +Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>purus actus</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Words have ruin'd and overrun all the sciences—law, +physique, chymistry, astrology, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. +The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do +they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract +ideas are terms unknown to them. +</p> + +<pb n='041'/><anchor id='Pg041'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Locke's out<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. i. § 10—where +he argues for interruptions +of consciousness. <q>Men think not +always.</q></note>—the case is different. We can have an +idea of body without motion, but not of soul without +thought. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +God ought to be worship'd. This easily demonstrated +when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, +worship, ought. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore +no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or +like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive, +i.e. the Will. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +I can will the calling to mind something that is past, +tho' at the same time that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> I call to mind was not in +my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently +I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought +two distinct beings. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. +V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum. +</p> + +<p> +You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or +one with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be +both minima, just perceiv'd, and next door to nothing. +You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like +unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv'd. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible +quality according as it is seen or felt. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The spirit—the active thing—that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is soul, & God—is +the Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The concrete of the will & understanding I might call +mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully +to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +You ask, do these volitions make <emph>one</emph> Will? W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> you +ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more<note place='foot'>In other words, the material +world is wholly impotent: all activity +in the universe is spiritual.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle +of offence to the Church or Churchmen. +</p> + +<pb n='042'/><anchor id='Pg042'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, +and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not +free of it themselves. Introd. +</p> + +<p> +Locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not +begin with his third book; at least that he had not some +thought of it at first. Certainly the 2<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> & 4<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> books don't +agree w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he says in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> 3<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi><note place='foot'>On the order of its four +books and the structure of Locke's +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, see the Prolegomena in my +edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, pp. liv-lviii.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +If Matter<note place='foot'>i.e. independent imperceptible +Matter.</note> is once allow'd to exist, clippings of weeds and +parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; +tho' he seems positive of the contrary. +</p> + +<p> +Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning +about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will +be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is +certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you +will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take +it all for such. Introd. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I +know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, +the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended +to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of +Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think +an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot +comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a +popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in +Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, +irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to +pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, +i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above +our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to +plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall +yield an explicit belief. Introd. +</p> + +<p> +Complexation of ideas twofold. Y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>s</hi> refers to colours +being complex ideas. +</p> + +<p> +Considering length without breadth is considering any +length, be the breadth w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> it will. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there +being other intelligences to perceive them, before +man was created<note place='foot'>What of the earliest geological +periods, asks Ueberweg? But +is there greater difficulty in such instances +than in explaining the existence +of a table or a house, while one +is merely seeing, without touching?</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='043'/><anchor id='Pg043'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +There is a philosopher<note place='foot'>Locke explains <q>substance</q> as +<q>an uncertain supposition of we +know not what.</q> <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. I. ch. 4. +§ 18.</note> who says we can get an idea +of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems +to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if +we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. +Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to +him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can +stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of +that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & +then we see and feel substance. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined +the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract +general idea. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in +judging of magnitudes and distances. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +'Tis evident y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> the solitary man should be taught to +speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save +only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown +before, may be signified by language) beside w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he had before. +If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea +before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +<q>Homo est homo,</q> &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, +&c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in +the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical +mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and +proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing<note place='foot'>Locke makes certainty consist +in the agreement of <q>our ideas with +the reality of things.</q> See <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, +Bk. IV. ch. 4. § 18. Here the +sceptical difficulty arises, which +Berkeley meets under his Principle. +If we have no perception +of reality, we cannot compare our +ideas with it, and so cannot have +any criterion of reality.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. +without other ideas than the words, and their standing for +one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, +but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain +I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions +<pb n='044'/><anchor id='Pg044'/> +form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception +'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and +consequently no certainty<note place='foot'>[This seems wrong. Certainty, +real certainty, is of sensible ideas. +I may be certain without affirmation +or negation.—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author.</hi>] This +needs further explanation.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs +is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made +at pleasure. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +The obscure ambiguous term <emph>relation</emph>, which is said to +be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that +does not depend on some false principle; or at best +on some principle of nature, which is y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> effect of God's +will, and we know not how soon it may be changed. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Qu. What becomes of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>æternæ veritates</foreign>? Ans. They +vanish<note place='foot'>This entry and the preceding +tends to resolve all judgments which +are not what Kant calls analytical +into contingent.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words +and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In +the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be +more clearly made out. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +<q>Cogito ergo sum.</q> Tautology. No mental proposition +answering thereto. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N. Mo.</note> +Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of +ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, +vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of +co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter +our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this +only real knowledge seemeth to be found<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. IV. +ch. 1, §§ 3-7, and ch. 3. §§ 7-21. +The stress Berkeley lays on <q>co-existence</q> +is significant.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +We must w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the mob place certainty in the senses<note place='foot'>i.e. we must not doubt the reality +of the immediate data of sense +but accept it, as <q>the mob</q> do.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to +speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I do. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. +Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me +in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to +my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd. +</p> + +<pb n='045'/><anchor id='Pg045'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>judicium intellectus</foreign> +preceding the volition: I think <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>judicium</foreign> includes volition. +I can by no means distinguish these—<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>judicium</foreign>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>intellectus</foreign>, +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>indifferentia</foreign>, uneasiness to many things accompanying or +preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? +Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive<note place='foot'>But is imagination different +from actual perception only in +<hi rend='italic'>degree</hi> of reality?</note>, &c. are +mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>homo</foreign> +and <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>agens</foreign> in this place? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & +Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by +all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want +them<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 13, 120; +also Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. 7. +sect. 7.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the +more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of +philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves +to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover +flaws and imperfections in their faculties w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> other men +never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of +admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for +true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or +behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger +and more numerous than w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is perceived, & at length turn +scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds +from, &c. Exord. Introd.<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 1.</note> +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common +single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge +by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at +once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in +the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract +ideas. +</p> + +<p> +It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & +sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their +visual systems are the largest. +</p> + +<p> +Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so +necessary that, instead of being (w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> duly us'd or in their +own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, +<pb n='046'/><anchor id='Pg046'/> +or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could +in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and +recalling men to Common Sense<note place='foot'>Berkeley's aim evidently is to +deliver men from empty abstractions, +by a return to more reasonably interpreted +common-sense.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but +as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> +such & such thoughts & such and such sensations<note place='foot'>The sort of <emph>external</emph> world that +is intelligible to us is that of which +<emph>another person</emph> is percipient, and +which is <emph>objective</emph> to me, in a percipient +experience foreign to mine.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty +which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I +question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse +or chimera. +</p> + +<p> +Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. +Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. +Therefore there can be no idea of volition. +</p> + +<p> +Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. +Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before +Algebra. +</p> + +<p> +2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear +the value of numbers. +</p> + +<p> +Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence +may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply +discuss'd. +</p> + +<p> +I am better informed & shall know more by telling me +there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn +up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd +have me make w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> you tell me how much (i.e. the name of +y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi>) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing +it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, +but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. +</p> + +<p> +Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have +made some progress in language. This could not be if +they were ideas suggested by all the senses. +</p> + +<pb n='047'/><anchor id='Pg047'/> + +<p> +Numbers are nothing but names—never words. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery. +</p> + +<p> +Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers. +</p> + +<p> +In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. +They only seek a denomination. This is all can be +of use to them. +</p> + +<p> +Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and +pray w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> remains? +</p> + +<p> +These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless +but for practice in societies of men. No speculative +knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them<note place='foot'>Cf. Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Arithmetica</hi> and +<hi rend='italic'>Miscellanea Mathematica</hi>, published +while he was making his entries in +this <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd +amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra +being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry +being an application of these to points<note place='foot'>Minima sensibilia?</note>? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. +Well to observe & con over that chapter. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. +They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Sensual pleasure is the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>summum bonum</foreign>. This the great +principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all +the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly +be demonstrated. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by +a wise man<note place='foot'>Pleasures, <hi rend='italic'>quâ</hi> pleasures, are +natural causes of correlative desires, +as pains or uneasinesses are of +correlative aversions. This is implied +in the very nature of pleasure +and pain.</note>. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ +pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the +same thing) of loss of greater pleasure. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> I consider, the more objects we see at once the +more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great +many things can see none of them near. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +By <emph>idea</emph> I mean any sensible or imaginable thing<note place='foot'>Here we have his explanation +of <emph>idea</emph>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +To be sure or certain of w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> we do not actually perceive<note place='foot'>Absent things.</note> +(I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether +<pb n='048'/><anchor id='Pg048'/> +passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be +assent, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be +actual volition. +</p> + +<p> +What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines +are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same +name<note place='foot'>Here, as elsewhere, he resolves +geometry, as strictly demonstrable, +into a reasoned system of analytical +or verbal propositions.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. M.</note> +I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, <q>Nihil est in +intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.</q><note place='foot'>Compare this with note 3, p. +34; also with the contrast between +Sense and Reason, in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>. Is +the statement consistent with implied +assumptions even in the +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, apart from which they +could not cohere?</note> I wish they +had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine +of abstract ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S. G.</note> +<q>Nihil dat quod non habet,</q> or, the effect is contained in +the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe +to be true. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or +new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal +and objective Being, Will, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. +We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible<note place='foot'>To have an <emph>idea</emph> of God—as +Berkeley uses idea—would imply +that God is an immediately perceptible, +or at least an imaginable object.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. E.</note> +Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not +what was meant by Reality<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 89.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular +wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the +same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies +in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are +usually confused. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, +and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they +both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the +next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul +of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible +perfection. This I do not understand. +</p> + +<pb n='049'/><anchor id='Pg049'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the +ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, +as others. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only +between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished +by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, +i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and +jealousies, nothing like a party. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Locke in his 4<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> Book<note place='foot'>Ch. 11. § 5.</note>, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use +the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that +sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly +willing; my acquiescing in the present state is +willing. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E.</note> +The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different +from imagination or perception<note place='foot'>Why add—<q>or perception</q>?</note>. Volition or Will, +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) +... First Book. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +There are four sorts of propositions:—<q>Gold is a metal;</q> +<q>Gold is yellow;</q> <q>Gold is fixt;</q> <q>Gold is not a stone</q>—of +which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and +have no mental propositions answering them. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute +what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., +viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that +sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, +but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of +that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously +take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as +if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free +will of God<note place='foot'>Here we have Berkeley's favourite +thought of the divine arbitrariness +of the constitution of Nature, +and of its laws of change.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately +by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several +acts. Ans. to 2<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> objection of Hobbs. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying +thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. +Object. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of +<pb n='050'/><anchor id='Pg050'/> +the scholastiques—<q>the will wills,</q> &c. So does Locke. +I am of another mind<note place='foot'>This suggests the puzzle, that +the cause of every volition must +be a preceding volition, and so on +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is +distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E. S.</note> +Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of +horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's +doctrine, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P. E.</note> +Malbranch in his illustration<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, I. 19.</note> differs widely from me. +He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the +least of this. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, +&c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind<note place='foot'>i.e. of his own individual mind.</note>. All +y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> carefully and lucidly to be set forth. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the +things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> not +actually perceived; but still with relation to perception<note place='foot'>i.e. to <emph>a</emph> percipient mind, but +not necessarily to <emph>mine</emph>; for natural +laws are independent of individual +will, although the individual participates +in perception of the ordered +changes.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman +shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least +not ideas different from the characters themselves<note place='foot'>Cf. the <hi rend='italic'>Arithmetica</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. N.</note> +Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about +actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, +no matter &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, +for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more +can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own +making. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand +mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing +which are not ideas<note place='foot'>i.e. which are not phenomena. +This recognition of originative Will +even then distinguished Berkeley.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. +I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to +call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should +perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned +<pb n='051'/><anchor id='Pg051'/> +the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good +one too, which I shall give in the Second Book<note place='foot'>Is this Part II of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +which was lost in Italy?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. S.</note> +Idea is the object of thought. Y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I think on, whatever +it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no +idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished +to effects—the Will. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. Mo.</note> +Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why +mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of +complex but because of abstract ideas. Y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> idea of a horse +is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the +<q>horse is white</q> I form a mental proposition with ease. +But when I say <q>fortitude is a virtue</q> I shall find a mental +proposition hard, or not at all to be come at. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Pure intellect I understand not<note place='foot'>The thought of articulate <emph>relations</emph> +to which real existence must +conform, was not then at least in +Berkeley's mind. Hence the +empiricism and sensationalism into +which he occasionally seems to +rush in the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>, +in his repulsion from empty abstractions.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Locke is in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> right in those things wherein he differs +from y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his +opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of +Existence & other abstract ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G. S.</note> +The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in +the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind +agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction<note place='foot'>This is the essence of Berkeley's +philosophy—<q>a blind agent +is a contradiction.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have +no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly +understand w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is meant by certainty. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, +incorruptible. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S. Mo.</note> +Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. +What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There +can be no errour in this. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo. N.</note> +Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a +wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning +about ideas or things. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong +inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that +<pb n='052'/><anchor id='Pg052'/> +bodies do exist. Pray w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> mean they by this? Would +they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, +and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but +cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense +as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know +not w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi><note place='foot'>This is the basis of Berkeley's +reasoning for the necessarily <emph>unrepresentative</emph> +character of the ideas +or phenomena that are presented to +our senses. <emph>They</emph> are the originals.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse +objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Understanding is in some sort an action. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were +motion, with which it has no likeness. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas +of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of +Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared +enemy of religion, comes to the ground. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also +seems to do the same<note place='foot'>Berkeley's horror of abstract +or unperceived space and atoms +is partly explained by dogmas +in natural philosophy that are now +antiquated.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. E.</note> +Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. +Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account +of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, +Canis, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to +be <q>omnium rerum causa immanens,</q> and to countenance +this produces that of St. Paul, <q>in Him we live,</q> &c. Now +this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well +as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's<note place='foot'>Ralph [?] Raphson, author of +<hi rend='italic'>Demonstratio de Deo</hi> (1710), and +also of <hi rend='italic'>De Spatio Reali, seu ente Infinito: +conamen mathematico-metaphysicum</hi> +(1697), to which Berkeley +refers in one of his letters to +Johnson. See also Green's <hi rend='italic'>Principles +of Natural Philosophy</hi> (1712). +The immanence of omnipotent +goodness in the material world +was unconsciously Berkeley's presupposition. +In God we have our +being.</note>, &c. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The Will is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>purus actus</foreign>, or rather pure spirit not imaginable, +<pb n='053'/><anchor id='Pg053'/> +not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object +of the understanding, no wise perceivable. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, +operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> may be +made of the word <q>it</q>) to act, cause, will, operate. Its +substance is not knowable, not being an idea. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create +things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in +some wise whenever we imagine. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E. N.</note> +<q>Ex nihilo nihil fit.</q> This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. +p. 464) and the like are called <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritates æternæ</foreign>, because +<q>nullam fidem habent extra mentem.</q> To make this axiom +have a positive signification, one should express it thus: +Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will<note place='foot'>Note here Berkeley's version +of the causal principle, which is +really the central presupposition +of his whole philosophy—viz. every +event in the material world +must be the issue of acting Will.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt +absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in +their own nature & the same things considered with respect +to us. I know not w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they mean by <q>things considered in +themselves.</q> This is nonsense, jargon. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without +Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had +rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than +them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be +an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there +being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> are preferable to annihilation. +</p> + +<p> +Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, +rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. +Hobbs against Wallis. +</p> + +<p> +'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, +that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost +clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a +point<note place='foot'>So Locke on an ideally perfect +memory. <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the +controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis. +</p> + +<pb n='054'/><anchor id='Pg054'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence +of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. +independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, +i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, +omnipotent, &c. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that we <emph>see</emph> solids. +I reject his <q>solid philosophy</q>—solidity being only perceived +by touch<note place='foot'>John Sergeant was the author of +<hi rend='italic'>Solid Philosophy asserted against the +Fancies of the Ideists</hi> (London, 1697); +also of <hi rend='italic'>the Method to Science</hi> (1696). +He was a deserter from the Church +of England to the Church of Rome, +and wrote several pieces in defence +of Roman theology—some of them +in controversy with Tillotson.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and +ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly +without the other. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>E. +S.</note> +Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or +will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential<note place='foot'>Spirit and Matter are mutually +dependent; but Spirit is the realising +factor and real agent in the +universe.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot +otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or +consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of +sense and the constant laws of nature. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra +quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>a</hi> ad Oldenburgium. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +My definition of the word God I think much clearer than +those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz. <q>Ens summe perfectum +& absolute infinitum,</q> or <q>Ens constans infinitis attributis, +quorum unumquodque est infinitum<note place='foot'>See Descartes, <hi rend='italic'>Meditations</hi>, III; +Spinoza, <hi rend='italic'>Epist.</hi> II, ad Oldenburgium.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible +ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean +by <q>we,</q> or <q>selves,</q> or <q>mind,</q> &c. 'Tis most sure & +certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the +Will, the Spirit<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 2.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or +<pb n='055'/><anchor id='Pg055'/> +part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in +the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. +I must not say that the understanding diners not from the +particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N. S.</note> +I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, +nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; +'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word +cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, +and call one idea the cause of another which always +follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you +into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into +opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that +signification of the word Cause. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & +our own. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as +a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible +relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. +Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of +musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, +those not but in order to their end. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo. +N.</note> +Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to +be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that +of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, +or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), +in Morality<note place='foot'>Is <q>inclusion</q> here virtually a synonym for verbal definition?</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as +they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists +in their objects, circumstances, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical +& spiritual. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet +(to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must +mean causes y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> do nothing. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness +<pb n='056'/><anchor id='Pg056'/> +so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; +for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in +his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. +I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, +that raising of expectation in my friend. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize +at all: no more than a deformed person ought to +cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld +themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased +with their diseases. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +What can an idea be like but another idea? We can +compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour +like a colour. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which +cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>h</hi> cannot be seen? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. +S.</note> +Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but +distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether +different therefrom<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 2. The universe +of Berkeley consists of Active +Spirits that perceive and produce +motion in impotent ideas or phenomena, +realised in the percipient +experience of persons. All supposed +powers in Matter are refunded +into Spirit.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity +of colours. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that +can be conceived by itself. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to +answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. +The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas. +</p> + +<p> +Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard +knots on purpose to unty them again. +</p> + +<p> +Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient +the same thing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is M.V. should be also M.T., or very +near it. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name +<q>pure act,</q> but rather pure spirit, or active being. +</p> + +<pb n='057'/><anchor id='Pg057'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, +but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they +not being even <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ratione</foreign> different from the Spirit, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> faculties, +or active. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible<note place='foot'>When self-conscious agents are +included among <q>things.</q> We can +have no sensuous image, i.e. idea, of +<emph>spirit</emph>, although he maintains we +can use the word intelligently.</note>. +That were the way to prove spirits are nothing. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo.</note> +Qu. whether <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritas</foreign> stands not for an abstract idea? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own +there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, +i.e. unperceived. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S. +G.</note> +Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or +any knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be +moved. There could be no variety of appearance. +</p> + +<p> +According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there +must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance +from it. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property +of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it +cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large +shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or +extended being. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +'Tis an absurd question w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> Locke puts, whether man be +free to will? +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining +questions in Algebra. +</p> + +<p> +It has already been observed by others that names are +nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. +P.</note> +I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said +to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent +of our will, and as distinct from the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo. +N.</note> +Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at +the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with +signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and +capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether +depend upon words or names<note place='foot'>Berkeley insists that we should +individualise our thinking—<q>ipsis +consuescere rebus,</q> as Bacon says,—to +escape the dangers of artificial +signs. This is the drift of his +assault on abstract ideas, and his +repulsion from what is not concrete. +He would even dispense with +words in his meditations in case of +being sophisticated by abstractions.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='058'/><anchor id='Pg058'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion +of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of +freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary<note place='foot'>Nature or the phenomenal +world in short is the revelation of +perfectly reasonable Will.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun +& firmament, you will not say <emph>he</emph> or <emph>his mind</emph> is the sun, or +is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without +mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing +whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely +'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries<note place='foot'>Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian.</note>, <hi rend='italic'>De Ideis Innatis</hi>, p. 64. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with +things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. +This a vain distinction. +</p> + +<p> +August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?]. +</p> + +<p> +It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, +honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by +education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass +all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications +necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality +& titles; that princes out of them might always chose men +fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +One eternity greater than another of the same kind. +</p> + +<p> +In what sense eternity may be limited. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G. T.</note> +Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other. +</p> + +<p> +Duration not distinguish'd from existence. +</p> + +<p> +Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering. +</p> + +<p> +Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +Duration infinitely divisible, time not so. +</p> + +<pb n='059'/><anchor id='Pg059'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences. +</p> + +<p> +Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure. +</p> + +<p> +Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense. +</p> + +<p> +Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately +duration. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +Time a sensation; therefore onely in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> mind. +</p> + +<p> +Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence +the immortality of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> soul easily conceiv'd, or rather the +immortality of the person, that of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> soul not being necessary +for ought we can see. +</p> + +<p> +Swiftness of ideas compar'd with y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> of motions shews +the wisdom of God. +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> if succession of ideas were swifter, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> if slower? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, +dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by +material substances. +</p> + +<p> +Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire +hot, &c. +</p> + +<p> +Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the +same manner y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> secondary ones are prov'd not to exist +therein. +</p> + +<p> +Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension +suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is +absurd. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +World w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out thought is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nec quid</foreign>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nec quantum</foreign>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nec quale</foreign>, +&c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +'Tis wondrous to contemplate y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> World empty'd of all +intelligences. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do +exist. All other things are not so much existences as +manners of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> existence of persons<note place='foot'>Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons exist?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not +compleatly known? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external +existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> former +also. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at +1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi> sight? +</p> + +<p> +Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are +<pb n='060'/><anchor id='Pg060'/> +different from those ideas perceived by touch w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> goe by +the same name. +</p> + +<p> +Diagonal incommensurable w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> side. Quære how +this can be in my doctrine? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with +my doctrine? +</p> + +<p> +Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or +cube to be bodies or extended at first sight<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Extension so far from being incompatible w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>, y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> 'tis +impossible it should exist without thought. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. S.</note> +Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these +being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we +thoroughly know. +</p> + +<p> +No extension but surface perceivable by sight. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only +conceiving a person affected with these sensations. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in +a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply +action], is a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other +times. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined +to a particular bigness & figure, but &c. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out corresponds to our primary ideas but +powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an +active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we +depend. +</p> + +<p> +The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, +by the relation of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> story of the German Count. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same +name in all languages? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the +soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> +faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition +of the soul? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, +it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely +<pb n='061'/><anchor id='Pg061'/> +at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at +present, bodies now apparently moving w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> then be apparently +at rest? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation? +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his +own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make +these like unto them? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long +as y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> of a man<note place='foot'>Time being relative to the capacity +of the percipient.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance +demonstrated 3 several ways:— +</p> + +<p> +1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi>. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to +a visible inch, thence it will follow y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> unequals are equals, +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch +be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch? +</p> + +<p> +2<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi>. One made to see that had not yet seen his own +limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length +would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible +foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc. +</p> + +<p> +3<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>dly</hi>. From Molyneux's problem, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> otherwise is falsely +solv'd by Locke and him<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. +9. § 8.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Nothing but ideas perceivable<note place='foot'>To perceive what is not an idea +(as Berkeley uses idea) is to perceive +what is not realised, and +therefore not real.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving +them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is +not an idea is like or unlike an idea. +</p> + +<p> +Bodies &c. do exist even w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> not perceived—they being +powers in the active being<note place='foot'>So things have a <emph>potential</emph> objective +existence in the Divine Will.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. +an inconceivable idea,] Locke says<note place='foot'>With Berkeley, change is time, +and time, abstracted from all +changes, is meaningless.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, +also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for +the same. +</p> + +<pb n='062'/><anchor id='Pg062'/> + +<p> +If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether +tangible or visible, or both? +</p> + +<p> +Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true +in a double sense. +</p> + +<p> +Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> pleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in +matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, +[as also the constant perception of 'em]. +</p> + +<p> +Blind at 1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi> sight could not tell how near what he saw +was to him, nor even whether it be w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out him or in his +eye<note place='foot'>Could he know, by seeing only, even that he <emph>had</emph> a body?</note>. Qu. Would he not think the later? +</p> + +<p> +Blind at 1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi> sight could not know y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he saw was +extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same +thing—not knowing how <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum tangibile</foreign> would +look in vision. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to +answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. +before animals. +</p> + +<p> +In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one +of tangible, the other of visible. +</p> + +<p> +All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point. +</p> + +<p> +Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in +bodies. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate +them. +</p> + +<p> +Extension if in matter changes its relation w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum +visibile</foreign>, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> seems to be fixt. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely +extended, or have an infinite series of extension. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind +gives it beauty and proportion. +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I have said onely proves there is no proportion +at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible +inch. +</p> + +<p> +Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because +they have no common measure; also because their simplest +constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz. +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>punctum visibile & tangibile</foreign>. N. B. The former seems to be +no good reason. +</p> + +<pb n='063'/><anchor id='Pg063'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. N.</note> +By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or +rather the dispute ceases. +</p> + +<p> +Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, +i.e. neither infinitely small or great. +</p> + +<p> +Greatest possible extension seen under an angle w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> will +be less than 180 degrees, the legs of w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> angle proceed +from the ends of the extension. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without +the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive +them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving +onely the impressions made upon its brain, or +rather the ideas attending these impressions<note place='foot'><q>the ideas attending these +impressions,</q> i.e. the ideas that +are correlatives of the (by us unperceived) +organic impressions.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Unity <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign> not at all divisible, it being as it were +a point, or with Barrow nothing at all; <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in concreto</foreign> not +divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, there being no one idea demonstrable +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities +but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, +or onely of their relations? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he +will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; +extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c. +</p> + +<p> +Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity +of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of +tangible points? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> sceptics, +Fardella<note place='foot'>The Italian physical and metaphysical +philosopher Fardella (1650-1718) +maintained, by reasonings +akin to those of Malebranche, that +the existence of the material world +could not be scientifically proved, +and could only be maintained by +faith in authoritative revelation. +See his <hi rend='italic'>Universæ Philosophiæ Systema</hi> +(1690), and especially his +<hi rend='italic'>Logica</hi> (1696).</note>, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +they doubt of. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I am more certain of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> existence & reality of bodies +than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he calls +sensitive knowledge<note place='foot'>Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. IV. ch. 11.</note>, whereas I think I have demonstrative +<pb n='064'/><anchor id='Pg064'/> +knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations +of powers in an unknown substratum<note place='foot'>What does he mean by <q>unknown +substratum</q>?</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the +figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) +being infinitely divisible, those not so. +</p> + +<p> +'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because +the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. +Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same +way colour is abstract from extension. +</p> + +<p> +Every position alters the line. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other +ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an +inch? +</p> + +<p> +The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. +Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of +extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to +consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by +position. +</p> + +<p> +No stated ideas of length without a minimum. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. +cease<note place='foot'>He gets rid of the infinite in +quantity, because it is incapable of +concrete manifestation to the senses. +When a phenomenon given in +sense reaches the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum sensibile</foreign>, +it reaches what is for us the +margin of realisable existence: it +cannot be infinitely little and still +a phenomenon: insensible phenomena +of sense involve a contradiction. +And so too of the infinitely +large.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were +all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have +confounded tangible & visible extension and figure? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, +a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a +1000 years a day? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +But one only colour & its degrees. +</p> + +<pb n='065'/><anchor id='Pg065'/> + +<p> +Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks +in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at +1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi> give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by +sight; since he would take distance y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> that he had perceived +by <emph>touch</emph> to be something existing without his mind, +but he would certainly think that nothing <emph>seen</emph> was without +his mind<note place='foot'>In short he would idealise the +visible world but not the tangible +world. In the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Berkeley +idealises both.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Space without any bodies existing <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in rerum natura</foreign> would +not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are +assigned to it w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> respect to body; from whence also the +notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or +distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything +beside one uniform Nothing? +</p> + +<p> +Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not +take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a +point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not +perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, +whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me +but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not +avoid seeing them. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception +caused in his touch by something he calls extended, +or else the power of raising that perception; w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> power is +without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not +know either of these to be in things visible till he had +try'd. +</p> + +<p> +Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, +figures, & motion—and not visible<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 149-59, +where he concludes that <q>neither +abstract nor visible extension makes +the object of geometry.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' +the visible idea it yields be less than w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> it was; therefore +the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different +from the visible extension. +</p> + +<p> +Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & +solidity being three several ideas. +</p> + +<pb n='066'/><anchor id='Pg066'/> + +<p> +Depth or solidity <emph>now</emph> perceived by sight<note place='foot'>By the adult, who has learned +to interpret its visual signs.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder +than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to +be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no +power at all<note place='foot'>Inasmuch as no physical consequences +<emph>follow</emph> the volition; which +however is still self-originated.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by +sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> affects us must be a thinking thing, for w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> thinks +not cannot subsist. +</p> + +<p> +Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, +depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or +less as the mind pleases<note place='foot'><q>A succession of ideas I take +to <emph>constitute</emph> time, and not to be +only the sensible measure thereof, +as Mr. Locke and others think.</q> +(Berkeley's letter to Johnson.)</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation +with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis +an abstract term of the Schools. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but +in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section. +</p> + +<p> +Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise +seen than colours felt by the German Count. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +<q>Of</q> and <q>thing</q> causes of mistake. +</p> + +<p> +The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will +not be greater or less than mine. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry +do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. +without the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, +b. 2. c. 14. s. 19. +</p> + +<p> +Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas +from those conceiv'd absolutely. +</p> + +<p> +Every position alters a line. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Blind man at 1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi> would not take colours to be without +his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place +with the coloured extension: therefore extension w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> not +seem to be without the mind. +</p> + +<pb n='067'/><anchor id='Pg067'/> + +<p> +All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the +centre are absolutely equal. +</p> + +<p> +Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by +Locke<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. 16, +sect. 8.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines? +</p> + +<p> +Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 67-77.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 88-120.</note>? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and +paradise. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a +pin's head. +</p> + +<p> +Motion is proportionable to space described in given +time. +</p> + +<p> +Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given +time. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it +exists, affects us not<note place='foot'>This is of the essence of +Berkeley's philosophy.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Magnitude when barely taken for the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ratio partium extra +partes</foreign>, or rather for co-existence & succession, without +considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, +or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, +because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, +determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of +points whereby (together w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> distance & position) they are +determin'd, are resoluble into those points. +</p> + +<p> +Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession +is not all divisible, but is one simple idea. +</p> + +<p> +Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated +and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled +by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not +imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily +existing (I speak of infinite space)—for w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> the body +has past may be conceiv'd annihilated. +</p> + +<pb n='068'/><anchor id='Pg068'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel +beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain? +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why not taste & smell extension? +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought +heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible +perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at +least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red? +</p> + +<p> +Moon w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible +extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes +about things seen under equal angles &c. cease. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +All <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>potentiæ</foreign> alike indifferent. +</p> + +<p> +A. B. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> does he mean by his <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>potentia</foreign>? Is it the will, +desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes +t'other? +</p> + +<p> +No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or +pleasure. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>We</emph> do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical +sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of +nature do that. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>Mo. +S.</note> +A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand +years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most +minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on +supposition that uneasiness determines the will. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard +balls. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost +who had always seen through an inverting glass? +</p> + +<p> +All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as +is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal. +</p> + +<p> +We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other +colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect +heterogeneal light. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), +there being, perhaps, rays of air w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> will onely +exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular +colour. +</p> + +<p> +Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt +thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & +separate the thoughts they include, or because we want +names for their component ideas. +</p> + +<pb n='069'/><anchor id='Pg069'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of +existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore +it is known and it may be defined. +</p> + +<p> +We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the +Will. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; +but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they +please; w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting +only the operative faculties<note place='foot'>But in moral freedom originates +in the agent, instead of being <q>consecutive</q> +to his voluntary acts or +found only in their consequences.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Men impute their actions to themselves because they +will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas +they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad. +</p> + +<p> +This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of +desiring. +</p> + +<p> +If anything is meant by the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>potentia</foreign> of A. B. it must be +desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, +or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be +indifferent in respect of w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> he desires till after he has +desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, +that is indifferent, as all other faculties are. +</p> + +<p> +Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will +them: therefore I will will them. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. concerning the procession of Wills <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques +and morality. Their definitions, being of words +not yet known to y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> learner, are not disputed; but words in +metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the +definitions of them may chance to be contraverted. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in +metaphysiques & ethiques: for y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> about mathematical +propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated +opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on +such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned +sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the +truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established +opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, +strigose<note place='foot'><q>Strigose</q> (strigosus)—meagre.</note>, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more +ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so +exact, will not go down with most. +</p> + +<pb n='070'/><anchor id='Pg070'/> + +<p> +Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal +thoughts co-existing without mixture. +</p> + +<p> +Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence +of colour in the mind. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S. +Mo.</note> +Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the +operative faculties, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> depend on the Will, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is determin'd +by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not +determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, +this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis +evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant. +</p> + +<p> +Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, +but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple +idea. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into +fluxions, &c. +</p> + +<p> +The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in +my hand or on the open firmament, for 1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi>, in both cases +the retina is full; 2<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi>, the radius's of both spheres are +equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>dly</hi>, equal +numbers of points in one & t'other. +</p> + +<p> +In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright. +</p> + +<p> +Why the horizontal moon greater? +</p> + +<p> +Why objects seen erect? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +To what purpose certain figure and texture connected +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> other perceptions? +</p> + +<p> +Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. +Blind at 1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi> could not know distance; or by pure sight, +abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and +tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by +pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make +us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing +the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>punctum visibile</foreign> below 30 minutes? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I. +S.</note> +Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible +things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for +the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. +Hence manyfold mistakes. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +The grand mistake is that we think we have <emph>ideas</emph> of the +<pb n='071'/><anchor id='Pg071'/> +operations of our minds<note place='foot'>As he afterwards expresses it, +we have intelligible <emph>notions</emph>, but +not <emph>ideas</emph>—sensuous pictures—of +the states or acts of our minds.</note>. Certainly this metaphorical +dress is an argument we have not. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, +when his essence is simple & uncompounded? +V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35<note place='foot'>[<q>Omnes reales rerum proprietates +continentur in Deo.</q> What +means Le Clerc &c. by this? Log. +I. ch. 8.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on margin.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>G.</note> +The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of +such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of +language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion +of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my +own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them<note place='foot'><q>Si non rogas intelligo.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The substance <emph>wood</emph> a collection of simple ideas. See +Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them +through an orbicular lattice. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are +now connected with greater tangible extensions could +have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there +seeming to be no <emph>necessary</emph> connexion between those +thoughts? +</p> + +<p> +Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by +altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent +distance. +</p> + +<p> +Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by +convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.N.</note> +Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. +P.</note> +Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons +not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent +to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. +This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly<note place='foot'>This way of winning others to +his own opinions is very characteristic +of Berkeley. See p. <ref target='Pg092'>92</ref> and note.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. +P.</note> +Colours in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; +or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we +open our eyes; and that whether we will or no. +</p> + +<p> +How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass? +</p> + +<p> +Convex speculums have the same effect w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> concave +glasses. +</p> + +<pb n='072'/><anchor id='Pg072'/> + +<p> +Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> convex glasses? +</p> + +<p> +The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave +magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem +inverted through a convex lens? +</p> + +<p> +Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall +magnify or diminish by altering the distance without +altering the angle? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals +besides persons<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Third Dialogue</hi>, on <emph>sameness</emph> +in things and <emph>sameness</emph> in +persons, which it puzzles him to +reconcile with his New Principles.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, +& all thoughts move w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> local motion as immaterial spirit. +</p> + +<p> +On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances +must consist in something else than continued +existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning +to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being +combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, +& they having divers beginnings & endings. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the +Will? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +No necessary connexion between great or little optique +angles and great or little extension. +</p> + +<p> +Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. +How then is extension perceiv'd by sight? +</p> + +<p> +Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique +angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as +the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, +that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in +assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], +p. 182. +</p> + +<p> +Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen +without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much +diminished by a convex speculum as another? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in +actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person +I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I then +<pb n='073'/><anchor id='Pg073'/> +did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the +same, for ought we know. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt. +</p> + +<p> +Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. +In the last § but one, I mean the latter. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears +to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, +'tis plain, cannot be properly & <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign> perceived by sight; +& as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be +no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted +from experience, &c. +</p> + +<p> +The greatness <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign> perceivable by the sight is onely the +proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen +at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion +of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. +But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than +a plain, but by reasoning. +</p> + +<p> +This is all the greatness the pictures have <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension +of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such +a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the +greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend +the same angle w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> a mile, & so create as great an image in +the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb. +</p> + +<p> +Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, +by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, +by great & little angles. +</p> + +<p> +Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected +with greatness might have been connected w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> smallness, +and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why +great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, +should stand for great extension, any more than a great +angle, vigorousness, and confusion<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 52-61.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a +general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate +them to the sciences, and shew how they may be +useful in optiques, geometry, &c.<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 101-134.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign> proportion of visible magnitudes be +perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness +and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be +<pb n='074'/><anchor id='Pg074'/> +as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, +as in viewing the whole confusedly. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically +nice as possible—to avoid giving handle. +</p> + +<p> +If men could without straining alter the convexity of +their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the +apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining. +</p> + +<p> +The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is +not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the +images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the +greater room in the fund of his eye. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, +the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c. +</p> + +<p> +Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they +being perfectly and <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto cælo</foreign> different—the one the proportion +that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived +at the same time w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> it, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is proportional to angles, +or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the +other is tangible bigness. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> would happen if the sphæræ of the retina were +enlarged or diminish'd? +</p> + +<p> +We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance +from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet +we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the +same angle, yet we do not. +</p> + +<p> +Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer +vision? Yet we do not. +</p> + +<p> +Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought +by the ear. +</p> + +<p> +As long as the same angle determines the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum +visibile</foreign> to two persons, no different conformation of the eye +can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same +thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly +know whether the same thing appears differently +big to two persons on account of their eyes. +</p> + +<p> +If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him +than to another; hence there is another sort of purely +visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance +bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V. +</p> + +<p> +Were there but one and the same language in the world, +and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and +<pb n='075'/><anchor id='Pg075'/> +were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts +or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable +connexion between words & thoughts, so y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>posito uno, +ponitur alterum</foreign> by the laws of nature; Qu. would not men +think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension<note place='foot'><q>distance</q>—on opposite page +in the MS. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, +sect. 140.</note>? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws +of nature is not perfect & adæquate<note place='foot'>Direct perception of phenomena +is adequate to the perceived +phenomena; indirect or scientific +perception is inadequate, leaving +room for faith and trust.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be +in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as +much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +We know many things w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> we want words to express. +Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of +considering w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> divers men have run into sundry mistakes, +endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +foundering them, they thought the defect was in their +knowledge, while in truth it was in their language. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a +man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding +from thence or from his legs? +</p> + +<p> +Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas +entirely different that makes me judge them the same? +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I see is onely variety of colours & light. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> I feel +is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> +resemblance have these thoughts with those? +</p> + +<p> +A picture painted w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> great variety of colours affects the +touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude +that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or +inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore +can I—before experience teaches me—know that the +visible leggs are (because 2) connected w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the tangible +ones, or the visible head (because one) connected w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the +tangible head<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 107-8.</note>? +</p> + +<pb n='076'/><anchor id='Pg076'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +All things by us conceivable are— +</p> + +<p> +1st, thoughts; +</p> + +<p> +2ndly, powers to receive thoughts; +</p> + +<p> +3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; +neither of all w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> can possibly exist in an inert, senseless +thing. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +An object w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out a glass may be seen under as great an +angle as w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> a glass. A glass therefore does not magnify +the appearance by the angle. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>S.</note> +Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas +being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted<note place='foot'>The Divine Ideas of Malebranche and the sensuous ideas of Berkeley +differ.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. +So I see figure or distance. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are +not magnify'd? +</p> + +<p> +Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more +distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? +What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, +and greaterness? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians. +</p> + +<p> +Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so +exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +Lines thought divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, because they are +suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought +the same when view'd by the naked eye, & w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> view'd thro' +magnifying glasses. +</p> + +<p> +They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence +for the divisibility <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +No idea of circle, &c. in abstract. +</p> + +<p> +Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but +not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; +because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in +ethiques. +</p> + +<p> +Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do +tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, +tastes, &c. are more blended. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction +with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very +distinct ideas? +</p> + +<pb n='077'/><anchor id='Pg077'/> + +<p> +Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an +uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as +soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, +then their extension is perceiv'd. +</p> + +<p> +Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of +tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. +Hence heterogeneous extension. +</p> + +<p> +Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude +of an object, in proportion to the faintness<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 71.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c. +</p> + +<p> +That w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> seems smooth & round to the touch may to +sight seem quite otherwise. Hence no <emph>necessary</emph> connexion +betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones. +</p> + +<p> +In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad +infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined +ideas of figures, for these are not divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference +being given a diameter may be found betwixt w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> & the +true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore +there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a +perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. +In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, +for in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> case there is ('tis true) a difference +perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much +greater, entirely different therefrom<note place='foot'>Cf. Malebranche, <hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, +Bk. I. c. 6. That and the following +chapters seem to have been in +Berkeley's mind.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may +be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even +perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. +never so small an arch of a circle; this being w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> makes +the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the +m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think. +</p> + +<p> +The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore +further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is +perfectly needless, & time thrown away. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To press w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> last precedes more homely, & so +think on't again. +</p> + +<p> +A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does +<pb n='078'/><anchor id='Pg078'/> +not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed +thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension<note place='foot'>He here assumes that extension +(visible) is implied in the visible +idea we call colour.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. A great difference between <emph>considering</emph> length +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out breadth, & having an <emph>idea</emph> of, or <emph>imagining</emph>, length +without breadth<note place='foot'>This strikingly illustrates Berkeley's +use of <q>idea,</q> and what he +intends when he argues against +<q>abstract</q> ideas.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, +L. 1. c. 6. +</p> + +<p> +'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is +sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the +least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt +visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation +to <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sphæra visualis</foreign>, or to the m. v. (w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is all that I would +have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might +possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. +Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. +does frequently, in that men view little objects near the +eye. +</p> + +<p> +Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know +whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of +the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6. +</p> + +<p> +Diagonal of particular square commensurable w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> its +side, they both containing a certain number of m. v. +</p> + +<p> +I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer +distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +would prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular +between 2 parallels. +</p> + +<p> +Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is +nothing, but 1/1000 of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> mile represented is something: +therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be +neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of +a mile. +</p> + +<p> +Particular determin'd lines are not divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, +but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd +to any particular finite number of points. Yet a +geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can +demonstrate an inch line is divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move +by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis +<pb n='079'/><anchor id='Pg079'/> +true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. +But, besides this, there is no visible change of place. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability +of diagonale & side—whether it does not go +on the supposition of units being divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, i.e. +of the extended thing spoken of being divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign> +(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so +the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio +principii</foreign>? +</p> + +<p> +The diagonal is commensurable with the side. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +From Malbranch, Locke, & my first arguings it can't be +prov'd that extension is not in matter. From Locke's +arguings it can't be proved that colours are not in bodies. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mem. That I was distrustful at 8 years old; and consequently +by nature disposed for these new doctrines<note place='foot'>An interesting autobiographical fact. From childhood he was indisposed +to take things on trust.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of +points be divisible [<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>] in two equals? +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see +the pictures. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know +even their proportions—contrary to Malbranch. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as +that extension cannot exist without a thinking substance. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This +prov'd either by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or +diminishers. +</p> + +<p> +Y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>r</hi> m. v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>rd</hi> person +have perfect ideas of both our m. v<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>s</hi>. His idea of my m. v. +contains his idea of yours, & somewhat more. Therefore +'tis made up of parts: therefore his idea of my m. v. is not +perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended? +</p> + +<p> +Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pictures. +We think them small because should a man be +suppos'd to see them their pictures would take up but little +room in the fund of his eye. +</p> + +<pb n='080'/><anchor id='Pg080'/> + +<p> +It seems all lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts. +Mem. To examine how the geometers prove the contrary. +</p> + +<p> +'Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine. +If there be, mine may become equal to it (because they are +homogeneous) by detraction of some part or parts. But it +consists not of parts, ergo &c. +</p> + +<p> +Suppose inverting perspectives bound to y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> eyes of a +child, & continu'd to the years of manhood—when he looks +up, or turns up his head, he shall behold w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> we call <emph>under</emph>. +Qu. What would he think of <emph>up</emph> and <emph>down</emph><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 88-119.</note>? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious +tho' amazing truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency +in not finding it out before—'tis no witchcraft to see. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or perceptions; +a perception cannot exist without a thing to +perceive it, or any longer than it is perceiv'd; a thought +cannot be in an unthinking thing; one uniform simple +thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple +thought. Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assemblage +of simple ideas, and can be the image of nothing, or +like unto nothing, but another assemblage of simple ideas, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The Cartesian opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox +enough even in their eyes who think the Scripture expression +may favour the common opinion. Why may not +mine also? But there is nothing in Scripture that can +possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps, +many things for me. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Bodies &c. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they +being taken in a twofold sense— +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +1. Collections of thoughts. +</p> + +<p> +2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +These later exist; tho' perhaps <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a parte rei</foreign> it may be one +simple perfect power. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Qu. whether the extension of a plain, look'd at straight +and slantingly, survey'd minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk +and confusedly at once, be the same? N. B. The plain is +suppos'd to keep the same distance. +</p> + +<pb n='081'/><anchor id='Pg081'/> + +<p> +The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of +y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the extension +of that plain view'd & consider'd all together. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Ignorance in some sort requisite in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> person that should +disown the Principle. +</p> + +<p> +Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken +for the interior operations of the mind, wherein the mind +is active. Those y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> obey not the acts of volition, and in +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> the mind is passive, are more properly call'd sensations +or perceptions. But y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> is all a case of words. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of +minimums, i.e. of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, +it cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions +exist not when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he +does not prove, nor can it be prov'd on his principles, that +the sorts are the work of the mind, and onely in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in +an unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd +distinct from or without all tangible or visible quality. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Tho' matter be extended w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> an indefinite extension, yet +the mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind +perceiving them, & even now they are not without the +mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho' indefinitely extended matter +do exist, are not without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The great danger of making extension exist without the +mind is, that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite, +immutable, eternal, &c.;—w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> will be to make either God +extended (w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> I think dangerous), or an eternal, immutable, +infinite, increate Being beside God. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad +absurdum</foreign>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The twofold signification of Bodies, viz. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +1. Combinations of thoughts<note place='foot'><q>thoughts,</q> i.e. ideas of sense?</note>; +</p> + +<p> +2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts. +</p> + +</quote> + +<pb n='082'/><anchor id='Pg082'/> + +<p> +These, I say, in conjunction with homogeneous particles, +may solve much better the objections from the creation +than the supposition that Matter does exist. Upon w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +supposition I think they cannot be solv'd. +</p> + +<p> +Bodies taken for powers do exist w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> not perceiv'd; but +this existence is not actual<note place='foot'>This, in a crude way, is the +distinction of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. +It helps to explain Berkeley's +meaning, when he occasionally +speaks of the ideas or phenomena +that appear in the sense experience +of different persons as if they were +absolutely independent entities.</note>. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> I say a power exists, no +more is meant than that if in the light I open my eyes, and +look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the body, &c. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of +light and colours & visible extension, after the same manner +as we perceive them w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> eyes shut, or in the dark—not +imagining, but seeing after a sort? +</p> + +<p> +Visible extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible +extension. Visible and tangible points can't make one sum. +Therefore these extensions are heterogeneous. +</p> + +<p> +A probable method propos'd whereby one may judge +whether in near vision there is a greater distance between +the crystalline & fund than usual, or whether the crystalline +be onely render'd more convex. If the former, then the +v. s. is enlarg'd, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi>ever it us'd to correspond to. +</p> + +<p> +Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not +visible extensions. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended. +'Tis nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension +out of our idea of God, & put a power in its place. It +seems dangerous to suppose extension, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is manifestly +inert, in God. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +But, say you, The thought or perception I call extension +is not itself in an unthinking thing or Matter—but it is like +something w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is in Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend +or conceive w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> you say extension is like unto, or do +you not? If the later, how know you they are alike? +How can you compare any things besides your own ideas? +If the former, it must be an idea, i.e. perception, thought, +<pb n='083'/><anchor id='Pg083'/> +or sensation—w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> to be in an unperceiving thing is a contradiction<note place='foot'>To be <q>in an unperceiving +thing,</q> i.e. to be real, yet unperceived. +Whatever is perceived is, +because realised only through a +percipient act, an <emph>idea</emph>—in Berkeley's +use of the word.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>I.</note> +I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures, +using a great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft +found it difficult to understand those that use the lofty & +Platonic, or subtil & scholastique strain<note place='foot'>This as to the <q>Platonic strain</q> +is not in the tone of <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive; it +being that very having, that passive recognition of ideas, +that denominates the mind perceiving—that being the very +essence of perception, or that wherein perception consists. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The faintness w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> alters the appearance of the horizontal +moon, rather proceeds from the quantity or grossness of +the intermediate atmosphere, than from any change of +distance, w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is perhaps not considerable enough to be a +total cause, but may be a partial of the phenomenon. N. B. +The visual angle is less in cause the horizon. +</p> + +<p> +We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things, +so also by the situation of their pictures in the eye, or (w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +is the same thing) according as they appear higher or lower. +Those w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> seem higher are farther off. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. why we see objects greater in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> dark? whether +this can be solv'd by any but my Principles? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The reverse of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> Principle introduced scepticism. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +N. B. On my Principles there is a reality: there are +things: there is a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>rerum natura</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c. +</p> + +<p> +We think that if just made to see we should judge of the +distance & magnitude of things as we do now; but this is +false. So also w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> we think so positively of the situation of +objects. +</p> + +<p> +Hays's, Keill's<note place='foot'>John Keill (1671-1721), an eminent +mathematician, educated at +the University of Edinburgh; in +1710 Savilian Professor of Astronomy +at Oxford, and the first to +teach the Newtonian philosophy in +that University. In 1708 he was +engaged in a controversy in support +of Newton's claims to the +discovery of the method of fluxions.</note>, &c. method of proving the infinitesimals +of the 3<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>d</hi> order absurd, & perfectly contradictions. +</p> + +<pb n='084'/><anchor id='Pg084'/> + +<p> +Angles of contact, & verily all angles comprehended by +a right line & a curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches +intercepted not being similar. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extension. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance +be deem'd the true one rather than that seen at a farther +distance? Why should the sun be thought many 1000 +miles rather than one foot in diameter—both being equally +apparent diameters? Certainly men judg'd of the sun not +in himself, but w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> relation to themselves. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by us. +</p> + +<p> +2. There is a law or course of nature. +</p> + +<p> +3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words +stand for nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction +that bears equally hard upon the other<note place='foot'>This suggests a negative argument +for Kant's antinomies, and +for Hamilton's law of the conditioned.</note>. +</p> + +</quote> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +What shall I say? Dare I pronounce the admired +ἀκρίβεια mathematica, that darling of the age, a trifle? +</p> + +<p> +Most certainly no finite extension divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Difficulties about concentric circles. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>N.</note> +Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of +the 8<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> definition of Mr. Newton's<note place='foot'>Newton became Sir Isaac on +April 16, 1705. Was this written +before that date?</note> Principia. +</p> + +<p> +Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general +ideas? +</p> + +<p> +All ideas come from without. They are all particular. +The mind, 'tis true, can consider one thing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out another; +but then, considered asunder, they make not 2 ideas. +Both together can make but one, as for instance colour & +visible extension<note place='foot'>These may be <emph>considered</emph> separately, +but not <emph>pictured</emph> as such.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='085'/><anchor id='Pg085'/> + +<p> +The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke's +argument that the end of his pen is black or white concludes +nothing here. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension, +for fear of the geometers. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because +we are not used to take notice of 'em singly; they not +being able singly to pleasure or hurt us, thereby to deserve +our regard. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To prove against Keill y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> the infinite divisibility of +matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts +with the whole. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending +infinites may be admitted as a plea. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the +extensions below the M. as well as the dd, &c., w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are +allowed to be something, & consequently may be magnify'd +by glasses into inches, feet, &c., as well as the quantities +next below the M.? +</p> + +<p> +Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How +therefore can y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> extension you suppose in Matter be big or +little? How can it consist of any number of points? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Mem. Strictly to remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8. +</p> + +<p> +Schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians. +</p> + +<p> +Extension is blended w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> tangible or visible ideas, & by +the mind præscinded therefrom. +</p> + +<p> +Mathematiques made easy—the scale does almost all. +The scale can tell us the subtangent in y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> parabola is +double the abscisse. +</p> + +<p> +W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> need of the utmost accuracy w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> the mathematicians +own <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in rerum natura</foreign> they cannot find anything corresponding +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> their nice ideas. +</p> + +<p> +One should endeavour to find a progression by trying +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the scale. +</p> + +<p> +Newton's fluxions needless. Anything below an M +might serve for Leibnitz's Differential Calculus. +</p> + +<p> +How can they hang together so well, since there are in +them (I mean the mathematiques) so many <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>contradictoriæ +argutiæ</foreign>. V. Barrow, Lect. +</p> + +<p> +A man may read a book of Conics with ease, knowing +how to try if they are right. He may take 'em on the +credit of the author. +</p> + +<pb n='086'/><anchor id='Pg086'/> + +<p> +Where's the need of certainty in such trifles? The +thing that makes it so much esteem'd in them is that we +are thought not capable of getting it elsewhere. But we +may in ethiques and metaphysiques. +</p> + +<p> +The not leading men into mistakes no argument for +the truth of the infinitesimals. They being nothings may +perhaps do neither good nor harm, except w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> they are +taken for something, & then the contradiction begets +a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +a + 500 nothings = a + 50 nothings—an innocent silly truth. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +My doctrine excellently corresponds w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> the creation. +I suppose no matter, no stars, sun, &c. to have existed +before<note place='foot'>In as far as they have not +been sensibly realised in finite percipient +mind.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +It seems all circles are not similar figures, there not +being the same proportion betwixt all circumferences & +their diameters. +</p> + +<p> +When a small line upon paper represents a mile, the +mathematicians do not calculate the 1/10000 of the paper line, +they calculate the 1/10000 of the mile. 'Tis to this they +have regard, 'tis of this they think; if they think or have +any idea at all. The inch perhaps might represent to their +imaginations the mile, but y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> 1/10000 of the inch cannot be +made to represent anything, it not being imaginable. +</p> + +<p> +But the 1/10000 of a mile being somewhat, they think the +1/10000 inch is somewhat: w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> they think of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they +imagine they think on this. +</p> + +<p> +3 faults occur in the arguments of the mathematicians for +divisibility <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>— +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +1. They suppose extension to exist without the mind, +or not perceived. +</p> + +<p> +2. They suppose that we have an idea of length +without breadth<note place='foot'>[Or rather that invisible length +does exist.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on margin.</note>, or that length without breadth +does exist. +</p> + +<p> +3. That unity is divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +To suppose a M. S. divisible is to say there are distinguishable +ideas where there are no distinguishable ideas. +</p> + +<pb n='087'/><anchor id='Pg087'/> + +<p> +The M. S. is not near so inconceivable as the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>signum in +magnitudine individuum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Mem. To examine the math, about their <emph>point</emph>—what it +is—something or nothing; and how it differs from the +M. S. +</p> + +<p> +All might be demonstrated by a new method of indivisibles, +easier perhaps and juster than that of Cavalierius<note place='foot'>Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647), +the Italian mathematician. +His <hi rend='italic'>Geometry of Indivisibles</hi> (1635) +prepared the way for the Calculus.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Unperceivable perception a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P. G.</note> +Proprietates reales rerum omnium in Deo, tam corporum +quum spirituum continentur. Clerici, Log. cap. 8. +</p> + +<p> +Let my adversaries answer any one of mine, I'll yield. +If I don't answer every one of theirs, I'll yield. +</p> + +<p> +The loss of the excuse<note place='foot'>[By <q>the excuse</q> is meant the +finiteness of our mind—making it +possible for contradictions to appear +true to us.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on margin.</note> may hurt Transubstantiation, +but not the Trinity. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +We need not strain our imaginations to conceive such +little things. Bigger may do as well for infinitesimals, +since the integer must be an infinite. +</p> + +<p> +Evident y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> has an infinite number of parts must be +infinite. +</p> + +<p> +Qu. Whether extension be resoluble into points it does +not consist of? +</p> + +<p> +Nor can it be objected that we reason about numbers, +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> are only words & not ideas<note place='foot'>He allows elsewhere that words +with meanings not realisable in +imagination, i.e. in the form of +idea, may discharge a useful office. +See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, sect. +20.</note>; for these infinitesimals +are words of no use, if not supposed to stand for ideas. +</p> + +<p> +Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no +idea. Therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals. +</p> + +<p> +Much less infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c. +</p> + +<p> +Axiom. No word to be used without an idea. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Our eyes and senses inform us not of the existence of +matter or ideas existing without the mind<note place='foot'>We do not perceive unperceived +matter, but only matter realised in +living perception—the percipient +act being the factor of its reality.</note>. They are not +to be blam'd for the mistake. +</p> + +<pb n='088'/><anchor id='Pg088'/> + +<p> +I defy any man to assign a right line equal to a paraboloid, +but w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>n</hi> look'd at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Newton's harangue amounts to no more than that gravity +is proportional to gravity. +</p> + +<p> +One can't imagine an extended thing without colour. +V. Barrow, L. G. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Men allow colours, sounds, &c.<note place='foot'>The secondary qualities of +things.</note> not to exist without the +mind, tho' they have no demonstration they do not. Why +may they not allow my Principle with a demonstration? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M. P.</note> +Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist +without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> +I call <q>I,</q> <q>myself</q>—y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> seems to be distinct from the understanding<note place='foot'>Because, while dependent on +percipient sense, they are independent +of <emph>my</emph> personal will, being +determined to appear under natural +law, by Divine agency.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible +& visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made +men take it to be without the mind. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are +meer triflers, mere Nihilarians. +</p> + +<p> +The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations +by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Keill's filling the world with a mite<note place='foot'>Keill's <hi rend='italic'>Introductio ad veram +Physicam</hi> (Oxon. 1702)—Lectio 5—a +curious work, dedicated to the +Earl of Pembroke.</note>. This follows from +the divisibility of extension <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be +nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 +points<note place='foot'>[Extension without breadth—i. +e. insensible, intangible length—is +not conceivable. 'Tis a mistake +we are led into by the doctrine of +abstraction.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on margin +of MS.</note>. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer +reference of the mind. +</p> + +<p> +To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses +geometrically? +</p> + +<p> +Sir Isaac<note place='foot'>Here <q>Sir Isaac.</q> Hence +written after April, 1705.</note> owns his book could have been demonstrated +on the supposition of indivisibles. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne. +</p> + +<p> +I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> any one of +<pb n='089'/><anchor id='Pg089'/> +common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove +it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c. +</p> + +<p> +Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more +is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had +been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew +not how to employ their parts. +</p> + +<p> +The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein +truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. IV. ch. iv. sect. 18; +ch. v. sect. 3, &c.</note>. I see the +best of 'em talk of light and colours as if w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi>out the mind. +</p> + +<p> +By <emph>thing</emph> I either mean ideas or that w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> has ideas<note place='foot'>He applies <emph>thing</emph> to self-conscious +persons as well as to passive +objects of sense.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. +Scaliger<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Scaligerana Secunda</hi>, p. 270.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses +as they consider. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +1. <note place='foot'>[These arguments must be +proposed shorter and more separate +in the Treatise.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on +margin.</note>All significant words stand for ideas<note place='foot'><q>Idea</q> here used in its wider +meaning—for <q>operations of mind,</q> +as well as for sense presented phenomena +that are independent of individual +will. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 1.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +2. All knowledge about our ideas. +</p> + +<p> +3. All ideas come from without or from within. +</p> + +<p> +4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are +call'd sensations<note place='foot'><q>sensations,</q> i.e. objective +phenomena presented in sense.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & +are called thoughts. +</p> + +<p> +6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing. +</p> + +<p> +7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing. +</p> + +<p> +8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 1.</note>, by 3, +4, 5. +</p> + +<p> +9. None of our ideas can be in a thing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is both +thoughtless & senseless<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 2.</note>, by 6, 7, 8. +</p> + +<p> +10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is +called perception. +</p> + +<p> +11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so +passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must +perceive. 10. +</p> + +<pb n='090'/><anchor id='Pg090'/> + +<p> +12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple +ideas. +</p> + +<p> +13. That thing w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> is like unto another thing must agree +w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>th</hi> it in one or more simple ideas. +</p> + +<p> +14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another +simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of +the same sort. 13. +</p> + +<p> +15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. +11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing. +</p> + +<p> +16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till +they have been compar'd. +</p> + +<p> +17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & +marking w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they agree in and w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they disagree in. +</p> + +<p> +18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17. +</p> + +<p> +19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. +11, 16, 18. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +N. B. Other arguments innumerable, both <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> & +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, +plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the +Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our +ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing<note place='foot'>An <q>unperceiving thing</q> cannot +be the factor of material reality.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +N. B. Not one argument of any kind w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi>soever, certain or +probable, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>, from any art or science, +from either sense or reason, against it. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence +angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension +divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences. +</p> + +<p> +We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, +more easily, & upon truer principles than himself<note place='foot'>[To the utmost accuracy, wanting +nothing of perfection. <emph>Their</emph> +solutions of problems, themselves +must own to fall infinitely short of +perfection.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author</hi>, on margin.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll +endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or +imaginable, or intelligible. But for <emph>the nothings</emph>, I'll leave +them to their admirers. +</p> + +<pb n='091'/><anchor id='Pg091'/> + +<p> +I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in +1/100 part the time that another will. +</p> + +<p> +Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence +Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there +is onely figure & motion. +</p> + +<p> +I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. W<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>ch</hi> goes on +the best principles? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The Billys<note place='foot'>Jean de Billy and René de Billy, +French mathematicians—the former +author of <hi rend='italic'>Nova Geometriæ Clavis</hi> and +other mathematical works.</note> use a finite visible line for an 1/m. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>T.</note> +Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died +solv'd by my idea of time<note place='foot'>According to Baronius, in the +fifth volume of his <q>Annals,</q> Ficinus +appeared after death to Michael +Mercatus—agreeably to a promise +he made when he was alive—to +assure him of the life of the human +spirit after the death of the body.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>M.</note> +The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. +The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. +The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> do the +rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them +still<note place='foot'>So far as we are factors of their +reality, in sense and in science, or +can be any practical way concerned +with them.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by +the bargain<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 101-34.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<note place='margin'>P.</note> +There are men who say there are insensible extensions. +There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is +not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths. +</p> + +<p> +The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. +About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all +angles: these are divisible <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. We Irishmen +can conceive no such lines. +</p> + +<p> +The mathematicians talk of w<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>t</hi> they call a point. This, +they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright +something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something<note place='foot'><q>something,</q> i.e. <emph>abstract</emph> something.</note> +& nothing are next neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +Engagements to P.<note place='foot'>Lord Pembroke (?)—to whom +the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> were dedicated, and +to whom Locke dedicated his <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>.</note> on account of y<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>e</hi> Treatise that grew +up under his eye; on account also of his approving my +<pb n='092'/><anchor id='Pg092'/> +harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull +tho' newly discover'd truths. +</p> + +<p> +How could I venture thoughts into the world before I +knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I +know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas? +</p> + +<p> +I publish not this so much for anything else as to know +whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. +This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign +countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my +heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction. +</p> + +<p> +Passing through all the sciences, though false for the +most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater +knowledge of the truth. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +He that would bring another over to his opinion, must +seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in +his own way of talking<note place='foot'>This is an interesting example +of a feature that is conspicuous +in Berkeley—the art of <q>humoring +an opponent in his own way +of thinking,</q> which it seems was +an early habit. It is thus that +he insinuates his New Principles +in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, and so +prepares to unfold and defend them +in the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> and the +three <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>—straining language +to reconcile them with ordinary +modes of speech.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of +thought that way. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than +a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is +upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears +1<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>st</hi>, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence +of God; 2<hi rend='vertical-align: super'>dly</hi>, from cutting off the useless labour +of sciences, and so forth. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='095'/><anchor id='Pg095'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>First published in 1709</hi> +</p> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards A New +Theory Of Vision</head> + +<p> +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Essay towards a New Theory of Vision</hi> was +meant to prepare the way for the exposition and defence +of the new theory of the material world, its natural +order, and its relation to Spirit, that is contained in +his book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> and in the relative <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>, +which speedily followed. The <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> was the firstfruits +of his early philosophical studies at Dublin. It was also +the first attempt to show that our apparently immediate +Vision of Space and of bodies extended in three-dimensioned +space, is either tacit or conscious inference, +occasioned by constant association of the phenomena of +which alone we are visually percipient with assumed +realities of our tactual and locomotive experience. +</p> + +<p> +The first edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> appeared early in 1709, +when its author was about twenty-four years of age. A +second edition, with a few verbal changes and an Appendix, +followed before the end of that year. Both were issued +in Dublin, <q>printed by Aaron Rhames, at the back of +<pb n='096'/><anchor id='Pg096'/> +Dick's Coffeehouse, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in +Skinner Row.</q> In March, 1732, a third edition, without +the Appendix, was annexed to <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron,</hi> on account of +its relation to the Fourth Dialogue in that book. This +was the author's last revision. +</p> + +<p> +In the present edition the text of this last edition is +adopted, after collation with those preceding. The Appendix +has been restored, and also the Dedication to Sir John +Percival, which appeared only in the first edition. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +A due appreciation of Berkeley's theory of seeing, and +his conception of the visible world, involves a study, not +merely of this tentative juvenile <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, but also of its +fuller development and application in his more matured +works. This has been commonly forgotten by his critics. +</p> + +<p> +Various circumstances contribute to perplex and even +repel the reader of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, making it less fit to be an +easy avenue of approach to Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +Its occasion and design, and its connexion with his +spiritual conception of the material world, are suggested +in Sections 43 and 44 of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. Those sections +are a key to the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. They inform us that in the +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> the author intentionally uses language which +seems to attribute a reality independent of all percipient +spirit to the ideas or phenomena presented in Touch; +it being beside his purpose, he says, to <q>examine and +refute</q> that <q>vulgar error</q> in <q>a work on Vision.</q> This +studied reticence of a verbally paradoxical conception of +Matter, in reasonings about vision which are fully intelligible +only under that conception, is one cause of +a want of philosophical lucidity in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +Another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of +those who approach the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> and the three <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> +through the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>. The <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> offers no +exception to the lax employment of equivocal words +familiar in the early literature of English philosophy, +<pb n='097'/><anchor id='Pg097'/> +but which is particularly inconvenient in the subtle +discussions to which we are here introduced. At the +present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precision +and uniformity in the philosophical use of language; +at any rate we connect other meanings than those +here intended with some of the leading words. It is +enough to refer to such terms as <emph>idea</emph>, <emph>notion</emph>, <emph>sensation</emph>, +<emph>perception</emph>, <emph>touch</emph>, <emph>externality</emph>, <emph>distance</emph>, and their conjugates. +It is difficult for the modern reader to revive and remember +the meanings which Berkeley intends by <emph>idea</emph> and +<emph>notion</emph>—so significant in his vocabulary; and <emph>touch</emph> with +him connotes muscular and locomotive experience as well +as the pure sense of contact. Interchange of the terms +<emph>outward</emph>, <emph>outness</emph>, <emph>externality</emph>, <emph>without the mind</emph>, and <emph>without +the eye</emph> is confusing, if we forget that Berkeley implies +that percipient mind is virtually coextensive with our +bodily organism, so that being <q>without</q> or <q>at a distance +from</q> our bodies is being at a distance from the percipient +mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some of +these ambiguities, of which Berkeley himself warns us +(cf. sect. 120). +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> moreover abounds in repetitions, and interpolations +of antiquated optics and physiology, so that its +logical structure and even its supreme generalisation are +not easily apprehended. I will try to disentangle them. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The reader must remember that this <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi> +is professedly an introspective appeal to human consciousness. +It is an analysis of what human beings are conscious +of when they see, the results being here and there applied, +partly by way of verification, to solve some famous optical +or physiological puzzle. The aim is to present the facts, +the whole facts, and nothing but the facts of our internal +visual experience, as distinguished from supposed facts +and empty abstractions, which an irregular exercise of +imagination, or abuse of words, had put in their place. +<pb n='098'/><anchor id='Pg098'/> +The investigation, moreover, is not concerned with Space +in its metaphysical infinity, but with finite sections of Space +and their relations, which concern the sciences, physical +and mathematical, and with real or tangible Distance, +Magnitude, and Place, in their relation to seeing. +</p> + +<p> +From the second section onwards the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> naturally +falls into six Parts, devoted successively to the proof of +the six following theses regarding the relation of Sight +to finite spaces and to things extended:— +</p> + +<p> +I. (Sect. 2-51.) Distance, or outness from the eye in +the line of vision, is not seen: it is only suggested to the +mind by visible phenomena and by sensations felt in +the eye, all which are somehow its arbitrarily constituted +and non-resembling Signs. +</p> + +<p> +II. (Sect. 52-87.) Magnitude, or the amount of space +that objects of sense occupy, is really invisible: we only +see a greater or less quantity of colour, and colour depends +upon percipient mind: our supposed visual perceptions +of real magnitude are only our own interpretations of the +tactual meaning of the colours we see, and of sensations +felt in the eye, which are its Signs. +</p> + +<p> +III. (Sect. 88-120.) Situation of objects of sense, or +their real relation to one another in ambient space, is +invisible: what we see is variety in the relations of colours +to one another: our supposed vision of real tangible +locality is only our interpretation of its visual non-resembling +Signs. +</p> + +<p> +IV. (Sect. 121-46.) There is no object that is presented +in common to Sight and Touch: space or extension, +which has the best claim to be their common object, +is specifically as well as numerically different in Sight +and in Touch. +</p> + +<p> +V. (Sect. 147-48.) The explanation of the tactual significance +of the visible and visual Signs, upon which human +experience proceeds, is offered in the Theory that all +visible phenomena are arbitrary signs in what is virtually +<pb n='099'/><anchor id='Pg099'/> +the Language of Nature, addressed by God to the senses +and intelligence of Man. +</p> + +<p> +VI. (Sect. 149-60.) The true object studied in Geometry +is the kind of Extension given in Touch, not that given +in Sight: real Extension in all its phases is tangible, +not visible: colour is the only immediate object of Sight, +and colour being mind-dependent sensation, cannot be +realised without percipient mind. These concluding +sections are supplementary to the main argument. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The fact that distance or outness is invisible is sometimes +regarded as Berkeley's contribution to the theory +of seeing. It is rather the assumption on which the +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> proceeds (sect. 2). The <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> does not prove +this invisibility, but seeks to shew how, notwithstanding, +we learn to find outness through seeing. That the relation +between the visual signs of outness, on the one hand, +and the real distance which they signify, on the other, is +in all cases arbitrary, and discovered through experience, is +the burden of sect. 2-40. The previously recognised +signs of <q>considerably remote</q> distances, are mentioned +(sect. 3). But <emph>near</emph> distance was supposed to be inferred +by a visual geometry—and to be <q>suggested,</q> not signified +by arbitrary signs. The determination of the visual signs +which suggest outness, near and remote, is Berkeley's +professed discovery regarding vision. +</p> + +<p> +An induction of the visual signs which <q>suggest</q> +distance, is followed (sect. 43) by an assertion of the +wholly sensuous reality of <emph>colour</emph>, which is acknowledged +to be the only immediate object of sight. Hence <emph>visible</emph> +extension, consisting in colour, must be dependent +for its realisation upon sentient or percipient mind. It +is then argued (sect. 44) that this mind-dependent visible +outness has no resemblance to the tangible reality (sect. +45). This is the first passage in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> in which Touch +and its data are formally brought into view. Tactual or +<pb n='100'/><anchor id='Pg100'/> +locomotive experience, it is implied, is needed to infuse +true reality into our conceptions of distance or outness. +This cannot be got from seeing any more than from +hearing, or tasting, or smelling. It is as impossible to +see and touch the same object as it is to hear and +touch the same object. Visible objects and ocular sensations +can only be <emph>ideal signs</emph> of <emph>real things</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +The sections in which Touch is thus introduced are +among the most important in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. They represent +the outness given in hearing as wholly sensuous, ideal, or +mind-dependent: they recognise as more truly real that +got by contact and locomotion. But if this is all that +man can see, it follows that his <emph>visible</emph> world, at any +rate, becomes real only in and through percipient mind. +The problem of an <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi> is thus, to explain +<emph>how</emph> the visible world of extended colour can inform us of +tangible realities, which it does not in the least resemble, +and with which it has no <emph>necessary</emph> connexion. That +visible phenomena, or else certain organic sensations +involved in seeing (sect. 3, 16, 21, 27), gradually <emph>suggest</emph> +the real or tangible outness with which they are connected +in the divinely constituted system of nature, is the +explanation which now begins to dawn upon us. +</p> + +<p> +Here an ambiguity in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> appears. It concludes +that the <emph>visible</emph> world cannot be real without percipient +realising mind, i.e. not otherwise than ideally: yet the +argument seems to take for granted that we are percipient +of a <emph>tangible</emph> world that is independent of percipient realising +mind. The reader is apt to say that the tangible world +must be as dependent on percipient mind for its reality +as the visible world is concluded to be, and for the same +reason. This difficulty was soon afterwards encountered +in the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, where the worlds of sight and +touch are put on the same level; and the possibility of +unperceived reality in both cases is denied; on the ground +that a material world cannot be realised in the total +<pb n='101'/><anchor id='Pg101'/> +absence of Spirit—human and divine. The term <q>external</q> +may still be applied to tactual and locomotive +phenomena alone, if men choose; but this not because +of the ideal character of what is seen, and the unideal +reality of what is touched, but only because tactual perceptions +are found to be more firm and steady than +visual. Berkeley preferred in this way to <emph>insinuate</emph> his +new conception of the material world by degrees, at the +risk of exposing this juvenile and tentative <hi rend='italic'>Essay on +Vision</hi> to a charge of incoherence. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The way in which visual ideas or phenomena <q>suggest</q> +the outness or distance of things from the organ of sight +having been thus explained, in what I call the First Part +of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, the Second and Third Parts (sect. 52-120) +argue for the invisibility of real extension in two other +relations, viz. magnitude and locality or situation. An +induction of the visual signs of tangible size and situation +is given in those sections. The result is applied to solve +two problems then notable in optics, viz. (1) the reason +for the greater visible size of the horizontal moon than +of the moon in its meridian (sect. 67-87); and (2) the +fact that objects are placed erect in vision only on condition +that their images on the retina are inverted (sect. +88-120). Here the antithesis between the ideal world +of coloured extension, and the real world of resistant +extension is pressed with vigour. The <q>high</q> and <q>low</q> +of the visible world is not the <q>high</q> and <q>low</q> of the +tangible world (sect. 91-106). There is no resemblance +and no necessary relation, between those two so-called +extensions; not even when the number of visible objects +happen to coincide with the number of tangible objects +of which they are the visual signs, e.g. the visible and +tangible fingers on the hand: for the born-blind, on first +receiving sight, could not parcel out the visible phenomena +in correspondence with the tangible. +</p> + +<pb n='102'/><anchor id='Pg102'/> + +<p> +The next Part of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> (sect. 121-45) argues for +a specific as well as a numerical difference between the +original data of sight and the data of touch and locomotion. +Sight and touch perceive nothing in common. Extension +in its various relations differs in sight from extension in +touch. Coloured extension, which alone is visible, is +found to be different in kind from resistant extension, +which alone is tangible. And if actually perceived or +concrete extensions differ thus, the question is determined. +For all extension with which man can be concerned +must be concrete (sect. 23). Extension in the +abstract is meaningless (sect. 124-25). What remains +is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to guard the +foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted +in sections 128-46. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The enunciation of the summary generalisation, which +forms the <q>New Theory of Vision</q> (sect. 147-8), may +be taken as the Fifth and culminating Part of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The closing sections (149-60), as I have said, are +supplementary, and profess to determine the sort of extension—visible +or tangible—with which Geometry is +concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries +to picture the mental state of Idominians, or unbodied +spirits, endowed with visual perceptions <emph>only</emph>, and asks +what <emph>their</emph> conception of outness and solid extension +must be. Here further refinements in the interpretation +of visual perception, and its organic conditions, which have +not escaped the attention of latter psychologists and +biologists, are hinted at. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling +arbitrary Signs of the tactual distances, sizes, and situations +of things, is a question which some might prefer +to deal with experimentally—by trial of the experience +of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer. +<pb n='103'/><anchor id='Pg103'/> +Of this sort would be the experience of the born-blind, +immediately after their sight has been restored; the +conception of extension and its relations found in persons +who continue from birth unable to see; the experience +(if it could be got) of persons always destitute of all +tactual and locomotive perceptions, but familiar with +vision; and the facts of seeing observed in infants of +the human species, and in the lower animals. +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this +way. Here and there (sect. 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, +110, 128, 132-37), he conjectures what the first visual +experience of those rescued from born-blindness is likely +to be; he also speculates, as we have seen, about the +experience of unbodied spirits supposed to be able to +see, but unable to touch or move (sect. 153-59); and +in the Appendix he refers, in confirmation of his New +Theory, to a reported case of one born blind who had +obtained sight. But he forms his Theory independently +of those delicate and difficult investigations. His testing +facts were sought introspectively. Indeed those physiologists +and mental philosophers who have since tried +to determine what vision in its purity is, by cases either +of communicated sight or of continued born-blindness, +have illustrated the truth of Diderot's remark—<q>préparer +et interroger un aveugle-né n'eût point été une occupation +indigne des talens réunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke, +et Leibniz<note place='foot'>In Diderot's <hi rend='italic'>Lettre sur les +aveugles, à l'usage de ceux qui +voient</hi>, where Berkeley, Molyneux, +Condillac, and others are mentioned. +Cf. also Appendix, pp. 111, +112; and <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 71, with the note, in +which some recorded experiments +are alluded to.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> has been quoted as a signal +example of discovery in metaphysics. The subtle analysis +which distinguishes <emph>seeing</emph> strictly so called, from judgments +about extended things, suggested by what we see, +<pb n='104'/><anchor id='Pg104'/> +appears to have been imperfectly known to the ancient +philosophers. Aristotle, indeed, speaks of colour as the +only proper object of sight; but, in passages of the +<hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi>, II. 6, III. 1, &c. +Aristotle assigns a pre-eminent +intellectual value to the sense of +sight. See, for instance, his +<hi rend='italic'>Metaphysics</hi>, I. 1.</note> where he names properties peculiar to particular +senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, figure, +and magnitude, which belong to all the senses in common. +His distinction of Proper and Common Sensibles +appears at first to contradict Berkeley's doctrine of the +heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible +worlds. Aristotle, however, seems to question the immediate +perceptibility of Common Sensibles, and to regard +them as realised through the activity of intelligence<note place='foot'><p>Sir A. Grant, (<hi rend='italic'>Ethics of Aristotle</hi>, +vol. II. p. 172) remarks, as to the +doctrine that the Common Sensibles +are apprehended concomitantly by +the senses, that: <q>this is surely the +true view; we see in the apprehension +of number, figure, and the like, +not an operation of sense, but the +mind putting its own forms and categories, +i.e. itself, on the external +object. It would follow then that +the senses cannot really be separated +from the mind; the senses +and the mind each contribute an +element to every knowledge. Aristotle's +doctrine of κοινὴ αἴσθησις +would go far, if carried out, to +modify his doctrine of the simple +and innate character of the senses, +e.g. sight (cf. <hi rend='italic'>Eth.</hi> II. 1, 4), and +would prevent its collision with +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision</hi>.</q>—See +also Sir W. Hamilton, <hi rend='italic'>Reid's +Works</hi>, pp. 828-830. +</p> +<p> +Dugald Stewart (<hi rend='italic'>Collected Works</hi>, +vol. I. p. 341, note) quotes Aristotle's +<hi rend='italic'>Ethics</hi>, II. 1, as evidence that +Berkeley's doctrine, <q>with respect +to the acquired perceptions of +sight, was quite unknown to the +best metaphysicians of antiquity.</q></p></note>. +</p> + +<p> +Some writers in Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early +modern philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining +the relation of our matured notion of distance to what +we originally perceive in seeing, and in the fifteenth century +it was discovered by Maurolyco that the rays of light +from the object converge to a focus in the eye; but I have +not been able to trace even the germ of the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> in +these speculations. +</p> + +<p> +Excepting some hints by Descartes, Malebranche was +among the first dimly to anticipate Berkeley, in resolving +our supposed power of seeing outness into an interpretation +<pb n='105'/><anchor id='Pg105'/> +of visual signs which we learn by experience to understand. +The most important part of Malebranche's account of +seeing is contained in the <hi rend='italic'>Recherche de la Vérité</hi> (Liv. I. +ch. 9), in one of those chapters in which he discusses the +frequent fallaciousness of the senses, and in particular of +our visual perceptions of extension. He accounts for +their inevitable uncertainty by assigning them not to sense +but to misinterpretation of what is seen. He also enumerates +various visual signs of distance. +</p> + +<p> +That the <hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi> of Malebranche, published more +than thirty years before the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, was familiar to Berkeley +before the publication of his <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi>, is proved by +internal evidence, and by his juvenile <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>. +I am not able to discover signs of a similar connexion +between the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> and the chapter on the mystery +of sensation in Glanvill's <hi rend='italic'>Scepsis Scientifica</hi> (ch. 5), published +some years before the <hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi> of Malebranche, +where Glanvill refers to <q>a secret deduction,</q> through +which—from motions, &c., of which we are immediately +percipient—we <q>spell out</q> figures, distances, magnitudes, +and colours, which have no resemblance to them. +</p> + +<p> +An approach to the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> is found in a passage +which first appeared in the second edition of Locke's +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, published in 1694, to which Berkeley refers in his +own <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> (sect. 132-35), and which, on account of its +relative importance, I shall here transcribe at length:— +</p> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>We are further to consider concerning Perception that +the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, +altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of +it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform +colour, e.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the +idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously +shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness +coming to our eyes. But, we having by use been +accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex +bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made +<pb n='106'/><anchor id='Pg106'/> +in the reflection of light by the difference in the sensible +figures of bodies—the judgment presently, by an habitual +custom, alters the appearances into their causes; so that, +from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting +the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and +frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an +uniform colour, when the idea we receive from them is +only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that +very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, +the learned and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was +pleased to send me in a letter some months since, and it is +this:—Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and +taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a +sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, +so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other, which is +the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube +and the sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be +made to see: quere, whether, by his sight, before he +touched them, he could not distinguish and tell, which is +the globe and which the cube? To which the acute and +judicious proposer answers: <q>Not.</q> For, though he has +obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects +his touch; yet he has not obtained the experience that +what affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so +and so; so that a protuberant angle in the cube, that +pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it +does in the cube.—I agree with this thinking gentleman, +whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this +his problem, and am of opinion that the blind man, at +first sight, would not be able to say with certainty which +was the globe and which the cube, whilst he only saw +them; though he would unerringly name them by his +touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference in +their figures felt.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an +<pb n='107'/><anchor id='Pg107'/> +occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden +to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, +where he thinks he had not the least use of, or help from +them: and the rather because this observing gentleman +further adds that, having, upon the occasion of my book, +proposed this problem to divers very ingenious men, he +hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to +it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they +were convinced.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but +those received by sight: because sight, the most comprehensive +of the senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of +light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; +and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, +the several varieties of which change the appearance of its +proper object, i.e. light and colours; we bring ourselves +by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many +cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent +experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, +that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which +is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, i.e. that +of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce +taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with +attention and understanding takes little notice of the +character or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in +him by them.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little +notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the +mind are performed; for, as itself is thought to take up no +space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to require +no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an +instant. I speak this in comparison of the actions of the +body.... Secondly, we shall not be much surprised that +this is done with us in so little notice, if we consider how +the facility we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, +makes them often pass in us without notice. Habits, +<pb n='108'/><anchor id='Pg108'/> +especially such as are begun very early, come at last to +produce actions in us which often escape our observation.... +And therefore it is not so strange that our mind +should often change the idea of its sensation into that of +its judgment, and make the one serve only to excite the +other, without our taking notice of it.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Essay concerning +Human Understanding</hi>, Book II. ch. 9. § 8.) +</p> + +<p> +This remarkable passage anticipates by implication the +view of an interpretation of materials originally given in +the visual sense, which, under the name of <q>suggestion,</q> is +the ruling factor in the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +The following sentences relative to the invisibility of distances, +contained in the <hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Dioptrics</hi> (published +in 1690) of Locke's friend and correspondent William +Molyneux, whose son was Berkeley's pupil, illustrate +Locke's statements, and may be compared with the opening +sections of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>:— +</p> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>In plain vision the estimate we make of the distance of +objects (especially when so far removed that the interval +between our two eyes bears no sensible proportion thereto, +or when looked upon with one eye only) is rather the act +of our judgment than of sense; and acquired by exercise, +and a faculty of comparing, rather than natural. For, distance +of itself is not to be perceived; for, 'tis a line (or a +length) presented to our eye with its end toward us, which +must therefore be only a point, and that is invisible. Wherefore +distance is chiefly perceived by means of interjacent +bodies, as by the earth, mountains, hills, fields, trees, houses, +&c. Or by the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude +of bodies, or of their faint colours, &c. These I say +are the chief means of apprehending the distance of objects +that are considerably remote. But as to nigh objects—to +whose distance the interval of the eyes bears a sensible +proportion—their distance is perceived by the turn of the +eyes, or by the angle of the optic axes (<hi rend='italic'>Gregorii Opt. Promot.</hi> +prop. 28). This was the opinion of the ancients, +<pb n='109'/><anchor id='Pg109'/> +Alhazen, Vitellio, &c. And though the ingenious Jesuit +Tacquet (<hi rend='italic'>Opt. Lib. I.</hi> prop. 2) disapprove thereof, and objects +against it a new notion of Gassendus (of a man's seeing +only with one eye at a time one and the same object), yet +this notion of Gassendus being absolutely false (as I could +demonstrate were it not beside my present purpose), it +makes nothing against this opinion.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of itself +perceivable, if an object were conveyed to the eye by one +single ray only, there were no other means of judging of +its distance but by some of those hinted before. Therefore +when we estimate the distance of nigh objects, either we +take the help of both eyes; or else we consider the pupil of +one eye as having breadth, and receiving a parcel of rays +from each radiating point. And, according to the various +inclinations of the rays from one point on the various parts +of the pupil, we make our estimate of the distance of the +object. And therefore (as is said before), by one single eye +we can only judge of the distance of such objects to whose +distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible proportion.... +For, it is observed before (prop. 29, sec. 2, see also +<hi rend='italic'>Gregorii Opt. Promot.</hi> prop. 29) that for viewing objects +remote and nigh, there are requisite various conformations +of the eye—the rays from nigh objects that fall on the eye +diverging more than those from more remote objects.</q> +(<hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Dioptrics</hi>, Part I. prop. 31.) +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +All this helps to shew the state of science regarding +vision about the time Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> appeared, especially +among those with whose works he was familiar<note place='foot'>A work resembling Berkeley's +in its title, but in little else, appeared +more than twenty years before the +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>—the <hi rend='italic'>Nova Visionis Theoria</hi> +of Dr. Briggs, published in 1685.</note>. I shall +next refer to illustrations of the change which the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> +produced. +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> has occasioned some interesting criticism +<pb n='110'/><anchor id='Pg110'/> +since its appearance in 1709. At first it drew little +attention. For twenty years after its publication the allusions +to it were few. The account of Cheselden's experiment +upon one born blind, published in 1728, in the +<hi rend='italic'>Philosophical Transactions</hi>, which seemed to bring the +Theory to the test of scientific experiment, recalled attention +to Berkeley's reasonings. The state of religious thought +about the same time confirmed the tendency to discuss +a doctrine which represented human vision as interpretation +of a natural yet divine language, thus suggesting +Omnipresent Mind. +</p> + +<p> +Occasional discussions of the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> may be found +in the <hi rend='italic'>Gentleman's Magazine</hi>, from 1732 till Berkeley's +death in 1753. Some criticisms may also be found in +Smith's <hi rend='italic'>Optics</hi>, published in 1738. +</p> + +<p> +Essential parts of Berkeley's analysis are explained +by Voltaire, in his <hi rend='italic'>Élémens de la Philosophie de Newton</hi>. +The following from that work is here given on its own +account, and also as a prominent recognition of the new +doctrine in France, within thirty years from its first +promulgation:— +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>Il faut absolument conclure de tout ceci, que les distances, +les grandeurs, les situations, ne sont pas, à proprement parler, +des choses visibles, c'est-à-dire, ne sont pas les objets propres +et immédiats de la vue. L'objet propre et immédiat de la vue +n'est autre chose que la lumière colorée: tout le reste, nous ne +le sentons qu'à la longue et par expérience. Nous apprenons +à voir précisément comme nous apprenons à parler et à +lire. La différence est, que l'art de voir est plus facile, et +que la nature est également à tous notre maître.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Les jugements soudains, presque uniformes, que toutes +nos âmes, à un certain âge, portent des distances, des +grandeurs, des situations, nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu'à +ouvrir les yeux pour voir la manière dont nous voyons. +On se trompe; il y faut le secours des autres sens. Si +les hommes n'avaient que le sens de la vue, ils n'auraient +<pb n='111'/><anchor id='Pg111'/> +aucun moyen pour connaître l'étendue en longueur, largeur +et profondeur; et un pur esprit ne la connaîtrait pas peutêtre, +à moins que Dieu ne la lui révélât. Il est très difficile +de séparer dans notre entendement l'extension d'un objet +d'avec les couleurs de cet objet. Nous ne voyons jamais +rien que d'étendu, et de là nous sommes tous portés +à croire que nous voyons en effet l'étendue.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Élémens de +la Philos. de Newton</hi>, Seconde Partie, ch. 7.) +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Condillac, in his <hi rend='italic'>Essais sur l'Origine des Connaissances +Humaines</hi> (Part I. sect. 6), published in 1746, combats +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi>, and maintains that an extension +exterior to the eye is immediately discernible by sight; the +eye being naturally capable of judging at once of figures, +magnitudes, situations, and distances. His reasonings in +support of this <q>prejudice,</q> as he afterwards allowed it to +be, may be found in the section entitled <q>De quelques +jugemens qu'on a attribués à l'âme sans fondement, ou +solution d'un problème de métaphysique.</q> Here Locke, +Molyneux, Berkeley, and Voltaire are criticised, and +Cheselden's experiment is referred to. Condillac's subsequent +recantation is contained in his <hi rend='italic'>Traité des Sensations</hi>, +published in 1754, and in his <hi rend='italic'>L'Art de Penser</hi>. In the +<hi rend='italic'>Traité des Sensations</hi> (Troisième Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, +&c.) the whole question is discussed at length, and Condillac +vindicates what he allows must appear a marvellous paradox +to the uninitiated—that we only gradually learn to see, +hear, smell, taste, and touch. He argues in particular that +the eye cannot originally perceive an extension that is beyond +itself, and that perception of trinal space is due to +what we experience in touch. +</p> + +<p> +Voltaire and Condillac gave currency to the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> +in France, and it soon became a commonplace with +D'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon, and other French philosophers. +In Germany we have allusions to it in the Berlin Memoirs +and elsewhere; but, although known by name, if not in its +distinctive principle and latent idealism, it has not obtained +<pb n='112'/><anchor id='Pg112'/> +the consideration which its author's developed theory of +the material as well as the visible world has received. The +Kantian <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> criticism of our cognition of Space, and +of our mathematical notions, subsequently indisposed the +German mind to the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> reasoning of Berkeley's +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +Its influence is apparent in British philosophy. The +following passages in Hartley's <hi rend='italic'>Observations on Man</hi>, published +in 1749, illustrate the extent to which some of the +distinctive parts of the new doctrine were at that time +received by an eminent English psychologist:— +</p> + +<p> +<q rend='pre'>Distance is judged of by the quantity of motion, and +figure by the relative quantity of distance.... And, as the +sense of sight is much more extensive and expedite than +feeling, we judge of tangible qualities chiefly by sight, which +therefore may be considered, agreeably to Bishop Berkeley's +remark, as a philosophical language for the ideas of feeling; +being, for the most part, an adequate representative of +them, and a language common to all mankind, and in which +they all agree very nearly, after a moderate degree of +experience.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>However, if the informations from touch and sight disagree +at any time, we are always to depend upon touch, as +that which, according to the usual ways of speaking upon +these subjects, is the true representation of the essential +properties, i.e. as the earnest and presage of what other +tangible impressions the body under consideration will +make upon our feeling in other circumstances; also what +changes it will produce in other bodies; of which again we +are to determine by our feeling, if the visual language +should not happen to correspond to it exactly. And it is +from this difference that we call the touch the reality, light +the representative—also that a person born blind may foretell +with certainty, from his present tangible impressions, +what others would follow upon varying the circumstances; +whereas, if we could suppose a person to be born without +<pb n='113'/><anchor id='Pg113'/> +feeling, and to arrive at man's estate, he could not, from his +present visible impressions, judge what others would follow +upon varying the circumstances. Thus the picture of a +knife, drawn so well as to deceive his eye, would not, when +applied to another body, produce the same change of visible +impressions as a real knife does, when it separates the +parts of the body through which it passes. But the touch +is not liable to these deceptions. As it is therefore the fundamental +source of information in respect of the essential +properties of matter, it may be considered as our first and +principal key to the knowledge of the external world.</q> +(Prop. 30.) +</p> + +<p> +In other parts of Hartley's book (e.g. Prop. 58) the +relation of our visual judgments of magnitude, figure, +motion, distance, and position to the laws of association +is explained, and the associating circumstances by +which these judgments are formed are enumerated in +detail. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Porterfield of Edinburgh, in his <hi rend='italic'>Treatise on the Eye, +or the Manner and Phenomena of Vision</hi> (Edinburgh, 1759), +is an exception to the consent which the doctrine had +then widely secured. He maintains, in opposition to +Berkeley, that <q>the judgments we form of the situation +and distance of visible objects, depend not on custom +and experience, but on original instinct, to which mind +is subject in our embodied state<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Treatise on the Eye</hi>, vol. II. pp. 299, &c.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley's Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves +our visual perceptions of distance into interpretation of +arbitrary signs, received the qualified approbation of Reid, +in his <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of +Common Sense</hi> (1764). He criticises it in the <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, +where the doctrine of visual signs, of which Berkeley's +whole philosophy is a development, is accepted, and to +some extent applied. With Reid it is divorced, however, +from the Berkeleian conception of the material world, +<pb n='114'/><anchor id='Pg114'/> +although the Theory of Vision was the seminal principle +of Berkeley's Theory of Matter<note place='foot'>See Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, ch. v. §§ +3, 5, 6, 7; ch. vi. § 24, and <hi rend='italic'>Essays +on the Intellectual Powers</hi>, II. ch. +10 and 19.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +This Theory of Matter was imperfectly conceived and then +rejected by Reid and his followers, while the New Theory +of Vision obtained the general consent of the Scottish +metaphysicians. Adam Smith refers to it in his <hi rend='italic'>Essays</hi> +(published in 1795) as <q>one of the finest examples of philosophical +analysis that is to be found either in our own +or in any other language.</q> Dugald Stewart characterises +it in his <hi rend='italic'>Elements</hi> as <q>one of the most beautiful, and at +the same time one of the most important theories of +modern philosophy.</q> <q>The solid additions,</q> he afterwards +remarks in his <hi rend='italic'>Dissertation</hi>, <q>made by Berkeley to the +stock of human knowledge, were important and brilliant. +Among these the first place is unquestionably +due to his <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, a work abounding +with ideas so different from those commonly received, +and at the same time so profound and refined, that it +was regarded by all but a few accustomed to deep metaphysical +reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical +romance than of a sober inquiry after truth. Such, +however, has since been the progress and diffusion of +this sort of knowledge, that the leading and most abstracted +doctrines contained in it form now an essential +part of every elementary treatise on optics, and are +adopted by the most superficial smatterers in science +as fundamental articles of their faith.</q> The <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> +is accepted by Thomas Brown, who proposes (<hi rend='italic'>Lectures</hi>, +29) to extend the scope of its reasonings. With regard +to perceptions of sight, Young, in his <hi rend='italic'>Lectures on Intellectual +Philosophy</hi> (p. 102), says that <q>it has been universally +admitted, at least since the days of Berkeley, +that many of those which appear to us at present to +be instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn to be +<pb n='115'/><anchor id='Pg115'/> +acquired; that most of the adult perceptions of sight +are founded on the previous information of touch; that +colour can give us no conception originally of those +qualities of bodies which produce it in us; and that +primary vision gives us no notion of distance, and, as I +believe, no notion of magnitude.</q> Sir James Mackintosh, +in his <hi rend='italic'>Dissertation</hi>, characterises the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi> +as <q>a great discovery in Mental Philosophy.</q> <q>Nothing +in the compass of inductive reasoning,</q> remarks Sir +William Hamilton (Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Works</hi>, p. 182, note), <q>appears +more satisfactory than Berkeley's demonstration of the +necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow process +of observation and comparison alone, the connexion +between the perceptions of vision and touch, and, in +general, all that relates to the distance and magnitude +of external things<note place='foot'>While Sir W. Hamilton (<hi rend='italic'>Lectures +on Metaphysics</hi>, lxxviii) acknowledges +the scientific validity +of Berkeley's conclusions, as to +the way we judge of distances, he +complains, in the same lecture, that +<q>the whole question is thrown into +doubt by the analogy of the lower +animals,</q> i.e. by their probable +<emph>visual instinct</emph> of distances; and +elsewhere (Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Works</hi>, p. 137, +note) he seems to hesitate about +Locke's Solution of Molyneux's +Problem, at least in its application +to Cheselden's case. Cf. Leibniz, +<hi rend='italic'>Nouveaux Essais</hi>, Liv. II. ch. 9, in +connexion with this last.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The New Theory of Vision has in short been generally +accepted, so far as it was understood, alike by the followers +of Hartley and by the associates and successors +of Reid. Among British psychologists, it has recommended +itself to rationalists and sensationalists, to the +advocates of innate principles, and to those who would +explain by accidental association what their opponents +attribute to reason originally latent in man. But this +wide conscious assent is I think chiefly confined to the +proposition that distance is invisible, and hardly reaches +the deeper implicates of the theory, on its extension to +all the senses, leading to a perception of the final unity +<pb n='116'/><anchor id='Pg116'/> +of the natural and the supernatural, and the ultimate +spirituality of the universe<note place='foot'>An almost solitary exception +in Britain to this unusual uniformity +on a subtle question in +psychology is found in Samuel +Bailey's <hi rend='italic'>Review of Berkeley's Theory +of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness +of that celebrated Speculation</hi>, +which appeared in 1842. It +was the subject of two interesting +rejoinders—a well-weighed criticism, +in the <hi rend='italic'>Westminster Review</hi>, +by J.S. Mill, since republished in +his <hi rend='italic'>Discussions</hi>; and an ingenious +Essay by Professor Ferrier, in +<hi rend='italic'>Blackwood's Magazine</hi>, republished +in his <hi rend='italic'>Philosophical Remains</hi>. The +controversy ended on that occasion +with Bailey's <hi rend='italic'>Letter to a Philosopher +in reply to some recent attempts to +vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision, +and in further elucidation of its unsoundness</hi>, +and a reply to it by +each of his critics. It was revived +in 1864 by Mr. Abbott of Trinity +College, Dublin, whose essay on +<hi rend='italic'>Sight and Touch</hi> is <q>an attempt to +disprove the received (or Berkeleian) +Theory of Vision.</q></note>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='117'/><anchor id='Pg117'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Dedication</head> + +<p> +TO THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN PERCIVALE, BART.<note place='foot'>Afterwards (in 1733) Earl of +Egmont. Born about 1683, he +succeeded to the baronetcy in +1691, and, after sitting for a few +years in the Irish House of Commons, +was in 1715 created Baron +Percival, in the Irish peerage. In +1732 he obtained a charter to colonise +the province of Georgia in North +America. His name appears in +the list of subscribers to Berkeley's +Bermuda Scheme in 1726. He +died in 1748. He corresponded +frequently with Berkeley from +1709 onwards.</note>, +</p> + +<p> +ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL +</p> + +<p> +IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND. +</p> + +<p> +Sir, +</p> + +<p> +I could not, without doing violence to myself, forbear +upon this occasion to give some public testimony of the +great and well-grounded esteem I have conceived for you, +ever since I had the honour and happiness of your acquaintance. +The outward advantages of fortune, and the +early honours with which you are adorned, together with +the reputation you are known to have amongst the best and +most considerable men, may well imprint veneration and +esteem on the minds of those who behold you from a distance. +But these are not the chief motives that inspire me +with the respect I bear you. A nearer approach has given +me the view of something in your person infinitely beyond +the external ornaments of honour and estate. I mean, an +intrinsic stock of virtue and good sense, a true concern for +religion, and disinterested love of your country. Add to +these an uncommon proficiency in the best and most useful +parts of knowledge; together with (what in my mind is +<pb n='118'/><anchor id='Pg118'/> +a perfection of the first rank) a surpassing goodness of +nature. All which I have collected, not from the uncertain +reports of fame, but from my own experience. Within +these few months that I have the honour to be known unto +you, the many delightful hours I have passed in your +agreeable and improving conversation have afforded me +the opportunity of discovering in you many excellent qualities, +which at once fill me with admiration and esteem. +That one at those years, and in those circumstances of +wealth and greatness, should continue proof against the +charms of luxury and those criminal pleasures so fashionable +and predominant in the age we live in; that he should +preserve a sweet and modest behaviour, free from that +insolent and assuming air so familiar to those who are +placed above the ordinary rank of men; that he should +manage a great fortune with that prudence and inspection, +and at the same time expend it with that generosity and +nobleness of mind, as to shew himself equally remote from +a sordid parsimony and a lavish inconsiderate profusion of +the good things he is intrusted with—this, surely, were admirable +and praiseworthy. But, that he should, moreover, +by an impartial exercise of his reason, and constant perusal +of the sacred Scriptures, endeavour to attain a right notion +of the principles of natural and revealed religion; that he +should with the concern of a true patriot have the interest +of the public at heart, and omit no means of informing +himself what may be prejudicial or advantageous to his +country, in order to prevent the one and promote the +other; in fine, that, by a constant application to the most +severe and useful studies, by a strict observation of the +rules of honour and virtue, by frequent and serious reflections +on the mistaken measures of the world, and the true +end and happiness of mankind, he should in all respects +qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before +him, to deserve the character of great and good in this life, +and be ever happy hereafter—this were amazing and almost +incredible. Yet all this, and more than this, <hi rend='smallcaps'>Sir</hi>, +might I justly say of you, did either your modesty permit, +or your character stand in need of it. I know it might +deservedly be thought a vanity in me to imagine that anything +coming from so obscure a hand as mine could add a +lustre to your reputation. But, I am withal sensible how +<pb n='119'/><anchor id='Pg119'/> +far I advance the interest of my own, by laying hold on +this opportunity to make it known that I am admitted into +some degree of intimacy with a person of your exquisite +judgment. And, with that view, I have ventured to make +you an address of this nature, which the goodness I have +ever experienced in you inclines me to hope will meet with +a favourable reception at your hands. Though I must own +I have your pardon to ask, for touching on what may possibly +be offensive to a virtue you are possessed of in a very +distinguishing degree. Excuse me, <hi rend='smallcaps'>Sir</hi>, if it was out of +my power to mention the name of <hi rend='smallcaps'>Sir John Percivale</hi> +without paying some tribute to that extraordinary and surprising +merit whereof I have so clear and affecting an idea, +and which, I am sure, cannot be exposed in too full a light +for the imitation of others, +</p> + +<p> +Of late I have been agreeably employed in considering +the most noble, pleasant, and comprehensive of all the +senses<note place='foot'>Similar terms are applied to +the sense of seeing by writers with +whom Berkeley was familiar. Thus +Locke (<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, II. ix. 9) refers to +sight as <q>the most comprehensive +of all our senses.</q> Descartes opens +his <hi rend='italic'>Dioptrique</hi> by designating it as +<q>le plus universal et le plus noble +de nos sens;</q> and he alludes to it +elsewhere (<hi rend='italic'>Princip.</hi> IV. 195) as <q>le +plus subtil de tous les sens.</q> Malebranche +begins his analysis of sight +(<hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, I. 6) by describing it as +<q>le premier, le plus noble, et le +plus étendu de tous les sens.</q> The +high place assigned to this sense +by Aristotle has been already +alluded to. Its office, as the chief +organ through which a conception +of the material universe as +placed in ambient space is given to +us, is recognised by a multitude of +psychologists and metaphysicians.</note>. The fruit of that (labour shall I call it or) diversion +is what I now present you with, in hopes it may give +some entertainment to one who, in the midst of business +and vulgar enjoyments, preserves a relish for the more refined +pleasures of thought and reflexion. My thoughts +concerning Vision have led me into some notions so far +out of the common road<note place='foot'>On Berkeley's originality in +his Theory of Vision see the Editor's +Preface.</note> that it had been improper to +address them to one of a narrow and contracted genius. +But, you, <hi rend='smallcaps'>Sir</hi>, being master of a large and free understanding, +raised above the power of those prejudices that enslave +the far greater part of mankind, may deservedly be thought +a proper patron for an attempt of this kind. Add to this, +that you are no less disposed to forgive than qualified to +discern whatever faults may occur in it. Nor do I think +<pb n='120'/><anchor id='Pg120'/> +you defective in any one point necessary to form an exact +judgment on the most abstract and difficult things, so +much as in a just confidence of your own abilities. And, +in this one instance, give me leave to say, you shew a +manifest weakness of judgment. With relation to the +following <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, I shall only add that I beg your pardon +for laying a trifle of that nature in your way, at a +time when you are engaged in the important affairs of the +nation, and desire you to think that I am, with all sincerity +and respect, +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Sir</hi>, +</p> + +<p> +Your most faithful and most humble servant, +</p> + +<p> +GEORGE BERKELEY. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='127'/><anchor id='Pg127'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision</head> + +<p> +1. My design is to shew the manner wherein we perceive +by Sight the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation +of objects: also to consider the difference there is betwixt +the ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether there be any +idea common to both senses<note place='foot'>In the first edition alone this +sentence followed:—<q>In treating +of all which, it seems to me, the +writers of Optics have proceeded +on wrong principles.</q></note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +2. It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and +immediately, cannot be seen<note place='foot'>Sect. 2-51 explain the way in +which we learn in seeing to judge +of Distance or Outness, and of +objects as existing remote from our +organism, viz. by their association +with what we see, and with certain +muscular and other sensations in +the eye which accompany vision. +Sect. 2 assumes, as granted, the +invisibility of distance in the line +of sight. Cf. sect. 11 and 88—<hi rend='italic'>First +Dialogue between Hylas and +Philonous—Alciphron</hi>, IV. 8—<hi rend='italic'>Theory +of Vision Vindicated and +Explained</hi>, sect. 62-69.</note>. For, distance<note place='foot'>i.e. outness, or distance outward +from the point of vision—distance in +the line of sight—the third dimension +of space. Visible distance is +visible space or interval between +two points (see sect. 112). We +can be sensibly percipient of it +only when <emph>both</emph> points are seen.</note> being a line +directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in +the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the +same, whether the distance be longer or shorter<note place='foot'>This section is adduced by +some of Berkeley's critics as if it +were the evidence discovered by +him for his <hi rend='italic'>Theory</hi>, instead of being, +as it is, a passing reference to the +scientific ground of the already +acknowledged invisibility of outness, +or distance in the line of +sight. See, for example, Bailey's +<hi rend='italic'>Review of Berkeley's Theory of +Vision</hi>, pp. 38-43, also his <hi rend='italic'>Theory +of Reasoning</hi>, p. 179 and pp. 200-7—Mill's +<hi rend='italic'>Discussions</hi>, vol. II. p. 95—Abbott's +<hi rend='italic'>Sight and Touch</hi>, p. 10, +where this sentence is presented +as <q>the sole positive argument +advanced by Berkeley.</q> The invisibility +of outness is not Berkeley's +discovery, but the way we +learn to interpret its visual signs, +and what these are.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='128'/><anchor id='Pg128'/> + +<p> +3. I find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make +of the distance of objects considerably remote is rather an +act of judgment grounded on experience than of sense. +For example, when I perceive a great number of intermediate +objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and the like, +which I have experienced to take up a considerable space, +I thence form a judgment or conclusion, that the object +I see beyond them is at a great distance. Again, when +an object appears faint and small which at a near distance +I have experienced to make a vigorous and large appearance, +I instantly conclude it to be far off<note place='foot'>i.e. aerial and linear perspective +are acknowledged signs of +remote distances. But the question, +in this and the thirty-six following +sections, concerns the visibility of +<emph>near</emph> distances only—a few yards +in front of us. It was <q>agreed by +all</q> that beyond this limit distances +are suggested by our experience of +their signs.</note>. And this, it is +evident, is the result of experience; without which, from +the faintness and littleness, I should not have inferred +anything concerning the distance of objects. +</p> + +<p> +4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance as +that the interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion +to it<note place='foot'>Cf. this and the four following +sections with the quotations in the +Editor's Preface, from Molyneux's +<hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Dioptrics</hi>.</note>, the opinion of speculative men is, that the +two optic axes (the fancy that we see only with one eye at +once being exploded), concurring at the object, do there +make an angle, by means of which, according as it is +greater or lesser, the object is perceived to be nearer or +farther off<note place='foot'>In the author's last edition we +have this annotation: <q>See what +Des Cartes and others have written +upon the subject.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating +distance there is this remarkable difference:—that, whereas +there was no apparent <emph>necessary</emph> connexion between small +distance and a large and strong appearance, or between +great distance and a little and faint appearance, there +<pb n='129'/><anchor id='Pg129'/> +appears a very <emph>necessary</emph> connexion between an obtuse +angle and near distance, and an acute angle and farther +distance. It does not in the least depend upon experience, +but may be evidently known by any one before he had +experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the optic +axes the greater the angle, and the remoter their concurrence +is, the lesser will be the angle comprehended by +them. +</p> + +<p> +6. There is another way, mentioned by optic writers, +whereby they will have us judge of those distances in +respect of which the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible +bigness. And that is the greater or lesser divergency of +the rays which, issuing from the visible point, do fall on +the pupil—that point being judged nearest which is seen +by most diverging rays, and that remoter which is seen by +less diverging rays, and so on; the apparent distance still +increasing, as the divergency of the rays decreases, till at +length it becomes infinite, when the rays that fall on the +pupil are to sense parallel. And after this manner it is +said we perceive distance when we look only with one eye. +</p> + +<p> +7. In this case also it is plain we are not beholden to +experience: it being a certain necessary truth that, the +nearer the direct rays falling on the eye approach to a +parallelism, the farther off is the point of their intersection, +or the visible point from whence they flow. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +8. <note place='foot'>In the first edition this section +opens thus: <q>I have here set +down the common current accounts +that are given of our perceiving +near distances by sight, which, +though they are unquestionably received +for true by mathematicians, +and accordingly made use of by them +in determining the apparent places +of objects, do nevertheless,</q> &c.</note>Now, though the accounts here given of perceiving +<emph>near</emph> distance by sight are received for true, and accordingly +made use of in determining the apparent places of +objects, they do nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory, +and that for these following reasons:— +</p> + +<p> +9. [<emph>First</emph><note place='foot'>Omitted in the author's last +edition.</note>,] It is evident that, when the mind perceives +any idea not immediately and of itself, it must be by +the means of some other idea. Thus, for instance, the +passions which are in the mind of another are of themselves +to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them +<pb n='130'/><anchor id='Pg130'/> +by sight; though not immediately, yet by means of the +colours they produce in the countenance. We often see +shame or fear in the looks of a man, by perceiving the +changes of his countenance to red or pale. +</p> + +<p> +10. Moreover, it is evident that no idea which is not +itself perceived can be to me the means of perceiving any +other idea. If I do not perceive the redness or paleness +of a man's face themselves, it is impossible I should perceive +by them the passions which are in his mind. +</p> + +<p> +11. Now, from sect. ii., it is plain that distance is in its +own nature imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight<note place='foot'>i.e. although immediately invisible, +it is mediately seen. +Mark, here and elsewhere, the +ambiguity of the term <emph>perception</emph>, +which now signifies the act of +being conscious of sensuous phenomena, +and again the act of inferring +phenomena of which we +are at the time insentient; while +it is also applied to the object +perceived instead of to the percipient +act; and sometimes to imagination, +and the higher acts of +intelligence.</note>. +It remains, therefore, that it be brought into view by means +of some other idea, that is itself immediately perceived in +the act of vision. +</p> + +<p> +12. But those lines and angles, by means whereof some +men<note place='foot'><q>Some men</q>—<q>mathematicians,</q> +in first edition.</note> pretend to explain the perception<note place='foot'>i.e. the <emph>mediate</emph> perception.</note> of distance, are +themselves not at all perceived; nor are they in truth ever +thought of by those unskilful in optics. I appeal to any +one's experience, whether, upon sight of an object, he +computes its distance by the bigness of the angle made by +the meeting of the two optic axes? or whether he ever +thinks of the greater or lesser divergency of the rays which +arrive from any point to his pupil? nay, whether it be not +perfectly impossible for him to perceive by sense the +various angles wherewith the rays, according to their greater +or lesser divergence, do fall on the eye? Every one is +himself the best judge of what he perceives, and what not. +In vain shall any man<note place='foot'><q>any man</q>—<q>all the mathematicians +in the world,</q> in first edition.</note> tell me, that I perceive certain +lines and angles, which introduce into my mind the various +ideas of distance, so long as I myself am conscious of no +such thing. +</p> + +<p> +13. Since therefore those angles and lines are not themselves +<pb n='131'/><anchor id='Pg131'/> +perceived by sight, it follows, from sect. x., that the +mind does not by them judge of the distance of objects. +</p> + +<p> +14. [<emph>Secondly</emph><note place='foot'>Omitted in the author's last +edition.</note>,] The truth of this assertion will be yet +farther evident to any one that considers those lines and +angles have no real existence in nature, being only an +hypothesis framed by the mathematicians, and by them +introduced into optics, that they might treat of that science +in a geometrical way. +</p> + +<p> +15. The [<emph>third</emph> and<note place='foot'>Omitted in the author's last +edition.</note>] last reason I shall give for rejecting +that doctrine is, that though we should grant the real +existence of those optic angles, &c., and that it was +possible for the mind to perceive them, yet these principles +would not be found sufficient to explain the phenomena of +distance, as shall be shewn hereafter. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +16. Now it being already shewn<note place='foot'>Sect. 3, 9.</note> that distance is <emph>suggested</emph><note place='foot'>Observe the first introduction +by Berkeley of the term <emph>suggestion</emph>, +used by him to express a leading +factor in his account of the visible +world, and again in his more +comprehensive account of our +knowledge of the material universe +in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. It had been employed +occasionally, among others, +by Hobbes and Locke. There are +three ways in which the objects +we have an immediate perception +of in sight may be supposed to conduct +us to what we do not immediately +perceive: (1) Instinct, +or what Reid calls <q><emph>original suggestion</emph></q> +(<hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, ch. VI. sect. 20-24); +(2) Custom; (3) Reasoning from +accepted premisses. Berkeley's +<q>suggestion</q> corresponds to the +second. (Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision +Vindicated</hi>, sect. 42.)</note> +to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea +which is itself perceived in the act of seeing, it remains +that we inquire, what ideas or sensations there be that +attend vision, unto which we may suppose the ideas of distance +are connected, and by which they are introduced into +the mind. +</p> + +<p> +And, <emph>first</emph>, it is certain by experience, that when we look +at a near object with both eyes, according as it approaches +or recedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by +lessening or widening the interval between the pupils. +This disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with a +sensation<note place='foot'>In the <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 66, it is added that this +<q>sensation</q> belongs properly to +the sense of touch. Cf. also sect. +145 of this <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>.</note>, which seems to me to be that which in this case +brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the +mind. +</p> + +<pb n='132'/><anchor id='Pg132'/> + +<p> +17. Not that there is any natural or necessary<note place='foot'>Here <q>natural</q>=<q>necessary</q>: +elsewhere=divinely arbitrary connexion.</note> connexion +between the sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes +and greater or lesser distance. But—because the mind +has, by constant experience, found the different sensations +corresponding to the different dispositions of the eyes to +be attended each with a different degree of distance in the +object—there has grown an habitual or customary connexion +between those two sorts of ideas: so that the mind +no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the different +turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the pupils nearer +or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different +idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that +sensation. Just as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea +is immediately suggested to the understanding which custom +had united with it<note place='foot'>That our <emph>mediate</emph> vision of outness +and of objects as thus external, is +due to media which have a contingent +or arbitrary, instead of a necessary, +connexion with the distances which +they enable us to see, or of which +they are the signs, is a cardinal +part of his argument.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +18. Nor do I see how I can easily be mistaken in this +matter. I know evidently that distance is not perceived of +itself<note place='foot'>Sect. 2.</note>; that, by consequence, it must be perceived by +means of some other idea, which is immediately perceived, +and varies with the different degrees of distance. I know +also that the sensation arising from the turn of the eyes is +of itself immediately perceived; and various degrees thereof +are connected with different distances, which never fail +to accompany them into my mind, when I view an object +distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small that +in respect of it the interval between the eyes has any considerable +magnitude. +</p> + +<p> +19. I know it is a received opinion that, by altering the +disposition of the eyes, the mind perceives whether the +angle of the optic axes, or the lateral angles comprehended +between the interval of the eyes or the optic axes, are made +greater or lesser; and that, accordingly, by a kind of +natural geometry, it judges the point of their intersection +to be nearer or farther off. But that this is not true I am +<pb n='133'/><anchor id='Pg133'/> +convinced by my own experience; since I am not conscious +that I make any such use of the perception I have by the +turn of my eyes. And for me to make those judgments, +and draw those conclusions from it, without knowing that +I do so, seems altogether incomprehensible<note place='foot'>Here, as generally in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, +the appeal is to our inward experience, +not to phenomena observed +by our senses in the organism.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +20. From all which it follows, that the judgment we +make of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is +entirely the result of experience. If we had not constantly +found certain sensations, arising from the various disposition +of the eyes, attended with certain degrees of distance, +we should never make those sudden judgments from them +concerning the distance of objects; no more than we would +pretend to judge of a man's thoughts by his pronouncing +words we had never heard before. +</p> + +<p> +21. <emph>Secondly</emph>, an object placed at a certain distance from +the eye, to which the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable +proportion, being made to approach, is seen more +confusedly<note place='foot'>See sect. 35 for the difference +between confused and faint vision. +Cf. sect. 32-38 with this section. +Also <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 68.</note>. And the nearer it is brought the more +confused appearance it makes. And this being found +constantly to be so, there arises in the mind an habitual +connexion between the several degrees of confusion and +distance; the greater confusion still implying the lesser +distance, and the lesser confusion the greater distance of +the object. +</p> + +<p> +22. This confused appearance of the object doth therefore +seem to be the medium whereby the mind judges of distance, +in those cases wherein the most approved writers of optics +will have it judge by the different divergency with which +the rays flowing from the radiating point fall on the pupil<note place='foot'>See sect. 6.</note>. +No man, I believe, will pretend to see or feel those imaginary +angles that the rays are supposed to form, according +to their various inclinations on his eye. But he cannot +choose seeing whether the object appear more or less +confused. It is therefore a manifest consequence from +what has been demonstrated that, instead of the greater or +lesser divergency of the rays, the mind makes use of the +<pb n='134'/><anchor id='Pg134'/> +greater or lesser confusedness of the appearance, thereby +to determine the apparent place of an object. +</p> + +<p> +23. Nor doth it avail to say there is not any necessary +connexion between confused vision and distance great or +small. For I ask any man what necessary connexion he +sees between the redness of a blush and shame? And yet +no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in the face +of another but it brings into his mind the idea of that passion +which hath been observed to accompany it. +</p> + +<p> +24. What seems to have misled the writers of optics in +this matter is, that they imagine men judge of distance as +they do of a conclusion in mathematics; betwixt which and +the premises it is indeed absolutely requisite there be an +apparent necessary connexion. But it is far otherwise in +the sudden judgments men make of distance. We are +not to think that brutes and children, or even grown reasonable +men, whenever they perceive an object to approach +or depart from them, do it by virtue of geometry and +demonstration. +</p> + +<p> +25. That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it +will suffice that they have been observed to go together, +without any demonstration of the <emph>necessity</emph> of their coexistence, +or without so much as knowing what it is that makes +them so to coexist. Of this there are innumerable instances, +of which no one can be ignorant<note place='foot'>These sections presuppose previous contiguity as an associative +law of mental phenomena.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +26. Thus, greater confusion having been constantly +attended with nearer distance, no sooner is the former +idea perceived but it suggests the latter to our thoughts. +And, if it had been the ordinary course of nature that the +farther off an object were placed the more confused it +should appear, it is certain the very same perception that +now makes us think an object approaches would then have +made us to imagine it went farther off; that perception, +abstracting from custom and experience, being equally +fitted to produce the idea of great distance, or small distance, +or no distance at all. +</p> + +<p> +27. <emph>Thirdly</emph>, an object being placed at the distance above +specified, and brought nearer to the eye, we may nevertheless +prevent, at least for some time, the appearance's +<pb n='135'/><anchor id='Pg135'/> +growing more confused, by straining the eye<note place='foot'>See Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, ch. vi. +sect. 22.</note>. In which +case that sensation supplies the place of confused vision, +in aiding the mind to judge of the distance of the object; +it being esteemed so much the nearer by how much the +effort or straining of the eye in order to distinct vision is +greater. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +28. I have here<note place='foot'>Sect. 16-27.—For the signs of +remote distances, see sect. 3.</note> set down those sensations or ideas<note place='foot'>These are muscular sensations +felt in the organ, and degrees of +confusion in a visible idea. Berkeley's +<q>arbitrary</q> signs of distance, +near and remote, are either (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) +invisible states of the visual organ, +or (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) visible appearances.</note> +that seem to be the constant and general occasions of introducing +into the mind the different ideas of near distance. +It is true, in most cases, that divers other circumstances +contribute to frame our idea of distance, viz. the particular +number, size, kind, &c. of the things seen. Concerning +which, as well as all other the forementioned occasions +which suggest distance, I shall only observe, they have +none of them, in their own nature, any relation or connexion +with it: nor is it possible they should ever signify the +various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experience +they have been found to be connected with them. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +29. I shall proceed upon these principles to account for +a phenomenon which has hitherto strangely puzzled the +writers of optics, and is so far from being accounted for by +any of their theories of vision, that it is, by their own confession, +plainly repugnant to them; and of consequence, if +nothing else could be objected, were alone sufficient to +bring their credit in question. The whole difficulty I shall +lay before you in the words of the learned Doctor Barrow, +with which he concludes his <hi rend='italic'>Optic Lectures</hi><note place='foot'>In Molyneux's <hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Dioptrics</hi>, +Pt. I. prop. 31, sect. 9, +Barrow's difficulty is stated. Cf. +sect. 40 below.</note>:— +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/illus-1.png' rend='width:60%'> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +<q>Hæc sunt, quæ circa partem opticæ præcipue mathematicam +dicenda mihi suggessit meditatio. Circa reliquas +(quæ φυσικώτεραι sunt, adeoque sæpiuscule pro certis +principiis plausibiles conjecturas venditare necessum +habent) nihil fere quicquam admodum verisimile succurrit, +<pb n='136'/><anchor id='Pg136'/> +a pervulgatis (ab iis, inquam, quæ Keplerus, Scheinerus<note place='foot'>Christopher Scheiner, a German +astronomer, and opponent of +the Copernican system, born 1575, +died 1650.</note>, +Cartesius, et post illos alii tradiderunt) alienum aut diversum. +Atqui tacere malo, quam toties oblatam cramben +reponere. Proinde receptui cano; nee ita tamen ut prorsus +discedam, anteaquam improbam quandam difficultatem +(pro sinceritate quam et vobis et veritati debeo minime +dissimulandam) in medium protulero, quæ doctrinæ nostræ, +hactenus inculcatæ, se objicit adversam, ab ea saltem +nullam admittit solutionem. Illa, breviter, talis est. Lenti +vel speculo cavo <hi rend='italic'>EBF</hi> exponatur punctum +visibile <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>, ita distans, ut radii ex +<hi rend='italic'>A</hi> manantes ex inflectione versus axem +<hi rend='italic'>AB</hi> cogantur. Sitque radiationis limes +(seu puncti <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> imago, qualem supra +passim statuimus) punctum <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>. Inter +hoc autem et inflectentis verticem <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> +uspiam positus concipiatur oculus. +Quæri jam potest, ubi loci debeat +punctum <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> apparere? Retrorsum ad +punctum <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi> videri non fert natura (cum +omnis impressio sensum afficiens proveniat +a partibus <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>) ac experientia +reclamat. Nostris autem e placitis +consequi videtur, ipsum ad partes anticas +apparens, ab intervallo longissime +dissito (quod et maximum sensibile +quodvis intervallum quodammodo exsuperet), +apparere. Cum enim quo +radiis minus divergentibus attingitur +objectum, eo (seclusis utique prænotionibus +et præjudiciis) longius abesse +sentiatur; et quod parallelos ad oculum +radios projicit, remotissime positum æstimetur: exigere +ratio videtur, ut quod convergentibus radiis apprehenditur, +adhuc magis, si fieri posset, quoad apparentiam elongetur. +Quin et circa casum hunc generatim inquiri possit, quidnam +omnino sit, quod apparentem puncti <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> locum determinet, +faciatque quod constanti ratione nunc propius, nunc remotius +appareat? Cui itidem dubio nihil quicquam ex +hactenus dictorum analogia responderi posse videtur, nisi +<pb n='137'/><anchor id='Pg137'/> +debere punctum <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> perpetuo longissime semotum videri. +Verum experientia secus attestatur, illud pro diversa oculi +inter puncta <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>, positione varie distans, nunquam fere (si +unquam) longinquius ipso <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> libere spectato, subinde vero +multo propinquius adparere; quinimo, quo oculum appellentes +radii magis convergunt, eo speciem objecti propius +accedere. Nempe, si puncto <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> admoveatur oculus, suo +(ad lentem) fere nativo in loco conspicitur punctum <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> (vel +æque distans, ad speculum); ad <hi rend='italic'>O</hi> reductus oculus ejusce +speciem appropinquantem cernit; ad <hi rend='italic'>P</hi> adhuc vicinius +ipsum existimat; ac ita sensim, donec alicubi tandem, velut +ad <hi rend='italic'>Q</hi>, constituto oculo, objectum summe propinquum apparens +in meram confusionem incipiat evanescere. Quæ +sane cuncta rationibus atque decretis nostris repugnare +videntur, aut cum iis saltem parum amice conspirant. +Neque nostram tantum sententiam pulsat hoc experimentum, +at ex æquo cæteras quas norim omnes: veterem +imprimis ac vulgatam, nostræ præ reliquis affinem, ita +convellere videtur, ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus A. +Tacquetus isti principio (cui pene soli totam inædificaverat +<hi rend='italic'>Catoptricam</hi> suam) ceu infido ac inconstanti renunciarit, +adeoque suam ipse doctrinam labefactarit? id tamen, opinor, +minime facturus, si rem totam inspexissit penitius, +atque difficultatis fundum attigissit. Apud me vero non ita +pollet hæc, nec eousque præpollebit ulla difficultas, ut ab +iis quæ manifeste rationi consentanea video, discedam; +præsertim quum, ut his accidit, ejusmodi difficultas in +singularis cujuspiam casus disparitate fundetur. Nimirum +in præsente casu peculiare quiddam, naturæ subtilitati +involutum, delitescit, ægre fortassis, nisi perfectius explorato +videndi modo, detegendum. Circa quod nil, fateor, +hactenus excogitare potui, quod adblandiretur animo meo, +nedum plane satisfaceret. Vobis itaque nodum hunc, +utinam feliciore conatu, resolvendum committo.</q> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +<emph>In English as follows</emph>: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +<q>I have here delivered what my thoughts have suggested +to me concerning that part of optics which is more properly +mathematical. As for the other parts of that science +(which, being rather physical, do consequently abound +with plausible conjectures instead of certain principles), +there has in them scarce anything occurred to my observation +<pb n='138'/><anchor id='Pg138'/> +different from what has been already said by Kepler, +Scheinerus, Des Cartes, &c. And methinks I had better +say nothing at all than repeat that which has been so often +said by others. I think it therefore high time to take my +leave of this subject. But, before I quit it for good and all, +the fair and ingenuous dealing that I owe both to you and +to truth obliges me to acquaint you with a certain untoward +difficulty, which seems directly opposite to the doctrine +I have been hitherto inculcating, at least admits of no +solution from it. In short it is this. Before the double +convex glass or concave speculum +<hi rend='italic'>EBF</hi>, let the point <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> be placed at +such a distance that the rays proceeding +from <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>, after refraction or reflection, +be brought to unite somewhere +in the axis <hi rend='italic'>AB</hi>. And suppose the +point of union (i.e. the image of the +point <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>, as hath been already set +forth) to be <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>; between which and +<hi rend='italic'>B</hi>, the vertex of the glass or speculum, +conceive the eye to be anywhere placed. +The question now is, where the point +<hi rend='italic'>A</hi> ought to appear. Experience shews +that it doth not appear behind at the +point <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>; and it were contrary to nature +that it should; since all the impression +which affects the sense comes +from towards <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>. But, from our tenets +it should seem to follow that it would +appear before the eye at a vast distance +off, so great as should in some sort surpass +all sensible distance. For since, +if we exclude all anticipations and prejudices, +every object appears by so much the farther off by +how much the rays it sends to the eye are less diverging; +and that object is thought to be most remote from which +parallel rays proceed unto the eye; reason would make +one think that object should appear at yet a greater distance +which is seen by converging rays. Moreover, it may +in general be asked concerning this case, what it is that +determines the apparent place of the point <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>, and maketh +it to appear after a constant manner, sometimes nearer, at +<pb n='139'/><anchor id='Pg139'/> +other times farther off? To which doubt I see nothing +that can be answered agreeable to the principles we have +laid down, except only that the point <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> ought always to +appear extremely remote. But, on the contrary, we are +assured by experience, that the point <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> appears variously +distant, according to the different situations of the eye +between the points <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>. And that it doth almost +never (if at all) seem farther off than it would if it were +beheld by the naked eye; but, on the contrary, it doth +sometimes appear much nearer. Nay, it is even certain +that by how much the rays falling on the eye do more +converge, by so much the nearer does the object seem to +approach. For, the eye being placed close to the point <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>, +the object <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> appears nearly in its own natural place, if the +point <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> is taken in the glass, or at the same distance, if in +the speculum. The eye being brought back to <hi rend='italic'>O</hi>, the +object seems to draw near; and, being come to <hi rend='italic'>P</hi>, it beholds +it still nearer: and so on by little and little, till at length the +eye being placed somewhere, suppose at <hi rend='italic'>Q</hi>, the object appearing +extremely near begins to vanish into mere confusion. +All which doth seem repugnant to our principles; +at least, not rightly to agree with them. Nor is our tenet +alone struck at by this experiment, but likewise all others +that ever came to my knowledge are every whit as much +endangered by it. The ancient one especially (which is +most commonly received, and comes nearest to mine) seems +to be so effectually overthrown thereby that the most +learned Tacquet has been forced to reject that principle, +as false and uncertain, on which alone he had built almost +his whole <hi rend='italic'>Catoptrics</hi>, and consequently, by taking away the +foundation, hath himself pulled down the superstructure +he had raised on it. Which, nevertheless, I do not believe +he would have done, had he but considered the whole +matter more thoroughly, and examined the difficulty to the +bottom. But as for me, neither this nor any other difficulty +shall have so great an influence on me, as to make me +renounce that which I know to be manifestly agreeable to +reason. Especially when, as it here falls out, the difficulty +is founded in the peculiar nature of a certain odd and +particular case. For, in the present case something +peculiar lies hid, which, being involved in the subtilty +of nature, will perhaps hardly be discovered till such time +<pb n='140'/><anchor id='Pg140'/> +as the manner of vision is more perfectly made known. +Concerning which, I must own I have hitherto been able +to find out nothing that has the least show of probability, +not to mention certainty. I shall therefore leave this knot +to be untied by you, wishing you may have better success +in it than I have had.</q> +</p> + +</quote> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +30. The ancient and received principle, which Dr. Barrow +here mentions as the main foundation of Tacquet's<note place='foot'>Andrea Tacquet, a mathematician, +born at Antwerp in 1611, and +referred to by Molyneux as <q>the +ingenious Jesuit.</q> He published a +number of scientific treatises, most +of which appeared after his death, +in a collected form, at Antwerp +in 1669.</note> +<hi rend='italic'>Catoptrics</hi>, is, that every <q>visible point seen by reflection +from a speculum shall appear placed at the intersection +of the reflected ray and the perpendicular of incidence.</q> +Which intersection in the present case happening to be +behind the eye, it greatly shakes the authority of that +principle whereon the aforementioned author proceeds +throughout his whole <hi rend='italic'>Catoptrics</hi>, in determining the +apparent place of objects seen by reflection from any kind +of speculum. +</p> + +<p> +31. Let us now see how this phenomenon agrees with +our tenets<note place='foot'>In what follows Berkeley tries +to explain by his visual theory +seeming contradictions which +puzzled the mathematicians.</note>. The eye, the nearer it is placed to the +point <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> in the above figures, the more distinct is the appearance +of the object: but, as it recedes to <hi rend='italic'>O</hi>, the +appearance grows more confused; and at <hi rend='italic'>P</hi> it sees the +object yet more confused; and so on, till the eye, being +brought back to <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>, sees the object in the greatest confusion +of all. Wherefore, by sect. 21, the object should +seem to approach the eye gradually, as it recedes from +the point <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>; that is, at <hi rend='italic'>O</hi> it should (in consequence of +the principle I have laid down in the aforesaid section) +seem nearer than it did at <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>, and at <hi rend='italic'>P</hi> nearer than at +<hi rend='italic'>O</hi>, and at <hi rend='italic'>Q</hi> nearer than at <hi rend='italic'>P</hi>, and so on, till it quite +vanishes at <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi>. Which is the very matter of fact, as +any one that pleases may easily satisfy himself by experiment. +</p> + +<p> +32. This case is much the same as if we should suppose +an Englishman to meet a foreigner who used the +same words with the English, but in a direct contrary +<pb n='141'/><anchor id='Pg141'/> +signification. The Englishman would not fail to make +a wrong judgment of the ideas annexed to those sounds, +in the mind of him that used them. Just so in the +present case, the object speaks (if I may so say) with +words that the eye is well acquainted with, that is, +confusions of appearance; but, whereas heretofore the +greatest confusions were always wont to signify nearer +distances, they have in this case a direct contrary signification, +being connected with the greater distances. +Whence it follows that the eye must unavoidably be +mistaken, since it will take the confusions in the sense +it has been used to, which is directly opposed to the true. +</p> + +<p> +33. This phenomenon, as it entirely subverts the opinion +of those who will have us judge of distance by lines +and angles, on which supposition it is altogether inexplicable, +so it seems to me no small confirmation of the truth +of that principle whereby it is explained<note place='foot'>This is offered as a verification +of the theory that near distances +are suggested, according to the +order of nature, by non-resembling +visual signs, contingently connected +with real distance.</note>. But, in order +to a more full explication of this point, and to shew how +far the hypothesis of the mind's judging by the various +divergency of rays may be of use in determining the +apparent place of an object, it will be necessary to +premise some few things, which are already well known +to those who have any skill in Dioptrics. +</p> + +<p> +34. <emph>First</emph>, Any radiating point is then distinctly seen +when the rays proceeding from it are, by the refractive +power of the crystalline, accurately reunited in the retina +or fund of the eye. But if they are reunited either +before they arrive at the retina, or after they have passed +it, then there is confused vision. +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/vision-fig-1.png' rend='width:60%'> + <head>Figure 1</head> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/vision-fig-2.png' rend='width:60%'> + <head>Figure 2</head> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/vision-fig-3.png' rend='width:60%'> + <head>Figure 3</head> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +35. <emph>Secondly</emph>, Suppose, in the adjacent figures, <hi rend='italic'>NP</hi> +represent an eye duly framed, and retaining its natural +figure. In fig. 1 the rays falling nearly parallel on the +eye, are, by the crystalline <hi rend='italic'>AB</hi>, refracted, so as their +focus, or point of union <hi rend='italic'>F</hi>, falls exactly on the retina. +But, if the rays fall sensibly diverging on the eye, as +in fig. 2, then their focus falls beyond the retina; or, if +the rays are made to converge by the lens <hi rend='italic'>QS</hi>, before +they come at the eye, as in fig. 3, their focus <hi rend='italic'>F</hi> will +fall before the retina. In which two last cases it is +<pb n='142'/><anchor id='Pg142'/> +evident, from the foregoing section, that the appearance +of the point <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi> is confused. And, by how much the +greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays +falling on the pupil, by so much the farther will the +point of their reunion be from the retina, either before +or behind it, and consequently the point <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi> will appear +by so much the more confused. And this, by the bye, +may shew us the difference between confused and faint +vision. Confused vision is, when the rays proceeding +from each distinct point of the object are not accurately +re-collected in one corresponding point on the retina, +but take up some space thereon—so that rays from +different points become mixed and confused together. +This is opposed to a distinct vision, and attends near +objects. Faint vision is when, by reason of the distance +of the object, or grossness of the interjacent +medium, few rays arrive from the object to the eye. +<pb n='143'/><anchor id='Pg143'/> +This is opposed to vigorous or clear vision, and attends +remote objects. But to return. +</p> + +<p> +36. The eye, or (to speak truly) the mind, perceiving +only the confusion itself, without ever considering the +cause from which it proceeds, doth constantly annex +the same degree of distance to the same degree of +confusion. Whether that confusion be occasioned by +converging or by diverging rays it matters not. Whence +it follows that the eye, viewing the object <hi rend='italic'>Z</hi> through +the glass <hi rend='italic'>QS</hi> (which by refraction causeth the rays <hi rend='italic'>ZQ</hi>, +<hi rend='italic'>ZS</hi>, &c. to converge), should judge it to be at such +a nearness, at which, if it were placed, it would radiate +on the eye, with rays diverging to that degree as would +produce the same confusion which is now produced by +converging rays, i.e. would cover a portion of the retina +equal to <hi rend='italic'>DC.</hi> (Vid. fig. 3, <hi rend='italic'>sup.</hi>) But then this must +be understood (to use Dr. Barrow's phrase) <q>seclusis +prænotionibus et præjudiciis,</q> in case we abstract from +all other circumstances of vision, such as the figure, size, +faintness, &c. of the visible objects—all which do ordinarily +concur to form our idea of distance, the mind having, +by frequent experience, observed their several sorts or +degrees to be connected with various distances. +</p> + +<p> +37. It plainly follows from what has been said, that a +person perfectly purblind (i.e. that could not see an +object distinctly but when placed close to his eye) would +not make the same wrong judgment that others do in +the forementioned case. For, to him, greater confusions +constantly suggesting greater distances, he must, as he +recedes from the glass, and the object grows more confused, +judge it to be at a farther distance; contrary to +what they do who have had the perception of the +objects growing more confused connected with the idea +of approach. +</p> + +<p> +38. Hence also it doth appear, there may be good use +of computation, by lines and angles, in optics<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 78; also <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 31.</note>; not that +the mind judges of distance immediately by them, but +because it judges by somewhat which is connected with +them, and to the determination whereof they may be +subservient. Thus, the mind judging of the distance +<pb n='144'/><anchor id='Pg144'/> +of an object by the confusedness of its appearance, and +this confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked +eye, according as the object is seen by rays more or +less diverging, it follows that a man may make use of the +divergency of the rays, in computing the apparent distance, +though not for its own sake, yet on account of the +confusion with which it is connected. But so it is, the +confusion itself is entirely neglected by mathematicians, +as having no necessary relation with distance, such as +the greater or lesser angles of divergency are conceived +to have. And these (especially for that they fall under +mathematical computation) are alone regarded, in determining +the apparent places of objects, as though they +were the sole and immediate cause of the judgments +the mind makes of distance. Whereas, in truth, they +should not at all be regarded in themselves, or any +otherwise than as they are supposed to be the cause of +confused vision. +</p> + +<p> +39. The not considering of this has been a fundamental +and perplexing oversight. For proof whereof, we need +go no farther than the case before us. It having been +observed that the most diverging rays brought into the +mind the idea of nearest distance, and that still as the +divergency decreased the distance increased, and it being +thought the connexion between the various degrees of +divergency and distance was immediate—this naturally +leads one to conclude, from an ill-grounded analogy, +that converging rays shall make an object appear at an +immense distance, and that, as the convergency increases, +the distance (if it were possible) should do so likewise. +That this was the cause of Dr. Barrow's mistake is +evident from his own words which we have quoted. +Whereas had the learned Doctor observed that diverging +and converging rays, how opposite soever they +may seem, do nevertheless agree in producing the same +effect, to wit, confusedness of vision, greater degrees +whereof are produced indifferently, either as the divergency +or convergency of the rays increaseth; and that +it is by this effect, which is the same in both, that either +the divergency or convergency is perceived by the eye—I +say, had he but considered this, it is certain he would +have made a quite contrary judgment, and rightly concluded +<pb n='145'/><anchor id='Pg145'/> +that those rays which fall on the eye with greater degrees +of convergency should make the object from whence +they proceed appear by so much the nearer. But it is +plain it was impossible for any man to attain to a right +notion of this matter so long as he had regard only to +lines and angles, and did not apprehend the true nature of +vision, and how far it was of mathematical consideration. +</p> + +<p> +40. Before we dismiss this subject, it is fit we take +notice of a query relating thereto, proposed by the ingenious +Mr. Molyneux, in his <hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Dioptrics</hi> (par. i. +prop. 31. sect. 9), where, speaking of the difficulty we have +been explaining, he has these words: <q>And so he (i.e. Dr. +Barrow) leaves this difficulty to the solution of others, +which I (after so great an example) shall do likewise; but +with the resolution of the same admirable author, of not +quitting the evident doctrine which we have before laid +down, for determining the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>locus objecti</foreign>, on account of being +pressed by one difficulty, which seems inexplicable till +a more intimate knowledge of the visive faculty be obtained +by mortals. In the meantime I propose it to the consideration +of the ingenious, whether the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>locus apparens</foreign> of +an object placed as in this ninth section be not as much +before the eye as the distinct base is behind the eye?</q> To +which query we may venture to answer in the negative. +For, in the present case, the rule for determining the distance +of the distinct base, or respective focus from the +glass is this: <emph>As the difference between the distance of the +object and focus is to the focus or focal length, so the distance +of the object from the glass is to the distance of the respective +focus or distinct base from the glass.</emph> (Molyneux, <hi rend='italic'>Dioptr.</hi>, +par. i. prop. 5.) Let us now suppose the object to be +placed at the distance of the focal length, and one-half of +the focal length from the glass, and the eye close to the +glass. Hence it will follow, by the rule, that the distance +of the distinct base behind the eye is double the true +distance of the object before the eye. If, therefore, +Mr. Molyneux's conjecture held good, it would follow +that the eye should see the object twice as far off as it +really is; and in other cases at three or four times its due +distance, or more. But this manifestly contradicts experience, +the object never appearing, at farthest, beyond its +due distance. Whatever, therefore, is built on this supposition +<pb n='146'/><anchor id='Pg146'/> +(vid. corol. i. prop. 57. ibid.) comes to the ground +along with it. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +41. From what hath been premised, it is a manifest +consequence, that a man born blind, being made to see, +would at first have no idea of distance by sight: the sun +and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would +all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The +objects intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth +they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations, +each whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain +or pleasure, or the most inward passions of his soul. For, +our judging objects perceived by sight to be at any distance, +or without the mind, is (vid. sect, xxviii.) entirely +the effect of experience; which one in those circumstances +could not yet have attained to<note place='foot'>Berkeley here passes from his +proof of visual <q>suggestion</q> of all +outward distances—i.e. intervals +between extremes in the line of +sight—by means of arbitrary signs, +and considers the nature of +visible externality. See note in +Hamilton's <hi rend='italic'>Reid</hi>, p. 177, on the +distinction between perception of +the external world and perception +of distance through the eye.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +42. It is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition—that +men judge of distance by the angle of the optic axes, +just as one in the dark, or a blind man by the angle comprehended +by two sticks, one whereof he held in each +hand<note place='foot'>See Descartes, <hi rend='italic'>Dioptrique</hi>, VI—Malebranche, +<hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, Liv. I. +ch. 9, 3—Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, VI. 11.</note>. For, if this were true, it would follow that one +blind from his birth, being made to see, should stand in +need of no new experience, in order to perceive distance +by sight. But that this is false has, I think, been sufficiently +demonstrated. +</p> + +<p> +43. And perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not +find that even those who from their birth have grown up +in a continued habit of seeing are irrecoverably prejudiced +on the other side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at +a distance from them. For, at this time it seems agreed +on all hands, by those who have had any thoughts of that +matter, that colours, which are the proper and immediate +object of sight, are not without the mind.—But then, it will +be said, by sight we have also the ideas of extension, and +figure, and motion; all which may well be thought without +and at some distance from the mind, though colour should +<pb n='147'/><anchor id='Pg147'/> +not. In answer to this, I appeal to any man's experience, +whether the visible extension of any object do not appear +as near to him as the colour of that object; nay, whether +they do not both seem to be in the very same place. Is +not the extension we see coloured, and is it possible for us, +so much as in thought, to separate and abstract colour from +extension? Now, where the extension is, there surely is +the figure, and there the motion too. I speak of those +which are perceived by sight<note place='foot'>Berkeley here begins to found, +on the experienced connexion between +extension and colour, and +between visible and tangible extension, +a proof that <emph>outness</emph> is +invisible. From Aristotle onwards +it has been assumed that colour is +the only phenomenon of which we +are immediately percipient in seeing. +Visible extension, visible +figure, and visible motion are +accordingly taken to be dependent +on the sensation of colour.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +44. But for a fuller explication of this point, and to shew +that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the +ideas or resemblances of things placed at a distance, it is +requisite that we look nearer into the matter, and carefully +observe what is meant in common discourse when one +says, that which he sees is at a distance from him. Suppose, +for example, that looking at the moon I should say it +were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from +me. Let us see what moon this is spoken of. It is plain +it cannot be the visible moon, or anything like the visible +moon, or that which I see—which is only a round luminous +plain, of about thirty visible points in diameter. For, in +case I am carried from the place where I stand directly +towards the moon, it is manifest the object varies still as +I go on; and, by the time that I am advanced fifty or sixty +semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far from being +near a small, round, luminous flat that I shall perceive +nothing like it—this object having long since disappeared, +and, if I would recover it, it must be by going back to the +earth from whence I set out<note place='foot'>In connexion with this and the +next illustration, Berkeley seems +to argue that we are not only unable +to see distance in the line of sight, +but also that we do not see a distant +object in its <emph>real visible</emph> magnitude. +But elsewhere he affirms +that only <emph>tangible</emph> magnitude is +entitled to be called <emph>real</emph>. Cf. +sect. 55, 59, 61.</note>. Again, suppose I perceive +by sight the faint and obscure idea of something, which +I doubt whether it be a man, or a tree, or a tower, but +<pb n='148'/><anchor id='Pg148'/> +judge it to be at the distance of about a mile. It is plain +I cannot mean that what I see is a mile off, or that it is +the image or likeness of anything which is a mile off; +since that every step I take towards it the appearance +alters, and from being obscure, small, and faint, grows +clear, large, and vigorous. And when I come to the +mile's end, that which I saw first is quite lost, neither +do I find anything in the likeness of it<note place='foot'>The sceptical objections to the +trustworthiness of the senses, proposed +by the Eleatics and others, +referred to by Descartes in his +<hi rend='italic'>Meditations</hi>, and by Malebranche +in the First Book of his <hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, +may have suggested the illustrations +in this section. Cf. also +Hume's Essay <hi rend='italic'>On the Academical +or Sceptical Philosophy</hi>. The sceptical +difficulty is founded on the +assumption that the object seen +at different distances is the <emph>same +visible object</emph>: it is really different, +and so the difficulty vanishes.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +45. In these and the like instances, the truth of the matter, +I find, stands thus:—Having of a long time experienced +certain ideas perceivable by touch<note place='foot'>Here Berkeley expressly introduces +<q>touch</q>—a term which +with him includes, not merely organic +sense of contact, but also +muscular and locomotive sense-experience. +After this he begins +to unfold the antithesis of visual +and tactual phenomena, whose subsequent +synthesis it is the aim of +the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> to explain. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>, +sect. 43—<hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 22 and 25. Note here +Berkeley's reticence of his idealization +of Matter—tangible as well +as visible. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 44.</note>—as distance, tangible +figure, and solidity—to have been connected with certain +ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, +forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted +ordinary course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an +object, I perceive a certain visible figure and colour, with +some degree of faintness and other circumstances, which, +from what I have formerly observed, determine me to think +that if I advance forward so many paces, miles, &c., I shall +be affected with such and such ideas of touch. So that, in +truth and strictness of speech, I neither see distance itself, +nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I say, neither +distance nor things placed at a distance are themselves, +or their ideas, truly perceived by sight. This I am persuaded +of, as to what concerns myself. And I believe +whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts, and +examine what he means by saying he sees this or that +thing at a distance, will agree with me, that what he sees +<pb n='149'/><anchor id='Pg149'/> +only suggests to his understanding that, after having passed +a certain distance, to be measured by the motion of his +body, which is perceivable by touch<note place='foot'>This connexion of our knowledge +of distance with our locomotive +experience points to a theory +which ultimately resolves space +into experience of unimpeded locomotion.</note>, he shall come to +perceive such and such tangible ideas, which have been +usually connected with such and such visible ideas. But, +that one might be deceived by these suggestions of sense, +and that there is no necessary connexion between visible +and tangible ideas suggested by them, we need go no +farther than the next looking-glass or picture to be convinced. +Note that, when I speak of tangible ideas, I take +the word idea for any the immediate object of sense, or +understanding—in which large signification it is commonly +used by the moderns<note place='foot'>Locke (<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Introduction, +§ 8) takes <emph>idea</emph> vaguely as <q>the +term which serves best to stand +whatsoever is the object of the +understanding when a man thinks.</q> +Oversight of what Berkeley intends +the term idea has made his +whole conception of nature and +the material universe a riddle to +many, of which afterwards.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest consequence +that the ideas of space, outness<note place='foot'>The expressive term <q>outness,</q> +favoured by Berkeley, is here first +used.</note>, and things placed +at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight<note place='foot'><q>We get the idea of Space,</q> +says Locke, <q>both by our sight and +touch</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, II. 13. § 2). Locke +did not contemplate Berkeley's antithesis +of visible and tangible extension, +and the consequent ambiguity +of the term extension; which sometimes +signifies <emph>coloured</emph>, and at +others <emph>resistant</emph> experience in sense.</note>; +they are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. +Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; +I look through the casement and see it; I walk out and +enter into it. Thus, common speech would incline one to +think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the +coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas intromitted by +each sense are widely different, and distinct from each +other; but, having been observed constantly to go together, +they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the +variation of the noise, I perceive the different distances of +the coach, and know that it approaches before I look out. +Thus, by the ear I perceive distance just after the same +manner as I do by the eye. +</p> + +<p> +47. I do not nevertheless say I hear distance, in like +<pb n='150'/><anchor id='Pg150'/> +manner as I say that I see it—the ideas perceived by +hearing not being so apt to be confounded with the ideas +of touch as those of sight are. So likewise a man is easily +convinced that bodies and external things are not properly +the object of hearing, but only sounds, by the mediation +whereof the idea of this or that body, or distance, is suggested +to his thoughts. But then one is with more difficulty +brought to discern the difference there is betwixt the ideas +of sight and touch<note place='foot'>For an explanation of this difficulty, +see sect. 144.</note>: though it be certain, a man no more +sees and feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the +same thing. +</p> + +<p> +48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought +a great absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing +should have any more than one extension and one figure. +But, the extension and figure of a body being let into the +mind two ways, and that indifferently, either by sight or +touch, it seems to follow that we see the same extension and +the same figure which we feel. +</p> + +<p> +49. But, if we take a close and accurate view of the +matter, it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel +one and the same object<note place='foot'><q>object</q>—<q>thing,</q> in the earlier +editions.</note>. That which is seen is one thing, +and that which is felt is another. If the visible figure and +extension be not the same with the tangible figure and +extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing +has divers extensions. The true consequence is that the +objects of sight and touch are two distinct things<note place='foot'>This is the issue of the analytical +portion of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>.</note>. It may +perhaps require some thought rightly to conceive this distinction. +And the difficulty seems not a little increased, +because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly +the same name as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith +it is connected—which doth of necessity arise from +the use and end of language<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 139-40.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +50. In order, therefore, to treat accurately and unconfusedly +of vision, we must bear in mind that there are two +sorts of objects apprehended by the eye—the one primarily +and immediately, the other secondarily and by intervention +of the former. Those of the first sort neither are nor +appear to be without the mind, or at any distance off<note place='foot'>Here the question of externality, +signifying independence of all percipient +life, is again mixed up with +that of the invisibility of distance +outwards in the line of sight.</note>. +<pb n='151'/><anchor id='Pg151'/> +They may, indeed, grow greater or smaller, more confused, +or more clear, or more faint. But they do not, cannot +approach, [or even seem to approach <note place='foot'>Omitted in author's last edition.</note>] or recede from us. +Whenever we say an object is at a distance, whenever we +say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always mean +it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the touch<note place='foot'>i.e. including muscular and +locomotive experience as well as +sense of contact. But what are +the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>tangibilia</foreign> themselves? Are +they also significant, like <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>visibilia</foreign>, +of a still ulterior reality? This +is the problem of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles +of Human Knowledge</hi>.</note>, +and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the eye, in +like manner as thoughts by the ear. +</p> + +<p> +51. No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar +language pronounced in our ears but the ideas corresponding +thereto present themselves to our minds: in the +very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the +understanding: so closely are they united that it is not in +our power to keep out the one except we exclude the other +also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very +thoughts themselves. So likewise the secondary objects, +or those which are only suggested by sight, do often more +strongly affect us, and are more regarded, than the proper +objects of that sense; along with which they enter into the +mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion +than ideas have with words<note place='foot'>In this section the conception +of a natural Visual Language, +makes its appearance, with its +implication that Nature is (for us) +virtually Spirit. Cf. sect. 140, 147—<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 44—<hi rend='italic'>Dialogues of +Hylas and Philonous</hi>—<hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, +IV. 8, 11—and <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision +Vindicated</hi>, passim.</note>. Hence it is we find it so +difficult to discriminate between the immediate and mediate +objects of sight, and are so prone to attribute to the former +what belongs only to the latter. They are, as it were, +most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together. +And the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our +thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language, and +want of reflection. However, I doubt not but anyone that +shall attentively consider what we have already said, and +shall say upon this subject before we have done (especially +if he pursue it in his own thoughts), may be able to deliver +himself from that prejudice. Sure I am, it is worth some +<pb n='152'/><anchor id='Pg152'/> +attention to whoever would understand the true nature of +vision. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +52. I have now done with Distance, and proceed to shew +how it is that we perceive by sight the Magnitude of objects<note place='foot'>Sect. 52-87 treat of the invisibility +of real, i.e. tactual, Magnitude. +Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 54-61.</note>. +It is the opinion of some that we do it by angles, or by +angles in conjunction with distance. But, neither angles +nor distance being perceivable by sight<note place='foot'>Sect. 8-15.</note>, and the things +we see being in truth at no distance from us<note place='foot'>Sect. 41, &c.</note>, it follows +that, as we have shewn lines and angles not to be the +medium the mind makes use of in apprehending the +apparent place, so neither are they the medium whereby it +apprehends the apparent magnitude of objects. +</p> + +<p> +53. It is well known that the same extension at a near +distance shall subtend a greater angle, and at a farther distance +a lesser angle. And by this principle (we are told) +the mind estimates the magnitude of an object<note place='foot'>See Molyneux's <hi rend='italic'>Treatise on +Dioptrics</hi>, B. I. prop. 28.</note>, comparing +the angle under which it is seen with its distance, and +thence inferring the magnitude thereof. What inclines +men to this mistake (beside the humour of making one see +by geometry) is, that the same perceptions or ideas which +suggest distance do also suggest magnitude. But, if we +examine it, we shall find they suggest the latter as immediately +as the former. I say, they do not first suggest +distance and then leave it to the judgment to use that as a +medium whereby to collect the magnitude; but they have +as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as +with the distance; and suggest magnitude as independently +of distance, as they do distance independently of +magnitude. All which will be evident to whoever considers +what has been already said and what follows. +</p> + +<p> +54. It has been shewn there are two sorts of objects +apprehended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magnitude, +or extension—the one, properly tangible, i.e. to be +perceived and measured by touch, and not immediately +falling under the sense of seeing; the other, properly and +immediately visible, by mediation of which the former is +brought in view. Each of these magnitudes are greater or +<pb n='153'/><anchor id='Pg153'/> +lesser, according as they contain in them more or fewer +points, they being made up of points or minimums. For, +whatever may be said of extension in abstract<note place='foot'>See sect. 122-126.</note>, it is +certain sensible extension is not infinitely divisible<note place='foot'>In short there is a point at which, +with our limited sense, we cease +to be percipient of colour, in seeing; +and of resistance, in locomotion. +Though Berkeley regards all visible +extensions as sensible, and therefore +dependent for their reality on +being realised by sentient mind, +he does not mean that mind or +consciousness is extended. With +him, extension, though it exists +only in mind,—i.e. as an idea seen, +in the case of visible extension, and +as an idea touched, in the case +of tangible extension,—is yet no +<emph>property</emph> of mind. Mind can exist +without being percipient of extension, +although extension cannot be +realised without mind.</note>. +There is a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum tangibile</foreign>, and a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign>, +beyond which sense cannot perceive. This every one's +experience will inform him. +</p> + +<p> +55. The magnitude of the object which exists without +the mind, and is at a distance, continues always invariably +the same: but, the visible object still changing as you +approach to or recede from the tangible object, it hath no +fixed and determinate greatness. Whenever therefore we +speak of the magnitude of any thing, for instance a tree or +a house, we must mean the tangible magnitude; otherwise +there can be nothing steady and free from ambiguity spoken +of it<note place='foot'>But this is true, though less +obviously, of tangible as well as of +visible objects.</note>. Now, though the tangible and visible magnitude +do in truth belong to two distinct objects<note place='foot'>Sect. 49.</note>, I shall nevertheless +(especially since those objects are called by the +same name, and are observed to coexist<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 139, 140, &c.</note>), to avoid tediousness +and singularity of speech, sometimes speak of them as +belonging to one and the same thing. +</p> + +<p> +56. Now, in order to discover by what means the magnitude +of tangible objects is perceived by sight, I need only +reflect on what passes in my own mind, and observe what +those things be which introduce the ideas of greater or +lesser into my thoughts when I look on any object. And +these I find to be, <emph>first</emph>, the magnitude or extension of the +visible object, which, being immediately perceived by sight, +is connected with that other which is tangible and placed +at a distance: <emph>secondly</emph>, the confusion or distinctness: and +<emph>thirdly</emph>, the vigorousness or faintness of the aforesaid +<pb n='154'/><anchor id='Pg154'/> +visible appearance. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Cæteris paribus</foreign>, by how much the +greater or lesser the visible object is, by so much the +greater or lesser do I conclude the tangible object to be. +But, be the idea immediately perceived by sight never so +large, yet, if it be withal confused, I judge the magnitude +of the thing to be but small. If it be distinct and clear, I +judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I apprehend it to be +yet greater. What is here meant by confusion and faintness +has been explained in sect. 35. +</p> + +<p> +57. Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do, +in like manner as those of distance, depend on the disposition +of the eye; also on the figure, number, and situation<note place='foot'><q>situation</q>—not in the earlier editions.</note> +of intermediate objects, and other circumstances that have +been observed to attend great or small tangible magnitudes. +Thus, for instance, the very same quantity of visible extension +which in the figure of a tower doth suggest the idea +of great magnitude shall in the figure of a man suggest +the idea of much smaller magnitude. That this is owing +to the experience we have had of the usual bigness of +a tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told. +</p> + +<p> +58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have no +more a necessary connexion with little or great magnitude +than they have with little or great distance. As they suggest +the latter, so they suggest the former to our minds. +And, by consequence, if it were not for experience, we +should no more judge a faint or confused appearance to be +connected with great or little magnitude than we should +that it was connected with great or little distance. +</p> + +<p> +59. Nor will it be found that great or small visible magnitude +hath any necessary relation to great or small +tangible magnitude—so that the one may certainly and +infallibly be inferred from the other. But, before we +come to the proof of this, it is fit we consider the difference +there is betwixt the extension and figure which is the proper +object of touch, and that other which is termed visible; +and how the former is principally, though not immediately, +taken notice of when we look at any object. This has been +before mentioned<note place='foot'>Sect. 55.</note>, but we shall here inquire into the cause +thereof. We regard the objects that environ us in proportion +as they are adapted to benefit or injure our own +<pb n='155'/><anchor id='Pg155'/> +bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensations +of pleasure or pain. Now, bodies operating on our organs +by an immediate application, and the hurt and advantage +arising therefrom depending altogether on the tangible, +and not at all on the visible, qualities of any object—this +is a plain reason why those should be regarded by us much +more than these. And for this end [chiefly<note place='foot'>Omitted in the author's last +edition.</note>] the visive +sense seems to have been bestowed on animals, to wit, +that, by the perception of visible ideas (which in themselves +are not capable of affecting or anywise altering the frame +of their bodies), they may be able to foresee<note place='foot'>Ordinary sight is virtually +foresight. Cf. sect. 85.—See also +Malebranche on the external senses, +as given primarily for the urgent +needs of embodied life, not +to immediately convey scientific +knowledge, <hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, Liv. I. ch. 5, +6, 9, &c.</note> (from the +experience they have had what tangible ideas are connected +with such and such visible ideas) the damage or benefit +which is like to ensue upon the application of their own +bodies to this or that body which is at a distance. Which +foresight, how necessary it is to the preservation of an +animal, every one's experience can inform him. Hence it +is that, when we look at an object, the tangible figure and +extension thereof are principally attended to; whilst there +is small heed taken of the visible figure and magnitude, +which, though more immediately perceived, do less sensibly +affect us, and are not fitted to produce any alteration in our +bodies. +</p> + +<p> +60. That the matter of fact is true will be evident to any +one who considers that a man placed at ten foot distance is +thought as great as if he were placed at the distance only +of five foot; which is true, not with relation to the visible, +but tangible greatness of the object: the visible magnitude +being far greater at one station than it is at the other. +</p> + +<p> +61. Inches, feet, &c. are settled, stated lengths, whereby +we measure objects and estimate their magnitude. We +say, for example, an object appears to be six inches, or six +foot long. Now, that this cannot be meant of visible +inches, &c. is evident, because a visible inch is itself no +constant determinate magnitude<note place='foot'>Sect. 44.—See also sect. 55, +and note.</note>, and cannot therefore +serve to mark out and determine the magnitude of any +<pb n='156'/><anchor id='Pg156'/> +other thing. Take an inch marked upon a ruler; view it +successively, at the distance of half a foot, a foot, +a foot and a half, &c. from the eye: at each of +which, and at all the intermediate distances, the inch shall +have a different visible extension, i.e. there shall be more +or fewer points discerned in it. Now, I ask which of all +these various extensions is that stated determinate one that +is agreed on for a common measure of other magnitudes? +No reason can be assigned why we should pitch on one +more than another. And, except there be some invariable +determinate extension fixed on to be marked by the word +inch, it is plain it can be used to little purpose; and to say +a thing contains this or that number of inches shall imply +no more than that it is extended, without bringing any +particular idea of that extension into the mind. Farther, +an inch and a foot, from different distances, shall both +exhibit the same visible magnitude, and yet at the same +time you shall say that one seems several times greater +than the other. From all which it is manifest, that the +judgments we make of the magnitude of objects by sight +are altogether in reference to their tangible extension. +Whenever we say an object is great or small, of this +or that determinate measure, I say, it must be meant +of the tangible and not the visible extension<note place='foot'>This supposes <q>settled</q> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>tangibilia</foreign>, +but not <q>settled</q> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>visibilia</foreign>. +Yet the sensible extension given +in touch and locomotive experience +is also relative—an object being +<emph>felt</emph> as larger or smaller according +to the state of the organism, and the +other conditions of our embodied +perception.</note>, which, +though immediately perceived, is nevertheless little taken +notice of. +</p> + +<p> +62. Now, that there is no necessary connexion between +these two distinct extensions is evident from hence—because +our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to +be able to see nothing but what were less than the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum +tangibile</foreign>. In which case it is not impossible we might have +perceived all the immediate objects of sight the very same +that we do now; but unto those visible appearances there +would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes +that are now. Which shews the judgments we make of +the magnitude of things placed at a distance, from the +various greatness of the immediate objects of sight, do not +<pb n='157'/><anchor id='Pg157'/> +arise from any essential or necessary, but only a customary, +tie which has been observed betwixt them. +</p> + +<p> +63. Moreover, it is not only certain that any idea of sight +might not have been connected with this or that idea of +touch we now observe to accompany it, but also that the greater +visible magnitudes might have been connected with and +introduced into our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, and +the lesser visible magnitudes greater tangible magnitudes. +Nay, that it actually is so, we have daily experience—that +object which makes a strong and large appearance not +seeming near so great as another the visible magnitude +whereof is much less, but more faint,<note place='foot'>What follows, to end of sect. 63, +added in the author's last edition.</note> and the appearance +upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower on the +retina, which faintness and situation suggest both greater +magnitude and greater distance. +</p> + +<p> +64. From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest +that, as we do not perceive the magnitude of objects immediately +by sight, so neither do we perceive them by the +mediation of anything which has a necessary connexion +with them. Those ideas that now suggest unto us the +various magnitudes of external objects before we touch +them might possibly have suggested no such thing; or +they might have signified them in a direct contrary manner, +so that the very same ideas on the perception whereof we +judge an object to be small might as well have served to +make us conclude it great;—those ideas being in their own +nature equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of +small or great, or no size at all, of outward objects<note place='foot'><q>outward objects,</q> i.e. objects +of which we are percipient in +tactual experience, taken in this +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> provisionally as the real external +objects. See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 44.</note>, just +as the words of any language are in their own nature +indifferent to signify this or that thing, or nothing at all. +</p> + +<p> +65. As we see distance so we see magnitude. And we +see both in the same way that we see shame or anger in the +looks of a man. Those passions are themselves invisible; +they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with colours +and alterations of countenance which are the immediate +object of vision, and which signify them for no other +reason than barely because they have been observed to +accompany them. Without which experience we should +<pb n='158'/><anchor id='Pg158'/> +no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than +of gladness. +</p> + +<p> +66. We are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine +those things which are perceived only by the mediation +of others to be themselves the immediate objects of sight, +or at least to have in their own nature a fitness to be +suggested by them before ever they had been experienced +to coexist with them. From which prejudice every one +perhaps will not find it easy to emancipate himself, by +any the clearest convictions of reason. And there are +some grounds to think that, if there was one only invariable +and universal language in the world, and that men +were born with the faculty of speaking it, it would be the +opinion of some, that the ideas in other men's minds were +properly perceived by the ear, or had at least a necessary +and inseparable tie with the sounds that were affixed to +them. All which seems to arise from want of a due application +of our discerning faculty, thereby to discriminate +between the ideas that are in our understandings, and consider +them apart from each other; which would preserve +us from confounding those that are different, and make us +see what ideas do, and what do not, include or imply this +or that other idea<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 144. Note, in this +and the three preceding sections, +the stress laid on the <emph>arbitrariness</emph> +of the connexion between the signs +which suggest magnitudes, or other +modes of extension, and their significates. +This is the foundation of the +<hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi>; which thus resolves +<emph>physical</emph> causality into a relation +of signs to what they signify and +predict—analogous to the relation +between words and their accepted +meanings.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +67. There is a celebrated phenomenon<note place='foot'>In sect. 67-78, Berkeley attempts +to verify the foregoing +account of the natural signs of +Size, by applying it to solve a +phenomenon, the cause of which +had been long debated among men +of science—the visible magnitude +of heavenly bodies when seen in +the horizon.</note> the solution +whereof I shall attempt to give, by the principles that have +been laid down, in reference to the manner wherein we +apprehend by sight the magnitude of objects.—The apparent +magnitude of the moon, when placed in the horizon, is +much greater than when it is in the meridian, though the +angle under which the diameter of the moon is seen be not +observed greater in the former case than in the latter; and +<pb n='159'/><anchor id='Pg159'/> +the horizontal moon doth not constantly appear of the same +bigness, but at some times seemeth far greater than at +others. +</p> + +<p> +68. Now, in order to explain the reason of the moon's +appearing greater than ordinary in the horizon, it must be +observed that the particles which compose our atmosphere +do intercept the rays of light proceeding from any object to +the eye; and, by how much the greater is the portion of +atmosphere interjacent between the object and the eye, by +so much the more are the rays intercepted, and, by consequence, +the appearance of the object rendered more faint—every +object appearing more vigorous or more faint in proportion +as it sendeth more or fewer rays into the eye. +Now, between the eye and the moon when situated in the +horizon there lies a far greater quantity of atmosphere than +there does when the moon is in the meridian. Whence it +comes to pass, that the appearance of the horizontal moon +is fainter, and therefore, by sect. 56, it should be thought +bigger in that situation than in the meridian, or in any +other elevation above the horizon. +</p> + +<p> +69. Farther, the air being variously impregnated, sometimes +more and sometimes less, with vapours and exhalations +fitted to retund and intercept the rays of light, it +follows that the appearance of the horizontal moon hath +not always an equal faintness, and, by consequence, that +luminary, though in the very same situation, is at one +time judged greater than at another. +</p> + +<p> +70. That we have here given the true account of the +phenomena of the horizontal moon, will, I suppose, be +farther evident to any one from the following considerations:—<emph>First</emph>, +it is plain, that which in this case suggests +the idea of greater magnitude, must be something which is +itself perceived; for, that which is unperceived cannot suggest +to our perception any other thing<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 10.</note>. <emph>Secondly</emph>, it must +be something that does not constantly remain the same, +but is subject to some change or variation; since the appearance +of the horizontal moon varies, being at one time +greater than at another. [<emph>Thirdly</emph>, it must not lie in the +circumjacent or intermediate objects, such as mountains, +houses, fields, &c.; because that when all those objects are +<pb n='160'/><anchor id='Pg160'/> +excluded from sight the appearance is as great as ever<note place='foot'>Omitted in the author's last +edition. Cf sect. 76, 77.—The +explanation in question is attributed +to Alhazen, and by Bacon to Ptolemy, +while it is sanctioned by +eminent scientific names before +and since Berkeley.</note>.] +And yet, <emph>thirdly</emph><note place='foot'><q>Fourthly</q> in the second +edition. Cf. what follows with +sect. 74. Why <q>lesser</q>?</note>, it cannot be the visible figure or magnitude; +since that remains the same, or is rather lesser, by +how much the moon is nearer to the horizon. It remains +therefore, that the true cause is that affection or alteration +of the visible appearance, which proceeds from the greater +paucity of rays arriving at the eye, and which I term faintness: +since this answers all the forementioned conditions, +and I am not conscious of any other perception that does. +</p> + +<p> +71. Add to this that in misty weather it is a common +observation, that the appearance of the horizontal moon is +far larger than usual, which greatly conspires with and +strengthens our opinion. Neither would it prove in the +least irreconcilable with what we have said, if the horizontal +moon should chance sometimes to seem enlarged beyond +its usual extent, even in more serene weather. For, we +must not only have regard to the mist which happens to be +in the place where we stand; we ought also to take into +our thoughts the whole sum of vapours and exhalations +which lie betwixt the eye and the moon: all which co-operating +to render the appearance of the moon more faint, and +thereby increase its magnitude, it may chance to appear +greater than it usually does even in the horizontal position, +at a time when, though there be no extraordinary fog or +haziness just in the place where we stand, yet the air between +the eye and the moon, taken altogether, may be +loaded with a greater quantity of interspersed vapours and +exhalations than at other times<note place='foot'>When Berkeley, some years +afterwards, visited Italy, he remarked +that distant objects appeared +to him much nearer than +they really were—a phenomenon +which he attributed to the comparative +purity of the southern +air.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +72. It may be objected that, in consequence of our principles, +the interposition of a body in some degree opaque, +which may intercept a great part of the rays of light, should +render the appearance of the moon in the meridian as +large as when it is viewed in the horizon. To which +I answer, it is not faintness anyhow applied that suggests +<pb n='161'/><anchor id='Pg161'/> +greater magnitude; there being no necessary, but only an experimental, +connexion between those two things. It follows +that the faintness which enlarges the appearance must +be applied in such sort, and with such circumstances, as +have been observed to attend the vision of great magnitudes. +When from a distance we behold great objects, the particles +of the intermediate air and vapours, which are themselves +unperceivable, do interrupt the rays of light, and thereby +render the appearance less strong and vivid. Now, faintness +of appearance, caused in this sort, hath been experienced +to co-exist with great magnitude. But when it is +caused by the interposition of an opaque sensible body, +this circumstance alters the case; so that a faint appearance +this way caused does not suggest greater magnitude, because +it hath not been experienced to co-exist with it. +</p> + +<p> +73. Faintness, as well as all other ideas or perceptions +which suggest magnitude or distance, does it in the same +way that words suggest the notions to which they are +annexed. Now, it is known a word pronounced with +certain circumstances, or in a certain context with other +words, hath not always the same import and signification +that it hath when pronounced in some other circumstances, +or different context of words. The very same visible appearance, +as to faintness and all other respects, if placed +on high, shall not suggest the same magnitude that it +would if it were seen at an equal distance on a level with +the eye. The reason whereof is, that we are rarely accustomed +to view objects at a great height; our concerns lie +among things situated rather before than above us; and +accordingly our eyes are not placed on the top of our +heads, but in such a position as is most convenient for +us to see distant objects standing in our way. And, this +situation of them being a circumstance which usually attends +the vision of distant objects, we may from hence +account for (what is commonly observed) an object's appearing +of different magnitude, even with respect to its +horizontal extension, on the top of a steeple, e.g. a hundred +feet high, to one standing below, from what it would +if placed at a hundred feet distance, on a level with his eye. +For, it hath been shewn that the judgment we make on +the magnitude of a thing depends not on the visible appearance +only, but also on divers other circumstances, any +<pb n='162'/><anchor id='Pg162'/> +one of which being omitted or varied may suffice to make +some alteration in our judgment. Hence, the circumstance +of viewing a distant object in such a situation as +is usual and suits with the ordinary posture of the head +and eyes, being omitted, and instead thereof a different +situation of the object, which requires a different posture +of the head, taking place—it is not to be wondered at if +the magnitude be judged different. But it will be demanded, +why a high object should constantly appear less +than an equidistant low object of the same dimensions; for +so it is observed to be. It may indeed be granted that the +variation of some circumstances may vary the judgment +made on the magnitude of high objects, which we are less +used to look at; but it does not hence appear why they +should be judged less rather than greater? I answer, that +in case the magnitude of distant objects was suggested by +the extent of their visible appearance alone, and thought +proportional thereto, it is certain they would then be judged +much less than now they seem to be. (Vid. sect. 79.) +But, several circumstances concurring to form the judgment +we make on the magnitude of distant objects, by +means of which they appear far larger than others whose +visible appearance hath an equal or even greater extension, +it follows that upon the change or omission of any +of those circumstances which are wont to attend the vision +of distant objects, and so come to influence the judgments +made on their magnitude, they shall proportionally appear +less than otherwise they would. For, any of those things +that caused an object to be thought greater than in +proportion to its visible extension being either omitted, +or applied without the usual circumstances, the judgment +depends more entirely on the visible extension; and consequently +the object must be judged less. Thus, in the +present case the situation of the thing seen being different +from what it usually is in those objects we have occasion +to view, and whose magnitude we observe, it follows that +the very same object being a hundred feet high, should +seem less than if it was a hundred feet off, on (or nearly +on) a level with the eye. What has been here set forth +seems to me to have no small share in contributing to +magnify the appearance of the horizontal moon, and deserves +not to be passed over in the explication of it. +</p> + +<pb n='163'/><anchor id='Pg163'/> + +<p> +74. If we attentively consider the phenomenon before +us, we shall find the not discerning between the mediate +and immediate objects of sight to be the chief cause of +the difficulty that occurs in the explication of it. The +magnitude of the visible moon, or that which is the proper +and immediate object of vision<note place='foot'>i.e. the original perception, +apart from any synthetic operation +of suggestion and inferential +thought, founded on visual signs.</note>, is no greater when +the moon is in the horizon than when it is in the meridian. +How comes it, therefore, to seem greater in one situation +than the other? What is it can put this cheat on the +understanding? It has no other perception of the moon +than what it gets by sight. And that which is seen is +of the same extent—I say, the visible appearance hath +the very same, or rather a less, magnitude, when the +moon is viewed in the horizontal than when in the +meridional position. And yet it is esteemed greater in +the former than in the latter. Herein consists the difficulty; +which doth vanish and admit of the most easy +solution, if we consider that as the visible moon is not +greater in the horizon than in the meridian, so neither +is it thought to be so. It hath been already shewn +that, in any act of vision, the visible object absolutely, +or in itself, is little taken notice of—the mind still carrying +its view from that to some tangible ideas, which +have been observed to be connected with it, and by that +means come to be suggested by it. So that when a thing +is said to appear great or small, or whatever estimate +be made of the magnitude of any thing, this is meant +not of the visible but of the tangible object. This duly +considered, it will be no hard matter to reconcile the +seeming contradiction there is, that the moon should +appear of a different bigness, the visible magnitude thereof +remaining still the same. For, by sect. 56, the very +same visible extension, with a different faintness, shall +suggest a different tangible extension. When therefore +the horizontal moon is said to appear greater than the +meridional moon, this must be understood, not of a greater +visible extension, but of a greater tangible extension, +which, by reason of the more than ordinary faintness +of the visible appearance, is suggested to the mind along +with it. +</p> + +<pb n='164'/><anchor id='Pg164'/> + +<p> +75. Many attempts have been made by learned men +to account for this appearance<note place='foot'>In Riccioli's <hi rend='italic'>Almagest</hi>, II. +lib. X. sect. 6. quest. 14, we have +an account of many hypotheses +then current, in explanation of the +apparent magnitude of the horizontal +moon.</note>. Gassendus<note place='foot'>Gassendi's <q>Epistolæ quatuor +de apparente magnitudine solis +humilis et sublimis.</q>—<hi rend='italic'>Opera</hi>, tom. +III pp. 420-477. Cf. Appendix to +this <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, p. 110.</note>, Des Cartes<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Dioptrique</hi>, VI.</note>, +Hobbes<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Opera Latina</hi>, vol. I, p. 376, +vol. II, pp. 26-62; <hi rend='italic'>English Works</hi>, +vol. I. p. 462. (Molesworth's +Edition.)</note>, and several others have employed their thoughts +on that subject; but how fruitless and unsatisfactory their +endeavours have been is sufficiently shewn in the <hi rend='italic'>Philosophical +Transactions</hi><note place='foot'>The paper in the Transactions +is by Molyneux.</note> (Numb. 187, p. 314), where you +may see their several opinions at large set forth and +confuted, not without some surprise at the gross blunders +that ingenious men have been forced into by endeavouring +to reconcile this appearance with the ordinary principles +of optics<note place='foot'>See Smith's <hi rend='italic'>Optics</hi>, pp. 64-67, +and <hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi>, pp. 48, &c. At p. 55 +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>New Theory</hi> is referred +to, and pronounced to be at variance +with experience. Smith concludes +by saying, that in <q>the second +edition of Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, and +also in a Vindication and Explanation +of it (called the <hi rend='italic'>Visual Language</hi>), +very lately published, the +author has made some additions to +his solution of the said phenomenon; +but seeing it still involves and depends +on the principle of faintness, +I may leave the rest of it to the +reader's consideration.</q> This, which +appeared in 1738, is one of the very +few early references to Berkeley's +<hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>.</note>. Since the writing of which there hath been +published in the <hi rend='italic'>Transactions</hi> (Numb. 187, p. 323) another +paper relating to the same affair, by the celebrated Dr. +Wallis, wherein he attempts to account for that phenomenon; +which, though it seems not to contain anything +new, or different from what had been said before by +others, I shall nevertheless consider in this place. +</p> + +<p> +76. His opinion, in short, is this:—We judge not of +the magnitude of an object by the optic angle alone, +but by the optic angle in conjunction with the distance. +Hence, though the angle remain the same, or even become +less, yet, if withal the distance seem to have been increased, +the object shall appear greater. Now, one way whereby +we estimate the distance of anything is by the number +and extent of the intermediate objects. When therefore +the moon is seen in the horizon, the variety of +<pb n='165'/><anchor id='Pg165'/> +fields, houses, &c. together with the large prospect of +the wide extended land or sea that lies between the eye +and the utmost limb of the horizon, suggest unto the +mind the idea of greater distance, and consequently +magnify the appearance. And this, according to Dr. +Wallis, is the true account of the extraordinary largeness +attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon, at +a time when the angle subtended by its diameter is not +one jot greater than it used to be. +</p> + +<p> +77. With reference to this opinion, not to repeat what +has been already said concerning distance<note place='foot'>Sect. 2-51.</note>, I shall only +observe, <emph>first</emph>, that if the prospect of interjacent objects +be that which suggests the idea of farther distance, and this +idea of farther distance be the cause that brings into the mind +the idea of greater magnitude, it should hence follow that +if one looked at the horizontal moon from behind a wall, +it would appear no bigger than ordinary. For, in that case, +the wall interposing cuts off all that prospect of sea and +land, &c. which might otherwise increase the apparent distance, +and thereby the apparent magnitude of the moon. +Nor will it suffice to say, the memory doth even then +suggest all that extent of land, &c. which lies within +the horizon, which suggestion occasions a sudden judgment +of sense, that the moon is farther off and larger +than usual. For, ask any man who from such a station +beholding the horizontal moon shall think her greater +than usual, whether he hath at that time in his mind +any idea of the intermediate objects, or long tract of +land that lies between his eye and the extreme edge +of the horizon? and whether it be that idea which is +the cause of his making the aforementioned judgment? +He will, without doubt, reply in the negative, and declare +the horizontal moon shall appear greater than the meridional, +though he never thinks of all or any of those +things that lie between him and it. [And as for the +absurdity of any idea's introducing into the mind another, +whilst itself is not perceived, this has already +fallen under our observation, and is too evident to need +any farther enlargement on it<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the author's last edition.</note>.] <emph>Secondly</emph>, it seems impossible, +by this hypothesis, to account for the moon's +<pb n='166'/><anchor id='Pg166'/> +appearing, in the very same situation, at one time greater +than at another; which, nevertheless, has been shewn +to be very agreeable to the principles we have laid +down, and receives a most easy and natural explication +from them. [<note place='foot'>What follows to the end of this +section is not contained in the first +edition.</note>For the further clearing up of this point, +it is to be observed, that what we immediately and +properly see are only lights and colours in sundry situations +and shades, and degrees of faintness and clearness, +confusion and distinctness. All which visible objects are +only in the mind; nor do they suggest aught external<note place='foot'>i.e. tangible.</note>, +whether distance or magnitude, otherwise than by habitual +connexion, as words do things. We are also to +remark, that beside the straining of the eyes, and beside +the vivid and faint, the distinct and confused appearances +(which, bearing some proportion to lines and angles, +have been substituted instead of them in the foregoing +part of this Treatise), there are other means which +suggest both distance and magnitude—particularly the +situation of visible points or objects, as upper or lower; +the former suggesting a farther distance and greater +magnitude, the latter a nearer distance and lesser magnitude—all +which is an effect only of custom and experience, +there being really nothing intermediate in the line of +distance between the uppermost and the lowermost, which +are both equidistant, or rather at no distance from the +eye; as there is also nothing in upper or lower which +by necessary connexion should suggest greater or lesser +magnitude. Now, as these customary experimental means +of suggesting distance do likewise suggest magnitude, +so they suggest the one as immediately as the other. +I say, they do not (vide sect. 53) first suggest distance, +and then leave the mind from thence to infer or compute +magnitude, but suggest magnitude as immediately and +directly as they suggest distance.] +</p> + +<p> +78. This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear +instance of the insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining +the way wherein the mind perceives and estimates the +magnitude of outward objects. There is, nevertheless, a +use of computation by them<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 38; and <hi rend='italic'>Theory of +Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 31.</note>—in order to determine the +<pb n='167'/><anchor id='Pg167'/> +apparent magnitude of things, so far as they have a connexion +with and are proportional to those other ideas or +perceptions which are the true and immediate occasions +that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude of things. +But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning +mathematical computation in optics—that it can never<note place='foot'><q>Never</q>—<q>hardly,</q> in first +edition.</note> be +very precise and exact<note place='foot'>Cf. Appendix, p. <ref target='Pg208'>208</ref>.—See +Smith's <hi rend='italic'>Optics</hi>, B. I. ch. v, and +<hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi>, p. 56, in which he <q>leaves +it to be considered, whether the +said phenomenon is not as clear +an instance of the insufficiency of +faintness</q> as of mathematical computation.</note>, since the judgments we make of +the magnitude of external things do often depend on several +circumstances which are not proportional to or capable of +being defined by lines and angles. +</p> + +<p> +79. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this +consequence, to wit, that a man born blind, and made to +see, would, at first opening of his eyes, make a very different +judgment of the magnitude of objects intromitted +by them from what others do. He would not consider the +ideas of sight with reference to, or as having any connexion +with, the ideas of touch. His view of them being entirely +terminated within themselves, he can no otherwise judge +them great or small than as they contain a greater or lesser +number of visible points. Now, it being certain that any +visible point can cover or exclude from view only one +other visible point, it follows that whatever object intercepts +the view of another hath an equal number of visible points +with it; and, consequently, they shall both be thought by +him to have the same magnitude. Hence, it is evident one +in those circumstances would judge his thumb, with which +he might hide a tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to +that tower; or his hand, the interposition whereof might +conceal the firmament from his view, equal to the firmament: +how great an inequality soever there may, in our +apprehensions, seem to be betwixt those two things, because +of the customary and close connexion that has grown +up in our minds between the objects of sight and touch, +whereby the very different and distinct ideas of those two +senses are so blended and confounded together as to be +mistaken for one and the same thing—out of which prejudice +we cannot easily extricate ourselves. +</p> + +<pb n='168'/><anchor id='Pg168'/> + +<p> +80. For the better explaining the nature of vision, and +setting the manner wherein we perceive magnitudes in a +due light, I shall proceed to make some observations concerning +matters relating thereto, whereof the want of +reflection, and duly separating between tangible and visible +ideas, is apt to create in us mistaken and confused notions. +And, <emph>first</emph>, I shall observe, that the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> is +exactly equal in all beings whatsoever that are endowed +with the visive faculty<note place='foot'>A favourite doctrine with +Berkeley, according to whose +theory of visibles there can be no +absolute visible magnitude, the +<emph>minimum</emph> being the least that is +<emph>perceivable</emph> by each seeing subject, +and thus relative to his visual +capacity. This section is thus +criticised, in January, 1752, in a +letter signed <q>Anti-Berkeley,</q> in +the <hi rend='italic'>Gent. Mag.</hi> (vol. XXII, p. 12): +<q>Upon what his lordship asserts +with respect to the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign>, +I would observe that it is +certain that there are infinite numbers +of animals which are imperceptible +to the naked eye, and +cannot be perceived but by the +help of a microscope; consequently +there are animals whose whole +bodies are far less than the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum +visibile</foreign> of a man. Doubtless these +animals have eyes, and, if their +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> were equal to that +of a man, it would follow that they +cannot perceive anything but what +is much larger than their whole +body; and therefore their own +bodies must be invisible to them, +because we know they are so to +men, whose <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> is +asserted by his lordship to be equal +to theirs.</q> There is some misconception +in this. Cf. Appendix to +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, p. 209.</note>. No exquisite formation of the +eye, no peculiar sharpness of sight, can make it less in one +creature than in another; for, it not being distinguishable +into parts, nor in anywise consisting of them, it must +necessarily be the same to all. For, suppose it otherwise, +and that the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> of a mite, for instance, be +less than the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> of a man; the latter therefore +may, by detraction of some part, be made equal to +the former. It doth therefore consist of parts, which is +inconsistent with the notion of a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> or point. +</p> + +<p> +81. It will, perhaps, be objected, that the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> +of a man doth really and in itself contain parts whereby +it surpasses that of a mite, though they are not perceivable +by the man. To which I answer, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> +having (in like manner as all other the proper and immediate +objects of sight) been shewn not to have any existence +without the mind of him who sees it, it follows there cannot +be any part of it that is not actually perceived and therefore +visible. Now, for any object to contain several distinct +<pb n='169'/><anchor id='Pg169'/> +visible parts, and at the same time to be a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign>, +is a manifest contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal +number. It is every whit as great when our view is +contracted and bounded by near objects as when it is +extended to larger and remoter ones. For, it being impossible +that one <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> should obscure or keep +out of sight more than one other, it is a plain consequence +that, when my view is on all sides bounded by the walls +of my study, I see just as many visible points as I could in +case that, by the removal of the study-walls and all other +obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent +fields, mountains, sea, and open firmament. For, so long +as I am shut up within the walls, by their interposition +every point of the external objects is covered from my +view. But, each point that is seen being able to cover or +exclude from sight one only other corresponding point, it +follows that, whilst my sight is confined to those narrow +walls, I see as many points, or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minima visibilia</foreign>, as I should +were those walls away, by looking on all the external +objects whose prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever, +therefore, we are said to have a greater prospect at one +time than another, this must be understood with relation, +not to the proper and immediate, but the secondary and +mediate objects of vision—which, as hath been shewn, do +properly belong to the touch. +</p> + +<p> +83. The visive faculty, considered with reference to its +immediate objects, may be found to labour of two defects. +<emph>First</emph>, in respect of the extent or number of visible points +that are at once perceivable by it, which is narrow and +limited to a certain degree. It can take in at one view but +a certain determinate number of <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minima visibilia</foreign>, beyond +which it cannot extend its prospect. <emph>Secondly</emph>, our sight +is defective in that its view is not only narrow, but also for +the most part confused. Of those things that we take in +at one prospect, we can see but a few at once clearly and +unconfusedly; and the more we fix our sight on any one +object, by so much the darker and more indistinct shall +the rest appear. +</p> + +<p> +84. Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may +imagine as many perfections, to wit, 1st. That of comprehending +in one view a greater number of visible points; +<pb n='170'/><anchor id='Pg170'/> +2dly, of being able to view them all equally and at once, +with the utmost clearness and distinction. That those +perfections are not actually in some intelligences of a +different order and capacity from ours, it is impossible for +us to know<note place='foot'>Those two defects belong to +human consciousness. See Locke's +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, II. 10, on the defects of +human memory. It is this imperfection +which makes reasoning +needful—to assist finite intuition. +Reasoning is the sign at once of +our dignity and our weakness.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +85. In neither of those two ways do microscopes contribute +to the improvement of sight. For, when we look +through a microscope, we neither see more visible points, +nor are the collateral points more distinct, than when we +look with the naked eye at objects placed at a due distance. +A microscope brings us, as it were, into a new world. It +presents us with a new scene of visible objects, quite +different from what we behold with the naked eye. But +herein consists the most remarkable difference, to wit, that +whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a +certain connexion with tangible objects, whereby we are +taught to foresee what will ensue upon the approach or +application of distant objects to the parts of our own body—which +much conduceth to its preservation<note place='foot'>Sect. 59.</note>—there is not +the like connexion between things tangible and those visible +objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope. +</p> + +<p> +86. Hence, it is evident that, were our eyes turned into +the nature of microscopes, we should not be much benefitted +by the change. We should be deprived of the forementioned +advantage we at present receive by the visive +faculty, and have left us only the empty amusement of +seeing, without any other benefit arising from it. But, in +that case, it will perhaps be said, our sight would be endued +with a far greater sharpness and penetration than it now +hath. But I would fain know wherein consists that sharpness +which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight. It +is certain, from what we have already shewn<note place='foot'>Sect. 80-82.</note>, that the +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> is never greater or lesser, but in all cases +constantly the same. And in the case of microscopical +eyes, I see only this difference, to wit, that upon the ceasing +of a certain observable connexion betwixt the divers perceptions +of sight and touch, which before enabled us to +<pb n='171'/><anchor id='Pg171'/> +regulate our actions by the eye, it would now be rendered +utterly unserviceable to that purpose. +</p> + +<p> +87. Upon the whole, it seems that if we consider the use +and end of sight, together with the present state and +circumstances of our being, we shall not find any great +cause to complain of any defect or imperfection in it, or +easily conceive how it could be mended. With such admirable +wisdom is that faculty contrived, both for the +pleasure and convenience of life. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +88. Having finished what I intended to say concerning +the Distance and Magnitude of objects, I come now to treat +of the manner wherein the mind perceives by sight their +Situation<note place='foot'>Sect. 88-119 relate to the nature, +invisibility, and arbitrary visual +signs of Situation, or of the localities +of tangible things. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of +Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 44-53.</note>. Among the discoveries of the last age, it is +reputed none of the least, that the manner of vision has been +more clearly explained than ever it had been before. +There is, at this day, no one ignorant that the pictures of +external objects are painted on the retina or fund of the +eye; that we can see nothing which is not so painted; and +that, according as the picture is more distinct or confused, +so also is the perception we have of the object<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 2, 114, 116, 118.</note>. But then, +in this explication of vision, there occurs one mighty difficulty, +viz. the objects are painted in an inverted order on the +bottom of the eye: the upper part of any object being +painted on the lower part of the eye, and the lower part of the +object on the upper part of the eye; and so also as to right +and left. Since therefore the pictures are thus inverted, it +is demanded, how it comes to pass that we see the objects +erect and in their natural posture? +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/vision-fig-4.png' rend='width:80%'> + <head>Figure 4</head> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +89. In answer to this difficulty, we are told that the mind, +perceiving an impulse of a ray of light on the upper part of +the eye, considers this ray as coming in a direct line from +the lower part of the object; and, in like manner, tracing +the ray that strikes on the lower part of the eye, it is +directed to the upper part of the object. Thus, in the adjacent +figure, <hi rend='italic'>C</hi>, the lower point of the object <hi rend='italic'>ABC</hi>, is projected on +<hi rend='italic'>c</hi> the upper part of the eye. So likewise, the highest point <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> +is projected on <hi rend='italic'>a</hi> the lowest part of the eye; which makes the +representation <hi rend='italic'>cba</hi> inverted. But the mind—considering +<pb n='172'/><anchor id='Pg172'/> +the stroke that is made on <hi rend='italic'>c</hi> as coming in the straight line +<hi rend='italic'>Cc</hi> from the lower end of the object; and the stroke or +impulse on <hi rend='italic'>a</hi>, as coming in the line <hi rend='italic'>Aa</hi> from the upper end +of the object—is directed to make a right judgment of the +situation of the object <hi rend='italic'>ABC</hi>, notwithstanding the picture +of it be inverted. Moreover, this is illustrated by conceiving +a blind man, who, holding in his hands two sticks +that cross each other, doth with them touch the extremities +of an object, placed in a perpendicular situation<note place='foot'>This illustration is taken from Descartes. See Appendix.</note>. It is certain +this man will judge that to be the upper part of the +object which he touches with the stick held in the undermost +hand, and that to be the lower part of the object +which he touches with the stick in his uppermost hand. +This is the common explication of the erect appearance of +objects, which is generally received and acquiesced in, +being (as Mr. Molyneux tells us, <hi rend='italic'>Diopt.</hi> part ii. ch. vii. p. 289) +<q>allowed by all men as satisfactory.</q> +</p> + +<p> +90. But this account to me does not seem in any degree +true. Did I perceive those impulses, decussations, and +directions of the rays of light, in like manner as hath been +set forth, then, indeed, it would not at first view be altogether +void of probability. And there might be some pretence +for the comparison of the blind man and his cross +sticks. But the case is far otherwise. I know very well +that I perceive no such thing. And, of consequence, I +cannot thereby make an estimate of the situation of objects. +Moreover, I appeal to any one's experience, whether he be +conscious to himself that he thinks on the intersection made +by the radius pencils, or pursues the impulses they give in +right lines, whenever he perceives by sight the position of +<pb n='173'/><anchor id='Pg173'/> +any object? To me it seems evident that crossing and +tracing of the rays, &c. is never thought on by children, +idiots, or, in truth, by any other, save only those who have +applied themselves to the study of optics. And for the +mind to judge of the situation of objects by those things +without perceiving them, or to perceive them without +knowing it<note place='foot'>Sect. 10 and 19.</note>, take which you please, it is perfectly beyond +my comprehension. Add to this, that the explaining the +manner of vision by the example of cross sticks, and +hunting for the object along the axes of the radius pencils, +doth suppose the proper objects of sight to be perceived at +a distance from us, contrary to what hath been demonstrated<note place='foot'>Sect. 2-51.</note>. +[We may therefore venture to pronounce this opinion, concerning +the way wherein the mind perceives the erect +appearance of objects, to be of a piece with those other +tenets of writers in optics, which in the foregoing parts of +this treatise we have had occasion to examine and refute<note place='foot'>Omitted in author's last edition.</note>.] +</p> + +<p> +91. It remains, therefore, that we look for some other +explication of this difficulty. And I believe it not impossible +to find one, provided we examine it to the bottom, +and carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and +touch; which cannot be too oft inculcated in treating of +vision<note place='foot'>This is Berkeley's universal +solvent of the psychological difficulties +involved in visual-perception.</note>. But, more especially throughout the consideration +of this affair, we ought to carry that distinction in our +thoughts; for that from want of a right understanding +thereof, the difficulty of explaining erect vision seems +chiefly to arise. +</p> + +<p> +92. In order to disentangle our minds from whatever +prejudices we may entertain with relation to the subject in +hand, nothing seems more apposite than the taking into our +thoughts the case of one born blind, and afterwards, when +grown up, made to see. And—though perhaps it may not +be a task altogether easy and familiar to us, to divest ourselves +entirely of the experiences received from sight, so +as to be able to put our thoughts exactly in the posture of +such a one's—we must, nevertheless, as far as possible, endeavour +to frame true conceptions of what might reasonably +be supposed to pass in his mind<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 103, 106, 110, 128, &c. +Berkeley treats this case hypothetically +in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, in defect of +actual experiments upon the born-blind, +since accumulated from +Cheselden downwards. See however +the Appendix, and <hi rend='italic'>Theory +of Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 71.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='174'/><anchor id='Pg174'/> + +<p> +93. It is certain that a man actually blind, and who had +continued so from his birth, would, by the sense of feeling, +attain to have ideas of upper and lower. By the motion +of his hand, he might discern the situation of any tangible +object placed within his reach. That part on which he +felt himself supported, or towards which he perceived his +body to gravitate, he would term <emph>lower</emph>, and the contrary +to this <emph>upper</emph>; and accordingly denominate whatsoever +objects he touched. +</p> + +<p> +94. But then, whatever judgments he makes concerning +the situation of objects are confined to those only that are +perceivable by touch. All those things that are intangible, +and of a spiritual nature—his thoughts and desires, his +passions, and in general all the modifications of his soul—to +these he would never apply the terms upper and lower, +except only in a metaphorical sense. He may perhaps, by +way of allusion, speak of high or low thoughts: but those +terms, in their proper signification, would never be applied +to anything that was not conceived to exist without the +mind. For, a man born blind, and remaining in the same +state, could mean nothing else by the words higher and +lower than a greater or lesser distance from the earth; +which distance he would measure by the motion or application +of his hand, or some other part of his body. It is, +therefore, evident that all those things which, in respect +of each other, would by him be thought higher or lower, +must be such as were conceived to exist without his mind, +in the ambient space<note place='foot'>i.e. tangible things. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 44.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +95. Whence it plainly follows, that such a one, if we +suppose him made to see, would not at first sight think +that anything he saw was high or low, erect or inverted. +For, it hath been already demonstrated, in sect. 41, that he +would not think the things he perceived by sight to be at +any distance from him, or without his mind. The objects +to which he had hitherto been used to apply the terms up +and down, high and low, were such only as affected, or +were some way perceived by his touch. But the proper +<pb n='175'/><anchor id='Pg175'/> +objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct +and different from the former, and which can in no sort +make themselves perceived by touch. There is, therefore, +nothing at all that could induce him to think those terms +applicable to them. Nor would he ever think it, till such +time as he had observed their connexion with tangible +objects, and the same prejudice<note place='foot'>The <q>prejudice,</q> to wit, which +Berkeley would dissolve by his +introspective analysis of vision. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 35.</note> began to insinuate itself +into his understanding, which, from their infancy, had +grown up in the understandings of other men. +</p> + +<p> +96. To set this matter in a clearer light, I shall make +use of an example. Suppose the above-mentioned blind +person, by his touch, perceives a man to stand erect. Let +us inquire into the manner of this. By the application of +his hand to the several parts of a human body, he had +perceived different tangible ideas; which being collected +into sundry complex ones<note place='foot'>Thus forming individual concrete +things out of what is perceived +separately through different +senses.</note> have distinct names annexed to +them. Thus, one combination of a certain tangible figure, +bulk, and consistency of parts is called the head; another +the hand; a third the foot, and so of the rest—all which +complex ideas could, in his understanding, be made up +only of ideas perceivable by touch. He had also, by his +touch, obtained an idea of earth or ground, towards which +he perceives the parts of his body to have a natural +tendency. Now—by <emph>erect</emph> nothing more being meant +than that perpendicular position of a man wherein his feet +are nearest to the earth—if the blind person, by moving +his hand over the parts of the man who stands before him, +do perceive the tangible ideas that compose the head to be +farthest from, and those that compose the feet to be nearest +to, that other combination of tangible ideas which he +calls earth, he will denominate that man erect. But, if we +suppose him on a sudden to receive his sight, and that he +behold a man standing before him, it is evident, in that +case, he would neither judge the man he sees to be erect +nor inverted; for he, never having known those terms +applied to any other save tangible things, or which existed +in the space without him, and what he sees neither being +tangible, nor perceived as existing without, he could not +<pb n='176'/><anchor id='Pg176'/> +know that, in propriety of language, they were applicable +to it. +</p> + +<p> +97. Afterwards, when, upon turning his head or eyes up +and down to the right and left, he shall observe the visible +objects to change, and shall also attain to know that they +are called by the same names, and connected with the +objects perceived by touch; then, indeed, he will come to +speak of them and their situation in the same terms that +he has been used to apply to tangible things: and those +that he perceives by turning up his eyes he will call upper, +and those that by turning down his eyes he will call lower. +</p> + +<p> +98. And this seems to me the true reason why he should +think those objects uppermost that are painted on the +lower part of his eye. For, by turning the eye up they +shall be distinctly seen; as likewise they that are painted +on the highest part of the eye shall be distinctly seen by +turning the eye down, and are for that reason esteemed +lowest. For we have shewn that to the immediate objects +of sight, considered in themselves, he would not attribute +the terms high and low. It must therefore be on account +of some circumstances which are observed to attend them. +And these, it is plain, are the actions of turning the eye up +and down, which suggest a very obvious reason why the +mind should denominate the objects of sight accordingly +high or low. And, without this motion of the eye—this +turning it up and down in order to discern different +objects—doubtless <emph>erect</emph>, <emph>inverse</emph>, and other the like terms +relating to the position of tangible objects, would never +have been transferred, or in any degree apprehended +to belong to the ideas of sight, the mere act of seeing +including nothing in it to that purpose; whereas the different +situations of the eye naturally direct the mind to +make a suitable judgment of the situation of objects intromitted +by it<note place='foot'>This briefly is Berkeley's solution +of <q>the knot about inverted +images,</q> which long puzzled men +of science.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +99. Farther, when he has by experience learned the +connexion there is between the several ideas of sight and +touch, he will be able, by the perception he has of the +situation of visible things in respect of one another, to +make a sudden and true estimate of the situation of outward, +tangible things corresponding to them. And thus +<pb n='177'/><anchor id='Pg177'/> +it is he shall perceive<note place='foot'>i.e. perceive <emph>mediately</emph>—visible +objects, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, having no tactual +situation. Pure vision, he would say, +has nothing to do with <q>high</q> and +<q>low,</q> <q>great</q> and <q>inverted,</q> in +the real or tactual meaning of those +terms.</note> by sight the situation of external<note place='foot'>i.e. tangible.</note> +objects, which do not properly fall under that sense. +</p> + +<p> +100. I know we are very prone to think that, if just made +to see, we should judge of the situation of visible things as +we do now. But, we are also as prone to think that, at +first sight, we should in the same way apprehend the +distance and magnitude of objects, as we do now; which +hath been shewn to be a false and groundless persuasion. +And, for the like reasons, the same censure may be passed +on the positive assurance that most men, before they have +thought sufficiently of the matter, might have of their being +able to determine by the eye, at first view, whether objects +were erect or inverse. +</p> + +<p> +101. It will perhaps be objected to our opinion, that a +man, for instance, being thought erect when his feet are +next the earth, and inverted when his head is next the +earth, it doth hence follow that, by the mere act of vision, +without any experience or altering the situation of the eye, +we should have determined whether he were erect or inverted. +For both the earth itself, and the limbs of the +man who stands thereon, being equally perceived by sight, +one cannot choose seeing what part of the man is nearest +the earth, and what part farthest from it, i.e. whether he +be erect or inverted. +</p> + +<p> +102. To which I answer, the ideas which constitute the +tangible earth and man are entirely different from those +which constitute the visible earth and man. Nor was it +possible, by virtue of the visive faculty alone, without +superadding any experience of touch, or altering the +position of the eye, ever to have known, or so much as +suspected, there had been any relation or connexion between +them. Hence, a man at first view would not +denominate anything he saw, <emph>earth</emph>, or <emph>head</emph>, or <emph>foot</emph>; +and consequently, he could not tell, by the mere act of +vision, whether the head or feet were nearest the earth. +Nor, indeed, would we have thereby any thought of earth +or man, erect or inverse, at all—which will be made yet +<pb n='178'/><anchor id='Pg178'/> +more evident, if we nicely observe, and make a particular +comparison between, the ideas of both senses. +</p> + +<p> +103. That which I see is only variety of light and +colours. That which I feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, +rough or smooth. What similitude, what connexion, have +those ideas with these? Or, how is it possible that any +one should see reason to give one and the same name<note place='foot'>e.g. <q>extension,</q> which, according +to Berkeley, is an equivocal +term, common (in its different +meanings) to <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>visibilia</foreign> and +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>tangibilia</foreign>. Cf. sect. 139, 140.</note> to +combinations of ideas so very different, before he had +experienced their co-existence? We do not find there is +any necessary connexion betwixt this or that tangible +quality, and any colour whatsoever. And we may sometimes +perceive colours, where there is nothing to be felt. +All which doth make it manifest that no man, at first +receiving of his sight<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 93, 106, 110, 128.</note>, would know there was any agreement +between this or that particular object of his sight and +any object of touch he had been already acquainted with. +The colours therefore of the head would to him no more +suggest the idea of head<note place='foot'>i.e. real or tangible head.</note> than they would the idea of feet. +</p> + +<p> +104. Farther, we have at large shewn (vid. sect. 63 and +64) there is no discoverable necessary connexion between +any given visible magnitude and any one particular tangible +magnitude; but that it is entirely the result of custom and +experience, and depends on foreign and accidental circumstances, +that we can, by the perception of visible extension, +inform ourselves what may be the extension of any tangible +object connected with it. Hence, it is certain, that neither +the visible magnitude of head or foot would bring along +with them into the mind, at first opening of the eyes, the +respective tangible magnitudes of those parts. +</p> + +<p> +105. By the foregoing section, it is plain the visible figure +of any part of the body hath no necessary connexion with +the tangible figure thereof, so as at first sight to suggest it +to the mind. For, figure is the termination of magnitude. +Whence it follows that no visible magnitude having in its +own nature an aptness to suggest any one particular tangible +magnitude, so neither can any visible figure be inseparably +connected with its corresponding tangible figure, so as of +itself, and in a way prior to experience, it might suggest it +<pb n='179'/><anchor id='Pg179'/> +to the understanding. This will be farther evident, if we +consider that what seems smooth and round to the touch +may to sight, if viewed through a microscope, seem quite +otherwise. +</p> + +<p> +106. From all which, laid together and duly considered, +we may clearly deduce this inference:—In the first act +of vision, no idea entering by the eye would have a perceivable +connexion with the ideas to which the names earth, +man, head, foot, &c. were annexed in the understanding of +a person blind from his birth; so as in any sort to introduce +them into his mind, or make themselves be called by +the same names, and reputed the same things with them, +as afterwards they come to be. +</p> + +<p> +107. There doth, nevertheless, remain one difficulty, +which to some may seem to press hard on our opinion, and +deserve not to be passed over. For, though it be granted +that neither the colour, size, nor figure of the visible feet +have any necessary connexion with the ideas that compose +the tangible feet, so as to bring them at first sight into +my mind, or make me in danger of confounding them, before +I had been used to and for some time experienced +their connexion; yet thus much seems undeniable, namely, +that the number of the visible feet being the same with that +of the tangible feet, I may from hence, without any +experience of sight, reasonably conclude that they represent +or are connected with the feet rather than the head. +I say, it seems the idea of two visible feet will sooner suggest +to the mind the idea of two tangible feet than of one head—so +that the blind man, upon first reception of the visive +faculty, might know which were the feet or two, and which +the head or one. +</p> + +<p> +108. In order to get clear of this seeming difficulty, we +need only observe that diversity of visible objects does not +necessarily infer diversity of tangible objects corresponding +to them. A picture painted with great variety of colours +affects the touch in one uniform manner; it is therefore +evident that I do not, by any necessary consecution, independent +of experience, judge of the number of things tangible +from the number of things visible. I should not therefore +at first opening my eyes conclude that because I see +two I shall feel two. How, therefore, can I, before experience +teaches me, know that the visible legs, because +<pb n='180'/><anchor id='Pg180'/> +two, are connected with the tangible legs; or the visible head, +because one, is connected with the tangible head? The +truth is, the things I see are so very different and heterogeneous +from the things I feel that the perception of the one +would never have suggested the other to my thoughts, or +enabled me to pass the least judgment thereon, until I had +experienced their connexion<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 140, 143. In the <hi rend='italic'>Gent. +Mag.</hi> (vol. XXII. p. 12), <q>Anti-Berkeley</q> +thus argues the case of +one born blind. <q>This man,</q> he +adds, <q>would, by being accustomed +to feel one hand with the other, +have perceived that the extremity +of the hand was divided into fingers—that +the extremities of these +fingers were distinguished by certain +hard, smooth surfaces, of a +different texture from the rest of +the fingers—and that each finger +had certain joints or flexures. Now, +if this man was restored to sight, +and immediately viewed his hand +before he touched it again, it is +manifest that the divisions of the +extremity of the hand into fingers +would be visibly perceived. He +would note too the small spaces at +the extremity of each finger, which +affected his sight differently from +the rest of the fingers; upon moving +his fingers he would see the joints. +Though therefore, by means of this +lately acquired sense of seeing, the +object affected his mind in a new +and different manner from what it +did before, yet, as by <emph>touch</emph> he had +acquired the knowledge of these +several divisions, marks, and distinctions +of the hand, and, as the +new object of <emph>sight</emph> appeared to be +divided, marked, and distinguished +in a similar manner, I think he +would certainly conclude, <emph>before he +touched his hand</emph>, that the thing +which he now saw was <emph>the same</emph> +which he had felt before and called +his hand.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +109. But, for a fuller illustration of this matter, it ought +to be considered, that number (however some may reckon +it amongst the primary qualities<note place='foot'>Locke, <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, II. 8, 16. Aristotle +regards number as a Common +Sensible.—<hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi>, II. 6, III. 1.</note>) is nothing fixed and +settled, really existing in things themselves. It is entirely +the creature of the mind, considering either a simple idea +by itself, or any combination of simple ideas to which it +gives one name, and so makes it pass for a unit. According +as the mind variously combines its ideas, the unit +varies; and as the unit, so the number, which is only a +collection of units, doth also vary. We call a window one, +a chimney one; and yet a house, in which there are many +windows and many chimneys, has an equal right to be +called one; and many houses go to the making of one city. +In these and the like instances, it is evident the <emph>unit</emph> constantly +relates to the particular draughts the mind makes +of its ideas, to which it affixes names, and wherein it +<pb n='181'/><anchor id='Pg181'/> +includes more or less, as best suits its own ends and purposes. +Whatever therefore the mind considers as one, +that is an unit. Every combination of ideas is considered as +one thing by the mind, and in token thereof is marked by +one name. Now, this naming and combining together of +ideas is perfectly arbitrary, and done by the mind in such +sort as experience shews it to be most convenient—without +which our ideas had never been collected into such sundry +distinct combinations as they now are. +</p> + +<p> +110. Hence, it follows that a man born blind, and afterwards, +when grown up, made to see, would not, in the first act +of vision, parcel out the ideas of sight into the same distinct +collections that others do who have experienced which do +regularly co-exist and are proper to be bundled up together +under one name. He would not, for example, make into +one complex idea, and thereby esteem and unite all those +particular ideas which constitute the visible head or foot. +For, there can be no reason assigned why he should do so, +barely upon his seeing a man stand upright before him. +There crowd into his mind the ideas which compose the +visible man, in company with all the other ideas of sight +perceived at the same time. But, all these ideas offered +at once to his view he would not distribute into sundry +distinct combinations, till such time as, by observing the +motion of the parts of the man and other experiences, he +comes to know which are to be separated and which to be collected +together<note place='foot'><q>If the visible appearance of +two shillings had been found connected +from the beginning with +the tangible idea of one shilling, +that appearance would as naturally +and readily have signified the unity +of the (tangible) object as it now +signifies its duplicity.</q> Reid, <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, +VI. 11.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +111. From what hath been premised, it is plain the +objects of sight and touch make, if I may so say, two sets +of ideas, which are widely different from each other. To +objects of either kind we indifferently attribute the terms +high and low, right and left, and such like, denoting the +position or situation of things; but then we must well +observe that the position of any object is determined with +respect only to objects of the same sense. We say any +object of touch is high or low, according as it is more or +less distant from the tangible earth: and in like manner we +<pb n='182'/><anchor id='Pg182'/> +denominate any object of sight high or low, in proportion +as it is more or less distant from the visible earth. But, +to define the situation of visible things with relation to the +distance they bear from any tangible thing, or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vice versa</foreign>, +this were absurd and perfectly unintelligible. For all +visible things are equally in the mind, and take up no part +of the external space; and consequently are equidistant +from any tangible thing which exists without the mind<note place='foot'>Here again note Berkeley's +inconvenient reticence of his full +theory of matter, as dependent on +percipient life for its reality. Tangible +things are meantime granted to +be real <q>without mind.</q> Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 43, 44. <q>Without the +mind</q>—in contrast to sensuous +phenomenon only.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +112. Or rather, to speak truly, the proper objects of sight +are at no distance, neither near nor far from any tangible +thing. For, if we inquire narrowly into the matter, we +shall find that those things only are compared together in +respect of distance which exist after the same manner, or +appertain unto the same sense. For, by the distance between +any two points, nothing more is meant than the +number of intermediate points. If the given points are +visible, the distance between them is marked out by the +number of the interjacent visible points; if they are tangible, +the distance between them is a line consisting of tangible +points; but, if they are one tangible and the other visible, +the distance between them doth neither consist of points +perceivable by sight nor by touch, i.e. it is utterly inconceivable<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 131.</note>. +This, perhaps, will not find an easy admission into +all men's understanding. However, I should gladly be +informed whether it be not true, by any one who will be +at the pains to reflect a little, and apply it home to his +thoughts. +</p> + +<p> +113. The not observing what has been delivered in the +two last sections, seems to have occasioned no small part +of the difficulty that occurs in the business of direct appearances. +The head, which is painted nearest the earth, +seems to be farthest from it; and on the other hand, the +feet, which are painted farthest from the earth, are thought +nearest to it. Herein lies the difficulty, which vanishes if +we express the thing more clearly and free from ambiguity, +thus:—How comes it that, to the eye, the visible head, +which is nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the +<pb n='183'/><anchor id='Pg183'/> +earth; and the visible feet, which are farthest from the +tangible earth, seem nearest the earth? The question +being thus proposed, who sees not the difficulty is founded +on a supposition that the eye or visive faculty, or rather +the soul by means thereof, should judge of the situation of +visible objects with reference to their distance from the +tangible earth? Whereas, it is evident the tangible earth +is not perceived by sight. And it hath been shewn, in the +two last preceding sections, that the location of visible +objects is determined only by the distance they bear from +one another, and that it is nonsense to talk of distance, far +or near, between a visible and tangible thing. +</p> + +<p> +114. If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of +sight, the whole is plain and easy. The head is painted +farthest from, and the feet nearest to, the visible earth; +and so they appear to be. What is there strange or unaccountable +in this? Let us suppose the pictures in the +fund of the eye to be the immediate objects of sight<note place='foot'>Sect. 2, 88, 116, 118.</note>. The +consequence is that things should appear in the same +posture they are painted in; and is it not so? The head +which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; +and the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth +which is seen. And just so they are painted. +</p> + +<p> +115. But, say you, the picture of the man is inverted, +and yet the appearance is erect. I ask, what mean you by +the picture of the man, or, which is the same thing, the +visible man's being inverted? You tell me it is inverted, +because the heels are uppermost and the head undermost? +Explain me this. You say that by the head's being undermost, +you mean that it is nearest to the earth; and, by the +heels being uppermost, that they are farthest from the +earth. I ask again, what earth you mean? You cannot +mean the earth that is painted on the eye or the visible +earth—for the picture of the head is farthest from the +picture of the earth, and the picture of the feet nearest to +the picture of the earth; and accordingly the visible head +is farthest from the visible earth, and the visible feet +nearest to it. It remains, therefore, that you mean the +tangible earth; and so determine the situation of visible +things with respect to tangible things—contrary to what +hath been demonstrated in sect. 111 and 112. The two +<pb n='184'/><anchor id='Pg184'/> +distinct provinces of sight and touch should be considered +apart, and as though their objects had no intercourse, no +manner of relation to one another, in point of distance or +position<note place='foot'>In short, we <emph>see</emph> only <emph>quantities +of colour</emph>—the real or tactual distance, +size, shape, locality, up and +down, right and left, &c., being +gradually associated with the various +visible modifications of colour.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +116. Farther, what greatly contributes to make us +mistake in this matter is that, when we think of the pictures +in the fund of the eye, we imagine ourselves looking on the +fund of another's eye, or another looking on the fund of +our own eye, and beholding the pictures painted thereon. +Suppose two eyes, <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>. <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> from some distance +looking on the pictures in <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> sees them inverted, and for +that reason concludes they are inverted in <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>. But this is +wrong. There are projected in little on the bottom of <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> +the images of the pictures of, suppose, man, earth, &c., +which are painted on <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>. And, besides these, the eye <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> +itself, and the objects which environ it, together with +another earth, are projected in a larger size on <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>. Now, +by the eye <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> these larger images are deemed the true +objects, and the lesser only pictures in miniature. And it +is with respect to those greater images that it determines +the situation of the smaller images; so that, comparing the +little man with the great earth, <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> judges him inverted, or +that the feet are farthest from and the head nearest to the +great earth. Whereas, if <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> compare the little man with +the little earth, then he will appear erect, i.e. his head +shall seem farthest from and his feet nearest to the little +earth. But we must consider that <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> does not see two +earths as <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> does. It sees only what is represented by +the little pictures in <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>, and consequently shall judge the +man erect. For, in truth, the man in <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> is not inverted, +for there the feet are next the earth; but it is the representation +of it in <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> which is inverted, for there the head of +the representation of the picture of the man in <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> is next +the earth, and the feet farthest from the earth—meaning +the earth which is without the representation of the pictures +in <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>. For, if you take the little linages of the pictures in +<hi rend='italic'>B</hi>, and consider them by themselves, and with respect +only to one another, they are all erect and in their natural +posture. +</p> + +<pb n='185'/><anchor id='Pg185'/> + +<p> +117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that +the pictures of external<note place='foot'>i.e. tangible.</note> objects are painted on the bottom +of the eye. It has been shewn there is no resemblance +between the ideas of sight and things tangible. It hath +likewise been demonstrated<note place='foot'>Sect. 41-44.</note>, that the proper objects of sight +do not exist without the mind. Whence it clearly follows +that the pictures painted on the bottom of the eye are not +the pictures of external objects. Let any one consult his +own thoughts, and then tell me, what affinity, what likeness, +there is between that certain variety and disposition of +colours which constitute the visible man, or picture of +a man, and that other combination of far different ideas, +sensible by touch, which compose the tangible man. But, +if this be the case, how come they to be accounted pictures +or images, since that supposes them to copy or represent +some originals or other? +</p> + +<p> +118. To which I answer—In the forementioned instance, +the eye <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> takes the little images, included within the +representation of the other eye <hi rend='italic'>B</hi>, to be pictures or copies, +whereof the archetypes are not things existing without<note place='foot'>i.e. tangible things.</note>, +but the larger pictures<note place='foot'>i.e. visible.</note> projected on its own fund; and +which by <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> are not thought pictures, but the originals or +true things themselves. Though if we suppose a third eye +<hi rend='italic'>C</hi>, from a due distance, to behold the fund of <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>, then +indeed the things projected thereon shall, to <hi rend='italic'>C</hi>, seem +pictures or images, in the same sense that those projected +on <hi rend='italic'>B</hi> do to <hi rend='italic'>A</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +119. Rightly to conceive the business in hand, we must +carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch, +between the visible and tangible eye; for certainly on the +tangible eye nothing either is or seems to be painted. +Again, the visible eye, as well as all other visible objects, +hath been shewn to exist only in the mind<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 41-44. The <q>eyes</q>—visible +and tangible—are themselves +objects of sense.</note>; which, +perceiving its own ideas, and comparing them together, +does call some pictures in respect to others. What hath +been said, being rightly comprehended and laid together, +does, I think, afford a full and genuine explication of the +erect appearance of objects—which phenomenon, I must +<pb n='186'/><anchor id='Pg186'/> +confess, I do not see how it can be explained by any +theories of vision hitherto made public. +</p> + +<p> +120. In treating of these things, the use of language is +apt to occasion some obscurity and confusion, and create +in us wrong ideas. For, language being accommodated to +the common notions and prejudices of men, it is scarce +possible to deliver the naked and precise truth, without +great circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an unwary +reader) seeming contradictions. I do, therefore, once for +all, desire whoever shall think it worth his while to understand +what I have written concerning vision, that he would +not stick in this or that phrase or manner of expression, +but candidly collect my meaning from the whole sum and +tenor of my discourse, and, laying aside the words<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 21-25.</note> as +much as possible, consider the bare notions themselves, +and then judge whether they are agreeable to truth and his +own experience or no. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +121. We have shewn the way wherein the mind, by +mediation of visible ideas<note place='foot'><q>Visible ideas</q>—including sensations +muscular and locomotive, +<emph>felt</emph> in the organ of vision. Sect. +16, 27, 57.</note>, doth perceive or apprehend the +distance, magnitude, and situation of tangible objects<note place='foot'>i.e. objects which, in this tentative +<hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, are granted, for argument's +sake, to be external, or independent +of percipient mind.</note>. +I come now to inquire more particularly concerning the +difference between the ideas of sight and touch which are +called by the same names, and see whether there be any +idea common to both senses<note place='foot'>i.e. to inquire whether there +are, in this instance, Common Sensibles; +and, in particular, whether +an <emph>extension</emph> of the same kind at +least, if not numerically the same, +is presented in each. The Kantian +theory of an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> intuition of +space, the common condition of +tactual and visual experience, because +implied in sense-experience +as such, is not conceived by Berkeley. +Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 15.</note>. From what we have at large +set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this +treatise, it is plain there is no one self-same numerical +extension, perceived both by sight and touch; but that the +particular figures and extensions perceived by sight, however +they may be called by the same names, and reputed +the same things with those perceived by touch, are nevertheless +different, and have an existence very distinct and +<pb n='187'/><anchor id='Pg187'/> +separate from them. So that the question is not now +concerning the same numerical ideas, but whether there be +any one and the same sort or species of ideas equally +perceivable to both senses? or, in other words, whether +extension, figure, and motion perceived by sight, are not +specifically distinct from extension, figure, and motion +perceived by touch? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +122. But, before I come more particularly to discuss +this matter, I find it proper to take into my thoughts extension +in abstract<note place='foot'>In the following reasoning +against abstract, as distinguished +from concrete or sense presented +(visible or tangible) extension, Berkeley +urges some of his favourite +objections to <q>abstract ideas,</q> fully +unfolded in his <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 6-20.—See also <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, +VII. 5-8.—<hi rend='italic'>Defence of Free +Thinking in Mathematics</hi>, sect. 45-48.</note>. For of this there is much talk; and +I am apt to think that when men speak of extension as +being an idea common to two senses, it is with a secret +supposition that we can single out extension from all other +tangible and visible qualities, and form thereof an abstract +idea, which idea they will have common both to sight and +touch. We are therefore to understand by extension in +abstract, an idea<note place='foot'>Berkeley's <emph>ideas</emph> are concrete or +particular—immediate data of sense +or imagination.</note> of extension—for instance, a line or +surface entirely stripped of all other sensible qualities and +circumstances that might determine it to any particular +existence; it is neither black, nor white, nor red, nor +hath it any colour at all, or any tangible quality whatsoever, +and consequently it is of no finite determinate magnitude<note place='foot'>i.e. it cannot be individualized, +either as a perceived or an imagined +object.</note>; +for that which bounds or distinguishes one extension +from another is some quality or circumstance +wherein they disagree. +</p> + +<p> +123. Now, I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, +or anywise frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is +here spoken of. A line or surface which is neither black, +nor white, nor blue, nor yellow, &c.; nor long, nor short, +nor rough, nor smooth, nor square, nor round, &c. is +perfectly incomprehensible. This I am sure of as to +myself; how far the faculties of other men may reach +they best can tell. +</p> + +<p> +124. It is commonly said that the object of geometry is +<pb n='188'/><anchor id='Pg188'/> +abstract extension. But geometry contemplates figures: +now, figure is the termination of magnitude<note place='foot'>Sect. 105.</note>; but we +have shewn that extension in abstract hath no finite +determinate magnitude; whence it clearly follows that +it can have no figure, and consequently is not the object +of geometry. It is indeed a tenet, as well of the modern +as the ancient philosophers, that all general truths are +concerning universal abstract ideas; without which, we +are told, there could be no science, no demonstration of +any general proposition in geometry. But it were no +hard matter, did I think it necessary to my present purpose, +to shew that propositions and demonstrations in +geometry might be universal, though they who make +them never think of abstract general ideas of triangles +or circles. +</p> + +<p> +125. After reiterated efforts and pangs of thought<note place='foot'><q>Endeavours</q> in first edition.</note> to +apprehend the general idea of a triangle<note place='foot'>i.e. a mental image of an abstraction, +an impossible image, +in which the extension and comprehension +of the notion must be +adequately pictured.</note>, I have found +it altogether incomprehensible. And surely, if any one +were able to let that idea into my mind, it must be +the author<note place='foot'><q>deservedly admired author,</q> in +the first edition.</note> of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay concerning Human Understanding</hi>: +he, who has so far distinguished himself +from the generality of writers, by the clearness and significancy +of what he says. Let us therefore see how +this celebrated author<note place='foot'><q>this celebrated author,</q>—<q>that +great man</q> in second edition. In +assailing Locke's <q>abstract idea,</q> he +discharges the meaning which +Locke intended by the term, and +then demolishes his own figment.</note> describes the general or [which +is the same thing, the<note place='foot'>Omitted in the author's last +edition.</note>] abstract idea of a triangle. <q>It +must be,</q> says he, <q>neither oblique nor rectangle, neither +equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenum; but all and none of +these at once. In effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot +exist; an idea, wherein some parts of several different +and inconsistent ideas are put together.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Human +Understanding</hi>, B. iv. ch. 7. s. 9.) This is the idea which +he thinks needful for the enlargement of knowledge, which +is the subject of mathematical demonstration, and without +which we could never come to know any general proposition +<pb n='189'/><anchor id='Pg189'/> +concerning triangles. [Sure I am, if this be the case, +it is impossible for me to attain to know even the first +elements of geometry: since I have not the faculty to +frame in my mind such an idea as is here described<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>.] +That author acknowledges it doth <q>require some pains +and skill to form this general idea of a triangle.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Ibid.</hi>) +But, had he called to mind what he says in another place, to +wit, <q>that ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent +ideas are put together, cannot so much as exist in the +mind, i.e. be conceived,</q> (vid. B. iii. ch. 10. s. 33, <hi rend='italic'>ibid.</hi>)—I +say, had this occurred to his thoughts, it is not improbable +he would have owned it above all the pains and +skill he was master of, to form the above-mentioned idea +of a triangle, which is made up of manifest staring contradictions. +That a man [of such a clear understanding<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>], +who thought so much and so well, and laid so great +a stress on clear and determinate ideas, should nevertheless +talk at this rate, seems very surprising. But the +wonder will lessen, if it be considered that the source +whence this opinion [of abstract figures and extension <note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>] +flows is the prolific womb which has brought forth innumerable +errors and difficulties, in all parts of philosophy, +and in all the sciences. But this matter, taken in its full +extent, were a subject too vast and comprehensive to be +insisted on in this place<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, passim.</note>. [I shall only observe that +your metaphysicians and men of speculation seem to +have faculties distinct from those of ordinary men, when +they talk of general or abstracted triangles and circles, &c., +and so peremptorily declare them to be the subject of +all the eternal, immutable, universal truths in geometry<note place='foot'>Omitted in author's last edition.</note>.] +And so much for extension in abstract. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +126. Some, perhaps, may think pure space, vacuum, or +trine dimension, to be equally the object of sight and +touch<note place='foot'>He probably has Locke in his +eye.</note>. But, though we have a very great propension +to think the ideas of outness and space to be the immediate +object of sight, yet, if I mistake not, in the +foregoing parts of this <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, that hath been clearly demonstrated +<pb n='190'/><anchor id='Pg190'/> +to be a mere delusion, arising from the quick +and sudden suggestion of fancy, which so closely connects +the idea of distance with those of sight, that we are apt +to think it is itself a proper and immediate object of that +sense, till reason corrects the mistake<note place='foot'>On Berkeley's theory, space +without relation to bodies (i.e. +insensible or abstract space) would +not be extended, as not having +parts; inasmuch as parts can be +assigned to it only with relation to +bodies. Berkeley does not distinguish +space from sensible extension. +Cf. Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Works</hi>, p. 126, note—in +which Sir W. Hamilton suggests +that one may have an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> conception +of pure space, and <emph>also</emph> an +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> perception of finite, +concrete space.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +127. It having been shewn that there are no abstract +ideas of figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any +precision of thought, to frame an idea of extension separate +from all other visible and tangible qualities, which shall be +common both to sight and touch—the question now remaining +is<note place='foot'>Sect. 121. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of +Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 15.</note>, whether the particular extensions, figures, +and motions perceived by sight, be of the same kind with +the particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived +by touch? In answer to which I shall venture to lay +down the following proposition:—<emph>The extension, figures, +and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from +the ideas of touch, called by the same names; nor is there any +such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common<note place='foot'>i.e. there are no Common Sensibles: +from which it follows that +we can reason from the one sense +to the other only by founding on +the constant connexion of their +respective phenomena, under a natural +yet (for us) contingent law. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 27, 28.</note> to both +senses.</emph> This proposition may, without much difficulty, +be collected from what hath been said in several places +of this Essay. But, because it seems so remote from, +and contrary to the received notions and settled opinion +of mankind, I shall attempt to demonstrate it more particularly +and at large by the following arguments:— +</p> + +<p> +128. [<emph>First</emph><note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>,] When, upon perception of an idea, I range +it under this or that sort, it is because it is perceived after +the same manner, or because it has a likeness or conformity +with, or affects me in the same way as the ideas +of the sort I rank it under. In short, it must not be +entirely new, but have something in it old and already +perceived by me. It must, I say, have so much, at least, +<pb n='191'/><anchor id='Pg191'/> +in common with the ideas I have before known and +named, as to make me give it the same name with them. +But, it has been, if I mistake not, clearly made out<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 93, 103, 106, 110.</note> that +a man born blind would not, at first reception of his sight, +think the things he saw were of the same nature with +the objects of touch, or had anything in common with +them; but that they were a new set of ideas, perceived +in a new manner, and entirely different from all he had +ever perceived before. So that he would not call them +by the same name, nor repute them to be of the same sort, +with anything he had hitherto known. [And surely the +judgment of such an unprejudiced person is more to +be relied on in this case than the sentiments of the generality +of men; who, in this as in almost everything else, +suffer themselves to be guided by custom, and the erroneous +suggestions of prejudice, rather than reason and +sedate reflection<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>.] +</p> + +<p> +129. <emph>Secondly</emph>, Light and colours are allowed by all to +constitute a sort or species entirely different from the ideas +of touch; nor will any man, I presume, say they can make +themselves perceived by that sense. But there is no other +immediate object of sight besides light and colours<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 43, 103, &c. A plurality +of co-existent <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minima</foreign> of coloured +points constitutes Berkeley's +visible extension; while a plurality +of successively experienced <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minima</foreign> +of resistant points constitutes his tactual +extension. Whether we can +perceive visible extension without +experience of muscular movement at +least in the eye, he does not here say.</note>. It is +therefore a direct consequence, that there is no idea common +to both senses. +</p> + +<p> +130. It is a prevailing opinion, even amongst those who +have thought and writ most accurately concerning our +ideas, and the ways whereby they enter into the understanding, +that something more is perceived by sight than +barely light and colours with their variations. [The excellent<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>] +Mr. Locke termeth sight <q>the most comprehensive +of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light +and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and +also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion.</q> +(<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Human Understanding</hi>, B. iii. ch. 9. s. 9.) +Space or distance<note place='foot'>Real distance belongs originally, +according to the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, to our +tactual experience only—in the +wide meaning of touch, which +includes muscular and locomotive +perceptions, as well as the simple +perception of contact.</note>, we have shewn, is no otherwise the +<pb n='192'/><anchor id='Pg192'/> +object of sight than of hearing. (Vid. sect. 46.) And, as +for figure and extension, I leave it to any one that shall +calmly attend to his own clear and distinct ideas to decide +whether he has any idea intromitted immediately and properly +by sight save only light and colours: or, whether it +be possible for him to frame in his mind a distinct abstract +idea of visible extension, or figure, exclusive of all colour; +and, on the other hand, whether he can conceive colour +without visible extension? For my own part, I must +confess, I am not able to attain so great a nicety of abstraction. +I know very well that, in a strict sense, I see nothing +but light and colours, with their several shades and variations. +He who beside these doth also perceive by sight +ideas far different and distinct from them, hath that faculty +in a degree more perfect and comprehensive than I can +pretend to. It must be owned, indeed, that, by the mediation +of light and colours, other far different ideas are suggested +to my mind. But so they are by hearing<note place='foot'>Added in second edition.</note>. But +then, upon this score, I see no reason why the sight should +be thought more comprehensive than the hearing, which, +beside sounds which are peculiar to that sense, doth, by +their mediation, suggest not only space, figure, and motion, but +also all other ideas whatsoever that can be signified by words. +</p> + +<p> +131. <emph>Thirdly</emph>, It is, I think, an axiom universally received, +that <q>quantities of the same kind may be added together +and make one entire sum.</q> Mathematicians add lines +together; but they do not add a line to a solid, or conceive +it as making one sum with a surface. These three +kinds of quantity being thought incapable of any such mutual +addition, and consequently of being compared together +in the several ways of proportion, are by them for that +reason esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous. +Now let any one try in his thoughts to add a visible line or +surface to a tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them +making one continued sum or whole. He that can do this +may think them homogeneous; but he that cannot must, +by the foregoing axiom, think them heterogeneous. [I +acknowledge myself to be of the latter sort<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>.] A blue and +a red line I can conceive added together into one sum and +<pb n='193'/><anchor id='Pg193'/> +making one continued line; but, to make, in my thoughts, +one continued line of a visible and tangible line added +together, is, I find, a task far more difficult, and even +insurmountable—and I leave it to the reflection and experience +of every particular person to determine for himself. +</p> + +<p> +132. A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn +from the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, published +by Mr. Locke in his <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi><note place='foot'>See also Locke's <q>Correspondence</q> +with Molyneux, in Locke's +<hi rend='italic'>Works</hi>, vol. IX. p. 34.—Leibniz, +<hi rend='italic'>Nouveaux Essais</hi>, Liv. II. ch. 9, +who, so far granting the fact, disputes +the heterogeneity.—Smith's +<hi rend='italic'>Optics.</hi>—<hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi>, §§ 161-170.—Hamilton's +Reid, p. 137, note, and +<hi rend='italic'>Lect. Metaph.</hi> II. p. 176.</note>: which I shall set down as it +there lies, together with Mr. Locke's opinion of it:—<q>Suppose +a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his +touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the +same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell +when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, and +which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere +placed on a table, and the blind man made to see: Quære, +Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could +now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the +cube. To which the acute and judicious proposer answers: +Not. For, though he has obtained the experience +of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has +not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch +so or so must affect his sight so or so: or that a protuberant +angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, +shall appear to his eye as it doth in the cube. I agree +with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call +my friend, in his answer to this his problem; and am of +opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not +be able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which +the cube, whilst he only saw them.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Human +Understanding</hi>, B. ii. ch. 9. s. 8.) +</p> + +<p> +133. Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of +the same sort with a square surface perceived by sight, it +is certain the blind man here mentioned might know a +square surface as soon as he saw it. It is no more but +introducing into his mind, by a new inlet, an idea he has +been already well acquainted with. Since therefore he is +supposed to have known by his touch that a cube is a body +<pb n='194'/><anchor id='Pg194'/> +terminated by square surfaces; and that a sphere is not +terminated by square surfaces—upon the supposition that +a visible and tangible square differ only <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in numero</foreign>, it +follows that he might know, by the unerring mark of the +square surfaces, which was the cube, and which not, while +he only saw them. We must therefore allow, either that +visible extension and figures are specifically distinct from +tangible extension and figures, or else, that the solution of +this problem, given by those two [very<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note>] thoughtful and +ingenious men, is wrong. +</p> + +<p> +134. Much more might be laid together in proof of the +proposition I have advanced. But, what has been said is, +if I mistake not, sufficient to convince any one that shall +yield a reasonable attention. And, as for those that will +not be at the pains of a little thought, no multiplication of +words will ever suffice to make them understand the truth, +or rightly conceive my meaning<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 70.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +135. I cannot let go the above-mentioned problem without +some reflection on it. It hath been made evident that +a man blind from his birth would not, at first sight, denominate +anything he saw, by the names he had been used to +appropriate to ideas of touch. (Vid. sect. 106.) Cube, +sphere, table are words he has known applied to things +perceivable by touch, but to things perfectly intangible he +never knew them applied. Those words, in their wonted +application, always marked out to his mind bodies or solid +things which were perceived by the resistance they gave. +But there is no solidity, no resistance or protrusion, +perceived by sight. In short, the ideas of sight are all +new perceptions, to which there be no names annexed in +his mind; he cannot therefore understand what is said to +him concerning them. And, to ask of the two bodies he +saw placed on the table, which was the sphere, which the +cube, were to him a question downright bantering and +unintelligible; nothing he sees being able to suggest to his +thoughts the idea of body, distance, or, in general, of +anything he had already known. +</p> + +<p> +136. It is a mistake to think the same<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 49, 146, &c. Here +<q>same</q> includes <q>similar.</q></note> thing affects both +sight and touch. If the same angle or square which is the +<pb n='195'/><anchor id='Pg195'/> +object of touch be also the object of vision, what should +hinder the blind man, at first sight, from knowing it? +For, though the manner wherein it affects the sight be +different from that wherein it affected his touch, yet, there +being, beside this manner or circumstance, which is new +and unknown, the angle or figure, which is old and known, +he cannot choose but discern it. +</p> + +<p> +137. Visible figure and extension having been demonstrated +to be of a nature entirely different and heterogeneous +from tangible figure and extension, it remains that we +inquire concerning motion. Now, that visible motion is +not of the same sort with tangible motion seems to need no +farther proof; it being an evident corollary from what we +have shewn concerning the difference there is betwixt +visible and tangible extension. But, for a more full and +express proof hereof, we need only observe that one who +had not yet experienced vision would not at first sight +know motion<note place='foot'>i.e. visible and tangible motions +being absolutely heterogeneous, and +the former, <emph>at man's point of view</emph>, +only contingent signs of the latter, +we should not, at first sight, be +able to interpret the visual signs of +tactual phenomena.</note>. Whence it clearly follows that motion perceivable +by sight is of a sort distinct from motion perceivable +by touch. The antecedent I prove thus—By touch he +could not perceive any motion but what was up or down, to +the right or left, nearer or farther from him; besides these, +and their several varieties or complications, it is impossible +he should have any idea of motion. He would not +therefore think anything to be motion, or give the name +motion to any idea, which he could not range under some +or other of those particular kinds thereof. But, from sect. +95, it is plain that, by the mere act of vision, he could not +know motion upwards or downwards, to the right or left, +or in any other possible direction. From which I conclude, +he would not know motion at all at first sight. As for the +idea of motion in abstract, I shall not waste paper about it, +but leave it to my reader to make the best he can of it. +To me it is perfectly unintelligible<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 122-125.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +138. The consideration of motion may furnish a new +field for inquiry<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 111-116; +also <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi>, query 12. On Berkeley's +system space in its three dimensions +is unrealisable without +experience of motion.</note>. But, since the manner wherein the +<pb n='196'/><anchor id='Pg196'/> +mind apprehends by sight the motion of tangible objects, +with the various degrees thereof, may be easily collected +from what has been said concerning the manner wherein +that sense doth suggest their various distances, magnitudes, +and situations, I shall not enlarge any farther on +this subject, but proceed to inquire what may be alleged, +with greatest appearance of reason, against the proposition +we have demonstrated to be true; for, where there +is so much prejudice to be encountered, a bare and naked +demonstration of the truth will scarce suffice. We must +also satisfy the scruples that men may start in favour of +their preconceived notions, shew whence the mistake +arises, how it came to spread, and carefully disclose +and root out those false persuasions that an early prejudice +might have implanted in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +139. <emph>First</emph>, therefore, it will be demanded how visible +extension and figures come to be called by the same name +with tangible extension and figures, if they are not of the +same kind with them? It must be something more than +humour or accident that could occasion a custom so constant +and universal as this, which has obtained in all ages +and nations of the world, and amongst all ranks of men, +the learned as well as the illiterate. +</p> + +<p> +140. To which I answer, we can no more argue a visible +and tangible square to be of the same species, from their +being called by the same name, than we can that a tangible +square, and the monosyllable consisting of six letters +whereby it is marked, are of the same species, because +they are both called by the same name. It is customary +to call written words, and the things they signify, by the +same name: for, words not being regarded in their own +nature, or otherwise than as they are marks of things, it +had been superfluous, and beside the design of language, +to have given them names distinct from those of the things +marked by them. The same reason holds here also. +Visible figures are the marks of tangible figures; and, from +sect. 59, it is plain that in themselves they are little regarded, +or upon any other score than for their connexion +with tangible figures, which by nature they are ordained +to signify. And, because this language of nature<note place='foot'>Here the term <q>language of +nature</q> makes its appearance, as +applicable to the ideas or visual +signs of tactual realities.</note> does +<pb n='197'/><anchor id='Pg197'/> +not vary in different ages or nations, hence it is that in +all times and places visible figures are called by the same +names as the respective tangible figures suggested by +them; and not because they are alike, or of the same +sort with them. +</p> + +<p> +141. But, say you, surely a tangible square is liker to +a visible square than to a visible circle: it has four angles, +and as many sides; so also has the visible square—but the +visible circle has no such thing, being bounded by one +uniform curve, without right lines or angles, which makes +it unfit to represent the tangible square, but very fit to represent +the tangible circle. Whence it clearly follows, +that visible figures are patterns of, or of the same species +with, the respective tangible figures represented by them; +that they are like unto them, and of their own nature fitted +to represent them, as being of the same sort; and that +they are in no respect arbitrary signs, as words. +</p> + +<p> +142. I answer, it must be acknowledged the visible +square is fitter than the visible circle to represent the +tangible square, but then it is not because it is liker, or +more of a species with it; but, because the visible square +contains in it several distinct parts, whereby to mark the +several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square, +whereas the visible circle doth not. The square perceived +by touch hath four distinct equal sides, so also +hath it four distinct equal angles. It is therefore necessary +that the visible figure which shall be most proper +to mark it contain four distinct equal parts, corresponding +to the four sides of the tangible square; as likewise +four other distinct and equal parts, whereby to denote the +four equal angles of the tangible square. And accordingly +we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible +parts, answering to the distinct tangible parts of the figures +signified or suggested by them. +</p> + +<p> +143. But, it will not hence follow that any visible figure +is like unto or of the same species with its corresponding +tangible figure—unless it be also shewn that not only the +number, but also the kind of the parts be the same in both. +To illustrate this, I observe that visible figures represent +tangible figures much after the same manner that written +words do sounds. Now, in this respect, words are not +arbitrary; it not being indifferent what written word stands +<pb n='198'/><anchor id='Pg198'/> +for any sound. But, it is requisite that each word contain +in it as many distinct characters as there are variations in +the sound it stands for. Thus, the single letter <emph>a</emph> is proper +to mark one simple uniform sound; and the word <emph>adultery</emph> +is accommodated to represent the sound annexed to it—in +the formation whereof there being eight different collisions +or modifications of the air by the organs of speech, each of +which produces a difference of sound, it was fit the word +representing it should consist of as many distinct characters, +thereby to mark each particular difference or part of +the whole sound. And yet nobody, I presume, will say the +single letter <emph>a</emph>, or the word <emph>adultery</emph>, are alike unto or of +the same species with the respective sounds by them represented. +It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, letters +of any language represent sounds at all; but, when that is +once agreed, it is not arbitrary what combination of letters +shall represent this or that particular sound. I leave this +with the reader to pursue, and apply it in his own thoughts. +</p> + +<p> +144. It must be confessed that we are not so apt to confound +other signs with the things signified, or to think +them of the same species, as we are visible and tangible +ideas. But, a little consideration will shew us how this +may well be, without our supposing them of a like nature. +These signs are constant and universal; their connexion +with tangible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance +into the world; and ever since, almost every moment of +our lives, it has been occurring to our thoughts, and fastening +and striking deeper on our minds. When we observe +that signs are variable, and of human institution; when we +remember there was a time they were not connected in our +minds with those things they now so readily suggest, but +that their signification was learned by the slow steps of +experience: this preserves us from confounding them. +But, when we find the same signs suggest the same things +all over the world; when we know they are not of human +institution, and cannot remember that we ever learned +their signification, but think that at first sight they would +have suggested to us the same things they do now: all this +persuades us they are of the same species as the things +respectively represented by them, and that it is by a +natural resemblance they suggest them to our minds. +</p> + +<p> +145. Add to this that whenever we make a nice survey +<pb n='199'/><anchor id='Pg199'/> +of any object, successively directing the optic axis to each +point thereof, there are certain lines and figures, described +by the motion of the head or eye, which, being in truth perceived +by feeling<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 16, 27, 97.</note>, do nevertheless so mix themselves, as +it were, with the ideas of sight that we can scarce think +but they appertain to that sense. Again, the ideas of sight +enter into the mind several at once, more distinct and unmingled +than is usual in the other senses beside the touch. +Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant, are +apt to coalesce, if I may so say, into one sound: but we +can perceive, at the same time, great variety of visible +objects, very separate and distinct from each other. Now, +tangible<note place='foot'>Is <q>tangible</q> here used in its +narrow meaning—excluding muscular +and locomotive experience?</note> extension being made up of several distinct coexistent +parts, we may hence gather another reason that +may dispose us to imagine a likeness or analogy between +the immediate objects of sight and touch. But nothing, +certainly, does more contribute to blend and confound them +together, than the strict and close connexion<note place='foot'>i.e. as natural signs, divinely +associated with their thus implied +meanings.</note> they have +with each other. We cannot open our eyes but the ideas +of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by +them. So swift, and sudden, and unperceived is the transit +from visible to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear +thinking them equally the immediate object of vision. +</p> + +<p> +146. The prejudice<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 35.</note> which is grounded on these, and +whatever other causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so +fast on our understandings, that it is impossible, without +obstinate striving and labour of the mind, to get entirely +clear of it. But then the reluctancy we find in rejecting +any opinion can be no argument of its truth, to whoever +considers what has been already shewn with regard to the +prejudices we entertain concerning the distance, magnitude, +and situation of objects; prejudices so familiar to +our minds, so confirmed and inveterate, as they will hardly +give way to the clearest demonstration. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +147. Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude<note place='foot'>Berkeley, in this section, enunciates +the principal conclusion in +the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, which conclusion indeed +forms his new theory of Vision.</note> +<pb n='200'/><anchor id='Pg200'/> +that the proper objects of Vision constitute the Universal +Language of Nature; whereby we are instructed how +to regulate our actions, in order to attain those things +that are necessary to the preservation and well-being +of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful +and destructive of them. It is by their information that +we are principally guided in all the transactions and +concerns of life. And the manner wherein they signify +and mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance +is the same with that of languages and signs of human +appointment; which do not suggest the things signified +by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an +habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe +between them<note place='foot'>A suggestion thus due to natural +laws of association. The +explanation of the fact that we +apprehend, by those ideas or phenomena +which are objects of +sight, certain other ideas, which +neither resemble them, nor efficiently +cause them, nor are so caused by +them, nor have any necessary connexion +with them, comprehends, +according to Berkeley, the whole +Theory of Vision. <q>The imagination +of every thinking person,</q> remarks +Adam Smith, <q>will supply him +with instances to prove that the ideas +received by any one of the senses +do readily excite such other ideas, +either of the same sense or of any +other, as have habitually been associated +with them. So that if, on +this account, we are to suppose, +with a late ingenious writer, that +the ideas of sight constitute a Visual +Language, because they readily +suggest the corresponding ideas of +touch—as the terms of a language +excite the ideas answering to them—I +see not but we may, for the same +reason, allow of a tangible, audible, +gustatory, and olefactory language; +though doubtless the Visual Language +will be abundantly more +copious than the rest.</q> Smith's +<hi rend='italic'>Optics</hi>.—<hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi>, p. 29.—And into +this conception of a universal sense +symbolism, Berkeley's theory of +Vision ultimately rises.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +148. Suppose one who had always continued blind be +told by his guide that after he has advanced so many +steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice, or be +stopped by a wall; must not this to him seem very admirable +and surprising? He cannot conceive how it +is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these, +which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable +as prophecy does to others. Even they who are blessed +with the visive faculty may (though familiarity make it +less observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration. +The wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted +to those ends and purposes for which it was apparently +<pb n='201'/><anchor id='Pg201'/> +designed; the vast extent, number, and variety of objects +that are at once, with so much ease, and quickness, and +pleasure, suggested by it—all these afford subject for much +and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us +some glimmering analogous prænotion of things, that are +placed beyond the certain discovery and comprehension +of our present state<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, Dialogue IV. +sect. 11-15.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +149. I do not design to trouble myself much with +drawing corollaries from the doctrine I have hitherto +laid down. If it bears the test, others may, so far as they +shall think convenient, employ their thoughts in extending +it farther, and applying it to whatever purposes it may +be subservient to. Only, I cannot forbear making some +inquiry concerning the object of geometry, which the +subject we have been upon does naturally lead one to. +We have shewn there is no such idea as that of extension +in abstract<note place='foot'>Sect. 122-125.</note>; and that there are two kinds of sensible +extension and figures, which are entirely distinct and +heterogeneous from each other<note place='foot'>Sect. 127-138.</note>. Now, it is natural to +inquire which of these is the object of geometry<note place='foot'>Some modern metaphysicians +would say, that neither tangible +nor visible extension is the object +geometry, but abstract extension; +and others that space is a +necessary implicate of sense-experience, +rather than, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, an object +of any single sense. Cf. Kant's +explanation of the origin of our +mathematical knowledge, <hi rend='italic'>Kritik +der reinen Vernunft</hi>. Elementarlehre, +I.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +150. Some things there are which, at first sight, incline +one to think geometry conversant about visible extension. +The constant use of the eyes, both in the practical and +speculative parts of that science, doth very much induce +us thereto. It would, without doubt, seem odd to a +mathematician to go about to convince him the diagrams +he saw upon paper were not the figures, or even the +likeness of the figures, which make the subject of the +demonstration—the contrary being held an unquestionable +truth, not only by mathematicians, but also by those +who apply themselves more particularly to the study of +logic; I mean who consider the nature of science, certainty, +and demonstration; it being by them assigned as one +<pb n='202'/><anchor id='Pg202'/> +reason of the extraordinary clearness and evidence of +geometry, that in that science the reasonings are free +from those inconveniences which attend the use of arbitrary +signs, the very ideas themselves being copied out, +and exposed to view upon paper. But, by the bye, how +well this agrees with what they likewise assert of abstract +ideas being the object of geometrical demonstration I +leave to be considered. +</p> + +<p> +151. To come to a resolution in this point, we need +only observe what has been said in sect. 59, 60, 61, where +it is shewn that visible extensions in themselves are little +regarded, and have no settled determinate greatness, +and that men measure altogether by the application of +tangible extension to tangible extension. All which makes +it evident that visible extension and figures are not the +object of geometry. +</p> + +<p> +152. It is therefore plain that visible figures are of +the same use in geometry that words are. And the one +may as well be accounted the object of that science as +the other; neither of them being any otherwise concerned +therein than as they represent or suggest to the mind +the particular tangible figures connected with them. +There is, indeed, this difference betwixt the signification +of tangible figures by visible figures, and of ideas by words—that +whereas the latter is variable and uncertain, depending +altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men, the +former is fixed, and immutably the same in all times +and places. A visible square, for instance, suggests to +the mind the same tangible figure in Europe that it doth +in America. Hence it is, that the voice of nature, which +speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation +and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are +unavoidably subject to<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 51-66, 144.</note>. From which may, in some +measure, be derived that peculiar evidence and clearness +of geometrical demonstrations. +</p> + +<p> +153. Though what has been said may suffice to shew +what ought to be determined with relation to the object +of geometry, I shall, nevertheless, for the fuller illustration +thereof, take into my thoughts the case of an intelligence +or unbodied spirit, which is supposed to see perfectly +<pb n='203'/><anchor id='Pg203'/> +well, i.e. to have a clear perception of the proper and +immediate objects of sight, but to have no sense of touch<note place='foot'>This is a conjecture, not as to +the probable ideas of one born blind, +but as to the ideas of an <q>unbodied</q> +intelligence, whose <emph>only</emph> sense +was that of seeing. See Reid's +speculation (<hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, VI. 9) on the +<q>Geometry of Visibles,</q> and the +mental experience of Idomenians, +or imaginary beings supposed to +have no ideas of the material world +except those got by seeing.</note>. +Whether there be any such being in nature or no, is beside +my purpose to inquire; it suffices, that the supposition +contains no contradiction in it. Let us now examine +what proficiency such a one may be able to make in +geometry. Which speculation will lead us more clearly +to see whether the ideas of sight can possibly be the +object of that science. +</p> + +<p> +154. <emph>First</emph>, then, it is certain the aforesaid intelligence +could have no idea of a solid or quantity of three dimensions, +which follows from its not having any idea of +distance. We, indeed, are prone to think that we have +by sight the ideas of space and solids; which arises from +our imagining that we do, strictly speaking, see distance, +and some parts of an object at a greater distance than +others; which has been demonstrated to be the effect of +the experience we have had what ideas of touch are connected +with such and such ideas attending vision. But +the intelligence here spoken of is supposed to have no +experience of touch. He would not, therefore, judge as +we do, nor have any idea of distance, outness, or profundity, +nor consequently of space or body, either immediately +or by suggestion. Whence it is plain he can have +no notion of those parts of geometry which relate to the +mensuration of solids, and their convex or concave surfaces, +and contemplate the properties of lines generated by the +section of a solid. The conceiving of any part whereof +is beyond the reach of his faculties. +</p> + +<p> +155. <emph>Farther</emph>, he cannot comprehend the manner wherein +geometers describe a right line or circle; the rule and +compass, with their use, being things of which it is impossible +he should have any notion. Nor is it an easier +matter for him to conceive the placing of one plane or +angle on another, in order to prove their equality; since +that supposes some idea of distance, or external space. +<pb n='204'/><anchor id='Pg204'/> +All which makes it evident our pure intelligence could +never attain to know so much as the first elements of plain +geometry. And perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be +found he cannot even have an idea of plain figures any +more than he can of solids; since some idea of distance +is necessary to form the idea of a geometrical plane, as will +appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it. +</p> + +<p> +156. All that is properly perceived by the visive faculty +amounts to no more than colours with their variations, and +different proportions of light and shade—but the perpetual +mutability and fleetingness of those immediate objects of +sight render them incapable of being managed after the manner +of geometrical figures; nor is it in any degree useful that +they should. It is true there be divers of them perceived +at once; and more of some, and less of others: but accurately +to compute their magnitude, and assign precise determinate +proportions between things so variable and inconstant, +if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be a +very trifling and insignificant labour. +</p> + +<p> +157. I must confess, it seems to be the opinion of some +very ingenious men that flat or plane figures are immediate +objects of sight, though they acknowledge solids are not. +And this opinion of theirs is grounded on what is observed +in painting, wherein (say they) the ideas immediately imprinted +in the mind are only of planes variously coloured, +which, by a sudden act of the judgment, are changed into +solids: but, with a little attention, we shall find the planes +here mentioned as the immediate objects of sight are not +visible but tangible planes. For, when we say that pictures +are planes, we mean thereby that they appear to the touch +smooth and uniform. But then this smoothness and uniformity, +or, in other words, this planeness of the picture is +not perceived immediately by vision; for it appeareth to +the eye various and multiform. +</p> + +<p> +158. From all which we may conclude that planes are no +more the immediate object of sight than solids. What we +strictly see are not solids, nor yet planes variously coloured—they +are only diversity of colours. And some of these +suggest to the mind solids, and others plane figures; just +as they have been experienced to be connected with the +one or the other: so that we see planes in the same way +that we see solids—both being equally suggested by the +<pb n='205'/><anchor id='Pg205'/> +immediate objects of sight, which accordingly are themselves +denominated planes and solids. But, though they are +called by the same names with the things marked by them, +they are, nevertheless, of a nature entirely different, as hath +been demonstrated<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 130, and <hi rend='italic'>New Theory +of Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 57. Does +Berkeley, in this and the two preceding +sections, mean to hint that +the only proper object of sight is +<emph>unextended</emph> colour; and that, apart +from muscular movement in the eye +or other locomotion, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>visibilia</foreign> resolve +into unextended mathematical +points? This question has not escaped +more recent British psychologists, +including Stewart, Brown, +Mill, and Bain, who seem to hold +that unextended colour is perceivable +and imaginable.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +159. What has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to +decide the question we proposed to examine, concerning +the ability of a pure spirit, such as we have described, to +know geometry. It is, indeed, no easy matter for us to +enter precisely into the thoughts of such an intelligence; +because we cannot, without great pains, cleverly separate +and disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of sight +from those of touch which are connected with them. This, +indeed, in a complete degree seems scarce possible to be +performed; which will not seem strange to us, if we consider +how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his +native language, which is familiar to him, pronounced in +his ears without understanding them. Though he endeavour +to disunite the meaning from the sound, it will nevertheless +intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find it +extreme difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly +in the posture of a foreigner that never learnt the language, +so as to be affected barely with the sounds themselves, and +not perceive the signification annexed to them. +</p> + +<p> +160. By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither +abstract nor visible extension makes the object of geometry; +the not discerning of which may, perhaps, have created +some difficulty and useless labour in mathematics. [<note place='foot'>The bracketed sentence is not +retained in the author's last edition, +in which the first sentence of sect. +160 is the concluding one of sect. +159, and of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>.</note>Sure +I am that somewhat relating thereto has occurred to my +thoughts; which, though after the most anxious and repeated +examination I am forced to think it true, doth, nevertheless, +seem so far out of the common road of geometry, that I +know not whether it may not be thought presumption if +<pb n='206'/><anchor id='Pg206'/> +I should make it public, in an age wherein that science hath +received such mighty improvements by new methods; +great part whereof, as well as of the ancient discoveries, +may perhaps lose their reputation, and much of that ardour +with which men study the abstruse and fine geometry be +abated, if what to me, and those few to whom I have +imparted it, seems evidently true, should really prove to +be so.] +</p> + + +</div> + +<pb n='207'/><anchor id='Pg207'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>An Appendix To The Essay On Vision</head> + +<p> +[<hi rend='italic'>This Appendix is contained only in the second edition.</hi>] +</p> + +<p> +The censures which, I am informed, have been made +on the foregoing <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> inclined me to think I had not been +clear and express enough in some points; and, to prevent +being misunderstood for the future, I was willing to make +any necessary alterations or additions in what I had written. +But that was impracticable, the present edition having been +almost finished before I received this information. Wherefore, +I think it proper to consider in this place the principal +objections that are come to my notice. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In the <emph>first</emph> place, it is objected, that in the beginning of +the Essay I argue either against all use of lines and angles +in optics, and then what I say is false; or against those +writers only who will have it that we can perceive by sense +the optic axes, angles, &c., and then it is insignificant, this +being an absurdity which no one ever held. To which +I answer that I argue only against those who are of opinion +that we perceive the distance of objects by lines and angles, +or, as they term it, by a kind of innate geometry. And, to +shew that this is not fighting with my own shadow, I shall +here set down a passage from the celebrated Des Cartes<note place='foot'>This passage is contained in the <hi rend='italic'>Dioptrices</hi> of Descartes, VI. 13; see +also VI. 11.</note>:— +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/vision-fig-5.png' rend='width:60%'> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Distantiam præterea discimus, per mutuam quandam +conspirationem oculorum. Ut enim cæcus noster duo bacilla +tenens, <hi rend='italic'>A E</hi> et <hi rend='italic'>C E</hi>, de quorum longitudine incertus, +solumque intervallum manuum <hi rend='italic'>A</hi> et <hi rend='italic'>C</hi>, cum magnitudine +<pb n='208'/><anchor id='Pg208'/> +angulorum <hi rend='italic'>A C E</hi>, et <hi rend='italic'>C A E</hi> exploratum habens, inde, ut +ex Geometria quadam omnibus innata, scire potest ubi +sit punctum <hi rend='italic'>E</hi>. Sic quum nostri +oculi <hi rend='italic'>R S T</hi> et <hi rend='italic'>r s t</hi> ambo, vertuntur +ad <hi rend='italic'>X</hi>, magnitudo lineæ <hi rend='italic'>S s</hi>, et angulorum +<hi rend='italic'>X S s</hi> et <hi rend='italic'>X s S</hi>, certos nos +reddunt ubi sit punctum <hi rend='italic'>X</hi>. Et +idem opera alterutrius possumus +indagare, loco illum movendo, ut si +versus <hi rend='italic'>X</hi> illum semper dirigentes, +prime sistamus in puncto <hi rend='italic'>S</hi>, et statim +post in puncto <hi rend='italic'>s</hi>, hoc sufficiet ut magnitudo +lineæ <hi rend='italic'>S s</hi>, et duorum angulorum +<hi rend='italic'>X S s</hi> et <hi rend='italic'>X s S</hi> nostræ imaginationi +simul occurrant, et distantiam puncti <hi rend='italic'>X</hi> nos edoceant: +idque per actionem mentis, quæ licet simplex judicium esse +videatur, ratiocinationem +tamen quandam involutam +habet, similem illi, qua +Geometræ per duas stationes +diversas, loca inaccessa +dimetiuntur.</q> +</p> + +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/vision-fig-6.png' rend='width:60%'> + <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> + +<p> +I might amass together +citations from several authors +to the same purpose, +but, this being so clear in +the point, and from an +author of so great note, +I shall not trouble the +reader with any more. What I have said on this head +was not for the sake of rinding fault with other men; but, +because I judged it necessary to demonstrate in the first +place that we neither see distance <emph>immediately</emph>, nor yet +perceive it by the mediation of anything that hath (as lines +and angles) a <emph>necessary</emph> connexion with it. For on the +demonstration of this point the whole theory depends<note place='foot'>The arbitrariness or contingency—as +far as our knowledge +carries us—of the connexion +between the visual phenomena, as +signs, on the one hand, and actual +distance, as perceived through this +means, on the other.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Secondly</emph>, it is objected, that the explication I give of +the appearance of the horizontal moon (which may also be +<pb n='209'/><anchor id='Pg209'/> +applied to the sun) is the same that Gassendus had given +before. I answer, there is indeed mention made of the +grossness of the atmosphere in both; but then the methods +wherein it is applied to solve the phenomenon are widely +different, as will be evident to whoever shall compare what +I have said on this subject with the following words of +Gassendus:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>Heinc dici posse videtur: solem humilem oculo spectatum +ideo apparere majorem, quam dum altius egreditur, +quia dum vicinus est horizonti prolixa est series vaporum, +atque adeo corpusculorum quæ solis radios ita retundunt, +ut oculus minus conniveat, et pupilla quasi umbrefacta +longe magis amplificetur, quam dum sole multum elato +rari vapores intercipiuntur, solque ipse ita splendescit, ut +pupilla in ipsum spectans contractissima efficiatur. Nempe +ex hoc esse videtur, cur visibilis species ex sole procedens, +et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in retinam, ampliorem +in illa sedem occupet, majoremque proinde creet +solis apparentiam, quam dum per contractam pupillam +eodem intromissa contendit.</q> Vid. <hi rend='italic'>Epist. 1. De Apparente +Magnitudine Solis Humilis et Sublimis</hi>, p. 6. This solution +of Gassendus proceeds on a false principle, to wit, that +the pupil's being enlarged augments the species or image +on the fund of the eye. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<emph>Thirdly</emph>, against what is said in Sect. 80, it is objected, +that the same thing which is so small as scarce to be discerned +by a man, may appear like a mountain to some +small insect; from which it follows that the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> +is not equal in respect of all creatures<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 80-83.</note>. I answer, if this +objection be sounded to the bottom, it will be found to +mean no more than that the same particle of matter which +is marked to a man by one <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign>, exhibits to an +insect a great number of <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minima visibilia</foreign>. But this does +not prove that one <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> of the insect is not +equal to one <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum visibile</foreign> of the man. The not distinguishing +between the mediate and immediate objects of +sight is, I suspect, a cause of misapprehension in this +matter. +</p> + +<p> +Some other misinterpretations and difficulties have been +<pb n='210'/><anchor id='Pg210'/> +made, but, in the points they refer to, I have endeavoured +to be so very plain that I know not how to express myself +more clearly. All I shall add is, that if they who +are pleased to criticise on my <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> would but read the +whole over with some attention, they might be the better +able to comprehend my meaning, and consequently to +judge of my mistakes. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +I am informed that, soon after the first edition of +this treatise, a man somewhere near London was made +to see, who had been born blind, and continued so for +about twenty years<note place='foot'>The reference here seems to be +to the case described in the <hi rend='italic'>Tatler</hi> +(No. 55) of August 16, 1709, in +which William Jones, born blind, +had received sight after a surgical +operation, at the age of twenty, +on the 29th of June preceding. +A medical narrative of this case +appeared, entitled <hi rend='italic'>A full and true +account of a miraculous cure of a +Young Man in Newington, who was +born blind, and was in five minutes +brought to perfect sight, by Mr. Roger +Grant, oculist</hi>. London, 1709.</note>. Such a one may be supposed a +proper judge to decide how far some tenets laid down in +several places of the foregoing Essay are agreeable to +truth; and if any curious person hath the opportunity +of making proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should +gladly see my notions either amended or confirmed by +experience<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 71, with the relative +note.</note>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='211'/><anchor id='Pg211'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge</head> + +<p> +[<note place='foot'>Omitted on the title-page in the second edition, but retained in the body +of the work.</note>PART I] +</p> + +<p> +WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY +IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, +ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, ARE INQUIRED INTO +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>First Published in 1710</hi> +</p> + +<pb n='213'/><anchor id='Pg213'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Editor's Preface To The Treatise Concerning The +Principles Of Human Knowledge</head> + +<p> +This book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> contains the most systematic and +reasoned exposition of Berkeley's philosophy, in its early +stage, which we possess. Like the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, +its tentative pioneer, it was prepared at Trinity College, +Dublin. Its author had hardly completed his twenty-fifth +year when it was published. The first edition of this +<q>First Part</q> of the projected Treatise, <q>printed by Aaron +Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row, +Dublin,</q> appeared early in 1710. A second edition, with +minor changes, and in which <q>Part I</q> was withdrawn from +the title-page, was published in London in 1734, <q>printed +for Jacob Tonson</q>—on the eve of Berkeley's settlement at +Cloyne. It was the last in the author's lifetime. The +projected <q>Second Part</q> of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> was never given +to the world, and we can hardly conjecture its design. +In a letter in 1729 to his American friend, Samuel +Johnson, Berkeley mentions that he had <q>made considerable +progress on the Second Part,</q> but <q>the manuscript,</q> +he adds, <q>was lost about fourteen years ago, during my +travels in Italy; and I never had leisure since to do so +<pb n='214'/><anchor id='Pg214'/> +disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject<note place='foot'>Beardsley's <hi rend='italic'>Life and Correspondence +of Samuel Johnson, D.D., +First President of King's College, +New York</hi>, p. 72 (1874).</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +An edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> appeared in London in 1776, +twenty-three years after Berkeley's death, with a running +commentary of <hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi> by the anonymous editor, on the +pages opposite the text, in which, according to the editor, +Berkeley's doctrines are <q>carefully examined, and shewn to +be repugnant to fact, and his principles to be incompatible +with the constitution of human nature and the reason and +fitness of things.</q> In this volume the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues between +Hylas and Philonous</hi> are appended to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, and a +<q>Philosophical Discourse concerning the nature of Human +Being</q> is prefixed to the whole, <q>being a defence of Mr. +Locke's principles, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's +<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Truth</hi>,</q> by the author of the <hi rend='italic'>Remarks on +Berkeley's Principles</hi>. The acuteness of the <hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi> is +not in proportion to their bulk and diffuseness: many +popular misconceptions of Berkeley are served up, without +appreciation of the impotence of matter, and of natural +causation as only passive sense-symbolism, which is at +the root of the theory of the material world against which +the <hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi> are directed. +</p> + +<p> +The Kantian and post-Kantian Idealism that is characteristic +of the nineteenth century has recalled attention +to Berkeley, who had produced his spiritual philosophy +under the prevailing conditions of English thought in the +preceding age, when Idealism in any form was uncongenial. +In 1869 the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> was translated into German, +with annotations, by Ueberweg, professor of philosophy at +Königsberg, the university of Kant. The Clarendon Press +edition of the Collected Works of Berkeley followed in +1871. In 1874 an edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, by Dr. Kranth, +Professor of Philosophy in the university of Pennsylvania, +appeared in America, with annotations drawn largely from +<pb n='215'/><anchor id='Pg215'/> +the Clarendon Press edition and Ueberweg. In 1878 Dr. +Collyns Simon republished the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, with discussions +based upon the text, followed by an appendix of remarks +on Kant and Hume in their relation to Berkeley. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, as we have it, must be taken as +a systematic fragment of an incompletely developed philosophy. +Many years after its appearance, the author thus +describes the conditions:—<q>It was published when I was +very young, and without doubt hath many defects. For +though the notions should be true (as I verily think they +are), yet it is difficult to express them clearly and consistently, +language being framed for common use and +received prejudices. I do not therefore pretend that my +books can teach truth. All I hope for is that they may +be an occasion to inquisitive men of discovering truth<note place='foot'>Beardsley's <hi rend='italic'>Life of Johnson</hi>, +pp. 71, 72.</note>.</q> +Again:—<q>I had no inclination to trouble the world with +large volumes. What I have done was rather with the +view of giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and +curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue them +in their own minds. Two or three times reading these +small tracts (<hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>De +Motu</hi>), and making what is read the occasion of thinking, +would, I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the +mind, and take off that shocking appearance which hath +often been observed to attend speculative truths<note place='foot'>Chandler's <hi rend='italic'>Life of Johnson</hi>, +Appendix, p. 161.</note>.</q> The +incitements to further and deeper thought thus proposed +have met with a more sympathetic response in this generation +than in the lifetime of Berkeley. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +There is internal evidence in the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +that its author had been a diligent and critical student of +Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. Like the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, it is dedicated to the +Earl of Pembroke. The word <emph>idea</emph> is not less characteristic +<pb n='216'/><anchor id='Pg216'/> +of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> than of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, although Berkeley +generally uses it with a narrower application than Locke, +confining it to phenomena presented objectively to our +senses, and their subjective reproductions in imagination. +With both Berkeley and Locke objective phenomena +(under the name of ideas) are the materials supplied to +man for conversion into natural science. Locke's reduction +of ideas into simple and complex, as well as some +of his subdivisions, reappear with modifications in the +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. Berkeley's account of Substance and Power, +Space and Time, while different from Locke's, still bears +marks of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. Concrete Substance, which in its +ultimate meaning much perplexes Locke, is identified with +the personal pronouns <q>I</q> and <q>you</q> by Berkeley, and +is thus spiritualised. Cause proper, or Power, he finds +only in the voluntary activity of persons. Space is presented +to us in our sensuous experience of resistance +to organic movements; while it is symbolised in terms of +phenomena presented to sight, as already explained in +the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>. Time is revealed in our actual +experience of change in the ideas or phenomena of +which we are percipient in sense; length of time being +calculated by the changes in the adopted measure of +duration. Infinite space and infinite time, being necessarily +incapable of finite ideation, are dismissed as +abstractions that for man must always be empty of +realisable meaning. Indeed, the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> +shews that Locke influenced Berkeley as much by antagonism +as otherwise. <q>Such was the candour of that +great man that I persuade myself, were he alive, he would +not be offended that I differed from him, seeing that in so +doing I follow his advice to use my own judgment, see with +my own eyes and not with another's.</q> So he argues against +Locke's opinions about the infinity and eternity of space, +and the possibility of matter endowed with power to think, +and urges his inconsistency in treating some qualities +<pb n='217'/><anchor id='Pg217'/> +of matter as wholly material, while he insists that others, +under the name of <q>secondary,</q> are necessarily dependent +on sentient intelligence. Above all he assails Locke's +<q>abstract ideas</q> as germs of scepticism—interpreting +Locke's meaning paradoxically. +</p> + +<p> +Next to Locke, Descartes and Malebranche are prominent +in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. Recognition of the ultimate supremacy +of Spirit, or the spiritual character of active power and +the constant agency of God in nature, suggested by +Descartes, was congenial to Berkeley, but he was opposed +to the mechanical conception of the universe found +in the Cartesian physical treatises. That thought is synonymous +with existence is a formula with which the French +philosopher might make him familiar, as well as with +the assumption that <emph>ideas only</emph> are immediate objects of +human perception; an assumption in which Descartes +was followed by Locke, and philosophical thinkers in the +seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but under differing +interpretations of the term <emph>idea</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +Malebranche appears less in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> than Locke +and Descartes. In early life, at any rate, Berkeley +would be less at home in the <q>divine vision</q> of Malebranche +than among the <q>ideas</q> of Locke. The mysticism +of the <hi rend='italic'>Recherche de la Vérité</hi> is unlike the transparent +lucidity of Berkeley's juvenile thought. But the subordinate +place and office of the material world in Malebranche's +system, and his conception of power as wholly +spiritual, approached the New Principles of Berkeley. +</p> + +<p> +Plato and Aristotle hardly appear, either by name or as +characteristic influence, in the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, which +in this respect contrasts with the abundant references to +ancient and mediaeval thinkers in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, and to a less +extent in the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> is a proclamation of +war against <q>abstract ideas,</q> which is renewed in the body +<pb n='218'/><anchor id='Pg218'/> +of the work, and again more than once in the writings of +Berkeley's early and middle life, but is significantly withdrawn +in his old age. In the ardour of youth, his prime +remedy for anarchy in philosophy, and for the sceptical disposition +which philosophy had been apt to generate, was suppression +of abstract ideas as impossible ideas—empty names +heedlessly accepted as ideas—an evil to be counteracted by +steady adherence to the concrete experience found in our +senses and inner consciousness. Never to lose our hold +of positive facts, and always to individualise general conceptions, +are regulative maxims by which Berkeley would +make us govern our investigation of ultimate problems. +He takes up his position in the actual universe of applied +reason; not in the empty void of abstract reason, +remote from particulars and succession of change, in +which no real existence is found. All realisable ideas +must be either concrete data of sense, or concrete data +of inward consciousness. It is relations embodied in +particular facts, not pretended abstract ideas, that give +fruitful meaning to common terms. Abstract matter, +abstract substance, abstract power, abstract space, abstract +time—unindividualisable in sense or in imagination—must +all be void of meaning; the issue of unlawful +analysis, which pretends to find what is real without +the concrete ideas that make the real, because percipient +spirit is the indispensable factor of all reality. +The only lawful abstraction is <emph>nominal</emph>—the application, +that is to say, of a name in common to an +indefinite number of things which resemble one another. +This is Berkeley's <q>Nominalism.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley takes Locke as the representative advocate +of the <q>abstract ideas</q> against which he wages war in +the Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. Under cover of an +ambiguity in the term <emph>idea</emph>, he is unconsciously fighting +against a man of straw. He supposes that Locke means +by <emph>idea</emph> only a concrete datum of sense, or of imagination; +<pb n='219'/><anchor id='Pg219'/> +and he argues that we cannot without contradiction +abstract from all such data, and yet retain idea. +But Locke includes among <emph>his</emph> ideas intellectual relations—what +Berkeley himself afterwards distinguished +as <emph>notions</emph>, in contrast with ideas. This polemic against +Locke is therefore one of verbal confusion. In later +life he probably saw this, as he saw deeper into the whole +question involved. This is suggested by the omission +of the argument against abstract ideas, given in earlier +editions of <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, from the edition published a year +before he died. In his juvenile attack on abstractions, +his characteristic impetuosity seems to carry him to the +extreme of rejecting rational relations that are involved +in the objectivity of sensible things and natural order, thus +resting experience at last only on phenomena—particular +and contingent. +</p> + +<p> +A preparatory draft of the Introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +which I found in the manuscript department of the library +of Trinity College, Dublin, is printed in the appendix to +this edition of Berkeley's Philosophical Works. The +variations are of some interest, biographical and philosophical. +It seems to have been written in the autumn +of 1708, and it may with advantage be compared +with the text of the finished Introduction, as well as +with numerous relative entries in the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace +Book</hi>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +After this Introduction, the New Principles themselves +are evolved, in a corresponding spirit of hostility to empty +abstractions. The sections may be thus divided:— +</p> + +<p> +i. Rationale of the Principles (sect. 1-33). +</p> + +<p> +ii. Supposed Objections to the Principles answered +(sect. 34-84). +</p> + +<p> +iii. Consequences and Applications of the Principles +(sect. 85-156). +</p> + +<pb n='220'/><anchor id='Pg220'/> + +<div> +<head>i. Rationale of the Principles.</head> + +<p> +The reader may remember that one of the entries +in the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> runs as follows:—<q>To begin +the First Book, not with mention of sensation and +reflexion, but, instead of sensation, to use perception, or +thought in general.</q> Berkeley seems there to be oscillating +between Locke and Descartes. He now adopts +Locke's account of the materials of which our concrete +experience consists (sect. 1). The data of human knowledge +of existence are accordingly found in the ideas, +phenomena, or appearances (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) of which we are percipient in +the senses, and (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) of which we are conscious when we +attend to our inward passions and operations—all which +make up the original contents of human experience, +to be reproduced in new forms and arrangements, (<hi rend='italic'>c</hi>) in +memory and (<hi rend='italic'>d</hi>) imagination and (<hi rend='italic'>e</hi>) expectation. Those +materials are called <emph>ideas</emph> because living mind or spirit +is the indispensable realising factor: they all presuppose +living mind, spirit, self, or ego to realise and +elaborate them (sect. 2). This is implied in our use of +personal pronouns, which signify, not ideas of any of +the preceding kinds, but that which is <q>entirely distinct +from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same +thing, by which they are perceived.</q> In this fundamental +presupposition Descartes is more apparent than Locke, and +there is even an unconscious forecast of Kant and Hegel. +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley next faces a New Question which his New +Principles are intended to answer. How is the concrete +world that is presented to our senses related to Mind or +Spirit? Is all or any of its reality independent of percipient +experience? Is it true that the phenomena of which +we are percipient in sense are ultimately independent of +all percipient and conscious life, and are even the ultimate +basis of all that is real? Must we recognise in the phenomena +of Matter the <emph>substance</emph> of what we call Mind? +<pb n='221'/><anchor id='Pg221'/> +For do we not find, when we examine Body and +Spirit mutually related in our personality, that the latter +is more dependent on the former, and on the physical +cosmos of which the former is a part, than our body +and its bodily surroundings are dependent on Spirit? In +short, is not the universe of existence, in its final form, +only lifeless Matter? +</p> + +<p> +The claim of Matter to be supreme is what Berkeley +produces his Principles in order to reduce. Concrete +reality is self-evidently unreal, he argues, in the total +absence of percipient Spirit, for Spirit is the one realising +factor. Try to imagine the material world unperceived +and you are trying to picture empty abstraction. +Wholly material matter is self-evidently an inconceivable +absurdity; a universe emptied of all percipient +life is an impossible universe. The material world +becomes real in being perceived: it depends for its reality +upon the spiritual realisation. As colours in a dark room +become real with the introduction of light, so the material +world becomes real in the life and agency of Spirit. It +must exist in terms of sentient life and percipient +intelligence, in order to rise into any degree of reality +that human beings at least can be at all concerned +with, either speculatively or practically. Matter totally +abstracted from percipient spirit must go the way of +all abstract ideas. It is an illusion, concealed by confused +thought and abuse of words; yet from obvious causes +strong enough to stifle faith in this latent but self-evident +Principle—that the universe of sense-presented phenomena +can have concrete existence only in and by +sentient intelligence. It is the reverse of this Principle +that Berkeley takes to have been <q>the chief source +of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions +and inexplicable puzzling absurdities, that have in all +ages been a reproach to human reason<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book.</hi></note>.</q> And indeed, +<pb n='222'/><anchor id='Pg222'/> +when it is fully understood, it is seen in its own +light to be the chief of <q>those truths which are so near +and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open +his eyes to see them. For such I take this important one +to be—that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the +Earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty +frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a +Mind</q> (sect. 6). Living Mind or Spirit is the indispensable +factor of all realities that are presented to our senses, +including, of course, our own bodies. +</p> + +<p> +Yet this Principle, notwithstanding its intuitive certainty, +needs to be evoked by reflection from the latency +in which it lies concealed, in the confused thought of +the unreflecting. It is only gradually, and with the help of +reasoning, that the world presented to the senses is distinctly +recognised in this its deepest and truest reality. +And even when we see that the phenomena <emph>immediately</emph> +presented to our senses need to be realised in percipient +experience, in order to be concretely real, we are ready to +ask whether there may not be substances <emph>like</emph> the things so +presented, which can exist <q>without mind,</q> or in a wholly +material way (sect. 8). Nay, are there not <emph>some</emph> of the +phenomena immediately presented to our senses which do +not need living mind to make them real? It is allowed by +Locke and others that all those qualities of matter which are +called <emph>secondary</emph> cannot be wholly material, and that +living mind is indispensable for <emph>their</emph> realisation in nature; +but Locke and the rest argue, that this is not so with the +qualities which they call <emph>primary</emph>, and which they regard as +of the essence of matter. Colours, sounds, tastes, smells are +all allowed to be not wholly material; but are not the size, +shape, situation, solidity, and motion of bodies qualities +that are real without need for the realising agency of any +Mind or Spirit in the universe, and which would continue +to be what they are now if all Spirit, divine or human, +ceased to exist? +</p> + +<pb n='223'/><anchor id='Pg223'/> + +<p> +The supposition that some of the phenomena of what +is called Matter can be real, and yet wholly material, is +discussed in sections 9-15, in which it is argued that the +things of sense cannot exist really, in <emph>any</emph> of their +manifestations, unless they are brought into reality in +some percipient life and experience. It is held impossible +that any quality of matter can have the reality which +we all attribute to it, unless it is spiritually realised +(sect. 15). +</p> + +<p> +But may Matter not be real apart from all its so-called +qualities, these being allowed to be not wholly material, +because real only within percipient spirit? May not +this wholly material Matter be Something that, as it were, +exists <emph>behind</emph> the ideas, phenomena, or qualities that +make their appearance to human beings? This question, +Berkeley would say, is a meaningless and wholly unpractical +one. Material substance that makes and can make no real +appearance—unphenomenal or unideal—stripped of all its +qualities—is only <q>another name for abstract Being,</q> and <q>the +abstract idea of Being appeareth to me the most incomprehensible +of all other. When I consider the two parts +or branches which make up the words <emph>material substance</emph>, +I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to +them</q> (sect. 17). Neither Sense nor Reason inform us of +the existence of real material substances that exist <emph>abstractly</emph>, +or out of all relation to the secondary and primary +qualities of which we are percipient when we exercise our +senses. By our senses we cannot perceive more than ideas +or phenomena, aggregated as individual things that are presented +to us: we cannot perceive substances that make +no appearance in sense. Then as for reason, unrealised +substances, abstracted from living Spirit, human or divine, +being altogether meaningless, can in no way explain +the concrete realisations of human experience. In +short, if there are wholly unphenomenal material substances, +it is impossible that we should ever discover +<pb n='224'/><anchor id='Pg224'/> +them, or have any concern with them, speculative +or practical; and if there are not, we should have the +same reason to assert that there are which we have +now (sect. 20). It is impossible to put any meaning +into wholly abstract reality. <q>To me the words +mean either a direct contradiction, or nothing at all</q> +(sect. 24). +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The Principle that the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign> of matter necessarily involves +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipi</foreign>, and its correlative Principle that there is not any +other substance than Spirit, which is thus the indispensable +factor of all reality, both lead on to the more +obviously practical Principle—that the material world, +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, is wholly powerless, and that all changes in Nature +are the immediate issue of the agency of Spirit (sect. 25-27). +Concrete power, like concrete substance, is essentially +spiritual. To be satisfied that the whole natural world is +only the passive instrument and expression of Spiritual +Power we are asked to analyse the sensuous data of +experience. We can find no reason for attributing inherent +power to any of the phenomena and phenomenal things +that are presented to our senses, or for supposing that +<emph>they</emph> can be active causes, either of the changes that +are continuously in progress among themselves, or of the +feelings, perceptions, and volitions of which spiritual beings +are conscious. We find the ideas or phenomena that pass +in procession before our senses related to one another as +signs to their meanings, in a cosmical order that virtually +makes the material world a language and a prophecy: +but this cosmical procession is not found to originate in the +ideas or phenomena themselves, and there is reason for +supposing it to be maintained by ever-living Spirit, which +thus not only substantiates the things of sense, but explains +their laws of motion and their movements. +</p> + +<p> +Yet the universe of reality is not exclusively One +Spirit. Experience contradicts the supposition. I find +<pb n='225'/><anchor id='Pg225'/> +on trial that my personal power to produce changes in the +ideas or phenomena which my senses present to me +is a limited power (sect. 28-33). I can make and unmake +my own fancies, but I cannot with like freedom +make and unmake presentations of sense. When in daylight +I open my eyes, it is not in my power to determine +whether I shall see or not; nor is it in my power to determine +what objects I shall see. The cosmical order of sense-phenomena +is independent of my will. When I employ +my senses, I find myself always confronted by sensible +signs of perfect Reason and omnipresent Will. But I +also awake in the faith that I am an individual person. +And the sense-symbolism of which the material world consists, +while it keeps me in constant and immediate relation +to the Universal Spirit, whose language it is, keeps me +likewise in intercourse with other persons, akin to myself, +who are signified to me by their overt actions and articulate +words, which enter into my sensuous experience. Sense-given +phenomena thus, among their other instrumental +offices, are the medium of communication between human +beings, who by this means can find companions, and make +signs to them. So while, at <emph>our</emph> highest point of view, +Nature is Spirit, experience shews that there is room in +the universe for a plurality of persons, individual, and in +a measure free or morally responsible. If Berkeley does +not say all this, his New Principles tend thus. +</p> + +<p> +At any rate, in his reasoned exposition of his Principles +he is anxious to distinguish those phenomena that are +presented to the senses of all mankind from the private +ideas or fancies of individual men (sect. 28-33). The +former constitute the world which sentient beings realise +in common. He calls them <emph>ideas</emph> because they are unrealisable +without percipient mind; but still on the understanding +that they are not to be confounded with the +chimeras of imagination. They are more deeply and truly +real than chimeras. The groups in which they are found +<pb n='226'/><anchor id='Pg226'/> +to coexist are the individual things of sense, whose fixed +order of succession exemplifies what we call natural law, or +natural causation: the correlation of their changes to our +pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, makes scientific +knowledge of their laws practically important to the life of +man, in his embodied state. +</p> + +<p> +Moreover, the real ideas presented to our senses, unlike +those of imagination, Berkeley would imply, cannot be +either representative or misrepresentative. Our imagination +may mislead us: the original data of sense cannot: +although we may, and often do, misinterpret their relations +to one another, and to our pleasures and pains and higher +faculties. The divine meaning with which they are charged, +of which science is a partial expression, they may perhaps +be said to represent. Otherwise representative sense-perception +is absurdity: the ideas of sense cannot be +representative in the way those of imagination are; for +fancies are faint representations of data of sense. The +appearances that sentient intelligence realises <emph>are</emph> the things +of sense, and we cannot go deeper. If we prefer accordingly +to call the material world a dream or a chimera, we must +understand that it is the <emph>reasonable</emph> dream in which all +sentient intelligence participates, and by which the embodied +life of man must be regulated. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Has Berkeley, in his juvenile ardour, and with the +impetuosity natural to him, while seeking to demonstrate +the impotence of matter, and the omnipresent supremacy of +Spirit, so spiritualised the material world as to make it unfit +for the symbolical office in the universe of reality which he +supposes it to discharge? Is its potential existence in God, +and its percipient realisation by me, and presumably by +innumerable other sentient beings, an adequate account +of the real material world existing in place and time? Can +this universal orderly dream experienced in sense involve +the objectivity implied in its being the reliable medium of +<pb n='227'/><anchor id='Pg227'/> +social intercourse? Does <emph>such</emph> a material world provide +me with a means of escape from absolute solitude? Nay, +if Matter cannot rise into reality without percipient spirit +as realising factor, can my individual percipient spirit realise +<emph>myself</emph> without independent Matter? Without intelligent +life Matter is pronounced unreal. But is it not also true +that without Matter, and the special material organism we +call our body, percipient spirit is unreal? Does not Nature +seem as indispensable to Spirit as Spirit is to Nature? Must +we not assume at least their unbeginning and unending +coexistence, even if we recognise in Spirit the deeper and +truer reality? Do the New Principles explain the <emph>final</emph> +ground of trust and certainty about the universe of change +into which I entered as a stranger when I was born? +If they make all that I have believed in as <emph>outward</emph> to be in +its reality <emph>inward</emph>, do they not disturb the balance that is +necessary to <emph>all</emph> human certainties, and leave me without +any realities at all? +</p> + +<p> +That Berkeley at the age of twenty-five, and educated +chiefly by Locke, had fathomed or even entertained all +these questions was hardly to be looked for. How far he +had gone may be gathered by a study of the sequel of his +book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>ii. Objections to the New Principles answered +(sect. 34-84).</head> + +<p> +The supposed Objections, with Berkeley's answers, may +be thus interpreted:— +</p> + +<p> +<emph>First objection.</emph> (Sect. 34-40.) The preceding Principles +banish all substantial realities, and substitute a universe +of chimeras. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> This objection is a play upon the popular +meaning of the word <q>idea.</q> That name is appropriate +to the phenomena presented in sense, because they become +concrete realities only in the experience of living +<pb n='228'/><anchor id='Pg228'/> +Spirit; and so it is not confined to the chimeras of individual +fancy, which may misrepresent the real ideas of +sense that are presented in the natural system independently +of our will. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Second objection.</emph> (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles +abolish the distinction between Perception and Imagination—between +imagining one's self burnt and actually +being burnt. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> Real fire differs from fancied fire: as real pain +does from fancied pain; yet no one supposes that real pain +any more than imaginary pain can exist unfelt by a sentient +intelligence. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Third objection.</emph> (Sect. 42-44.) We actually <emph>see</emph> sensible +things existing at a distance from our bodies. Now, +whatever is seen existing at a distance must be seen as +existing external to us in our bodies, which contradicts +the foregoing Principles. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> Distance, or outness, is not visible. It is +a conception which is suggested gradually, by our experience +of the connexion between visible colours and certain +visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one hand, +and our tactual experience, on the other—as was proved +in the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, in which the ideality of the <emph>visible</emph> +world is demonstrated<note place='foot'>Moreover, even if the outness +or distance of things <emph>were</emph> visible, it +would not follow that either they +or their distances could be real if +unperceived. On the contrary, +Berkeley implies that they <emph>are</emph> +perceived <emph>visually</emph>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Fourth objection.</emph> (Sect. 45-48.) It follows from the New +Principles, that the material world must be undergoing +continuous annihilation and recreation in the innumerable +sentient experiences in which it becomes real. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer</emph>. According to the New Principles a thing +may be realised in the sense-experience of <emph>other</emph> minds, +during intervals of its perception by <emph>my</emph> mind; for the +Principles do not affirm dependence only on this or that +<pb n='229'/><anchor id='Pg229'/> +mind, but on a living Mind. If this implies a constant +creation of the material world, the conception of +the universe as in a state of constant creation is not new, +and it signally displays Divine Providence. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Fifth objection.</emph> (Sect. 49.) If extension and extended +Matter can exist only <emph>in mind</emph>, it follows that extension is +an attribute of mind—that mind is extended. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> Extension and other sensible qualities exist in +mind, not as <emph>modes</emph> of mind, which is unintelligible, but <emph>as +ideas</emph> of which Mind is percipient; and this is absolutely +inconsistent with the supposition that Mind is itself extended<note place='foot'>It is also to be remembered +that sensible things exist <q>in +mind,</q> without being exclusively +<emph>mine</emph>, as creatures of <emph>my will</emph>. In +one sense, that only is mine in +which my will exerts itself. But, +in another view, my involuntary +states of feeling and imagination +are <emph>mine</emph>, because their existence +depends on my consciousness of +them; and even sensible things +are so far <emph>mine</emph>, because, though +present in many minds in common, +they are, for me, dependent on +<emph>my</emph> percipient mind.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Sixth objection.</emph> (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds +on the assumption that Matter is independent of percipient +mind, and it thus contradicts the New Principles. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> On the contrary, Matter—if it means what +exists abstractly, or in independence of all percipient +Mind—is useless in natural philosophy, which is conversant +exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that +compose concrete things, not with empty abstractions. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Seventh objection.</emph> (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to +spiritual agents alone, and to regard the things of sense +as wholly impotent, thus discharging natural causes as +the New Principles do, is at variance with human language +and with good sense. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> While we may speak as the multitude do, we +should learn to think with the few who reflect. We may +still speak of <q>natural causes,</q> even when, as philosophers, +we recognise that all true efficiency must be spiritual, and +that the material world is only a system of sensible symbols, +<pb n='230'/><anchor id='Pg230'/> +regulated by Divine Will and revealing Omnipresent +Mind. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Eighth objection.</emph> (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men +seems inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> Not so when we consider that men seldom +comprehend the deep meaning of their practical assumptions; +and when we recollect the prejudices, once dignified +as good sense, which have successively surrendered to +philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Ninth objection.</emph> (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is +inconsistent with our common faith in the existence of +the material world must be rejected. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> The fact that we are conscious of not being +ourselves the cause of changes perpetually going on in +our <emph>sense</emph>-ideas, some of which we gradually learn by +experience to foresee, sufficiently accounts for the common +belief in the independence of those ideas, and is what men +truly mean by this. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Tenth objection.</emph> (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles +concerning Matter and Spirit are inconsistent with the +laws of motion, and with other truths in mathematics and +natural philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> The laws of motion, and those other truths, +may be all conceived and expressed in consistency with +the absence of independent substance and causation in +Matter. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Eleventh objection.</emph> (Sect. 60-66.) If, according to the +foregoing Principles, the material world is merely phenomena +presented by a Power not-ourselves to our senses, +the elaborate contrivances which we find in Nature are +useless; for we might have had all experiences that are +needful without them, by the direct agency of God. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> Elaborate contrivances in Nature are relatively +necessary as signs: they express to <emph>us</emph> the occasional presence +and some of the experience of other men, also the +constant presence and power of the Universal Spirit, while +<pb n='231'/><anchor id='Pg231'/> +the scientific interpretation of elaborately constituted Nature +is a beneficial moral and intellectual exercise. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Twelfth objection.</emph> (Sect. 67-79.) Although the impossibility +of <emph>active</emph> Matter may be demonstrable, this does not +prove the impossibility of <emph>inactive</emph> Matter, <emph>neither solid +nor extended</emph>, which may be the occasion of our having +sense-ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> This supposition is unintelligible: the words +in which it is expressed convey no meaning. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Thirteenth objection.</emph> (Sect. 80, 81.) Matter may be <emph>an +unknowable Somewhat</emph>, neither substance nor accident, cause +nor effect, spirit nor idea: all the reasonings against +Matter, conceived as something positive, fail, when this +wholly negative notion is maintained. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> This is to use the word <q>Matter</q> as people +use the word <q>nothing</q>: Unknowable Somewhat cannot be +distinguished from nothing. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Fourteenth objection.</emph> (Sect. 82-84.) Although we cannot, +in opposition to the New Principles, infer scientifically the +existence of Matter, in abstraction from all realising percipient +life, or form any conception, positive or negative, of +what Matter is; yet Holy Scripture demands the faith of +every Christian in the independent reality of the material +world. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Answer.</emph> The <emph>independent</emph> reality of the material world +is nowhere affirmed in Scripture. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>iii. Consequences and Applications of the New +Principles (sect. 85-156).</head> + +<p> +In this portion of the Treatise, the New Principles, already +guarded against objections, are applied to enlighten and +invigorate final faith, often suffering from the paralysis of +the scepticism produced by materialism; also to improve +the sciences, including those which relate to Mind, in +man and in God. They are applied:— +</p> + +<pb n='232'/><anchor id='Pg232'/> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +1. To the refutation of Scepticism as to the reality +of the world (sect. 85-91) and God (sect. 92-96); +</p> + +<p> +2. To the liberation of thought from the bondage of +unmeaning abstractions (sect. 97-100); +</p> + +<p> +3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by +making it an interpretation of ideas of sense, +simply in their relations of coexistence and sequence, +according to which they constitute the +Divine Language of Nature (sect. 101-116); +</p> + +<p> +4. To simplify Mathematics, by eliminating infinites +and other empty abstractions (sect. 117-134); +</p> + +<p> +5. To explain and sustain faith in the Immortality +of men (sect. 135-144); +</p> + +<p> +6. To explain the belief which each man has in the +existence of other men; as signified to him in and +through sense-symbolism (sect. 145); +</p> + +<p> +7. To vindicate faith in God, who is signified in and +through the sense-symbolism of universal nature +(sect. 146-156). +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +It was only by degrees that Berkeley's New Principles +attracted attention. A new mode of conceiving the world +we live in, by a young and unknown author, published at a +distance from the centre of English intellectual life, was apt +to be overlooked. In connexion with the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, +however, it drew enough of regard to make Berkeley an +object of interest to the literary world on his first visit to +London, three years after its publication. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='233'/><anchor id='Pg233'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Dedication</head> + +<p> +TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE +</p> + +<p> +THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE<note place='foot'>Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl +of Pembroke and fifth Earl of Montgomery, +was the correspondent +and friend of Locke—who dedicated +his famous <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> to him, as a work +<q>having some little correspondence +with some parts of that nobler +and vast system of the sciences +your lordship has made so new, +exact, and instructive a draft of.</q> +He represents a family renowned +in English political and literary +history. He was born in 1656; +was a nobleman of Christ Church, +Oxford, in 1672; succeeded to his +titles in 1683; was sworn of the +Privy Council in 1689; and made +a Knight of the Garter in 1700. +He filled some of the highest +offices in the state, in the reigns +of William and Mary, and of Anne. +He was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland +in 1707, having previously been +one of the Commissioners by whom +the union between England and +Scotland was negotiated. He died +in January 1733.</note>, &c. +</p> + +<p> +KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND +ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST +HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>My Lord</hi>, +</p> + +<p> +You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who +has not the honour to be known to your lordship, should +presume to address you in this manner. But that a man +who has written something with a design to promote +Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should +make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be +thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted +with the present state of the church and learning, +and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and +support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced +me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were +<pb n='234'/><anchor id='Pg234'/> +I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness +which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. +I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and +bounty you have been pleased to shew towards our +Society<note place='foot'>Trinity College, Dublin.</note> gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to +countenance the studies of one of its members. These +considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your +lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to +have it known that I am with the truest and most profound +respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the +world so justly admires in your lordship, +</p> + +<p> +My Lord, +</p> + +<p> +Your lordship's most humble<lb/> +and most devoted servant, +</p> + +<p> +GEORGE BERKELEY. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='235'/><anchor id='Pg235'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Preface</head> + +<p> +What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous +inquiry<note place='foot'>In his <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi> +Berkeley seems to refer his speculations +to his boyhood. The conception +of the material world propounded +in the following Treatise +was in his view before the publication +of the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, +which was intended to prepare the +way for it.</note>, seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful +to be known; particularly to those who are tainted +with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence +and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of +the Soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader +should impartially examine; since I do not think myself +any farther concerned for the success of what I have written +than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may +not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend +his judgment till he has once at least read the whole +through, with that degree of attention and thought which +the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there +are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very +liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, +and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, +nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to +follow from them; so likewise, though the whole should +be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very +probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking +reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and +obvious. +</p> + +<p> +As for the characters of novelty and singularity<note place='foot'>Cf. Locke, in the <q>Epistle +Dedicatory</q> of his <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>. Notwithstanding +the <q>novelty</q> of the +New Principles, viz. <emph>negation</emph> of +abstract or unperceived Matter, +Space, Time, Substance, and Power; +and <emph>affirmation</emph> of Mind, as the +Synthesis, Substance, and Cause +of all—much in best preceding +philosophy, ancient and modern, +was a dim anticipation of it.</note> which +<pb n='236'/><anchor id='Pg236'/> +some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I +hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He +must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted +with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of +demonstration<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c., in illustration +of the demonstrative claim +of Berkeley's initial doctrine.</note>, for no other reason but because it is newly +known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. +</p> + +<p> +Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, +if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are +too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend +it<note place='foot'>Berkeley entreats his reader, +here and throughout, to take pains +to understand his meaning, and +especially to avoid confounding the +ordered ideas or phenomena, objectively +presented to our senses, +with capricious chimeras of imagination.</note>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='237'/><anchor id='Pg237'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Introduction</head> + +<p> +1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of Wisdom +and Truth<note place='foot'><q>Philosophy is nothing but the +true knowledge of things.</q> Locke.</note>, it may with reason be expected that those who +have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater +calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and +evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts +and difficulties than other men. Yet, so it is, we see the +illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the high-road of plain +common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, +for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing +that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. +They complain not of any want of evidence +in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming +Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and +instinct to follow the light of a superior principle—to reason, +meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand +scruples spring up in our minds, concerning those things +which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices +and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves +to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, +we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, +and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as +we advance in speculation; till at length, having wandered +through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just +where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn +Scepticism<note place='foot'>The purpose of those early +essays of Berkeley was to reconcile +philosophy with common +sense, by employing reflection +to make <emph>latent</emph> common sense, or +common reason, reveal itself in its +genuine integrity. Cf. the closing +sentences in the <hi rend='italic'>Third Dialogue between +Hylas and Philonous</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='238'/><anchor id='Pg238'/> + +<p> +2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of +things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our +understandings. It is said the faculties we have are few, +and those designed by nature for the support and pleasure +of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and +constitution of things: besides, the mind of man being +finite, when it treats of things which partake of Infinity, it +is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, +out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate +itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended +by that which is finite<note place='foot'>Cf. Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 4-7; Bk. II. ch. 23, § 12, &c. +Locke (who is probably here in +Berkeley's eye) attributes the perplexities +of philosophy to our narrow +faculties, which are meant to +regulate our lives, not to remove +all mysteries. See also Descartes, +<hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, I. 26, 27, &c.; Malebranche, +<hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, III. 2.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in +placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather +in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to +suppose that right deductions from true principles should +ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or +made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt +more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a +strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite +out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted +indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites +it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually +furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, +will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined +to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those +difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and +blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to +ourselves. We have first raised a dust, and then complain +we cannot see. +</p> + +<p> +4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what +those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness +and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, +into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the +wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving +it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation +of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving +our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First +<pb n='239'/><anchor id='Pg239'/> +Principles of Human Knowledge; to sift and examine +them on all sides: especially since there may be some +grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which +stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do +not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, +or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from +false Principles which have been insisted on, and might +have been avoided. +</p> + +<p> +5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt +may seem, when I consider what a number of very great +and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like +designs<note place='foot'>His most significant forerunners +were Descartes in his <hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, +and Locke in his <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>.</note>, yet I am not without some hopes; upon the +consideration that the largest views are not always the +clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged +to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close +and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far +better eyes. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the +easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise +somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature +and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter +leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by +taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in +rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to +have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in +almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion +that the mind hath a power of framing <emph>abstract</emph> ideas or +notions of things<note place='foot'>Here <q>idea</q> and <q>notion</q> +seem to be used convertibly. See +sect. 142. Cf. with the argument +against <emph>abstract ideas</emph>, unfolded in +the remainder of the Introduction, +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 97-100, 118-132, +143; <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. +122-125; <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, Dial. vii. 5-7; +<hi rend='italic'>Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics</hi>, +sect. 45-48. Also <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, +sect. 323, 335, &c., where he +distinguishes Idea in a higher +meaning from his sensuous ideas. +As mentioned in my Preface, +the third edition of <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, +published in 1752, the year before +Berkeley died, omits the three +sections of the Seventh Dialogue +which repeat the following argument +against abstract ideas.</note>. He who is not a perfect stranger to +the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs +<pb n='240'/><anchor id='Pg240'/> +acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract +ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought +to be the object of those sciences which go by the name +of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes +under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime +learning; in all which one shall scarce find any question +handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence +in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +7. It is agreed on all hands that the <emph>qualities</emph> or <emph>modes</emph> +of things do never really exist each of them apart by +itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as +it were, and blended together, several in the same object. +But, we are told, the mind, being able to consider each +quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with +which it is united, does by that means frame to itself +<emph>abstract ideas</emph>. For example, there is conceived by sight an +object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound +idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent +parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does +frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. +Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without +extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by +abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and +of motion exclusive of both colour and extension. +</p> + +<p> +8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular +extensions perceived by sense there is something common +and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or +that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from +another, it considers apart, or singles out by itself, that +which is common; making thereof a most abstract idea of +extension; which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has +any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded +from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the +particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes +them one from another, and retaining that only +which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract; +which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other +determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering +motion abstractedly, not only from the body moved, but +likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular +directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is +<pb n='241'/><anchor id='Pg241'/> +framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions +whatsoever that may be perceived by sense. +</p> + +<p> +9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of +<emph>qualities</emph> or <emph>modes</emph>, so does it, by the same precision, or +mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded +<emph>beings</emph> which include several coexistent qualities. +For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, +and John resemble each other in certain common agreements +of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the +complex or compound idea it has of Peter, James, and any +other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, +retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an +abstract idea, wherein all the particulars equally partake; +abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances +and differences which might determine it to any +particular existence. And after this manner it is said we +come by the abstract idea of <emph>man</emph>, or, if you please, humanity, +or human nature; wherein it is true there is included +colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but +then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular +colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein +all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, +but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet +middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. +And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety +of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of +the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts +which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which +are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of +<emph>animal</emph>; which abstracts not only from all particular men, +but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent +parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, +sense, and spontaneous motion. By <emph>body</emph> is meant body +without any particular shape or figure, there being no one +shape or figure common to all animals; without covering, +either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: +hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing +properties of particular animals, and for that reason +left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account, the +spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, +nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that +motion is it is not easy to conceive. +</p> + +<pb n='242'/><anchor id='Pg242'/> + +<p> +10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of +abstracting their ideas, they best can tell<note place='foot'>As in Derodon's <hi rend='italic'>Logica</hi>, Pt. II. +c. 6, 7; <hi rend='italic'>Philosophia Contracta</hi>, I. i. §§ +7-11; and Gassendi, <hi rend='italic'>Leg. Instit.</hi>, +I. 8; also Cudworth, <hi rend='italic'>Eternal and +Immutable Morality</hi>, Bk. IV.</note>. For myself, [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>I +dare be confident I have it not.] I find indeed I have +a faculty of imagining or representing to myself, the ideas +of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously +compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man +with two heads; or the upper parts of a man joined to the +body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the +nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of +the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine<note place='foot'>We must remember that what +Berkeley intends by an <emph>idea</emph> is either +a percept of sense, or a sensuous +imagination; and his argument +is that none of <emph>these</emph> can be +an abstraction. We can neither +perceive nor imagine what is not +concrete and part of a succession.</note>, it +must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise +the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of +a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, +a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any +effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. +And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract +idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which +is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and +the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas +whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in +one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or +qualities separated from others, with which, though they +are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really +exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from +one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which +it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can +frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the +manner aforesaid—which last are the two proper acceptations +of <emph>abstraction</emph>. And there is ground to think most +men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The +generality of men which are simple and illiterate never +pretend to abstract notions<note place='foot'><q>abstract notions</q>—here used +convertibly with <q>abstract ideas.</q> +Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 89 and 142, on +the special meaning of <emph>notion</emph>.</note>. It is said they are difficult, +and not to be attained without pains and study. We may +<pb n='243'/><anchor id='Pg243'/> +therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they +are confined only to the learned. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence +of the doctrine of abstraction<note place='foot'>Supposed by Berkeley to mean, +that we can imagine, in abstraction +from all phenomena presented in +concrete experience, e.g. imagine +<emph>existence</emph>, in abstraction from all +phenomena in which it manifests itself +to us; or <emph>matter</emph>, stripped of all +the phenomena in which it is +realised in sense.</note>, and try if I can discover +what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace +an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to +be. There has been a late [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>excellent and] deservedly +esteemed philosopher<note place='foot'>Locke.</note> who, no doubt, has given it very +much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract +general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of +understanding betwixt man and beast. <q>The having of +general ideas,</q> saith he, <q>is that which puts a perfect distinction +betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which +the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For +it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making +use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we +have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of +abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no +use of words, or any other general signs.</q> And a little +after:—<q>Therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in +this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man: +and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly +separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. +For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines +(as some would have them<note place='foot'>Descartes, who regarded brutes +as (sentient?) machines.</note>), we cannot deny them to have +some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, +some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that they +have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they +receive them from their senses. They are the best of them +tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I +think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.</q>—<hi rend='italic'>Essay +on Human Understanding</hi>, B. II. ch. 11. § 10 and +11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties +of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But +then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort +<pb n='244'/><anchor id='Pg244'/> +of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men +must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is +here assigned, why we have no grounds to think brutes +have abstract general ideas, is, that we observe in them no +use of words, or any other general signs; which is built on +this supposition, to wit, that the making use of words implies +having general ideas. From which it follows that men who +use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas. +That this is the sense and arguing of the author will +further appear by his answering the question he in another +place puts: <q>Since all things that exist are only particulars, +how come we by general terms?</q> His answer is: <q>Words +become general by being made the signs of general ideas.</q>—<hi rend='italic'>Essay +on Human Understanding</hi>, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But +it seems that a word<note place='foot'><q>To this I cannot assent, being +of opinion that a word,</q> &c.—in +first edition.</note> becomes general by being made the +sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular +ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the +mind. For example, when it is said <q>the change of motion +is proportional to the impressed force,</q> or that <q>whatever +has extension is divisible,</q> these propositions are to be +understood of motion and extension in general; and +nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my +thoughts an <emph>idea</emph><note place='foot'><q>an idea,</q> i.e. a concrete mental +picture.</note> of motion without a body moved, or any +determinate direction and velocity; or that I must conceive +an <emph>abstract general idea</emph> of extension, which is neither line, +surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, +nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only +implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether +it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, +or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds +equally true. As does the other of every particular extension; +it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether +of this or that magnitude or figure<note place='foot'>So that <q>generality</q> in an idea +is our <q>consideration</q> of a particular +idea (e.g. a <q>particular motion</q> +or a <q>particular extension</q>) not <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per +se</foreign>, but under general relations, +which that particular idea exemplifies, +and which, as he shews, +may be signified by a corresponding +word. All ideas (in Berkeley's +confined meaning of <q>idea</q>) are +particular. We rise above particular +ideas by an intellectual apprehension +of their relations; not by +forming <emph>abstract pictures</emph>, which are +contradictory absurdities.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='245'/><anchor id='Pg245'/> + +<p> +12. By observing how ideas become general, we may +the better judge how words are made so. And here it is +to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are <emph>general +ideas</emph>, but only that there are any <emph>abstract general ideas</emph>. For, +in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention +of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed +by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and +9<note place='foot'>Locke is surely misconceived. +He does not say, as Berkeley seems +to suppose, that in forming <q>abstract +ideas,</q> we are forming abstract +mental images—pictures in +the mind that are not individual +pictures.</note>. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and +speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall +acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is +particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or +stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort<note place='foot'>Does Locke intend more than +this, although he expresses his +meaning in ambiguous words?</note>. To +make this plain by an example. Suppose a geometrician +is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal +parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in +length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless +<emph>with regard to its signification</emph> general; since, as it +is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; +so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all +lines, or, in other words, of a line in general<note place='foot'>It is a particular idea, but considered +relatively—a <emph>significant</emph> +particular idea, in other words. +We realise our notions in examples, +and these must be concrete.</note>. And, as +<emph>that particular line</emph> becomes general by being made a sign, +so the <emph>name</emph> line, which taken absolutely is particular, by +being a sign, is made general. And as the former owes its +generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or +general line, but of all particular right lines that may +possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its +generality from the same cause, namely, the various particular +lines which it indifferently denotes. +</p> + +<p> +13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature +of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary +to, I shall add one more passage out of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on +Human Understanding</hi>, which is as follows:—<q>Abstract +ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet +unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to +grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use +<pb n='246'/><anchor id='Pg246'/> +they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon +them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and +contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, +and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to +imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and +skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet +none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); +for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither +equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of +these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that +cannot exist; an idea<note place='foot'>i.e. <q>ideas</q> in Locke's meaning +of idea, under which he comprehends, +not only the particular +ideas of sense and imagination—Berkeley's +<q>ideas</q>—but these considered +relatively, and so seen +intellectually, when Locke calls +them abstract, general, or universal. +Omniscience in its all-comprehensive +intuition may not +require, or even admit, such general +ideas.</note> wherein some parts of several +different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is +true the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such +ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the +conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; +to both which it is naturally very much inclined. +But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of +our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that +the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the +mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such +as its earliest knowledge is conversant about.</q>—B. iv. ch. 7. +§ 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such +an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to +pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. +All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly +inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And +this, methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. +What more easy than for any one to look a little into his +own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain +to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description +that is here given of the general idea of a triangle—which +is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor +scalenon, but all and none of these at once? +</p> + +<p> +14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas +carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the +forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is +<pb n='247'/><anchor id='Pg247'/> +need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate +our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to +those sublime speculations that are conversant about +abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence +should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming +abstract ideas was not necessary for <emph>communication</emph>, which +is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are +told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is +only because by constant and familiar use they are made +so. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are +employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing +themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It +cannot be when they are grown up; for then it seems they +are not conscious of any such painstaking. It remains +therefore to be the business of their childhood. And +surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract +notions<note place='foot'>Here and in what follows, +<q>abstract <emph>notion</emph>,</q> <q>universal <emph>notion</emph>,</q> +instead of abstract <emph>idea</emph>. Notion +seems to be here a synonym for +idea, and not taken in the special +meaning which he afterwards +attached to the term, when he contrasted +it with idea.</note> will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is +it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children +cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and +the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked +together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their +minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every +common name they make use of? +</p> + +<p> +15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the +<emph>enlargement of knowledge</emph> than for communication. It is, I +know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and +demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully +agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions +are formed by abstraction in the manner premised—<emph>universality</emph>, +so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the +absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in +the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented +by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or +notions<note place='foot'><q>notions,</q> again synonymous +with ideas, which are all particular +or concrete, in his meaning of <emph>idea</emph>, +when he uses it strictly.</note>, being in their own nature <emph>particular</emph>, are <emph>rendered +universal</emph>. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition +concerning triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the +<pb n='248'/><anchor id='Pg248'/> +universal idea of a triangle: which ought not to be +understood as if I could frame an <emph>idea</emph><note place='foot'><emph>idea</emph>, i.e. individual mental picture.</note> of a triangle which +was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but +only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this +or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent +all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that +sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to +include any difficulty in it<note place='foot'>In all this he takes no account +of the intellectual relations necessarily +embodied in concrete knowledge, +and without which experience +could not cohere.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any +proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we +have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of +a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, because +a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one +particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally +belongs to any other triangle which in all respects is not +the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that +the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are +equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this +affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a +right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, +to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must +either make a particular demonstration for every particular +triangle, which is impossible; or once for all demonstrate +it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the +particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are +all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the +idea I have in view<note place='foot'><q>have in view,</q> i.e. actually +realise in imagination.</note> whilst I make the demonstration be, +for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose +sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be +certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what +sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right +angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides +are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the +diagram I have in view includes all these particulars; but +then there is not the least mention made of <emph>them</emph> in the +proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are +equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right +<pb n='249'/><anchor id='Pg249'/> +angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the +same length. Which sufficiently shews that the right angle +might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all +that the demonstration have held good. And for this +reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular +or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular +right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because +I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a +triangle. [<note place='foot'>What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the second or +1734 edition.</note>And here it must be acknowledged that a man +may <emph>consider</emph> a figure merely as triangular; without +attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations +of the sides. <emph>So far he may abstract.</emph> But this will +never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, +inconsistent <emph>idea</emph> of a triangle. In like manner we may +consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as +animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea, +either of man or of animal; inasmuch as all that is +perceived is not considered.] +</p> + +<p> +17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to +trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, +through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error +and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and +notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings +and controversies, and what a learned dust have been +raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has +been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this +day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it +had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined +to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. +When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts +that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation +and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding +all this the far greater part of them remain full of darkness +and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have +an end; and even those that are thought to be supported +by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in +them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the +understandings of men; and that, taking all together, +a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit +to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion +<pb n='250'/><anchor id='Pg250'/> +and amusement<note place='foot'>So Bacon in many passages of +his <hi rend='italic'>De Augmentis Scientiarium</hi> and +<hi rend='italic'>Novum Organum</hi>.</note>—I say, the consideration of all this is apt +to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of +all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the +false Principles that have obtained in the world; amongst +all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide +influence<note place='foot'><q>wide influence,</q>—<q>wide and +extended sway</q>—in first edition.</note> over the thoughts of speculative men than this +of <emph>abstract general ideas</emph>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +18. I come now to consider the <emph>source</emph> of this prevailing +notion, and that seems to me to be <emph>language</emph>. And surely +nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been +the source of an opinion so universally received. The +truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from +the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract +ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to +naming; from which it is clear consequence that if there +had been no such thing as speech or universal signs, +there never had been any thought of abstraction. See +B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and elsewhere of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Human +Understanding</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +Let us examine the manner wherein Words have contributed +to the origin of that mistake.—First then, it is +thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only +precise and settled signification; which inclines men to think +there are certain abstract determinate ideas that constitute +the true and only immediate signification of each general +name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas +that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. +Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise +and definite signification annexed to any general name, +they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular +ideas. All which does evidently follow from what has +been already said, and will clearly appear to any one by a +little reflexion. To this it will be objected that every name +that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain +signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be <q>a +plain surface comprehended by three right lines</q>; by which +that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no +other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not +<pb n='251'/><anchor id='Pg251'/> +said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, +nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, +nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in +all which there may be great variety, and consequently +there is no one settled idea which limits the signification +of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name +constantly to the same <emph>definition</emph>, and another to make it +stand everywhere for the same <emph>idea</emph><note place='foot'><q>idea,</q> i.e. individual datum +of sense or of imagination.</note>: the one is necessary, +the other useless and impracticable. +</p> + +<p> +19. But, to give a farther account how words came to +produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed +that it is a received opinion that language has no other end +but the communicating ideas, and that every significant +name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal +certain that names which yet are not thought altogether +insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable +ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract +notions. That there are many names in use amongst speculative +men which do not always suggest to others determinate, +particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what +nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that +it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that +significant names which stand for ideas should, every time +they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they +are made to stand for: in reading and discoursing, names +being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in +which, though a particular quantity be marked by each +letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every +step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular +quantity it was appointed to stand for<note place='foot'>See Leibniz on Symbolical +Knowledge (<hi rend='italic'>Opera Philosophica</hi>, +pp. 79, 80, Erdmann), and Stewart +in his <hi rend='italic'>Elements</hi>, vol. I. ch. 4, § 1, +on our habit of using language +without realising, in individual +examples or ideas, the meanings of +the common terms used.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words +is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly +supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some +passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the +putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which +the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes +entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without +<pb n='252'/><anchor id='Pg252'/> +it, as I think doth<note place='foot'><q>doth</q>—<q>does,</q> here and elsewhere +in first edition.</note> not unfrequently happen in the +familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect +with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in +hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, +love, hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise +immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain +words, without any ideas<note place='foot'><q>ideas,</q> i.e. representations in +imagination of <emph>any</emph> of the individual +objects to which the names +are applicable. The sound or +sight of a verbal sign may do duty +for the concrete idea in which +the notion signified by the word +might be exemplified.</note> coming between. At first, +indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were +fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it +will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, +the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft +immediately attended with those passions which at first +were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas +that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be +affected with the promise of a <emph>good thing</emph>, though we have +not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened +with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think +not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame +to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one +shall join ever so little reflection of his own to what has +been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that +general names are often used in the propriety of language +without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas in +his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of +the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem +always spoken with a design to bring into our view the +ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked +by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me +<q>Aristotle hath said it,</q> all I conceive he means by it is to +dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and +submission which custom has annexed to that name. And +this effect may be so instantly produced in the minds of +those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to +authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea +either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before. +[<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the +second edition.</note>So close and immediate a connexion may custom establish +<pb n='253'/><anchor id='Pg253'/> +betwixt the very word Aristotle<note place='foot'>Elsewhere he mentions Aristotle +as <q>certainly a great admirer +and promoter of the doctrine of +abstraction,</q> and quotes his statement +that there is hardly anything +so incomprehensible to men as +notions of the utmost universality; +for they are the most remote from +sense. <hi rend='italic'>Metaph.</hi>, Bk. I. ch. 2.</note> and the motions of assent +and reverence in the minds of some men.] Innumerable +examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist +on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt +not, plentifully suggest unto him? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract +Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them +by their ablest patrons; and endeavoured to shew they are +of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary. +And lastly, we have traced them to the source +from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be +Language. +</p> + +<p> +It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, +in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which +has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive +men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view +and made the possession of one single person. But [<note place='foot'>Added in second edition.</note>at the +same time it must be owned that] most parts of knowledge +have been [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>so] strangely perplexed and darkened by the +abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they +are delivered, [that it may almost be made a question +whether language has contributed more to the hindrance +or advancement of the sciences<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>]. Since therefore words +are so apt to impose on the understanding, [I am resolved +in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I +can<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>:] whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take +them bare and naked into my view; keeping out of my +thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long +and constant use hath so strictly united with them. From +which I may expect to derive the following advantages:— +</p> + +<p> +22. <emph>First</emph>, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies +purely verbal, the springing up of which weeds in almost all +the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of +true and sound knowledge. <emph>Secondly</emph>, this seems to be a +sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net +<pb n='254'/><anchor id='Pg254'/> +of abstract ideas, which has so miserably perplexed and +entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar +circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious +was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he +likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. <emph>Thirdly</emph>, so +long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas<note place='foot'><q>my own ideas,</q> i.e. the concrete +phenomena which I can +realise as perceptions of sense, +or in imagination.</note>, divested +of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The +objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot +be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have +not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own +ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the +agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, +to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and +what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive +perception of what passes in my own understanding. +</p> + +<p> +23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose +an entire deliverance from the deception of words; +which I dare hardly promise myself, so difficult a thing it is +to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so +long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty +seems to have been very much increased by the +doctrine of <emph>abstraction</emph>. For, so long as men thought +<emph>abstract</emph> ideas were annexed to their words, it does not +seem strange that they should use words for ideas; it being +found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain +the <emph>abstract</emph> idea in the mind; which in itself was perfectly +inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why +those who have so emphatically recommended to others the +laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating +their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it +themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the +absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out +of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, +they advise well<note place='foot'>He probably refers to Locke.</note>, that we attend to the ideas signified, and +draw off our attention from the words which signify them<note place='foot'>According to Locke, <q>that +which has most contributed to +hinder the due tracing of our ideas, +and finding out their relations, and +agreements or disagreements one +with another, has been, I suppose, +the ill use of words. It is impossible +that men should ever +truly seek, or certainly discover, +the agreement or disagreement of +ideas themselves, whilst their +thoughts flutter about, or stick +only in sounds of doubtful and +uncertain significations. Mathematicians, +abstracting their thoughts +from names, and accustoming +themselves to set before their +minds the ideas themselves that +they would consider, and not +sounds instead of them, have +avoided thereby a great part of +that perplexity, puddering, and +confusion which has so much +hindered men's progress in other +parts of knowledge.</q> <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. IV. +ch. 3, § 30. See also Bk. III. ch. +10, 11.</note>. +<pb n='255'/><anchor id='Pg255'/> +But, how good soever this advice may be they have given +others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it +themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use +of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification +of every general name was a determinate abstract +idea. +</p> + +<p> +24. But these being known to be mistakes, a man may +with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. +He that knows he has no other than <emph>particular</emph> ideas, will +not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the +<emph>abstract</emph> idea annexed to any name. And he that knows +names do not always stand for ideas<note place='foot'>General names involve in their +signification intellectual relations +among ideas or phenomena; but the +relations, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, are unimaginable.</note> will spare himself the +labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. +It were, therefore, to be wished that every one would use +his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he +would consider; separating from them all that dress and +incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind +the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we +extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails +of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned +men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need +only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree +of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach +of our hand. +</p> + +<p> +25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of +Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of Words, we +may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; +we may draw consequences from consequences, and be +never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose +ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled +in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore +designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he +<pb n='256'/><anchor id='Pg256'/> +would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and +endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading +that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy +for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He +will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words. +And I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering +his own naked, undisguised ideas<note place='foot'><p>The rough draft of the Introduction, +prepared two years before +the publication of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +(see Appendix, vol. III), should +be compared with the published +version. He there tells that <q>there +was a time when, being bantered +and abused by words,</q> he <q>did +not in the least doubt</q> that he +was <q>able to abstract his ideas</q>; +adding that <q>after a strict survey +of my abilities, I not only discovered +my own deficiency on +this point, but also cannot conceive +it possible that such a power +should be even in the most perfect +and exalted understanding.</q> What +he thus pronounces <q>impossible,</q> is +a <emph>sensuous</emph> perception or imagination +of an intellectual relation, as to +which most thinkers would agree +with him. But in so arguing, he +seems apt to discard the intellectual +relations themselves that are necessarily +embodied in experience. +</p> +<p> +David Hume refers thus to Berkeley's +doctrine about <q>abstract +ideas</q>:—<q>A great philosopher has +asserted that all general ideas are +nothing but particular ones annexed +to a certain term, which gives them +a more extensive signification. I +look upon this to be one of the +greatest and most valuable discoveries +that has been made of +late years in the republic of letters.</q> +(<hi rend='italic'>Treatise of H. N.</hi> Pt. I, sect. 7.)</p></note>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='257'/><anchor id='Pg257'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Part First</head> + +<p> +1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the +<emph>objects of human knowledge</emph>, that they are either <emph>ideas</emph> +actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are +perceived by attending to the passions and operations of +the mind; or lastly, <emph>ideas</emph> formed by help of memory and +imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing +those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. +By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their +several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard +and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance; and of all +these more and less either as to quantity or degree. +Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; +and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety +of tone and composition<note place='foot'>This resembles Locke's account +of the ideas with which human +knowledge is concerned. They +are all originally presented to the +senses, or got by reflexion upon +the passions and acts of the mind; +and the materials contributed +in this external and internal experience +are, with the help of +memory and imagination, elaborated +by the human understanding +in ways innumerable, true and false. +See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II, ch. 1, +§§ 1-5; ch. 10, 11, 12.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='258'/><anchor id='Pg258'/> + +<p> +And as several of these are observed to accompany each +other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be +reputed as one <emph>thing</emph>. Thus, for example, a certain colour, +taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed +to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified +by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a +stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things; which +as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of +love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth<note place='foot'>The ideas or phenomena of +which we are percipient in our +five senses make their appearance, +not isolated, but in individual +masses, constituting the things, that +occupy their respective places in +perceived ambient space. It is as +<emph>qualities</emph> of <emph>things</emph> that the ideas +or phenomena of sense arise in +human experience.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or +objects of knowledge, there is likewise Something which +knows or perceives them; and exercises divers operations, +as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This +perceiving, active being is what I call <emph>mind</emph>, <emph>spirit</emph>, <emph>soul</emph>, +or <emph>myself</emph>. By which words I do not denote any one of my +ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein +they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are +perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being +perceived<note place='foot'>This is an advance upon the +language of the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace Book</hi>, +in which <q>mind</q> is spoken of as only +a <q>congeries of perceptions.</q> Here +it is something <q>entirely distinct</q> +from ideas or perceptions, in which +they exist and are perceived, and +on which they ultimately depend. +Spirit, intelligent and active, presupposed +with its implicates in +ideas, thus becomes the basis of +Berkeley's philosophy. Is this +subjective idealism only? Locke +appears in sect. 1, Descartes, if not +Kant by anticipation, in sect. 2.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas +formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is +what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less +evident that the various sensations, or ideas imprinted on +the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, +whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise +than in a mind perceiving them<note place='foot'>This sentence expresses Berkeley's +New Principle, which filled +his thoughts in the <hi rend='italic'>Commonplace +Book</hi>. Note <q>in <emph>a</emph> mind,</q> not +necessarily in <emph>my</emph> mind.</note>. I think an intuitive +knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall +attend to what is meant by the term <emph>exist</emph> when applied to +<pb n='259'/><anchor id='Pg259'/> +sensible things<note place='foot'>That is to say, one has only to +put concrete meaning into the terms +<emph>existence</emph> and <emph>reality</emph>, in order to have +<q>an intuitive knowledge</q> that matter +depends for its real existence +on percipient spirit.</note>. The table I write on I say exists; that +is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should +say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study +I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does +perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; +there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, +and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I +can understand by these and the like expressions<note place='foot'>In other words, the things of +sense become real, only in the concrete +experience of living mind, +which gives them the only reality +we can conceive or have any sort +of concern with. Extinguish Spirit +and the material world necessarily +ceases to be real.</note>. For +as to what is said of the <emph>absolute</emph> existence of unthinking +things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is +to me perfectly unintelligible. Their <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign> is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipi</foreign>; nor is +it possible they should have any existence out of the minds +or thinking things which perceive them<note place='foot'>That <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign> is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipi</foreign> is Berkeley's +initial Principle, called <q>intuitive</q> +or self-evident.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst +men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all +sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real<note place='foot'>Mark that it is the <q>natural or +real existence</q> of the material world, +in the absence of all realising Spirit, +that Berkeley insists is impossible—meaningless.</note>, +distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. +But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever +this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever +shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I +mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. +For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we +perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our +own<note place='foot'><q>our own</q>—yet not exclusively +<emph>mine</emph>. They depend for their reality +upon <emph>a</emph> percipient, not on <emph>my</emph> perception.</note> ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant +that any one of these, or any combination of them, should +exist unperceived? +</p> + +<p> +5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet<note place='foot'><q>this tenet,</q> i.e. that the concrete +material world could still be a +reality after the annihilation of all +realising spiritual life in the universe—divine +or other.</note> it will, perhaps, +<pb n='260'/><anchor id='Pg260'/> +be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of <emph>abstract +ideas</emph>. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than +to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their +being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived<note place='foot'><q>existing unperceived,</q> i.e. existing +without being realised in any +living percipient experience—existing +in a totally abstract existence, +whatever that can mean.</note>? +Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and +figures—in a word the things we see and feel—what are +they but so many sensations, notions<note place='foot'><q>notions</q>—a term elsewhere +(see sect. 27, 89, 142) restricted, +is here applied to the immediate +data of the senses—the ideas of +sense.</note>, ideas, or impressions +on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in +thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I +might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, +divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, +those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense +so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body +without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without +thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can +abstract; if that may properly be called <emph>abstraction</emph> which +extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as +it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived +asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not +extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. +Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel +anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is +it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any +sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception +of it. [<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the +second edition.</note>In truth, the object and the sensation are the +same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each +other.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the +mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. +Such I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir +of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those +bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, +have not any subsistence without a mind; that their <emph>being</emph> is +to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they +are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my +mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must either +<pb n='261'/><anchor id='Pg261'/> +have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of +some Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and +involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to +any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. +[<note place='foot'>In the first edition, instead of +this sentence, we have the following: +<q>To make this appear with +all the light and evidence of an +Axiom, it seems sufficient if I can +but awaken the reflexion of the +reader, that he may take an impartial +view of his own meaning, +and turn his thoughts upon the +subject itself; free and disengaged +from all embarras of words and +prepossession in favour of received +mistakes.</q></note>To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, +and try to separate in his own thoughts the <emph>being</emph> of +a sensible thing from its <emph>being perceived</emph>.] +</p> + +<p> +7. From what has been said it is evident there is not +any other Substance than <emph>Spirit</emph>, or that which perceives<note place='foot'>In other words, active percipient +Spirit is at the root of all +intelligible trustworthy experience.</note>. +But, for the fuller proof<note place='foot'>'proof'—<q>demonstration</q> in +first edition; yet he calls it <q>intuitive.</q></note> of this point, let it be considered +the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, +and such like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense. Now, +for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest +contradiction; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive: +that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities +exist must perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be +no unthinking substance or <emph>substratum</emph> of those ideas. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves<note place='foot'><q>the ideas themselves,</q> i.e. the +phenomena immediately presented +in sense, and that are thus realised +in and through the percipient experience +of living mind, as their +factor.</note> do not +exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, +whereof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist +without the mind, in an unthinking substance<note place='foot'>As those say who assume that +perception is ultimately only representative +of the material reality, +the very things themselves not +making their appearance to us +at all.</note>. I answer, +an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure +can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we +look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it +impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only +between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed +<emph>originals</emph>, or external things, of which our ideas are the +pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or +<pb n='262'/><anchor id='Pg262'/> +no? If they are, then <emph>they</emph> are ideas, and we have gained +our point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one +whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something +which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is +intangible; and so of the rest. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt +<emph>primary</emph> and <emph>secondary</emph> qualities<note place='foot'>He refers especially to Locke, +whose account of Matter is accordingly +charged with being incoherent.</note>. By the former they +mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, +and number; by the latter they denote all other +sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. +The ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to +be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, +or unperceived; but they will have our ideas of the +<emph>primary qualities</emph> to be patterns or images of things which +exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance +which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to +understand an inert<note place='foot'><q>inert.</q> See the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>.</note>, senseless substance, in which extension, +figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is +evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension, +figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind<note place='foot'><q>ideas existing in the mind,</q> i.e. +phenomena of which <emph>some</emph> mind is +percipient; which are realised in +the sentient experience of a living +spirit, human or other.</note>, +and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea; and +that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can +exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that +the very notion of what is called <emph>Matter</emph> or <emph>corporeal +substance</emph>, involves a contradiction in it. [<note place='foot'>What follows to the end of the +section is omitted in the second +edition.</note>Insomuch that +I should not think it necessary to spend more time in +exposing its absurdity. But, because the tenet of the existence +of Matter<note place='foot'><q>the existence of Matter,</q> i.e. +the existence of the material world, +regarded as a something that does +not need to be perceived in order +to be real.</note> seems to have taken so deep a root in +the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill +consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and +tedious than omit anything that might conduce to the full +discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.] +</p> + +<p> +10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of +<pb n='263'/><anchor id='Pg263'/> +the primary or original qualities<note place='foot'>Sometimes called <emph>objective</emph> qualities, +because they are supposed +to be realised in an abstract objectivity, +which Berkeley insists is +meaningless.</note> do exist without the +mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time +acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike +secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us are sensations, +existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are +occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the +minute particles of matter<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II, ch. 8, +§§ 13, 18; ch. 23, § 11; Bk. IV, +ch. 3, § 24-26. Locke suggests +this relation between the secondary +and the primary qualities of matter +only hypothetically.</note>. This they take for an undoubted +truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all +exception. Now, if it be certain that those <emph>original</emph> +qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible +qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted +from them, it plainly follows that <emph>they</emph> exist only in the +mind. But I desire any one to reflect, and try whether he +can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension +and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. +For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power +to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but +I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality, +which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, +extension, figure and motion, abstracted from all other +qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other +sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the +mind and nowhere else<note place='foot'><q>in the mind, and nowhere +else,</q> i.e. perceived or conceived, +but in no other manner can they +be real or concrete.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +11. Again, <emph>great</emph> and <emph>small</emph>, <emph>swift</emph> and <emph>slow</emph>, are allowed +to exist nowhere without the mind<note place='foot'><q>without the mind,</q> i.e. independently +of all percipient experience.</note>; being entirely relative, +and changing as the frame or position of the organs of +sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without +the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither +swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. But, say +you, they are extension in general, and motion in general. +Thus we see how much the tenet of extended moveable +substances existing without the mind depends on that +strange doctrine of <emph>abstract ideas</emph>. And here I cannot but +remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description +<pb n='264'/><anchor id='Pg264'/> +of Matter, or corporeal substance, which the modern +philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles +that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>materia +prima</foreign>, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. +Without extension solidity cannot be conceived: since +therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an +unthinking substance, the same must also be true of +solidity<note place='foot'>Extension is thus the distinguishing +characteristic of the +material world. Geometrical and +physical solidity, as well as motion, +imply extension.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +12. That <emph>number</emph> is entirely the creature of the mind<note place='foot'><q>number is the creature of the +mind,</q> i.e. is dependent on being +realised in percipient experience. +This dependence is here illustrated +by the relation of concrete number +to the point of view of each +mind; as the dependence of the +other primary qualities was illustrated +by their dependence on the +organisation of the percipient. In +this, the preceding, and the following +sections, Berkeley argues the +inconsistency of the abstract reality +attributed to the primary qualities +with their acknowledged dependence +on the necessary conditions +of sense perception.</note>, +even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, +will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing +bears a different denomination of number as the mind +views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension +is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind +considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. +Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's +understanding, that it is strange to think how any one +should give it an absolute existence without the mind. +We say one book, one page, one line, &c.; all these are +equally units, though some contain several of the others. +And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some +particular combination of ideas <emph>arbitrarily</emph> put together by +the mind<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. +109.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +13. Unity I know some<note place='foot'>e.g. Locke, <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II, ch. 7, +§ 7; ch. 16, § 1.</note> will have to be a simple or +uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the +mind. That I have any such idea answering the word +<emph>unity</emph> I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not +miss finding it; on the contrary, it should be the most +familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany +all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of +<pb n='265'/><anchor id='Pg265'/> +sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an <emph>abstract +idea</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as +modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to +have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same +thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities +whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and +cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns +of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which +excite them; for that the same body which appears cold to +one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not +as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns +or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter; because +to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different +texture at the same station, they appear various, and +cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and +determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that +sweetness is not really in the sapid thing; because the +thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into +bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is +it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the +mind; since if the succession of ideas in the mind become +swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower, +without any alteration in any external object<note place='foot'><q>without any alteration in any +external object</q>—<q>without any external +alteration</q>—in first edition.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +15. In short, let any one consider those arguments +which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and +tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may +with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of +extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed +this method of arguing does not so much prove that +there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as +that we do not know by sense which is the true extension +or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing<note place='foot'>These arguments, founded on +the mind-dependent nature of <emph>all</emph> +the qualities of matter, are expanded +in the <hi rend='italic'>First Dialogue between Hylas +and Philonous</hi>.</note> +plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension +at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist +in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth that +there should be any such thing as an outward object<note place='foot'><q>an outward object,</q> i.e. an object +wholly abstract from living Mind.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='266'/><anchor id='Pg266'/> + +<p> +16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. It +is said extension is a <emph>mode</emph> or <emph>accident</emph> of Matter, and that +Matter is the <emph>substratum</emph> that supports it. Now I desire +that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's +<emph>supporting</emph> extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter; +and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have +no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must +at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you +know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know +what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by +its supporting them. It is evident <emph>support</emph> cannot here be +taken in its usual or literal sense, as when we say that +pillars support a building. In what sense therefore must +it be taken? [<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the +second edition.</note> For my part, I am not able to discover any +sense at all that can be applicable to it.] +</p> + +<p> +17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers +declare themselves to mean by <emph>material substance</emph>, +we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning +annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in +general, together with the relative notion of its supporting +accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the +most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as +for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now +observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of +those words: it must therefore be taken in some other +sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when +I consider the two parts or branches which make the +signification of the words <emph>material substance</emph>, I am convinced +there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. +But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in +discussing this material <emph>substratum</emph> or support of figure and +motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose +they have an existence without the mind? And is not this +a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? +</p> + +<p> +18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, +moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding +to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it +possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by +Sense or by Reason<note place='foot'><q>reason,</q> i.e. reasoning. It is +argued, in this and the next section, +that a reality unrealised in percipient +experience cannot be proved, +either by our senses or by reasoning.</note>. As for our senses, by them we +<pb n='267'/><anchor id='Pg267'/> +have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or +those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call +them what you will: but they do not inform us that things +exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which +are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.—It +remains therefore that if we have any knowledge +at all of external things, it must be by reason inferring +their existence from what is immediately perceived by +sense. But (<note place='foot'>Omitted in the second edition, +and the sentence converted into +a question.</note>I do not see) what reason can induce us to +believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what +we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves +do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt +them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and +what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it +beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected +with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed +without resembling them<note place='foot'>But the ideas of which we are +cognizant in waking dreams, and +dreams of sleep, differ in important +characteristics from the external +ideas of which we are percipient +in sense. Cf. sect. 29-33.</note>. Hence it is evident the supposition +of external bodies<note place='foot'><q>external bodies,</q> i.e. bodies +supposed to be real independently +of all percipients in the universe.</note> is not necessary for the producing +our ideas; since it is granted they are produced +sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in +the same order we see them in at present, without their +concurrence. +</p> + +<p> +19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations +without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier +to conceive and explain the manner of their production, +by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than +otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are +such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. +But neither can this be said. For, though we give the +materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession +are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are +produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend +in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is +possible it should imprint any idea in the mind<note place='foot'>i.e. they cannot shew how +their unintelligible hypothesis of +Matter accounts for the experience +we have, or expect to have; or +which we believe other persons +have, or to be about to have.</note>. Hence +<pb n='268'/><anchor id='Pg268'/> +it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our +minds<note place='foot'><q>the production,</q> &c., i.e. the +fact that we and others have percipient +experience.</note>, can be no reason why we should suppose Matter +or corporeal substances<note place='foot'>Mind-dependent Matter he not +only allows to exist, but maintains +its reality to be intuitively evident.</note>; since that is acknowledged to +remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. +If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist +without the mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be +a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without +any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings +that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +20. In short, if there were external bodies<note place='foot'>i.e. bodies existing in abstraction +from living percipient spirit.</note>, it is impossible +we should ever come to know it; and if there +were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there +were that we have now. Suppose—what no one can deny +possible—an intelligence, without the help of external +bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or +ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with +like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence +hath not all the reason to believe the existence of +Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting +them in his mind, that you can possibly have for +believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question. +Which one consideration were enough to make any +reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments +he may think himself to have, for the existence of +bodies without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against +the existence of Matter<note place='foot'><q>Matter,</q> i.e. abstract Matter, +unrealised in sentient intelligence.</note>, after what has been said, I could +instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to +mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It +has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in +philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. +But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, +as well because I think arguments <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> are unnecessary +for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, +<pb n='269'/><anchor id='Pg269'/> +sufficiently demonstrated <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, as because I shall hereafter +find occasion to speak somewhat of them. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly +prolix in handling this subject. For, to what +purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated +with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that +is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into +your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive +it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to +exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial<note place='foot'>The appeal here and elsewhere +is to consciousness—directly in +each person's experience, and indirectly +in that of others.</note> may +perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a +downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to +put the whole upon this issue:—If you can but conceive it +possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general +for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise +than in a mind perceiving it<note place='foot'>i.e. otherwise than in the form +of an idea or actual appearance +presented to our senses.</note>, I shall readily give up +the cause. And, as for all that compages of external +bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, +though you cannot either give me any reason why you +believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed +to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being +true shall pass for an argument that it is so. +</p> + +<p> +23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for +me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing +in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, +you may so, there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, +I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain +ideas which you call <emph>books</emph> and <emph>trees</emph>, and at the same time +omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive +them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them +all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: +it only shews you have the power of imagining, or forming +ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can +conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist +without the mind<note place='foot'>This implies that the material +world may be realised in imagination +as well as in sensuous perception, +but in a less degree of +reality; for reality, he assumes, +admits of degrees.</note>. To make out this, it is necessary that +<pb n='270'/><anchor id='Pg270'/> +you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of; +which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost +to conceive the existence of external bodies<note place='foot'><q>to conceive the existence of +external bodies,</q> i.e. to conceive +bodies that are not conceived—that +are not ideas at all, but which +exist in abstraction. To suppose +what we conceive to be unconceived, +is to suppose a contradiction.</note>, we are all the +while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, +taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and +does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the +mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or +exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one +the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it +unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence +of <emph>material substance</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +24. [<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the +second edition.</note>Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with +words, we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in +this point.] It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into +our own thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to +understand what is meant by the <emph>absolute existence of sensible +objects in themselves</emph>, or <emph>without the mind</emph><note place='foot'><q>The existence of things without +mind,</q> or in the absence of all +spiritual life and perception, is what +Berkeley argues against, as <emph>meaningless</emph>, +if not <emph>contradictory</emph>; not the +existence of a material world, +when this means the realised order +of nature, regulated independently +of individual will, and to which our +actions must conform if we are to +avoid physical pain.</note>. To me it is +evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, +or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I +know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would +calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention +the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions +does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. +It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that +the <emph>absolute existence of unthinking things</emph> are words without +a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This +is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend +to the attentive thoughts of the reader. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +25. All our ideas, sensations, notions<note place='foot'>Here again <emph>notion</emph> is undistinguished +from <emph>idea</emph>.</note>, or the things which +we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, +are visibly inactive: there is nothing of power or agency +<pb n='271'/><anchor id='Pg271'/> +included in them. So that one idea or object of thought +cannot produce or make any alteration in another<note place='foot'>This and the three following +sections argue for the essential +impotence of matter, and that, as far +as we are concerned, so-called +<q>natural causes</q> are only <emph>signs</emph> +which foretell the appearance of +their so-called effects. The material +world is presented to our senses as +a procession of orderly, and therefore +interpretable, yet in themselves +powerless, ideas or phenomena: +motion is always an effect, never +an originating active cause.</note>. To be +satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite +but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and +every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that +there is nothing in them but what is perceived; but whoever +shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not +perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, +no such thing contained in them. A little attention will +discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness +and inertness in it; insomuch that it is impossible +for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the +cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or +pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. +Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion +cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, +that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, +number, motion, and size of corpuscles<note place='foot'>As Locke suggests.</note>, must +certainly be false. +</p> + +<p> +26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some +are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. +There is therefore <emph>some</emph> cause of these ideas, whereon they +depend, and which produces and changes them<note place='foot'>This tacitly presupposes the +necessity in reason of the Principle +of Causality, or the ultimate need +for an efficient cause of every +change. To determine the sort of +Causation that constitutes and pervades +the universe is the aim of +his philosophy.</note>. That this +cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of <emph>ideas</emph>, +is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be +a <emph>substance</emph>; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal +or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause +of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit<note place='foot'>In other words, the material +world is not only real in and +through percipient spirit, but the +changing forms which its phenomena +assume, in the natural evolution, +are the issue of the perpetual +activity of in-dwelling Spirit. The +argument in this section requires +a deeper criticism of its premisses.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='272'/><anchor id='Pg272'/> + +<p> +27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided active being—as it +perceives ideas it is called the <emph>understanding</emph>, and as it produces +or otherwise operates about them it is called the <emph>will</emph>. +Hence there can be no <emph>idea</emph> formed of a soul or spirit; for +all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid. sect. 25), +they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, +that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any +one, that to have an idea which shall be <emph>like</emph> that active Principle +of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. +Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it +cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which +it produceth<note place='foot'>In other words, an agent cannot, +as such, be perceived or imagined, +though its effects can. The +spiritual term <emph>agent</emph> is not meaningless; +yet we have no <emph>sensuous +idea</emph> of its meaning.</note>. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what +is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame +the idea of any power or active being; and whether he has +ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names <emph>will</emph> +and <emph>understanding</emph>, distinct from each other, as well as from a +third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative +notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid +powers—which is signified by the name <emph>soul</emph> or <emph>spirit</emph>. +This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words +<emph>will</emph>, [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note><emph>understanding</emph>, <emph>mind</emph>,] <emph>soul</emph>, <emph>spirit</emph>, do not stand for +different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something +which is very different from ideas, and which, being +an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea +whatsoever. [<note place='foot'>This sentence is not contained +in the first edition. It is remarkable +for first introducing the term +<emph>notion</emph>, to signify <emph>idealess meaning</emph>, +as in the words soul, active power, +&c. Here he says that <q>the operations +of the mind</q> belong to +notions, while, in sect. 1, he speaks +of <q><emph>ideas</emph> perceived by attending to +the <q>operations</q> of the mind.</q></note>Though it must be owned at the same time +that we have some <emph>notion</emph> of soul, spirit, and the operations +of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating—inasmuch +as we know or understand the meaning of these words.] +</p> + +<p> +28. I find I can excite ideas<note place='foot'><q>ideas,</q> i.e. fancies of imagination; +as distinguished from the +more real ideas or phenomena that +present themselves objectively to +our senses.</note> in my mind at pleasure, +and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no +more than <emph>willing</emph>, and straightway this or that idea arises +in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and +<pb n='273'/><anchor id='Pg273'/> +makes way for another. This making and unmaking of +ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. +Thus much is certain and grounded on experience: but +when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas +exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with +words<note place='foot'>With Berkeley the world of +external ideas is distinguished +from Spirit by its essential passivity. +Active power is with him +the essence of Mind, distinguishing +me from the changing ideas of +which I am percipient. We must +not attribute free agency to phenomena +presented to our senses.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +29. But, whatever power I may have over my own +thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have +not a like dependence on <emph>my</emph> will. When in broad daylight +I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose +whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular +objects shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise +as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted +on them are not creatures of <emph>my</emph> will<note place='foot'>In this and the four following +sections, Berkeley mentions <emph>marks</emph> +by which the ideas or phenomena +that present themselves to the +senses may be distinguished from +all other ideas, in consequence of +which they may be termed <q>external,</q> +while those of feeling and +imagination are wholly subjective +or individual.</note>. There is therefore +some other Will or Spirit that produces them. +</p> + +<p> +30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct +than those of the Imagination<note place='foot'>This mark—the superior +strength and liveliness of the +ideas or phenomena that are presented +to the senses—was afterwards +noted by Hume. See +<hi rend='italic'>Inquiry concerning Human Understanding</hi>, +sect. II.</note>; they have likewise a +steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at +random, as those which are the effects of human wills often +are, but in a regular train or series—the admirable connexion +whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence +of its Author. Now the set rules, or established +methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us +the ideas of Sense, are called <emph>the laws of nature</emph>; and +these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such +and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, +in the ordinary course of things. +</p> + +<p> +31. This gives us a sort of foresight, which enables us to +regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without +this we should be eternally at a loss: we could not know +<pb n='274'/><anchor id='Pg274'/> +how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, +or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, +sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time +is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general +that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means +are conducive—all this we know, not by discovering any +<emph>necessary connexion</emph> between our ideas, but only by the +observation of the <emph>settled laws</emph> of nature; without which +we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a +grown man no more know how to manage himself in the +affairs of life than an infant just born<note place='foot'>Berkeley here and always insists +on the <emph>arbitrary</emph> character of +<q>settled laws</q> of change in the +world, as contrasted with <q>necessary +connexions</q> discovered in +mathematics. The material world +is thus virtually an interpretable +natural language, constituted in +what, at our point of view, is +<emph>arbitrariness</emph> or <emph>contingency</emph>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so +evidently displays the Goodness and Wisdom of that Governing +Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, +is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather +sends them wandering after second causes<note place='foot'>Under this conception of the +universe, <q>second causes</q> are +<emph>divinely established signs</emph> of impending +changes, and are only +metaphorically called <q>causes.</q></note>. For, when we +perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other +ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith +attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and +make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be +more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having +observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round +luminous figure, we at the same time perceive by touch the +idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude +the sun to be the <emph>cause</emph> of heat. And in like manner +perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended +with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the <emph>effect</emph> of +the former<note place='foot'>So Schiller, in <hi rend='italic'>Don Carlos</hi>, +Act III, where he represents sceptics +as failing to see the God who +veils Himself in everlasting laws. +But in truth God is eternal law +or order vitalised and moralised.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of +nature are called <emph>real things</emph>: and those excited in the +imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are +more properly termed <emph>ideas</emph> or <emph>images of</emph> things, which +<pb n='275'/><anchor id='Pg275'/> +they copy and represent. But then our <emph>sensations</emph>, be +they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas<note place='foot'><q><emph>sensations</emph>,</q> with Berkeley, are +not mere feelings, but in a sense +external appearances.</note>: +that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as +truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense +are allowed to have more reality<note place='foot'><q><emph>more</emph> reality.</q> This implies +that reality admits of degrees, and +that the difference between the +phenomena presented to the senses +and those which are only imagined +is a difference in degree of reality.</note> in them, that is, to be +more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures +of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist +without the mind. They are also less dependent on the +spirit or thinking substance which perceives them, in that +they are excited by the will of another and more powerful +Spirit; yet still they are <emph>ideas</emph>: and certainly no idea, +whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind +perceiving it<note place='foot'>In the preceding sections, two +relations should be carefully distinguished—that +of the material +world to percipient mind, in +which it becomes <emph>real</emph>; and that +between changes in the world +and spiritual agency. These are +Berkeley's two leading Principles. +The first conducts to and vindicates +the second—inadequately, however, +apart from explication of their +root in moral reason. The former +gives a relation <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sui generis</foreign>. The +latter gives our only example of +active causality—the natural order +of phenomena being the outcome of +the causal energy of intending Will.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we +spend some time in answering Objections<note place='foot'>Sect. 34-84 contain Berkeley's +answers to supposed <emph>objections</emph> to +the foregoing Principles concerning +Matter and Spirit in their +mutual relations.</note> which may +probably be made against the Principles we have hitherto +laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those +of quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since +all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature; +and I am willing to be understood by every one. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>First</emph>, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing +principles all that is real and substantial in nature is +banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical +scheme of <emph>ideas</emph> takes place. All things that exist exist +only in the mind; that is, they are purely notional. What +therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What +must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; +nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many +<pb n='276'/><anchor id='Pg276'/> +chimeras and illusions on the fancy?—To all which, and +whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, +that by the Principles premised we are not deprived of any +one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any +wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and +is as real as ever. There is a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>rerum natura</foreign>, and the distinction +between realities and chimeras retains its full force. +This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have +shewn what is meant by <emph>real things</emph>, in opposition to <emph>chimeras</emph> +or <emph>ideas of our own framing</emph>; but then they both equally +exist in the mind, and in that sense<note place='foot'>To be an <q>idea</q> is, with Berkeley, +to be the imaginable object of +a percipient spirit. But he does +not define precisely the relation +of ideas to mind. <q>Existence +in mind</q> is existence <emph>in this +relation</emph>. His question (which he +determines in the negative) is, +the possibility of concrete phenomena, +naturally presented to sense, +<emph>yet out of all relation to living +mind</emph>.</note> are alike <emph>ideas</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing +that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That +the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do +exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only +thing whose existence we deny is that which <emph>philosophers</emph> +call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this +there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I +dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want +the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and +the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great +handle for trifling and disputation. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>But that is all the +harm that I can see done.] +</p> + +<p> +36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence +or reality of things, he is very far from understanding +what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could +think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:—There +are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, +which will or excite ideas<note place='foot'>i.e. of imagination. Cf. sect. +28-30.</note> in themselves at pleasure; but +these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others +they perceive by sense: which, being impressed upon them +according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves +the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than +human spirits<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 29.</note>. These latter are said to have <emph>more reality</emph><note place='foot'><q>more reality.</q> This again implies +that reality admits of degrees. +What is perceived in sense is +more real than what is imagined, +and eternal realities are more +deeply real than the transitory +things of sense.</note> +<pb n='277'/><anchor id='Pg277'/> +in them than the former;—by which is meant that they are +more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not +fictions of the mind perceiving them<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 33. <q>Not fictions,</q> +i.e. they are presentative, and +therefore cannot misrepresent.</note>. And in this sense the +sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I +imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense +here given of <emph>reality</emph>, it is evident that every vegetable, star, +mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, +is as much a <emph>real being</emph> by our principles as by any other. +Whether others mean anything by the term <emph>reality</emph> different +from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own +thoughts and see. +</p> + +<p> +37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, +that we take away all <emph>corporeal substances</emph>. To this my answer +is, that if the word <emph>substance</emph> be taken in the vulgar sense, +for a <emph>combination</emph> of sensible qualities, such as extension, +solidity, weight, and the like—this we cannot be accused of +taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense, for +the support of accidents or qualities without the mind—then +indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may +be said to take away that which never had any existence, +not even in the imagination<note place='foot'>With Berkeley <emph>substance</emph> is +either (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) active reason, i.e. spirit—substance +proper, or (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) an aggregate +of sense-phenomena, called a +<q>sensible thing</q>—substance conventionally +and superficially.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we +eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge +it does so—the word <emph>idea</emph> not being used in common +discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible +qualities which are called <emph>things</emph>; and it is certain that any +expression which varies from the familiar use of language +will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern +the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more +than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we +perceive immediately by our senses<note place='foot'>And which, because realised +in living perception, are called +<emph>ideas</emph>—to remind us that reality is +attained in and through percipient +mind.</note>. The hardness or softness, +the colour, taste, warmth, figure, and suchlike qualities, +which combined together<note place='foot'><q>combined together,</q> i.e. in the +form of <q>sensible things,</q> according +to natural laws. Cf. sect. 33.</note> constitute the several sorts of +<pb n='278'/><anchor id='Pg278'/> +victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind +that perceives them: and this is all that is meant by calling +them <emph>ideas</emph>; which word, if it was as ordinarily used as +<emph>thing</emph>, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. +I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of +the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we +eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of +sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, +I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable +to custom that they should be called <emph>things</emph> rather than +<emph>ideas</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word <emph>idea</emph>, +and do not rather in compliance with custom call them +<emph>things</emph>; I answer, I do it for two reasons:—First, because +the term <emph>thing</emph>, in contradistinction to <emph>idea</emph>, is generally +supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind: +Secondly, because <emph>thing</emph> hath a more comprehensive signification +than <emph>idea</emph>, including spirits, or thinking things<note place='foot'><q>thinking things</q>—more appropriately +called <emph>persons</emph>.</note>, as +well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist +only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, +I chose to mark them by the word <emph>idea</emph>; which implies +those properties<note place='foot'>Berkeley uses the word idea +to mark the fact, that sensible +things are real only as they +manifest themselves in the form +of passive objects, presented to +sense-percipient mind; but he +does not, as popularly supposed, +regard <q>sensible things</q> as created +and regulated by the activity of his +own individual mind. They are +perceived, but are neither created +nor regulated, by the individual +percipient, and are thus <emph>practically +external</emph> to each person.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt +to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer +any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the +certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense +as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. +That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is +perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own +being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be +alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is <emph>not</emph> +perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn +sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give +them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there +<pb n='279'/><anchor id='Pg279'/> +any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we +have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 87-91, against the +scepticism which originates in alleged +fallacy of sense.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +41. <emph>Secondly</emph>, it will be objected that there is a great difference +betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, +betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually +being so. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>If you suspect it to be only the idea of +fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you +will be convinced with a witness.] This and the like +may be urged in opposition to our tenets.—To all which +the answer is evident from what hath been already said<note place='foot'>It is always to be remembered +that with Berkeley ideas or phenomena +presented to sense are +<emph>themselves</emph> the real things, whilst +ideas of imagination are representative +(or misrepresentative).</note>; +and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very +different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that +it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, +and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can +possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, +any more than its idea<note place='foot'>Here feelings of pleasure or +pain are spoken of, without qualification, +as in like relation to living +mind as sensible things or ideas are.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +42. <emph>Thirdly</emph>, it will be objected that we see things actually +without or at a distance from us, and which consequently +do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things +which are seen at the distance of several miles should be +as near to us as our own thoughts<note place='foot'>That the ideas of sense should +be seen <q>at a distance of several +miles</q> seems not inconsistent with +their being dependent on a percipient, +if ambient space is <emph>itself</emph> (as +Berkeley asserts) dependent on +percipient experience. Cf. sect. 67.</note>.—In answer to this, I +desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive +things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for +all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence +only in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be +worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance, +and things placed at a distance, by sight. For, that we +should in truth <emph>see</emph> external space, and bodies actually existing +in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry +<pb n='280'/><anchor id='Pg280'/> +with it some opposition to what hath been said of their +existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of +this difficulty it was that gave birth to my <hi rend='italic'>Essay towards a +New Theory of Vision</hi>, which was published not long since<note place='foot'>In the preceding year.</note>. +Wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither +immediately of itself perceived by sight<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, sect. 2.</note>, nor yet apprehended +or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath +a necessary connexion with it<note place='foot'>Ibid. sect. 11-15.</note>; but that it is only suggested +to our thoughts by certain visible ideas, and sensations +attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner +of similitude or relation either with distance or things +placed at a distance<note place='foot'>Ibid. sect. 16-28.</note>; but, by a connexion taught us by +experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, +after the same manner that words of any language suggest +the ideas they are made to stand for<note place='foot'>Ibid. sect. 51.</note>. Insomuch that +a man born blind, and afterwards made to see, would not, +at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his +mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the +forementioned treatise. +</p> + +<p> +44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely +distinct and heterogeneous<note place='foot'>Ibid. sect. 47-49, 121-141.</note>. The former are marks +and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of +sight neither exist without the mind, nor are the images +of external things, was shewn even in that treatise<note place='foot'>Ibid. sect. 43.</note>. +Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed +true of <emph>tangible objects</emph>;—not that to suppose that vulgar error +was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, +but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute +it, in a discourse concerning <emph>Vision</emph>. So that in strict truth +the ideas of sight<note place='foot'>i.e. what we are <emph>immediately</emph> +percipient of in seeing.</note>, when we apprehend by them distance, +and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark +out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only +admonish us what ideas of touch<note place='foot'>Touch is here and elsewhere +taken in its wide meaning, and includes +our muscular and locomotive +experience, all which Berkeley included +in the <q>tactual</q> meaning of +distance.</note> will be imprinted in our +minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence +of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident, from +<pb n='281'/><anchor id='Pg281'/> +what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, +and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning +Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the +Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what +tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case +we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for +a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +45. <emph>Fourthly</emph>, it will be objected that from the foregoing +principles it follows things are every moment annihilated +and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when +they are perceived: the trees therefore are in the garden, +or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there +is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my +eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, +and barely upon opening them it is again created<note place='foot'>To explain the condition of +sensible things <emph>during the intervals +of our perception of them</emph>, consistently +with the belief of all sane persons +regarding the material world, is +a challenge which has been often +addressed to the advocates of ideal +Realism. According to Berkeley, +there are no intervals in the existence +of sensible things. They are +permanently perceivable, under +the laws of nature, though not +always perceived by this, that +or the other individual percipient. +Moreover they always exist <emph>really</emph> +in the Divine Idea, and <emph>potentially</emph>, +in relation to finite minds, in the +Divine Will.</note>.—In +answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been +said in sect. 3, 4, &c.; and desire he will consider whether +he means anything by the actual existence of an idea +distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after +the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover +that anything else is meant by those words; and +I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, +and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If +he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their +archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give +up the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it +is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he +knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity, +the not assenting to those propositions which at +bottom have no meaning in them<note place='foot'>Berkeley allows to bodies unperceived +by me potential, but (for +me) not real existence. When I say +a body exists thus conditionally, +I mean that if, in the light, I open +my eyes, I shall see it, and that +if I move my hand, I must feel it.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='282'/><anchor id='Pg282'/> + +<p> +46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received +principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with +those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd +that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects +around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is +not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when +they agree on all hands that light and colours, which +alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are +mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? +Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible +that things should be every moment creating; yet +this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For +the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence +of Matter<note place='foot'>i.e. unperceived material substance.</note>, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed +out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist +without the divine conservation; which by them is +expounded to be a continual creation<note place='foot'>Berkeley remarks, in a letter to +the American Samuel Johnson, that +<q>those who have contended for a +material world have yet acknowledged +that <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>natura naturans</foreign> (to +use the language of the Schoolmen) +is God; and that the Divine conservation +of things is equipollent +to, and in fact the same thing with, +a continued repeated creation;—in +a word, that conservation and +creation differ only as the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>terminus +a quo</foreign>. These are the common +opinions of Schoolmen; and Durandus, +who held the world to be +a machine, like a clock made up +and put in motion by God, but +afterwards continued to go of itself, +was therein particular, and had few +followers. The very poets teach +a doctrine not unlike the Schools—<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>mens +agitat molem</foreign> (Virgil, Æneid, +VI). The Stoics and Platonists +are everywhere full of the same +notion. I am not therefore singular +in this point itself, so much as in +my way of proving it.</q> Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, +Dial. IV. sect. 14; <hi rend='italic'>Vindication +of New Theory of Vision</hi>, +sect. 8, 17, &c.; <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>passim</hi>, +but especially in the latter part. +See also <hi rend='italic'>Correspondence between +Clarke and Leibniz</hi> (1717). Is it +not possible that the universe of +things and persons is in continuous +natural creation, unbeginning and +unending?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that, +though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal +substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the principles +which are now generally admitted, that the particular +bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst +they are not perceived. For, it is evident, from sect. 11 +and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers +contend for is an incomprehensible Somewhat, which hath +<pb n='283'/><anchor id='Pg283'/> +none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies +falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. +But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked +that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally +allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable +philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate +it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an +infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which +are not perceived by sense<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 123-132.</note>. The reason therefore that +any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, +or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not +because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an +infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute +enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the +sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater +number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears +greater; and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities +which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound +it in very different lines and angles from those perceived +by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes +of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely +acute, the body shall seem infinite. During all which +there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. +Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely +extended, and consequently void of all shape and figure. +From which it follows that, though we should grant the +existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal +as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own +principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular +bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, +exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle +thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless; and +it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which +compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist +longer than it is perceived. +</p> + +<p> +48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed +in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on +the Principles we have premised, so as in truth to make +any objection at all against our notions. For, though we +hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but +<pb n='284'/><anchor id='Pg284'/> +ideas which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not +hence conclude they have no existence except only while +they are perceived by <emph>us</emph>; since there may be some other +spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever +bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, +I would not be understood to mean this or that particular +mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore +follow from the foregoing Principles that bodies are annihilated +and created every moment, or exist not at all during +the intervals between <emph>our</emph> perception of them. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +49. <emph>Fifthly</emph>, it may perhaps be objected that if extension +and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind +is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or +attribute which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of +the subject in which it exists.—I answer, those qualities +are in the mind only as they are perceived by it;—that is, not +by way of <emph>mode</emph> or <emph>attribute</emph>, but only by way of <emph>idea</emph><note place='foot'>He distinguishes <q>idea</q> from +<q>mode or attribute.</q> With Berkeley, +the <q>substance</q> of <emph>matter</emph> (if the +term is still to be applied to sensible +things) is the naturally constituted +aggregate of phenomena of which +each particular thing consists. +Now extension, and the other +qualities of sensible things, are +not, Berkeley argues, <q>in mind</q> +either (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) according to the abstract +relation of substance and attribute +of which philosophers speak; +nor (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) as one idea or phenomenon +is related to another idea or +phenomenon, in the natural aggregation +of sense-phenomena which +constitute, with him, the <emph>substance</emph> +of a <emph>material</emph> thing. Mind and its +<q>ideas</q> are, on the contrary, related +as percipient to perceived—in whatever +<q>otherness</q> that altogether +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sui generis</foreign> relation implies.</note>. +And it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, +because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is +red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged +to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what +philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very +groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this +proposition <q>a die is hard, extended, and square,</q> they +will have it that the word <emph>die</emph> denotes a subject or substance, +distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure +which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This +I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing +distinct from those things which are termed its modes +or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and +<pb n='285'/><anchor id='Pg285'/> +square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject +distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication +of the meaning of the word <emph>die</emph>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +50. <emph>Sixthly</emph>, you will say there have been a great many +things explained by matter and motion; take away these +and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and +undermine those mechanical principles which have been +applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. +In short, whatever advances have been made, +either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of +nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal +substance or Matter doth really exist.—To this I answer +that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that +supposition which may not as well be explained without it, +as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars. +To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew +why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with +such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on +a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher +will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there +can be no use of Matter<note place='foot'><q>Matter,</q> i.e. abstract material +Substance, as distinguished from +the concrete things that are realised +in living perceptions.</note> in natural philosophy. Besides, +they who attempt to account for things do it, not by +corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other +qualities; which are in truth no more than mere ideas, +and therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath +been already shewn. See sect. 25. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +51. <emph>Seventhly</emph>, it will upon this be demanded whether it +does not seem absurd to take away natural causes<note place='foot'><q>take away natural causes,</q> i.e. +empty the material world of all +originative power, and refer the +supposed powers of bodies to the +constant and omnipresent agency +of God.</note>, and +ascribe everything to the immediate operation of spirits? +We must no longer say upon these principles that fire +heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth. +Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should +talk after this manner?—I answer, he would so: in such +things we ought to think with the learned and speak with the +vulgar. They who to demonstration are convinced of the +<pb n='286'/><anchor id='Pg286'/> +truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say <q>the +sun rises,</q> <q>the sun sets,</q> or <q>comes to the meridian</q>; +and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it +would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little +reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that +the common use of language would receive no manner +of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our +tenets<note place='foot'>Some philosophers have treated +the relation of Matter to Mind in +<emph>perception</emph> as one of cause and effect. +This, according to Berkeley, is an +illegitimate analysis, which creates +a fictitious duality. On his New +Principles, philosophy is based on +a recognition of the fact, that perception +is neither the cause nor +the effect of its object, but in +a relation to it that is altogether +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sui generis</foreign>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be +retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or +dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for +our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken +in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, +since, propriety being regulated by custom, language +is suited to the received opinions, which are not always +the truest. Hence it is impossible—even in the most +rigid, philosophic reasonings—so far to alter the bent +and genius of the tongue we speak as never to give +a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. +But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect +the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of +a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes +of speech which use has made inevitable. +</p> + +<p> +53. As to the opinion that there are no corporeal +causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some +of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the +modern philosophers; who though they allow Matter to +exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate +efficient cause of all things<note place='foot'>He refers to Descartes, and +perhaps Geulinx and Malebranche, +who, while they argued for material +<emph>substance</emph>, denied the <emph>causal efficiency</emph> +of sensible things. Berkeley's +new Principles are presented +as the foundation in reason +for this denial, and for the essential +spirituality of all active power +in the universe.</note>. These men saw that +amongst all the objects of sense there was none which +had any power or activity included in it; and that by +consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies +<pb n='287'/><anchor id='Pg287'/> +they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the +immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should +suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, +which they acknowledge are not capable of producing +any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made +to no manner of purpose, since God might have done +everything as well without them—this I say, though we +should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable +and extravagant supposition<note place='foot'>On the principle, <q>Entia non +sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.</q></note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +54. In the <emph>eighth</emph> place, the universal concurrent assent +of mankind may be thought by some an invincible +argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external +things<note place='foot'><q>external things,</q> i.e. things +in the abstract.</note>. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? +And if so, what cause can be assigned of so +widespread and predominant an error?—I answer, first, +that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found +so many as is imagined do really believe the existence +of Matter or things without the mind<note place='foot'>That the unreflecting part of +mankind should have a confused +conception of what should be +meant by the <emph>external reality</emph> of +matter is not wonderful. It is +the office of philosophy to improve +their conception, making it deeper +and truer, and this was Berkeley's +preliminary task; as a mean for +shewing the impotence of the things +of sense, and conclusive evidence +of omnipresent spiritual activity.</note>. Strictly speaking, +to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no +meaning in it<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24.</note>, is impossible; and whether the foregoing +expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial +examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men +may be said to believe that Matter exists; that is, they +act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which +affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to +them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that +they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by +those words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, +is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only +instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining +they believe those propositions which they have +often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in +them. +</p> + +<pb n='288'/><anchor id='Pg288'/> + +<p> +55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be +never so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this +is but a weak argument of its truth to whoever considers +what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are +everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by +the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. +There was a time when the antipodes and motion +of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities +even by men of learning: and if it be considered what +a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, +we shall find that at this day those notions have gained +but a very inconsiderable footing in the world. +</p> + +<p> +56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this +prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. To +this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several +ideas, whereof they themselves were, not the authors<note place='foot'>i.e. their <emph>sense-ideas</emph>.—Though +sense-ideas, i.e. the appearances +presented to the senses, are independent +of the <emph>will</emph> of the individual +percipient, it does not follow that +they are independent of <emph>all perception</emph>, +so that they can be real in the +absence of realising percipient experience. +Cf. sect. 29-33.</note>, +as not being excited from within, nor depending on the +operation of their wills, this made them maintain <emph>those</emph> +ideas or objects of perception, had an existence independent +of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that +a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers +having plainly seen that the immediate objects +of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some +degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar<note place='foot'>By shewing that what we are +percipient of in sense must be <emph>idea</emph>, +or that it is immediately known +by us only as sensuous appearance.</note>; but at the +same time run into another, which seems no less absurd, +to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without +the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being +perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, +imprinted by those objects on the mind<note place='foot'>i.e. <q>imprinted</q> by unperceived +Matter, which, on this +dogma of a representative sense-perception, +was assumed to exist +behind the perceived ideas, and to +be the <emph>cause</emph> of their appearance. +Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Third Dialogue between Hylas +and Philonous</hi>.</note>. And +this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same +cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that +<emph>they</emph> were not the authors of their own sensations; which +<pb n='289'/><anchor id='Pg289'/> +they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and +which therefore must have <emph>some</emph> cause, distinct from the +minds on which they are imprinted. +</p> + +<p> +57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense +to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not +rather have recourse to <emph>Spirit</emph>, which alone can act, may +be accounted for. First, because they were not aware +of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things +like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to +them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme +Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not +marked out and limited to our view by any particular +finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are +by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And +thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. +Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, +men are ready to own the presence of a Superior Agent. +But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course, +they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order and +concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest +wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator, is yet so +constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them +the immediate effects of a <emph>Free Spirit</emph>; especially since +inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an +imperfection, is looked on as a mark of <emph>freedom</emph><note place='foot'>Hence the difficulty men have +in recognising that Divine Reason +and Will, and Law in Nature, are +coincident. But the advance of scientific +discovery of the laws which +express Divine Will in nature, +instead of narrowing, extends our +knowledge of God. And <emph>divine</emph> or +<emph>absolutely reasonable</emph> <q>arbitrariness</q> +is not caprice.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +58. <emph>Tenthly</emph>, it will be objected that the notions we +advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in +philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion +of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers +as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing +reasons. But, on the foregoing Principles, there can be +no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it +follows that if it be not perceived it exists not: but the +motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.—I answer, +That tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree +with the Principles we have premised: for, the question +<pb n='290'/><anchor id='Pg290'/> +whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no +more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, +from what has been observed by astronomers, +that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, +and such or such a position and distance both from the +earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move +among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects +like one of them: and this, by the established rules of +nature, which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably +collected from the phenomena. +</p> + +<p> +59. We may, from the experience we have had of the +train and succession of ideas<note place='foot'><q>ideas,</q> i.e. ideas of <emph>sense</emph>. This +<q>experience</q> implied an association +of sensuous ideas, according to the +divine or reasonable order of nature.</note> in our minds, often make, +I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded +predictions concerning the ideas we shall be +affected with pursuant to a great train of actions; and +be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would +have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances +very different from those we are in at present. +Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may +preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what +hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever +objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude +of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy +or nature. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +60. In the <emph>eleventh</emph> place, it will be demanded to what +purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and +the animal mechanism in the parts of animals. Might +not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, +and animals perform all their motions, as well without +as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly +contrived and put together;—which, being ideas, have +nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any +<emph>necessary</emph> connexion with the effects ascribed to them? +If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect +by a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>fiat</foreign>, or act of his will<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 25-33, and other passages +in Berkeley's writings in +which he insists upon the <emph>arbitrariness</emph>—divine +or reasonable—of +the natural laws and sense-symbolism.</note>, we must think all that is fine +and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, +<pb n='291'/><anchor id='Pg291'/> +to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist +hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement +of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he +knew would produce the motions he designed; yet he +must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an +Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the +hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do +it, without <emph>his</emph> being at the pains of making the movements +and putting them together? Why does not an empty +case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass, +that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, +there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the +movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is +right again? The like may be said of all the Clockwork +of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and +subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. +In short, it will be asked, how, upon our Principles, any +tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned +of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, +framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common +philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, +and serve to explain abundance of phenomena? +</p> + +<p> +61. To all which I answer, first, that though there +were some difficulties relating to the administration of +Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several +parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing +Principles, yet this objection could be of small weight +against the truth and certainty of those things which +may be proved <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, with the utmost evidence and +rigour of demonstration<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 3, 4, 6, 22-24, 26, in +which he proceeds upon the intuitive +certainty of his two leading +Principles, concerning <emph>Reality</emph> and +<emph>Causation</emph>.</note>. Secondly, but neither are the +received principles free from the like difficulties; for, +it may still be demanded to what end God should take +those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments +and machines, which no one can deny might have +been effected by the mere command of His will, without +all that <emph>apparatus</emph>. Nay, if we narrowly consider it, we +shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force +on those who hold the existence of those machines without +the mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, +<pb n='292'/><anchor id='Pg292'/> +figure, motion, and the like have no <emph>activity</emph> or <emph>efficacy</emph> +in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect +in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes +them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when +they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; +since the only use that is assigned to them, as they +exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable +effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but +Spirit. +</p> + +<p> +62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed +that though the fabrication of all those parts and +organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any +effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a +constant regular way, according to the laws of nature. +There are certain general laws that run through the +whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the +observation and study of nature, and are by men applied, +as well to the framing artificial things for the use and +ornament of life as to the explaining the various phenomena. +Which explication consists only in shewing the +conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general +laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering +the <emph>uniformity</emph> there is in the production of natural +effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to +the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to +account for appearances. That there is a great and +conspicuous <emph>use</emph> in these regular constant methods of +working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn +in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular +size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, +though not absolutely to the producing any effect, +yet to the producing it according to the standing +mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot +be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains +and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He +were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions +on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made +the movements and put them in it. But yet, if He will act +agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends +established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary +that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby <emph>he</emph> makes +the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the +<pb n='293'/><anchor id='Pg293'/> +production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any +disorder in them be attended with the perception of some +corresponding disorder in the movements, which being +once corrected all is right again<note place='foot'>In short, what is virtually the +language of universal natural order +is the divine way of revealing +omnipresent Intelligence; nor can +we conceive how this revelation +could be made through a capricious +or chaotic succession of changes.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary +that the Author of nature display His overruling power +in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series +of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of +nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an +acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but then they are +to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason +why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems +to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes +by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony +and contrivance in their make, and are such plain +indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, +rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by +anomalous and surprising events<note place='foot'>He here touches on moral +purpose in miraculous phenomena, +but without discussing their relation +to the divine, or perfectly +reasonable, order of the universe. +Relatively to a fine knowledge +of nature, they seem anomalous—exceptions +from general rules, +which nevertheless express, immediately +and constantly, perfect +active Reason.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall +observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts +in reality to no more than this:—<emph>ideas</emph><note place='foot'><q>ideas,</q> i.e. the phenomena +presented to the senses.</note> are not anyhow +and at random produced, there being a certain order +and connexion between them, like to that of cause and +effect: there are also several combinations of them, made +in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like +so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being +hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation +in producing those appearances which are seen on the +theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to +the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea +cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that +connexion? And since those instruments, being barely +<emph>inefficacious</emph> perceptions in the mind, are not subservient +<pb n='294'/><anchor id='Pg294'/> +to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why +they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be +assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection +into His works, behold so great variety of ideas, +so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; +it not being [<note place='foot'><q>imaginable</q>—in first edition.</note> credible] that He would be at the expense +(if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no +purpose? +</p> + +<p> +65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion +of ideas<note place='foot'><q>the connexion of ideas,</q> i.e. +the presence of law or reasonable +uniformity in the coexistence and +succession of the phenomena of +sense; which makes them interpretable +signs.</note> does not imply the relation of <emph>cause</emph> and <emph>effect</emph>, +but only of a mark or <emph>sign</emph> with the <emph>thing signified</emph>. The +fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon +my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of +it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect +of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, +but the sign thereof<note place='foot'>According to Berkeley, it is +by an abuse of language that the +term <q>power</q> is applied to those +ideas which are invariable antecedents +of other ideas—the prior +forms of their existence, as it were.</note>. Secondly, the reason why ideas +are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular +combinations, is the same with that for combining letters +into words. That a few original ideas may be made +to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is +necessary they be variously combined together. And to +the end their use be permanent and universal, these +combinations must be made by <emph>rule</emph>, and with <emph>wise contrivance</emph>. +By this means abundance of information is +conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect +from such and such actions, and what methods are proper +to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas<note place='foot'>Berkeley, in meeting this objection, +thus implies Universal +Natural Symbolism as the essential +character of the sensible world, in +its relation to man.</note>. Which +in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when +it is said<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. IV, ch. 3, +§ 25-28, &c., in which he suggests +that the secondary qualities of +bodies may be the natural issue +of the different relations and modifications +of their primary qualities.</note> that, by discerning the figure, texture, and +mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural +or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses +<pb n='295'/><anchor id='Pg295'/> +and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the +thing. +</p> + +<p> +66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under +the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the +production of effects, are altogether inexplicable and run +us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, +and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, +when they are considered only as marks or signs for +<emph>our</emph> information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring +to understand this Language (if I may so +call it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the +employment of the natural philosopher; and not the +pretending to explain things by <emph>corporeal</emph> causes, which +doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds +of men from that Active Principle, that supreme and +wise Spirit <q>in whom we live, move, and have our being.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +67. In the <emph>twelfth</emph> place, it may perhaps be objected +that—though it be clear from what has been said that +there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, +solid, figured, moveable Substance, existing without the +mind, such as philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any +man shall leave out of his idea of Matter the positive ideas +of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he +means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, +that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which is the +<emph>occasion</emph> of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is +pleased to excite ideas in us—it doth not appear but that +Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist.—In answer +to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to +suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose +accidents without a substance<note place='foot'>With Berkeley, <emph>material substance</emph> +is merely the natural combination +of sense-presented phenomena, +which, under a <emph>divine</emph> or +<emph>reasonable</emph> <q>arbitrariness,</q> constitute +a concrete thing. Divine Will, or +Active Reason, is the constantly +sustaining cause of this combination +or substantiation.</note>. But secondly, +though we should grant this unknown substance may +possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That +it exists not in the mind<note place='foot'>i.e. that it is not realised in +a living percipient experience.</note> is agreed; and that it exists not +in place is no less certain, since all place or extension +<pb n='296'/><anchor id='Pg296'/> +exists only in the mind<note place='foot'>For <q>place</q> is realised only as +perceived—percipient experience +being its concrete existence. Living +perception is, with Berkeley, the +condition of the possibility of concrete +locality.</note>, as hath been already proved. It +remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all. +</p> + +<p> +68. Let us examine a little the description that is here +given us of Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is +perceived: for this is all that is meant by saying it is an +inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition +entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative +notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it +must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how +nearly this comes to the description of a <emph>nonentity</emph> I desire +may be considered. But, say you, it is the <emph>unknown +occasion</emph><note place='foot'>So in the Cartesian theory of +occasional causes.</note>, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us +by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything +can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by +sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in +our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor +exists in any place. The words <q>to be present,</q> when +thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and +strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend. +</p> + +<p> +69. Again, let us examine what is meant by <emph>occasion</emph>. +So far as I can gather from the common use of language, +that word signifies either the agent which produces any +effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or +go before it, in the ordinary course of things. But, when +it is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be taken +in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive +and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It +is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible +qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions +in the latter sense; as when the burning my finger is said +to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What +therefore can be meant by calling <emph>matter</emph> an <emph>occasion</emph>? +This term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some +very distant from its received signification. +</p> + +<p> +70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not +perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to +whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds<note place='foot'>So Geulinx and Malebranche.</note>. +<pb n='297'/><anchor id='Pg297'/> +For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be +imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but +reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and +regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, +that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of +Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do +not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately +affect us, as being altogether passive, and unperceivable to +us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they <emph>are</emph> +perceived<note place='foot'>As known in Divine intelligence, +they are accordingly +<emph>Divine Ideas</emph>. And, if this means +that the sensible system is the +expression of Divine Ideas, which +are its ultimate archetype—that the +Ideas of God are symbolised to our +senses, and then interpreted (or +misinterpreted) by human minds, +this allies itself with Platonic +Idealism.</note>, as it were so many occasions to remind Him +when and what ideas to imprint on our minds: that so +things may go on in a constant uniform manner. +</p> + +<p> +71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of +Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning +the existence of a thing distinct from <emph>Spirit</emph> and <emph>idea</emph>, from +perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not +certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the mind of God, +which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to +produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular +method: much after the same manner as a musician is +directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious +train and composition of sound which is called a tune; +though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, +and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of +Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I +can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems +too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in +effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. +that there is no senseless unperceived substance. +</p> + +<p> +72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the +constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the +goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in +our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably +concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that +the being of a Spirit—infinitely wise, good, and powerful—is +abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of +nature<note place='foot'><q>It seems to me,</q> Hume says, +<q>that this theory of the universal +energy and operation of the +Supreme Being is <emph>too bold</emph> ever +to carry conviction with it to a mind +sufficiently apprised of the weakness +of human reason, and the +narrow limits to which it is confined +in all its operations.</q> But is it +not virtually presupposed in the +assumed trustworthiness of our experience +of the universe?</note>. But, as for <emph>inert, senseless Matter</emph>, nothing that +<pb n='298'/><anchor id='Pg298'/> +I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads +to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one +explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or +shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of +probability, that he can have for its existence; or even +make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. +For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, +evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. +It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion +to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to +we have just now seen. +</p> + +<p> +73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives +which induced men to suppose the existence of <emph>material +substance</emph>; that so having observed the gradual ceasing +and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may +proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded +on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, +figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or +accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this +reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking +<emph>substratum</emph> or substance wherein they did exist, since +they could not be conceived to exist by themselves<note place='foot'>Accordingly we are led to ask, +what the deepest support of their +reality must be. Is it found in +living Spirit, i.e. Active Reason, or +in blind Matter?</note>. +Afterwards, in process of time, men<note place='foot'>e.g. Descartes, Malebranche, +Locke, &c.</note> being convinced that +colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary +qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped +this <emph>substratum</emph> or material substance of <emph>those</emph> qualities, +leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike; +which they still conceived to exist without the mind, +and consequently to stand in need of a material support. +But, it having been shewn that none even of these can +possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which +perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any +reason to suppose the being of Matter<note place='foot'>In short, if we mean by Matter, +something unrealised in percipient +experience of sense, what is called +its <emph>reality</emph> is something unintelligible.</note>, nay, that it is +<pb n='299'/><anchor id='Pg299'/> +utterly impossible there should be any such thing;—so +long as that word is taken to denote an <emph>unthinking substratum</emph> +of qualities or accidents, wherein they exist without +the mind<note place='foot'>And if sensible phenomena are +<emph>sufficiently</emph> externalised, when regarded +as regulated by Divine +Reason.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +74. But—though it be allowed by the materialists +themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake +of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, +one might expect the mind should naturally, and without +any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely +grounded thereon: yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply +in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how to part with it, +and are therefore inclined, since the <emph>thing</emph> itself is indefensible, +at least to retain the <emph>name</emph>; which we apply to I +know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of <emph>being</emph>, +or <emph>occasion</emph>, though without any shew of reason, at least +so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or +what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, +notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense +or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence +of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on +the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what +can there be that should make us believe or even suspect +He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our +minds? +</p> + +<p> +75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of +prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man +retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of +reason, for a stupid thoughtless <emph>Somewhat</emph>, by the interposition +whereof it would as it were screen itself from +the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the +affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we +can to secure the belief of Matter; though, when reason +forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the +bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge +ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated +by reason to make out that poor possibility; yet the upshot +of all is—that there are certain <emph>unknown</emph> Ideas in the mind +of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be +meant by <emph>occasion</emph> with regard to God. And this at the +<pb n='300'/><anchor id='Pg300'/> +bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the +name<note place='foot'>Twenty years after the publication +of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, in a letter +to his American friend Johnson, +Berkeley says:—<q>I have no objection +against calling the Ideas in the +mind of God <emph>archetypes</emph> of ours. +But I object against those archetypes +by philosophers supposed to +be real things, and so to have +an absolute rational existence distinct +from their being perceived by +any mind whatsoever; it being the +opinion of all materialists that an +ideal existence in the Divine Mind +is one thing, and the real existence +of material things another.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind +of God, and whether <emph>they</emph> may be called by the name +<emph>Matter</emph>, I shall not dispute<note place='foot'>Berkeley's philosophy is not +inconsistent with Divine Ideas +which receive expression in the +laws of nature, and of which +human science is the imperfect +interpretation. In this view, +assertion of the existence of +Matter is simply an expression +of faith that the phenomenal +universe into which we are born +is a reasonable and interpretable +universe; and that it would be +fully interpreted, if our notions +could be fully harmonised with the +Divine Ideas which it expresses.</note>. But, if you stick to the +notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, +motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most +evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since +it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in, +or be supported by, an unperceiving substance<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 3-24.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no +thoughtless support of extension, and the other qualities or +accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be +some inert, unperceiving substance or <emph>substratum</emph> of some +other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to +a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to +them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no +more doubt of <emph>their</emph> existence than a blind man made to see +does of the existence of light and colours.—I answer, first, +if what you mean by the word <emph>Matter</emph> be only the unknown +support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether +there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us. +And I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about +what we know not <emph>what</emph>, and we know not <emph>why</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only +furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we +should have the same reason against <emph>their</emph> existing in an +unperceiving substance that has been already offered with +<pb n='301'/><anchor id='Pg301'/> +relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like. <emph>Qualities</emph>, +as hath been shewn, are nothing else but <emph>sensations</emph> or +<emph>ideas</emph>, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and +this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with +at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever<note place='foot'>So that superhuman persons, +endowed with a million senses, +would be no nearer this abstract +Matter than man is, with his few +senses.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to +believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign +any use to it, or explain anything by it, or even conceive +what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction +to say that Matter <emph>exists</emph>, and that this Matter is <emph>in general</emph> +a <emph>substance</emph>, or <emph>occasion of ideas</emph>; though indeed to go +about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular +explication of those words may be attended with great +difficulties.—I answer, when words are used without a +meaning, you may put them together as you please, without +danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for +example, that <emph>twice two</emph> is equal to <emph>seven</emph>; so long as you +declare you do not take the words of that proposition in +their usual acceptation, but for marks of you know not +what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an +inert thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the +occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as +much by one proposition as the other. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +80. In the <emph>last</emph> place, you will say, What if we give up +the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that +Matter is an unknown <emph>Somewhat</emph>—neither substance nor +accident, spirit nor idea—inert, thoughtless, indivisible, +immoveable, unextended, existing in no place? For, say +you, whatever may be urged against <emph>substance</emph> or <emph>occasion</emph>, +or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no +place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is +adhered to.—I answer, You may, if so it shall seem good, +use the word <emph>matter</emph> in the same sense as other men use +<emph>nothing</emph>, and so make those terms convertible in your +style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be +the result of that definition; the parts whereof, when I +<pb n='302'/><anchor id='Pg302'/> +consider with attention, either collectively or separate from +each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or +impression made on my mind, different from what is +excited by the term <emph>nothing</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid +definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish +it from nothing—the positive abstract idea of <emph>quiddity</emph>, +<emph>entity</emph>, or <emph>existence</emph>. I own, indeed, that those who pretend +to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as +if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most +abstract and general notion of all: that is to me the most +incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great +variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose +faculties, both in number and extent, are far exceeding +those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see +no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine, +by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception, what +ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may +imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly and +presumption. Since there may be, for aught that I know, +innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different +from one another, and from all that I have perceived, +as colours are from sounds<note place='foot'>Matter and physical science is +<emph>relative</emph>, so far that we may suppose +in other percipients than men, +an indefinite number of additional +senses, affording corresponding +varieties of qualities in things, of +course inconceivable by man. Or, +we may suppose an intelligence +destitute of <emph>all our</emph> senses, and so in +a material world wholly different +in its appearances from ours.</note>. But, how ready soever +I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension, +with regard to the endless variety of spirits and +ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to +a <emph>notion</emph> of Entity or Existence, <emph>abstracted</emph> from <emph>spirit</emph> and +<emph>idea</emph>, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, +a downright repugnancy and trifling with words. +</p> + +<p> +It remains that we consider the objections which may +possibly be made on the part of Religion. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments +for the real existence of bodies which are drawn +from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, +yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as will +<pb n='303'/><anchor id='Pg303'/> +sufficiently convince every good Christian, that bodies +do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; +there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which +evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains +and rivers, and cities, and human bodies<note place='foot'>The authority of Holy Scripture, +added to our natural tendency +to believe in external reality, are +grounds on which Malebranche +and Norris infer a material world. +Berkeley's material world claims +no logical proof of its reality. His +is not to prove the reality of +the world, but to shew what we +should mean when we affirm its +reality, and the basis of its explicability +in science.</note>—To +which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or +profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar +acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger +of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. +That all those things do really exist; that there are bodies, +even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar +sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles: +and the difference betwixt <emph>things</emph> and <emph>ideas</emph>, <emph>realities</emph> and +<emph>chimeras</emph>, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, +33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers +call <emph>Matter</emph>, or the existence of objects without the mind<note place='foot'>i.e. existing unrealised in any +intelligence—human or Divine.</note>, +is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. +</p> + +<p> +83. Again, whether there be or be not external things<note place='foot'><q>external things,</q> i.e. things +existing really, yet out of all relation +to active living spirit.</note>, +it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words +is the marking <emph>our</emph> conceptions, or things only as they +are known and perceived by us: whence it plainly follows, +that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing +inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, +and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is +intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so +very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the +premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. +</p> + +<p> +84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose +much of their stress and import by our principles. +What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not <emph>really</emph> +turned into a serpent? or was there only a change of <emph>ideas</emph> +in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed +that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in +Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of +<pb n='304'/><anchor id='Pg304'/> +the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea +only of wine? The same may be said of all other +miracles: which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, +must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of +fancy.—To this I reply, that the rod was changed into +a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does +not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will +be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of +<emph>real</emph> and <emph>imaginary</emph> has been already so plainly and fully +explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties +about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, +that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to +resume the explication of it in this place. I shall only +observe that if at table all who were present should see, +and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects +of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality<note place='foot'><p>Simultaneous perception of +the <q>same</q> (similar?) <emph>sense</emph>-ideas, +<emph>by different persons</emph>, as distinguished +from purely individual consciousness +of feelings and fancies, +is here taken as a test of the <emph>virtually +external reality</emph> of the former. +</p> +<p> +Berkeley does not ask whether +the change of the rod into a serpent, +or of the water into wine, is +the issue of divine agency and +order, otherwise than as all natural +evolution is divinely providential.</p></note>. So +that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has +no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, +and consequently makes rather for than against what has +been said. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured +to propose in the clearest light, and gave them +all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the +next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences<note place='foot'>Some of the Consequences of +adoption of the New Principles, in +their application to the physical +sciences and mathematics, and then +to psychology and theology, are +unfolded in the remaining sections +of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>.</note>. +Some of these appear at first sight—as that +several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance +of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely +banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance +can think? Whether Matter be infinitely divisible? And +how it operates on spirit?—these and the like inquiries +have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages. +<pb n='305'/><anchor id='Pg305'/> +But, depending on the existence of Matter, they have +no longer any place on our Principles. Many other +advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as +the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from +what has been premised. But this will appear more +plainly in the sequel. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows +human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads—that +of <emph>ideas</emph> and that of <emph>Spirits</emph>. Of each of these +I shall treat in order. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +And First as to <emph>ideas</emph>, or <emph>unthinking things</emph>. Our knowledge +of these has been very much obscured and confounded, +and we have been led into very dangerous errors, +by supposing a two-fold existence of sense—the one +<emph>intelligible</emph> or in the mind, the other <emph>real</emph> and without +the mind<note place='foot'>Berkeley disclaims the supposed +<emph>representative</emph> character of the +ideas given in sensuous perception, +and recognises as the real object +only what is ideally presented in +consciousness.</note>. Whereby unthinking things are thought to +have a natural subsistence of their own, distinct from +being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, +hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd +notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as +men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, +and that their knowledge was only so far forth <emph>real</emph> as it +was <emph>conformable to real things</emph>, it follows they could not +be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For +how can it be known that the things which are perceived +are conformable to those which are not perceived, or +exist without the mind<note place='foot'>So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, +who all see in a wholly representative +sense-perception, with its +double object, the germ of total +scepticism. Berkeley claims that, +under <emph>his</emph> interpretation of what +the reality of the material world +means, immediate knowledge of +mind-dependent matter is given in +sense.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, +considered only as so many <emph>sensations</emph> in the mind, are +perfectly known; there being nothing in them which +is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or +images, referred to <emph>things</emph> or <emph>archetypes existing without the +mind</emph>, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see +only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. +<pb n='306'/><anchor id='Pg306'/> +What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything +really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us +to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our +senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary; and +which of them, or even whether any of them at all, +represent the true quality really existing in the thing, +it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught +we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom +and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things +existing in <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>rerum natura</foreign>. All this scepticism<note place='foot'><q>scepticism</q>—<q>sceptical cant</q> +in the first edition.</note> follows +from our supposing a difference between <emph>things</emph> and <emph>ideas</emph>, +and that the former have a subsistence without the mind, or +unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and +shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages +depend on the supposition of external objects. [<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the +second edition.</note>But this +is too obvious to need being insisted on.] +</p> + +<p> +88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking +things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not +only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of +any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence +it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and +doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything +they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And after all +their labouring and struggle of thought, they are forced to +own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative +knowledge of the existence of sensible things<note place='foot'>Berkeley's argument against +a <emph>finally representative</emph> perception +so far resembles that afterwards +employed by Reid and Hamilton. +They differ as regards the dependence +of the sensible object upon +percipient spirit for its reality.</note>. But, all +this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the +mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the +world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, +and do not amuse ourselves with the terms <emph>absolute</emph>, +<emph>external</emph>, <emph>exist</emph>, and such like, signifying we know not what. +I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of +those things which I actually perceive by sense: it being +a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should +be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the +same time have no existence in nature; since the very +<pb n='307'/><anchor id='Pg307'/> +existence of an <emph>unthinking being</emph> consists in <emph>being perceived</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting +a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be +proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the +beginning in a distinct explication of <emph>what is meant</emph> by +<emph>thing</emph>, <emph>reality</emph>, <emph>existence</emph>; for in vain shall we dispute concerning +the real existence of things, or pretend to any +knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the +meaning of those words. <emph>Thing</emph> or <emph>being</emph> is the most +general name of all: it comprehends under it two kinds, +entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have +nothing common but the name, viz. <emph>spirits</emph> and <emph>ideas</emph>. The +former are active, indivisible, [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>incorruptible] substances: +the latter are inert, fleeting, [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>perishable passions,] or +dependent beings; which subsist not by themselves<note place='foot'>But whilst unthinking things +depend on being perceived, do not +our spirits depend on ideas of +some sort for their percipient life?</note>, but +are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances. +</p> + +<p> +[<note place='foot'>The important passage within +brackets was added in the second +edition.</note>We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling +or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason<note place='foot'><q>reason,</q> i.e. reasoning.</note>. We +may be said to have some knowledge or <emph>notion</emph><note place='foot'><q>Notion,</q> in its stricter meaning, +is thus confined by Berkeley +to apprehension of the <emph>Ego</emph>, and +intelligence of <emph>relations</emph>. The term +<q>notion,</q> in this contrast with +<emph>his</emph> <q>idea,</q> becomes important in +his vocabulary, although he sometimes +uses it vaguely.</note> of our +own minds, of spirits and active beings; whereof in a strict +sense we have not <emph>ideas</emph>. In like manner, we know and +have a <emph>notion</emph> of relations between things or ideas; +which relations are distinct from the ideas or things +related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us +without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that +<emph>ideas</emph>, <emph>spirits</emph>, and <emph>relations</emph> are all in their respective kinds +the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; +and that the term <emph>idea</emph> would be improperly extended to +signify <emph>everything</emph> we know or have any notion of<note place='foot'>Locke uses <emph>idea</emph> in this wider +signification.</note>.] +</p> + +<p> +90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are <emph>real</emph> things, or do +really exist<note place='foot'>Inasmuch as they are <emph>real</emph> +in and through living percipient +mind.</note>: this we do not deny; but we deny they <emph>can</emph> +<pb n='308'/><anchor id='Pg308'/> +subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they +are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the +mind<note place='foot'>i.e. <emph>unthinking</emph> archetypes.</note>; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists +in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing +but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be +termed <emph>external</emph>, with regard to their origin; in that they +are not generated from within by the mind itself, but +imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives +them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be <q>without +the mind</q> in another sense, namely when they exist +in some other mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the +things I saw may still exist; but it must be in another +mind<note place='foot'>In this section Berkeley explains +what he means by <emph>externality</emph>. Men +cannot act, cannot live, without +assuming an external world—in +some meaning of the term <q>external.</q> +It is the business of the +philosopher to explicate its true +meaning.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said +derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is +acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, +motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need +of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. +But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be +nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently +cannot subsist by themselves<note place='foot'>i.e. they are not <emph>substances</emph> in +the truest or deepest meaning of +the word.</note>. Thus far it is +agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things +perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance +or support wherein they may exist, we detract +nothing from the received opinion of their <emph>reality</emph>, and +are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the +difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings +perceived by sense have no existence distinct from +being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other +substance than those unextended indivisible substances, +or <emph>spirits</emph>, which act, and think and perceive them. +Whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible +qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving +Substance, which they call <emph>Matter</emph>, to which they attribute +a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or +distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, +<pb n='309'/><anchor id='Pg309'/> +even the Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they +suppose only Ideas of the corporeal substances<note place='foot'><q>Ideas of the corporeal substances.</q> +Berkeley might perhaps +say—Divine Ideas which are <emph>themselves</emph> +our world of sensible things +in its ultimate form.</note> created +by Him: if indeed they allow them to be at all <emph>created</emph><note place='foot'>On the scheme of ideal Realism, +<q>creation</q> of matter is presenting +to finite minds sense-ideas or +phenomena, which are, as it were, +letters of the alphabet, in that +language of natural order which +God employs for the expression +of <emph>His</emph> Ideas to us.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter +or Corporeal Substance to have been the main pillar +and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same +foundation have been raised all the impious schemes +of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty +has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of +nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient +philosophers, even of those who maintained the being +of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal +with Him<note place='foot'>The <emph>independent</emph> eternity of +Matter must be distinguished +from an unbeginning and endless +<emph>creation</emph> of sensible ideas or +phenomena, in percipient spirits, +according to divine natural law +and order, with implied immanence +of God.</note>. How great a friend <emph>material substance</emph> +has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. +All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary +a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone +is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but +fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no longer worth +while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities +of every wretched sect of Atheists<note place='foot'>Because the question at +issue with Atheism is, whether +the universe of things and persons +is finally substantiated and +evolved in unthinking Matter or in +the perfect Reason of God.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +93. That impious and profane persons should readily +fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, +by deriding <emph>immaterial substance</emph>, and supposing the soul +to be divisible, and subject to corruption as the body; +which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from +the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, +stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin +of all beings; that they should hearken to those who +deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind +<pb n='310'/><anchor id='Pg310'/> +over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series +of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity, arising +from the impulse of one body on another—all +this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when +men of better principles observe the enemies of religion +lay so great a stress on <emph>unthinking Matter</emph>, and all of +them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything +to it; methinks they should rejoice to see them +deprived of their grand support, and driven from that +only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, +and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but +become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world. +</p> + +<p> +94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, +has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, +but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise +in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider +that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object +of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, +which have no other existence but barely being perceived, +doubtless they would never fall down and worship <emph>their +own ideas</emph>; but rather address their homage to that Eternal +Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things. +</p> + +<p> +95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with +the articles of our faith, hath occasioned no small difficulties +to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, +how many scruples and objections have been +raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most +plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body +is denominated the <emph>same</emph>, with regard not to the form, +or that which is perceived by sense<note place='foot'>Of which Berkeley does <emph>not</emph> +predicate a <emph>numerical</emph> identity. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Third Dialogue between Hylas and +Philonous</hi>.</note>, but the material +substance, which remains the same under several forms? +Take away this <emph>material substance</emph>—about the identity +whereof all the dispute is—and mean by <emph>body</emph> what +every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, +that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only +a combination of sensible qualities or ideas: and then +their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. +</p> + +<p> +96. Matter<note place='foot'><q>matter,</q> i.e. matter abstracted +from all percipient life and voluntary +activity.</note> being once expelled out of nature drags +<pb n='311'/><anchor id='Pg311'/> +with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an +incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, +which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well +as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for +mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against +it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they +evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, +peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +97. Beside the external<note place='foot'><q>external</q>—not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90, +note 2.</note> existence of the objects of +perception, another great source of errors and difficulties +with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of <emph>abstract +ideas</emph>, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. +The plainest things in the world, those we are most +intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when +they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely +difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, +taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows; +but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, +they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended +by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you +at such a <emph>time</emph>, in such a <emph>place</emph>, and he shall never stay +to deliberate on the meaning of those words. In conceiving +that particular time and place, or the motion by +which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. +But if <emph>time</emph> be taken exclusive of all those particular actions +and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation +of existence or duration in abstract, then it will +perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. +</p> + +<p> +98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame +a simple idea of <emph>time</emph>, abstracted from the succession +of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated +by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in +inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all: +only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak +of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd +thoughts of my existence: since that doctrine lays one +under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he +passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else +that he is annihilated every moment of his life: both +<pb n='312'/><anchor id='Pg312'/> +which seem equally absurd<note place='foot'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Si non rogas, intelligo.</foreign> Berkeley +writes long after this to Johnson +thus:—<q>A succession of ideas +(phenomena) I take to <emph>constitute</emph> +time, and not to be only the sensible +measure thereof, as Mr. Locke +and others think. But in these +matters every man is to think for +himself, and speak as he finds. +One of my earliest inquiries was +about <emph>time</emph>; which led me into +several paradoxes that I did not +think it fit or necessary to publish, +particularly into the notion that +the resurrection follows the next +moment after death. We are +confounded and perplexed about +time—supposing a succession in +God; that we have an abstract +idea of time; that time in one mind +is to be measured by succession of +ideas in another mind: not considering +the true use of words, +which as often terminate in +the will as in the understanding, +being employed to excite and +direct action rather than to produce +clear and distinct ideas.</q> +Cf. Introduction, sect. 20.</note>. Time therefore being nothing, +abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, +it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be +estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding +each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is +a plain consequence that the soul always thinks. And +in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts +or abstract the <emph>existence</emph> of a spirit from its <emph>cogitation</emph>, +will, I believe, find it no easy task<note place='foot'>As the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign> of unthinking things +is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipi</foreign>, according to Berkeley, so +the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign> of persons is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipere</foreign>. The +real existence of individual Mind +thus depends on having ideas of +some sort: the real existence of +matter depends on a percipient.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract <emph>extension</emph> +and <emph>motion</emph> from all other qualities, and consider +them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, +and run into great extravagances. [<note place='foot'>This sentence is omitted in the +second edition.</note> Hence spring those +odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot, nor the wall +white; or that heat and colour are in the objects nothing +but figure and motion.] All which depend on a +twofold abstraction: first, it is supposed that extension, +for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible +qualities; and, secondly, that the entity of extension +may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever +shall reflect, and take care to understand what +he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible +qualities are alike <emph>sensations</emph>, and alike <emph>real</emph>; that +where the extension is, there is the colour too, to wit, in +his mind<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. 43.</note>, and that their archetypes can exist only in +<pb n='313'/><anchor id='Pg313'/> +some other <emph>mind</emph>: and that the objects of sense<note place='foot'><q>objects of sense,</q> i.e. sensible +things, practically external to each +person. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning +of <emph>thing</emph>, as distinct from the distinguishable +ideas or phenomena +that are naturally aggregated in the +form of concrete things.</note> are +nothing but those sensations, combined, blended, or +(if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all +which can be supposed to exist unperceived. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note> And +that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended, +and in the same sense.] +</p> + +<p> +100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object +good, every one may think he knows. But to frame +an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular +pleasure, or of goodness from everything that +is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise +a man may be just and virtuous without having precise +ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those +and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted +from all particular persons and actions, seems to have +rendered morality difficult, and the study thereof of less +use to mankind. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>And in effect one may make a great +progress in school ethics without ever being the wiser +or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself +in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself +or his neighbours than he did before.] And in effect +the doctrine of <emph>abstraction</emph> has not a little contributed +towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +101. The two great provinces of speculative science +conversant about ideas received from sense and their +relations, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics. With +regard to each of these I shall make some observations. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. +On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that +stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties +and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn +principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible +blindness as to the <emph>true</emph> and <emph>real</emph> nature of things. +This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are +miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused +only with the outside and shew of things. The real +<pb n='314'/><anchor id='Pg314'/> +essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every +the meanest object, is hid from our view: something +there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, +which it is beyond the power of human understanding +to fathom or comprehend<note place='foot'>Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With +Berkeley, the real essence of sensible +things is given in perception—so +far as our perceptions carry us.</note>. But, it is evident from +what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, +and that we are influenced by false principles to that +degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know +nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. +</p> + +<p> +102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves +ignorant of the nature of things is, the current opinion +that every thing includes <emph>within itself</emph> the cause of its +properties: or that there is in each object an inward +essence, which is the source whence its discernible qualities +flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended +to account for appearances by occult qualities; +but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical +causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike +qualities, of insensible particles<note place='foot'>e.g. Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. IV. ch. 3.</note>: whereas, in truth, there +is no other agent or efficient cause than <emph>spirit</emph>, it being +evident that motion, as well as all other <emph>ideas</emph>, is perfectly +inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain +the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, +magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. +And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not +at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of +those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned +for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses +and speculations are left out, and how much +the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine<note place='foot'>Berkeley advocates a Realism, +which eliminates effective +causation from the material world, +concentrates it in Mind, and in +physical research seeks among data +of sense for their divinely maintained +natural laws.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue +is <emph>attraction</emph>. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea +swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently +explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being +told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word +signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the +<pb n='315'/><anchor id='Pg315'/> +mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled +or protruded towards each other? But nothing is determined +of the manner or action, and it may as truly +(for aught we know) be termed <emph>impulse</emph>, or <emph>protrusion</emph>, +as <emph>attraction</emph>. Again, the parts of steel we see cohere +firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction; +but, in this, as in the other instances, I do not perceive +that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as +to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the +cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. +</p> + +<p> +104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, +and compare them together, we may observe +some likeness and conformity between them. For example, +in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising +of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion and crystallization, +there is something alike; namely, an union or mutual +approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like +phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man +who has nicely observed and compared the effects of +nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, +or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our +observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre +of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we +perceive every moment of our lives. But that they should +have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon +may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it +is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose +thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having +observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in +the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies +to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he +denotes by the general name <emph>attraction</emph>, whatever can be +reduced to that, he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he +explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous +globe towards the moon; which to him doth not appear +odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a +general rule or law of nature. +</p> + +<p> +105. If therefore we consider the difference there is +betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard +to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it +consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause +that produces them—for that can be no other than the <emph>will +<pb n='316'/><anchor id='Pg316'/> +of a spirit</emph>—but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, +whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are +discovered in the works of nature, and the particular +effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see +sect. 62: which rules, grounded on the analogy and +uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, +are most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that +they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near +to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures +touching things that may have happened at very great +distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to +come: which sort of endeavour towards Omniscience is +much affected by the mind. +</p> + +<p> +106. But we should proceed warily in such things: for +we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to +the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind, +whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general +theorems. For example, gravitation or mutual attraction, +because it appears in many instances, some are straightway +for pronouncing <emph>universal</emph>; and that to attract and be +attracted by every other body is an essential quality +inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident +the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; +and, so far is that gravitation from being <emph>essential</emph> to bodies +that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to +shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and +the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or +essential in the case<note place='foot'>In interpreting the data of +sense, we are obliged to assume +that every <emph>new</emph> phenomenon must +have previously existed in some +equivalent form—but not necessarily +in this or that particular +form, for a knowledge of which +we are indebted to inductive comparisons +of experience.</note>; but it depends entirely on the will +of the Governing Spirit<note place='foot'>The preceding forms of new +phenomena, being finally determined +by Will, are, in that sense, +arbitrary; but not capricious, for +the Will is perfect Reason. God +is the immanent cause of the +natural order.</note>, who causes certain bodies to +cleave together or tend towards each other according to +various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; +and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly +asunder, just as He sees convenient. +</p> + +<p> +107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay +down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers +<pb n='317'/><anchor id='Pg317'/> +amuse themselves in vain, when they enquire for +any natural efficient cause, distinct from a <emph>mind</emph> or <emph>spirit</emph>. +Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship +of a <emph>wise and good Agent</emph>, it should seem to become +philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what +some hold<note place='foot'>He probably refers to Bacon.</note>) about the final causes of things. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note> For, besides +that this would prove a very pleasing entertainment to the +mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not only +discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also +direct us in several instances to the proper uses and +applications of things.] And I must confess I see no +reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural +things are adapted, and for which they were originally +with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought +one good way of accounting for them, and altogether +worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised, +no reason can be drawn why the history of nature +should not still be studied, and observations and experiments +made; which, that they are of use to mankind, and +enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the +result of any immutable habitudes or relations between +things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness +to men in the administration of the world. See sects. +30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the +phenomena within our view, we may discover the general +laws of nature, and from them deduce other phenomena. +I do not say <emph>demonstrate</emph>; for all deductions of that kind +depend on a supposition that the Author of Nature +always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance +of those rules <emph>we</emph> take for principles, which we cannot +evidently know<note place='foot'>What we are able to discover +in the all-comprehensive order +may be subordinate and provisional +only. Nature in its deepest meaning +explains itself in the Divine +Omniscience.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +108. It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent +methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the +Language of its Author, whereby He discovers His +attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the +convenience and felicity of life. Those men who frame<note place='foot'>i.e. inductively.</note> +general rules from the phenomena, and afterwards derive<note place='foot'>i.e. deductively.</note> +<pb n='318'/><anchor id='Pg318'/> +the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs<note place='foot'><q>seem to consider signs,</q> i.e. +to be grammarians rather than +philosophers: physical sciences +deal with the grammar of the divine +language of nature.</note> +rather than causes. <note place='foot'><q>A man may be well read in the +language of nature without understanding +the grammar of it, or being +able to say,</q> &c.—in first edition.</note>A man may well understand natural +signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say +by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very +possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance +of general grammar-rules; so, in arguing from +general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may extend<note place='foot'><q>extend</q>—<q>stretch</q>—in first +edition.</note> +the analogy too far, and by that means run into +mistakes. +</p> + +<p> +109. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note> To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading +other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on +the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in +grammatical remarks on the language; so, in perusing the +volume of nature, methinks it is beneath the dignity of the +mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular +phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows +from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler +views, such as to recreate and exalt the mind with a +prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural +things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions +of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator: +and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far +as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed +for—God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of +ourselves and fellow-creatures. +</p> + +<p> +110. [<note place='foot'>In the first edition, the section +commences thus: <q>The best grammar +of the kind we are speaking of +will be easily acknowledged to be +a treatise of <emph>Mechanics</emph>, demonstrated +and applied to Nature, by a philosopher +of a neighbouring nation, +whom all the world admire. I shall +not take upon me to make remarks +on the performance of that +extraordinary person: only some +things he has advanced so directly +opposite to the doctrine we have +hitherto laid down, that we should +be wanting in the regard due to +the authority of so great a man did +we not take some notice of them.</q> +He refers, of course, to Newton. +The first edition of Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +was published in Ireland—hence +<q>neighbouring nation.</q> Newton's +<hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi> appeared in 1687.</note> The best key for the aforesaid analogy, or natural +Science, will be easily acknowledged to be a certain +celebrated Treatise of <hi rend='italic'>Mechanics</hi>.] In the entrance of +<pb n='319'/><anchor id='Pg319'/> +which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion +are distinguished into <emph>absolute</emph> and <emph>relative</emph>, <emph>true</emph> and <emph>apparent</emph>, +<emph>mathematical</emph> and <emph>vulgar</emph>: which distinction, as it is at +large explained by the author, does suppose those quantities +to have an existence without the mind: and that they +are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to +which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no +relation at all. +</p> + +<p> +III. As for <emph>Time</emph>, as it is there taken in an absolute or +abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the +existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning +it after what has been already said on that subject. +Sects. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author +holds there is an <emph>absolute Space</emph>, which, being unperceivable +to sense, remains in itself similar and immoveable; +and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being +moveable and defined by its situation in respect of +sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space. +<emph>Place</emph> he defines to be that part of space which is occupied +by any body: and according as the space is absolute or +relative so also is the place. <emph>Absolute Motion</emph> is said to be +the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute +place, as relative motion is from one relative place to +another. And because the parts of absolute space do not +fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to +use their sensible measures; and so define both place and +motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable. +But it is said, in philosophical matters we must +abstract from our senses; since it may be that none of +those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so; +and the same thing which is moved relatively may be +really at rest. As likewise one and the same body may be +in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary +relative motions at the same time, according as its place is +variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in +the apparent motions; but not at all in the true or absolute, +which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. +And the true we are told are distinguished from apparent +or relative motions by the following properties. First, in +true or absolute motion, all parts which preserve the same +position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions +of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that +<pb n='320'/><anchor id='Pg320'/> +which is placed therein is also moved: so that a body +moving in a place which is in motion doth participate +the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never +generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed +on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always +changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, +in circular motion, barely relative, there is no centrifugal +force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, +is proportional to the quantity of motion. +</p> + +<p> +112. But, notwithstanding what hath been said, I must +confess it does not appear to me that there can be any +motion other than <emph>relative</emph><note place='foot'><q>Motion,</q> in various aspects, +is treated specially in the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. +An imagination of trinal space +presupposes locomotive experience—unimpeded, +in contrast with—impeded locomotion. Cf. sect. +116.</note>: so that to conceive motion +there must be conceived at least two bodies; whereof +the distance or position in regard to each other is +varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it +could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in +that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include +relation.—[<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a +little attention may satisfy them.] +</p> + +<p> +113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to +conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only +is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the +change in the distance or situation of the bodies is impressed. +For, however some may define relative motion, +so as to term that body <emph>moved</emph> which changes its distance +from some other body, whether the force [<note place='foot'>Added in second edition.</note>or action] +causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet, as +relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and +regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every +man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best +philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of +motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes +over may be said to <emph>move</emph>, because they change distance +with his feet? To me it appears that though motion +includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not +necessary that each term of the relation be denominated +from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does +<pb n='321'/><anchor id='Pg321'/> +not think, so a body may be moved to or from another +body which is not therefore itself in motion, [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note> I mean +relative motion, for other I am not able to conceive.] +</p> + +<p> +114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the +motion which is related to it varies<note place='foot'>See Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. +13, §§ 7-10.</note>. A man in a ship +may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of +the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he +may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in +respect of the other. In the common affairs of life, men +never go beyond the Earth to define the place of any +body; and what is quiescent in respect of <emph>that</emph> is accounted +<emph>absolutely</emph> to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater +extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of +things, discover even the Earth itself to be moved. In +order therefore to fix their notions, they seem to conceive +the Corporeal World as finite, and the utmost unmoved +walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate +true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I +believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame +an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion +thus defined. For, as has been already observed, absolute +motion, exclusive of <emph>all</emph> external relation, is incomprehensible: +and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned +properties, causes, and effects ascribed to +absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. +As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not +at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how +this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove +it. See Newton's <hi rend='italic'>Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, +in Schol. Def. VIII</hi>. For the water in the vessel, +at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative +circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all: as is plain +from the foregoing section. +</p> + +<p> +115. For, to denominate a body <emph>moved</emph>, it is requisite, +first, that it change its distance or situation with regard +to some other body: and secondly, that the force occasioning +that change be applied to<note place='foot'><q>applied to</q>—<q>impressed on</q>—in +first edition.</note> it. If either of these +be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the +sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body +<pb n='322'/><anchor id='Pg322'/> +can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it +is possible for us to think a body, which we see change +its distance from some other, to be moved, though it have +no force applied to<note place='foot'><q>applied to</q>—<q>impressed on</q>—in +first edition.</note> it (in which sense there may be +apparent motion); but then it is because the force causing +the change<note place='foot'><q>the <emph>force</emph> causing the change</q>—which +<q>force,</q> according to Berkeley, +can only be attributed metaphorically +to the so-called impelling +body; inasmuch as <emph>bodies</emph>, or the +data of sense, can only be signs of +their consequent events, not efficient +causes of change.</note> of distance is imagined by us to be [<note place='foot'>Added in second edition.</note>applied +or] impressed on that body thought to move. Which +indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be +in motion which is not, and that is all. [<note place='foot'>What follows to the end of this +section is omitted in the second +edition.</note>But it does not +prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body +is moved merely because it changes distance from another; +since as soon as we are undeceived, and find that +the moving force was not communicated to it, we no +longer hold it to be moved. So, on the other hand, when +one only body (the parts whereof preserve a given position +between themselves) is imagined to exist, some there +are who think that it can be moved all manner of ways, +though without any change of distance or situation to any +other bodies; which we should not deny, if they meant +only that it might have an impressed force, which, upon +the bare creation of other bodies, would produce a motion +of some certain quantity and determination. But that +an actual motion (distinct from the impressed force, or +power, productive of change of place in case there were +bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such a +single body, I must confess I am not able to comprehend.] +</p> + +<p> +116. From what has been said, it follows that the +philosophic consideration of motion doth not imply the +being of an <emph>absolute Space</emph>, distinct from that which is +perceived by sense, and related to bodies: which that +it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same +principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects +of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall +find we cannot even frame an idea of <emph>pure Space exclusive +of all body</emph>. This I must confess seems impossible<note place='foot'><q>seems impossible</q>—<q>is above +my capacity</q>—in first edition.</note>, as +<pb n='323'/><anchor id='Pg323'/> +being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in +some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, +I say there is <emph>Space</emph>. But if I find a resistance, then I say +there is <emph>Body</emph>: and in proportion as the resistance to +motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less +<emph>pure</emph>. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, +it is not to be supposed that the word <emph>space</emph> stands for +an idea distinct from, or conceivable without, body and +motion. Though indeed we are apt to think every noun +substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated +from all others; which hath occasioned infinite +mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be +annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains +<emph>pure Space</emph>; thereby nothing else is meant but only that +I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be +moved on all sides without the least resistance: but if that +too were annihilated then there could be no motion, and +consequently no Space<note place='foot'>In short, empty Space <emph>is</emph> the +sensuous idea of unresisted motion. +This is implied in the <hi rend='italic'>New Theory +of Vision</hi>. He minimises Space, +treating it as a datum of sense.</note>. Some, perhaps, may think the +sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure +space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere +shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained +by that sense. See the <hi rend='italic'>Essay concerning Vision</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to +all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up +amongst the learned concerning the nature of <emph>pure Space</emph>. +But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are +freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several +who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine +themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real +Space is God, or else that there is something beside God +which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. +Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd +notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as +philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they +found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, +concluded it must be <emph>divine</emph>. And some of late have set +themselves particularly to shew that the incommunicable +attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy +soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet +<pb n='324'/><anchor id='Pg324'/> +I must confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so +long as we adhere to the received opinions<note place='foot'>He probably refers to Samuel +Clarke's <hi rend='italic'>Demonstration of the Being +and Attributes of God</hi>, which appeared +in 1706, and a treatise <hi rend='italic'>De Spatio +Reali</hi>, published in the same year.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy. We come now +to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch +of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics<note place='foot'>Sect. 118-132 are accordingly +concerned with the New Principles +in their application to Mathematics. +The foundation of the mathematical +sciences engaged much of +Berkeley's thought in early life and +in his later years. See his <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi>.</note>. These, +how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness +and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere +else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed +altogether free from mistakes, if in their principles +there lurks some secret error which is common to the +professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. +Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from +a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are +limited by the consideration of Quantity. And they do +not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental +maxims which influence all the particular sciences; +each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, doth consequently +participate of the errors involved in them. That +the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and +their way of deduction from those principles clear and +incontestible, we do not deny. But we hold there may +be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the +object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly +mentioned, though tacitly supposed, throughout the whole +progress of that science; and that the ill effects of those +secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the +branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians +are no less deeply concerned than other men +in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general +ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +119. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its object +abstract ideas of <emph>number</emph>. Of which to understand the +properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean +part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and +intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them +<pb n='325'/><anchor id='Pg325'/> +in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have +affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. +It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations, +which in practice are of no use, but serve only +for amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the +minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty <emph>mysteries</emph> +involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of +natural things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire into +our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, +we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high +flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries about +numbers only as so many <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>difficiles nugae</foreign>, so far as they are +not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. +</p> + +<p> +120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in +sect. 13; from which, and what has been said in the Introduction, +it plainly follows there is not any such idea. +But, number being defined a <emph>collection of units</emph>, we may +conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity, or unit +in abstract, there are no <emph>ideas</emph> of number in abstract, +denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories +therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the +names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as +well as from the particular things numbered, can be +supposed to have nothing at all for their object. Hence +we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate +to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes +when considered as a matter of mere speculation<note place='foot'>Numerical relations are <emph>realised</emph> only in concrete experience.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +121. However, since there may be some who, deluded +by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities, +waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems +which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more +fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence. +And this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic +in its infancy, and observing what it was that originally +put men on the study of that science, and to what +scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, +men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made +use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, +or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e. +some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to +<pb n='326'/><anchor id='Pg326'/> +reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious +ways of making one character stand in place of several +strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the +Arabians or Indians came into use; wherein, by the repetition +of a few characters or figures, and varying the +signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, +all numbers may be most aptly expressed. Which seems +to have been done in imitation of language, so that an +exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures +and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine +first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding +to denominations in the latter. And agreeably +to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, +were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures +or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are +proper to denote the whole, or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vice versa</foreign>. And having +found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being +observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; +and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then +the number of any particular things is said to be known, +when we know the name or figures (with their due +arrangement) that according to the standing analogy +belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by +the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of +the particular sums signified by them; and thus computing +in signs, (because of the connexion established betwixt +them and the distinct multitudes of things, whereof one +is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, +divide, and proportion the things themselves that we +intend to number. +</p> + +<p> +122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the <emph>things</emph> +but the <emph>signs</emph>; which nevertheless are not regarded for +their own sake, but because they direct us how to act +with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, +agreeably to what we have before observed of Words +in general (sect. 19, Introd.), it happens here likewise, +that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral +names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of +particular things to our minds. I shall not at present +enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject; +but only observe that it is evident from what has been +said, those things which pass for abstract truths and +<pb n='327'/><anchor id='Pg327'/> +theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant +about no object distinct from particular numerable things; +except only names and characters, which originally came +to be considered on no other account but their being +<emph>signs</emph>, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular +things men had need to compute. Whence it follows +that to study them for their own sake would be just as +wise, and to as good purpose, as if a man, neglecting +the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, +should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon +words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. 107, &c.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +123. From numbers we proceed to speak of <emph>extension</emph><note place='foot'>Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160.</note>, +which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. +The <emph>infinite</emph> divisibility of <emph>finite</emph> extension, though it is not +expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in +the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same +everywhere supposed, and thought to have so inseparable +and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations +in Geometry that mathematicians never admit +it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And as +this notion is the source from whence do spring all those +amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct +repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and +are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet +debauched by learning; so is it the principal occasion +of all that nice and extreme subtilty, which renders the +study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. +Hence, if we can make it appear that no <emph>finite</emph> extension +contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it +follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry +from a great number of difficulties and contradictions +which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human +reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business +of much less time and pains than it hitherto hath been. +</p> + +<p> +124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly +be the object of our thought is an <emph>idea</emph> existing only +in the mind; and consequently each part thereof must be +perceived. If, therefore, I cannot <emph>perceive</emph> innumerable +parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain +they are not contained in it. But it is evident that +<pb n='328'/><anchor id='Pg328'/> +I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular +line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, +or figure to myself in my mind. Wherefore I conclude +they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer +to me than that the extensions I have in view are no +other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that +I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite +number of other ideas; that is, that they are not infinitely +divisible<note place='foot'>An infinitely divided extension, +being unperceived, must be unreal—if +its existence is made real +only in and through actual perception, +or at least imagination. +The only possible extension is, +accordingly, sensible extension, +which could not be infinitely +divided without the supposed parts +ceasing to be perceived or real.</note>. If by <emph>finite extension</emph> be meant something +distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what +that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. +But if the terms <emph>extension</emph>, <emph>parts</emph>, and the like, are taken +in any sense conceivable—that is, for <emph>ideas</emph>,—then to say +a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite +in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction, +that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so. +And it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any +reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle +and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile<note place='foot'><q>converted Gentile</q>—<q>pagan +convert</q>—in first edition.</note> to the belief +of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices +do often pass into principles. And those propositions +which once obtain the force and credit of a <emph>principle</emph>, are +not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible +from them, thought privileged from all examination. +And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, +the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow<note place='foot'>Cf. Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. I, ch. +3, § 25.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with +the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded +that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) <emph>extension +in abstract</emph> is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks +the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps, +in virtue thereof, be brought to admit<note place='foot'><q>will perhaps in virtue thereof +be brought to admit,</q> &c.—<q>will +not stick to affirm,</q> &c.—in first +edition.</note> that a line but an +inch long may contain innumerable parts really existing, +though too small to be discerned. These errors are +<pb n='329'/><anchor id='Pg329'/> +grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other +men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and +it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments +from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility +of extension are bottomed on them. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition. See the <hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi>.</note> But this, if +it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper +place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present +we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians +are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +126. It has been observed in another place that the +theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant +about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.): where it is +explained in what sense this ought to be understood, +to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the +diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of +different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer considers +them abstracting from their magnitude: which doth +not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that +he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether +great or small, but looks on that as a thing indifferent +to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in +the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though +it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not +in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only +in its signification, whereby it <emph>represents</emph> innumerable +lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished +ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be +above an inch in <emph>it</emph>. After this manner, the properties +of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred +to the sign; and thence, through mistake, thought +to appertain to it considered in its own nature. +</p> + +<p> +127. Because there is no number of parts so great +but it is possible there may be a line containing more, +the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any +assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken +absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But +men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, +slide into a belief that the small particular line described +on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There +<pb n='330'/><anchor id='Pg330'/> +is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch; but +there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may +be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate +a triangle on paper, and take one side, not above an +inch for example in length, to be the radius, this I +consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts, or +more. For, though the ten thousandth part of that line +considered in itself, is nothing at all, and consequently +may be neglected without any error or inconveniency, +yet these described lines, being only marks standing +for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten thousandth +part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent +notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of +10,000 parts, or more. +</p> + +<p> +128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, +to the end any theorem may become universal in its use, +it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper +as though they contained parts which really they do not. +In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly, +we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an +inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a +thousand parts, but only some other line which is far +greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that +when we say a line is <emph>infinitely divisible</emph>, we must mean<note place='foot'><q>we must mean</q>—<q>we mean (if we mean anything)</q>—in first +edition.</note> +<emph>a line which is infinitely great</emph>. What we have here observed +seems to be the chief cause, why to suppose +the <emph>infinite</emph> divisibility of <emph>finite extension</emph> has been thought +necessary in geometry. +</p> + +<p> +129. The several absurdities and contradictions which +flowed from this false principle might, one would think, +have been esteemed so many demonstrations against +it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> are not to be admitted against propositions +relating to Infinity. As though it were not impossible +even for an Infinite Mind to reconcile contradictions; +or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a +necessary connexion with truth, or flow from it. But +whoever considers the weakness of this pretence, will +think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness +of the mind, which had rather acquiesce in an +<pb n='331'/><anchor id='Pg331'/> +indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through +with a severe examination of those principles it has ever +embraced for true. +</p> + +<p> +130. Of late the speculations about Infinites have run +so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have +occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the +geometers of the present age. Some there are of great +note who, not content with holding that finite lines may +be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet +farther maintain, that each of those Infinitesimals is itself +subdivisible into an infinity of other parts, or Infinitesimals +of a second order, and so on <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>. These, +I say, assert there are Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals of +Infinitesimals, without ever coming to an end. So that +according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite +number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign> of parts. Others there be who hold all +orders of Infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at +all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there +is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though +multiplied infinitely, can ever equal the smallest given +extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less +absurd to think the square, cube, or other power of a +positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which +they who hold Infinitesimals of the first order, denying +all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain. +</p> + +<p> +131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they +are <emph>both</emph> in the wrong, and that there is in effect no +such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of +parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say +that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations +of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men +who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, +have been all the while building a castle in the air. To +this it may be replied, that whatever is useful in geometry, +and promotes the benefit of human life, does still +remain firm and unshaken on our Principles; that science +considered as practical will rather receive advantage than +any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this +in a due light,[<note place='foot'>Omitted in the second edition.</note> and shew how lines and figures may be +<pb n='332'/><anchor id='Pg332'/> +measured, and their properties investigated, without supposing +finite extension to be infinitely divisible,] may +be the proper business of another place<note place='foot'>Does this refer to the intended +<q>Part II</q> of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>?</note>. For the rest, +though it should follow that some of the more intricate +and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be +pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not +see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. +On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished +that men of great abilities and obstinate application<note place='foot'><q>men of great abilities and obstinate +application,</q> &c.—<q>men of +the greatest abilities and most +obstinate application,</q> &c.—in first +edition.</note> +would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, +and employ them in the study of such things as lie +nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence +on the manners. +</p> + +<p> +132. If it be said that several theorems, undoubtedly +true, are discovered by methods in which Infinitesimals +are made use of, which could never have been if their +existence included a contradiction in it:—I answer, that +upon a thorough examination it will not be found that +in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive +<emph>infinitesimal</emph> parts of <emph>finite</emph> lines, or even quantities +less than the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>minimum sensibile</foreign>: nay, it will be evident +this is never done, it being impossible. [<note place='foot'>What follows to the end of +this section is omitted in the second +edition.</note> And whatever +mathematicians may think of Fluxions, or the Differential +Calculus, and the like, a little reflexion will shew them +that, in working by those methods, they do not conceive +or imagine lines or surfaces less than what are perceivable +to sense. They may indeed call those little and +almost insensible quantities Infinitesimals, or Infinitesimals +of Infinitesimals, if they please. But at bottom this +is all, they being in truth finite; nor does the solution of +problems require the supposing any other. But this +will be more clearly made out hereafter.] +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that +very numerous and important errors have taken their +rise from those false Principles which were impugned +in the foregoing parts of this Treatise; and the opposites +<pb n='333'/><anchor id='Pg333'/> +of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be +most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable +consequences, highly advantageous to true philosophy +as well as to religion. Particularly <emph>Matter</emph>, or <emph>the absolute<note place='foot'><q>absolute,</q> i.e. abstract, independent, +irrelative existence—as +something of which there can +be no sensuous perception or conception.</note> +existence of corporeal objects</emph>, hath been shewn to be that +wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of +all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever +placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely +if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking +things from their being perceived, and allowing them +a subsistence of their own, out of the minds of spirits, +no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary +a great many inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition +of Matter<note place='foot'>Matter unrealised in perception—not +the material world that +is realised in percipient experience +of sense.</note> is barely precarious, as not being +grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences +cannot endure the light of examination and +free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and +general pretence of <emph>infinites being incomprehensible</emph>; if +withal the removal of <emph>this</emph> Matter be not attended with +the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in +the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived +without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists +are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and +ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable +both to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect +it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it +were proposed only as an <emph>hypothesis</emph>, and the existence +of Matter had been allowed possible; which yet I +think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not. +</p> + +<p> +134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing +Principles, several disputes and speculations which are +esteemed no mean parts of learning are rejected as useless +[<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note> and in effect conversant about nothing at all]. +But how great a prejudice soever against our notions +this may give to those who have already been deeply +engaged, and made large advances in studies of that +nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought +<pb n='334'/><anchor id='Pg334'/> +any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets +herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, +and make human sciences more clear, compendious, and +attainable than they were before. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning +the knowledge of <emph>ideas</emph>, the method we proposed +leads us in the next place to treat of <emph>spirits</emph><note place='foot'>Sect. 135-156 treat of consequences +of the New Principles, +in their application to +sciences concerned with our notions +of <emph>Spirit</emph> or <emph>Mind</emph>; as distinguished +from sciences of ideas +in external Nature, and their +mathematical relations. Individual +mind, with Berkeley, needs data +of sense in order to its realisation +in consciousness; while it is dependent +on God, in a relation +which he does not define distinctly.</note>: with regard +to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient +as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned +for our being thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits +is our not having an <emph>idea</emph> of it. But, surely it ought not +to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding +that it does not perceive the idea of Spirit, if it is manifestly +impossible there should be any such idea. And +this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section +27. To which I shall here add that a Spirit has been +shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking +beings or ideas can exist: but that this <emph>substance</emph> +which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an +idea, or like an idea, is evidently absurd. +</p> + +<p> +136. It will perhaps be said that we want a <emph>sense</emph> +(as some have imagined<note place='foot'>e.g. Locke suggests this.</note>) proper to know substances +withal; which, if we had, we might know our own soul +as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that in case +we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only +receive thereby some new <emph>sensations</emph> or <emph>ideas of sense</emph>. +But I believe nobody will say that what he means by +the terms <emph>soul</emph> and <emph>substance</emph> is only some particular sort +of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all +things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to +think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish +us with an <emph>idea</emph> of Spirit, or active thinking substance, +than it would be if we should blame them for not being +able to comprehend a <emph>round square</emph><note place='foot'>Is this analogy applicable?</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='335'/><anchor id='Pg335'/> + +<p> +137. From the opinion that Spirits are to be known +after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many +absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about +the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this +opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether +they had any soul at all distinct from their body; since +upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. +That an <emph>idea</emph>, which is inactive, and the existence whereof +consists in being perceived, should be the image or +likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need +no other refutation than barely attending to what is +meant by those words. But perhaps you will say that +though an idea cannot resemble a Spirit in its thinking, +acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other +respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be +in all respects like the original. +</p> + +<p> +138. I answer, If it does not in those mentioned, it is +impossible it should represent it in any other thing. +Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and +perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein +the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word <emph>spirit</emph> +we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; +this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that +term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of +those powers should be represented in an idea [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition, as +he had previously learned to distinguish +<emph>notion</emph> from <emph>idea</emph>. Cf. sect. +89, 142.</note>or +notion], it is evident there can be no idea [or notion] of +a Spirit. +</p> + +<p> +139. But it will be objected that, if there is no <emph>idea</emph> +signified by the terms <emph>soul</emph>, <emph>spirit</emph>, and <emph>substance</emph>, they +are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. +I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing; +which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which +perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. +What I am <emph>myself</emph>, that which I denote by the term <emph>I</emph>, is +the same with what is meant by <emph>soul</emph>, or <emph>spiritual substance</emph>. +[<note place='foot'>Ibid. In the omitted passage +it will be seen that he makes <emph>idea</emph> +and <emph>notion</emph> synonymous.</note>But if I should say that <emph>I</emph> was nothing, or that <emph>I</emph> was +an <emph>idea</emph> or <emph>notion</emph>, nothing could be more evidently absurd +than either of these propositions.] If it be said that +<pb n='336'/><anchor id='Pg336'/> +this is only quarrelling at a word, and that, since the +immediate significations of other names are by common +consent called <emph>ideas</emph>, no reason can be assigned why +that which is signified by the name <emph>spirit</emph> or <emph>soul</emph> may not +partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking +objects of the mind agree in that they are +entirely passive, and their existence consists only in +being perceived: whereas a <emph>soul</emph> or <emph>spirit</emph> is an active +being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, +but in perceiving ideas and thinking<note place='foot'>Is the reality of mind as dependent +on having ideas (of some +sort) as ideas are on mind; although +mind is more deeply and truly +real than its ideas are?</note>. It is therefore +necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding +natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we +distinguish between <emph>spirit</emph> and <emph>idea</emph>. See sect. 27. +</p> + +<p> +140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have +an idea [<note place='foot'>Introduced in second edition.</note>or rather a notion] of <emph>spirit</emph>. That is, we +understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we +could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as +we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits +by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances +of them, so we know other spirits by means of +our own soul: which in that sense is the image or idea +of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that +blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas +perceived by another<note place='foot'>We know <emph>other finite persons</emph> +through sense-presented phenomena, +but not as themselves +phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It +is a mediate knowledge that we +have of other persons. The question +about the individuality of finite +egos, as distinguished from God, +Berkeley has not touched.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +141. [<note place='foot'>These sentences are omitted +in the second edition.</note>The natural immortality of the soul is a necessary +consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before +we attempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the +meaning of that tenet.] It must not be supposed that +they who assert the natural immortality of the soul<note place='foot'><q>the soul,</q> i.e. the individual +Ego.</note> are +of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation +even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave +it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or +<pb n='337'/><anchor id='Pg337'/> +dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion +They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin +vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing +and corruptible as the body; since there is nothing +more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is +naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle +wherein it is inclosed. And this notion hath been +greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of +mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions +of virtue and religion. But it hath been made +evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, +are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more +distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from +darkness<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 2; 25-27.</note>. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, +incorporeal, unextended; and it is consequently incorruptible. +Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, +changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see +befal natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the +<emph>course of nature</emph>) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, +uncompounded substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble +by the force of nature; that is to say, <emph>the soul of +man</emph> is <emph>naturally immortal</emph><note place='foot'>This is Berkeley's application +of his new conception of the reality +of matter, to the final human question +of the self-conscious existence +of the individual human +Ego, after physical death. Philosophers +and theologians were +accustomed in his generation to +ground their argument for a future +life on the metaphysical assumption +of the physical indivisibility of our +self-conscious spirit, and on our contingent +connexion with the body. +<q>Our bodies,</q> says Bishop Butler, +<q>are no more <emph>ourselves</emph>, or <emph>part of +ourselves</emph>, than any other matter +around us.</q> This train of thought +is foreign to us at the present +day, when men of science remind +us that self-conscious life is found +only in correlation with corporeal +organisation, whatever may +be the abstract possibility. Hope +of continued life after physical +death seems to depend on ethical +considerations more than on metaphysical +arguments, and on what +is suggested by faith in the final +outcome of personal life in a <emph>divinely</emph> +constituted universe.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain +that our souls are not to be known in the same manner +as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of <emph>idea</emph>. <emph>Spirits</emph> +and <emph>ideas</emph> are things so wholly different, that when we +say <q>they exist,</q> <q>they are known,</q> or the like, these words +<pb n='338'/><anchor id='Pg338'/> +must not be thought to signify anything common to both +natures<note place='foot'>Mind and the ideas presented +to the senses are at opposite poles +of existence. But he does not say +that, thus opposed, they are each +independent of the other.</note>. There is nothing alike or common in them; and +to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our +faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a +triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to <emph>see +a sound</emph>. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be +of moment towards clearing several important questions, +and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning +the nature of the soul. +</p> + +<p> +[<note place='foot'>What follows was introduced +in the second edition, in which +<emph>notion</emph> is contrasted with <emph>idea</emph>.</note>We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an <emph>idea</emph> +of an active being, or of an action; although we may be +said to have a <emph>notion</emph> of them. I have some knowledge +or notion of <emph>my mind</emph>, and its acts about ideas; inasmuch +as I know or understand what is meant by these words. +What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not +say that the terms <emph>idea</emph> and <emph>notion</emph> may not be used +convertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet it conduceth +to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish +things very different by different names. It is also to +be remarked that, all <emph>relations</emph> including an act of the mind<note place='foot'>Here is a germ of Kantism. +But Berkeley has not analysed +that activity of mind which constitutes +<emph>relation</emph>, nor systematically +unfolded the relations involved in +the rational constitution of experience. +There is more disposition +to this in <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>.</note>, +we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but +rather a notion, of the relations and habitudes between +things. But if, in the modern way<note place='foot'>As with Locke, for example.</note>, the word <emph>idea</emph> is +extended to <emph>spirits</emph>, and <emph>relations</emph>, and <emph>acts</emph>, this is, after all, +an affair of verbal concern.] +</p> + +<p> +143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of +<emph>abstract ideas</emph> has had no small share in rendering those +sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly +conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined +they could frame abstract notions of the <emph>powers</emph> and <emph>acts</emph> +of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from +the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects +and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous +<pb n='339'/><anchor id='Pg339'/> +terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, +have been introduced into metaphysics and morality; +and from these have grown infinite distractions and +disputes amongst the learned<note place='foot'>Note this condemnation of the +tendency to substantiate <q>powers +of mind.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed +towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes +with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, +than the being used to speak of those things in terms +borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will +is termed the <emph>motion</emph> of the soul: this infuses a belief +that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled +and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily +as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless +scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in +morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth +appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers +be prevailed on to [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition. +Berkeley was after all reluctant +to <q>depart from received modes +of speech,</q> notwithstanding their +often misleading associations.</note>depart from some received +prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into themselves, +and attentively consider their own meaning. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>But +the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular +disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise.] +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +145. From what hath been said, it is plain that we +cannot know the existence of <emph>other spirits</emph> otherwise than +by their operations, or the ideas by them, excited in us. +I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations +of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular +agents, like myself, which accompany them, and concur +in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of +other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of +my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by +me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as +effects or concomitant signs<note place='foot'>This is one of the notable +sections in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, as it +suggests the <emph>rationale</emph> of Berkeley's +rejection of Panegoism or +Solipsism. Is this consistent with +his conception of the reality of +the material world? It is objected +(e.g. by Reid) that ideal realism +dissolves our faith in the existence +of other persons. The difficulty +is to shew how appearances presented +to my senses, which are +sensuous and subjective, can be +media of communication between +persons. The question carries us +back to the theistic presupposition +in the trustworthiness +of experience—which is adapted +to deceive if I am the only person +existing. With Berkeley a chief +function of ideas of sense is to signify +other persons to each person. +See <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, Dial. IV; <hi rend='italic'>New Theory +of Vision Vindicated</hi>, and <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='340'/><anchor id='Pg340'/> + +<p> +146. But, though there be some things which convince +us human agents are concerned in producing them, +yet it is evident to every one that those things which +are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater +part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are <emph>not</emph> +produced by, or dependent on, the wills of <emph>men</emph>. There +is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since +it is repugnant<note place='foot'><q>repugnant</q>—for it would involve +thought in incoherence, +by paralysis of its indispensable +causal presupposition.</note> that they should subsist by themselves. +See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant +regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, +the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the +larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts +of the creation, together with the exact harmony and +correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired +laws of pain and pleasure, and the +instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of +animals;—I say if we consider all these things, and at the +same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes +One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we +shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, +<q>who works all in all</q> and <q>by whom all things consist.</q> +</p> + +<p> +147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly +and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, +distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the +existence of God is far more evidently perceived than +the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are +infinitely more numerous and considerable than those +ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark +that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which +does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit +who is the Author of Nature<note place='foot'>Is not God the indispensable +presupposition of trustworthy experience, +rather than an empirical +inference?</note>. For it is evident that, in +affecting other persons, the will of man hath no other +object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; +but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite +<pb n='341'/><anchor id='Pg341'/> +any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the +will of the Creator. He alone it is who, <q>upholding all +things by the word of His power,</q> maintains that intercourse +between spirits whereby they are able to perceive +the existence of each other<note place='foot'>This suggests an explanation +of the objective reality and significance +of <emph>ideas of sense</emph>; through +which they become media of social +intercourse in the fundamentally +divine universe. God so regulates +the sense-given ideas of which +human beings are individually percipient, +as that, <emph>while numerically +different, as in each mind</emph>, those +ideas are nevertheless a sufficient +medium for social intercourse, if +the Power universally at work is +morally trustworthy. Unless our +God-given experience is deceiving, +Solipsism is not a necessary +result of the fact that no one but +myself can be percipient of my +sensuous experience.</note>. And yet this pure and +clear Light which enlightens everyone is itself invisible [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>to +the greatest part of mankind]. +</p> + +<p> +148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking +herd that they cannot <emph>see</emph> God. Could we but see Him, +say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, +and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need +only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all +things, with a <emph>more</emph> full and clear view than we do any one +of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God +(as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or +see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that +which represents them in the essence of God; which +doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible<note place='foot'>Malebranche, as understood by +Berkeley. See <hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, Liv. III. +p. ii. ch. 6, &c.</note>. +But I shall explain my meaning. A human spirit or +person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea. +When therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions +of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas +excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to +our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out +unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like +ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man, if by +<emph>man</emph> is meant, that which lives, moves, perceives, and +thinks as we do: but only such a certain collection of +ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of +thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and +represented by it. And after the same manner we see +<pb n='342'/><anchor id='Pg342'/> +God: all the difference is that, whereas some one finite +and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular +human mind, whithersoever we direct our view we do at +all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the +Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive +by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; +as is our perception of those very motions which are +produced by men<note place='foot'>For all finite persons <emph>somehow</emph> +live, and move, and have their +being <q>in God.</q> The existence of +<emph>eternal</emph> living Mind, and the <emph>present</emph> +existence of other men, are both +<emph>inferences</emph>, resting on the same +foundation, according to Berkeley.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more +evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion +than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately +present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of +ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom +we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short <q>in +whom we live, and move, and have our being.</q> That the +discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and +obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason +of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and +inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with +such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little +affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with +excess of light<note place='foot'>The theistic trust in which our +experience is rooted remaining +latent, or being unintelligent.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +150. But you will say—Hath Nature no share in the +production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed +to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, +If by <emph>Nature</emph> is meant only the <emph>visible series</emph> of effects or +sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain +fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken +in this sense, cannot produce anything at all<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66. +His conception of Divine causation +in Nature, as the constant omnipresent +agency in all natural law, +is the deepest part of his philosophy. +It is pursued in the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>.</note>. But if by +<emph>Nature</emph> is meant some being distinct from God, as well as +from the laws of nature and things perceived by sense, I +must confess that word is to me an empty sound, without +any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this +acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those +heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence +<pb n='343'/><anchor id='Pg343'/> +and infinite perfection of God. But it is more unaccountable +that it should be received among Christians, professing +belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe +those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen +philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. <q>The Lord, +He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings +with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of His treasures.</q> +Jerem. x. 13. <q>He turneth the shadow of death +into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night.</q> +Amos v. 8. <q>He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft +with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and +crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures +are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over +with corn.</q> See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding that this +is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know +not what aversion from believing that God concerns +Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose +Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind +unthinking deputy in His stead; though (if we may believe +Saint Paul) <q>He be not far from every one of us.</q> +</p> + +<p> +151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow, +gradual, and roundabout methods observed in the production +of natural things do not seem to have for their +cause the <emph>immediate</emph> hand of an Almighty Agent: besides, +monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, +rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human +life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole +frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended +by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But +the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain +from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods +of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by +the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and +consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and +goodness of God<note place='foot'>Is not the unbeginning and +unending natural evolution, an articulate +revelation of Eternal Spirit +or Active Reason at the heart of +the whole?</note>. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>For, it doth hence follow that the +finger of God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and +careless sinner; which gives him an opportunity to harden +in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect. +57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty +<pb n='344'/><anchor id='Pg344'/> +machine of Nature that, whilst its motions and various +phenomena strike on our senses, the Hand which actuates +the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. +<q>Verily</q> (saith the prophet) <q>thou art a God that hidest +thyself.</q> Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the Lord conceal +Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will +not be at the least expense of thought<note place='foot'>So Pascal in the <hi rend='italic'>Pensées</hi>.</note>, yet to an unbiassed +and attentive mind, nothing can be more plainly +legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, +who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system +of Being. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, +that the operating according to general and stated +laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, +and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all +reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, +could serve to no manner of purpose. It were even +impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in +the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly +outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may +thence arise<note place='foot'>Divine reason ever active in +Nature is the necessary correlate +to reason in man; inasmuch as +otherwise the changing universe +in which we live would be unfit +to be reasoned about or acted in.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +152. We should further consider, that the very blemishes +and defects of nature are not without their use, +in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment +the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades +in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more +enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine, +whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, +and accidental destruction of plants and animals before +they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the +Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted +by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. +In <emph>man</emph> indeed a thrifty management of those things +which he cannot procure without much pains and industry +may be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine +that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable +costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble +in its production than a pebble does; nothing being +more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently +<pb n='345'/><anchor id='Pg345'/> +produce everything by a mere <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>fiat</foreign> or act of his +will. Hence it is plain that the splendid profusion of +natural things should not be interpreted weakness or +prodigality in the Agent who produces them, but rather +be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power. +</p> + +<p> +153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which +is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of Nature, +and the actions of finite, imperfect Spirits, this, in the +state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary +to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. +We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular +pain into our thoughts, and account it <emph>evil</emph>. Whereas, +if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various +ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what +occasions and in what proportions we are affected with +pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and +the design with which we are put into the world; we +shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular +things which, considered in themselves, appear to be +evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked +with the whole system of beings<note place='foot'>The existence of <emph>moral</emph> evil, +or what ought not to exist, is <emph>the</emph> +difficulty which besets faith in the +fundamental divinity or goodness +of the universe. Yet that faith is +presupposed in interpretation of +nature, which proceeds on the +<emph>postulate</emph> of universal order; and +this implies the moral trustworthiness +of the world which we begin +to realise when we begin to be +conscious. That we are living and +having our being in omnipotent +goodness is thus not an inference, +but the implied basis of all real inferences. +I have expanded this +thought in my <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of Theism</hi>. +We cannot <emph>prove</emph> God, for we must +assume God, as the basis of all proof. +Faith even in the uniformity of +nature is virtually faith in omnipotent +goodness immanent in the +universe.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +154. From what hath been said, it will be manifest to +any considering person, that it is merely for want of +attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are +any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be +found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque +the works of Providence; the beauty and order +whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the +pains, to comprehend<note place='foot'>So Leibniz in his <hi rend='italic'>Theodicée</hi>, which +was published in the same year as +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>.</note>. But those who are masters of +any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used +to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces +<pb n='346'/><anchor id='Pg346'/> +of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the +economy of Nature. But what truth is there which +glares so strongly on the mind that, by an aversion of +thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape +seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality +of men, who are ever intent on business or +pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their +mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence +of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable +creatures<note place='foot'>The divine presupposition, latent +in all human reasoning and +experience, is hid from the unreflecting, +in whom the higher life +is dormant, and the ideal in the universe +is accordingly undiscerned. +Unless the universe is assumed to +be physically and morally trustworthy, +i.e. unless God is presupposed, +even natural science has no +adequate foundation.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +155. We should rather wonder that men can be found +so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should +be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth<note place='foot'>Our necessarily incomplete +knowledge of the Universe in +which we find ourselves is apt +to disturb the fundamental faith, +that the phenomena presented to +us are significant of God. Yet +we <emph>tacitly assume</emph> that they are +thus significant when we interpret +real experience, physical or moral.</note>. +And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and +leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely +through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into +a sort of Atheism. [<note place='foot'>Omitted in second edition.</note>They cannot say there is not a +God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For +what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some +secret misgivings of mind with regard to the existence +and attributes of God, which permits sinners to grow +and harden in impiety?] Since it is downright impossible +that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough +sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that +Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation +of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to +meditate and dwell on those important points; that so +we may attain conviction without all scruple <q>that the +eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil +and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in +all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat +and raiment to put on;</q> that He is present and conscious +<pb n='347'/><anchor id='Pg347'/> +to our innermost thoughts; and, that we have +a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A +clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill +our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which +is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard +against Vice. +</p> + +<p> +156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in +our studies is, the consideration of <hi rend='smallcaps'>God</hi> and our <hi rend='smallcaps'>Duty</hi>; +which to promote, as it was the main drift and design +of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless +and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire +my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; +and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren +speculations which make the chief employment of learned +men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace +the salutary truths of the Gospel; which to know and to +practise is the highest perfection of human nature. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='349'/><anchor id='Pg349'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous +The Design Of Which Is Plainly To Demonstrate +The Reality And Perfection Of Human Knowledge, +The Incorporeal Nature Of The Soul, +And The Immediate Providence Of A Deity, +In Opposition To Sceptics And Atheists, +Also To Open A Method For Rendering The Sciences More +Easy, Useful, And Compendious</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>First published in 1713</hi> +</p> + +<pb n='351'/><anchor id='Pg351'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Editor's Preface</head> + +<p> +This work is the gem of British metaphysical literature. +Berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of Socratic +dialogue rests, perhaps, upon <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, which surpasses +the conversations between Hylas and Philonous in expression +of individual character, and in dramatic effect. Here +conversation is adopted as a convenient way of treating +objections to the conception of the reality of Matter which +had been unfolded systematically in the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. +But the lucid thought, the colouring of fancy, the glow of +human sympathy, and the earnestness that pervade the +subtle reasonings pursued through these dialogues, are +unique in English metaphysical literature. Except perhaps +Hume and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art +of uniting metaphysical thought with easy, graceful, +and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are +increased when we recollect that this charming production +of reason and imagination came from Ireland, at a time +when that country was scarcely known in the world of +letters and philosophy. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The immediate impression produced by the publication +<pb n='352'/><anchor id='Pg352'/> +of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, is shewn in Berkeley's correspondence +with Sir John Percival. Berkeley was eager to hear what +people had to say for or against what looked like a paradox +apt to shock the reader; but in those days he was not +immediately informed by professional critics. <q>If when +you receive my book</q>—he wrote from Dublin in July, +1710, to Sir John Percival<note place='foot'>For the following extracts from +previously unpublished correspondence +of Berkeley and Sir John +Percival, I am indebted to the kindness +of his descendant, the late Lord +Egmont.</note>, then in London,—<q>you can +procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances +who are thinking men, addicted to the study of natural +philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely obliged +to you.</q> In the following month he was informed by +Sir John that it was <q>incredible what prejudice can work in +the best geniuses, even in the lovers of novelty. For I did +but name the subject matter of your book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +to some ingenious friends of mine and they immediately +treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to read +it, which I have not yet got one to do. A physician of my +acquaintance undertook to discover your person, and +argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to +take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of +starting something new should put you upon such an +undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so +far as a gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there +is no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no +being at all.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley's reply is interesting. <q>I am not surprised,</q> +he says, <q>that I should be ridiculed by those who won't take +the pains to understand me. If the raillery and scorn of +those who criticise what they will not be at the pains to +understand had been sufficient to deter men from making +any attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of +mankind, we should not have been troubled with some +very fair improvements in knowledge. The common +<pb n='353'/><anchor id='Pg353'/> +cry's being against any opinion seems to me, so far from +proving false, that it may with as good reason pass for an +argument of its truth. However, I imagine that whatever +doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need +be introduced with great caution into the world. For this +reason it was that I omitted all mention of the non-existence +of Matter in the title-page, dedication, preface and +introduction to the <hi rend='italic'>Treatise on the Principles of Human +Knowledge</hi>; that so the notion might steal unawares upon +the reader, who probably might never have meddled with +the book if he had known that it contained such +paradoxes.</q> +</p> + +<p> +With characteristic fervour he disclaims <q>variety and +love of paradox</q> as motives of the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +and professes faith in the unreality of abstract unperceived +Matter, a faith which he has held for some years, <q>the +conceit being at first warm in my imagination, but since +carefully examined, both by my own judgment and that +of ingenious friends.</q> What he especially complained +of was <q>that men who have never considered my book +should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the +existence of sensible things, and are not positive as to +any one truth, no, not so much as their own being—which +I find by your letter is the case of some wild visionist +now in London. But whoever reads my book with +attention will see that there is a direct opposition +between the principles that are contained in it and +those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence +of anything we perceive by our senses. I do not deny +the existence of the sensible things which Moses says +were created by God. They existed from all eternity, in +the Divine Intellect; and they became perceptible (i.e. were +created) in the same manner and order as is described +in Genesis. For I take creation to belong to things only +as they respect finite spirits; there being nothing new to +God. Hence it follows that the act of creation consists in +<pb n='354'/><anchor id='Pg354'/> +God's willing that those things should become perceptible +to other spirits which before were known only to Himself. +Now both reason and scripture assure us that there <emph>are</emph> +other spirits besides men, who, 'tis possible, might have +perceived this visible world as it was successively exhibited +to their view before man's creation. Besides, for to +agree with the Mosaic account of the creation, it's sufficient +if we suppose that a man, in case he was existing at the +time of the chaos of sensible things, might have perceived +all things formed out of it, in the very order set down in +scripture; all which is in no way repugnant to my +principles.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Sir John in his next letter, written from London in +October, 1716, reports that the book of <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> had +fallen into the hands of the highest living English authority +in metaphysical theology, Samuel Clarke, who had produced +his <hi rend='italic'>Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God</hi> +four years before. The book had also been read by +Whiston, Newton's successor at Cambridge. <q>I can only +report at second-hand,</q> he says, <q>that they think you a +fair arguer, and a clear writer; but they say your first +principles you lay down are false. They look upon you +as an extraordinary genius, ranking you with Father +Malebranche, Norris, and another whose name I forget, +all of whom they think extraordinary men, but of a particular +turn of mind, and their labours of little use to +mankind, on account of their abstruseness. This may +arise from these gentlemen not caring to think after +a new manner, which would oblige them to begin +their studies anew; or else it may be the strength of +prejudice.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley was vexed by this treatment on the part of +Clarke and Whiston. He sent under Sir John's care a +letter to each of them, hoping through him to discover +<q>their reasons against his notions, as truth is his sole aim.</q> +<q>As to what is said of ranking me with Father Malebranche +<pb n='355'/><anchor id='Pg355'/> +and Mr. Norris, whose writings are thought to be +too fine-spun to be of any great use to mankind, I have +this answer, that I think the notions I embrace are not in +the least agreeing with theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent +with them in the main points, inasmuch as I know +few writers I take myself at bottom to differ more from +than from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what on all +occasions I declare against, and if any one shall shew +anything of that sort in my Treatise I will willingly +correct it.</q> Sir John delivered the letters to two friends of +Clarke and Whiston, and reported that <q>Dr. Clarke told +his friend in reply, that he did not care to write you his +thoughts, because he was afraid it might draw him into a +dispute upon a matter which was already clear to him. +He thought your first principles you go on are false; but +he was a modest man, his friend said, and uninclined to +shock any one whose opinions on things of this nature +differed from his own.</q> This was a disappointment to the +ardent Berkeley. <q>Dr. Clarke's conduct seems a little +surprising,</q> he replies. <q>That an ingenious and candid +person (as I take him to be) should refuse to shew me +where my error lies is something unaccountable. I never +expected that a gentleman otherwise so well employed as +Dr. Clarke should think it worth his while to enter into +a dispute with me concerning any notions of mine. But, +seeing it was clear to him I went upon false principles, +I hoped he would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point +them out to me, that so I may more closely review and +examine them. If he but once did me this favour, he +need not apprehend I should give him any further trouble. +I should be glad if you have opportunity that you +would let his friend know this. There is nothing that +I more desire than to know thoroughly all that can +be said against what I take for truth.</q> Clarke, however, +was not to be drawn. The incident is thus referred to by +Whiston, in his <hi rend='italic'>Memoirs</hi> of Clarke. <q>Mr. Berkeley,</q> he +<pb n='356'/><anchor id='Pg356'/> +says, <q>published in 1710, at Dublin, the metaphysical +notion, that matter was not a real thing<note place='foot'>What Berkeley seeks to shew +is, not that the world of the senses +is unreal, but in what its reality +consists. Is it inexplicable chaos, +or explicable expression of ever +active Intelligence, more or less +interpreted in natural science?</note>; nay, that the +common opinion of its reality was groundless, if not +ridiculous. He was pleased to send Mr. Clarke and +myself each of us a book. After we had perused it, +I went to Mr. Clarke to discourse with him about it, +to this effect, that I, being not a metaphysician, was not +able to answer Mr. Berkeley's subtle premises, though +I did not believe his absurd conclusions. I therefore +desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties, but did +not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's conclusion, would +answer him. <emph>Which task he declined</emph>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +What Clarke's criticism of Berkeley might have been is +suggested by the following sentences in his <hi rend='italic'>Remarks on +Human Liberty</hi>, published seven years after this correspondence: +<q>The case as to the proof of our free agency +is exactly the same as in that notable question, whether +the [material] world exists or no? There is no demonstration +of it from experience. There always remains a bare +possibility that the Supreme Being may have so framed +my mind, that I shall always be necessarily deceived in +every one of my perceptions as in a dream—though +possibly there be no material world, nor any other +creature existing besides myself. And yet no man in +his senses argues from thence, that experience is no proof +to us of the existence of things. The bare physical +possibility too of our being so framed by the Author of +Nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by +every experience of every action we perform, is no more +any ground to doubt the truth of our liberty, than the +bare natural possibility of our being all our lifetime in a +dream, deceived in our [natural] belief of the existence of +<pb n='357'/><anchor id='Pg357'/> +the material world, is any just ground to doubt the reality +of its existence.</q> Berkeley would hardly have accepted +this analogy. Does the conception of a material world +being dependent on percipient mind for its reality imply +<emph>deception</emph> on the part of the <q>Supreme Being</q>? <q>Dreams,</q> +in ordinary language, may signify illusory fancies during +sleep, and so understood the term is misapplied to a universally +mind-dependent universe with its steady natural +order. Berkeley disclaims emphatically any doubt of +the reality of the sensible world, and professes only to +shew in what its reality consists, or its dependence upon +percipient life as the indispensable realising factor. To +suppose that we can be <q>necessarily deceived in every one +of our perceptions</q> is to interpret the universe atheistically, +and virtually obliges us in final nescience to acknowledge +that it is wholly uninterpretable; so that experience is +impossible, because throughout unintelligible. The moral +trustworthiness or perfect goodness of the Universal Power +is I suppose the fundamental postulate of science and +human life. If all our temporal experience can be called +a dream it must at any rate be a dream of the sort supposed +by Leibniz. <q>Nullo argumento absolute demonstrari +potest, dari corpora; nec quidquam prohibet <emph>somnia +quædam bene ordinata</emph> menti nostræ, objecta esse, quæ +a nobis vera judicentur, et ob consensum inter se quoad +usum veris equivalent<note place='foot'>Leibniz: <hi rend='italic'>De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis</hi> +(1707).</note>.</q> +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The three <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> discuss what Berkeley regarded +as the most plausible Objections, popular and philosophical, +to his account of living Mind or Spirit, as the +indispensable factor and final cause of the reality of the +material world. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The principal aim of the <hi rend='italic'>First Dialogue</hi> is to illustrate +<pb n='358'/><anchor id='Pg358'/> +the contradictory or unmeaning character and sceptical +tendency of the common philosophical opinion—that we +perceive in sense a material world which is <emph>real</emph> only +in as far as it can exist in absolute independence of perceiving +mind. The impossibility of any of the qualities +in which Matter is manifested to man—the primary +qualities not less than the secondary—having real existence +in a mindless or unspiritual universe is argued +and illustrated in detail. Abstract Matter, unrealised +in terms of percipient life, is meaningless, and the material +world becomes real only in and through living +perception. And Matter, as an abstract substance without +qualities, cannot, without a contradiction, it is also +argued, be presented or represented, in sense. What +is called <emph>matter</emph> is thus melted in a spiritual solution, +from which it issues the flexible and intelligible medium +of intercourse for spiritual beings such as men are; +whose faculties moreover are educated in interpreting +the cosmical order of the phenomena presented to their +senses. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Second Dialogue</hi> is in the first place directed against +modifications of the scholastic account of Matter, which +attributes our knowledge of it to inference, founded on +sense-ideas assumed to be representative, or not presentative +of the reality. The advocates of Matter independent +and supreme, are here assailed in their various +conjectures—that this Matter may be the active Cause, +or the Instrument, or the Occasion of our sense-experience; +or that it is an Unknowable Something somehow +connected with that experience. It is argued in +this and in the preceding Dialogue, by <hi rend='italic'>Philonous</hi> (who +personates Berkeley), that unrealised Matter—intending +by that term either a qualified substance, or a Something +of which we cannot affirm anything—is not merely unproved, +but a proved impossibility: it must mean nothing, +<pb n='359'/><anchor id='Pg359'/> +or it must mean a contradiction, which comes to the +same thing. It is not <emph>perceived</emph>; nor can it be <emph>suggested</emph> +by what we perceive; nor <emph>demonstrated</emph> by reasoning; +nor <emph>believed in</emph> as an article in the fundamental faith of +intuitive reason. The only consistent theory of the universe +accordingly implies that concrete realities must all +be either (a) phenomena presented to the senses, or +else (b) active spirits percipient of presented phenomena. +And neither of these two sorts of concrete +realities is strictly speaking independent of the other; +although the latter, identical amid the variations of +the sensuous phenomena, are deeper and more real than +the mere data of the senses. The <hi rend='italic'>Second Dialogue</hi> +ends by substituting, as concrete and intelligible Realism, +the universal and constant dependence of the material +world upon active living Spirit, in place of the abstract +hypothetical and unintelligible Realism, which +defends Matter unrealised in percipient life, as the type +of reality. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In the <hi rend='italic'>Third Dialogue</hi> plausible objections to this conception +of what the reality of the material world means +are discussed. +</p> + +<p> +Is it said that the new conception is sceptical, and +Berkeley another Protagoras, on account of it? His +answer is, that the <emph>reality</emph> of sensible things, as far as +man can in any way be concerned with them, does +not consist in what cannot be perceived, suggested, +demonstrated, or even conceived, but in phenomena +actually seen and touched, and in the working faith +that future sense-experience may be anticipated by the +analogies of present sense-experience. +</p> + +<p> +But is not this negation of the Matter that is assumed +to be real and independent of Spirit, an unproved conjecture? +It is answered, that the affirmation of this +abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture, and one self-convicted +<pb n='360'/><anchor id='Pg360'/> +by its implied contradictions, while its negation +is only a simple falling back on the facts of experience, +without any attempt to explain them. +</p> + +<p> +Again, is it objected that the <emph>reality</emph> of sensible things +involves their continued reality during intervals of our +perception of them? It is answered, that sensible +things are indeed permanently dependent on Mind, +but not on this, that, or the other finite embodied +spirit. +</p> + +<p> +Is it further alleged that the reality of Spirit or +Mind is open to all the objections against independent +Matter; and that, if we deny <emph>this</emph> Matter, we must in +consistency allow that Spirit can be only a succession +of isolated feelings? The answer is, that there is no +parity between self-conscious Spirit, and Matter out of +all relation to any Spirit. We find, in memory, our own +personality and identity; that <emph>we</emph> are not our ideas, <q>but +somewhat else</q>—a thinking, active principle, that perceives, +knows, wills, and operates about ideas, and that +is revealed as continuously real. Each person is conscious +of himself; and may reasonably infer the existence +of other self-conscious persons, more or less like what +he is conscious of in himself. A universe of self-conscious +persons, with their common sensuous experiences +all under cosmical order, is not open to the contradictions +involved in a pretended universe of Matter, independent +of percipient realising Spirit. +</p> + +<p> +Is it still said that sane people cannot help distinguishing +between the <emph>real existence</emph> of a thing and +its <emph>being perceived</emph>? It is answered, that all they are +entitled to mean is, to distinguish between being +perceived exclusively by me, and being independent +of the perception of all sentient or conscious beings. +</p> + +<p> +Does an objector complain that this ideal realism dissolves +the distinction between facts and fancies? He +is reminded of the meaning of the word <emph>idea</emph>. That term +<pb n='361'/><anchor id='Pg361'/> +is not limited by Berkeley to chimeras of fancy: it is +applied also to the objective phenomena of our sense-experience. +</p> + +<p> +Is the supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause +of all changes in nature declaimed against as baseless? +It is answered, that the supposition of unthinking Power +at the heart of the cosmos of sensible phenomena is +absurd. +</p> + +<p> +Is the negation of Abstract Matter repugnant to the +common belief of mankind? It is argued in reply, that +this unrealised Matter is foreign to common belief, which +is incapable of even entertaining the conception; and +which only requires to reflect upon what it does entertain +to be satisfied with a relative or ideal reality for +sensible things. +</p> + +<p> +But, if sensible things are the real things, the real +moon, for instance, it is alleged, can be only a foot +in diameter. It is maintained, in opposition to this, that +the term <emph>real moon</emph> is applied only to what is an inference +from the moon, one foot in diameter, which +we immediately perceive; and that the former is a +part of our previsive or mediate inference, due to what +is perceived. +</p> + +<p> +The dispute, after all, is merely verbal, it is next +objected; and, since all parties refer the data of the +senses and the <emph>things</emph> which they compose to <emph>a</emph> Power +external to each finite percipient, why not call that +Power, whatever it may be, Matter, and not Spirit? The +reply is, that this would be an absurd misapplication +of language. +</p> + +<p> +But may we not, it is next suggested, assume the possibility +of a third nature—neither idea nor Spirit? Not, +replies Philonous, if we are to keep to the rule of having +meaning in the words we use. We know what is meant +by a spirit, for each of us has immediate experience of +one; and we know what is meant by sense-ideas and +<pb n='362'/><anchor id='Pg362'/> +sensible things, for we have immediate and mediate +experience of them. But we have no immediate, and +therefore can have no mediate, experience of what is +neither perceived by our senses, nor realised in inward +consciousness: moreover, <q>entia non sunt multiplicanda +praeter necessitatem.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Again, this conception of the realities implies, it is said, +imperfection, because sentient experience, in God. This +objection, it is answered, implies a confusion between +being actually sentient and merely conceiving sensations, +and employing them, as God does, as signs for expressing +His conceptions to our minds. +</p> + +<p> +Further, the negation of independent powerful Matter +seems to annihilate the explanations of physical phenomena +given by natural philosophers. But, to be assured that +it does not, we have only to recollect what physical explanation +means—that it is the reference of an apparently +irregular phenomenon to some acknowledged general rule +of co-existence or succession among sense-ideas. It is +interpretation of sense-signs. +</p> + +<p> +Is the proposed ideal Realism summarily condemned +as a novelty? It can be answered, that all discoveries +are novelties at first; and moreover that this one is +not so much a novelty as a deeper interpretation of the +common faith. +</p> + +<p> +Yet it seems, at any rate, it is said, to change real +things into mere ideas. Here consider on the contrary +what we mean when we speak of sensible things as +real. The changing appearances of which we are percipient +in sense, united objectively in their cosmical +order, are what is truly meant by the realities of sense. +</p> + +<p> +But this reality is inconsistent with the <emph>continued identity</emph> +of material things, it is complained, and also with the +fact that different persons can be percipient of the <emph>same</emph> +thing. Not so, Berkeley explains, when we attend to +the true meaning of the word <emph>same</emph>, and dismiss from +<pb n='363'/><anchor id='Pg363'/> +our thoughts a supposed abstract idea of identity which +is nonsensical. +</p> + +<p> +But some may exclaim against the supposition that +the material world exists in mind, regarding this as an +implied assertion that mind is extended, and therefore +material. This proceeds, it is replied, on forgetfulness +of what <q>existence in mind</q> means. It is intended +to express the fact that matter is real in being an +objective appearance of which a living mind is sensible. +</p> + +<p> +Lastly, is not the Mosaic account of the creation of +Matter inconsistent with the perpetual dependence of +Matter for its reality upon percipient Spirit? It is +answered that the conception of creation being dependent +on the existence of finite minds is in perfect +harmony with the Mosaic account: it is what is +seen and felt, not what is unseen and unfelt, that is +created. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Third Dialogue</hi> closes with a representation of +the new principle regarding Matter being the harmony of +two apparently discordant propositions—the one-sided +proposition of ordinary common sense; and the one-sided +proposition of the philosophers. It agrees with +the mass of mankind in holding that the material world +is actually presented to our senses, and with the +philosophers in holding that this same material world is +realised only in and through the percipient experience of +living Spirit. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Most of the objections to Berkeley's conception of +Matter which have been urged in the last century and +a half, by its British, French, and German critics, are +discussed by anticipation in these <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. The history +of objections is very much a history of misconceptions. +Conceived or misconceived, it has tacitly simplified and +<pb n='364'/><anchor id='Pg364'/> +purified the methods of physical science, especially in +Britain and France. +</p> + +<p> +The first elaborate criticism of Berkeley by a British +author is found in Andrew Baxter's <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry into the +Nature of the Human Soul</hi>, published in 1735, in the +section entitled <q>Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the +existence of Matter examined, and shewn to be inconclusive.</q> +Baxter alleges that the new doctrine tends to +encourage scepticism. To deny Matter, for the reasons +given, involves, according to this critic, denial of mind, +and so a universal doubt. Accordingly, a few years +later, Hume sought, in his <hi rend='italic'>Treatise of Human Nature</hi>, to +work out Berkeley's negation of abstract Matter into sceptical +phenomenalism—against which Berkeley sought to +guard by anticipation, in a remarkable passage introduced +in his last edition of these <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +In Scotland the writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, +Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, and Sir W. Hamilton +form a magazine of objections. Reid—who curiously +seeks to refute Berkeley by refuting, not more clearly +than Berkeley had done before him, the hypothesis of a +wholly representative sense-perception—urges the spontaneous +belief or common sense of mankind, which obliges +us all to recognise a direct presentation of the external +material world to our senses. He overlooks what +with Berkeley is the only question in debate, namely, +the meaning of the term <emph>external</emph>; for, Reid and Berkeley +are agreed in holding to the reality of a world regulated +independently of the will of finite percipients, and +is sufficiently objective to be a medium of social intercourse. +With Berkeley, as with Reid, <emph>this</emph> is practically +self-evident. The same objection, more scientifically defined—that +we have a natural belief in the existence of +Matter, and in our own immediate perception of its +qualities—is Sir W. Hamilton's assumption against Berkeley; +but Hamilton does not explain the reality thus +<pb n='365'/><anchor id='Pg365'/> +claimed for it. <q>Men naturally believe,</q> he says, <q>that +<emph>they themselves</emph> exist—because they are conscious of +a Self or Ego; they believe that <emph>something different +from themselves</emph> exists—because they believe that they +are conscious of this Not-self or Non-ego.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Discussions</hi>, +p. 193.) Now, the existence of a Power +that is independent of each finite Ego is at the root +of Berkeley's principles. According to Berkeley and +Hamilton alike, we are immediately percipient of solid +and extended phenomena; but with Berkeley the phenomena +are dependent on, at the same time that they are +<q>entirely distinct</q> from, the percipient. The Divine +and finite spirits, signified by the phenomena that +are presented to our senses in cosmical order, form +Berkeley's external world. +</p> + +<p> +That Berkeley sows the seeds of Universal Scepticism; +that his conception of Matter involves the Panegoism +or Solipsism which leaves me in absolute solitude; +that his is virtually a system of Pantheism, +inconsistent with personal individuality and moral responsibility—these +are probably the three most comprehensive +objections that have been alleged against it. They are +in a measure due to Berkeley's imperfect criticism of +first principles, in his dread of a departure from the +concrete data of experience in quest of empty abstractions. +</p> + +<p> +In England and France, Berkeley's criticism of Matter, +taken however only on its negative side, received a +countenance denied to it in Germany. Hartley and +Priestley shew signs of affinity with Berkeley. Also +an anonymous <hi rend='italic'>Essay on the Nature and Existence of +the Material World</hi>, dedicated to Dr. Priestley and Dr. +Price, which appeared in 1781, is an argument, on empirical +grounds, which virtually makes the data of the +senses at last a chaos of isolated sensations. The +author of the <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi> is said to have been a certain +<pb n='366'/><anchor id='Pg366'/> +Russell, who died in the West Indies in the end of +the eighteenth century. A tendency towards Berkeley's +negations, but apart from his synthetic principles, appears +in James Mill and J.S. Mill. So too with Voltaire and +the Encyclopedists. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous</hi> were published +in London in 1713, <q>printed by G. James, for +Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in St. Paul's churchyard,</q> +unlike the <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi> and the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, which +first appeared in Dublin. The second edition, which is +simply a reprint, issued in 1725, <q>printed for William +and John Innys, at the West End of St. Paul's.</q> A +third, the last in the author's lifetime, <q>printed by Jacob +Tonson,</q> which contains some important additions, +was published in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of +the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>. The <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> were reprinted in 1776, in +the same volume with the edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles, with +Remarks</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> have been translated into French and +German. The French version appeared at Amsterdam +in 1750. The translator's name is not given, but it is +attributed to the Abbé Jean Paul de Gua de Malves<note place='foot'>For some information relative +to Gua de Malves, see Querard's +<hi rend='italic'>La France Littéraire,</hi> tom. iii. p. 494.</note>, +by Barbier, in his <hi rend='italic'>Dictionnaire des Ouvrages anonymes +et pseudonymes</hi>, tom. i. p. 283. It contains a Prefatory +Note by the translator, with three curious vignettes +(given in the note below) meant to symbolise the +leading thought in each Dialogue<note place='foot'><p>The following is the translator's +Prefatory Note, on the objects of +the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues,</hi> and in explanation +of the three illustrative vignettes:— +</p> +<p> +<q rend='pre'>L'Auteur expose dans le premier +Dialogue le sentiment du Vulgaire +et celui des Philosophes, sur les +qualités secondaires et premieres, +la nature et l'existence des corps; +et il prétend prouver en même tems +l'insuffisance de l'un et de l'autre. +La Vignette qu'on voit à la téte du +Dialogue, fait allusion à cet objet. +Elle représente un Philosophe dans +son cabinet, lequel est distrait de +son travail par un enfant qu'il appercoit +se voyant lui-méme dans +un miroir, en tendant les mains +pour embrasser sa propre image. +Le Philosophe rit de l'erreur où il +croit que tombe l'enfant; tandis +qu'on lui applique à lui-même ces +mots tirés d'Horace:</q> +</p> +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Quid rides?....de te<lb/> +Fabula narratur.</hi> +</p> +<p> +<q rend='pre'>Le second Dialogue est employé +à exposer le sentiment de l'Auteur +sur le même sujet, sçavoir, que +les choses corporelles ont une +existence réelle dans les esprits +qui les apperçoivent; mais qu'elles +ne sçauroient exister hors de tous +les esprits à la fois, même de l'esprit +infini de Dieu; et que par +conséquent la Matière, prise suivant +l'acception ordinaire du mot, non +seulement n'existe point, mais seroit +même absolument impossible. On +a taché de représenter aux yeux +ce sentiment dans la Vignette du +Dialogue. Le mot grec νοῦς qui +signifie <emph>âme</emph>, désigne l'àme: les +rayons qui en partent marquent +l'attention que l'âme donne à des +idées ou objets; les tableaux qu'on +a placés aux seuls endroits où les +rayons aboutissent, et dont les +sujets sont tirés de la description des +beautés de la nature, qui se trouve +dans le livre, représentent les idées +ou objets que l'âme considère, pas +le secours des facultes qu'elle a +reçues de Dieu; et l'action de +l'Étre suprème sur l'âme est figurée +par un trait, qui, partant d'un triangle, +symbole de la Divinité, et +perçant les nuages dont le triangle +est environné. s'étend jusqu'à l'âme +pour la vivifier; enfin, on a fait +en sorte de rendre le même sentiment +par ces mots:</q> +</p> +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Quæ noscere cumque Deus det,<lb/> +Esse puta.</hi> +</p> +<p> +<q rend='pre'>L'objet du troisième Dialogue +est de répondre aux difficultés auxquelles +le sentiment qu'on a établi +dans les Dialogues précédens, peut +être sujet, de l'éclaircir en cette +sorte de plus, d'en développer toutes +les heureuses conséquences, enfin +de faire voir, qu'étant bien entendu, +il revient aux notions les plus communes. +Et comme l'Auteur exprime +à la fin du livre cette dernière pensée, +en comparant ce qu'il vient de dire, +à l'eau que les deux Interlocuteurs +sont supposés voir jaillir d'un jet, +et qu'il remarque que la même force +de la gravité fait élever jusqu'à une +certaine hauteur et retomber ensuite +dans le bassin d'où elle étoit d'abord +partie; on a pris cet emblême pour +le sujet de la Vignette de ce Dialogue; +on a représenté en conséquence +dans cette dernière Vignette +les deux Interlocuteurs, se promenant +dans le lieu où l'Auteur les +suppose, et s'entretenant là-dessus, +et pour donner au Lecteur l'explication +de l'emblême, on a mis au bas +le vers suivant:</q> +</p> +<p> +<q rend='post'><hi rend='italic'>Urget aquas vis sursum, eadem flectitque deorsum.</hi></q> +</p></note>. A German translation, +<pb n='367'/><anchor id='Pg367'/> +by John Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of +Philosophy in Rostock, was published at Rostock in +1756. It forms the larger part of a volume entitled +<hi rend='italic'>Sammlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die Wirklichkeit +ihres eignen Körpers und der ganzen Körperwelt läugnen</hi>. +This professed Collection of the most eminent authors +<pb n='368'/><anchor id='Pg368'/> +who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies +and of the whole material world, consists of Berkeley's +<hi rend='italic'>Dialogues,</hi> and Arthur Collier's <hi rend='italic'>Clavis Universalis</hi>, or +<hi rend='italic'>Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an +<pb n='369'/><anchor id='Pg369'/> +External World</hi>. The volume contains some annotations, +and an Appendix in which a counter-demonstration of the +existence of Matter is attempted. Eschenbach's principal +argument is indirect, and of the nature of a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>reductio ad +absurdum</foreign>. He argues (as others have done) that the +reasons produced against the independent reality of Matter +are equally conclusive against the independent reality +of Spirit. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +An interesting circumstance connected with the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues +between Hylas and Philonous</hi> was the appearance, also in +1713, of the <hi rend='italic'>Clavis Universalis</hi>, or demonstration of the +impossibility of Matter, of Arthur Collier, in which the +merely ideal existence of the sensible world is maintained. +The production, simultaneously, without concert, of conceptions +of the material world which verbally at least have +much in common, is a curious coincidence. It shews +that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in +England contained elements favourable to a reconsideration +of the ultimate meaning of Matter. They are both the +genuine produce of the age of Locke and Malebranche. +Neither Berkeley nor Collier were, when they published +their books, familiar with ancient Greek speculations; +those of modern Germany had only begun to loom in +the distance. Absolute Idealism, the Panphenomenalism +of Auguste Comte, and the modern evolutionary conception +of nature, have changed the conditions under which the +universal problem is studied, and are making intelligible +to this generation a manner of conceiving the Universe +which, for nearly a century and a half, the British and +French critics of Berkeley were unable to entertain. +</p> + +<p> +Berkeley's <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> appeared three years before the +<hi rend='italic'>Clavis Universalis</hi>. Yet Collier tells us that it was <q>after +a ten years' pause and deliberation,</q> that, <q>rather than +the world should finish its course without once offering +to inquire in what manner it exists,</q> he had <q>resolved +<pb n='370'/><anchor id='Pg370'/> +to put himself upon the trial of the common reader, without +pretending to any better art of gaining him than dry +reason and metaphysical demonstration.</q> Mr. Benson, +his biographer, says that it was in 1703, at the age of +twenty-three, that Collier came to the conclusion that +<q>there is no such thing as an external world</q>; and he +attributes the premises from which Collier drew this +conclusion to his neighbour, John Norris. Among Collier's +MSS., there remains the outline of an essay, in three +chapters, dated January, 1708, on the non-externality of +the <emph>visible</emph> world. +</p> + +<p> +There are several coincidences between Berkeley and +Collier. Berkeley virtually presented his new theory of +Vision as the first instalment of his explanation of the Reality +of Matter. The first of the two Parts into which Collier's +<hi rend='italic'>Clavis</hi> is divided consists of proofs that the Visible World +is not, and cannot be, external. Berkeley, in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +and the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>, explains the reality of Matter. In like +manner the Second Part of the <hi rend='italic'>Clavis</hi> consists of reasonings +in proof of the impossibility of an external world +independent of Spirit. Finally, in his full-blown theory, +as well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted, +as intuitively known, the existence of sensible Matter; +meaning by this, its relative existence, or dependence +on living Mind. The third proposition of Collier's +system asserts the real existence of visible matter in +particular, and of sensible matter in general. +</p> + +<p> +The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magnitudes +and situations, and their suggestion by interpretation +of visual symbols, propositions which occupy so large +a space in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, have no counterpart +in Collier. His proof of the non-externality of +the visible world consists of an induction of instances +of visible objects that are allowed by all not to be external, +although they seem to be as much so as any that are +called external. His Demonstration consists of nine proofs, +<pb n='371'/><anchor id='Pg371'/> +which may be compared with the reasonings and analyses +of Berkeley. Collier's Demonstration concludes with +answers to objections, and an application of his account of +the material world to the refutation of the Roman doctrine +of the substantial existence of Christ's body in the +Eucharist. +</p> + +<p> +The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, and his +pervading recognition of the distinction between physical +or symbolical, and efficient or originative causation, are +wanting in the narrow reasonings of Collier. Berkeley's +more comprehensive philosophy, with its human +sympathies and beauty of style, is now recognised as +a striking expression and partial solution of fundamental +problems, while Collier is condemned to the obscurity of +the Schools<note place='foot'>Collier never came fairly in sight +of the philosophical public of last +century. He is referred to in Germany +by Bilfinger, in his <hi rend='italic'>Dilucidationes +Philosophicæ</hi> (1746), and also +in the <hi rend='italic'>Ada Eruditorum</hi>, Suppl. VI. +244, &c., and in England by Corry +in his <hi rend='italic'>Reflections on Liberty and +Necessity</hi> (1761), as well as in the +<hi rend='italic'>Remarks</hi> on the Reflections, and +<hi rend='italic'>Answers</hi> to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8 +(1763), where he is described as +<q>a weak reasoner, and a very dull +writer also.</q> Collier was dragged +from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in +his <hi rend='italic'>Essays on the Intellectual Powers</hi>, +Essay II. ch. 10. He was a subject +of correspondence between Sir +James Mackintosh, then at Bombay, +and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity +to Dugald Stewart. A beautiful +reprint of the <hi rend='italic'>Clavis</hi> (of the +original edition of which only seven +copies were then known to exist) +appeared in Edinburgh in 1836; +and in the following year it was +included in a collection of <hi rend='italic'>Metaphysical +Tracts by English Philosophers +of the Eighteenth Century</hi>, +prepared for the press by Dr. Parr.</note>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='373'/><anchor id='Pg373'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Dedication</head> + +<p> +TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE +THE +LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON<note place='foot'>William, fourth Lord Berkeley +of Stratton, born about 1663, succeeded +his brother in 1697, and died +in 1741 at Bruton in Somersetshire. +The Berkeleys of Stratton +were descended from a younger +son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley +of Berkeley Castle, who died in +1326. His descendant, Sir John +Berkeley of Bruton, a zealous +Royalist, was created first Lord +Berkeley of Stratton in 1658, and +in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of +Ireland, an office which he held +till 1672, when he was succeeded +by the Earl of Essex (see Burke's +<hi rend='italic'>Extinct Peerages</hi>). It is said that +Bishop Berkeley's father was related +to him. The Bishop himself +was introduced by Dean Swift, in +1713, to the Lord Berkeley of Stratton, +to whom the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> are dedicated, +as <q>a cousin of his Lordship.</q> +The title of Berkeley of Stratton +became extinct on the death of the +fifth Lord in 1773.</note>, +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, +CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND +ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST +HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. +</quote> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>My Lord</hi>, +</p> + +<p> +The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged +to distinguish your character, would tempt me +to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in +giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour: +and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great +Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy +in the favour of your sovereign, and the honours she +has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any +application from your lordship, but entirely to her majesty's +own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit, +<pb n='374'/><anchor id='Pg374'/> +and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is +prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour +to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged +by the favour you have treated me with to address these +papers to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious +of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise could +not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person +of your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable +distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of +Philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +I am, with the greatest respect, +</p> + +<p> +My Lord, +</p> + +<p> +Your lordship's most obedient and<lb/> +most humble servant, +</p> + +<p> +GEORGE BERKELEY. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='375'/><anchor id='Pg375'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Preface<note place='foot'>This interesting Preface is omitted in his last edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>.</note></head> + +<p> +Though it seems the general opinion of the world, no +less than the design of nature and providence, that the +end of speculation be Practice, or the improvement and +regulation of our lives and actions; yet those who are +most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally +of another mind. And indeed if we consider the pains +that have been taken to perplex the plainest things, that +distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those +abstractions and refinements that occur in the very +entrance of the sciences; it will not seem strange that +men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out +in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the practical +parts of life, or informing themselves in the more +necessary and important parts of knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are +not assured of the existence of things from their being +perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their <emph>real</emph> +nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence +arise scepticism and paradoxes. It is not enough that +we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true +nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For, +though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made +it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, +reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those +things which other men evidently know, and believing +those things which they laugh at and despise. +</p> + +<p> +In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man +from vain researches, it seemed necessary to inquire +into the source of its perplexities; and, if possible, to +<pb n='376'/><anchor id='Pg376'/> +lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them, +together with their own native evidence, may at once +recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and +rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in. +Which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate +Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality +of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, +as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice +of virtue. +</p> + +<p> +This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise +concerning the <hi rend='italic'>Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>, published +in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to publish the +Second Part<note place='foot'>The Second Part of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> +was never published, and only +in part written. See Editor's +Preface to the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>.</note>, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly +and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and +to place them in a new light. Which is the business +of the following <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +In this Treatise, which does not presuppose in the +reader any knowledge of what was contained in the +former, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I +advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar +manner; especially because they carry with them a great +opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which have +so far prevailed against the common sense and natural +notions of mankind. +</p> + +<p> +If the Principles which I here endeavour to propagate +are admitted for true, the consequences which, I think, +evidently flow from thence are, that Atheism and Scepticism +will be utterly destroyed, many intricate points made +plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of +science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and +men reduced from paradoxes to common sense. +</p> + +<p> +And although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion +to some, that when they have taken a circuit through +so many refined and unvulgar notions, they should at +last come to think like other men; yet, methinks, this +return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wandered +through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. +It is like coming home from a long voyage: +a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties +<pb n='377'/><anchor id='Pg377'/> +and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart +at ease, and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for +the future. +</p> + +<p> +As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels +by reason, so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe +the most rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial +reader, I hope it will be manifest that the sublime notion +of a God, and the comfortable expectation of Immortality, +do naturally arise from a close and methodical application +of thought: whatever may be the result of that loose, +rambling way, not altogether improperly termed Free-thinking +by certain libertines in thought, who can no +more endure the restraints of logic than those of religion +or government. +</p> + +<p> +It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so +far as it tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless +inquiries, it can affect only a few speculative persons. +But if, by their speculations rightly placed, the study of +morality and the law of nature were brought more into +fashion among men of parts and genius, the discouragements +that draw to Scepticism removed, the measures of +right and wrong accurately defined, and the principles of +Natural Religion reduced into regular systems, as artfully +disposed and clearly connected as those of some +other sciences; there are grounds to think these effects +would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the +too much defaced sense of virtue in the world, but also, +by shewing that such parts of revelation as lie within +the reach of human inquiry are most agreeable to right +reason, would dispose all prudent, unprejudiced persons +to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries +which are above the comprehension of our faculties. +</p> + +<p> +It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his +censure of these <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> till he has read them through. +Otherwise, he may lay them aside in a mistake of their +design, or on account of difficulties or objections which +he would find answered in the sequel. A Treatise of +this nature would require to be once read over coherently, +in order to comprehend its design, the proofs, solution +of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its +parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading, +this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain. +<pb n='378'/><anchor id='Pg378'/> +Especially if recourse be had to an Essay I wrote some +years since upon <hi rend='italic'>Vision</hi>, and the Treatise concerning +the <hi rend='italic'>Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>; wherein divers notions +advanced in these <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi> are farther pursued, or placed +in different lights, and other points handled which naturally +tend to confirm and illustrate them. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='379'/><anchor id='Pg379'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The First Dialogue</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Philonous.</hi> Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to +find you abroad so early. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hylas.</hi> It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts +were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last +night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise +and take a turn in the garden. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It happened well, to let you see what innocent +and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can +there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more +delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those +wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon +the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising +sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature +inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too +being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, +which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity +of the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid +I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed very intent +on something. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if +you will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that +I would by any means deprive myself of your company, +for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation +<pb n='380'/><anchor id='Pg380'/> +with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, +that you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> With all my heart, it is what I should have requested +myself if you had not prevented me. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I was considering the odd fate of those men who +have in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished +from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, +pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe +the most extravagant things in the world. This however +might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not +draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage +to mankind. But the mischief lieth here; that when +men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have +spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge +professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing +such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly +received principles, they will be tempted to entertain +suspicions concerning the most important truths, which +they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, sect. 1.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency +of the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical +conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this +way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime +notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. +And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from +metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and +common sense<note place='foot'>Berkeley's philosophy is professedly +a <q>revolt</q> from abstract +ideas to an enlightened sense of concrete +realities. In these Dialogues +<hi rend='italic'>Philonous</hi> personates the revolt, +and represents Berkeley. <hi rend='italic'>Hylas</hi> +vindicates the uncritical conception +of independent Matter.</note>, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, +so that I can now easily comprehend a great +many things which before were all mystery and riddle. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts +I heard of you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray, what were those? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You were represented, in last night's conversation, +as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that +ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is +no such thing as <emph>material substance</emph> in the world. +</p> + +<pb n='381'/><anchor id='Pg381'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That there is no such thing as what <emph>philosophers</emph> +call <emph>material substance</emph>, I am seriously persuaded: but, +if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, +I should then have the same reason to renounce this that +I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What! can anything be more fantastical, more +repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of +Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as <emph>matter</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove +that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, +a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances +to Common Sense, than I who believe no such +thing? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater +than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and +Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my +opinion in this point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Well then, are you content to admit that opinion +for true, which upon examination shall appear most +agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> With all my heart. Since you are for raising +disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content +for once to hear what you have to say. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a <emph>sceptic</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I mean what all men mean—one that doubts of +everything. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> He then who entertains no doubt concerning +some particular point, with regard to that point cannot +be thought a sceptic. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the +affirmative or negative side of a question? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> In neither; for whoever understands English cannot +but know that <emph>doubting</emph> signifies a suspense between +both. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> He then that denies any point, can no more be +said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same +degree of assurance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And, consequently, for such his denial is no more +to be esteemed a sceptic than the other. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge it. +</p> + +<pb n='382'/><anchor id='Pg382'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you +pronounce me a <emph>sceptic</emph>, because I deny what you affirm, to +wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can +tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your +affirmation. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my +definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse +is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a <emph>sceptic</emph> was +one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, +or who denies the reality and truth of things. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What things? Do you mean the principles and +theorems of sciences? But these you know are universal +intellectual notions, and consequently independent of +Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the +denying them<note place='foot'>Berkeley's zeal against Matter +in the abstract, and all abstract +ideas of concrete things, is therefore +not necessarily directed against +<q>universal intellectual notions</q>—<q>the +principles and theorems of +sciences.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I grant it. But are there no other things? What +think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real +existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing +of them. Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a +<emph>sceptic</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that +denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the +greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he +is to be esteemed the greatest <emph>sceptic</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is what I desire. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What mean you by Sensible Things? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Those things which are perceived by the senses. +Can you imagine that I mean anything else? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to +apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our +inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. +Are those things only perceived by the senses which are +perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be +said to be <emph>sensible</emph> which are perceived mediately, or not +without the intervention of others? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do not sufficiently understand you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> In reading a book, what I immediately perceive +<pb n='383'/><anchor id='Pg383'/> +are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, +are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, +&c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or +perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know +whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, certainly: it were absurd to think <emph>God</emph> or <emph>virtue</emph> +sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested +to the mind by sensible marks, with which they +have an arbitrary connexion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then, that by <emph>sensible things</emph> you mean +those only which can be perceived <emph>immediately</emph> by sense? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one +part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason +doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of +that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be +a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It doth. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, +yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be +hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, +that I feel the cause of its heat or weight? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell +you once for all, that by <emph>sensible things</emph> I mean those only +which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses +perceive nothing which they do not perceive <emph>immediately</emph>: +for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of +causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which +alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason<note place='foot'>Here <q>reason</q> means reasoning +or inference. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision +Vindicated</hi>, sect. 42, including the +distinction between <q>suggestion</q> +and <q>inference.</q></note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> This point then is agreed between us—That <emph>sensible +things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense</emph>. +You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive +by sight anything beside light, and colours, and +figures<note place='foot'><q>figure</q> as well as colour, is +here included among the original +data of sight.</note>; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, +anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or +by the touch, more than tangible qualities. +</p> + +<pb n='384'/><anchor id='Pg384'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> We do not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible +qualities, there remains nothing sensible? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I grant it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Sensible things therefore are nothing else but +so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible +qualities? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> <emph>Heat</emph> then is a sensible thing? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Doth the <emph>reality</emph> of sensible things consist in being +perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being +perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To <emph>exist</emph> is one thing, and to be <emph>perceived</emph> is another. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I speak with regard to sensible things only. And +of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a +subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their +being perceived? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and +without any relation to, their being perceived. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must +exist without the mind<note place='foot'><q>without the mind,</q> i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It must. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible +to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is +there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and +deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me know that +reason. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we +may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What! the greatest as well as the least? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect +of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the +greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, +if there is any difference, we are more certain of +its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser +degree. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But is not the most vehement and intense degree +of heat a very great pain? +</p> + +<pb n='385'/><anchor id='Pg385'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No one can deny it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or +pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is your material substance a senseless being, or a +being endowed with sense and perception? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is senseless without doubt. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It cannot therefore be the subject of pain? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> By no means. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived +by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I grant it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What shall we say then of your external object; is +it a material Substance, or no? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is a material substance with the sensible qualities +inhering in it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How then can a great heat exist in it, since you +own it cannot in a material substance? I desire you +would clear this point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding +intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that +pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence +or effect of it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you +perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct +sensations? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But one simple sensation. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is not the heat immediately perceived? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And the pain? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived +at the same time, and the fire affects you only with +one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this +same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, +and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense +heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular +sort of pain. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It seems so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can +conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or +pleasure. +</p> + +<pb n='386'/><anchor id='Pg386'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible +pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular +idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi>—I do not find that I can. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is +nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an +intense degree? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin +to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind +perceiving it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What! are you then in that sceptical state of +suspense, between affirming and denying? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I think I may be positive in the point. A very +violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It hath not therefore, according to you, any <emph>real</emph> +being? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in +nature really hot? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. +I only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, did you not say before that all degrees of +heat were equally real; or, if there was any difference, that +the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True: but it was because I did not then consider +the ground there is for distinguishing between them, +which I now plainly see. And it is this: because intense +heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful +sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving +being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in +an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no +reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to +exist in such a substance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But how shall we be able to discern those degrees +of heat which exist only in the mind from those which +exist without it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is no difficult matter. You know the least +pain cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree +of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all +other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same +of them. +</p> + +<pb n='387'/><anchor id='Pg387'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I think you granted before that no unperceiving +being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I did. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of +heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What then? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in +an unperceiving substance, or body. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> So it seems. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that +are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in +a thinking substance; may we not conclude that external +bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat +whatsoever? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident +that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is +a pain. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure +as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small +pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I could rather call it an <emph>indolence</emph>! It seems to be +nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. +And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an +unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or +a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to +convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own +sense. But what think you of cold? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of +cold is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive +a great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the +mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser +degree of heat. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application +to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must +be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth +in them; and those, upon whose application we feel a like +degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They must. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads +a man into an absurdity? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without doubt it cannot. +</p> + +<pb n='388'/><anchor id='Pg388'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing +should be at the same time both cold and warm? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other +cold, and that they are both at once put into the same +vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the +water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 14.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It will. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to +conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, +that is, according to your own concession, to believe an +absurdity? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I confess it seems so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently, the principles themselves are false, +since you have granted that no true principle leads to an +absurdity. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to +say, <emph>there is no heat in the fire</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, +in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same +judgment? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> We ought. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend +and divide the fibres of your flesh? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It doth. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any +more? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It doth not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation +itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in +the pin; you should not, conformably to what you have +now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or +anything like it, to be in the fire. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield +this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are +only sensations existing in our minds. But there still +remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external +things. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear +that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible +<pb n='389'/><anchor id='Pg389'/> +qualities<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 14, 15.</note>, and that they can no more be supposed to exist +without the mind, than heat and cold? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Then indeed you will have done something to the +purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Let us examine them in order. What think you +of <emph>tastes</emph>—do they exist without the mind, or no? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is +sweet, or wormwood bitter? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular +kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or +pain? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I grant it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking +corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can +sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree +to them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me +all this time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness +and bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure +and pain; to which I answered simply, that they were. +Whereas I should have thus distinguished:—those qualities, +as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains; but not as +existing in the external objects. We must not therefore +conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or +sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as +perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say +you to this? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse +proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you +defined to be, <emph>the things we immediately perceive by our +senses</emph>. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of, +as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do +they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, +indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which +you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities +exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this +to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell +me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and +<pb n='390'/><anchor id='Pg390'/> +cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities +which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without +the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up +the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though +I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along +with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to +a distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be +plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes +in the same food; since that which one man delights in, +another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was +something really inherent in the food? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge I know not how. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> In the next place, <emph>odours</emph> are to be considered. +And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what +hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? +Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Can you then conceive it possible that they should +exist in an unperceiving thing? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect +those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with +the same smells which we perceive in them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> By no means. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the +other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in +any but a perceiving substance or mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I think so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Then as to <emph>sounds</emph>, what must we think of them: +are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain +from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted +receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, +therefore, must be thought the subject of sound. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What reason is there for that, Hylas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we +perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's +motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear +any sound at all. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And granting that we never hear a sound but when +<pb n='391'/><anchor id='Pg391'/> +some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how +you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is this very motion in the external air that produces +in the mind the sensation of <emph>sound</emph>. For, striking +on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by +the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the +soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called <emph>sound</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What! is sound then a sensation? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular +sensation in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And can any sensation exist without the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in +the air, if by the <emph>air</emph> you mean a senseless substance existing +without the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as +it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the +same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, +and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is +a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a +vibrative or undulatory motion in the air. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I thought I had already obviated that distinction, +by the answer I gave when you were applying it in a like +case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure +then that sound is really nothing but motion? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I am. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with +truth be attributed to motion? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It may. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is then good sense to speak of <emph>motion</emph> as of +a thing that is <emph>loud, sweet, acute, or grave</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is +it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to +sensible sound, or <emph>sound</emph> in the common acceptation of the +word, but not to <emph>sound</emph> in the real and philosophic sense; +which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain +motion of the air? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then there are two sorts of sound—the +one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical +and real? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Even so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And the latter consists in motion? +</p> + +<pb n='392'/><anchor id='Pg392'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I told you so before. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, +the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, certainly; but to the sight and touch. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It should follow then, that, according to you, real +sounds may possibly be <emph>seen</emph> or <emph>felt</emph>, but never <emph>heard</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make +a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of +things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into +sound something oddly; but common language, you know, +is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not +therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic +notions seem uncouth and out of the way. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself +to have gained no small point, since you make so light of +departing from common phrases and opinions; it being +a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are +widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the +general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more +than a philosophical paradox, to say that <emph>real sounds are +never heard</emph>, and that the idea of them is obtained by some +other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to +nature and the truth of things? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after +the concessions already made, I had as well grant that +sounds too have no real being without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge +the same of <emph>colours</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. +Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the +objects? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal +Substances existing without the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And have true and real colours inhering in them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Each visible object hath that colour which we see +in it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How! is there anything visible but what we +perceive by sight? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> There is not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And, do we perceive anything by sense which we +do not perceive immediately? +</p> + +<pb n='393'/><anchor id='Pg393'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> How often must I be obliged to repeat the same +thing? I tell you, we do not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once +more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by +the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted +there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you +still persist in the same opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible +quality, or made up of sensible qualities? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What a question that is! who ever thought it was? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> My reason for asking was, because in saying, <emph>each +visible object hath that colour which we see in it</emph>, you make +visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies +either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or +else that there is something beside sensible qualities perceived +by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed +between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear +consequence, that your <emph>corporeal substance</emph> is nothing +distinct from <emph>sensible qualities</emph><note place='foot'><q>Sensible qualities,</q> i.e. the significant appearances presented in +sense.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You may draw as many absurd consequences as +you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; +but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly +understand my own meaning. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I wish you would make me understand it too. +But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of +corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no +farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the +same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or +some other. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The very same. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What! are then the beautiful red and purple we +see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine +they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark +mist or vapour? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really +in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They +are only apparent colours. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> <emph>Apparent</emph> call you them? how shall we distinguish +these apparent colours from real? +</p> + +<pb n='394'/><anchor id='Pg394'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent +which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer +approach. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which +are discovered by the most near and exact survey. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the +help of a microscope, or by the naked eye? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> By a microscope, doubtless. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But a microscope often discovers colours in an +object different from those perceived by the unassisted +sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to +any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, +viewed through them, would appear in the same colour +which it exhibits to the naked eye. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> And what will you conclude from all this? You +cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours +on objects: because by artificial managements they may be +altered, or made to vanish. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I think it may evidently be concluded from your +own concessions, that all the colours we see with our +naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since +they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection +which is afforded us by a microscope. Then, as to what +you say by way of prevention: I ask you whether the +real and natural state of an object is better discovered by +a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less +sharp? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> By the former without doubt. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not plain from <hi rend='italic'>Dioptrics</hi> that microscopes +make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as +they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally +endowed with a most exquisite sharpness? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently the microscopical representation is +to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of +the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, +by it perceived are more genuine and real than those +perceived otherwise. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I confess there is something in what you say. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that +there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed +<pb n='395'/><anchor id='Pg395'/> +to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness +escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably +small animals perceived by glasses? Must we suppose +they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be +imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving +their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all +other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident they must +see particles less than their own bodies; which will present +them with a far different view in each object from that +which strikes our senses<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. 80-86.</note>? Even our own eyes do not +always represent objects to us after the same manner. In +the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow. +Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose +eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours, +and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not +see the same colours in every object that we do? From +all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are +equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive +are really inherent in any outward object? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It should. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The point will be past all doubt, if you consider +that, in case colours were real properties or affections +inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration +without some change wrought in the very bodies +themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been +said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change +happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of +distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing +itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or +totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining +the same, change but the situation of some objects, and +they shall present different colours to the eye. The same +thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees +of light. And what is more known than that the same +bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from +what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment +of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous +rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause +the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked +eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion +<pb n='396'/><anchor id='Pg396'/> +that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; +and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from +you, what certain distance and position of the object, what +peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or +kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, +and distinguishing it from apparent ones. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all +equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour +really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether +in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is, that +in proportion to the light colours are still more or less +vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours +perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external +objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? +For no external body affects the mind, unless it acts first +on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is +motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise +than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act +on the eye; nor consequently make itself or its properties +perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it +is immediately some contiguous substance, which, operating +on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such is +light. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How! is light then a substance? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but +a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated +with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from +the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate +different motions to the optic nerves; which, +being propagated to the brain, cause therein various +impressions; and these are attended with the sensations +of red, blue, yellow, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then the light doth no more than shake +the optic nerves. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And consequent to each particular motion of the +nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some +particular colour. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And these sensations have no existence without +the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They have not. +</p> + +<pb n='397'/><anchor id='Pg397'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How then do you affirm that colours are in the +light; since by <emph>light</emph> you understand a corporeal substance +external to the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, +I grant cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves +they are only the motions and configurations of certain +insensible particles of matter. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the +immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving +substance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is what I say. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Well then, since you give up the point as to those +sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all +mankind beside, you may hold what you please with regard to +those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my +business to dispute about <emph>them</emph>; only I would advise you +to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we +are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm—<emph>the red and blue +which we see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions +and figures which no man ever did or can see are truly so</emph>. +Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject +to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged +to renounce before in the case of sounds? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand +out any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all +those termed <emph>secondary qualities</emph>, have certainly no existence +without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must +not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of +Matter, or external objects; seeing it is no more than +several philosophers maintain<note place='foot'>Descartes and Locke for example.</note>, who nevertheless are the +farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer +understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities +are by philosophers divided into <emph>Primary</emph> and <emph>Secondary</emph><note place='foot'>On Primary and Secondary +Qualities of Matter, and their mutual +relations, cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 9-15. +See also Descartes, <hi rend='italic'>Meditations</hi>, III, +<hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, I. sect. 69; Malebranche, +<hi rend='italic'>Recherche</hi>, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2; +Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. 8.</note>. +The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, +Motion, and Rest; and these they hold exist really in +Bodies. The latter are those above enumerated; or, +<pb n='398'/><anchor id='Pg398'/> +briefly, <emph>all sensible qualities beside the Primary</emph>; which they +assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing +nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you +are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time +sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers, +but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth +until now. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You are still then of opinion that <emph>extension</emph> and +<emph>figures</emph> are inherent in external unthinking substances? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I am. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But what if the same arguments which are brought +against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these +also? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too +exist only in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it your opinion the very figure and extension +which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object +or material substance? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Have all other animals as good grounds to think +the same of the figure and extension which they see and +feel? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without doubt, if they have any thought at all. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were +bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and +well-being in life? or were they given to men alone for +this end? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I make no question but they have the same use in +all other animals. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled +by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies +which are capable of harming them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own +foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of +some considerable dimension; though at the same time +they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so +many visible points<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. 80.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I cannot deny it. +</p> + +<pb n='399'/><anchor id='Pg399'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And to creatures less than the mite they will seem +yet larger? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They will. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will +to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge +mountain? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> All this I grant. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Can one and the same thing be at the same time +in itself of different dimensions? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That were absurd to imagine. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, from what you have laid down it follows that +both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived +by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser +animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's +foot; that is to say, by your own principles you are led +into an absurdity. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> There seems to be some difficulty in the point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Again, have you not acknowledged that no real +inherent property of any object can be changed without +some change in the thing itself? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I have. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, as we approach to or recede from an object, +the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or +a hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not +therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really +inherent in the object? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own I am at a loss what to think. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Your judgment will soon be determined, if you +will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as +you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted +as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the +water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to +the other? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It was. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, +there is no extension or figure in an object, because to +one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at +the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and +angular? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The very same. But does this latter fact ever +happen? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You may at any time make the experiment, by +<pb n='400'/><anchor id='Pg400'/> +looking with one eye bare, and with the other through +a microscope. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath +to give up <emph>extension</emph>, I see so many odd consequences +following upon such a concession. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Odd, say you? After the concessions already +made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. +[<note place='foot'>What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and +second editions.</note> But, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd, +if the general reasoning which includes all other sensible +qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed +that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an +unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no +figure, or mode of extension, which we can either perceive, +or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really +inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty +there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior +to and distinct from extension, to be the <emph>substratum</emph> of +extension. Be the sensible quality what it will—figure, +or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it should +subsist in that which doth not perceive it.] +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I give up the point for the present, reserving still +a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter +discover any false step in my progress to it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures +and extension being despatched, we proceed next to +<emph>motion</emph>. Can a real motion in any external body be at +the same time both very swift and very slow? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal +proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given +space? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour +moves three times faster than it would in case it described +only a mile in three hours. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And is not time measured by the succession of +ideas in our minds? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And is it not possible ideas should succeed one +another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or +in that of some spirit of another kind? +</p> + +<pb n='401'/><anchor id='Pg401'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently the same body may to another seem +to perform its motion over any space in half the time that +it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to +any other proportion: that is to say, according to your +principles (since the motions perceived are both really in +the object) it is possible one and the same body shall be +really moved the same way at once, both very swift and +very slow. How is this consistent either with common +sense, or with what you just now granted? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I have nothing to say to it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Then as for <emph>solidity</emph>; either you do not mean any +sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our +inquiry: or if you do, it must be either hardness or +resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly +relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems +hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath +greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain +that the resistance I feel is not in the body. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own the very <emph>sensation</emph> of resistance, which is all +you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the <emph>cause</emph> +of that sensation is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But the causes of our sensations are not things +immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible. +This point I thought had been already determined. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem +a little embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> To help you out, do but consider that if <emph>extension</emph> +be once acknowledged to have no existence without the +mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, +solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently suppose +extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly +concerning each of them. In denying extension, you +have denied them all to have any real existence<note place='foot'>Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of <emph>all</emph> +the qualities of sensible things.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why +those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any +real existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If +there is no difference between them, how can this be +accounted for? +</p> + +<pb n='402'/><anchor id='Pg402'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is not my business to account for every opinion +of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which +may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure +and pain being rather annexed to the former than the +latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have +something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the +ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, +it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure +can be in an unperceiving Substance, men are more easily +weaned from believing the external existence of the +Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be +satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the +difference you made between an intense and more +moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real existence, +while you denied it to the other. But, after all, +there is no rational ground for that distinction; for, +surely an indifferent sensation is as truly <emph>a sensation</emph> as +one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should +not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking +subject. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have +somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and +sensible extension<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. 122-126; <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 123, &c.; +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 270, &c.</note>. Now, though it be acknowledged +that <emph>great</emph> and <emph>small</emph>, consisting merely in the relation +which other extended beings have to the parts of our +own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; +yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with +regard to <emph>absolute extension</emph>, which is something abstracted +from <emph>great</emph> and <emph>small</emph>, from this or that particular magnitude +or figure. So likewise as to motion; <emph>swift</emph> and <emph>slow</emph> +are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our +own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those +modifications of motion exist not without the mind, +that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them +doth not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or +one part of extension, from another? Is it not something +sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some +certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each? +</p> + +<pb n='403'/><anchor id='Pg403'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I think so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible +properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, +as the schools call them. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That is to say, they are extension in general, and +motion in general. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Let it be so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But it is a universally received maxim that <emph>Everything +which exists is particular</emph><note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 15.</note>. How then can motion +in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal +substance? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I will take time to solve your difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But I think the point may be speedily decided. +Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame +this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on +this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct +<emph>abstract idea</emph> of motion or extension, divested of all those +sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round +and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to +exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you +contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable +on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no +notion<note place='foot'>Is <q>notion</q> here a synonym for +idea?</note> of. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To confess ingenuously, I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Can you even separate the ideas of extension and +motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they +who make the distinction term <emph>secondary</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension +and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other +sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat +of them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form +general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, +without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to +consider or treat of them abstractedly<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 16.</note>. But, how doth +it follow that, because I can pronounce the word <emph>motion</emph> +by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive +<pb n='404'/><anchor id='Pg404'/> +of body? or, because theorems may be made of extension +and figures, without any mention of <emph>great</emph> or <emph>small</emph>, or any +other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible +such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular +size or figure, or sensible quality<note place='foot'><q>Size or figure, or sensible +quality</q>—<q>size, color &c.,</q> in the +first and second editions.</note>, should be distinctly +formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians +treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible +qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent +to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the +words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you +will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of +extension. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But what say you to <emph>pure intellect</emph>? May not +abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is +plain I cannot frame them by the help of <emph>pure intellect</emph>; +whatsoever faculty you understand by those words<note place='foot'>In Berkeley's later and more +exact terminology, the data or +implicates of pure intellect are +called <emph>notions</emph>, in contrast to his +<emph>ideas</emph>, which are concrete or individual +sensuous presentations.</note>. +Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect +and its spiritual objects, as <emph>virtue</emph>, <emph>reason</emph>, <emph>God</emph>, or the like, +thus much seems manifest—that sensible things are only +to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. +Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally +perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, +for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea +of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or +even from other sensible qualities. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi>Let me think a little——I do not find that +I can. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And can you think it possible that should really +exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> By no means. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind +to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other +sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one +exist there necessarily the other exist likewise? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It should seem so. +</p> + +<pb n='405'/><anchor id='Pg405'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently, the very same arguments which you +admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities +are, without any farther application of force, against the +Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it +not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear +as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a +motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and +tangible qualities? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You need say no more on this head. I am free to +own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings +hitherto, that <emph>all</emph> sensible qualities are alike to be +denied existence without the mind<note place='foot'>They need living percipient +mind to make them real.</note>. But, my fear is that +I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked +some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time +to think. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time +you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You +are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or +offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first +opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> One great oversight I take to be this—that I did not +sufficiently distinguish the <emph>object</emph> from the <emph>sensation</emph><note place='foot'>So Reid's <hi rend='italic'>Inquiry</hi>, ch. ii, sect. +8, 9; <hi rend='italic'>Essays on the Intellectual +Powers</hi>, II. ch. 16. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory +of Vision Vindicated</hi>, sect. 8, &c.</note>. Now, +though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it +will not thence follow that the former cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What object do you mean? the object of the +senses? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The same. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is then immediately perceived? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Make me to understand the difference between +what is immediately perceived and a sensation. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; +besides which, there is something perceived; and +this I call the <emph>object</emph>. For example, there is red and yellow +on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours +is in me only, and not in the tulip. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you +see? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The same. +</p> + +<pb n='406'/><anchor id='Pg406'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And what do you see beside colour, figure, and +extension<note place='foot'>i.e. figured or extended visible +colour. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, +sect. 43, &c.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Nothing. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What you would say then is that the red and yellow +are coexistent with the extension; is it not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is not all; I would say they have a real existence +without the mind, in some unthinking substance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That the colours are really in the tulip which I see +is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may +exist independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate +object of the senses—that is, any idea, or combination +of ideas—should exist in an unthinking substance, or +exterior to <emph>all</emph> minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. +Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said +just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip +<emph>you saw</emph>, since you do not pretend to <emph>see</emph> that unthinking +substance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our +inquiry from the subject. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. +To return then to your distinction between <emph>sensation</emph> and +<emph>object</emph>; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception +two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any +unthinking thing<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 25, 26.</note>; but, whatever beside is implied in a +perception may? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is my meaning. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> So that if there was a perception without any act +of the mind, it were possible such a perception should +exist in an unthinking substance? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I grant it. But it is impossible there should be +such a perception. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When is the mind said to be active? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, +but by an act of the will? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It cannot. +</p> + +<pb n='407'/><anchor id='Pg407'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The mind therefore is to be accounted <emph>active</emph> in its +perceptions so far forth as <emph>volition</emph> is included in them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> In plucking this flower I am active; because I do +it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon +my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But +is either of these smelling? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because +my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of +my volition. But neither can this be called <emph>smelling</emph>: for, if +it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But I do not find my will concerned any farther. +Whatever more there is—as that I perceive such a particular +smell, or any smell at all—this is independent of my will, +and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise +with you, Hylas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, the very same. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open +your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without doubt. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, doth it in like manner depend on <emph>your</emph> will +that in looking on this flower you perceive <emph>white</emph> rather +than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes +towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing +the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You are then in these respects altogether passive? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I am. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Tell me now, whether <emph>seeing</emph> consists in perceiving +light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without doubt, in the former. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Since therefore you are in the very perception of +light and colours altogether passive, what is become of +that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every +sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, +that the perception of light and colours, including +no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? +And is not this a plain contradiction? +</p> + +<pb n='408'/><anchor id='Pg408'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I know not what to think of it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Besides, since you distinguish the <emph>active</emph> and <emph>passive</emph> +in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But +how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you +please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In +short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, +whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are +not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You +may indeed call them <emph>external objects</emph>, and give them in +words what subsistence you please. But, examine your +own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation +of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing +else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety +of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation +should exist in an unperceiving substance.—But +then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things +in a different view, considering them as so many modes +and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a <emph>material +substratum</emph>, without which they cannot be conceived to +exist<note place='foot'>After maintaining, in the preceding +part of this Dialogue, the +inevitable dependence of all the +qualities of Matter upon percipient +Spirit, the argument now proceeds +to dispose of the supposition that +Matter may still be an unmanifested +or unqualified <emph>substratum</emph>, +independent of living percipient +Spirit.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> <emph>Material substratum</emph> call you it? Pray, by which +of your senses came you acquainted with that being? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities +only being perceived by the senses. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you +obtained the idea of it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do not pretend to any proper positive <emph>idea</emph> of it. +However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be +conceived to exist without a support. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then you have only a relative <emph>notion</emph> of it, +or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving +the relation it bears to sensible qualities? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that +relation consists. +</p> + +<pb n='409'/><anchor id='Pg409'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term <emph>substratum</emph>, +or <emph>substance</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> If so, the word <emph>substratum</emph> should import that it is +spread under the sensible qualities or accidents? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And consequently under extension? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely +distinct from extension? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is +something that supports modes. And is it not evident the +thing supported is different from the thing supporting? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, +extension is supposed to be the <emph>substratum</emph> of extension? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Just so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without +extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included +in <emph>spreading</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under +anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the +extension of that thing under which it is spread? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It must. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently, every corporeal substance, being +the <emph>substratum</emph> of extension, must have in itself another +extension, by which it is qualified to be a <emph>substratum</emph>: and +so on to infinity? And I ask whether this be not absurd +in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to +wit, that the <emph>substratum</emph> was something distinct from and +exclusive of extension? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not +mean that Matter is <emph>spread</emph> in a gross literal sense under +extension. The word <emph>substratum</emph> is used only to express +in general the same thing with <emph>substance</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Well then, let us examine the relation implied in +the term <emph>substance</emph>. Is it not that it stands under accidents? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The very same. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, that one thing may stand under or support +another, must it not be extended? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It must. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is not therefore this supposition liable to the +same absurdity with the former? +</p> + +<pb n='410'/><anchor id='Pg410'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You still take things in a strict literal sense. That +is not fair, Philonous. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I am not for imposing any sense on your words: +you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, +I beseech you, make me understand something by them. +You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. +How! is it as your legs support your body? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No; that is the literal sense. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, +that you understand it in.—How long must I wait for an +answer, Hylas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I declare I know not what to say. I once thought +I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's +supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it +the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know +nothing of it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then you have no idea at all, neither +relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it +is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And yet you asserted that you could not conceive +how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving +at the same time a material support of them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I did. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That is to say, when you conceive the <emph>real</emph> existence +of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you +cannot conceive? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some +fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just +come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies +in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant +that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. +Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without +some other sensible quality. But, as the several +qualities united or blended together form entire sensible +things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed +to exist without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad +memory. Though indeed we went through all the +qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments, +or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that +the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by +<pb n='411'/><anchor id='Pg411'/> +itself; but, that they were not <emph>at all</emph> without the mind. +Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded +they could not exist without the mind, because it was +impossible even in thought to separate them from all +secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by +themselves. But then this was not the only argument +made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all +that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, +if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole +upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any +mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object +whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it +actually to be so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. +What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing +by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind +whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them +existing after that manner. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is +at the same time unseen? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No, that were a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of <emph>conceiving</emph> +a thing which is <emph>unconceived</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The tree or house therefore which you think of is +conceived by you? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> How should it be otherwise? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And what is conceived is surely in the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without question, that which is conceived is in the +mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How then came you to say, you conceived a house +or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me +consider what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake +enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, +where no one was present to see it, methought that was +to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought +of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the +while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame +ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own +thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but +<pb n='412'/><anchor id='Pg412'/> +that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive +them <emph>existing out of the minds of all Spirits</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly +conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should +exist otherwise than in a mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth +of that which you cannot so much as conceive? +</p> + +<p> +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I profess I know not what to think; but still there +are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I <emph>see +things at a distance</emph>? Do we not perceive the stars and +moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, +I say, manifest to the senses? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the +like objects? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And have they not then the same appearance of +being distant? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They have. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in +a dream to be without the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> By no means. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible +objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or +manner wherein they are perceived. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive +me in those cases? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> By no means. The idea or thing which you +immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs +you that <emph>it</emph> actually exists without the mind. By sense +you only know that you are affected with such certain +sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will +not say are without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True: but, beside all that, do you not think the +sight suggests something of <emph>outness</emph> or <emph>distance</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible +size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the +same at all distances? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are in a continual change. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way +inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive +<pb n='413'/><anchor id='Pg413'/> +exists at a distance<note place='foot'>[See the <hi rend='italic'>Essay towards a New +Theory of Vision</hi>, and its <hi rend='italic'>Vindication</hi>.] +Note by the <hi rend='italic'>Author</hi> in +the 1734 edition.</note>, or will be perceived when you +advance farther onward; there being a continued series +of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole +time of your approach. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an +object, what object I shall perceive after having passed +over a certain distance: no matter whether it be exactly +the same or no: there is still something of distance +suggested in the case. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, +and then tell me whether there be any more in it than +this: From the ideas you actually perceive by sight, +you have by experience learned to collect what other +ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) +be affected with, after such a certain succession of time +and motion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born +blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have +no experience of what may be <emph>suggested</emph> by sight? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> He would not then, according to you, have any +notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but +would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only +in his mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is undeniable. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, to make it still more plain: is not <emph>distance</emph> +a line turned endwise to the eye<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Essay on Vision</hi>, sect. 2.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And can a line so situated be perceived by sight? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not +properly and immediately perceived by sight? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It should seem so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Again, is it your opinion that colours are at +a distance<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 43.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting +in the same place with extension and figures? +</p> + +<pb n='414'/><anchor id='Pg414'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They do. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How can you then conclude from sight that figures +exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the +sensible appearance being the very same with regard to +both? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I know not what to answer. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately +perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence +follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is +immediately perceived is an idea<note place='foot'><q>an idea,</q> i.e. a phenomenon +present to our senses.</note>: and can any idea +exist out of the mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, +Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our +ideas<note place='foot'>This was Reid's fundamental +question in his criticism of Berkeley.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, +that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can +best tell whether you perceive anything which is not +immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the +things immediately perceived are other than your own +sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, +in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on +those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have +departed from what you then thought. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are +two kinds of objects:—the one perceived immediately, +which are likewise called <emph>ideas</emph>; the other are real things +or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, +which are their images and representations. Now, I own +ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter +sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this +distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your +discourse. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Are those external objects perceived by sense, or +by some other faculty? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are perceived by sense. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How! Is there anything perceived by sense +which is not immediately perceived? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, +when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Cæsar, I may +<pb n='415'/><anchor id='Pg415'/> +be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) +by my senses. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then you will have our ideas, which +alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external +things: and that these also are perceived by sense, +inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our +ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is my meaning. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And, in the same way that Julius Cæsar, in himself +invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real +things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by +sense. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> In the very same. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of +Julius Cæsar, do you see with your eyes any more than +some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and +composition of the whole? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And would not a man who had never known anything +of Julius Cæsar see as much? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> He would. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, +in as perfect a degree as you? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Whence comes it then that your thoughts are +directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This +cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by +you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have +no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem +therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should +it not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It should. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently, it will not follow from that instance +that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately +perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, +be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: +that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the +immediate perception of ideas by one sense <emph>suggests</emph> to the +mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which +are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when +I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive +only the sound; but, from the experience I have had +<pb n='416'/><anchor id='Pg416'/> +that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to +hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth +and strictness, nothing can be <emph>heard</emph> but <emph>sound</emph>; and the +coach is not properly perceived by sense, but +suggested from experience. So likewise when we are +said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat +of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested +to the imagination by the colour and figure which are +properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things +alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, +which would have been perceived in case that same sense +had then been first conferred on us. As for other things, +it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience, +grounded on former perceptions. But, to return +to your comparison of Cæsar's picture, it is plain, if you +keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes +of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some +internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would +therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from +reason for the existence of what you call <emph>real things</emph> or +<emph>material objects</emph>. Or, whether you remember to have seen +them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have +heard or read of any one that did. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but +that will never convince me. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> My aim is only to learn from you the way to come +at the knowledge of <emph>material beings</emph>. Whatever we perceive +is perceived immediately or mediately: by sense, or +by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded +sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe +their existence; or what <emph>medium</emph> you can possibly make +use of to prove it, either to mine or your own understanding. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider +the point, I do not find I can give you any good reason +for it. But, thus much seem pretty plain, that it is at +least possible such things may really exist. And, as +long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am +resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons +to the contrary. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What! Is it come to this, that you only <emph>believe</emph> +the existence of material objects, and that your belief is +<pb n='417'/><anchor id='Pg417'/> +founded barely on the possibility of its being true? Then +you will have me bring reasons against it: though another +would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who +holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which +you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is +in effect what you have more than once during this discourse +seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all +this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not +exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, +or representations, of certain originals that do? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You take me right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> They are then like external things<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 8.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Have those things a stable and permanent nature, +independent of our senses; or are they in a perpetual +change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies—suspending, +exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs +of sense? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, +which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our +senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies; which +indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd +to think they had the same effect on things existing without +the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How then is it possible that things perpetually +fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or +images of anything fixed and constant? Or, in other words, +since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that +is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon every alteration +in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; +how can any determinate material objects be properly +represented or painted forth by several distinct things, +each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? +Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, +how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all +the false ones? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not +what to say to this. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But neither is this all. Which are material objects +in themselves—perceptible or imperceptible? +</p> + +<pb n='418'/><anchor id='Pg418'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived +but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves +insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or +originals insensible? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But how can that which is sensible be <emph>like</emph> that +which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself <emph>invisible</emph>, +be like a <emph>colour</emph>; or a real thing, which is not <emph>audible</emph>, be +like a <emph>sound</emph>? In a word, can anything be like a sensation +or idea, but another sensation or idea? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I must own, I think not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it possible there should be any doubt on the +point? Do you not perfectly know your own ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive +or know can be no part of my idea<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 25, 26.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then +tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without +the mind: or if you can conceive anything like them existing +without the mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to +conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be +like an idea. And it is most evident that <emph>no idea can exist +without the mind</emph><note place='foot'>In other words, the percipient +activity of a living spirit is the +necessary condition of the real existence +of all ideas or phenomena +immediately present to our senses.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You are therefore, by your principles, forced to +deny the <emph>reality</emph> of sensible things; since you made it +to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. +That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have +gained my point, which was to shew your principles led +to Scepticism. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at +least silenced. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I would fain know what more you would require +in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the +liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were +any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on? Or +were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you +had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not +everything you could say been heard and examined with +<pb n='419'/><anchor id='Pg419'/> +all the fairness imaginable? In a word, have you not in +every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if +you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former +concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new +distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you +not produce it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so +amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned +in the labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the +sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out. +You must give me time to look about me and recollect +myself. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Hark; is not this the college bell? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It rings for prayers. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> We will go in then, if you please, and meet here +again to-morrow morning. In the meantime, you may +employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try +if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means +to extricate yourself. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Agreed. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='420'/><anchor id='Pg420'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Second Dialogue</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hylas.</hi> I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting +you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with +our late conversation that I had not leisure to think of +the time of the day, or indeed of anything else. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Philonous.</hi> I am glad you were so intent upon it, in +hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions, or +fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now discover +them to me. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw +you but search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that +view, have minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's +discourse: but all in vain, for the notions it led me +into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident; +and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do +they force my assent. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And is not this, think you, a sign that they are +genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conformable +to right reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, +that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage; +while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure +being reviewed, or too nearly inspected. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor +can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those +odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings +that lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, +there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory, +so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining +things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I know not what way you mean. +</p> + +<pb n='421'/><anchor id='Pg421'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or +ideas. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How is that? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is supposed the soul makes her residence in +some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their +rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and +that outward objects, by the different impressions they +make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative +motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits +propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, +according to the various impressions or traces thereby +made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas<note place='foot'>An <q>explanation</q> afterwards +elaborately developed by Hartley, +in his <hi rend='italic'>Observations on Man</hi> (1749). +Berkeley has probably Hobbes in +view.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And call you this an explication of the manner +whereby we are affected with ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to +object against it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I would first know whether I rightly understand +your hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to +be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me +whether by the <emph>brain</emph> you mean any sensible thing. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What else think you I could mean? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; +and those things which are immediately perceivable are +ideas; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you +have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do not deny it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible +thing, exists only in the mind<note place='foot'>The brain with the human body +in which it is included constitutes +a part of the material world, and +must equally with the rest of the +material world depend for its realisation +upon percipient Spirit as the +realising factor.</note>. Now, I would fain know +whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea +or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas. +And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the +origin of that primary idea or brain itself? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that +brain which is perceivable to sense—this being itself only +a combination of sensible ideas—but by another which +I imagine. +</p> + +<pb n='422'/><anchor id='Pg422'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But are not things imagined as truly <emph>in the mind</emph> +as things perceived<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 23.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I must confess they are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you +have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain +motions or impressions of the brain; that is, by some +alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it +matters not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I begin to suspect my hypothesis. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are +our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are +occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive +this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted +in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. +If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of +forming a reasonable hypothesis. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is +nothing in it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You need not be much concerned at it; for after +all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could +never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion +is there between a motion in the nerves, and the +sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is +it possible these should be the effect of that? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But I could never think it had so little in it as now +it seems to have. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible +things have a real existence; and that you are in +truth an arrant sceptic? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is too plain to be denied. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful +verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, +in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, +that transports the soul? At the prospect of the wide and +deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the +clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled +with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is +there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure +is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To preserve +and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night +<pb n='423'/><anchor id='Pg423'/> +alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change +her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements +disposed! What variety and use [<note place='foot'><q>in stones and minerals</q>—in first and second editions.</note>in the meanest productions +of nature!] What delicacy, what beauty, what +contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies! How exquisitely +are all things suited, as well to their particular +ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole! And, +while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set +off and illustrate each other? Raise now your thoughts +from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that +adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation +of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? +Were those (miscalled <emph>erratic</emph>) globes once known to stray, +in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do +they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned +to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by +which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. +How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! +How magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with +which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole +azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into +your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. +Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer +view immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk +in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to +your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable +worlds revolving round the central fires; and in +those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed +in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are +big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all +its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert +and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands +out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the +vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant +and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some +Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and +intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which +was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd +of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, +glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What +treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would, +<pb n='424'/><anchor id='Pg424'/> +deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all <emph>reality</emph>? +How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to +think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary +glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of +yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men +of sense? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Other men may think as they please; but for your +part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort +is, you are as much a sceptic as I am. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, +and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to +maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me +into? This surely is not fair. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I deny that I agreed with you in those notions +that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the <emph>reality</emph> of +sensible things consisted in an <emph>absolute existence out of the +minds of spirits</emph>, or distinct from their being perceived. +And pursuant to this notion of reality, <emph>you</emph> are obliged to +deny sensible things any real existence: that is, according +to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. +But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible +things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is +evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things +cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence +I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, +seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an +existence distinct from being perceived by me<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 29-33; also +sect. 90.—The <emph>permanence</emph> of a +thing, during intervals in +which it may be unperceived and +unimagined by human beings, is +here assumed, as a natural conviction.</note>, <emph>there must +be some other Mind wherein they exist</emph>. As sure, therefore, +as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an +infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What! This is no more than I and all Christians +hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, +and that He knows and comprehends all things. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly +believe that all things are known or perceived by God, +because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on +the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the +<pb n='425'/><anchor id='Pg425'/> +being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived +by Him<note place='foot'>In other words, men are apt +to treat the omniscience of God +as an inference from the dogmatic +assumption that God exists, instead +of seeing that our cosmic experience +necessarily presupposes +omnipotent and omniscient Intelligence +at its root.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what +matter is it how we come by that belief? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For +philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings +to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an +absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by +any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no +difference between saying, <emph>There is a God, therefore He +perceives all things</emph>; and saying, <emph>Sensible things do really +exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived +by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an infinite Mind, or +God<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 90. A permanent +material world is grounded +on Divine Mind, because it cannot +but depend on Mind, while its +reality is only partially and at +intervals sustained by finite minds.</note>?</emph> This furnishes you with a direct and immediate +demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the <emph>being +of a God</emph>. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond +all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the +several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship +of God. But that—setting aside all help of astronomy +and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, +order, and adjustment of things—an infinite Mind +should be necessarily inferred from<note place='foot'><q>necessarily inferred from</q>—rather +necessarily presupposed in.</note> the bare <emph>existence of +the sensible world</emph>, is an advantage to them only who have +made this easy reflexion: That the sensible world is that +which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing +is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea +or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. +You may now, without any laborious search into the +sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length +of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate +for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an +eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in +a fortuitous concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations +of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a word, the whole +system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this +<pb n='426'/><anchor id='Pg426'/> +single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing +the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, +of the visible world, to exist without a Mind? Let any +one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own +thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as +a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how +anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist +independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be +convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put +a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself +to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds +to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real +existence<note place='foot'>The present reality of Something +implies the eternal existence +of living Mind, if Something <emph>must</emph> +exist eternally, and if real or concrete +existence involves living +Mind. Berkeley's conception of +material nature presupposes a theistic +basis.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It cannot be denied there is something highly +serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you +not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some +eminent moderns<note place='foot'>He refers of course to Malebranche +and his Divine Vision.</note>, of <emph>seeing all things in God</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain +it to me. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is +incapable of being united with material things, so as to +perceive them in themselves; but that she perceives +them by her union with the substance of God, which, +being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable +of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. +Besides, the Divine essence contains in it perfections +correspondent to each created being; and which are, for +that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the +mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I do not understand how our ideas, which are +things altogether passive and inert<note place='foot'>But Malebranche uses <emph>idea</emph> in +a higher meaning than Berkeley +does—akin to the Platonic, and in +contrast to the sensuous phenomena +which Berkeley calls ideas.</note>, can be the essence, or +any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of +God, who is an impassive, indivisible, pure, active being. +Many more difficulties and objections there are which +occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only +<pb n='427'/><anchor id='Pg427'/> +add, that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common +hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than +in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all which it hath this +peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve +to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against +other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, +or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do +that by tedious roundabout methods which might have +been performed in a much more easy and compendious +way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes +the whole world made in vain? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But what say you? Are not you too of opinion +that we see all things in God? If I mistake not, what you +advance comes near it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> [<note place='foot'>The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.</note>Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence +men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing +strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so +different, should nevertheless be confounded with each +other, by those who do not consider them attentively. +I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine +that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in +truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most +abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He +asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He +maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and know +not the real natures or the true forms and figures of +extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. +So that upon the whole there are no Principles more +fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be +owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture +saith, 'That in God we live and move and have our being.' +But that we see things in His essence, after the manner +above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in +brief my meaning:—It is evident that the things I perceive +are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be +in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by +me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist +independently of <emph>my</emph> mind, since I know myself not to be +their author, it being out of my power to determine at +pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with +<pb n='428'/><anchor id='Pg428'/> +upon opening my eyes or ears<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 25-33.</note>: they must therefore exist +in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be +exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived +are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But +how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, +anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24.</note>. +And to assert that which is inconceivable is +to talk nonsense: is it not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without doubt. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that +they should exist in and be produced by a Spirit; since +this is no more than I daily experience in myself<note place='foot'>I <emph>can</emph> represent to myself +another mind perceiving and conceiving +things; because I have an +example of this my own conscious +life. I <emph>cannot</emph> represent to myself +sensible things existing totally +unperceived and unimagined; because +I cannot, without a contradiction, +have an example of this in my +own experience.</note>, inasmuch +as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, +can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my +imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures +of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, +and permanent, as those perceived by my senses—which +latter are called <emph>real things</emph>. From all which I conclude, +<emph>there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all the +sensible impressions I perceive</emph>. And, from the variety, +order, and manner of these, I conclude <emph>the Author of them +to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension</emph>. Mark +it well; I do not say I see things by perceiving that which +represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. This +I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived +are known by the understanding, and produced by the will +of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and +evident? Is there any more in it than what a little +observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in +them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us +to acknowledge? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I think I understand you very clearly; and own +proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than +it is surprising. But, allowing that God is the supreme +and universal Cause of all things, yet, may there not be +still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we +<pb n='429'/><anchor id='Pg429'/> +not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? +In a word, may there not for all that be <emph>Matter</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How often must I inculcate the same thing? You +allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist +nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived +by sense which is not perceived immediately; therefore +there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. +The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something +intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered +by reason<note place='foot'><q>reason,</q> i.e. by reasoning.</note>, and not by sense. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You are in the right. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of +Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your +present sense of it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I find myself affected with various ideas whereof +I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of +themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by +themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent +beings. They have therefore <emph>some</emph> cause distinct from me +and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that +it is <emph>the cause of my ideas</emph>. And this thing whatever it +be, I call Matter. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change +the current proper signification attached to a common +name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller +should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt +through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found +he meant by the word <emph>fire</emph> that which others call <emph>water</emph>. +Or, if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon +two legs, meaning men by the term <emph>trees</emph>. Would you +think this reasonable? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No; I should think it very absurd. Common +custom is the standard of propriety in language. And +for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert +the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose +than to protract and multiply disputes where there is no +difference in opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And doth not <emph>Matter</emph>, in the common current +acceptation of the word, signify an extended solid moveable, +unthinking, inactive Substance? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It doth. +</p> + +<pb n='430'/><anchor id='Pg430'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And, hath it not been made evident that no <emph>such</emph> +substance can possibly exist<note place='foot'>Berkeley's <emph>material substance</emph> +is a natural or divinely ordered +aggregate of sensible qualities or +phenomena.</note>? And, though it should be +allowed to exist, yet how can that which is <emph>inactive</emph> be +a <emph>cause</emph>; or that which is <emph>unthinking</emph> be a <emph>cause of thought</emph>? +You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word <emph>Matter</emph> +a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell +me you understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active +being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else +is this than to play with words, and run into that very +fault you just now condemned with so much reason? +I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that +you collect <emph>a</emph> cause from the <emph>phenomena</emph>: but I deny that +<emph>the</emph> cause deducible by reason can properly be termed +Matter<note place='foot'>Inasmuch as, according to +Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit, +and it would be an abuse of language +to call this Matter.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> There is indeed something in what you say. But +I am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. +I would by no means be thought to deny that God, +or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things. +All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme +Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, +which <emph>concurs</emph> in the production of our ideas, not by any +act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action +which belongs to Matter, viz. <emph>motion</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I find you are at every turn relapsing into your +old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an +extended, substance, existing without the mind. What! +Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or are +you willing I should repeat what has been said on that +head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to +suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged +to have no being. But, not to insist farther on +what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your +ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing +of action in them<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 25, 26.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And are sensible qualities anything else but +ideas? +</p> + +<pb n='431'/><anchor id='Pg431'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> How often have I acknowledged that they are not. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But is not <emph>motion</emph> a sensible quality? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently it is no action? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that +when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will +which produced the motion is active. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, +motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any +action besides volition: and, in the second place, +whether to say something and conceive nothing be not +to talk nonsense<note place='foot'>It is here argued that as <emph>volition</emph> +is the only <emph>originative</emph> cause implied +in our experience, and which consequently +alone puts true meaning +into the term Cause, to apply that +term to what is not volition is to +make it meaningless, or at least to +misapply it.</note>: and, lastly, whether, having considered +the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any +efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than <emph>Spirit</emph>, +is highly absurd and unreasonable? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter +may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an <emph>instrument</emph>, +subservient to the supreme Agent in the production +of our ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> An instrument say you; pray what may be the +figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the +substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What? You are then of opinion it is made up +of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an +unknown shape? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion +at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities +can exist in an unperceiving substance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But what notion is it possible to frame of an +instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension +itself? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I do not pretend to have any notion of it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And what reason have you to think this unknown, +this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you +imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you +find by experience the use of some such thing, when +you form ideas in your own mind? +</p> + +<pb n='432'/><anchor id='Pg432'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You are always teasing me for reasons of my +belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the +existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. +But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not +so much as let me know <emph>what it is</emph> you would have me +believe; since you say you have no manner of notion +of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether +it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common +sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you +know not why. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an +<emph>instrument</emph>, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true +I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, +I have some notion of <emph>instrument in general</emph>, which +I apply to it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But what if it should prove that there is something, +even in the most general notion of <emph>instrument</emph>, as +taken in a distinct sense from <emph>cause</emph>, which makes the use +of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Make that appear and I shall give up the point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What mean you by the general nature or notion +of <emph>instrument</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That which is common to all particular instruments +composeth the general notion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not common to all instruments, that they are +applied to the doing those things only which cannot be +performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for +instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, +because it is done by a volition. But I should use one +if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by +the roots. Are you of the same mind? Or, can you +shew any example where an instrument is made use of +in producing an effect <emph>immediately</emph> depending on the will +of the agent? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect +Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and +immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his +operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it +seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless +inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite +<pb n='433'/><anchor id='Pg433'/> +perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to +give up the point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It doth not readily occur what I can answer you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, methinks you should be ready to own the +truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, +who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use +of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth +the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, +and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and +by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, +that the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool or instrument +at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no +sooner exerted than executed, without the application of +means; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it +is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, +or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in +compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions +prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself +above all limitation or prescription whatsoever<note place='foot'>While thus arguing against the +need for independent matter, as an +instrument needed by God, Berkeley +fails to explain how dependent +matter can be a medium of intercourse +between persons. It +must be more than a subjective +dream, however well ordered, +if it is available for this purpose. +Unless the visible and audible +ideas or phenomena presented to +me are actually seen and heard +by other men, how can they be +instrumental in intercommunication?</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. +However, I would not be understood to give up its +existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been +said, it may still be an <emph>occasion</emph><note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 68-79.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, +how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are +content to part with it? But, to say no more of this +(though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame +you for so frequently changing the signification of the +principal term)—I would fain know what you mean by +affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied +it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what +sense you understand <emph>occasion</emph>, pray, in the next place, +be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe +there is such an occasion of our ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> As to the first point: by <emph>occasion</emph> I mean an inactive +<pb n='434'/><anchor id='Pg434'/> +unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites +ideas in our minds. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking +being? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I know nothing of its nature. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Proceed then to the second point, and assign some +reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive, +unthinking, unknown thing. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> When we see ideas produced in our minds, after +an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they +have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of +which they are excited. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause +of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence +of those occasions. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is my opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Those things which you say are present to God, +without doubt He perceives. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an +occasion of acting. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Not to insist now on your making sense of this +hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and +difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the order +and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or +the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by +the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not +derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, +directed, or put in mind, when and what He +is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, +whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would +make anything to your purpose; it not being easy to +conceive how the external or absolute existence of an +unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, +can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain +things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him +the occasion of producing ideas in us? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of +<emph>occasion</emph> seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Do you not at length perceive that in all these +different acceptations of <emph>Matter</emph>, you have been only +supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, +and to no kind of use? +</p> + +<pb n='435'/><anchor id='Pg435'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I freely own myself less fond of my notions since +they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, +I have some confused perception that there is such +a thing as <emph>Matter</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately +or mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which +of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know +by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which +you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. +Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, +<emph>substratum</emph>, cause, instrument, or occasion? You have +already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions, +and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, +then in another. And what you have offered hath been +disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything +new to advance I would gladly hear it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I think I have already offered all I had to say on +those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. +But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire +that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will +farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter +exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be +affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether +it be not evident you might for all that be affected with +the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the +very same reasons to believe its existence that you now +can have<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 20.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all +things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the +world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it +should produce any idea in our minds. And, I do farther +grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible +there should be such a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing +acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that +there is <emph>Matter</emph> in some sense or other. <emph>What that is</emph> I do +not indeed pretend to determine. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I do not expect you should define exactly the +nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me +whether it is a Substance; and if so, whether you can +<pb n='436'/><anchor id='Pg436'/> +suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you +suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will +let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant +by Matter's supporting them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> We have already argued on those points. I have +no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther +questions, let me tell you I at present understand by <emph>Matter</emph> +neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended +being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something +entirely unknown, distinct from all these<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 80, 81.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems then you include in your present notion +of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of <emph>entity</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Nothing else; save only that I superadd to this +general idea the negation of all those particular things, +qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise +apprehend. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter +to exist? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled +me; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer +that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place +or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not +ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it +exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is +a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other +to all the questions you put for the future about Matter. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased +to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or +what you mean by its <emph>existence</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is +perceived. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But what is there positive in your abstracted notion +of its existence? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any +positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am +not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is +meant by its <emph>existence</emph>, or how it exists. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous +part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct +idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of +<pb n='437'/><anchor id='Pg437'/> +all thinking and corporeal beings<note place='foot'>i.e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena.</note>, all particular things +whatsoever. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Hold, let me think a little——I profess, Philonous, +I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had +some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; +but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of +sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed +in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative +answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any +positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its <emph>where</emph>, its +<emph>how</emph>, its <emph>entity</emph>, or anything belonging to it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When, therefore, you speak of the existence of +Matter, you have not any notion in your mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> None at all. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray tell me if the case stands not thus:—At first, +from a belief of material substance, you would have it that +the immediate objects existed without the mind; then that +they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then +occasions: lastly, <emph>something in general</emph>, which being interpreted +proves <emph>nothing</emph>. So Matter comes to nothing. What +think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole +proceeding? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that <emph>our</emph> +not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against +its existence. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other +circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence +of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it +were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of +that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of +it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; +where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe +the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative +notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving +and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, +where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint +idea pretended to—I will not indeed thence conclude +against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; +but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; +that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without +<pb n='438'/><anchor id='Pg438'/> +any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to +you to consider how mere jargon should be treated. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments +seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have +not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, +that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration<note place='foot'>This, according to Hume (who +takes for granted that Berkeley's +reasonings can produce no conviction), +is the natural effect of +Berkeley's philosophy.—<q>Most of +the writings of that very ingenious +author (Berkeley) form the best +lessons of scepticism which are to +be found either among the ancient +or modern philosophers, Bayle not +excepted.... That all his arguments, +though otherwise intended, +are, in reality, merely sceptical, +appear from this—<emph>that they admit +of no answer, and produce no +conviction</emph>. Their only effect is to +cause that momentary amazement +and irresolution and confusion, +which is the result of scepticism.</q> +(Hume's <hi rend='italic'>Essays</hi>, vol. II. Note N, +p. 554.)</note>. +I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise +of I know not what, <emph>matter</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things +must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary +assent in the mind? Let a visible object be set in never +so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the +sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be +distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so +well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal +a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, +can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and +adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time +and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained +by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the +same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and +find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable +licence you take, in pretending to maintain +you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you +know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art +or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there +anything <emph>so</emph> barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to +be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? +But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though +at the same time you neither know <emph>what is meant</emph> by <emph>Matter</emph>, +or by its <emph>existence</emph>. This indeed is surprising, and the more +so because it is altogether voluntary [<note place='foot'>Omitted in last edition.</note> and of your own +<pb n='439'/><anchor id='Pg439'/> +head], you not being led to it by any one reason; for I +challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs +Matter to explain or account for it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The <emph>reality</emph> of things cannot be maintained without +supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think +you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The reality of things! What things? sensible or +intelligible? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Sensible things. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> My glove for example? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That, or any other thing perceived by the senses. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not +a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this <emph>glove</emph>, +that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not +do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of +this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing +that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, +exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or +in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of that +which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really +exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible +thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, +that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall +think nothing too hard for you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence +of Matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute +impossibility of it does not appear to me. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that +account merely, it can have no more claim to existence +than a golden mountain, or a centaur. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is +possible; and that which is possible, for aught you know, +may actually exist. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake +not, evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it +is not. In the common sense of the word <emph>Matter</emph>, is there +any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable +substance, existing without the mind? And have not +you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen +evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True, but that is only one sense of the term <emph>Matter</emph>. +</p> + +<pb n='440'/><anchor id='Pg440'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But is it not the only proper genuine received +sense? And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, +may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely +impossible? Else how could anything be proved impossible? +Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all +one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle +and change the common signification of words? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak +more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined +to the common acceptation of a term. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But this now mentioned is the common received +sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist +on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what +sense you pleased? And have you not used this privilege +in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at +others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, +for the present, best served your design, contrary to +all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not +this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute +to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly +examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of +those senses? And can any more be required to prove +the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it +impossible in every particular sense that either you or any +one else understands it in? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have +proved the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure +abstracted and indefinite sense. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When is a thing shewn to be impossible? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the +ideas comprehended in its definition. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy +can be demonstrated between ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite +sense of the word <emph>Matter</emph>, it is plain, by your own confession, +there was included no idea at all, no sense except +an unknown sense; which is the same thing as none. You +are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy +between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility +of Matter taken in an <emph>unknown</emph> sense, that is, no +sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant +<pb n='441'/><anchor id='Pg441'/> +<emph>nothing</emph>; and this you were brought to own. So that, in +all your various senses, you have been shewed either to +mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if +this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, +I desire you will let me know what is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; +nor do I see what more can be said in defence of +it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all +my other notions. For surely none could be more seemingly +evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as +false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think +we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. +The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in +running over in my thoughts the several heads of this +morning's conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to +meet you here again about the same time. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I will not fail to attend you. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='442'/><anchor id='Pg442'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Third Dialogue</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Philonous.</hi> <note place='foot'><q>Tell me, Hylas,</q>—<q>So Hylas</q>—in first and second editions.</note>Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's +meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same +mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen +cause to change your opinion? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hylas.</hi> Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are +alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we +condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, +and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas! we +know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for +us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are +too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended +us for speculation. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> There is not that single thing in the world whereof +we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or +water is? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and +water fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations +are produced in your own mind, upon the application +of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal +constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly +in the dark as to <emph>that</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand +on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> <emph>Know?</emph> No, it is impossible you or any man alive +should know it. All you know is, that you have such a +certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what +is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, +<pb n='443'/><anchor id='Pg443'/> +figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real +natures of those things, or in the least like them. The +same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal +substances, which compose the world. They have none +of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities +by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to +affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own +nature. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for +example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not +what either truly was? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish +between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, +and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in +the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have +no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to +distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances +in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that +should conclude two men were of a different species, +because their clothes were not of the same colour. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the +appearances of things, and those false ones too. The +very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in +them like what I see and feel. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Even so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But is it not strange the whole world should be +thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? +And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and +sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably +and conveniently as if they really knew the things they +are conversant about. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> They do so: but you know ordinary practice does +not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the +vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift +to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers +know better things. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You mean, they <emph>know</emph> that they <emph>know nothing</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> That is the very top and perfection of human +knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and +are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in +the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you +<pb n='444'/><anchor id='Pg444'/> +not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and +do you not know what it is you call for? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> How often must I tell you, that I know not the +real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may +indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. +But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I +declare positively I know not. And the same is true with +regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, +we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of +things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied +that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but +it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. +Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former +concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any <emph>real</emph> +corporeal thing should exist in nature. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild +and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and +is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances +by the belief of <emph>material substance</emph>? This makes you +dream of those unknown natures<note place='foot'>Variously called <foreign lang='el' rend='italic'>noumena</foreign>, +<q>things-in-themselves,</q> absolute +substances, &c.—which Berkeley's +philosophy banishes, on the +ground of their unintelligibility, +and thus annihilates all farther questions +concerning them. Questions +about existence are thus confined +within the concrete or realising +experiences of living spirits.</note> in everything. It is +this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and +sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are +indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows +perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant +of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether +anything really exists, or whether there are any true +natures at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material +beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you +suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in +the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a +direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you +are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material +Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of +any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into +the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man +was<note place='foot'>Berkeley claims that his doctrine +supersedes scepticism, and excludes +the possibility of fallacy in sense, +in excluding an ultimately representative +perception of Matter. He +also assumes the reasonableness of +faith in the reality and constancy +of natural law. When we see an +orange, the visual sense guarantees +only colour. The other phenomena, +which we associate with this colour—the +other <q>qualities</q> of the +orange—are, when we only <emph>see</emph> the +orange, matter of faith. We believe +them to be realisable.</note>. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say? +</p> + +<pb n='445'/><anchor id='Pg445'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree with you. <emph>Material substance</emph> was no more +than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. +I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But +whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme +of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will +appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question +you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your +own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as +many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same +state of scepticism that I myself am in at present. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any +hypothesis at all<note place='foot'>He accepts the common belief +on which interpretation of sense +symbols proceeds—that sensible +phenomena are evolved in rational +order, under laws that are independent +of, and in that respect external +to, the individual percipient.</note>. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough +to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. +To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those +very things I see, and feel, and perceive<note place='foot'>Mediately as well as immediately.</note> by my senses. +These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities +and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about +any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, +for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten +thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, +real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that +colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects. +I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and +fire hot. You indeed, who by <emph>snow</emph> and <emph>fire</emph> mean certain +external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the +right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent +in <emph>them</emph>. But I, who understand by those words the +things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. +And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of +things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a +thing should be really perceived by my senses<note place='foot'>We can hardly be said to have +an <emph>immediate</emph> sense-perception of +an individual <q>thing</q>—meaning by +<q>thing</q> a congeries of sense-ideas +or phenomena, presented to different +senses. We immediately perceive +some of them, and believe in +the others, which those suggest. +See the last three notes.</note>, and at +<pb n='446'/><anchor id='Pg446'/> +the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; +since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in +thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being +perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the +like things, which I name and discourse of, are things +that I know. And I should not have known them but +that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived +by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately +perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist +without the mind; their existence therefore consists in +being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived +there can be no doubt of their existence. Away +then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical +doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to +question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it +proved to him from the veracity of God<note place='foot'>He probably refers to Descartes, +who <emph>argues</emph> for the trustworthiness +of our faculties from the +veracity of God; thus apparently +arguing in a circle, seeing that the +existence of God is manifested to +us only through our suspected +faculties. But is not confidence +in the trustworthiness of the Universal +Power at the heart of the +universe, the fundamental <emph>presupposition</emph> +of all human experience, +and God thus the basis and end of +philosophy and of experience?</note>; or to pretend +our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or +demonstration<note place='foot'>As Locke does. See <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, +Bk. IV. ch. 11.</note>! I might as well doubt of my own being, +as of the being of those things I actually see and feel. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive +how sensible things should exist without the mind. +Do you not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I do. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive +it possible that things perceivable by sense may still +exist<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>, +sect. 45-48.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I can; but then it must be in another mind. When +I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do +not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is +plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since +I find them by experience to be independent of it<note place='foot'>And to be thus external to +individual minds.</note>. There +<pb n='447'/><anchor id='Pg447'/> +is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during +the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as +likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my +supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with +regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily +follows there is an <emph>omnipresent eternal Mind</emph>, which knows +and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view +in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He +Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the <emph>laws +of nature</emph><note place='foot'>It is here that Berkeley differs, +for example, from Hume and Comte +and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given +phenomena, and assume +the constancy of their orderly +reappearances, <emph>as a matter of fact</emph>, +while they confess total ignorance +of the <emph>cause</emph> of natural order. +(Thus ignorant, why do they assume +reason or order in nature?) +The ground of sensible things, +which Berkeley refers to Divine +Power, Mill expresses by the term +<q><emph>permanent possibility</emph> of sensation.</q> +(See his <hi rend='italic'>Examination of Hamilton</hi>, +ch. 11.) Our belief in the continued +existence of a sensible thing +<emph>in our absence</emph> merely means, with +him, our conviction, derived from +custom, that we should perceive it +under inexplicable conditions which +determine its appearance.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly +inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> They are altogether passive and inert<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 25, 26.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> And is not God an agent, a being purely active? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I acknowledge it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent +the nature of God? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It cannot. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Since therefore you have no <emph>idea</emph> of the mind of +God, how can you conceive it possible that things should +exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of +God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed +to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have +no idea of it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> As to your first question: I own I have properly +no <emph>idea</emph>, either of God or any other spirit; for these being +active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as +our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am +a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know +my ideas exist<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142.</note>. Farther, I know what I mean by the +terms <emph>I</emph> and <emph>myself</emph>; and I know this immediately or intuitively, +<pb n='448'/><anchor id='Pg448'/> +though I do not perceive it as I perceive a +triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul +is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and +perceives. I say <emph>indivisible</emph>, because unextended; and <emph>unextended</emph>, +because extended, figured, moveable things are +ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and +wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are +things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings +altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my +soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word +<emph>idea</emph> in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me +with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God—though +indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have +of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening +its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, +therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in <emph>myself</emph> some +sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though +I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, +or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind +and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; +and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the +possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas<note place='foot'>Inasmuch as I am conscious of +<emph>myself</emph>, I can gather, through the +sense symbolism, the real existence +of other minds, external to my own. +For I cannot, of course, enter into +the very consciousness of another +person.</note>. +Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency +I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason<note place='foot'><q>reason,</q> i.e. reasoning or +necessary inference—founded here +on our sense of personal dependence; +not merely on our faith in +sense symbolism and the interpretability +of the sensible world. Our +belief in the existence of finite +minds, external to our own, is, with +Berkeley, an application of this faith.</note>, +necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created +things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. +For the second: I suppose by this time you can +answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter<note place='foot'><q>Matter,</q> i.e. Matter as abstract +substance. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 135-138.</note> +objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor +know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act<note place='foot'>Does this imply that with +Berkeley, <emph>self</emph>, as distinguished +from the <emph>phenomena</emph> of which the +material world consists, is not a +necessary presuppostion of experience? +He says in many places—I +am <emph>conscious</emph> of <q>my own being,</q> +and that my mind is myself. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect, 2.</note>; neither do +<pb n='449'/><anchor id='Pg449'/> +you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the +other<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 8.</note>; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which +you know immediately<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 20</note>. All which makes the case of +<emph>Matter</emph> widely different from that of the <emph>Deity</emph>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +[<note place='foot'>This important passage, printed +within brackets, is not found in +the first and second editions of the +<hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. It is, by anticipation, +Berkeley's answer to Hume's application +of the objections to the +reality of abstract or unperceived +Matter, to the reality of the Ego +or Self, of which we are aware +through memory, as identical +amid the changes of its successive +states.</note><hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You say your own soul supplies you with some +sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, +you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no <emph>idea</emph> of +your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of +beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that +no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea +of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual +Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you +deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, +because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair +dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit +Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the +existence of material substance, merely because I have no +notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, +in other words, because it is repugnant that there should +be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may +exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can +have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those +things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must +be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, +although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, +yet we may not believe that any particular thing +exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no +reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no +immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately +from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, +infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance—either +by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. +Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, +or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion<note place='foot'>See note 4 on preceding page.</note>. +<pb n='450'/><anchor id='Pg450'/> +You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer +to the same objections. In the very notion or definition +of <emph>material Substance</emph>, there is included a manifest repugnance +and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the +notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not +perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. +But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving +thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the +cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate +evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence +of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that +such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to +suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent +to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no +argument, and there is a probability for the other; if we +see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like +ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads +to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have +a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an +idea of it<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 142.</note>. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means +of an idea, but know it by reflexion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems +that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence +of your own principles, it should follow that <emph>you</emph> +are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance +to support them. Words are not to be used without a +meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in <emph>spiritual +Substance</emph> than in <emph>material Substance</emph>, the one is to be exploded +as well as the other. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious +of my own being; and that I <emph>myself</emph> am not my +ideas, but somewhat else<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he +assume that he exists when he is +not conscious of ideas—sensible +or other? Or, does he deny +that he is ever unconscious?</note>, a thinking, active principle +that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. +I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours +and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor +a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual +principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the +same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. +<pb n='451'/><anchor id='Pg451'/> +But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence +or essence of Matter<note place='foot'>That is of matter supposed to +exist independently of any mind. +Berkeley speaks here of a <emph>consciousness</emph> +of matter. Does he mean consciousness +of belief in abstract +material Substance?</note>. On the contrary, I know +that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence +of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what +I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or +support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives +ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said +that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and +supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is +therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit +and Matter.] +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you +in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists +in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes +it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask the +first man you meet, and he shall tell you, <emph>to be perceived</emph> is +one thing, and <emph>to exist</emph> is another. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common +sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the +gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the +garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; +in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask +him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he +shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he +perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it +<emph>is</emph> or <emph>exists;</emph> but, that which is not perceivable, the same, +he saith, hath no being. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible +thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually +perceived. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And what is perceivable but an idea? And can +an idea exist without being actually perceived? These +are points long since agreed between us. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you +will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common +sense of men<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 54-57.</note>. Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath +an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he +would make? +</p> + +<pb n='452'/><anchor id='Pg452'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth +exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot +surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without +his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is +<emph>exists in</emph>) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not +at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof +there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or +any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. +But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between +the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a <emph>real</emph> +existence out of the mind of this or that person<note place='foot'>Which he does not doubt.</note>, but, +whether they have an <emph>absolute</emph> existence, distinct from +being perceived by God, and exterior to <emph>all</emph> minds<note place='foot'>This sentence expresses the +whole question between Berkeley +and his antagonists.</note>. This +indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, +but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to +the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, according to your notions, what difference is +there between real things, and chimeras formed by the +imagination, or the visions of a dream—since they are all +equally in the mind<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 29-41.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and +indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on +the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real +things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on +the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like +dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of +confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as +little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, +which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they +should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by +their not being connected, and of apiece with the preceding +and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily +be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever +method you distinguish <emph>things</emph> from <emph>chimeras</emph> on your +scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. +For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; +and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you +perceive. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in +<pb n='453'/><anchor id='Pg453'/> +the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs +acknowledge, sounds very oddly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I own the word <emph>idea</emph>, not being commonly used for +<emph>thing</emph>, sounds something out of the way. My reason for +using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is +understood to be implied by that term; and it is now +commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate +objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the +proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing +so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in effect +amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only +things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every +unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature +of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by +a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind +of God, in whom 'we live, and move, and have our being.' +Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not +on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence +of things, or know anything of their real natures—though +we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our +senses? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> And, in consequence of this, must we not think +there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes; +but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena +in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant +than this? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a +thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which +is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, [<note place='foot'>The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.</note>without +any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, +<emph>Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself</emph>]. +Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, +seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures +assert in a hundred places. In them God is represented +as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which +some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to +Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. +This is so much the constant language of Scripture that +it were needless to confirm it by citations. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God +<pb n='454'/><anchor id='Pg454'/> +the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you +make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and +the like heinous sins. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation +of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an +action with or without an instrument. In case therefore +you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument, +or occasion, called <emph>Matter</emph>, you as truly make Him the +author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent +in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. +I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not +consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in +the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason +and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy +in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not +thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same +with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin +doth not consist in the physical action, the making God +an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him +the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God +is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. +It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides +spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking +rational beings, in the production of motions, the use +of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, +but immediately under the direction of their own wills, +which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their +actions<note place='foot'>The index pointing to the originative +causes in the universe is thus +the ethical judgment, which fastens +upon the free voluntary agency of +<emph>persons</emph>, as absolutely responsible +causes, not merely caused causes.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal +Substance; there is the point. You can never persuade +me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of +mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most +voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without +gathering the votes. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and +submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common +sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let +me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who +thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains +<pb n='455'/><anchor id='Pg455'/> +no doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth +with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism +about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determination +of any indifferent person. That there is no substance +wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. +And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is +on all hands agreed<note place='foot'>That only ideas or phenomena +are presented to our senses may +be assented to by those who nevertheless +maintain that intelligent +sensuous experience implies more +than the sensuous or empirical +data.</note>. And that sensible qualities are +objects immediately perceived no one can deny. It is +therefore evident there can be no <emph>substratum</emph> of those +qualities but spirit; <emph>in</emph> which they exist, not by way of +mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which +perceives it<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 49.</note>. I deny therefore that there is any unthinking +<emph>substratum</emph> of the objects of sense, and <emph>in that acceptation</emph> +that there is any material substance. But if by +<emph>material substance</emph> is meant only <emph>sensible body</emph>—that which +is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, +I dare say, mean no more)—then I am more certain of +matter's existence than you or any other philosopher +pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the +generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse: +it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible +things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not +I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your +notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as +certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or +corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by +my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind +will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all +concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and +philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What say you to this? Since, according to you, +men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how +can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid +surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen +at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the +water, crooked? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he +actually perceives, but in the inferences he makes from +<pb n='456'/><anchor id='Pg456'/> +his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, +what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly +crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence +conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall +perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his +touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. +In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he +perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards +the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like +ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he +perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest +contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) +but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas +he apprehends to be connected with those immediately +perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he +perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in +other circumstances. The case is the same with regard to +the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any +motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, +that, in case we were placed at as great a distance +from that as we are now from the other planets, we should +not then perceive its motion<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 58.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I understand you; and must needs own you say +things plausible enough. But, give me leave to put you +in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not +formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now +that it does not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my +positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice; +but now, after inquiry, upon evidence. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words +than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the +name. That we are affected with ideas <emph>from without</emph> is +evident; and it is no less evident that there must be +(I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind<note place='foot'><q>without the mind,</q> i.e. without +the mind of each percipient +person.</note>, +corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot +subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them +necessarily to be admitted; which I call <emph>Matter</emph>, and you +call <emph>Spirit</emph>. This is all the difference. +</p> + +<pb n='457'/><anchor id='Pg457'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of +powers, extended? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It hath not extension; but it hath the power to +raise in you the idea of extension, +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is therefore itself unextended? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I grant it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not also active? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute +powers to it? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Now let me ask you two questions: <emph>First</emph>, Whether +it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or +others to give the name <emph>Matter</emph> to an unextended active +being? And, <emph>Secondly</emph>, Whether it be not ridiculously +absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use +of language? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you +will have it so, but some <emph>Third Nature</emph> distinct from +Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you +should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply +that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> My reason is this: because I have a mind to have +some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no +notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can +I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, +when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to +mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that +a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them +to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. +To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if +it be possible. I assert as well as you that, since we are +affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, +in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are +agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful +Being<note place='foot'>This is the gist of the whole +question. According to the +Materialists, sense-presented phenomena +are due to unpresented, +unperceived, abstract Matter; according +to Berkeley, to living Spirit; +according to Hume and Agnostics, +their origin is unknowable, yet +(incoherently) they claim that we +<emph>can</emph> interpret them—in physical +science.</note>. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know +not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third +Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects +I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because +<pb n='458'/><anchor id='Pg458'/> +actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there +must be a <emph>will</emph>. Again, the things I perceive must have an +existence, they or their archetypes, out of <emph>my</emph> mind: but, +being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist +otherwise than in an understanding; there is therefore +an <emph>understanding</emph>. But will and understanding constitute +in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful +cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech +a <emph>Spirit</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> And now I warrant you think you have made the +point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance +leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity +to imagine any imperfection in God? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Without a doubt. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> To suffer pain is an imperfection? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness +by some other Being? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> We are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and +is not that Spirit God? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I grant it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But you have asserted that whatever ideas we +perceive from without are in the mind which affects us. +The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God; +or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to say, there +is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you +acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain +contradiction<note place='foot'>A similar objection is urged +by Erdmann, in his criticism of +Berkeley in the <hi rend='italic'>Grundriss der Geschichte +der Philosophie</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That God knows or understands all things, and +that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even +every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His +creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that +God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful +sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively +deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are +liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external +Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes +painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external +<pb n='459'/><anchor id='Pg459'/> +being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we +do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all +things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: +it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor +be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any +sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to +say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. +By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every +alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; +which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but +a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence +distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that +this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions +means no more than a correspondence in the order of +nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately +perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from +all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions +are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in +His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly +a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything +by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees +to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; +but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours +are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest +a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where +there is none. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, all this while you have not considered that +the quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned +to the gravity of bodies<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 50; <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 319.</note>. And what can withstand +demonstration? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Let me see how you demonstrate that point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or +quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded +reason of the velocities and quantities of Matter contained +in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows +the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each. +But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the +small inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) +descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of +descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which +<pb n='460'/><anchor id='Pg460'/> +is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional +to the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You lay it down as a self-evident principle that +the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the +velocity and <emph>Matter</emph> taken together; and this is made use +of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of +<emph>Matter</emph> is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional +to the velocity, jointly with the extension and +solidity. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence +follow that gravity is proportional to <emph>Matter</emph>, in your +philosophic sense of the word; except you take it for +granted that unknown <emph>substratum</emph>, or whatever else you +call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which +to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is +magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, +I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may be proportional +to those qualities I will not dispute. But that +either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing +them, do exist in a <emph>material substratum</emph>; this is what +I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your +demonstration, have not yet proved. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you +think, however, you shall persuade me the natural philosophers +have been dreaming all this while? Pray what +becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the +phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 58.</note>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What mean you, Hylas, by the <emph>phenomena</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I mean the appearances which I perceive by my +senses. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And the appearances perceived by sense, are they +not ideas? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I have told you so a hundred times. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew +how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner +and<note place='foot'><q>order</q>—<q>series,</q> in first and second editions.</note> order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is +it not? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<pb n='461'/><anchor id='Pg461'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has +explained the production of any one idea in our minds by +the help of <emph>Matter</emph><note place='foot'><q>Matter,</q> i.e. when the reality +of <q>matter</q> is supposed to signify +what Berkeley argues cannot be; +because really meaningless.</note>, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on +all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you +cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. +That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should +produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that +a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should +be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, +this I can never understand. This I say, though +we had some positive conception of Matter, though we +knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, +would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself +the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all +this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing +nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion +of ideas<note place='foot'><q>the connexion of ideas,</q> i.e. +the physical coexistences and sequences, +maintained in constant +order by Power external to the +individual, and which are disclosed +in the natural sciences.</note>, they discover the laws and methods of +nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> After all, can it be supposed God would deceive +all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced +the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there +was no such thing? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, +or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to +God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. +Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either +because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; +or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, +which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible +we should withhold our assent from it. But where is +the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the +belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, +<emph>taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our +senses</emph>, is thought to exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by +any except a few philosophers, who do not know what +<pb n='462'/><anchor id='Pg462'/> +they would be at? Your question supposes these points +are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think +myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, +let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God +has deceived mankind at all. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There +lies the danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; +they unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows +where they will end. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, +either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should +be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are +grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That +innovations in government and religion are dangerous, +and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is +there the like reason why they should be discouraged in +philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown +before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all +such innovations had been forbidden, men would have +made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But +it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. +That the qualities we perceive are not on the +objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we +know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never +be assured even of their existence: that real colours and +sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and +motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor +slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without +any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, +thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the +least particle of a body contains innumerable extended +parts:—these are the novelties, these are the strange +notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment +of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the +mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against +these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate +Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps +be obliged to use some <foreign rend='italic'>ambages</foreign>, and ways of speech not +common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, +that which is most singular in them will, in effect, +be found to amount to no more than this:—that it is +absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose +<pb n='463'/><anchor id='Pg463'/> +any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived +by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it +should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable +to, those are out of the question. It is your business to +defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than +that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, +I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with <emph>scepticism</emph>. +This is so plain, there is no denying it. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You mistake me. I am not for changing things +into ideas, but rather ideas into things<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 38. Berkeley +is not for making things <emph>subjective</emph>, +but for recognising ideas or +phenomena presented to the senses +as <emph>objective</emph>.</note>; since those immediate +objects of perception, which, according to you, +are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things +themselves<note place='foot'>They are not mere illusory +appearances but are the very +things themselves making their +appearance, as far as our limited +senses allow them to be realised +for us.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Things! You may pretend what you please; but +it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of +things, the outside only which strikes the senses. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What you call the empty forms and outside of +things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are +they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition—that +Matter<note place='foot'>i.e. abstract Matter.</note> is an essential part of all corporeal +things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive +only sensible forms: but herein we differ—you will have +them to be empty appearances, I real beings. In short, +you do not trust your senses, I do. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You say you believe your senses; and seem to +applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. +According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is +discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? +Why is not the same figure, and other +sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why +should we use a microscope the better to discover the true +nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same +object that we feel<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. +49; and <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision +Vindicated</hi>, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c.</note>; neither is the same object perceived +<pb n='464'/><anchor id='Pg464'/> +by the microscope which was by the naked eye<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>New Theory of Vision</hi>, sect. +84-86.</note>. But, in +case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute +a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion +of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, +to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which +are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together +several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the +same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, +but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, +either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which +they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence +it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a +thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better +the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object +of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. +And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that +I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with +my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite +different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is +only to know what ideas are connected together; and the +more a man knows of the connexion of ideas<note place='foot'><q>the connexion of ideas,</q> i.e. +the order providentially maintained +in nature.</note>, the more he +is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, +if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all +circumstances affected with the same appearances? It +will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that +they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything +else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know +not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real +Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems +to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the +common language of men, speaking of several distinct +ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, +there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the +philosophers are owing to the same original: while they +began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on +words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency +and dispatch in the common actions of life, without +any regard to speculation<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introduction, +sect. 23-25.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='465'/><anchor id='Pg465'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl</hi>. Methinks I apprehend your meaning. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our +senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. +Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our +ideas are the true <emph>representations</emph> of those <emph>originals</emph>. But, +as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it +is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; +or whether they resemble them at all<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 8-10, 86, 87.</note>. We cannot, therefore, +be sure we have any real knowledge<note place='foot'>This difficulty is thus pressed +by Reid:—<q>The ideas in my mind +cannot be the same with the ideas +in any other mind; therefore, if +the objects I perceive be only +ideas, it is impossible that two or +more such minds can perceive the +same thing. Thus there is one unconfutable +consequence of Berkeley's +system, which he seems not +to have attended to, and from +which it will be found difficult, if +at all possible, to guard it. The +consequence I mean is this—that, +although it leaves us sufficient +evidence of a Supreme Mind, it +seems to take away all the evidence +we have of other intelligent +beings like ourselves. What I call +a father, or a brother, or a friend, +is only a parcel of ideas in my +own mind ; they cannot possibly +have that relation to another mind +which they have to mine, any +more than the pain felt by me +can be the <emph>individual pain</emph> felt by +another. I am thus left alone as +the only creature of God in the +universe</q> (Hamilton's <hi rend='italic'>Reid</hi>, pp. 284-285). +Implied Solipsism or Panegoism +is thus charged against Berkeley, +unless his conception of the +material world is further guarded.</note>. Farther, as +our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in +the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot +all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others +are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the +latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty<note place='foot'>Reid and Hamilton argue in +like manner against a fundamentally +representative sense-perception.</note>. +Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive +how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an +absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according +to you, how there should be any real thing in nature<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 6.</note>. +The result of all which is that we are thrown into the most +hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave +to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain +absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, +be not the source of all this scepticism<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.</note>? Secondly, +whether you are informed, either by sense or reason<note place='foot'>Cf. Ibid., sect. 18.</note>, of +the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case +<pb n='466'/><anchor id='Pg466'/> +you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? +Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything +distinctly conceived or meant by the <emph>absolute or external +existence of unperceiving substances</emph><note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 24.</note>? Lastly, Whether, +the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow +nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious +thought about unknown natures or substances<note place='foot'><q>unknown,</q> i.e. unrealised in +percipient life.</note>, admit +with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived +by the senses? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> For the present, I have no inclination to the +answering part. I would much rather see how you can +get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived +by the <emph>senses</emph> of one, likewise perceivable to others +present? If there were a hundred more here, they +would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as +I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected +with the ideas I frame in my <emph>imagination</emph>. Does not this +make a difference between the former sort of objects and +the latter? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference +between the objects of sense and those of imagination<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 28-33.</note>. +But what would you infer from thence? You +cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because +they are perceived by many. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it +hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by +our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our +minds? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> It is. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But the <emph>same</emph> idea which is in my mind cannot be +in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore +follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same +thing<note place='foot'>See also Collier's <hi rend='italic'>Clavis Universalis</hi>, +p. 6: <q>Two or more persons +who are present at a concert +of music may indeed in some +measure be said to hear the <emph>same</emph> +notes; yet the sound which the +one hears is <emph>not the very same</emph> with +the sound which another hears, +<emph>because the souls or persons are supposed +to be different</emph>.</q></note>? And is not this highly absurd? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> If the term <emph>same</emph> be taken in the vulgar acceptation, +it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles +<pb n='467'/><anchor id='Pg467'/> +I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same +thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. +Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are +used to apply the word <emph>same</emph> where no distinction or +variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their +perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, +<emph>several saw the same thing</emph>, so they may, upon like +occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without +any deviation either from propriety of language, or the +truth of things. But, if the term <emph>same</emph> be used in the +acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted +notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions +of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that +philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be +possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing<note place='foot'>Berkeley seems to hold that +in <emph>things</emph> there is no identity +other than perfect similarity—only +in <emph>persons</emph>. And even as to personal +identity he is obscure. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 347, &c.</note>. +But whether philosophers shall think fit to <emph>call</emph> a thing +the <emph>same</emph> or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let +us suppose several men together, all endued with the +same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by +their senses, and who had yet never known the use of +language; they would, without question, agree in their +perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the +use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what +was perceived, might call it the <emph>same</emph> thing: others, +especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, +might choose the denomination of <emph>different</emph> things. +But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? +to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may +yet have the term <emph>same</emph> applied to it<note place='foot'>But the question is, whether +the very ideas or phenomena that +are perceived by me <emph>can</emph> be also +perceived by other persons; and +if not, how I can discover that +<q>other persons</q> exist, or that any +finite person except myself is +cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if +the sort of <emph>sameness</emph> that Berkeley +advocates is all that can be predicated +of concrete ideas; which are +thus only <emph>similar</emph>, or generically +the same. Unless the ideas are +<emph>numerically</emph> the same, can different +persons make signs to one another +through them?</note>? Or, suppose +a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, +the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones +built in their place; and that you should call this the +<pb n='468'/><anchor id='Pg468'/> +<emph>same</emph>, and I should say it was not the <emph>same</emph> house:—would +we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the +house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference +consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed +in our notions; for that you superadded to your idea of +the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas +I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean +by the <emph>abstracted idea of identity</emph>; and should desire you to +look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood +yourself.——Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet +satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, +without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, +abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion with +you—that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the +case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the +Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately +perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your +difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes +equally against the Materialists and me. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> [<note place='foot'>Omitted in author's last edition.</note>Ay, Philonous,] But they suppose an external +archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may +truly be said to perceive the same thing. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And (not to mention your having discarded those +archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype +on my principles;—<emph>external, I mean, to your own mind</emph>: +though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind +which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all +the ends of <emph>identity,</emph> as well as if it existed out of a mind<note place='foot'>This seems to imply that intercourse +between finite persons is +maintained through ideas or phenomena +presented to the senses, +under a tacit faith in divinely +guaranteed correspondence between +the phenomena of which I +am conscious, and the phenomena +of which my neighbour is conscious; +so that they are <emph>practically</emph> <q>the same.</q> +If we are living in a fundamentally +divine, and therefore absolutely +trustworthy, universe, the phenomena +presented to my senses, +which I attribute to the agency of +another person, are so attributed +rightly. For if not, the so-called +cosmos is adapted to mislead me.</note>. +And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that +there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there +be, that it makes equally against both opinions. +</p> + +<pb n='469'/><anchor id='Pg469'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But that which makes equally against two contradictory +opinions can be a proof against neither. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I acknowledge it. +</p> + +<p> +But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance +of what you advance against <emph>Scepticism</emph>, it amounts to no +more than this:—We are sure that we really see, hear, +feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And how are <emph>we</emph> concerned any farther? I see +this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure <emph>nothing</emph> +cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore <emph>real</emph>. +Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, +tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not +a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is +nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas +perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into +one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, +because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, +when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, +the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with +roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, +and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure +the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my +opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But +if by the word <emph>cherry</emph> you mean an unknown nature, +distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its +<emph>existence</emph> something distinct from its being perceived; +then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, +can be sure it exists. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should +bring the very same reasons against the existence of +sensible things <emph>in a mind</emph> which you have offered against +their existing <emph>in a material substratum</emph>? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When I see your reasons, you shall hear what +I have to say to them. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Is the mind extended or unextended? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Unextended, without doubt. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Do you say the things you perceive are in your +mind? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> They are. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible +impressions? +</p> + +<pb n='470'/><anchor id='Pg470'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I believe you may. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible +there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist +in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that +which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions +made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say +objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that +things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon +wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand +those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and +I shall then be able to answer all those queries you +formerly put to me about my <emph>substratum</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as +existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would +not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when +bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an +impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind +comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected +from without, or by some being distinct from itself<note place='foot'>This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley's critics.</note>. This +is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve +to make your tenet of an unperceiving material <emph>substratum</emph> +intelligible, I would fain know. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use +can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse +of language in this? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> None at all. It is no more than common custom, +which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: +nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak +of the immediate objects of the understanding as things +existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but +what is conformable to the general analogy of language; +most part of the mental operations being signified by +words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in +the terms <emph>comprehend</emph>, <emph>reflect</emph>, <emph>discourse</emph>, &c., which, being +applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, +original sense. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But +there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not +how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance +<pb n='471'/><anchor id='Pg471'/> +that if you could solve all others, without being able +to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make +me a proselyte to your principles. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Let me know this mighty difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> The Scripture account of the creation is what +appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 82-84.</note>. +Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of +ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid +corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with +this, and I shall perhaps agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth +and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really +exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make +no question. If by <emph>ideas</emph> you mean fictions and fancies +of the mind<note place='foot'>i.e. if you take the term <emph>idea</emph> +in its wholly subjective and popular +meaning.</note>, then these are no ideas. If by <emph>ideas</emph> you +mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible +things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind<note place='foot'>i.e. if you take the term <emph>idea</emph> +in its objective meaning.</note>, +then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do +not call them <emph>ideas</emph>, it matters little. The difference is +only about a name. And, whether that name be retained +or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things +continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our +senses are not termed <emph>ideas</emph>, but <emph>things</emph>. Call them so +still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute +external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for +a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a +creation of things, of <emph>real</emph> things. Neither is this in the +least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from +what I have now said; and would have been evident to +you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been +so often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, +I desire you to shew where Moses makes any +mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by +him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent +on you to shew those words were not taken in the +vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but +in the philosophic<note place='foot'><q>philosophic,</q> i.e. <emph>pseudo</emph>-philosophic, +against which he argues.</note> acceptation, for Matter, or <emph>an unknown +<pb n='472'/><anchor id='Pg472'/> +quiddity, with an absolute existence</emph>. When you have proved +these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the +authority of Moses into our dispute. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. +I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are +you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy +between the Mosaic account of the creation and your +notions? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> If all possible sense which can be put on the first +chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with +my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy +with them. But there is no sense you may not +as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, +all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do +not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the +mind. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Pray let me see any sense you can understand +it in. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the +creation, I should have seen things produced into being—that +is become perceptible—in the order prescribed by +the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic +account of the creation, and now find no alteration in +my manner of believing it. When things are said to +begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with +regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are +eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, +have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things, +before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, +perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative +existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading +therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand +that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable +to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; +so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth +perceived by them<note place='foot'>Had this their relative existence—this +realisation of the +material world through finite percipient +and volitional life—any beginning? +May not God have been +eternally presenting phenomena to +the senses of percipient beings in +cosmical order, if not on this planet +yet elsewhere, perhaps under other +conditions? Has there been any +beginning in the succession of +finite persons?</note>. This is the literal obvious sense +<pb n='473'/><anchor id='Pg473'/> +suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in +which is included no mention, or no thought, either of +<emph>substratum</emph>, instrument, occasion, or absolute existence. +And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most +plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of +those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense +you may understand it in, you only can tell. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that +you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, +and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon +supposition there were <emph>men</emph> to perceive them; without +which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein +creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according +to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate +creatures should precede that of man? And is not this +directly contrary to the Mosaic account? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might +begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, +beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any +contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you +first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits +in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive +the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants +or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, +in a desert where nobody was present—that this way of +explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, +since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; +that it exactly suits with the common, natural, +and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests +the dependence of all things on God; and consequently +hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible +that important article of our faith should have in making +men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [<note place='foot'>In the first and second editions only.</note>great] +Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception +of things, divested of words, there will not be found any +notion of what you call the <emph>actuality of absolute existence</emph>. +You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so +lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you +calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if +they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon. +</p> + +<pb n='474'/><anchor id='Pg474'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own I have no very clear notion annexed to +them. But what say you to this? Do you not make the +existence of sensible things consist in their being in a +mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of +God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, +according to you? And how could that which was eternal +be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better +connected than this? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all +things from eternity? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I am. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Consequently they always had a being in the +Divine intellect. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> This I acknowledge. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, +or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are +agreed in that point. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> What shall we make then of the creation? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> May we not understand it to have been entirely +in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to +us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be +created, when God decreed they should become perceptible +to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which +He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? +You may call this a <emph>relative</emph>, or <emph>hypothetical existence</emph> if you +please. But, so long as it supplies us with the most +natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of +the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends +of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign +no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we +reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical +humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? +I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For, +allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the +corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical +to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all +created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the +immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary +and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, +would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making +things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not +<pb n='475'/><anchor id='Pg475'/> +plain, God did either execute that decree from all eternity, +or at some certain time began to will what He had not +actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the +former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of +existence, in finite things<note place='foot'>Is <q>creation</q> by us distinguishable +from continuous evolution, +unbeginning and unending, in +divinely constituted order; and +is there a distinction between +creation or evolution of <emph>things</emph> and +creation or evolution of <emph>persons</emph>?</note>. If the latter, then we must +acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which +implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident +this objection concludes equally against a creation in +any sense; nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable +by the light of nature? None of which can <emph>we</emph> +conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having +a beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited +perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to +finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any +man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have +exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways +of operation. If then you would infer anything against +me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness +of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable +on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, +of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in +what you have now objected. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned +to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence +of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are +in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to +think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the +creation and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, +I do not distinctly know. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> What would you have? Do I not acknowledge +a twofold state of things—the one ectypal or natural, the +other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in +time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of +God<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 347-349.</note>. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of +divines? or, is any more than this necessary in order to +conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar +<pb n='476'/><anchor id='Pg476'/> +repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take +away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider +this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the +creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is +no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular +opinion on that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, +if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable +is taken away? You have all along been allowed +the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, +therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately +or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination +from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, +or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the +notion you have of the creation by other Principles be +intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, +I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there +is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that +the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown +and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive +anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that +if the existence of Matter<note place='foot'><q>Matter,</q> i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the +word.</note> doth not make the creation +conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable +can be no objection against its non-existence. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me +in this point of the creation. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. +You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic +history and Immaterialism: but you know not where it +lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should +solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to +pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured +there is no repugnancy between the received notions of +Materialists and the inspired writings? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> And so I am. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood +in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is +metaphysical and out of the way? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> In the plain sense, doubtless. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. +as having been created by God; think you not the sensible +<pb n='477'/><anchor id='Pg477'/> +things commonly signified by those words are suggested to +every unphilosophical reader? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I cannot help thinking so. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, +to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the +Materialist? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> This I have already acknowledged. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> The creation, therefore, according to them, was not +the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative +being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an +absolute being, wherein creation might terminate? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> True. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter +destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their +notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude +on us I know not what; something equally unintelligible to +themselves and me? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I cannot contradict you. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? +of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or <emph>substratum</emph>? No, +certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must +first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should +be reconciled to them. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I see you can assault me with my own weapons. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Then as to <emph>absolute existence</emph>; was there ever +known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is +so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly +owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything +by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion +of absolute existence to be as clear as light; yet, was this +ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, +hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages +with the most plausible arguments against a creation? +That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence +without the minds of spirits, should be produced out +of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked +upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible +and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the +ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers +have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity<note place='foot'>Thus Origen in the early +Church. That <q>Matter</q> is co-eternal +with God would mean that God +is eternally making things real +in the percipient experience of +persons.</note>. +<pb n='478'/><anchor id='Pg478'/> +Lay these things together, and then judge you whether +Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the +<emph>creation</emph> is the last objection I can think of; and I must +needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the +rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of +unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards +your notions. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one +side of the question, can this, think you, be anything else +but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old +and rooted notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot +deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage +over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I confess it seems to be as you say. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, +let us throw into the scale the great advantages<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 85-156, in +which the religious and scientific +advantages of the new conception +of matter and the material cosmos +are illustrated, when it is rightly +understood and applied.</note> that arise +from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion +and human learning. The being of a God, and incorruptibility +of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they +not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? +When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure +general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, +but God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A +Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, +infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous +as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding +the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) +there is no more reason to doubt than of our own +being.—Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural +Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions +hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say +nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, +homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.—do they not +pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, +according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to +comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, +<pb n='479'/><anchor id='Pg479'/> +admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion +of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an +accident might pass from one body to another; yet, by all +their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have +they been able to reach the <emph>mechanical</emph> production of any +one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the +laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or +for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, +by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance +even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? +But, laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, and admitting +only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the +effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the <emph>phenomena</emph> +are nothing else but <emph>ideas</emph>; God is a <emph>spirit</emph>, but Matter an +unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate +an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, +but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, +and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; +God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute +of all contrivance and design. These surely are great +advantages in <emph>Physics</emph>. Not to mention that the apprehension +of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to +a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be +more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately +present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition +of Matter, or unthinking second causes.—Then in <emph>Metaphysics</emph>: +what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, +substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,<note place='foot'><q>substance and accident</q>—<q>subjects and adjuncts,</q>—in the first +and the second edition.</note> +substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility +of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how +two independent substances so widely different as <emph>Spirit</emph> +and <emph>Matter</emph>, should mutually operate on each other? what +difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning +these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, +by supposing only Spirits and ideas?—Even the <emph>Mathematics</emph> +themselves, if we take away the absolute existence +of extended things, become much more clear and easy; +the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in +those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite +<pb n='480'/><anchor id='Pg480'/> +extension; which depends on that supposition.—But what +need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not +that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the +ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? +Or can you produce so much as one argument against the +reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter +ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their +reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon +this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of +colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken +oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But +these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain +the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality +of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;—however, +not changed at random, but according to the fixed +order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and +truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and +distinguishes that which is <emph>real</emph> from the <emph>irregular visions</emph> + of the fancy<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 28-42. In +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 294-297, 300-318, 335, +359-365, we have glimpses of +thought more allied to Platonism, +if not to Hegelianism.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I agree to all you have now said, and must own +that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more +than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by +nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in +knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths +of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of +false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of +<emph>Immaterialism</emph>! +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> After all, is there anything farther remaining to be +done? You may remember you promised to embrace +that opinion which upon examination should appear most +agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism. +This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, +or the <emph>absolute</emph> existence of corporeal things. Nor is this +all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed +in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all +objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater +evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all +the marks of a true opinion and yet be false? +</p> + +<pb n='481'/><anchor id='Pg481'/> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in +all respects. But, what security can I have that I shall +still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and +that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur +hereafter? +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point +is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account +of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the +difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable +quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to +curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against +mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the +Providence of God, because there may be some particular +things which <emph>you</emph> know not how to reconcile with it? If +there are difficulties attending <emph>Immaterialism</emph>, there are at +the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the +existence of Matter<note place='foot'><q>Matter,</q> i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine.</note> there is not one proof, and far more +numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. +But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? +Alas! you know not where or what they are; something +which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient +pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never +yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, +how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> You have satisfied me, Philonous. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> But, to arm you against all future objections, do +but consider: That which bears equally hard on two +contradictory opinions can be proof against neither. +Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you +can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the +<emph>Materialists</emph>. Be not deceived by words; but sound your +own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier +by the help of <emph>Materialism</emph>, it is plain it can be no objection +against <emph>Immaterialism</emph>. Had you proceeded all along +by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself +abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your +difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained +by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with +than without that supposition; and consequently makes +rather <emph>against</emph> than <emph>for</emph> it. You should consider, in each +<pb n='482'/><anchor id='Pg482'/> +particular, whether the difficulty arises from the <emph>non-existence +of Matter</emph>. If it doth not, you might as well +argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against +the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against +<emph>Immaterialism</emph>. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you +will find this to have been often, if not always, the case. +You should likewise take heed not to argue on a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio +principii</foreign>. One is apt to say—The unknown substances +ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas +in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking +external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, +in the productions of our ideas? But is not this +proceeding on a supposition that there are such external +substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the +question? But, above all things, you should beware of +imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is +called <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ignoratio clenchi</foreign>. You talked often as if you +thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible +Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly +assured of their existence than I am. And it is you who +doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything +that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by +the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; +but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend +for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed +<emph>somewhat</emph>), which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, +and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended +by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object +which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or +square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. +Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct +from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds +whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively +considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not +comprehend the state of the question; without which your +objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of +mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they +have been) against your own notions. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to +have kept me from agreeing with you more than this +same <emph>mistaking the question</emph>. In denying Matter, at first +glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things +<pb n='483'/><anchor id='Pg483'/> +we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no +ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining +the name <emph>Matter</emph>, and applying it to <emph>sensible things</emph>? This +may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, +believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to +some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation +in words than in opinion. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> With all my heart: retain the word <emph>Matter,</emph> and +apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided +you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from +their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for +an expression. <emph>Matter</emph>, or <emph>material substance</emph>, are terms +introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply +a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from +being perceived by a mind: but are never used by +common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate +objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as +the names of all particular things, with the terms <emph>sensible</emph>, +<emph>substance</emph>, <emph>body</emph>, <emph>stuff</emph>, and the like, are retained, the word +<emph>Matter</emph> should be never missed in common talk. And in +philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it +quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that +hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent +of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general +confused term. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up +the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, +I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using +the word <emph>Matter</emph> as I please, and annexing it to a collection +of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely +own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than +<emph>Spirit</emph>. But I have been so long accustomed to the <emph>term +Matter</emph> that I know not how to part with it: to say, there +is no <emph>Matter</emph> in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas +to say—There is no <emph>Matter</emph>, if by that term be meant an +unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by +<emph>Matter</emph> is meant some sensible thing, whose existence +consists in being perceived, then there is <emph>Matter</emph>:—this +distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come +into your notions with small difficulty, when they are +proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy +about <emph>Matter</emph> in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether +<pb n='484'/><anchor id='Pg484'/> +between you and the philosophers: whose principles, +I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable +to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, +as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but +as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our +happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, +joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; +or with unknown entities, <emph>abstracted from all +relation to us</emph>? It is evident, things regard us only as +they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please +or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. +Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far +you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is +something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now +think with the philosophers; nor yet altogether with the +vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that +respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered +in my former notions. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. +My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer +light, that truth which was before shared between the +vulgar and the philosophers:—the former being of opinion, +that <emph>those things they immediately perceive are the real things</emph>; +and the latter, that <emph>the things immediately perceived are ideas, +which exist only in the mind</emph><note place='foot'>These two propositions are +a summary of Berkeley's conception +of the material world. With +him, the <emph>immediate</emph> objects of sense, +realise in <emph>perception</emph>, are independent +of the <emph>will</emph> of the percipient, +and are thus external to his proper +personality. Berkeley's <q>material +world</q> of enlightened Common +Sense, resulting from two factors, +Divine and human, is independent +of each finite mind; but not independent +of all living Mind.</note>. Which two notions put together, +do, in effect, constitute the substance of what +I advance. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Hyl.</hi> I have been a long time distrusting my senses: +methought I saw things by a dim light and through false +glasses. Now the glasses are removed and a new light +breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced +that I see things in their native forms, and am +no longer in pain about their <emph>unknown natures</emph> or <emph>absolute +existence</emph>. This is the state I find myself in at present; +though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not +<pb n='485'/><anchor id='Pg485'/> +yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same +principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects +usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were +advancing their philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, +your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Phil.</hi> You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how +it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain +height; at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin +from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as descent, proceeding +from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. +Just so, the same Principles which, at first view, +lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men +back to Common Sense. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='487'/><anchor id='Pg487'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>De Motu: Sive; De Motus Principio Et Natura, +Et De Causa Communicationis Motuum</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>First published in 1721</hi> +</p> + +<pb n='489'/><anchor id='Pg489'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Editor's Preface To De Motu</head> + +<p> +This Latin dissertation on Motion, or change of place +in the component atoms of the material world, was written +in 1720, when Berkeley was returning to Ireland, after +he had spent some years in Italy, on leave of absence +from Trinity College. A prize for an essay on the <q>Cause +of Motion,</q> had, it seems, been offered in that year by the +Paris Academy of Sciences. The subject suggested an +advance on the line of thought pursued in Berkeley's +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> and <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. The mind-dependent reality of +the material world, prominent in those works, was in them +insisted on, not as a speculative paradox, but mainly in +order to shew the spiritual character of the Power that +is continually at work throughout the universe. This +essay on what was thus a congenial subject was finished +at Lyons, and published early in 1721, soon after Berkeley +arrived in London. It was reprinted in his <hi rend='italic'>Miscellany</hi> +in 1752. I have not found evidence that it was ever submitted +to the French Academy. At any rate the prize +was awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician and professor +of philosophy at Lausanne. +</p> + +<pb n='490'/><anchor id='Pg490'/> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi> is interesting biographically as well as +philosophically, as a revelation of Berkeley's way of +thinking about the causal relations of Matter and Spirit +seven years after the publication of the <hi rend='italic'>Dialogues</hi>. In +1713 his experience of life was confined to Ireland. Now, +after months in London, in the society of Swift, and Pope, +and Addison, he had observed nature and men in France +and Italy. His eager temperament and extraordinary +social charm opened the way in those years of travel to +frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the time, +superseded controversy with materialism and scepticism, +and diverted his enthusiasm to nature and high art. One +likes to see how he handles the old questions as they now +arise in the philosophical treatment of motion in space, +which was regarded by many as the key to all other +phenomena presented in the material world. +</p> + +<p> +For one thing, the unreality of the data of sense after +total abstraction of living mind, the chief Principle in +the earlier works, lies more in the background in the +<hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. Yet it is tacitly assumed, as the basis of an +argument for the powerlessness of all sensible things, +and for refunding all active power in the universe into +conscious agency. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Mens agitat molem</foreign> might be taken as +a motto for the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. Then there is more frequent +reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than +in his more juvenile treatises. Plato and Aristotle are +oftener in view. Italy seems to have introduced him to +the physical science of Borelli and Torricelli. Leibniz, +who died in 1716, when Berkeley was in Italy, is named +by him for the first time in the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. Perhaps he +had learned something when he was abroad about the +most illustrious philosopher of the time. And it is interesting +by the way to find in one of those years what +is, I think, the only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It +is contained in one of the German philosopher's letters +to Des Bosses, in 1715. <q>Qui in Hybernia corporum +<pb n='491'/><anchor id='Pg491'/> +realitatem impugnat,</q> Leibniz writes, <q>videtur nec rationes +afferre idoneas, nee mentem suam satis explicare. +Suspicor esse ex eo hominum genere qui per Paradoxa +cognosci volunt.</q> This sentence is interesting on account +of the writer, although it suggests vague, and perhaps +second-hand knowledge of the Irishman and his principles. +The name of Hobbes does not appear in the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. +Yet one might have expected it, in consideration of the +supreme place which motion takes in his system, which +rests upon the principle that all changes in the universe +may be resolved into change of place. +</p> + +<p> +In the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi> the favourite language of ideal realism +is abandoned for the most part. <q>Bodies,</q> not <q>ideas +of sense,</q> are contrasted with mind or spirit, although +body still means significant appearance presented to the +senses. Indeed the term <emph>idea</emph> occurs less often in this and +the subsequent writings of Berkeley. +</p> + +<p> +I will now give some account of salient features in the +<hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Like the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> the tract opens with a protest against +the empty abstractions, and consequent frivolous discussions, +which even mechanical science had countenanced +although dealing with matters so obvious to sense as the +phenomena of motion. <emph>Force</emph>, <emph>effort</emph>, <emph>solicitation of gravity</emph>, +<emph>nisus</emph>, are examples of abstract terms connected with motion, +to which nothing in what is presented to the senses is +found to correspond. Yet corporeal power is spoken of +as if it were something perceptible by sense, and so found +<emph>within</emph> the bodies we see and touch (sect. 1-3). +</p> + +<p> +But it turns out differently when philosophers and +naturalists try to imagine the <emph>physical force</emph> that is supposed +to inhabit bodies, and to explain their motions. +The conception of motion has been the parent of innumerable +paradoxes and seeming contradictions among ancient +Greek thinkers; for it presents, in a striking form, the +<pb n='492'/><anchor id='Pg492'/> +metaphysical difficulties in the way of a reconciliation of +the One and the Many—difficulties which Berkeley had +already attributed to perverse abstractions, with which +philosophers amused themselves and blocked up the +way to concrete knowledge; first wantonly raising a dust, +and then complaining that they could not see. Nor has +modern mechanical science in this respect fared better +than the old philosophies. Even its leaders, Torricelli, +for instance, and Leibniz, offer us scholastic shadows—empty +metaphysical abstractions—when they speak about +an active power that is supposed to be lodged within the +things of sense. Torricelli tells us that the forces within +the things around us, and within our own bodies, are +<q>subtle quintessences, enclosed in a corporeal substance +as in the enchanted vase of Circe</q>; and Leibniz speaks +of their active powers as their <q>substantial form,</q> whatever +that can be conceived to mean. Others call the power to +which change of place is due, the hylarchic principle, an +appetite in bodies, a spontaneity inherent in them; or they +assume that, besides their extension, solidity, and other +qualities which appear in sense, there is also something +named force, latent in them if not patent—in all which +we have a flood of words, empty of concrete thought. At +best the language is metaphorical (sect. 2-9). +</p> + +<p> +For showing the active cause at work in the production +of motion in bodies, it is of no avail to name, as if it were +a datum of sense, what is not presentable to our senses. +Let us, instead, turn to the only other sort of data in +realised experience. For we find only two sorts of +realities in experience, the one sort revealed by our +senses, the other by inward consciousness. We can +affirm nothing about the contents of <emph>bodies</emph> except what +our senses present, namely, concrete things, extended, +figured, solid, having also innumerable other qualities, +which seem all to depend upon change of place in the +things, or in their constituent particles. The contents +<pb n='493'/><anchor id='Pg493'/> +of <emph>mind</emph> or <emph>spirit</emph>, on the other hand, are disclosed to +inner consciousness, which reveals a sentient Ego that is +actively percipient and exertive. And it must be in the +second of these two concrete revelations of reality, that +active causation, on which motion and all other change +depends, is to be found—not in empty abstractions, +covered by words like <emph>power</emph>, <emph>cause</emph>, <emph>force</emph>, or <emph>nisus</emph>, +which correspond to nothing perceived by the senses +(sect. 21). +</p> + +<p> +So that which we call body presents <emph>within itself</emph> nothing +in which change of place or state can originate causally. +Extension, figure, solidity, and all the other perceptible +constituents of bodies are appearances only—passive +phenomena, which succeed one another in an orderly +cosmical procession, on which doubtless our pains and +pleasures largely depend. But there is no sensibly perceptible +power found among those sensuous appearances. +They can only be <emph>caused causes</emph>, adapted, as we presuppose, +to signify to us what we may expect to follow +that appearance. The reason of their significance, i.e. of +the constancy of their sequences and coexistences, must +be sought for <emph>outside of themselves</emph>. Experimental research +may discover new terms among the correlated cosmical +sequences or coexistences, but the newly discovered terms +must still be only passive phenomena previously unperceived. +Body means only what is presentable to the +senses. Those who attribute to it something not perceptible +by sense, which they call the force or power in +which its motions originate, say in other words that the +origin of motion is unknowable by sense (sect. 22-24). +</p> + +<p> +Turn now from things of sense, the data of perception, +to Mind or Spirit, as revealed in inner consciousness. +Here we have a deeper and more real revelation of what +underlies, or is presupposed in, the passive cosmical procession +that is presented to the senses. Our inward +consciousness plainly shews the thinking being actually +<pb n='494'/><anchor id='Pg494'/> +<emph>exercising</emph> power to move its animated body. We find +that we can, by a causal exertion of which we are distinctly +conscious, either excite or arrest movements in bodies. +In voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example +of force or power, <emph>producing</emph> and not merely <emph>followed +by</emph> motion. In the case of human volition this is no +doubt conditioned power; nevertheless it exemplifies +Power on a greater scale than human, even Divine power, +universally and continuously operative, in all natural +motions, and in the cosmical laws according to which +they proceed (sect. 25-30). +</p> + +<p> +Thus those who pretend to find force or active causation +<emph>within</emph> bodies, pretend to find what their sensuous +experience does not support, and they have to sustain +their pretence by unintelligible language. On the other +hand, those who explain motion by referring it to conscious +exertion of personal agents, say what is supported by their +own consciousness, and confirmed by high authorities, +including Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and +Newton, demonstrating that in Spirit only do we find power +to change its own state, as well as the states and mutual +relations of bodies. Motion in nature is God continuously +acting (sect. 31-34). But physical science is conveniently +confined to the order of the passive procession of sensuous +appearances, including experiments in quest of the rules +naturally exemplified in the motions of bodies: reasoning +on mathematical and mechanical principles, it leaves the +contemplation of active causation to a more exalted science +(sect. 35-42). +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +In all this it can hardly be said that Berkeley has in +this adequately sounded the depths of Causation. He +proclaims inability to find through his senses more than +sequence of significant sensuous appearances, which are +each and all empty of active power; while he apparently +insists that he <emph>has</emph> found active power in the mere <emph>feeling +<pb n='495'/><anchor id='Pg495'/> +of exertion</emph>; which after all, as such, is only one sort of +antecedent sign of the motion that is found to follow it. +This is still only sequence of phenomena; not active power. +But is not causation a relation that cannot be truly presented +empirically, either in outer or inner consciousness? +And is not the Divine order that is presupposed +by us in all change, a presupposition that is inevitable in +trustworthy intercourse with a changing universe; unless +we are to confess <emph>atheistically</emph>, that our whole sensuous +experience may in the end put us to utter confusion? The +passive, uneasy feeling of strain, more or less involved +in the effort to move our bodies and their surroundings, +is no doubt apt to be confused with active causation; +for as David Hume remarks, <q>the animal <emph>nisus</emph> which +we experience, though it can afford no accurate precise +idea of power, enters very much into the vulgar, inaccurate +idea which is formed of it.</q> So when Berkeley +supposes that he has found a concrete example of originating +power in the <emph>nisus</emph> of which we are conscious when +we move our bodies, he is surely too easily satisfied. The +<emph>nisus</emph> followed by motion is, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, only a natural sequence, +a caused cause, which calls for an originating cause that +is <emph>absolutely</emph> responsible for the movement. Is not the +index to this absolutely responsible agency an ethical one, +which points to a free moral agent as alone necessarily +connected with, or responsible for, the changes which <emph>he +can</emph> control? Persons are causally responsible for their +own actions; and are accordingly pronounced good or +evil on account of acts of will that are not mere caused +causes—passively dependent terms in the endless succession +of cosmical change. They must originate in self, be +absolutely self-referable, in a word supernatural issues of +the personality. Moral reason implies that they are not +determined <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ab extra</foreign>, and so points to moral agents as our +only concrete examples of independent power; but this +only so far as those issues go for which they are morally +<pb n='496'/><anchor id='Pg496'/> +responsible. Is not faith in the Universal Power necessarily +faith-venture in the absolutely perfect and trustworthy +moral agency of God? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +While the principle of Causation, in its application to +change of place on the part of bodies and their constituent +atoms, is the leading thought in the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>, this essay +also investigates articulately the nature of the phenomenon +which we call <emph>motion</emph> (sect. 43-66). It assumes that +motion is only an effect, seeing that no one who reflects +can doubt that what is presented to our senses in the +case of motion is altogether passive: there is nothing in +the successive appearance of the same body in different +places that involves action on the part of either of the moving +or the moved body, or that can be more than inert +effect (sect. 49). And all concrete motion, it is assumed, +must be something that can be perceived by our senses. +Accordingly it must be a perceptible <emph>relation between +bodies</emph>, as far as it is bodily: it could make no appearance +at all if space contained only one solitary body: +a plurality of bodies is indispensable to its appearance. +Absolute motion of a solitary body, in otherwise absolutely +empty space, is an unmeaning abstraction, a collocation +of empty words. This leads into an inquiry about relative +space as well as relative place, and the intelligibility of +absolute space, place, and motion (sect. 52-64). +</p> + +<p> +Local motion is unintelligible unless we understand +the meaning of <emph>space</emph>. Now some philosophers distinguish +between absolute space, which with them is ultimately +the only real space, and that which is conditioned by +the senses, or relative. The former is said to be +boundless, pervading and embracing the material world, +but not itself presentable to our senses; the other is the +space marked out or differentiated by bodies contained in +it, and it is in this way exposed to our senses (sect. 52). +What must remain after the annihilation of all bodies in the +<pb n='497'/><anchor id='Pg497'/> +universe is relativeless, undifferentiated, absolute space, +of which all attributes are denied, even its so-called +extension being neither divisible nor measurable; necessarily +imperceptible by sense, unimaginable, and unintelligible, +in every way unrealisable in experience; so that +the words employed about it denote <emph>nothing</emph> (sect. 53). +</p> + +<p> +It follows that we must not speak of the real space +which a body occupies as part of a space that is necessarily +abstracted from all sentient experience; nor of real motion +as change within absolute space, without any relation between +bodies, either perceived or conceived. All change +of place in one body must be relative to other bodies, +among which the moving body is supposed to change its +place—our own bodies which we animate being of course +recognised among the number. Motion, it is argued, is +unintelligible, as well as imperceptible and unimaginable, +without some relation between the moving body and at +least one other body: the truth of this is tested when we +try to suppose the annihilation of all other bodies, our +own included, and retain only a solitary globe: absolute +motion is found unthinkable. So that, on the whole, to +see what motion means we must rise above the mathematical +postulates that are found convenient in mechanical +science; we must beware of empty abstractions; we must +treat motion as something that is real only so far as it +is presented to our senses, and remain modestly satisfied +with the perceived relations under which it then appears +(sect. 65-66). +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +Finally, is motion, thus explained, something that can +be spoken of as an entity communicable from one body +to another body? May we think of it as a datum of +sense existing in the striking body, and then passing +from it into the struck body, the one losing exactly as +much as the other receives? (sect. 67). Deeper thought +finds in those questions only a revival of the previously +<pb n='498'/><anchor id='Pg498'/> +exploded postulate of <q>force</q> as <emph>something sensible</emph>, yet +distinct from all the significant appearances sense presents. +The language used may perhaps be permitted in mathematical +hypotheses, or postulates of mechanical science, +in which we do not intend to go to the root of things. +But the obvious fact is, that the moving body shews less +perceptible motion, and the moved body more. To dispute +whether the perceptible motion acquired is numerically +the same with that lost leads into frivolous verbal controversy +about Identity and Difference, the One and the +Many, which it was Berkeley's aim to expel from science, +and so to simplify its procedure and result. Whether we +say that motion passes from the striking body into the +struck, or that it is generated anew within the struck +body and annihilated in the striking, we make virtually the +same statement. In each way of expression the facts remain, +that the one body presents perceptible increase of its +motion and the other diminution. Mind or Spirit is the +active cause of all that we then see. Yet in mechanical +science—which explains things only physically, by shewing +the significant connexion of events with their mechanical +rules—terms which seem to imply the conveyance of +motion out of one body into another may be pardoned, +in consideration of the limits within which physical science +is confined, and its narrower point of view. In physics +we confine ourselves to the sensuous signs which arise +in experience, and their natural interpretation, in all +which mathematical hypotheses are found convenient; so +that gravitation, for example, and other natural rules of +procedure, are spoken of as <emph>causes</emph> of the events which +conform to them, no account being taken of the Active +Power that is ultimately responsible for the rules. For +the Active Power in which we live, move, and have our +being, is not a datum of sense; meditation brings it into +light. But to pursue this thought would carry us beyond +the physical laws of Motion (sect. 69-72). +</p> + +<pb n='499'/><anchor id='Pg499'/> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi> may be compared with what we found +in the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 25-28 and 101-117. The total +powerlessness of the significant appearances presented +to the senses, and the omnipotence of Mind in the +economy of external nature, is its chief philosophical +lesson. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='501'/><anchor id='Pg501'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>De Motu</head> + +<p> +1. Ad veritatem inveniendam præcipuum est cavisse ne +voces males intellectæ<note place='foot'><q>voces male intellectæ.</q> Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Principles of Human Knowledge</hi>, +<q>Introduction,</q> sect. 6, 23-25, on +the abuse of language, especially +by abstraction.</note> nobis officiant: quod omnes fere +monent philosophi, pauci observant. Quanquam id quidem +haud adeo difficile videtur, in rebus præsertim physicis +tractandis, ubi locum habent sensus, experientia, et ratiocinium +geometricum. Seposito igitur, quantum licet, omni +præjudicio, tam a loquendi consuetudine quam a philosphorum +auctoritate nato, ipsa rerum natura diligenter +inspicienda. Neque enim cujusquam auctoritatem usque +adeo valere oportet, ut verba ejus et voces in pretio sint, +dummodo nihil clari et certi iis subesse comperiatur. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +2. Motus contemplatio mire torsit veterum philosophorum<note place='foot'><q>veterum philosophorum.</q> The +history of ancient speculations +about motion, from the paradoxes +of Zeno downwards, is, in some +sort, a history of ancient metaphysics. +It involves Space, Time, +and the material world, with the +ultimate causal relation of Nature +to Spirit.</note> +mentes, unde natæ sunt variæ opiniones supra +modem difficiles, ne dicam absurdæ; quæ, quum jam fere +in desuetudinem abierint, haud merentur ut iis discutiendis +nimio studio immoremur. Apud recentiores autem et +saniores hujus ævi philosophos<note place='foot'><q>hujus ævi philosophos.</q> As in +Bacon on motion, and in the questions +raised by Newton, Borelli, +Leibniz, and others, discussed in +the following sections.</note>, ubi de Motu agitur, +vocabula haud pauca abstractæ nimium et obscuræ significationis +occurrunt, cujusmodi sunt <emph>solicitatio gravitatis</emph>, +<emph>conatus</emph>, <emph>vires mortuæ</emph>, &c., quæ scriptis, alioqui doctissimis, +tenebras offundunt, sententiisque non minus a vero, quam +a sensu hominum communi abhorrentibus, ortum præbent. +<pb n='502'/><anchor id='Pg502'/> +Hæc vero necesse est ut, veritatis gratia, non alios refellendi +studio, accurate discutiantur. +</p> + +<p> +3. <emph>Solicitatio</emph> et <emph>nisus</emph>, sive <emph>conatus</emph>, rebus solummodo +animatis revera competunt<note place='foot'>Sect. 3-42 are concerned with +the principle of Causality, exemplified +in the motion, or change of +place and state, that is continually +going on in the material world, +and which was supposed by some +to explain all the phenomena of +the universe.</note>. Cum aliis rebus tribuuntur, +sensu metaphorico accipiantur necesse est. A metaphoris +autem abstinendum philosopho. Porro, seclusa omni tarn +animæ affectione quam corporis motione, nihil clari ac +distincti iis vocibus significari, cuilibet constabit qui modo +rem serio perpenderit. +</p> + +<p> +4. Quamdiu corpora gravia a nobis sustinentur, sentimus +in nobismet ipsis nisum, fatigationem, et molestiam. Percipimus +etiam in gravibus cadentibus motum acceleratum +versus centrum telluris; ope sensuum præterea nihil. +Ratione tamen colligitur causam esse aliquam vel principium +horum phænomenon; illud autem <emph>gravitas</emph> vulgo +nuncupatur. Quoniam vero causa descensus gravium cæca +sit et incognita, gravitas ea acceptione proprie dici nequit +qualitas sensibilis; est igitur qualitas occulta. Sed vix, +et ne vix quidem, concipere licet quid sit qualitas occulta, +aut qua ratione qualitas ulla agere aut operari quidquam +possit. Melius itaque foret, si, missa qualitate occulta, +homines attenderent solummodo ad effectus sensibiles; +vocibusque abstractis (quantumvis illæ ad disserendum +utiles sint) in meditatione omissis, mens in particularibus +et concretis, hoc est in ipsis rebus, defigeretur. +</p> + +<p> +5. <emph>Vis</emph><note place='foot'><q>vis.</q> The assumption that +<emph>active power</emph> is an immediate datum +of sense is the example here +offered of the abase of abstract +words. He proceeds to dissolve +the assumption by shewing that it +is meaningless.</note> similiter corporibus tribuitur: usurpatur autem +vocabulum illud, tanquam significaret qualitatem cognitam, +distinctamque tarn a motu, figura, omnique alia re sensibili, +quam ab omni animalis affectione: id vero nihil aliud esse +quam qualitatem <emph>occultam</emph>, rem acrius rimanti constabit. +Nisus animalis et motus corporeus vulgo spectantur tanquam +symptomata et mensuræ hujus qualitatis occultæ. +</p> + +<p> +6. Patet igitur gravitatem aut vim frustra poni pro +principio<note place='foot'><q>principio</q>—the ultimate explanation +or originating cause. Cf. +sect. 36. Metaphors, or indeed +empty words, are accepted for +explanations, it is argued, when +<emph>bodily</emph> power or force, in any form, +e.g. gravitation, is taken as the real +cause of motion. To call these +<q>occult causes</q> is to say nothing +that is intelligible. The perceived +sensible effects and their customary +sequences are all we know. +Physicists are still deluded by +words and metaphors.</note> motus: nunquid enim principium illud clarius +<pb n='503'/><anchor id='Pg503'/> +cognosci potest ex eo quod dicatur qualitas occulta? Quod +ipsum occultum est, nihil explicat: ut omittamus causam +agentem incognitam rectius dici posse substantiam quam +qualitatem. Porro <emph>vis</emph>, <emph>gravitas</emph>, et istiusmodi voces, sæpius, +nec inepte, in concreto usurpantur; ita ut connotent corpus +motum, difficultatem resistendi, &c. Ubi vero a philosophis +adhibentur ad significandas naturas quasdam, ab +hisce omnibus præcisas et abstractas, quæ nec sensibus +subjiciuntur, nec ulla mentis vi intelligi nec imaginatione +effingi<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 53, where <emph>sense</emph>, <emph>imagination</emph>, +and <emph>intelligence</emph> are distinguished.</note> possunt, turn demum errores et confusionem +pariunt. +</p> + +<p> +7. Multos autem in errorem ducit, quod voces generales +et abstractas in disserendo utiles esse videant, nec tamen +earum vim satis capiant. Partim vero a consuetudine +vulgari inventæ sunt illæ ad sermonem abbreviandum, +partim a philosophis ad docendum excogitatæ; non quod +ad naturas rerum accommodatas sint, quæ quidem singulares +et concretæ existunt; sed quod idoneæ ad tradendas +disciplinas, propterea quod faciant notiones, vel saltem +propositiones, universales<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, Introd. 16, 20, 21; +also <hi rend='italic'>Alciphron</hi>, Dial. VII. sect. 8, 17.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +8. <emph>Vim corpoream</emph> esse aliquid conceptu facile plerumque +existimamus. Ii tamen qui rem accuratius inspexerunt +in diversa sunt opinione; uti apparet ex mira verborum +obscuritate qua laborant, ubi illam explicare conantur. +Torricellius ait vim et impetum esse res quasdam abstractas +subtilesque et quintessentias, quæ includuntur in substantia +corporea, tanquam in vase magico Circes<note place='foot'>[La Materia altro non è che +un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale +serve per ricettacolo della forza +et de' momenti dell' impeto. La +forzae l'impeti sono astratti tanto +sottili, sono quintessenze tanto +spiritose, che in altre ampolle non +si possono racchiudere, fuor che +nell' intima corpulenza de' solidi +naturali, Vide <hi rend='italic'>Lezioni Accademiche</hi>.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author.</hi> +Torricelli (1608-47), +the eminent Italian physicist, and +professor of mathematics at Florence, +who invented the barometer.</note>. Leibnitius +item in naturæ vi explicanda hæc habet—<emph>Vis activa, primitiva, +quæ est ἐντελέχεια πρώτη, animæ vel formæ substantiali +<pb n='504'/><anchor id='Pg504'/> +respondet</emph>. Vide <hi rend='italic'>Acta Erudit. Lips.</hi> Usque adeo necesse +est ut vel summi viri, quamdiu abstractionibus indulgent, +voces nulla certa significatione præditas, et meras scholasticorum +umbras sectentur. Alia ex neotericorum scriptis, +nec pauca quidem ea, producere liceret; quibus abunde +constaret, metaphysicas abstractiones non usquequaque +cessisse mechanicæ et experimentis, sed negotium inane +philosophis etiamnum facessere. +</p> + +<p> +9. Ex illo fonte derivantur varia absurda, cujus generis +est illud, <emph>vim percussionis, utcunque exiguæ, esse infinite +magnam</emph>. Quod sane supponit, gravitatem esse qualitatem +quandam realem ab aliis omnibus diversam; et gravitationem +esse quasi actum hujus qualitatis, a motu realiter +distinctum: minima autem percussio producit effectum +majorem quam maxima gravitatio sine motu; ilia scilicet +motum aliquem edit, hæc nullum. Unde sequitur, vim +percussionis ratione infinita excedere vim gravitationis, hoc +est, esse infinite magnam<note place='foot'>Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor +of mathematics at Pisa, and +then of medicine at Florence; see +his <hi rend='italic'>De Vi Percussionis</hi>, cap. XXIV. +prop. 88, and cap. XXVII.</note>. Videantur experimenta +Galilæi, et quæ de definita vi percussionis scripserunt +Torricellius, Borellus, et alii. +</p> + +<p> +10. Veruntamen fatendum est vim nullam per se immediate +sentiri; neque aliter quam per effectum<note place='foot'><q>per effectum,</q> i.e. by its +sensible effects—real power or +active force not being a datum +of the senses, but found in the spiritual +efficacy, of which we have an +example in our personal agency.</note> cognosci +et mensurari. Sed vis mortuæ, seu gravitationis simplicis, +in corpore quiescente subjecto, nulla facta mutatione, +effectus nullus est; percussionis autem, effectus aliquis. +Quoniam, ergo, vires sunt effectibus proportionales, concludere +licet vim mortuam<note place='foot'><q>vim mortuam.</q> The only +power we can find is the living +power of Mind. Reason is perpetually +active in the universe, +imperceptible through the senses, +and revealed to <emph>them</emph> only in its +sensible effects. <q>Power,</q> e.g. +<q>gravitation,</q> in things, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, is distinguished +from perceived <q>motion</q> +only through illusion due to misleading +abstraction. There is no +<emph>physical</emph> power, intermediate between +spiritual agency, on the +one hand, and the sensible changes +we see, on the other. Cf. +sect. 11.</note> esse nullam. Neque tamen +propterea vim percussionis esse infinitam: non enim oportet +quantitatem ullam positivam habere pro infinita, propterea +quod ratione infinita superet quantitatem nullam sive nihil. +</p> + +<pb n='505'/><anchor id='Pg505'/> + +<p> +11. Vis gravitationis a momento secerni nequit; momentum +autem sine celeritate nullum est, quum sit moles in +celeritatem ducta: porro celeritas sine motu intelligi non +potest; ergo nec vis gravitationis. Deinde vis nulla nisi +per actionem innotescit, et per eandem mensuratur; actionem +autem corporis a motu præscindere non possumus; +ergo quamdiu corpus grave plumbi subjecti vel chordæ +figuram mutat, tamdiu movetur; ubi vero quiescit, nihil +agit, vel, quod idem est, agere prohibetur. Breviter, voces +istæ <emph>vis mortua</emph> et <emph>gravitatio</emph>, etsi per abstractionem metaphysicam +aliquid significare supponuntur diversum a +movente, moto, motu et quiete, revera tamen id totum +nihil est. +</p> + +<p> +12. Siquis diceret pondus appensum vel impositum agere +in chordam, quoniam impedit quominus se restituat vi +elastica: dico, pari ratione corpus quodvis inferum agere +in superius incumbens, quoniam illud descendere prohibet: +dici vero non potest actio corporis, quod prohibeat aliud +corpus existere in eo loco quern occupat. +</p> + +<p> +13. Pressionem corporis gravitantis quandoque sentimus. +Verum sensio ista molesta oritur ex motu corporis istius +gravis fibris nervisque nostri corporis communicato, et +eorundem situm immutante; adeoque percussioni accepta +referri debet. In hisce rebus multis et gravibus præjudiciis +laboramus, sed illa acri atque iterata meditatione subigenda +sunt<note place='foot'><q>meditatione subigenda sunt.</q> Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Theory of Vision Vindicated</hi>, +sect. 35, 70.</note>, vel potius penitus averruncanda. +</p> + +<p> +14. Quo probetur quantitatem ullam esse infinitam, +ostendi oportet partem aliquam finitam homogeneam in +ea infinities contineri. Sed vis mortua se habet ad +vim percussionis, non ut pars ad totum, sed ut punctum +ad lineam, juxta ipsos vis infinitæ percussionis auctores. +Multa in hanc rem adjicere liceret, sed vereor ne prolixus +sim. +</p> + +<p> +15. Ex principiis præmissis lites insignes solvi possunt, +quæ viros doctos multum exercuerunt. Hujus rei exemplum +sit controversia illa de proportione virium. Una +pars dum concedit, momenta, motus, impetus, data mole, +esse simpliciter ut velocitates, affirmat vires esse ut quadrata +velocitatum. Hanc autem sententiam supponere vim +<pb n='506'/><anchor id='Pg506'/> +corporis distingui<note place='foot'><q>distingui.</q> It is here argued +that so-called power within the +things of sense is not distinguishable +from the sensibly perceived +sequences. To the meaningless +supposition that it is, he attributes +the frivolous verbal controversies +among the learned mentioned +in the following section. +The province of natural philosophy, +according to Berkeley, is to inquire +what the rules are under which +sensible effects are uniformly manifested. +Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 236, 247, +249.</note> a momento, motu, et impetu; eaque +suppositione sublata corruere, nemo non videt. +</p> + +<p> +16. Quo clarius adhuc appareat, confusionem quandam +miram per abstractiones metaphysicas in doctrinam de +motu introductam esse, videamus quantum intersit inter +notiones virorum celebrium de vi et impetu. Leibnitius +impetum cum motu confundit. Juxta Newtonum<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Principia Math.</hi> Def. III.</note> impetus +revera idem est cum vi inertiæ. Borellus<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>De Vi Percussionis</hi>, cap. I.</note> asserit impetum +non aliud esse quam gradum velocitatis. Alii impetum et +conatum inter se differre, alii non differre volunt. Plerique +vim motricem motui proportionalem intelligunt. Nonnulli +aliam aliquam vim præter motricem, et diversimode +mensurandam, utpote per quadrata velocitatum in moles, +intelligere <emph>præ</emph> se ferunt. Sed infinitum esset hæc prosequi. +</p> + +<p> +17. <emph>Vis</emph>, <emph>gravitas</emph>, <emph>attractio</emph>, et hujusmodi voces, utiles<note place='foot'><q>utiles.</q> Such words as <q>force,</q> +<q>power,</q> <q>gravity,</q> <q>attraction,</q> are +held to be convenient in physical +reasonings about the <emph>phenomena</emph> of +motion, but worthless as philosophical +expressions of the <emph>cause</emph> of +motion, which transcends sense +and mechanical science. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, +sect. 234, 235.</note> +sunt ad ratiocinia et computationes de motu et corporibus +motis; sed non ad intelligendam simplicem ipsius motus +naturam, vel ad qualitates totidem distinctas designandas. +Attractionem certe quod attinet, patet illam ab Newtono +adhiberi, non tanquam qualitatem veram et physicam, sed +solummodo ut hypothesin mathematicam<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 67.</note>. Quinetiam +Leibnitius, nisum elementarem seu solicitationem ab impetu +distinguens, fatetur illa entia non re ipsa inveniri in rerum +natura, sed abstractione facienda esse. +</p> + +<p> +18. Similis ratio est compositionis et resolutionis virium +quarumcunque directarum in quascunque obliquas, per +diagonalem et latera parallelogrammi. Hæc mechanicæ +et computationi inserviunt: sed aliud est computationi +et demonstrationibus mathematicis inservire, aliud rerum +naturam exhibere. +</p> + +<p> +19. Ex recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione, ut putent +<pb n='507'/><anchor id='Pg507'/> +motum neque destrui nec de novo gigni, sed eandem<note place='foot'><q>candem.</q> So in recent discussions +on the conservation of +force.</note> +semper motus quantitatem permanere. Aristoteles etiam +dubium illud olim proposuit—utrum motus factus sit et +corruptus, an vero ab æterno? <hi rend='italic'>Phys.</hi> lib. viii. Quod vero +motus sensibilis pereat, patet sensibus: illi autem eundem +impetum, nisum, aut summam virium eandem manere velle +videntur. Unde affirmat Borellus, vim in percussione non +imminui, sed expandi; impetus etiam contrarios suscipi et +retineri in eodem corpore. Item Leibnitius nisum ubique +et semper esse in materia, et ubi non patet sensibus, +ratione intelligi contendit.—Hæc autem nimis abstracta +esse et obscura, ejusdemque fere generis cum formis +substantialibus et entelechiis, fatendum. +</p> + +<p> +20. Quotquot ad explicandam motus causam atque +originem, vel principio hylarchico, vel naturæ indigentia, +vel appetitu, aut denique instinctu naturali utuntur, dixisse +aliquid potius quam cogitasse censendi sunt. Neque ab +hisce multum absunt qui supposuerint<note place='foot'>[Borellus.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author.</hi> See <hi rend='italic'>De +Vi Percussionis</hi>, cap. XXIII.</note> <emph>partes terræ esse se +moventes, aut etiam spiritus iis implantatos ad instar formæ</emph>, +ut assignent causam accelerationis gravium cadentium: +aut qui dixerit<note place='foot'>[Leibnitius.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author.</hi></note>, <emph>in corpore præter solidam extensionem +debere etiam poni aliquid unde virium consideratio oriatur</emph>. +Siquidem hi omnes vel nihil particulare et determinatum +enuntiant; vel, si quid sit, tarn difficile erit illud explicare, +quam id ipsum cujus explicandi causa adducitur<note place='foot'>On Berkeley's reasoning all +terms which involve the assumption +that real causality is something +presentable to the senses are a cover +for meaninglessness. Only through +self-conscious experience of personal +activity does real meaning +enter into the portion of language +which deals with active causation. +This is argued in detail in sect. +21-35.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +21. Frustra ad naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea quæ +nec sensibus patent, nec ratione intelligi possunt. Videndum +ergo quid sensus, quid experientia, quid demum +ratio iis innixa, suadeat. Duo sunt summa rerum genera—<emph>corpus</emph> +et <emph>anima</emph>. Rem extensam, solidam, mobilem, +figuratam, aliisque qualitatibus quæ sensibus occurrunt +præditam, ope sensuum; rem vero sentientem, percipientem, +intelligentem, conscientia quadam interna cognovimus. +<pb n='508'/><anchor id='Pg508'/> +Porro, res istas plane inter se diversas esse, +longeque heterogeneas, cernimus. Loquor autem de +rebus cognitis: de incognitis enim disserere nil juvat<note place='foot'>Our concrete experience is assumed +to be confined to (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) <emph>bodies</emph>, i.e. +the data of the senses, and (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) <emph>mind</emph> +or <emph>spirit</emph>—sentient, intelligent, +active—revealed by internal consciousness. +Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 1, +2, in which experience is resolved +into <emph>ideas</emph> and the <emph>active intelligence</emph> +which they presuppose. +Here the word idea disappears, but, +in accordance with its signification, +<q>bodies</q> is still regarded as aggregates +of external phenomena, the +passive subjects of changes of +place and state: the idealisation of +the material world is tacitly implied, +but not obtruded.</note>. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +22. Totum id quod novimus, cui nomen <emph>corpus</emph> indidimus, +nihil <emph>in se</emph> continet quod motus principium seu causa +efficiens esse possit. Etenim impenetrabilitas, extensio, +figura nullam includunt vel connotant potentiam producendi +motum; quinimo e contrario non modo illas, verum etiam +alias, quotquot sint, corporis qualitates sigillatim percurrentes, +videbimus omnes esse revera passivas, nihilque +iis activum inesse, quod ullo modo intelligi possit tanquam +fons et principium motus<note place='foot'><q>nihilque,</q> &c. Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles +of Human Knowledge</hi>, e.g. sect. 26, +65, 66. where the essential passivity +of the <emph>ideas</emph> presented to the senses, +i.e. the material world, is maintained +as a cardinal principle—on the +positive ground of our percipient +experience of sensible things. To +speak of the cause of motion as +<emph>something sensible</emph>, he argues (sect. +24), is merely to shew that we +know nothing about it. Cf. sect. +28, 29, infra.</note>. Gravitatem quod attinet, voce +illa nihil cognitum et ab ipso effectu sensibili, cujus causa +quæritur, diversum significari jam ante ostendimus. Et +sane quando corpus grave dicimus, nihil aliud intelligimus, +nisi quod feratur deorsum; de causa hujus effectus sensibilis +nihil omnino cogitantes. +</p> + +<p> +23. De corpore itaque audacter pronunciare licet, utpote +de re comperta, quod non sit principium motus. Quod si +quisquam, præter solidam extensionem ejusque modificationes, +vocem <emph>corpus</emph> qualitatem etiam <emph>occultam</emph>, virtutem, +formam, essentiam complecti sua significatione contendat; +licet quidem illi inutili negotio sine ideis disputare, et +nominibus nihil distincte exprimentibus abuti. Cæterum +sanior philosophandi ratio videtur ab notionibus abstractis +et generalibus (si modo notiones dici debent quæ intelligi +nequeunt) quantum fieri potest abstinuisse. +</p> + +<p> +24. Quicquid continetur in idea corporis novimus; quod +<pb n='509'/><anchor id='Pg509'/> +vero novimus in corpore, id non esse principium motus +constat<note place='foot'>The phenomena that can be +presented to the senses are taken +as the measure of what can be +attributed to the material world; +and as the senses present <emph>only</emph> +conditioned change of place in +bodies, we must look for the active +cause in the invisible world which +internal consciousness presents to +us.</note>. Qui præterea aliquid incognitum in corpore, +cujus ideam nullam habent, comminiscuntur, quod motus +principium dicant, ii revera nihil aliud quam <emph>principium +motus esse incognitum</emph> dicunt. Sed hujusmodi subtilitatibus +diutius immorari piget. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +25. Præter res corporeas alterum est <emph>genus rerum cogitantium</emph><note place='foot'><q><emph>genus rerum cogitantium.</emph></q> Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 2.</note>. +In iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi, +propria experientia didicimus<note place='foot'><q>experientia didicimus.</q> Can +the merely empirical data even of +internal consciousness reveal this +causal connexion between volition +and bodily motions, without the +venture of theistic faith?</note>; quandoquidem anima +nostra pro lubitu possit ciere et sistere membrorum motus, +quacunque tandem ratione id fiat. Hoc certe constat, +corpora moveri ad nutum animæ; eamque proinde haud +inepte dici posse principium motus: particulare quidem +et subordinatum, quodque ipsum dependeat a primo et +universali Principio<note place='foot'><q>a primo et universali Principio</q> +i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in +whom the universe of bodies and +spirits finds explanation; in a way +which Berkeley does not attempt to +unfold articulately and exhaustively +in philosophical system.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +26. Corpora gravia feruntur deorsum, etsi nullo impulsu +apparente agitata; non tamen existimandum propterea in +iis contineri principium motus: cujus rei hanc rationem +assignat Aristoteles<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Phys.</hi> θ. 4. 255 a 5-7.</note>;—<emph>Gravia et levia</emph> (inquit) <emph>non moventur +a seipsis; id enim vitale esset, et se sistere possent</emph>. Gravia +omnia una eademque certa et constanti lege centrum +telluris petunt, neque in ipsis animadvertitur principium +vel facultas ulla motum istum sistendi, minuendi, vel, nisi +pro rata proportione, augendi, aut denique ullo modo +immutandi: habent adeo se passive. Porro idem, stricte +et accurate loquendo, dicendum de corporibus percussivis. +Corpora ista quamdiu moventur, ut et in ipso percussionis +momento, si gerunt passive, perinde scilicet atque cum +quiescunt. Corpus iners tam agit quam corpus motum, si +<pb n='510'/><anchor id='Pg510'/> +res ad verum exigatur: id quod agnoscit Newtonus, ubi +ait, vim inertiæ esse eandem cum impetu<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Princip. Math.</hi> Def. III.</note>. Corpus autem +iners et quietum nihil agit, ergo nee motum. +</p> + +<p> +27. Revera corpus æque perseverat in utrovis statu, vel +motus vel quietis. Ista vero perseverantia non magis +dicenda est actio corporis, quam existentia ejusdem actio +diceretur. Perseverantia nihil aliud est quam continuatio +in eodem modo existendi, quæ proprie dici actio non potest. +Cæterum resistentiam, quam experimur in sistendo corpore +moto, ejus actionem esse fingimus vana specie delusi. +Revera enim ista resistentia quam sentimus<note place='foot'><q>resistentia.</q> Our muscular +<emph>sensation</emph> of resistance is apt to be +accepted empirically as itself <emph>active +power in the concrete</emph>, entering very +much, as has been said, into the +often inaccurate idea of power +which is formed. See Editor's +Preface.</note>, passio est +in nobis, neque arguit corpus agere, sed nos pati: constat +utique nos idem passuros fuisse, sive corpus illud a se +moveatur, sive ab alio principio impellatur. +</p> + +<p> +28. Actio et reactio dicuntur esse in corporibus: nec +incommode ad demonstrationes mechanicas<note place='foot'><q>nec incommode.</q> Cf. sect. +17, and note.</note>. Sed cavendum, +ne propterea supponamus virtutem aliquam realem, +quæ motus causa sive principium sit, esse in iis. Etenim +voces illæ eodem modo intelligendæ sunt ac vox <emph>attractio</emph>; +et quemadmodum hæc est hypothesis solummodo mathematica<note place='foot'><q>hypothesis mathematica.</q> Cf. +sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 250-251.</note>, +non autem qualitas physica: idem etiam de illis +intelligi debet, et ob eandem rationem. Nam sicut veritas +et usus theorematum de mutua corporum attractione in +philosophia mechanica stabiles manent, utpote unice fundati +in motu corporum, sive motus iste causari supponatur +per actionem corporum se mutuo attrahentium, sive per +actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus diversi impellentis +et moderantis corpora; pari ratione, quæcunque tradita +sunt de regulis et legibus motuum, simul ac theoremata +inde deducta, manent inconcussa, dum modo concedantur +effectus sensibiles, et ratiocinia iis innixa; sive supponamus +actionem ipsam, aut vim horum effectuum causatricem, +esse in corpore, sive in agente incorporeo. +</p> + +<p> +29. Auferantur ex idea corporis extensio, soliditas, figura, +remanebit nihil<note place='foot'><q>nihil.</q> This section sums up +Berkeley's objections to crediting +<emph>matter</emph> with real power; the senses +being taken as the test of what is +contained in matter. It may be +compared with David Hume, +Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mill on +Causation. Berkeley differs from +them in recognising active power +in spirit, while with them he resolves +causation among bodies into +invariable sequence.</note>. Sed qualitates istæ sunt ad motum +<pb n='511'/><anchor id='Pg511'/> +indifferentes, nec in se quidquam habent quod motus +principium dici possit. Hoc ex ipsis ideis nostris perspicuum +est. Si igitur voce <emph>corpus</emph> significatur id quod +concipimus, plane constat inde non peti posse principium +motus: pars scilicet nulla aut attributum illius causa +efficiens vera est, quæ motum producat. Vocem autem +proferre, et nihil concipere, id demum indignum esset +philosopho. +</p> + +<p> +30. Datur res cogitans, activa, quam principium motus +... in nobis experimur<note place='foot'>Can the data presented to +us reveal more than sequence, +in the relation between our volitions +and the corresponding movements +of our bodies? Is not the +difference found in the moral presupposition, +which <emph>supernaturalises</emph> +man in his voluntary or morally +responsible activity? This obliges +us to see <emph>ourselves</emph> as absolutely +original causes of all bodily and +mental states for which we can be +morally approved or blamed.</note>. Hanc <emph>animam</emph>, <emph>mentem</emph>, <emph>spiritum</emph> ... +Datur etiam res extensa, iners, impenetrabilis, +... quæ a priori toto cœlo differt, novumque genus<note place='foot'><q>novumque genus.</q> Cf. sect. +21. We have here Berkeley's antithesis +of mind and matter—spirits +and external phenomena presented +to the senses—persons in contrast +to passive ideas.</note> ... +Quantum intersit inter res cogitantes et extensas, +primus omnium deprehendens Anaxagoras, vir +longe sapientissimus, asserebat mentem nihil habere cum +corporibus commune, id quod constat ex primo libro Aristotelis +<hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi>, I. ii. 13, 22, 24.</note>. Ex neotericis idem optime animadvertit +Cartesius<note place='foot'><q>Cartesius.</q> The antithesis of +extended things and thinking things +pervades Descartes; but not, as +with Berkeley, on the foundation +of the new conception of what is +truly meant by matter or sensible +things. See e.g. <hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, P. I. +§§ 63, 64.</note>. Ab eo alii<note place='foot'><q>alii.</q> Does he refer to Locke, +who suggests the possibility of +matter thinking?</note> rem satis claram vocibus obscuris +impeditam ac difficilem reddiderunt. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +31. Ex dictis manifestum est eos qui vim activam, +actionem, motus principium, in <emph>corporibus</emph> revera inesse +affirmant, sententiam nulla experientia fundatam amplecti, +eamque terminis obscuris et generalibus adstruere, nec +<pb n='512'/><anchor id='Pg512'/> +quid sibi velint satis intelligere. E contrario, qui <emph>mentem</emph> +esse principium motus volunt, sententiam propria experientia +munitam proferunt, hominumque omni ævo +doctissimorum suffragiis comprobatam. +</p> + +<p> +32. Primus Anaxagoras<note place='foot'>See Aristotle, <hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi>, I. ii. +5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. +6.</note> τὸν νοῦν introduxit, qui motum +inerti materiæ imprimeret. Quam quidem sententiam +probat etiam Aristoteles<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Nat. Ausc.</hi> VIII. 15; also <hi rend='italic'>De +Anima</hi>, III, x. 7.</note>, pluribusque confirmat, aperto +pronuncians primum movens esse immobile, indivisibile, et +nullam habens magnitudinem. Dicere autem, omne me +vum esse mobile, recte animadvertit idem esse ac s +diceret, omne ædificativum esse ædificabile, <hi rend='italic'>Physic</hi>, lib +Plato insuper in Timæo<note place='foot'>Hardly any passage in the +<hi rend='italic'>Timæus</hi> exactly corresponds to this. +The following is, perhaps, the most +pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν +αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν +ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν +μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle +quotes the <hi rend='italic'>Timæus</hi> in the same +connexion, <hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi>, I. iii. ii.</note> tradit machinam hanc corpo +seu mundum visibilem, agitari et animari a mente, +sensum omnem fugiat. Quinetiam hodie philosophi +siani<note place='foot'><q>philosophi Cartesiani.</q> Secundum +Cartesium causa generalis +omnium motuum et quietum est +Deus.—Derodon, <hi rend='italic'>Physica</hi>, I. ix. 30.</note> principium motuum naturalium Deum agnoscun. +Et Newtonus<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Principia Mathematica</hi>—Scholium +Generale.</note> passim nec obscure innuit, non solummodo +motum ab initio a numine profectum esse, verum adhuc +systema mundanum ab eodem actu moveri. Hoc sacris +literis consonum est: hoc scholasticorum calculo comprobatur. +Nam etsi Peripatetici naturam tradant esse principium +motus et quietis, interpretantur tamen naturam +naturantem esse Deum<note place='foot'><q>naturam naturantem esse +Deum</q>—as we might say, God +considered as imminent cause in +the universe. See St. Thomas +Aquinas, <hi rend='italic'>Opera</hi>, vol. XXII. Quest. +6, p. 27.</note>. Intelligunt nimirum corpora +omnia systematis hujusce mundani a mente præpotenti +juxta certam et constantem rationem<note place='foot'><q>juxta certam et constantem +rationem.</q> While all changes +in Nature are determined by Will, +it is not capricious but rational +Will. The so-called arbitrariness +of the Language of Nature is +relative to us, and from our point +of view. In itself, the universe of +reality expresses Perfect Reason.</note> moveri. +</p> + +<p> +33. Cæterum qui principium vitale corporibus tribuunt, +obscurum aliquid et rebus parum conveniens fingunt. +Quid enim aliud est vitali principio præditum esse quam +<pb n='513'/><anchor id='Pg513'/> +vivere? aut vivere quam se movere, sistere, et statum suum +mutare? Philosophi autem hujus sæculi doctissimi pro +principio indubitato ponunt, omne corpus perseverare in +statu suo, vel quietis vel motus uniformis in directum, nisi +quatenus aliunde cogitur statum ilium mutare: e contrario, +in anima sentimus esse facultatem tam statum suum quam +aliarum rerum mutandi; id quod proprie dicitur vitale, +animamque a corporibus longe discriminat. +</p> + +<p> +34. Motum et quietem in corporibus recentiores considerant +velut duos status existendi, in quorum utrovis corpus +omne sua natura iners permaneret<note place='foot'><q>permaneret.</q> Cf. sect. 51.</note>, nulla vi externa +urgente. Unde colligere licet, eandem esse causam motus +et quietis, quæ est existentiæ corporum. Neque enim +quærenda videtur alia causa existentiæ corporis successivæ +in diversis partibus spatii, quam illa unde derivatur existentia +ejusdem corporis successiva in diversis partibus +temporis. De Deo autem Optimo Maximo rerum omnium +Conditore et Conservatore tractare, et qua ratione res +cunctæ a summo et vero Ente pendeant demonstrare, +quamvis pars sit scientiæ humanæ præcellentissima, spectat +tamen potius ad philosophiam primam<note place='foot'><q>spectat potius ad philosophiam +primam.</q> The drift of the <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi> +is to distinguish the physical sequences +of molecular motion, which +the physical sciences articulate, +from the Power with which metaphysics +and theology are concerned, +and which we approach +through consciousness.</note>, seu metaphysicam +et theologiam, quam ad philosophiam naturalem, quæ +hodie fere omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica. +Itaque cognitionem de Deo vel supponit philosophia naturalis, +vel mutuatur ab aliqua scientia superiori. Quanquam +verissimum sit, naturæ investigationem scientiis altioribus +argumenta egregia ad sapientiam, bonitatem, et potentiam +Dei illustrandam et probandam undequaque subministrare. +</p> + +<p> +35. Quod hæc minus intelligantur, in causa est, cur nonnulli +immerito repudient physicæ principia mathematica, +eo scilicet nomine quod illa causas rerum efficientes non +assignant: quum tamen revera ad physicam aut mechanicam +spectet regulas<note place='foot'><q>regulas.</q> Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, sect. 231-235.</note> solummodo, non causas efficientes, +impulsionum attractionumve, et ut verbo dicam, motuum +leges tradere; ex iis vero positis phænomenon particularium +solutionem, non autem causam efficientem assignare. +</p> + +<pb n='514'/><anchor id='Pg514'/> + +<p> +36. Multum intererit considerasse quid proprie sit +principium, et quo sensu intelligenda sit vox illa apud +philosophos<note place='foot'>Having, in the preceding sections, +contrasted perceived motions +and their immanent originating +Power—matter and mind—physics +and metaphysics—he proceeds in +this and the seven following sections +to explain more fully what +ha means by <emph>principium</emph> and also +the two meanings (metaphysical +and mechanical) of <emph>solutio</emph>. By +<emph>principium</emph>, in philosophy, he understands +universally efficient supersensible +Power. In natural +philosophy the term is applied to +the orderly sequences manifested +to our senses, not to the active +cause of the order.</note>. Causa quidem vera efficiens et conservatrix +rerum omnium jure optimo appellatur fons et principium +earundem. Principia vero philosophiæ experimentalis +proprie dicenda sunt fundamenta quibus illa innititur, seu +fontes unde derivatur, (non dico existentia, sed) cognitio +rerum corporearum, sensus utique ex experientia. Similiter, +in philosophia mechanica, principia dicenda sunt, in +quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina, leges +illæ motuum primariæ, quæ experimentis comprobatæ, +ratiocinio etiam excultæ sunt et redditæ universales<note place='foot'><q>ratiocinio ... redditæ universales.</q> +Relations of the data of sense +to universalising reason are here +recognised.</note>. +Hæ motuum leges commode dicuntur principia, quoniam +ab iis tam theoremata mechanica generalia quam particulares +τῶν φαινομένων explicationes derivantur. +</p> + +<p> +37. Tum nimirum dici potest quidpiam explicari mechanice, +cum reducitur ad ista principia simplicissima +et universalissima, et per accuratum ratiocinium, cum iis +consentaneum et connexum esse ostenditur. Nam inventis +semel naturæ legibus, deinceps monstrandum est philosopho, +ex constanti harum legum observatione, hoc est, ex +iis principiis phænomenon quodvis necessario consequi: +id quod est phænomena explicare et solvere, causamque, +id est rationem cur fiant, assignare. +</p> + +<p> +38. Mens humana gaudet scientiam suam extendere et +dilatare. Ad hoc autem notiones et propositiones generales +efformandæ sunt, in quibus quodam modo continentur +propositiones et cognitiones particulares, quæ turn demum +intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis continuo nexu deducuntur. +Hoc geometris notissimum est. In mechanica +etiam præmittuntur notiones, hoc est definitiones, et +enunciationes de motu primæ et generales, ex quibus +<pb n='515'/><anchor id='Pg515'/> +postmodum methodo mathematica conclusiones magis +remotæ et minus generales colliguntur. Et sicut per +applicationem theorematum geometricorum, corporum particularium +magnitudines mensurantur; ita etiam per applicationem +theorematum mechanices universalium, systematis +mundani partium quarumvis motus, et phænomena inde +pendentia, innotescunt et determinantur: ad quem scopum +unice collineandum physico. +</p> + +<p> +39. Et quemadmodum geometræ, disciplinæ causa, multa +comminiscuntur, quæ nec ipsi describere possunt, nec in +rerum natura invenire; simili prorsus ratione mechanicus +voces quasdam abstractas et generales adhibet, fingitque +in corporibus <emph>vim</emph>, <emph>actionem</emph>, <emph>attractionem</emph>, <emph>solicitationem</emph>, &c. +quæ ad theorias et enunciationes, ut et computationes de +motu apprime utiles sunt, etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate +et corporibus actu existentibus frustra quærerentur, non +minus quam quæ a geometris per abstractionem mathematicam +finguntur. +</p> + +<p> +40. Revera ope sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates +sensibiles, et res corporeas omnino passivas, sive in motu +sint sive in quiete, percipimus: ratioque et experientia +activum nihil præter mentem aut animam esse suadet. +Quidquid ultra fingitur, id ejusdem generis esse cum aliis +hypothesibus et abstractionibus mathematicis existimandum: +quod penitu sanimo infigere oportet. Hoc ni fiat, facile +in obscuram scholasticorum subtilitatem, quæ per tot +sæcula, tanquam dira quædam pestis, philosophiam corrupit, +relabi possumus. +</p> + +<p> +41. Principia mechanica legesque motuum aut naturæ +universales, sæculo ultimo feliciter inventæ, et subsidio +geometriæ tractatæ et applicatæ, miram lucem in philosophiam +intulerunt. Principia vero metaphysica causæque +reales efficientes motus et existentiæ corporum attributorumve +corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut +experimenta pertinent; neque eis lucem dare possunt, nisi +quatenus, velut præcognita, inserviant ad limites physicæ +præfiniendos, eaque ratione ad tollendas difficultates +quæstionesque peregrinas. +</p> + +<p> +42. Qui a spiritibus motus principium petunt, ii vel rem +corpoream vel incorpoream voce <emph>spiritus</emph> intelligunt. Si +rem corpoream, quantumvis tenuem, tamen redit difficultas: +si incorpoream, quantumvis id verum sit, attamen ad +<pb n='516'/><anchor id='Pg516'/> +physicam non proprie pertinet. Quod si quis philosophiam +naturalem ultra limites experimentorum et mechanicæ +extenderit, ita ut rerum etiam incorporearum, et inextensarum +cognitionem complectatur, latior quidem illa vocis +acceptio tractationem de anima, mente, seu principio vitali +admittit. Cæterum commodius erit, juxta usum jam fere +receptum, ita distinguere inter scientias, ut singulæ propriis +circumscribantur cancellis, et philosophus naturalis totus +sit in experimentis, legibusque motuum, et principiis +mechanicis, indeque depromptis ratiociniis; quidquid autem +de aliis rebus protulerit, id superiori alicui scientiæ acceptum +referat. Etenim ex cognitis naturæ legibus pulcherrimæ +theoriæ, praxes etiam mechanicæ ad vitam utiles consequuntur. +Ex cognitione autem ipsius naturæ Auctoris +considerationes longe præstantissimæ quidem illæ, sed +metaphysicæ, theologicæ, morales oriuntur. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +43. De <emph>principiis</emph> hactenus: nunc dicendum de <emph>natura</emph> +motus<note place='foot'><q>natura motus.</q> Sect. 43-66 +treat of the nature of the <emph>effect</emph>—i.e. +perceptible motion, as distinguished +from its true causal origin (<emph>principium</emph>) +in mind or spirit. The +origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; +its nature, as dependent +on percipient experience, belongs +to physics. Is motion independent +of a plurality of bodies; or +does it involve bodies in relation +to other bodies, so that absolute +motion is meaningless? Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 111-116.</note>. Atque is quidem, cum sensibus clare percipiatur, +non tam natura sua, quam doctis philosophorum commentis +obscuratus est. Motus nunquam in sensus nostros incurrit +sine mole corporea, spatio, et tempore. Sunt tamen qui +motum, tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et abstractam, +atque ab omnibus aliis rebus sejunctam, contemplari +student. Verum idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima<note place='foot'><q>idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.</q> +The difficulty as to +definition of motion is attributed +to abstractions, and the inclination +of the scholastic mind to +prefer these to concrete experience.</note> +intellectus aciem eludit: id quod quilibet secum meditando +experiri potest. Hinc nascuntur magnæ difficultates de +natura motus, et definitiones, ipsa re quam illustrare +debent longe obscuriores. Hujusmodi sunt definitiones +illæ Aristotelis et Scholasticorum<note place='foot'>Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ +κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. Ausc. III. +ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon, +<hi rend='italic'>Physica</hi>, I. ix.</note>, qui motum dicunt esse +<pb n='517'/><anchor id='Pg517'/> +<emph>actum mobilis quatenus est mobile, vel actum entis in potentia +quatenus in potentia</emph>. Hujusmodi etiam est illud viri<note place='foot'>Newton.</note> inter +recentiores celebris, qut asserit <emph>nihil in motu esse reale +præter momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente +constitui debet</emph>. Porro constat, horum et similium definitionum +auctores in animo habuisse abstractam motus +naturam, seclusa omni temporis et spatii consideratione, +explicare: sed qua ratione abstracta ilia motus quintessentia +(ut ita dicam) intelligi possit, non video. +</p> + +<p> +44. Neque hoc contenti, ulterius pergunt, partesque +ipsius motus a se invicem dividunt et secernunt, quarum +ideas distinctas, tanquam entium revera distinctorum, +efformare conantur. Etenim sunt qui motionem a motu +distinguant, illam velut instantaneum motus elementum +spectantes. Velocitatem insuper, conatum, vim, impetum +totidem res essentia diversas esse volunt, quarum quæque +per propriam atque ab aliis omnibus segregatam et abstractam +ideam intellectui objiciatur. Sed in hisce rebus +discutiendis, stantibus iis quæ supra disseruimus<note place='foot'>Cf. sect. 3-42.</note>, non est +cur diutius immoremur. +</p> + +<p> +45. Multi etiam per <emph>transitum</emph><note place='foot'>Descartes, <hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, P. II. +§ 25; also Borellus, <hi rend='italic'>De Vi Percussionis</hi>, +p. 1.</note> motum definiunt, obliti, +scilicet, transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi non posse, +et per motum definiri oportere. Verissimum adeo est +definitiones, sicut nonnullis rebus lucem, ita vicissim aliis +tenebras afferre. Et profecto, quascumque res sensu +percipimus, eas clariores aut notiores definiendo efficere +vix quisquam potuerit. Cujus rei vana spe allecti res +faciles difficillimas<note place='foot'><q>res faciles difficillimas.</q> Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, <q>Introduction,</q> sect. 1.</note> reddiderunt philosophi, mentesque +suas difficultatibus, quas ut plurimum ipsi peperissent, +implicavere. Ex hocce definiendi, simul ac abstrahendi +studio, multæ tam de motu quam de aliis rebus natæ subtilissimæ +quæstiones, eædemque nullius utilitatis, hominum +ingenia frustra torserunt; adeo ut Aristoteles ultro et +sæpius fateatur motum esse <emph>actum quendam cognitu difficilem</emph><note place='foot'>Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν +λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. <hi rend='italic'>Nat. Ausc.</hi> III. ii.</note>, +et nonnulli ex veteribus usque eo nugis exercitati +deveniebant, ut motum omnino esse negarent<note place='foot'>e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument +against the possibility of +motion, referred to as a signal example +of fallacy.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='518'/><anchor id='Pg518'/> + +<p> +46. Sed hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget. Satis sit +fontes solutionum indicasse: ad quos etiam illud adjungere +libet: quod ea quæ de infinita divisione temporis et +spatii in mathesi traduntur, ob congenitam rerum naturam +paradoxa et theorias spinosas (quales sunt illæ omnes +in quibus agitur de infinito<note place='foot'><q>de infinite, &c.</q> Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, +sect. 130-132, and the +<hi rend='italic'>Analyst</hi> passim, for Berkeley's +treatment of infinitesimals.</note>) in speculationes de motu +intulerunt. Quidquid autem hujus generis sit, id omne +motus commune habet cum spatio et tempore, vel potius +ad ea refert acceptum. +</p> + +<p> +47. Et quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio +seu divisio rerum vere inseparabilium, ita ab altera parte +compositio seu potius confusio rerum diversissimarum +motus naturam perplexam reddidit. Usitatum enim est +motum cum causa motus efficiente confundere<note place='foot'><q>confundere.</q> Cf. sect. 3-42 +for illustrations of this confusion.</note>. Unde +accidit ut motus sit quasi biformis, unam faciem sensibus +obviam, alteram caliginosa nocte obvolutam habens. Inde +obscuritas et confusio, et varia de motu paradoxa originem +trahunt, dum effectui perperam tribuitur id quod revera +causæ solummodo competit. +</p> + +<p> +48. Hinc oritur opinio illa, <emph>eandem</emph> semper motus +quantitatem conservari<note place='foot'>The modern conception of the +<q>conservation of force.</q></note>. Quod, nisi intelligatur de vi et +potentia causæ, sive causa ilia dicatur natura, sive νοῦς, +vel quodcunque tandem agens sit, falsum esse cuivis facile +constabit. Aristoteles<note place='foot'>Aristotle states the question in +<hi rend='italic'>Nat. Ausc.</hi> VIII. cap. i, and solves +it in cap. iv.</note> quidem l. viii. <hi rend='italic'>Physicorum</hi>, ubi +quærit utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab +æterno tanquam vita immortalis insit rebus omnibus, vitale +principium potius, quam effectum externum, sive mutationem +loci<note place='foot'><q>mutatio loci</q> is the effect, i.e. +motion perceived by sense; <q>vitale +principium</q> the real cause, i.e. vital +rational agency.</note>, intellexisse videtur. +</p> + +<p> +49. Hinc etiam est, quod multi suspicantur motum non +esse meram passionem in corporibus. Quod si intelligamus +id quod in motu corporis sensibus objicitur, quin omnino +passivum sit nemo dubitare potest. Ecquid enim in se +habet successiva corporis existentia in diversis locis, quod +actionem referat, aut aliud sit quam nuduset iners effectus? +</p> + +<pb n='519'/><anchor id='Pg519'/> + +<p> +50. Peripatetici, qui dicunt motum esse actum unum +utriusque, moventis et moti<note place='foot'><q>moventis et moti,</q> i.e. as concauses.</note>, non satis discriminant causam +ab effectu. Similiter, qui nisum aut conatum in motu +fingunt, aut idem corpus simul in contrarias partes ferri +putant, eadem idearum confusione, eadem vocum ambiguitate +ludificari videntur. +</p> + +<p> +51. Juvat multum, sicut in aliis omnibus, ita in scientia +de motu accuratam diligentiam adhibere, tam ad aliorum +conceptus intelligendos quam ad suos enunciandos: in +qua re nisi peccatum esset, vix credo in disputationem +trahi potuisse, utrum corpus indifferens sit ad motum et +ad quietem, necne. Quoniam enim experientia constat, +esse legem naturæ primariam, ut corpus perinde perseveret +in <emph>statu motus ac quietis, quamdiu aliunde nihil accidat ad +statum istum mutandum</emph>; et propterea vim inertiæ sub +diverso respectu esse vel resistentiam, vel impetum, +colligitur: hoc sensu profecto corpus dici potest sua +natura indifferens ad motum vel quietem. Nimirum tam +difficile est quietem in corpus motum, quam motum in +quiescens inducere: cum vero corpus pariter conservet +statum utrumvis, quidni dicatur ad utrumvis se habere +indifferenter? +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +52. Peripatetici pro varietate mutationum, quas res aliqua +subire potest, varia motus genera distinguebant. Hodie +de motu agentes intelligunt solummodo <emph>motum localem</emph><note place='foot'><q>motum localem.</q> Sect. 52-65 +discuss the reality of absolute or +empty space, in contrast with concrete +space realised in perception +of the local relations of bodies. +The meaninglessness of absolute +space and motion is argued. Cf. +<hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>, sect. 116, 117. See +Locke's <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, +17; also <hi rend='italic'>Papers which passed between +Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke +in 1715-16</hi>, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, +&c. Leibniz calls absolute +space <q>an ideal of some modern +Englishman.</q></note>. +Motus autem localis intelligi nequit nisi simul intelligatur +quid sit <emph>locus</emph>: is vero a neotericis<note place='foot'>Newton's <hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, Def. Sch. +III. See also Derodon, <hi rend='italic'>Physica</hi>, +P. I. cap. vi. § 1.</note> definitur <emph>pars spatii +quam corpus occupat</emph>: unde dividitur in relativum et absolutum +pro ratione spatii. Distinguunt enim inter spatium +absolutum sive verum, ac relativum sive apparens. Volunt +scilicet dari spatium undequaque immensum, immobile, +insensibile, corpora universa permeans et continens, quod +<pb n='520'/><anchor id='Pg520'/> +vocant spatium absolutum. Spatium autem a corporibus +comprehensum vel definitum, sensibusque adeo subjectum, +dicitur spatium relativum, apparens, vulgare. +</p> + +<p> +53. Fingamus itaque corpora cuncta destrui, et in nihilum +redigi. Quod reliquum est vocant spatium absolutum, omni +relatione quæ a situ et distantiis corporum oriebatur, simul +cum ipsis corporibus, sublata. Porro spatium illud est +infinitum, immobile, indivisibile, insensibile, sine relatione +et sine distinctione. Hoc est, omnia ejus attributa sunt +privativa vel negativa: videtur igitur esse merum nihil<note place='foot'>Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and +the <q>possibility of space existing +without matter,</q> <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. +ch. 13.</note>. +Parit solummmodo difficultatem aliquam quod extensum +sit. Extensio autem est qualitas positiva. Verum qualis +tandem extensio est illa quæ nec dividi potest, nec mensurari, +cujus nullam partem, nec sensu percipere, nec +imaginatione depingere possumus? Etenim nihil in +imaginationem cadit, quod, ex natura rei, non possibile +est ut sensu percipiatur; siquidem <emph>imaginatio</emph><note place='foot'>Note the account here given +of <emph>imagination</emph> and <emph>intellect</emph>, as +distinguished from <emph>sense</emph>, which +may be compared with αἴσθησις, +φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian +psychology.</note> nihil aliud +est quam facultas representatrix rerum sensibilium, vel +actu existentium, vel saltem possibilium. Fugit insuper +<emph>intellectum purum</emph>, quum facultas illa versetur tantum +circa res spirituales et inextensas, cujusmodi sunt mentes +nostræ, earumque habitus, passiones, virtutes, et similia. +Ex spatio igitur absoluto auferamus modo vocabula, et +nihil remanebit in sensu, imaginatione, aut intellectu: nihil +aliud ergo iis designatur, quam pura privatio aut negatio, +hoc est, merum nihil. +</p> + +<p> +54. Confitendum omnino est nos circa hanc rem gravissimis +præjudiciis teneri, a quibus ut liberemur, omnis animi +vis exercenda. Etenim multi, tantum abest quod spatium +absolutum pro nihilo ducant, ut rem esse ex omnibus (Deo +excepto) unicam existiment, quæ annihilari non possit: +statuantque illud suapte natura necessario existere, æternumque +esse et increatum, atque adeo attributorum divinorum +particeps<note place='foot'><q>attributorum divinorum particeps.</q> +See Samuel Clarke, in his +<hi rend='italic'>Demonstration</hi>, and in the <hi rend='italic'>Papers +between Clarke and Leibnitz</hi>.</note>. Verum enimvero quum certissimum +sit, res omnes, quas nominibus designamus, per qualitates +<pb n='521'/><anchor id='Pg521'/> +aut relationes, vel aliqua saltem ex parte cognosci (ineptum +enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil, nihil notionis, +ideæ vel conceptus subjiceretur), inquiramus diligenter, +utrum formare liceat <emph>ideam</emph> ullam spatii illius puri, realis, +absoluti, quod post omnium corporum annihilationem perseveret +existere. Ideam porro talem paulo acrius intuens, +reperio ideam esse nihili purissimam, si modo idea appellanda +sit. Hoc ipse summa adhibita diligentia expertus +sum: hoc alios pari adhibita diligentia experturos reor. +</p> + +<p> +55. Decipere nos nonnunquam solet, quod aliis omnibus +corporibus imaginatione sublatis, <emph>nostrum</emph><note place='foot'><q>nostrum,</q> sc. corpus. When +we imagine space emptied of +bodies, we are apt to forget that our +own bodies are part of the material +world.</note> tamen manere +supponimus. Quo supposito, motum membrorum ab omni +parte liberrimum imaginamur. Motus autem sine spatio +concipi non potest. Nihilominus si rem attento animo +recolamus, constabit primo concipi spatium relativum +partibus nostri corporis definitum: 2°. movendi membra +potestatem liberrimam nullo obstaculo retusam: et præter +hæc duo nihil. Falso tamen credimus tertium aliquod, +spatium videlicet immensum, realiter existere, quod liberam +potestatem nobis faciat movendi corpus nostrum: ad hoc +enim requiritur absentia solummodo aliorum corporum. +Quam absentiam, sive privationem corporum, nihil esse +positivum fateamur necesse est<note place='foot'>[Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum +disseruntur in libro <hi rend='italic'>De +Principiis Cognitionis Humanæ</hi>, +idiomate anglicano decem abhine +annis edito.]—<hi rend='smallcaps'>Author.</hi> He refers +to sect. 116 of the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +56. Cæterum hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine +perspexerit, verba et voces parum valent. Meditanti vero, +et rationes secum reputanti, ni fallor, manifestum erit, +quæcunque de spatio puro et absoluto prædicantur, ea +omnia de nihilo prædicari posse. Qua ratione mens +humana facillime liberatur a magnis difficultatibus simulque +ab ea absurditate tribuendi existentiam necessariam<note place='foot'>He treats absolute space as +nothing, and relative space as dependent +on Perception and Will.</note> ulli +rei præterquam soli Deo optimo maximo. +</p> + +<p> +57. In proclivi esset sententiam nostram argumentis +a posteriori (ut loquuntur) ductis confirmare, quæstiones +de spatio absoluto proponendo; exempli gratia, utrum sit +substantia vel accidens? utrum creatum vel increatum? +<pb n='522'/><anchor id='Pg522'/> +et absurditates ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando. +Sed brevitati consulendum. Illud tamen omitti non debet, +quod sententiam hancce Democritus olim calculo suo comprobavit, +uti auctor est Aristoteles 1. i. <hi rend='italic'>Phys.</hi><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Phys.</hi> α. 5. 188a. 22, 23.</note> ubi hæc +habet: <emph>Democritus solidum et inane ponit principia, quorum +aliud quidem ut quod est, aliud ut quod non est esse dicit.</emph> +Scrupulum si forte injiciat, quod distinctio illa inter spatium +absolutum et relativum a magni nominis philosophis usurpetur, +eique quasi fundamento inædificentur multa præclara +theoremata, scrupulum istum vanum esse, ex iis quæ +secutura sunt, apparebit. +</p> + +<p> +58. Ex præmissis patet, non convenire ut definiamus +locum verum corporis esse partem spatii absoluti quam +occupat corpus, motumque verum seu absolutum esse +mutationem loci veri et absoluti. Siquidem omnis locus +est relativus, ut et omnis motus. Veruntamen ut hoc +clarius appareat, animadvertendum est, motum nullum +intelligi posse sine determinatione aliqua seu directione, +quæ quidem intelligi nequit, nisi praeter corpus motum, +nostrum etiam corpus, aut aliud aliquod, simul intelligatur +existere. Nam sursum, deorsum, sinistrorsum, dextrorsum, +omnesque plagæ et regiones in relatione aliqua fundantur, +et necessario corpus a moto diversum connotant et supponunt. +Adeo ut, si reliquis corporibus in nihilum redactis, +globus, exempli gratia, unicus existere supponatur; in illo +motus nullus concipi possit: usque adeo necesse est, ut +detur aliud corpus, cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur. +Hujus sententiæ veritas clarissime elucebit, modo corporum +omnium tam nostri quam aliorum, præter globum istum +unicum, annihilationem recte supposuerimus. +</p> + +<p> +59. Concipiantur porro duo globi, et præterea nil corporeum, +existere. Concipiantur deinde vires quomodocunque +applicari: quicquid tandem per applicationem +virium intelligamus, motus circularis duorum globorum +circa commune centrum nequit per imaginationem concipi. +Supponamus deinde cœlum fixarum creari: subito ex concepto +appulsu globorum ad diversas cœli istius partes motus +concipietur. Scilicet cum motus natura sua sit relativus, +concipi non potuit priusquam darentur corpora correlata. +Quemadmodum nec ulla relatio alia sine correlatis concipi +potest. +</p> + +<pb n='523'/><anchor id='Pg523'/> + +<p> +60. Ad motum circularem quod attinet, putant multi, +crescente motu vero circulari, corpus necessario magis +semper magisque ab axe niti. Hoc autem ex eo provenit, +quod, cum motus circularis spectari possit tanquam in +omni momento a duabus directionibus ortum trahens, +una secundum radium, altera secundum tangentem; si in +hac ultima tantum directione impetus augeatur, tum a centro +recedet corpus motum, orbita vero desinet esse circularis. +Quod si æqualiter augeantur vires in utraque directione, +manebit motus circularis, sed acceleratus conatu, qui non +magis arguet vires recedendi ab axe, quam accedendi +ad eundem, auctas esse. Dicendum igitur, aquam in situla +circumactam ascendere ad latera vasis, propterea quod, +applicatis novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quamvis +particulam aquæ, eodem instanti non applicentur novæ +vires æquales centripetæ. Ex quo experimento nullo +modo sequitur, motum absolutum circularem per vires +recedendi ab axe motus necessario dignosci. Porro qua +ratione intelligendæ sunt voces istæ, <emph>vires corporum et +conatus</emph>, ex præmissis satis superque innotescit. +</p> + +<p> +61. Quo modo curva considerari potest tanquam constans +ex rectis infinitis, etiamsi revera ex illis non constet, sed +quod ea hypothesis ad geometriam utilis sit, eodem modo +motus circularis spectari potest tanquam a directionibus +rectilineis infinitis ortum ducens, quæ suppositio utilis est +in philosophia mechanica. Non tamen ideo affirmandum, +impossibile esse, ut centrum gravitatis corporis cujusvis +successive existat in singulis punctis peripheriae circularis, +nulla ratione habita directionis ullius rectilineæ, sive in +tangente sive in radio. +</p> + +<p> +62. Haud omittendum est, motum lapidis in funda, aut +aquæ in situla circumacta, dici non posse motum vere +circularem, juxta mentem eorum qui per partes spatii absoluti +definiunt loca vera corporum; cum sit mire compositus +ex motibus non solum situlæ vel fundæ, sed etiam telluris +diurno circa proprium axem, menstruo circa commune +centrum gravitatis terræ et lunæ, et annuo circa solem: et +propterea particula quævis lapidis vel aquæ describat +lineam a circulari longe abhorrentem. Neque revera est, +qui creditur, conatus axifugus, quoniam non respicit unum +aliquem axem ratione spatii absoluti, supposito quod detur +tale spatium: proinde non video quomodo appellari possit +<pb n='524'/><anchor id='Pg524'/> +conatus unicus, cui motus vere circularis tanquam proprio +et adaequato effectui respondet. +</p> + +<p> +63. Motus nullus dignosci potest, aut mensurari, nisi per +res sensibiles. Cum ergo spatium absolutum nullo modo +in sensus incurrat, necesse est ut inutile prorsus sit ad +distinctionem motuum. Præterea determinatio sive directio +motui essentialis est, ilia vero in relatione consistit. Ergo +impossibile est ut motus absolutus concipiatur. +</p> + +<p> +64. Porro quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit +motus ejusdem corporis, quinimo uno respectu moveri, +altero quiescere dici quidpiam possit<note place='foot'>See Locke, <hi rend='italic'>Essay</hi>, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.</note>; ad determinandum +motum verum et quietem veram, quo scilicet tollatur +ambiguitas, et consulatur mechanicæ philosophorum, qui +systema rerum latius contemplantur, satis fuerit spatium +relativum fixarum cœlo, tanquam quiescente spectato, +conclusum adhibere, loco spatii absoluti. Motus autem +et quies tali spatio relativo definiti, commode adhiberi +possunt loco absolutorum, qui ab illis nullo symptomate +discerni possunt. Etenim imprimantur utcunque vires, +sint quicunque conatus, concedamus motum distingui per +actiones in corpora exercitas; nunquam tamen inde +sequetur, dari spatium illud et locum absolutum, ejusque +mutationem esse locum verum. +</p> + +<p> +65. Leges motuum, effectusque, et theoremata eorundem +proportiones et calculos continentia, pro diversis viarum +figuris, accelerationibus itidem et directionibus diversis, +mediisque plus minusve resistentibus, hæc omnia constant +sine calculatione motus absoluti. Uti vel ex eo patet quod, +quum secundum illorum principia qui motum absolutum +inducunt, nullo symptomate scire liceat, utrum integra +rerum compages quiescat, an moveatur uniformiter in +directum, perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis +cognosci posse. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +66. Ex dictis patet ad veram motus naturam perspiciendam +summopere juvaturum, 1°. Distinguere inter hypotheses +mathematicas et naturas rerum: 2°. Cavere ab +abstractionibus: 3°. Considerare motum tanquam aliquid +sensibile, vel saltem imaginabile; mensurisque relativis +esse contentos. Quæ si fecerimus, simul clarissima quæque +<pb n='525'/><anchor id='Pg525'/> +philosophiæ mechanicæ theoremata, quibus reserantur +naturæ recessus, mundique systema calculis humanis +subjicitur, manebunt intemerata, et motus contemplatio +a mille minutiis, subtilitatibus, ideisque abstractis libera +evadet. Atque hæc de natura motus dicta sufficiant. +</p> + +<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/> + +<p> +67. Restat, ut disseramus de causa communicationis +motuum<note place='foot'>Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed +ejection of motion from the +striking body into the body struck. +Is this only metaphorical? Is +the motion received by the latter +to be supposed identical with, +or equivalent to, that given forth +by the former?</note>. Esse autem vim impressam in corpus mobile +causam motus in eo, plerique existimant. Veruntamen +illos non assignare causam motus cognitam, et a corpore +motuque distinctam, ex præmissis constat. Patet insuper +vim non esse rem certam et determinatam, ex eo quod viri +summi de ilia multum diversa, immo contraria, proferant, +salva tamen in consequentiis veritate. Siquidem Newtonus<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Principia</hi>, Def. IV.</note> +ait vim impressam consistere in actione sola, esseque +actionem exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus mutandum, +nee post actionem manere. Torricellius<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Lezioni Accademiche.</hi></note> cumulum quendam +sive aggregatum virium impressarum per percussionem in +corpus mobile recipi, ibidemque manere atque impetum +constituere contendit. Idem fere Borellus<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>De Vi Percussionis</hi>, cap. IX.</note> aliique prædicant. +At vero, tametsi inter se pugnare videantur +Newtonus et Torricellius, nihilominus, dum singuli sibi +consentanea proferunt, res satis commode ab utrisque +explicatur. Quippe vires omnes corporibus attributæ +tam sunt hypotheses mathematicæ quam vires attractivæ +in planetis et sole. Cæterum entia mathematica in rerum +natura stabilem essentiam non habent: pendent autem +a notione definientis; unde eadem res diversimode explicari +potest. +</p> + +<p> +68. Statuamus motum novum in corpore percusso conservari, +sive per vim insitam, qua corpus quodlibet perseverat +in statu suo vel motus vel quietis uniformis in +directum; sive per vim impressam, durante percussione +in corpus percussum receptam ibidemque permanentem; +idem erit quoad rem, differentia existente in nominibus +tantum. Similiter, ubi mobile percutiens perdit, et +<pb n='526'/><anchor id='Pg526'/> +percussum acquirit motum, parum refert disputare, utrum +motus acquisitus sit idem numero cum motu perdito, ducit +enim in minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de +identitate. Itaque sive dicamus motum transire a percutiente +in percussum, sive in percusso motum de novo +generari, destrui autem in percutiente, res eodem recidit. +Utrobique intelligitur unum corpus motum perdere, alterum +acquirere, et præterea nihil. +</p> + +<p> +69. Mentem, quæ agitat et continet universam hancce +molem corpoream, estque causa vera efficiens motus, eandem +esse, proprie et stricte loquendo, causam communicationis +ejusdem haud negaverim. In philosophia tamen physica, +causas et solutiones phænomenon a principiis mechanicis +petere oportet. Physice igitur res explicatur non assignando +ejus causam vere agentem et incorpoream, sed demonstrando +ejus connexionem cum principiis mechanicis: +cujusmodi est illud, <emph>actionem et reactionem esse semper +contrarias et æquales</emph><note place='foot'>Newton's third law of motion.</note>, a quo, tanquam fonte et principio +primario, eruuntur regulæ de motuum communicatione, +quæ a neotericis, magno scientiarum bono, jam ante +repertæ sunt et demonstratæ. +</p> + +<p> +70. Nobis satis fuerit, si innuamus principium illud alio +modo declarari potuisse. Nam si vera rerum natura potius +quam abstracta mathesis spectetur, videbitur rectius dici, +in attractione vel percussione passionem corporum, quam +actionem, esse utrobique æqualem. Exempli gratia, lapis +fune equo alligatus tantum trahitur versus equum, quantum +equus versus lapidem: corpus etiam motum in aliud +quiescens impactum, patitur eandem mutationem cum corpore +quiescente. Et quoad effectum realem, percutiens +est item percussum, percussumque percutiens. Mutatio +autem illa est utrobique, tam in corpore equi quam in +lapide, tam in moto quam in quiescente, passio mera. Esse +autem vim, virtutem, aut actionem corpoream talium +effectuum vere et proprie causatricem non constat. Corpus +motum in quiescens impingitur; loquimur tamen active, +dicentes illud hoc impellere: nec absurde in mechanicis, +ubi ideæ mathematicæ potius quam veræ rerum naturæ +spectantur. +</p> + +<p> +71. In physica, sensus et experientia, quæ ad effectus +<pb n='527'/><anchor id='Pg527'/> +apparentes solummodo pertingunt, locum habent; in +mechanica, notiones abstractæ mathematicorum admittuntur. +In philosophia prima, seu metaphysica, agitur +de rebus incorporeis, de causis, veritate, et existentia +rerum. Physicus series sive successiones rerum sensibilium +contemplatur, quibus legibus connectuntur, et quo +ordine, quid præcedit tanquam causa, quid sequitur tanquam +effectus, animadvertens.<note place='foot'>Berkeley sees in motion only +a link in the chain which connects +the sensible and intelligible worlds—a +conception unfolded in his +<hi rend='italic'>Siris</hi>, more than twenty years +later.</note> Atque hac ratione dicimus corpus +motum esse causam motus in altero, vel ei motum imprimere, +trahere etiam, aut impellere. Quo sensu causæ +secundæ corporeæ intelligi debent, nulla ratione habita +veræ sedis virium, vel potentiarum actricum, aut causæ +realis cui insunt. Porro dici possunt causæ vel principia +mechanica, ultra corpus, figuram, motum, etiam axiomata +scientiæ mechanicæ primaria, tanquam causæ consequentium +spectata. +</p> + +<p> +72. Causæ vere activæ meditatione tantum et ratiocinio +e tenebris erui quibus involvuntur possunt, et aliquatenus +cognosci. Spectat autem ad philosophiam primam, seu +metaphysicam, de iis agere. Quodsi cuique scientiæ +provincia sua<note place='foot'><q>provincia sua.</q> The <hi rend='italic'>De Motu</hi>, +so far as it treats of motion perceptible +to the senses, is assigned to +physics; in contrast to theology +or metaphysics, alone concerned +with active causation.</note> tribuatur, limites assignentur, principia +et objecta accurate distinguantur, quæ ad singulas pertinent, +tractare licuerit majore, cum facilitate, tum perspicuitate. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +</body> +<back rend="page-break-before: right"> + <div id="footnotes"> + <index index="toc" /> + <index index="pdf" /> + <head>Footnotes</head> + <divGen type="footnotes"/> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: right"> + <divGen type="pgfooter" /> + </div> +</back> +</text> +</TEI.2> diff --git a/39746-tei/images/alcove.png b/39746-tei/images/alcove.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..111fe40 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/alcove.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/frontispiece.png b/39746-tei/images/frontispiece.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..994bbb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/frontispiece.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/illus-1.png b/39746-tei/images/illus-1.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef06949 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/illus-1.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-1.png b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-1.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc84986 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-1.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-2.png b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-2.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ca39b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-2.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-3.png b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-3.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2220b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-3.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-4.png b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-4.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4f5c20 --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-4.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-5.png b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-5.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0634b1a --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-5.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-6.png b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-6.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c2f0bb --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/vision-fig-6.png diff --git a/39746-tei/images/whitehall.png b/39746-tei/images/whitehall.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fc85cb --- /dev/null +++ b/39746-tei/images/whitehall.png |
