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diff --git a/39551-h/39551-h.htm b/39551-h/39551-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9711dc --- /dev/null +++ b/39551-h/39551-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,25999 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ethics, by John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts</title> + <style type="text/css"> + + p { margin-top: .5em; + text-align: justify; + text-indent: 1em; + margin-bottom: .5em; + } + + blockquote { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; } + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + width: 70%; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + } /* page numbers */ + + .blockquot{font-size: 90%; margin-top: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 1.5em;} + .iquot {font-size: 90%; line-height: 100%; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + + .bb {border-bottom: solid 2px;} + .bl {border-left: solid 2px;} + .bt {border-top: solid 2px;} + .br {border-right: solid 2px;} + .bbox {border: solid 2px;} + + .center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0em;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + .u {text-decoration: underline;} + .noidt {text-indent: 0em;} + + .tjust {text-align: justify; padding-left: 2em; padding-right: 1em;} + .caption {font-weight: bold; text-align: left; font-size: 115%; text-indent: -1em; margin-top: 1.5em;} + .ft20 {font-size: 125%; text-align: center;} + + .figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center;} + + .footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 82%; text-align: right;} + .fnanchor {vertical-align: super; font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left; text-indent: 0em;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem span.i0 {display: block; margin-left: 0em; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem span.i2 {display: block; margin-left: 2em; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem span.i4 {display: block; margin-left: 4em; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .notebox {border: solid 2px; padding: 1em; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; background: #CCCCB2; margin-top: 2em;} + + hr.full { width: 100%; + margin-top: 3em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + height: 4px; + border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */ + border-style: solid; + border-color: #000000; + clear: both; } + pre {font-size: 85%;} + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, Ethics, by John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts</h1> +<p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a +href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></p> +<p>Title: Ethics</p> +<p>Author: John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts</p> +<p>Release Date: April 28, 2012 [eBook #39551]</p> +<p>Language: English</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ETHICS***</p> +<p> </p> +<h4>E-text prepared by Adrian Mastronardi<br /> + and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> + (<a href="http://www.pgdp.net">http://www.pgdp.net</a>)<br /> + from page images generously made available by<br /> + Internet Archive<br /> + (<a href="http://www.archive.org">http://www.archive.org</a>)</h4> +<p> </p> +<table border="0" style="background-color: #ccccff;margin: 0 auto;" cellpadding="10"> + <tr> + <td valign="top"> + Note: + </td> + <td> + Images of the original pages are available through + Internet Archive. See + <a href="http://archive.org/details/ethicsdew00deweuoft"> + http://archive.org/details/ethicsdew00deweuoft</a> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center"><i>AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES</i></p> + + +<h1>ETHICS</h1> + +<p> </p> + + +<h3><small>BY</small><br /> +<br /> +JOHN DEWEY</h3> + +<p class="center"><i>Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University</i></p> + +<h3><small>AND</small><br /> +<br /> +JAMES H. TUFTS</h3> +<p class="center"><i>Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago</i></p> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 235px;"> +<img src="images/titlepage.jpg" width="235" height="273" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<p class="ft20"> +<small>NEW YORK</small><br /> +<b>HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY</b><br /> +<small><span class="smcap">London</span>: GEORGE BELL AND SONS</small><br /> +1909</p> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span></p> + + + +<p class="center"><small> +<span class="smcap">Copyright, 1908,<br /> +by</span><br /> +HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY<br /> +</small></p> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> +<h2>PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>The significance of this text in Ethics lies in its effort +to awaken a vital conviction of the genuine reality +of moral problems and the value of reflective thought +in dealing with them. To this purpose are subordinated +the presentation in Part I. of historic material; the discussion +in Part II. of the different types of theoretical +interpretation, and the consideration, in Part III., of some +typical social and economic problems which characterize +the present.</p> + +<p>Experience shows that the student of morals has difficulty +in getting the field objectively and definitely before +him so that its problems strike him as real problems. Conduct +is so intimate that it is not easy to analyze. It is so +important that to a large extent the perspective for regarding +it has been unconsciously fixed by early training. +The historical method of approach has proved in the +classroom experience of the authors an effective method +of meeting these difficulties. To follow the moral life +through typical epochs of its development enables students +to realize what is involved in their own habitual standpoints; +it also presents a concrete body of subject-matter +which serves as material of analysis and discussion.</p> + +<p>The classic conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable +importance in illuminating the obscure places +of the moral life and in giving the student clues which +will enable him to explore it for himself. But there is +always danger of either dogmatism or a sense of unreality +when students are introduced abruptly to the theoretical +ideas. Instead of serving as tools for understanding the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span>moral facts, the ideas are likely to become substitutes for +the facts. When they are proffered ready-made, their +theoretical acuteness and cleverness may be admired, but +their practical soundness and applicability are suspected. +The historical introduction permits the student to be +present, as it were, at the social situations in which the +intellectual instruments were forged. He appreciates their +relevancy to the conditions which provoked them, and he +is encouraged to try them on simple problems before attempting +the complex problems of the present. By assisting +in their gradual development he gains confidence in +the ideas and in his power to use them.</p> + +<p>In the second part, devoted more specifically to the +analysis and criticism of the leading conceptions of moral +theory, the aim accordingly has not been to instill the +notions of a school nor to inculcate a ready-made system, +but to show the development of theories out of the problems +and experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest +how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical +exigencies. Aspects of the moral life have been so thoroughly +examined that it is possible to present certain principles +in the confidence that they will meet general acceptance. +Rationalism and hedonism, for example, have +contributed toward a scientific statement of the elements +of conduct, even though they have failed as self-inclosed +and final systems. After the discussions of Kant and Mill, +Sidgwick and Green, Martineau and Spencer, it is possible +to affirm that there is a place in the moral life for reason +and a place for happiness,—a place for duty and a place +for valuation. Theories are treated not as incompatible +rival systems which must be accepted or rejected <i>en bloc</i>, +but as more or less adequate methods of surveying the +problems of conduct. This mode of approach facilitates +the scientific estimation and determination of the part +played by various factors in the complexity of moral life. +The student is put in a position to judge the problems of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span>conduct for himself. This emancipation and enlightenment +of individual judgment is the chief aim of the +theoretical portion.</p> + +<p>In a considerable part of the field, particularly in the +political and economic portions of Part III., no definitive +treatment is as yet possible. Nevertheless, it is highly +desirable to introduce the student to the examination of +these unsettled questions. When the whole civilized world +is giving its energies to the meaning and value of justice +and democracy, it is intolerably academic that those interested +in ethics should have to be content with conceptions +already worked out, which therefore relate to what is +least doubtful in conduct rather than to questions now +urgent. Moreover, the advantages of considering theory +and practice in direct relation to each other are mutual. +On the one hand, as against the <i>a priori</i> claims of both +individualism and socialism, the need of the hour seems +to us to be the application of methods of more deliberate +analysis and experiment. The extreme conservative may +deprecate any scrutiny of the present order; the ardent +radical may be impatient of the critical and seemingly +tardy processes of the investigator; but those who have +considered well the conquest which man is making of the +world of nature cannot forbear the conviction that the +cruder method of trial and error and the time-honored +method of prejudice and partisan controversy need not +longer completely dominate the regulation of the life of +society. They hope for a larger application of the scientific +method to the problems of human welfare and progress. +Conversely, a science which takes part in the actual +work of promoting moral order and moral progress must +receive a valuable reflex influence of stimulus and of test. +To consider morality in the making as well as to dwell +upon values already established should make the science +more vital. And whatever the effect upon the subject-matter, +the student can hardly appreciate the full force +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span>of his materials and methods as long as they are kept aloof +from the questions which are occupying the minds of his +contemporaries.</p> + +<p>Teachers who are limited in time will doubtless prefer +to make their own selections of material, but the following +suggestions present one possible line of choice. In Part +I., of the three chapters dealing with the Hebrew, Greek, +and modern developments, any one may be taken as furnishing +an illustration of the method; and certain portions +of Chapter IX. may be found more detailed in analysis +than is necessary for the beginner. In Part II., Chapters +XI.-XII. may be omitted without losing the thread of the +argument. In Part III., any one of the specific topics—viz., +the political state, the economic order, the family—may +be considered apart from the others. Some teachers +may prefer to take Parts in their entirety. In this case, +any two may be chosen.</p> + +<p>As to the respective shares of the work for which the +authors are severally responsible, while each has contributed +suggestions and criticisms to the work of the +other in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a +joint work, Part I. has been written by Mr. Tufts, Part II. +by Mr. Dewey, and in Part III., Chapters XX. and XXI. +are by Mr. Dewey, Chapters XXII.-XXVI. by Mr. Tufts.</p> + +<p>It need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made +in the bibliographies to be exhaustive. When the dates +of publication of the work cited are given, the plan +has been in general to give, in the case of current literature, +the date of the latest edition, and in the case of +some classical treatises the date of original publication.</p> + +<p>In conclusion, the authors desire to express their indebtedness +to their colleagues and friends Dr. Wright, +Mr. Talbert, and Mr. Eastman, who have aided in the +reading of the proof and with other suggestions.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> +<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2> + + + + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="" width="90%"> +<tr><td align='left'><small>CHAPTER</small></td> +<td align='right'><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>I. <span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Definition and Method:</i>—Ethical and moral, specific +problem, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>; importance of genetic study, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>. § 2. <i>Criterion of +the moral:</i>—The moral in cross section, the "what" and the +"how," <a href="#Page_5">5</a>; the moral as growth, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>. § 3. <i>Divisions of the +treatment</i>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan='2' align='center'><big>PART I +<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">The Beginnings and Growth of Morality</span></big></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>II. <span class="smcap">Early Group Life</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Typical facts of group life:</i>—Primitive unity and +solidarity, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>. § 2. <i>Kinship and household groups:</i>—The +kinship group, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>; the family or household group, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>. +§ 3. <i>Kinship and family groups as economic and industrial +units:</i>—The land and the group, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>; movable goods, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>. +§ 4. <i>Kinship and family groups as political bodies:</i>—Their +control over the individual, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>; rights and responsibility, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>. +§ 5. <i>The kinship or household as a religious unit:</i>—Totem +groups, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>; ancestral religion, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>. § 6. <i>Age and sex groups</i>, +<a href="#Page_32">32</a>. § 7. <i>Moral significance of the group</i>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>III. <span class="smcap">The Rationalizing and Socializing Agencies in Early +Society</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_37">37</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Three levels of conduct:</i>—Conduct as instinctive and +governed by primal needs, regulated by society's standards, +and by personal standards, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>. § 2. <i>Rationalizing agencies:</i> +Work, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>; arts and crafts, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>; war, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>. § 3. <i>Socializing +agencies:</i>—Coöperation, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; art, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>. § 4. <i>Family life as +idealizing and socializing agency</i>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>. § 5. <i>Moral interpretation +of this first level</i>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>IV. <span class="smcap">Group Morality—Customs or Mores</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_51">51</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Meaning, authority, and origin of customs</i>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>. +§ 2. <i>Means of enforcing custom:</i>—Public approval, taboos, +rituals, force, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>. § 3. <i>Conditions which render group control +conscious:</i>—Educational customs, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>; law and justice, +<a href="#Page_59">59</a>; danger or crisis, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>. § 4. <i>Values and defects of customary +morality:</i>—Standards, motives, content, organization of +character, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span>V. <span class="smcap">From Custom to Conscience; from Group Morality to +Personal Morality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Contrast and collision</i>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>. § 2. <i>Sociological agencies +in the transition:</i>—Economic forces, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>; science and the arts, +<a href="#Page_78">78</a>; military forces, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>; religious forces, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>. § 3. <i>Psychological +agencies:</i>—Sex, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>; private property, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>; struggles +for mastery and liberty, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>; honor and esteem, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>. § 4. <i>Positive +reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>VI. <span class="smcap">The Hebrew Moral Development</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_91">91</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>General character and determining principles:</i>—The +Hebrew and the Greek, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>; Political and economic factors, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>. +§ 2. <i>Religious agencies:</i>—Covenant, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>; personal law-giver, +<a href="#Page_95">95</a>; cultus, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>; prophets, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>; the kingdom, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>. § 3. <i>Moral +conceptions attained:</i>—Righteousness and sin, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>; responsibility, +<a href="#Page_104">104</a>; purity of motive, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>; the ideal of "life," <a href="#Page_107">107</a>; +the social ideal, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>VII. <span class="smcap">The Moral Development of the Greeks</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_111">111</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>The fundamental notes:</i>—Convention versus nature, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>; +measure, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>; good and just, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>. § 2. <i>Intellectual forces +of individualism:</i>—The scientific spirit, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>. § 3. <i>Commercial +and political individualism:</i>—Class interests, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>; why +obey laws? <a href="#Page_122">122</a>. § 4. <i>Individualism and ethical theory:</i>—The +question formulated, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>; individualistic theories, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>. +§ 5. <i>The deeper view of nature and the good, of the individual +and the social order:</i>—Aristotle on the natural, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>; +Plato's ideal state, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>; passion or reason, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>; eudæmonism +and the mean, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>; man and the cosmos, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>. § 6. <i>The conception +of the ideal:</i>—Contrast with the actual, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>; ethical +significance, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>. § 7. <i>The conception of the self, of character +and responsibility:</i>—The poets, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>; Plato and the +Stoics, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>VIII. <span class="smcap">The Modern Period</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>The mediæval ideals:</i>—Groups and class ideals, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>; the +church ideal, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>. § 2. <i>Main lines of modern development</i>, +<a href="#Page_147">147</a>. § 3. <i>The old and new in the beginnings of individualism</i>, +<a href="#Page_149">149</a>. § 4. <i>Individualism in the progress of liberty and +democracy:</i>—Rights, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>. § 5. <i>Individualism as affected by +the development of industry, commerce, and art:</i>—Increasing +power and interests, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>; distribution of goods, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>; industrial +revolution raises new problems, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>. § 6. <i>The individual +and the development of intelligence:</i>—The Renaissance, +<a href="#Page_163">163</a>; the Enlightenment, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>; the present significance of scientific +method, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>IX. <span class="smcap">A General Comparison of Customary and Reflective +Morality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_171">171</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Elements of agreement and continuity:</i>—Régime of +custom, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>; persistence of group morality, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>; origin of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span>ethical terms, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>. § 2. <i>Elements of contrast:</i>—Differentiation +of the moral, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>; observing <i>versus</i> reflecting, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>; the +higher law, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>; deepening of meaning, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>. § 3. <i>Opposition +between individual and social aims and standards:</i>—Withdrawal +from the social order, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>; individual emancipation, +<a href="#Page_186">186</a>. § 4. <i>Effects upon the individual character:</i>—Increased +possibilities of evil as well as of good, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>. § 5. <i>Moral +differentiation and the social order:</i>—Effects on the family, +<a href="#Page_193">193</a>; on industry and government, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>; on religion, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>; general +relation of religion to morality, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan='2' align='center'><big>PART II +<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">Theory of the Moral Life</span></big></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>X. <span class="smcap">The Moral Situation</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_201">201</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>; Traits of +voluntary activity, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>; The good and bad in non-voluntary +behavior, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>; Indifferent voluntary conduct, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>; The moral is +introduced when ends have conflicting values, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>; Selection +then depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self, +<a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XI. <span class="smcap">Problems of Moral Theory</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Theory grows from practical problems, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>; Three typical +problems of reflective practice, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>; Corresponding problems +of theory, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>; Their historical sequence, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>; Growth of individualism, +<a href="#Page_220">220</a>; The two types of individualism, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XII. <span class="smcap">Types of Moral Theory</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Typical divisions of theories:</i>—Teleological and jural, +<a href="#Page_224">224</a>; individual and institutional, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>; empirical and intuitional, +<a href="#Page_226">226</a>. § 2. <i>Division of voluntary activity into Inner +and Outer:</i>—The "how" and the "what," <a href="#Page_227">227</a>; attitude and +consequences, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>; different types of each theory, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>; bearing +of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control, +<a href="#Page_231">231</a>. § 3. <i>General interpretation of these theories:</i>—Ordinary +view of disposition and of consequences, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>; advantages +claimed for emphasis upon consequences, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>; for +emphasis upon disposition or attitude, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>; necessity of reconciliation +of these theories, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XIII. <span class="smcap">Conduct and Character</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Problem of their relation, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>. § 1. <i>The good will of +Kant:</i>—Emphasis upon motive, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>; motive with or without +consequences, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>; necessity of effort, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>; overt action required +to prove motive, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>. § 2. <i>The "Intention" of the +Utilitarians:</i>—Emphasis upon consequences, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>; distinction +of intention from motive, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>; they are really identical, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>; +motive as blind and as intelligent, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>; practical importance +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span>of insistence upon consequences, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>; foresight of consequences +depends upon motive, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>. § 3. <i>Conduct and character:</i>—The +nature of disposition, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>; partial and complete +intention, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>; complexity of motives, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>. § 4. <i>Morality of +acts and of agents:</i>—Subjective and objective morality, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>; +the doer and his deed, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>; summary, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XIV. <span class="smcap">Happiness and Conduct: The Good and Desire</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_263">263</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Residence and nature of goodness, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>; happiness as the +good, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>; love of happiness as the evil, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>; ambiguity in +conception of happiness, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>. § 1. <i>The Object of Desire:</i>—Is +it pleasure? <a href="#Page_269">269</a>; desire presupposes instinctive appetites, +<a href="#Page_270">270</a>; and objects of thought, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>; happiness and desire, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>; +need for standard, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>. § 2. <i>The Conception of Happiness +as a Standard:</i>—Utilitarian method, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>; Difficulty of measuring +pleasure, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>; character determines the value of a +pleasure, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>. +§ 3. <i>The constitution of happiness:</i>—Pleasures depend upon +objects, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>; they are qualitative, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>; they vary with disposition, +<a href="#Page_283">283</a>; happiness as the moral good, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XV. <span class="smcap">Happiness and Social Ends</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_286">286</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>; value as a theory +of social reform, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory +of motive, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>; Bentham's method of reconciling personal +and general happiness, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>; Mill's method, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>; sympathy +and the social self, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>; the distinctively moral interest, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>; +equation of virtue and happiness, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>; moral democracy, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XVI. <span class="smcap">The Place of Reason in the Moral Life: Moral +Knowledge</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Problem of reason and desire:</i>—Nature of a reasonable +act, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>; theories about moral knowledge, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>. § 2. <i>Kant's +theory of practical reason:</i>—Traits of morality, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>; reason +as <i>a priori</i> and formal, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>; true meaning of generalization, +<a href="#Page_313">313</a>; the general and the social, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>. § 3. <i>Moral sense intuitionalism:</i>—Function +of reason, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>; habit and sense, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>; +invalid intuitions, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>; deliberation and intuition, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>; the +good man's judgment, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>. § 4. <i>The place of general rules:</i>—Their +value, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>; casuistry, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>; and its dangers, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>; +secondary ends of utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>; empirical rules and +customs, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>; distinction of rules and principles, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>; sympathy +and reasonableness, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XVII. <span class="smcap">The Place of Duty in the Moral Life: Subjection to +Authority</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_337">337</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Conflict of the rational with the attractive end, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>. § 1. +<i>The subjection of desire to law</i>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>; cause of conflict of +desire and thought, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>; demand for transformation of desire, +<a href="#Page_343">343</a>; social character of duties, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>; the social self is the +"universal" self, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>. § 2. <i>Kantian theory:</i>—Accord with +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span>duty versus from duty, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>; the two-fold self of Kant, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>; +criticism of Kant, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>; emphasis falls practically on political +authority, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>; "Duty for duty's sake," <a href="#Page_351">351</a>. § 3. <i>The Utilitarian +theory of duty:</i>—The hedonistic problem, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>; Moral +sanctions, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>; they are too external, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>; Bain's account, +<a href="#Page_356">356</a>; Spencer's account, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>; such views set up a fictitious non-social +self, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>. § 3. <i>Final statement:</i>—Growth requires disagreeable +readjustments, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XVIII. <span class="smcap">The Place of the Self in the Moral Life</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_364">364</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Problems regarding the self, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>. § 1. <i>The doctrine of self-denial:</i>—Explanation +of its origin, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>; four objections to +doctrine, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>. § 2. <i>Self-assertion:</i>—Ethical dualism, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>; +"naturalistic" ethics, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>; false biological basis, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>; misinterprets +nature of efficiency, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>. § 3. <i>Self-love and benevolence; +or egoism and altruism:</i>—The "crux" of ethical speculation, +<a href="#Page_375">375</a>; are all motives selfish? <a href="#Page_376">376</a>; ambiguity of term +selfish, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>; are results selfish? <a href="#Page_379">379</a>; self-preservation, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>; +rational regard for self, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>; regard for others, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>; the existence +of "other-regarding" impulses, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>; altruism may +be immoral, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>; social justice necessary to moral altruism, +<a href="#Page_389">389</a>. § 4. <i>The good as self-realization:</i>—Self-realization an +ambiguous idea, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>; true and false consideration of the self, +<a href="#Page_393">393</a>; equation of personal and general happiness, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XIX. <span class="smcap">The Virtues</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_399">399</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Introductory—virtue defined, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>; natural ability and virtue, +<a href="#Page_400">400</a>; evolution of virtues, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>; responsibility for moral judgment, +<a href="#Page_402">402</a>; futility of cataloguing virtues, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>; their cardinal +aspects, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>. § 1. <i>Temperance:</i>—Greek, Roman, and Christian +conceptions, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>; negative and positive aspects, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>; +pleasure and excitement, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>. § 2. <i>Courage or persistent +vigor:</i>—Dislike of the disagreeable, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>; "dimensions" of +courage, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>; optimism and pessimism, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>. § 3. <i>Justice:</i>—Three +meanings of, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>; justice and love, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>; justice and +punishment, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>. § 4. <i>Wisdom or conscientiousness:</i>—Importance +of intelligent interest, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>; Greek and modern ideas +of moral wisdom, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>; ideals and thoughtfulness, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>; ideals +and progress, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan='2' align='center'><big>PART III +<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">The World of Action</span></big></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XX. <span class="smcap">Social Organization and the Individual</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_427">427</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>Object of discussion, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>. § 1. <i>Growth of individuality +through social organizations:</i>—Emancipation from custom, +<a href="#Page_428">428</a>; double movement towards individuality and complex +associations, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>; morality and legality, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>; two-fold contribution +of social environment to individual morality, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>; +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span>moral value of the state, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>. § 2. <i>Responsibility and freedom:</i>—Liability, +<a href="#Page_436">436</a>; freedom as exemption and as power, +<a href="#Page_437">437</a>; legal and moral freedom, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>. § 3. <i>Rights and obligations:</i>—Their +definition, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>; they are correlative, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>; physical +rights, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>; limitations put upon them by war and punishment, +<a href="#Page_443">443</a>; by poverty, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>; mental rights, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>; limitations to +freedom of thought and expression, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>; education, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XXI. <span class="smcap">Civil Society and the Political State</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_451">451</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Civil rights and obligations:</i>—Their definition, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>; their +classes, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>; significance of established remedies for wrongs, +<a href="#Page_454">454</a>. § 2. <i>Development of civil rights:</i>—Contrast with savage +age justice, <a href="#Page_456">456</a>; social harm versus metaphysical evil, <a href="#Page_457">457</a>; +recognition of accident and intent, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>; of character and +circumstances, <a href="#Page_460">460</a>; of mental incapacity, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>; significance +of negligence and carelessness, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>; conflict of substantial and +technical justice, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>; relations of the legal and moral, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>; +reform of criminal procedure necessary, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>; also of punitive +methods, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>; and of civil administration, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>. § 3. <i>Political +rights and obligations:</i>—Significance of the state, <a href="#Page_473">473</a>; +distrust of government, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>; indifference to politics, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>; +political corruption, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>; reform of partisan machinery, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>; +of governmental machinery, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>; constructive social legislation, +<a href="#Page_480">480</a>; a federated humanity, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>. § 4. <i>The moral criterion +of political activity:</i>—Its statement, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>; the individualistic +formula, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>; the collectivistic formula, <a href="#Page_484">484</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XXII. <span class="smcap">The Ethics of the Economic Life</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_486">486</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>General analysis:</i>—The economic in relation to happiness, +<a href="#Page_487">487</a>; relation to character, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>; social aspects, <a href="#Page_491">491</a>. +§ 2. <i>The problem set by the new economic order:</i>—Collective +and impersonal organizations, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>; readjustments required, +<a href="#Page_496">496</a>. § 3. <i>The agencies for carrying on commerce and industry:</i>—Early +agencies, <a href="#Page_497">497</a>; the business enterprise, <a href="#Page_498">498</a>; the +labor union, <a href="#Page_499">499</a>; reversion to group morality, <a href="#Page_500">500</a>; members +and management, <a href="#Page_500">500</a>; employer and employed, <a href="#Page_501">501</a>; relations +to the public, <a href="#Page_502">502</a>; to the law, <a href="#Page_503">503</a>. § 4. <i>The methods +of production, exchange, and valuation:</i>—The machine, <a href="#Page_507">507</a>; +basis of valuation, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>. § 5. <i>The factors which aid ethical +reconstruction:</i>—Principles more easily seen, <a href="#Page_511">511</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XXIII. <span class="smcap">Some Principles in the Economic Order</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_514">514</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>1. Wealth subordinate to personality, <a href="#Page_514">514</a>. 2. Wealth and +activity, <a href="#Page_514">514</a>. 3. Wealth and public service, <a href="#Page_515">515</a>. 4. A +change demanded from individual to collective morality, <a href="#Page_517">517</a>. +5. Personal responsibility, <a href="#Page_519">519</a>. 6. Publicity and legal control, +<a href="#Page_520">520</a>. 7. Democracy and distribution, <a href="#Page_521">521</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XXIV. <span class="smcap">Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_523">523</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Individualism and socialism:</i>—General statement, <a href="#Page_523">523</a>; +equal opportunity, <a href="#Page_526">526</a>. § 2. <i>Individualism or free contract</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> +<i>analyzed; its values:</i>—Efficiency, <a href="#Page_527">527</a>; initiative, <a href="#Page_527">527</a>; regulation +of production, <a href="#Page_528">528</a>. § 3. <i>Criticisms upon individualism:</i>—It +does not secure real freedom, <a href="#Page_528">528</a>; nor justice, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>; competition +tends to destroy itself, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>; position of the aristocratic +individualists, <a href="#Page_532">532</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XXV. <span class="smcap">Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order (Continued)</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_536">536</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 4. <i>The theory of public agency and control</i>, <a href="#Page_536">536</a>. § 5. +<i>Society as agency of production:</i>—Charges against private +management, <a href="#Page_537">537</a>; corruption, <a href="#Page_538">538</a>; conditions of labor, <a href="#Page_540">540</a>; +collective agency not necessarily social, <a href="#Page_544">544</a>. § 6. <i>Theories +of just distribution:</i>—Individualistic theory, <a href="#Page_546">546</a>; equal division, +<a href="#Page_547">547</a>; a working programme, <a href="#Page_548">548</a>. § 7. <i>Ownership and +use of property:</i>—Defects in the present system, <a href="#Page_551">551</a>. § 8. +<i>Present tendencies:</i>—Individualistic character of the Constitution, +<a href="#Page_554">554</a>; increased recognition of public welfare, <a href="#Page_555">555</a>; +social justice through economic, social, and scientific progress, +<a href="#Page_557">557</a>. § 9. <i>Three special problems:</i>—The open versus the +closed shop, <a href="#Page_559">559</a>; the capitalization of corporations, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>; the +unearned increment, <a href="#Page_564">564</a>. Appendix: Prof. Seager's programme +of social legislation, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>.</td></tr> +<tr><td></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>XXVI. <span class="smcap">The Family</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_571">571</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tjust'>§ 1. <i>Historical antecedents of the modern family:</i>—Maternal +type, <a href="#Page_572">572</a>; paternal type, <a href="#Page_572">572</a>; influence of the church, <a href="#Page_576">576</a>. +§ 2. <i>The psychological basis of the family:</i>—Emotional and +instinctive basis, <a href="#Page_578">578</a>; common will, <a href="#Page_580">580</a>; parenthood, <a href="#Page_581">581</a>; +social and religious factors, <a href="#Page_582">582</a>; the children, <a href="#Page_582">582</a>. § 3. +<i>General elements of strain in family relations:</i>—Differences +between the sexes in temperament and occupation, <a href="#Page_584">584</a>; in +attitude toward the family, <a href="#Page_587">587</a>; differences between parents +and children, <a href="#Page_589">589</a>. § 4. <i>Special conditions which give rise to +present problems:</i>—The economic factors, <a href="#Page_590">590</a>; cultural and +political factors, <a href="#Page_593">593</a>. § 5. <i>Unsettled problems:</i>—Economic +problems, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>; the dilemma between the domestic life and +occupations outside the home, <a href="#Page_595">595</a>; the family as consumer, +<a href="#Page_598">598</a>. § 6. <i>Unsettled problems:</i>—Political problems, authority +within the family, <a href="#Page_599">599</a>; equality or inequality, <a href="#Page_600">600</a>; isolation +not the solution, <a href="#Page_602">602</a>; authority over the family, divorce, +<a href="#Page_603">603</a>; general law of social health, <a href="#Page_605">605</a>; conclusion, <a href="#Page_605">605</a>.</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> +<h1>ETHICS</h1> + + +<p> </p> + +<h2><small>CHAPTER I</small> + +<br /><br /> + +INTRODUCTION</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. DEFINITION AND METHOD</h4> + +<p><b>Provisional Definition.</b>—The place for an accurate +definition of a subject is at the end of an inquiry rather +than at the beginning, but a brief definition will serve to +mark out the field. Ethics is the science that deals with +conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong, +good or bad. A single term for conduct so considered +is "moral conduct," or the "moral life." Another way of +stating the same thing is to say that Ethics aims to give +a systematic account of our judgments about conduct, in +so far as these estimate it from the standpoint of right +or wrong, good or bad.</p> + +<p><b>Ethical and Moral.</b>—The terms "ethics" and "ethical" +are derived from a Greek word <i>ethos</i> which originally meant +customs, usages, especially those belonging to some group +as distinguished from another, and later came to mean +disposition, character. They are thus like the Latin +word "moral," from <i>mores</i>, or the German <i>sittlich</i>, from +<i>Sitten</i>. As we shall see, it was in customs, "ethos," +"mores," that the moral or ethical began to appear. For +customs were not merely habitual ways of acting; they +were ways approved by the group or society. To act +contrary to the customs of the group brought severe disapproval. +This might not be formulated in precisely our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +terms—right and wrong, good and bad,—but the attitude +was the same in essence. The terms ethical and moral +as applied to the conduct of to-day imply of course a +far more complex and advanced type of life than the old +words "ethos" and "mores," just as economics deals with a +more complex problem than "the management of a household," +but the terms have a distinct value if they suggest +the way in which the moral life had its beginning.</p> + +<p><b>Two Aspects of Conduct.</b>—To give a scientific account +of judgments about conduct, means to find the +principles which are the basis of these judgments. Conduct +or the moral life has two obvious aspects. On the +one hand it is a life of purpose. It implies thought and +feeling, ideals and motives, valuation and choice. These +are processes to be studied by psychological methods. On +the other hand, conduct has its outward side. It has relations +to nature, and especially to human society. Moral +life is called out or stimulated by certain necessities of +individual and social existence. As Protagoras put it, +in mythical form, the gods gave men a sense of justice +and of reverence, in order to enable them to unite for +mutual preservation.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> And in turn the moral life aims +to modify or transform both natural and social environments, +to build a "kingdom of man" which shall be also +an ideal social order—a "kingdom of God." These relations +to nature and society are studied by the biological +and social sciences. Sociology, economics, politics, law, +and jurisprudence deal particularly with this aspect of +conduct. Ethics must employ their methods and results +for this aspect of its problem, as it employs psychology +for the examination of conduct on its inner side.</p> + +<p><b>The Specific Problem of Ethics.</b>—But ethics is not +merely the sum of these various sciences. It has a problem +of its own which is created by just this twofold aspect +of life and conduct. It has to relate these two sides. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +has to study the inner process <i>as determined by the outer +conditions or as changing these outer conditions</i>, and the +outward behavior or institution <i>as determined by the inner +purpose, or as affecting the inner life</i>. To study choice +and purpose is psychology; to study choice as affected +by the rights of others and to judge it as right or wrong +by this standard is ethics. Or again, to study a corporation +may be economics, or sociology, or law; to study its +activities as resulting from the purposes of persons or as +affecting the welfare of persons, and to judge its acts +as good or bad from such a point of view, is ethics.</p> + +<p><b>Genetic Study.</b>—When we deal with any process of life +it is found to be a great aid for understanding the +present conditions if we trace the history of the process +and see how present conditions have come about. And +in the case of morality there are four reasons in particular +for examining earlier stages. The first is that we +may begin our study with a simpler material. Moral life +at present is extremely complex. Professional, civic, +domestic, philanthropic, ecclesiastical, and social obligations +claim adjustment. Interests in wealth, in knowledge, +in power, in friendship, in social welfare, make demand +for recognition in fixing upon what is good. It is +desirable to consider first a simpler problem. In the second +place, this complex moral life is like the human body +in that it contains "rudiments" and "survivals." Some +of our present standards and ideals were formed at one +period in the past, and some at another. Some of these +apply to present conditions and some do not. Some +are at variance with others. Many apparent conflicts +in moral judgments are explained when we discover how +the judgments came to be formed in the first instance. +We cannot easily understand the moral life of to-day +except in the light of earlier morality. The third reason +is that we may get a more objective material for study. +Our moral life is so intimate a part of ourselves that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +it is hard to observe impartially. Its characteristics escape +notice because they are so familiar. When we travel +we find the customs, laws, and moral standards of other +peoples standing out as "peculiar." Until we have been +led by some such means to compare our own conduct with +that of others it probably does not occur to us that our +own standards are also peculiar, and hence in need of explanation. +It is as difficult scientifically as it is personally "to +see ourselves as others see us." It is doubtless true that +to see ourselves merely as others see us would not be +enough. Complete moral analysis requires us to take +into our reckoning motives and purposes which may perhaps +be undiscoverable by the "others." But it is a great +aid to this completer analysis if we can sharpen our vision +and awaken our attention by a comparative study. A +fourth reason for a genetic study is that it emphasizes +the dynamic, progressive character of morality. Merely +to examine the present may easily give the impression that +the moral life is not a life, a moving process, something +still in the making—but a changeless structure. There is +moral progress as well as a moral order. This may be +discovered by an analysis of the very nature of moral +conduct, but it stands out more clearly and impressively +if we trace the actual development in history. Before +attempting our analysis of the present moral consciousness +and its judgments, we shall therefore give an outline of +the earlier stages and simpler phases.</p> + +<p><b>Theory and Practice.</b>—Finally, if we can discover +ethical principles these ought to give some guidance for +the unsolved problems of life which continually present +themselves for decision. Whatever may be true for other +sciences it would seem that ethics at least ought to have +some practical value. "In this theater of man's life it is +reserved for God and the angels to be lookers on." Man +must act; and he must act well or ill, rightly or wrongly. +If he has reflected, has considered his conduct in the light<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +of the general principles of human order and progress, he +ought to be able to act more intelligently and freely, +to achieve the satisfaction that always attends on scientific +as compared with uncritical or rule-of-thumb practice. +Socrates gave the classic statement for the study +of conduct when he said, "A life unexamined, uncriticized, +is not worthy of man."</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. CRITERION OF THE MORAL</h4> + +<p>It is not proposed to attempt at this point an accurate or +minute statement of what is implied in moral conduct, as +this is the task of Part II. But for the purposes of tracing +in Part I. the beginnings of morality, it is desirable to +have a sort of rough chart to indicate to the student what +to look for in the earlier stages of his exploration, and +to enable him to keep his bearings on the way.</p> + +<p>Certain of the characteristics of the moral may be seen +in a cross-section, a statement of the elements in moral +conduct at a given time. Other characteristics come out +more clearly by comparing later with earlier stages. We +give first a cross-section.</p> + +<p><b>1. Characteristics of the Moral Life in Cross-section.</b>—In +this cross-section the first main division is suggested +by the fact that we sometimes give our attention to <i>what</i> +is done or intended, and sometimes to <i>how</i> or <i>why</i> the +act is done. These divisions may turn out to be less absolute +than they seem, but common life uses them and moral +theories have often selected the one or the other as the +important aspect. When we are told to seek peace, tell +the truth, or aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest +number, we are charged to do or intend some definite act. +When we are urged to be conscientious or pure in heart +the emphasis is on a kind of attitude that might go with +a variety of acts. A newspaper advocates a good measure. +So far, so good. But people may ask, what is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +motive in this? and if this is believed to be merely selfish, +they do not credit the newspaper with having genuine interest +in reform. On the other hand, sincerity alone is not +enough. If a man advocates frankly and sincerely a +scheme for enriching himself at the public expense we condemn +him. We say his very frankness shows his utter +disregard for others. One of the great moral philosophers +has indeed said that to act rationally is all that is necessary, +but he at once goes on to claim that this implies +treating every man as an end and not merely a means, and +this calls for a particular kind of action. Hence we may +assume for the present purpose a general agreement that +our moral judgments take into account both what is done +or intended, and how or why the act is done. These two +aspects are sometimes called the "matter" and the "form," +or the "content" and the attitude. We shall use the +simpler terms, the What and the How.</p> + +<p><b>The "What" as a Criterion.</b>—If we neglect for the +moment the How and think of the What, we find two main +standpoints employed in judging: one is that of "higher" +and "lower" within the man's own self; the other is his +treatment of others.</p> + +<p>The distinction between a higher and lower self has many +guises. We speak of a man as "a slave to his appetites," +of another as possessed by greed for money, of another as +insatiately ambitious. Over against these passions we +hear the praise of scientific pursuits, of culture, of art, +of friendship, of meditation, or of religion. We are bidden +to think of things σέμνα, nobly serious. A life of +the spirit is set off against the life of the flesh, the finer +against the coarser, the nobler against the baser. However +misguided the forms in which this has been interpreted, +there is no doubt as to the reality of the conflicting +impulses which give rise to the dualism. The source is +obvious. Man would not be here if self-preservation and +self-assertion and sex instinct were not strongly rooted in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +his system. These may easily become dominant passions. +But just as certainly, man cannot be all that he may be +unless he controls these impulses and passions by other motives. +He has first to create for himself a new world of +ideal interests before he finds his best life. The appetites +and instincts may be "natural," in the sense that they are +the beginning; the mental and spiritual life is "natural," +as Aristotle puts it, in the sense that man's full nature +is developed only in such a life.</p> + +<p>The other aspect of the What, the treatment of others, +need not detain us. Justice, kindness, the conduct of the +Golden Rule are the right and good. Injustice, cruelty, +selfishness are the wrong and the bad.</p> + +<p><b>Analysis of the How: the Right and the Good.</b>—We +have used right and good as though they might be used +interchangeably in speaking of conduct. Perhaps this +may in the end prove to be true. If an act is right, then +the hero or the saint may believe that it is also good; +if an act is good in the fullest sense, then it will commend +itself as right. But right and good evidently approach +conduct from two different points of view. These might +have been noted when speaking of the content or the What, +but they are more important in considering the How.</p> + +<p>It is evident that when we speak of conduct as <i>right</i> +we think of it as before a judge. We bring the act to a +standard, and measure the act. We think too of this +standard as a "moral law" which we "ought" to obey. +We respect its authority and hold ourselves responsible. +The standard is conceived as a control over our impulses and +desires. The man who recognizes such a law and is anxious +to find and to do his duty, we call conscientious; as governing +his impulses, he has self-control; as squaring his +conduct strictly by his standard, he is upright and +reliable.</p> + +<p>If I think of "<i>good</i>," I am approaching conduct from +the standpoint of value. I am thinking of what is desira<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>ble. +This too is a standard, but it is a standard regarded +as an end to be sought rather than as a law. I am to +"choose" it and identify myself with it, rather than to control +myself by it. It is an "ideal." The conscientious +man, viewed from this standpoint, would seek to discover +the true good, to value his ends, to form ideals, +instead of following impulse or accepting any seeming +good without careful consideration. In so far as impulses +are directed by ideals the thoroughly good man will be +straightforward, "sincere": that is, he will not be moved +to do the good act by fear of punishment, or by bribery, +just as the upright man will be "governed by a sense of +duty," of "respect for principles."</p> + +<p><b>Summary of the Characteristics of the Moral.</b>—To sum +up the main characteristics of the moral life viewed in +cross-section, or when in full activity, we may state them +as follows:</p> + +<p>On the side of the "what," there are two aspects:</p> + +<p>(a) The dominance of "higher," ideal interests of +knowledge, art, freedom, rights, and the "life of the +spirit."</p> + +<p>(b) Regard for others, under its various aspects of +justice, sympathy, and benevolence.</p> + +<p>On the side of the "how" the important aspects +are:</p> + +<p>(a) The recognition of some standard, which may arise +either as a control in the guise of "right" and "law," or +as measure of value in the form of an ideal to be followed +or good to be approved.</p> + +<p>(b) A sense of duty and respect for the law; sincere +love of the good.</p> + +<p>(a) and (b) of this latter division are both included +under the "conscientious" attitude.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Moral as a Growth.</b>—The psychologists distinguish +<i>three stages</i> in conduct: (a) Instinctive activity. +(b) Attention; the stage of conscious direction or control<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> +of action by imagery; of deliberation, desire, and choice. +(c) Habit; the stage of unconscious activity along lines +set by previous action. Consciousness thus "occupies a +curious middle ground between hereditary reflex and automatic +activities upon the one hand and acquired habitual +activities upon the other." Where the original equipment +of instincts fails to meet some new situation, when +there are stimulations for which the system has no ready-made +response, consciousness appears. It selects from the +various responses those which suit the purpose, and when +these responses have become themselves automatic, habitual, +consciousness "betakes itself elsewhere to points +where habitual accommodatory movements are as yet +wanting and needed."<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> To apply this to the moral development +we need only to add that this process repeats itself +over and over. The starting-point for each later repetition +is not the hereditary instinct, but the habits which +have been formed. For the habits formed at one age +of the individual's life, or at one stage of race development, +prove inadequate for more complex situations. The +child leaves home, the savage tribe changes to agricultural +life, and the old habits no longer meet the need. +Attention is again demanded. There is deliberation, struggle, +effort. If the result is successful new habits are +formed, but upon a higher level. For the new habits, the +new character, embody more intelligence. The first stage, +purely instinctive action, we do not call moral conduct. It +is of course not <i>im</i>moral; it is merely <i>un</i>moral. The second +stage shows morality in the making. It includes the +process of transition from impulse, through desire to will. +It involves the stress of conflicting interests, the processes +of deliberation and valuation, and the final act of choice. +It will be illustrated in our treatment of race development +by the change from early group life and customs to the +more conscious moral life of higher civilization. The third<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +stage, well-organized character, is the goal of the process. +But it is evidently only a relative point. A good man +has built up a set of habits; a good society has established +certain laws and moral codes. But unless the man or +society is in a changeless world with no new conditions +there will be new problems. And this means that however +good the habit was for its time and purpose there +must be new choices and new valuations. A character that +would run automatically in every case would be pretty +nearly a mechanism. It is therefore the second stage of +this process that is the stage of active moral consciousness. +It is upon this that we focus our attention.</p> + +<p>Moral growth from the first on through the second stage +may be described as a process in which man becomes more +<i>rational</i>, more <i>social</i>, and finally more <i>moral</i>. We examine +briefly each of these aspects.</p> + +<p><b>The Rationalizing or Idealizing Process.</b>—The first +need of the organism is to live and grow. The first +instincts and impulses are therefore for food, self-defence, +and other immediate necessities. Primitive men eat, +sleep, fight, build shelters, and give food and protection +to their offspring. The "rationalizing" process will +mean at first greater use of intelligence to satisfy these +same wants. It will show itself in skilled occupations, +in industry and trade, in the utilizing of all resources to +further man's power and happiness. But to rationalize +conduct is also to introduce new ends. It not only enables +man to get what he wants; it changes the kind of objects +that he wants. This shows itself externally in what man +makes and in how he occupies himself. He must of course +have food and shelter. But he makes temples and statues +and poems. He makes myths and theories of the world. +He carries on great enterprises in commerce or government, +not so much to gratify desires for bodily wants +as to experience the growth of power. He creates a family +life which is raised to a higher level by art and reli<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>gion. +He does not live by bread only, but builds up +gradually a life of reason. Psychologically this means +that whereas at the beginning we want what our body +calls for, we soon come to want things which the mind +takes an interest in. As we form by memory, imagination, +and reason a more continuous, permanent, highly-organized +self, we require a far more permanent and ideal kind +of good to satisfy us. This gives rise to the contrast +between the material and ideal selves, or in another form, +between "the world" and "the spirit."</p> + +<p><b>The Socializing Process.</b>—The "socializing" side of +the process of development stands for an increased capacity +to enter into relations with other human beings. Like +the growth of reason it is both a means and an end. It +has its roots in certain instincts—sex, gregariousness, +parental instincts—and in the necessities of mutual support +and protection. But the associations thus formed +imply a great variety of activities which call out new +powers and set up new ends. Language is one of the first +of these activities and a first step toward more complete +socialization. Coöperation, in all kinds of enterprises, +interchange of services and goods, participation in social +arts, associations for various purposes, institutions of +blood, family, government, and religion, all add enormously +to the individual's power. On the other hand, as he +enters into these relations and becomes a "member" of all +these bodies he inevitably undergoes a transformation in +his interests. Psychologically the process is one of building +up a "social" self. Imitation and suggestion, sympathy +and affection, common purpose and common interest, +are the aids in building such a self. As the various +instincts, emotions, and purposes are more definitely organized +into such a unit, it becomes possible to set off the +interests of others against those interests that center in +my more individual good. Conscious egoism and altruism +become possible. And in a way that will be explained, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> +interests of self and others are raised to the plane of +rights and justice.</p> + +<p><b>What is Needed to Make Conduct Moral.</b>—All this +is not yet moral progress in the fullest sense. The progress +to more rational and more social conduct is the indispensable +condition of the moral, but not the whole story. +What is needed is that the more rational and social conduct +should itself be valued as good, and so be chosen +and sought; or in terms of control, that the law which +society or reason prescribes should be consciously thought +of as right, used as a standard, and respected as binding. +This gives the contrast between the higher and lower, as +a conscious aim, not merely as a matter of taste. It raises +the collision between self and others to the basis of personal +rights and justice, of deliberate selfishness or benevolence. +Finally it gives the basis for such organization of the +social and rational choices that the progress already +gained may be permanently secured, while the attention, +the struggle between duty and inclination, the conscious +choice, move forward to a new issue. Aristotle made these +points clear:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"But the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts. +The products of art have their excellence in themselves, and +so it is enough if when produced they are of a certain quality; +but in the case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly +or temperately (or like a just or temperate man) if what he +does merely be of a certain sort—he must also be in a certain +state of mind when he does it: i.e., first of all, he must know +what he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it +for itself; and, thirdly, his act must be the expression of a +formed and stable character."</p></div> + +<p><b>Summary of the Characteristics of the Moral as +Growth.</b>—The full cycle has three stages:</p> + +<p>(a) Instinctive or habitual action.</p> + +<p>(b) Action under the stress of attention, with conscious +intervention and reconstruction.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> + +<p>(c) Organization of consciously directed conduct into +habits and a self of a higher order: Character.</p> + +<p>The advance from (a) to and through (b) has three +aspects.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a rationalizing and idealizing process. Reason +is both a means to secure other ends, and an element +in determining what shall be sought.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a socializing process. Society both strengthens +and transforms the individual.</p> + +<p>(c) It is a process in which finally conduct itself is made +the conscious object of reflection, valuation, and criticism. +In this the definitely moral conceptions of right and duty, +good and virtue appear.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. DIVISIONS OF THE TREATMENT</h4> + +<p><span class="smcap">Part I.</span>, after a preliminary presentation of certain +important aspects of group life, will first trace the process +of moral development in its general outlines, and then +give specific illustrations of the process taken from the life +of Israel, of Greece, and of modern civilization.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Part II.</span> will analyze conduct or the moral life on its +inner, personal side. After distinguishing more carefully +what is meant by moral action, and noting some typical +ways in which the moral life has been viewed by ethical +theory, it will examine the meaning of right and good, +of duty and virtue, and seek to discover the principles +underlying moral judgments and moral conduct.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Part III.</span> will study conduct as action in society. But +instead of a general survey, attention will be centered +upon three phases of conduct which are of especial interest +and importance. Political rights and duties, the production, +distribution, and ownership of wealth, and finally +the relations of domestic and family life, all present +unsettled problems. These challenge the student to +make a careful examination, for he must take some attitude +as citizen on the issues involved.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>The literature on specific topics will be found at the beginning of +each Part, and at the close of the several chapters. We indicate here +some of the more useful manuals and recent representative works, +and add some specific references on the scope and methods of ethics. +Baldwin's <i>Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology</i> has selected lists +(see especially articles, <i>Ethical Theories</i>, <i>Ethics</i>, <i>Worth</i>) and general +lists (Vol. III.). Runze, <i>Ethik</i>, 1891, has good bibliographies.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Elementary Texts</span>: Mackenzie, <i>Manual of Ethics</i>, 3rd ed., 1900; +Muirhead, <i>Elements of Ethics</i>, 1892; Seth, <i>A Study of Ethical Principles</i>, +6th ed., 1902; Thilly, <i>Introduction to Ethics</i>, 1900.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Representative Books and Treatises in English</span>: Green, <i>Prolegomena +to Ethics</i>, 1883 (Idealism); Martineau, <i>Types of Ethical +Theory</i>, 1885, 3rd ed., 1891 (Intuitionism); Sidgwick's <i>Methods of +Ethics</i>, 1874, 6th ed., 1901 (Union of Intuitionist and Utilitarian Positions +with careful analysis of common sense); Spencer, <i>The Principles +of Ethics</i>, 1892-3 (Evolution); Stephen's <i>Science of Ethics</i>, 1882; The +comprehensive work of Paulsen (<i>System der Ethik</i>, 1889, 5th ed., +1900) has been translated in part by Thilly, 1899; that of Wundt +(<i>Ethik</i>, 1886, 3rd ed., 1903), by Titchener, Gulliver, and Washburn, +1897-1901. Among the more recent contributions, either to the whole +field or to specific parts, may be noted: Alexander, <i>Moral Order and +Progress</i>, 1889; 2nd ed., 1891; Dewey, <i>Outlines of Ethics</i>, 1891, and +<i>The Study of Ethics, A Syllabus</i>, 1894; Fite, <i>An Introductory Study +of Ethics</i>, 1903; Höffding, <i>Ethik</i> (German tr.), 1887; Janet, <i>The +Theory of Morals</i> (Eng. tr.), 1884; Ladd, <i>The Philosophy of Conduct</i>, +1902; Mezes, <i>Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory</i>, 1900; Moore, +<i>Principia Ethica</i>, 1903; Palmer, <i>The Field of Ethics</i>, 1902, <i>The Nature +of Goodness</i>, 1903; Taylor, <i>The Problem of Conduct</i>, 1901; Rashdall, +<i>The Theory of Good and Evil</i>, 1907; Bowne, <i>The Principles of Ethics</i>, +1892; Rickaby, <i>Moral Philosophy</i>, 1888.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Histories of Ethics</span>: Sidgwick, <i>History of Ethics</i>, 3rd ed., 1892; +Albee, <i>A History of English Utilitarianism</i>, 1902; Stephen, <i>The Utilitarians</i>, +1900; Martineau, <i>Types of Ethical Theory</i>; Whewell, <i>Lectures +on the History of Moral Philosophy in England</i>, 1852, 1862; +Köstlin, <i>Geschichte der Ethik</i>, 2 vols., 1881-92 (ancient theories); +Jodl, <i>Geschichte der Ethik</i>, 2 vols., 1882-89 (modern); Wundt, <i>Ethik</i>, +Vol. II.; the histories of philosophy by Windelband, Höffding, Erdmann, +Ueberweg, Falckenberg.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Scope and Method of Ethics</span>: See the opening chapters in nearly +all the works cited above, especially Palmer (<i>Field of Ethics</i>), Moore, +Stephen, Spencer, Paulsen, and Wundt (<i>Facts of the Moral Life</i>); +see also Ritchie, <i>Philosophical Studies</i>, 1905, pp. 264-291; Wallace, +<i>Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics</i>, 1898, pp. +194 ff.; Dewey, <i>Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality</i> +(<i>University of Chicago Decennial Publications</i>, 1903); Stuart, +<i>The Logic of Self-realization</i>, in University of California Publications: +<i>Philosophy</i>, I., 1904; Small, <i>The Significance of Sociology for +Ethics</i>, 1902; Hadley, Article <i>Economic Theory</i> in Baldwin's <i>Dict.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Relation of Theory to Life</span>: Green, <i>Prolegomena</i>, Book IV.; +Dewey, <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. I., 1891, pp. 186-203; +James, same journal, Vol. I., 330-354; Mackenzie, same journal, +Vol. IV., 1894, pp. 160-173.</p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Plato, <i>Protagoras</i>, 320 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Angell, <i>Psychology</i>, p. 59.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="PART_I" id="PART_I"></a>PART I + +<br /><br /> + +THE BEGINNINGS AND GROWTH OF MORALITY</h2> + +<p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>GENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART I</h3> + +<p>Hobhouse, <i>Morals in Evolution</i>, 2 vols., 1906.</p> + +<p>Westermarck, <i>The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas</i>, Vol. I., +1906.</p> + +<p>Sutherland, <i>The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct</i>, 2 vols., +1898.</p> + +<p>Wundt, <i>Facts of the Moral Life</i>, 1902; also <i>Ethik</i>, 3rd ed., 1903, +Vol. I., pp. 280-523.</p> + +<p>Paulsen, <i>A System of Ethics</i>, 1899, Book I.</p> + +<p>Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>, 1907.</p> + +<p>Bergmann, <i>Ethik als Kulturphilosophie</i>, 1904.</p> + +<p>Mezes, <i>Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory</i>, Part I.</p> + +<p>Dewey, <i>The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality</i>, Philos. +Review, XI., 1902, pp. 107-124, 353-371.</p> + +<p>Adam Smith, <i>Theory of Moral Sentiments</i>, 1759.</p> + +<p>Baldwin, <i>Social and Ethical Interpretations</i>, 1902.</p> + +<p>Taylor, <i>The Problem of Conduct</i>, 1901, chap. iii.</p> + +<p>Spencer, <i>Data of Ethics</i>, 1879; <i>Psychology</i>, 1872, Part IX., chs. +v.-viii.</p> + +<p>Ihering, <i>Der Zweck im Recht</i>, 3rd ed., 1893.</p> + +<p>Steinthal, <i>Allgemeine Ethik</i>, 1885.</p> +</div> + + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER II</small> + +<br /><br /> + +EARLY GROUP LIFE</h2> + + +<p>To understand the origin and growth of moral life, it is +essential to understand primitive society. And while there +is much that is uncertain, there is one fact of capital importance +which stands out clearly. This is <i>the dominant +influence of group life</i>. It is not asserted that all peoples +have had precisely the same type of groups, or the same +degree of group solidarity. It is beyond question that +the ancestors of modern civilized races lived under the +general types of group life which will be outlined, and +that these types or their survivals are found among the +great mass of peoples to-day.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. TYPICAL FACTS OF GROUP LIFE</h4> + +<p>Consider the following incident as related by Dr. Gray:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A Chinese aided by his wife flogged his mother. The imperial +order not only commanded that the criminals should +be put to death; it further directed that the head of the clan +should be put to death; that the immediate neighbors each +receive eighty blows and be sent into exile; that the head or +representatives of the graduates of the first degree (or B.A.) +among whom the male offender ranked should be flogged and +exiled; that the granduncle, the uncle, and two elder brothers +should be put to death; that the prefect and the rulers should +for a time be deprived of their rank; that on the face of the +mother of the female offender four Chinese characters expressive +of neglect of duty towards her daughter should be tattooed, +and that she be exiled to a distant province; that the +father of the female offender, a bachelor of arts, should not +be allowed to take any higher literary degrees, and that he be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +flogged and exiled; that the son of the offenders should receive +another name, and that the lands of the offender for a time +remain fallow." (<span class="smcap">J. H. Gray</span>, <i>China</i>, Vol. I., pp. 237 f.)</p></div> + +<p>Put beside this the story of Achan:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Achan had taken for his own possession certain articles from +the spoil of Jericho which had been set apart or "devoted" +to Jehovah. Israel then suffered a defeat in battle. When +Achan's act became known, "Joshua and all Israel with him +took Achan, the son of Zerah, and the mantle, and the wedge +of gold, and his sons and his daughters, and his oxen, and his +asses, and his sheep, and his tent, and all that he had.... +And all Israel stoned him with stones; and they burned +them with fire and stoned them with stones." (<span class="smcap">Joshua</span> +vii: 24, 25.)</p></div> + +<p>The converse of these situations is brought out in the +regulations of the Kumi, a Japanese local institution comprising +five or more households:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As members of a Kumi we will cultivate friendly feelings +even more than with our relatives, and will promote each +other's happiness as well as share each other's grief. If there +is an unprincipled or lawless person in a Kumi, we shall all +share the responsibility for him." (<span class="smcap">Simmons</span> and <span class="smcap">Wigmore</span>, +<i>Transactions, Asiatic Society of Japan</i>, xix., 177 f.)</p></div> + +<p>For another aspect of the group take Cæsar's description +of landholding among the Germans:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"No one possesses privately a definite extent of land; no +one has limited fields of his own; but every year the magistrates +and chiefs distribute the land to the clans and the +kindred groups (<i>gentibus cognationibusque hominum</i>) and to +those (<i>other</i> groups) who live together." (<i>De Bell. Gall.</i>, +VI., 22.)</p></div> + +<p>Of the Greeks, our intellectual ancestors, as well as +fellow Aryans, it is stated that in Attica, even to a late +period, the land remained to a large degree in possession +of ideal persons, gods, phylæ (tribes) or phratries, kinships, +political communities. Even when the superficies +of the land might be regarded as private, mines were re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>served +as public.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The basis on which these kinship groups +rested is thus stated by Grote:<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"All these phratric and gentile associations, the larger as +well as the smaller, were founded upon the same principles +and tendencies of the Grecian mind—a coalescence of the +idea of worship with that of ancestry, or of communion in +certain special religious rites with communion of blood, real +or supposed." "The god or hero, to whom the assembled +members offered their sacrifices, was conceived as the primitive +ancestor to whom they owed their origin."</p></div> + +<p>Coulanges gives a similar statement as to the ancient +family group:<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The members of the ancient family were united by something +more powerful than birth, affection, or physical strength; +this was the religion of the sacred fire, and of dead ancestors. +This caused the family to form a single body both in this life +and in the next."</p></div> + +<p>Finally, the following passage on clanship among the +Kafirs brings out two points: (1) That such a group life +implies feelings and ideas of a distinctive sort; and (2) +that it has a strength rooted in the very necessities of life.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A Kafir feels that the 'frame that binds him in' extends to +the clan. The sense of solidarity of the family in Europe is +thin and feeble compared to the full-blooded sense of corporate +union of the Kafir clan. The claims of the clan +entirely swamp the rights of the individual. The system of +tribal solidarity, which has worked so well in its smoothness +that it might satisfy the utmost dreams of the socialist, is a +standing proof of the sense of corporate union of the clan. In +olden days a man did not have any feeling of personal injury +when a chief made him work for white men and then told him +to give all, or nearly all of his wages to his chief; the money +was kept within the clan, and what was the good of the clan +was the good of the individual and <i>vice versa</i>. The striking +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>thing about this unity of the clan is that it was not a thought-out +plan imposed from without by legislation upon an unwilling +people, but it was a <i>felt-out</i> plan which arose spontaneously +along the line of least resistance. If one member of the +clan suffered, all the members suffered, not in sentimental +phraseology, but in real fact." (<span class="smcap">Dudley Kidd</span>, <i>Savage Childhood</i>, +pp. 74 f.)</p></div> + +<p>The above passages refer to Aryan, Semitic, Mongolian, +and Kafir peoples. They could be matched by +similar statements concerning nearly every people. They +suggest a way of living, and a view of life very different +from that of the American or of most Europeans.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The +American or European belongs to groups of various kinds, +but he "joins" most of them. He of course is born into +a family, but he does not stay in it all his life unless he +pleases. And he may choose his own occupation, residence, +wife, political party, religion, social club, or even national +allegiance. He may own or sell his own house, give or +bequeath his property, and is responsible generally speaking +for no one's acts but his own. This makes him an +"individual" in a much fuller sense than he would be if +all these relations were settled for him. On the other hand, +the member of such groups as are referred to in our examples +above, has all, or nearly all, his relations fixed when +he is born into a certain clan or family group. This settles +his occupation, dwelling, gods, and politics. If it +doesn't decide upon his wife, it at least usually fixes the +group from which she must be taken. His conditions, in +the words of Maine, are thus of "status," not of "contract." +This makes a vast difference in his whole attitude. +It will help to bring out more clearly by contrast the +character of present morality, as well as to see moral life +in the making, if we examine more carefully this group<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> +life. We shall find, as brought out in the passages already +quoted, that the most important type of group is at +once a kindred or family, an economic, a political, a religious, +and a moral unit. First, however, we notice briefly +the most important types of groups.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. KINSHIP AND HOUSEHOLD GROUPS</h4> + +<p><b>1. The Kinship Group.</b>—The kinship group is a body +of persons who conceive of themselves as sprung from one +ancestor, and hence as having in their veins one blood. +It does not matter for our study whether each group +has actually sprung from a single ancestor. It is highly +probable that the contingencies of food-supply or of war +may have been an original cause for the constitution of +the group, wholly or in part. But this is of no consequence +for our purpose. The important point is that +the members of the group regard themselves as of one +stock. In some cases the ancestor is believed to have been +an animal. Then we have the so-called totem group, +which is found among North American Indians, Africans, +and Australians, and was perhaps the early form of +Semitic groups. In other cases, some hero or even some +god is named as the ancestor. In any case the essential +part of the theory remains the same: namely, that one +blood circulates in all the members, and hence that the +life of each is a part of the common life of the group. +There are then no degrees of kindred. This group, it +should be noted, is not the same as the family, for in the +family, as a rule, husband and wife are of different kinship +groups, and continue their several kinship relations. +Among some peoples marriage ceremonies, indeed, symbolize +the admission of the wife into the husband's kinship, +and in this case the family becomes a kinship group, but +this is by no means universally the case.</p> + +<p>The feeling that one is first and foremost a member of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +a group, rather than an individual, is furthered among +certain kin groups by a scheme of class relationship. +According to this system, instead of having one definite +person whom I, and I alone, regard and address as father +or mother, grandfather, uncle, brother, sister, I call any +one of a given group or class of persons mother, grandfather, +brother, sister. And any one else who is in the +same class with me calls the same persons, mother, grandfather, +brother, or sister.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> The simplest form of such a +class system is that found among the Hawaiians. Here +there are five classes based upon the generations corresponding +to what we call grandparents, parents, brothers +and sisters, children, and grandchildren, but the words +used to designate them do not imply any such specific +parentage as do these words with us. Bearing this in +mind, we may say that every one in the first class is +equally grandparent to every one in the third; every one +in the third is equally brother or sister to every other in +the third, equally father or mother to every one in the +fourth, and so on. In Australia the classes are more +numerous and the relationships far more intricate and +complicated, but this does not, as might be supposed, render +the bond relatively unimportant; on the contrary, his +relationship to every other class is "one of the most +important points with which each individual must be +acquainted"; it determines marital relations, food distribution, +salutations, and general conduct to an extraordinary +degree. A kinship group was known as "tribe" +or "family" (English translation) among the Israelites;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> +as genos, phratria, and phyle among the Greeks, gens +and curia among the Romans; clan in Scotland; sept in +Ireland; Sippe in Germany.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Family or Household Group.</b>—Two kinds of +families may be noted as significant for our purpose. In +the <i>maternal family</i> the woman remains among her own +kin, and the children are naturally reckoned as belonging +to the mother's kin. The husband and father is more or +less a guest or outsider. In a blood feud he would have +to side with his own clan and against that of his wife +if his clan quarreled with hers. Clan and family are thus +seen to be distinct. In the <i>paternal</i>, which easily becomes +the <i>patriarchal</i> family the wife leaves her relatives to +live in her husband's house and among his kin. She might +then, as at Rome, abjure her own kindred and be formally +adopted into her husband's gens or clan. The Greek +myth of Orestes is an illustration of the clashing of these +two conceptions of father kin and mother kin, and Hamlet's +sparing of his mother under similar circumstances, +shows a more modern point of view.</p> + +<p>It is evident that with the prevalence of the paternal +type of family, clan and household ties will mutually +strengthen each other. This will make an important difference +in the father's relation to the children, and gives +a much firmer basis for ancestral religion. But in many +respects the environing atmosphere, the pressure and support, +the group sympathy and group tradition, are essentially +similar. The important thing is that every person +is a member of a kindred, and likewise, of some family +group, and that he thinks, feels, and acts accordingly.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 3. THE KINSHIP AND FAMILY GROUPS ARE ALSO ECONOMIC +AND INDUSTRIAL UNITS</h4> + +<p><b>1. The Land and the Group.</b>—In land, as a rule, no +individual ownership in the modern sense was recognized. +Among hunting and pastoral peoples there was, of course, +no "ownership" by any group in the strict sense of modern +law. But none the less, the group, large or small, had +its fairly well-defined territory within which it hunted +and fished; in the pastoral life it had its pasture range +and its wells of water. With agriculture a more definite +sense of possession arose. But possession was by +the tribe or gens or household, not by the individual:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The land belonged to the clan, and the clan was settled +upon the land. A man was thus not a member of the clan, +because he lived upon, or even owned, the land; but he lived +upon the land, and had interests in it, because he was a member +of the clan."<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p></div> + +<p>Greek and German customs were quoted at the outset. +Among the Celts the laws of ancient Ireland show a transitional +stage. "The land of the tribe consisted of two +distinct allotments, the 'fechfine' or tribeland, and the +'orta' or inheritance land. This latter belonged as individual +property to the men of the chieftain groups."<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The +Hindoo joint-family and the house-community of the +Southern Slavonians are present examples of group<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> +ownership. They are joint in food, worship, and estate. +They have a common home, a common table. Maxims of +the Slavs express their appreciation of community life: +"The common household waxes rich"; "The more bees in +the hive, the heavier it weighs." One difficulty in the English +administration of Ireland has been this radical difference +between the modern Englishman's individualistic +conception of property and the Irishman's more primitive +conception of group or clan ownership. Whether rightly +or not, the Irish tenant refuses to regard himself as merely +a tenant. He considers himself as a member of a family +or group which formerly owned the land, and he does +not admit the justice, even though he cannot disprove +the legality, of an alienation of the group possession. For +such a clan or household as we have described is not merely +equivalent to the persons who compose it at a given time. +Its property belongs to the ancestors and to the posterity +as well as to the present possessors; and hence in +some groups which admit an individual possession or use +during life, no right of devise or inheritance is permitted. +The property reverts at death to the whole gens or clan. +In other cases a child may inherit, but in default of such +an heir the property passes to the common possession. +The right to bequeath property to the church was long +a point on which civil law and canon law were at variance. +The relations of the primitive clan or household group to +land were therefore decidedly adapted to keep the individual's +good bound up with the good of the group.</p> + +<p><b>2. Movable Goods.</b>—In the case of movable goods, such +as tools, weapons, cattle, the practice is not uniform. +When the goods are the product of the individual's own +skill or prowess they are usually his. Tools, weapons, +slaves or women captured, products of some special craft +or skill, are thus usually private. But when the group +acts as a unit the product is usually shared. The buffalo +and salmon and large game were thus for the whole Indian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> +group which hunted or fished together; and in like manner +the maize which was tended by the women belonged to +the household in common. Slavic and Indian house communities +at the present day have a common interest in +the household property. Even women and children among +some tribes are regarded as the property of the group.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. THE KINSHIP AND FAMILY GROUPS WERE POLITICAL +BODIES</h4> + +<p>In a modern family the parents exercise a certain degree +of control over the children, but this is limited in several +respects. No parent is allowed to put a child to death, +or to permit him to grow up in ignorance. On the other +hand, the parent is not allowed to protect the child from +arrest if a serious injury has been done by him. The +<i>State</i>, through its laws and officers, is regarded by us as +the highest authority in a certain great sphere of action. +It must settle conflicting claims and protect life and property; +in the opinion of many it must organize the life of +its members where the coöperation of every member is +necessary for some common good. In early group life +there may or may not be some political body over and +above the clan or family, but in any case the <i>kin or family +is itself a sort of political State</i>. Not a State in the +sense that the political powers are deliberately separated +from personal, religious, and family ties; men gained a +new conception of authority and rose to a higher level +of possibilities when they consciously separated and defined +government and laws from the undifferentiated whole +of a religious and kindred group. But yet this primitive +group was after all a State, not a mob, or a voluntary +society, or a mere family; for (1) it was a more or less +permanently organized body; (2) it exercised control over +its members which they regarded as rightful authority, not +as mere force; (3) it was not limited by any higher author<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>ity, +and acted more or less effectively for the interest of the +whole. The representatives of this political aspect of the +group may be chiefs or sachems, a council of elders, or, as +in Rome, the House Father, whose <i>patria potestas</i> marks +the extreme development of the patriarchal family.</p> + +<p>The control exercised by the group over individual +members assumes various forms among the different peoples. +The more important aspects are a right over +life and bodily freedom, in some cases extending to power +of putting to death, maiming, chastising, deciding whether +newly born children shall be preserved or not; the right +of betrothal, which includes control over the marriage +portion received for its women; and the right to administer +property of the kin in behalf of the kin as a whole. +It is probable that among all these various forms of control, +the control over the marriage relations of women +has been most persistent. One reason for this control +may have been the fact that the group was bound to resent +injuries of a member of the group who had been married +to another. Hence this responsibility seemed naturally +to involve the right of decision as to her marriage.</p> + +<p><b>It is Membership in the Group Which Gives the Individual +Whatever Rights He Has.</b>—According to present +conceptions this is still largely true of legal rights. +A State may allow a citizen of another country to own +land, to sue in its courts, and will usually give him a +certain amount of protection, but the first-named rights +are apt to be limited, and it is only a few years since +Chief Justice Taney's dictum stated the existing legal +theory of the United States to be that the negro "had no +rights which the white man was bound to respect." Even +where legal theory does not recognize race or other distinctions, +it is often hard in practice for an alien to get +justice. In primitive clan or family groups this principle +is in full force. Justice is a privilege which falls to a +man as belonging to some group—not otherwise. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +member of the clan or the household or the village community +has a claim, but the stranger has no standing. +He may be treated kindly, as a guest, but he cannot demand +"justice" at the hands of any group but his own. +In this conception of rights within the group we have the +prototype of modern civil law. The dealing of clan +with clan is a matter of war or negotiation, not of law; +and the clanless man is an "outlaw" in fact as well as in +name.</p> + +<p><b>Joint Responsibility</b> and mutual support, as shown in +the blood feud, was a natural consequence of this fusion of +political and kindred relations. In modern life States +treat each other as wholes in certain respects. If some +member of a savage tribe assaults a citizen of one of the +civilized nations, the injured party invokes the help of +his government. A demand is usually made that the guilty +party be delivered up for trial and punishment. If he is +not forthcoming a "punitive expedition" is organized +against the whole tribe; guilty and innocent suffer alike. +Or in lieu of exterminating the offending tribe, in part or +completely, the nation of the injured man may accept +an indemnity in money or land from the offender's tribe. +Recent dealings between British and Africans, Germans +and Africans, France and Morocco, the United States +and the Filipinos, the Powers and China, illustrate this. +The State protects its own members against other States, +and avenges them upon other States. Each opposes a +united body to the other. The same principle carried out +through private citizens as public agents, and applied to +towns, is seen in the practice which prevailed in the Middle +Ages. "When merchants of one country had been defrauded +by those of another, or found it impossible to collect +a debt from them, the former country issued letters +of marque and reprisal, authorizing the plunder of any +citizens of the offending town until satisfaction should +be obtained." Transfer the situation to the early clan<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +or tribe, and this solidarity is increased because each member +is related to the rest by blood, as well as by national +unity. The Arabs do not say "The blood of M. or N. has +been spilt," naming the man; they say, "Our blood has +been spilt."<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> The whole group, therefore, feels injured +and regards every man in the offender's kin as more or +less responsible. The next of kin, the "avenger of blood," +stands first in duty and privilege, but the rest are all +involved in greater or less degree.</p> + +<p><b>Within the Group</b> each member will be treated more +or less fully as an individual. If he takes his kinsman's +wife or his kinsman's game he will be dealt with by the +authorities or by the public opinion of his group. He +will not indeed be put to death if he kills his kinsman, +but he will be hated, and may be driven out. "Since the +living kin is not killed for the sake of the dead kin, everybody +will hate to see him."<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> + +<p>When now a smaller group, like a family, is at the +same time a part of a larger group like a phratry or a +tribe, we have the phase of solidarity which is so puzzling +to the modern. We hold to solidarity in war or between +nations; but with a few exceptions<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> we have replaced it +by individual responsibility of adults for debts and crimes +so far as the civil law has jurisdiction. In earlier times +the higher group or authority treated the smaller as a +unit. Achan's family all perished with him. The Chinese +sense of justice recognized a series of degrees in responsibility +dependent on nearness of kin or of residence, or of +occupation. The Welsh system held kinsmen as far as +second cousins responsible for insult or injury short of +homicide, and as far as fifth cousins (seventh degree of +descent) for the payment in case of homicide. "The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +mutual responsibility of kinsmen for <i>saraal</i> and <i>galanas</i> +(the Wergild of the Germans), graduated according to +nearness of kin to the murdered man and to the criminal, +reveals more clearly than anything else the extent to +which the individual was bound by innumerable meshes to +his fixed place in the tribal community."<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> + + +<h4>§ 5. THE KINSHIP OR HOUSEHOLD GROUP WAS A RELIGIOUS +UNIT</h4> + +<p>The kinship or household group determined largely +both the ideas and the cultus of primitive religion; +conversely religion gave completeness, value, and sacredness +to the group life. Kinship with unseen powers or +persons was the fundamental religious idea. The kinship +group as a religious body <i>simply extended the kin to +include invisible as well as visible members</i>. The essential +feature of religion is not unseen beings who are feared, +or cajoled, or controlled by magic. It is rather <i>kindred</i> +unseen beings, who may be feared, but who are also reverenced +and loved. The kinship may be physical or spiritual, +but however conceived it makes gods and worshippers +members of one group.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> + +<p><b>1. Totem Groups.</b>—In totem groups, the prevailing +conception is that one blood circulates in all the members +of the group and that the ancestor of the whole group +is some object of nature, such as sun or moon, plant or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +animal. Perhaps the most interesting and intelligible account +of the relation between the animal ancestor and the +members of the group is that which has recently been +discovered in certain Australian tribes who believe that +every child, at its birth, is the reincarnation of some previous +member of the group, and that these ancestors were +an actual transformation of animals and plants, or of +water, fire, wind, sun, moon, or stars. Such totem groups +cherish that animal which they believe to be their ancestor +and ordinarily will not kill it or use it for food. The +various ceremonies of religious initiation are intended to +impress upon the younger members of the group the +sacredness of this kindred bond which units them to each +other and to their totem. The beginnings of decorative art +frequently express the importance of the symbol, and the +totem is felt to be as distinctly a member of the group as +is any of the human members.</p> + +<p><b>2. Ancestral Religion.</b>—At a somewhat higher stage +of civilization, and usually in connection with the patriarchal +households or groups in which kinship is reckoned +through the male line, the invisible members of the group +are the <i>departed ancestors</i>. This ancestor worship is a +power to-day in China and Japan, and in the tribes of +the Caucasus. The ancient Semites, Romans, Teutons, +Celts, Hindoos, all had their kindred gods of the household. +The Roman genius, lares, penates, and manes, perhaps the +Hebrew teraphim,—prized by Laban and Rachel, kept +by David, valued in the time of Hosea,—were loved and +honored side by side with other deities. Sometimes the +nature deities, such as Zeus or Jupiter, were incorporated +with the kinship or family gods. The Greek Hestia and +Roman Vesta symbolized the sacredness of the hearth. The +kinship tie thus determined for every member of the group +his religion.</p> + +<p><b>Religion Completes the Group.</b>—Conversely, this bond +of union with unseen, yet ever present and powerful kin<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>dred +spirits completed the group and gave to it its highest +authority, its fullest value, its deepest sacredness. If the +unseen kin are nature beings, they symbolize for man his +dependence upon nature and his kinship in some vague +fashion with the cosmic forces. If the gods are the +departed ancestors, they are then conceived as still potent, +like Father Anchises, to protect and guide the fortunes +of their offspring. The wisdom, courage, and affection, +as well as the power of the great heroes of the group, +live on. The fact that the gods are unseen enhances tremendously +their supposed power. The visible members of +the group may be strong, but their strength can be measured. +The living elders may be wise, yet they are not +far beyond the rest of the group. But the invisible beings +cannot be measured. The long-departed ancestor may +have inconceivable age and wisdom. The imagination has +free scope to magnify his power and invest him with all +the ideal values it can conceive. The religious bond is, +therefore, fitted to be the bearer, as the religious object +is the embodiment in concrete form, of the higher standards +of the group, and to furnish the sanction for their +enforcement or adoption.</p> + + +<h4>§ 6. GROUPS OR CLASSES ON THE BASIS OF AGE AND SEX</h4> + +<p>While the kindred and family groups are by far the +most important for early morality, other groupings are +significant. The division by ages is widespread. The +simplest scheme gives three classes: (1) children, (2) +young men and maidens, (3) married persons. Puberty +forms the bound between the first and second; marriage +that between the second and third. Distinct modes of +dress and ornament, frequently also different residences +and standards of conduct, belong to these several classes. +Of groups on the basis of sex, the <i>men's clubs</i> are espe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>cially +worthy of note. They flourish now chiefly in the +islands of the Pacific, but there are indications, such as +the common meals of the Spartans, of a wide spread among +European peoples in early times. The fundamental idea<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> +seems to be that of a common house for the unmarried +young men, where they eat, sleep, and pass their time, +whereas the women, children, and married men sleep and +eat in the family dwelling. But in most cases all the men +resort to the clubhouse by day. Strangers may be entertained +there. It thus forms a sort of general center for +the men's activities, and for the men's conversation. As +such, it is an important agency for forming and expressing +public opinion, and for impressing upon the young +men just entering the house the standards of the older +members. Further, in some cases these houses become the +center of rites to the dead, and thus add the impressiveness +of religious significance to their other activities.</p> + +<p>Finally, <i>secret societies</i> may be mentioned as a subdivision +of sex groups, for among primitive peoples such +societies are confined in almost all cases to the men. They +seem in many cases to have grown out of the age classes +already described. The transition from childhood to manhood, +mysterious in itself, was invested with further mysteries +by the old men who conducted the ceremonies of +initiation. Masks were worn, or the skulls of deceased +ancestors were employed, to give additional mystery and +sanctity. The increased power gained by secrecy would +often be itself sufficient to form a motive for such organization, +especially where they had some end in view not +approved by the dominant authorities. Sometimes they +exercise strict authority over their members, and assume +judicial and punitive functions, as in the Vehm of the +Middle Ages. Sometimes they become merely leagues of +enemies to society.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 7. MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KINDRED AND OTHER +GROUPS</h4> + +<p>The moral in this early stage is not to be looked for +as something distinct from the political, religious, kindred, +and sympathetic aspects of the clan, family, and other +groups. The question rather is, <i>How far are these very +political, religious, and other aspects implicitly moral</i>? +If by moral we mean a conscious testing of conduct by +an inner and self-imposed standard, if we mean a freely +chosen as contrasted with a habitual or customary standard, +then evidently we have the moral only in germ. For the +standards are group standards, rather than those of individual +conscience; they operate largely through habit +rather than through choice. Nevertheless they are not set +for the individual by outsiders. They are set by a group +of which he is a member. They are enforced by a group +<i>of which he is a member</i>. Conduct is praised or blamed, +punished or rewarded by the group of which he is a +member. Property is administered, industry is carried on, +wars and feuds prosecuted for the common good. What +the group does, each member joins in doing. It is a reciprocal +matter: A helps enforce a rule or impose a service +on B; he cannot help feeling it fair when the same rule +is applied to himself. He has to "play the game," and +usually he expects to play it as a matter of course. Each +member, therefore, is practicing certain acts, standing in +certain relations, maintaining certain attitudes, just because +he is one of the group which does these things and +maintains these standards. And he does not act in common +with the group without sharing in the group emotions. +It is a grotesque perversion to conceive the restraints of +gods and chiefs as purely external terrors. The primitive +group could enter into the spirit implied in the words +of the Athenian chorus, which required of an alien upon +adoption<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></p> + +<p class="poem"> +"To loathe whate'er our state does hateful hold,<br /> +To reverence what it loves."<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a><br /> +</p> + +<p class="noidt">The gregarious instinct may be the most elemental of +the impulses which bind the group together, but it is +reinforced by sympathies and sentiments growing out +of common life, common work, common danger, common +religion. The morality is already implicit, it needs only to +become conscious. The standards are embodied in the +old men or the gods; the rational good is in the inherited +wisdom; the respect for sex, for property rights, and for +the common good, is embodied in the system—but it is +there. Nor are the union and control a wholly objective +affair. "The corporate union was not a pretty religious +fancy with which to please the mind, but was so truly felt +that it formed an excellent basis from which the altruistic +sentiment might start. Gross selfishness was curbed, and +the turbulent passions were restrained by an impulse which +the man felt welling up within him, instinctive and unbidden. +Clannish camaraderie was thus of immense value +to the native races."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>The works of Hobhouse, Sumner, Westermarck contain copious +references to the original sources. Among the most valuable are:</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">For Savage People</span>: Waitz, <i>Anthropologie der Naturvölker</i>, 1859-72; +Tylor, <i>Primitive Culture</i>, 1903; Spencer and Gillen, <i>The Native Tribes +of Central Australia</i>, 1899, and <i>The Northern Tribes of Central +Australia</i>, 1904; Howitt and Fison, <i>Kamilaroi and Kurnai</i>, 1880; +Howitt, <i>The Native Tribes of S. E. Australia</i>, 1904; N. Thomas, +<i>Kinship, Organization and Group Marriages in Australia</i>, 1906; +Morgan, <i>Houses and House-life of the American Aborigines</i>, 1881, +<i>The League of the Iroquois</i>, 1851, <i>Systems of Consanguinity, Smithsonian +Contributions</i>, 1871, <i>Ancient Society</i>, 1877. Many papers in +the <i>Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology</i>, especially by Powell in 1st, +1879-80; Dorsey in 3rd, 1881-82, Mendeleff in 19th, 1893-94.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">For India, China, and Japan</span>: Lyall, <i>Asiatic Studies, Religious +and Social</i>, 1882; Gray, <i>China</i>, 1878; Smith, <i>Chinese Characteristics</i>, +1894; <i>Village Life in China</i>, 1899; Nitobé, <i>Bushido</i>, 1905; L. Hearn, +<i>Japan</i>, 1904.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">For Semitic and Indo-Germanic Peoples</span>: W. R. Smith, <i>Kinship +and Marriage in Early Arabia</i>, 1885; <i>The Religion of the Semites</i>, +1894; W. Hearn, <i>The Aryan Household</i>, 1879; Coulanges, <i>The Ancient +City</i>, 1873; Seebohm, <i>The Tribal System in Wales</i>, 1895, and <i>Tribal +Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law</i>, 1902; Krauss, <i>Sitte und Brauch der +Südslaven</i>, 1885.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">General</span>: Grosse, <i>Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der +Wirthschaft</i>, 1896; Starke, <i>The Primitive Family</i>, 1889; Maine, <i>Ancient +Law</i>, 1885; McLennan, <i>Studies in Ancient History</i>, 1886; Rivers, +<i>On the Origin of the Classificatory System of Relationships</i>, in Anthropological +Essays, presented to E. B. Tylor, 1907; Ratzel, <i>History +of Mankind</i>, 1896-98; Kovalevsky, <i>Tableau des origines et de l'Evolution +de la Famille et de la Propriété</i>, 1890; Giddings, <i>Principles of +Sociology</i>, 1896, pp. 157-168, 256-298; Thomas, <i>Relation of Sex to +Primitive Social Control</i> in Sex and Society, 1907; Webster, <i>Primitive +Secret Societies</i>, 1908; Simmel, <i>The Sociology of Secrecy and of +Secret Societies</i>, American Journal Sociology, Vol. XI., 1906, pp. +441-498. See also the references at close of Chapters VI., VII.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, <i>Aristotle und Athen</i>, II. 93, 47.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>History of Greece</i>, III., 55.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>The Ancient City</i>, p. 51.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Russian mirs, South Slavonian "joint" families, Corsican clans +with their vendettas, and tribes in the Caucasus still have the group +interest strong, and the feuds of the mountaineers in some of the +border states illustrate family solidarity.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> "In all the tribes with whom we are acquainted all the terms +coincide without any exception in the recognition of relationships, +all of which are dependent on the existence of a classificatory system, +the fundamental idea of which is that the women of certain groups +marry the men of others. Each tribe has one term applied indiscriminately +to the man or woman whom he actually marries and to +all whom he might lawfully marry, that is, who belong to the right +group: One term to his actual mother and to all the women whom +his father might lawfully have married."—<span class="smcap">Spencer</span> and <span class="smcap">Gillen</span>, +<i>Native Tribes of Central Australia</i>, p. 57.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The fact that primitive man is at once an individual and a member +of a group—that he has as it were two personalities or selves, +an individual self and a clan-self, or "tribal-self," as Clifford called +it,—is not merely a psychologist's way of stating things. The Kafir +people, according to their most recent student, Mr. Dudley Kidd, +have two distinct words to express these two selves. They call one +the <i>idhlozi</i> and other the <i>itongo</i>. "The <i>idhlozi</i> is the individual and +personal spirit born with each child—something fresh and unique +which is never shared with any one else—while the <i>itongo</i> is the ancestral +and corporate spirit which is not personal but tribal, or a thing +of the clan, the possession of which is obtained not by birth but by +certain initiatory rites. The <i>idhlozi</i> is personal and inalienable, +for it is wrapped up with the man's personality, and at death it +lives near the grave, or goes into the snake or totem of the clan; +but the <i>itongo</i> is of the clan, and haunts the living-hut; at death it +returns to the tribal <i>amatongo</i> (ancestral spirits). A man's share +in this clan-spirit (<i>itongo</i>) is lost when he becomes a Christian, or +when he is in any way unfaithful to the interests of the clan, but +a man never loses his <i>idhlozi</i> any more than he ever loses his +individuality."—<i>Savage Childhood</i>, pp. 14 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Hearn, <i>The Aryan Household</i>, p. 212.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> MacLennan, <i>Studies in Ancient History</i>, p. 381.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Robertson Smith, <i>Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia</i>, p. 23.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Cited from the Gwentian Code. Seebohm, <i>The Tribal System in +Wales</i>, p. 104.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> E.g., certain joint responsibilities of husband and wife.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Seebohm, <i>The Tribal System in Wales</i>, pp. 103 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> "From the earliest times, religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, +addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed +be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable +except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members +of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, +but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their +worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true +sense of the word begins."—<span class="smcap">Robertson Smith</span>, <i>Religion of the +Semites</i>, p. 54.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Schurtz, <i>Altersklassen und Männerbünde</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Œdipus at Colonus</i>, vv. 186 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Dudley Kidd, <i>Savage Childhood</i>, pp. 74 f.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER III</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE RATIONALIZING AND SOCIALIZING AGENCIES +IN EARLY SOCIETY</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. THREE LEVELS OF CONDUCT</h4> + +<p>A young man may enter a profession thinking of it +only as a means of support. But the work requires foresight +and persistence; it broadens his interests; it develops +his character. Like Saul, he has gone to search for +asses, he has found a kingdom. Or he may marry on the +basis of emotional attraction. But the sympathies evoked, +the coöperation made necessary, are refining and enlarging +his life. Both these cases illustrate agencies which +are moral in their results, although not carried on from +a consciously moral purpose.</p> + +<p>Suppose, however, that children are born into the family. +Then the parent consciously sets about controlling +their conduct, and in exercising authority almost inevitably +feels the need of some standard other than caprice +or selfishness. Suppose that in business the partners differ +as to their shares in the profits, then the question of +fairness is raised; and if one partner defaults, the question +of guilt. Or suppose the business encounters a law +which forbids certain operations, the problem of justice +will come to consciousness. Such situations as these are +evidently in the moral sphere in a sense in which those +of the preceding paragraph are not. They demand +some kind of judgment, some approval or disapproval. +As Aristotle says, it is not enough to do the acts; it is +necessary to do them in a certain way,—not merely to +get the result, but to intend it. The result must be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> +thought of as in some sense good or right; its opposite as +in some sense bad or wrong.</p> + +<p>But notice that the judgments in these cases may follow +either of two methods: (1) The parent or business +man may teach his child, or practice in business, what +tradition or the accepted standard calls for; or (2) he +may consider and examine the principles and motives +involved. Action by the first method is undoubtedly moral, +in one sense. It is judging according to a standard, though +it takes the standard for granted. Action by the second +method is moral in a more complete sense. It examines +the standard as well. The one is the method of "customary" +morality, the other that of reflective morality, +or of conscience in the proper sense.</p> + +<p><b>The Three Levels and Their Motives.</b>—We may distinguish +then three levels of conduct.</p> + +<p>1. Conduct arising from instincts and fundamental +needs. To satisfy these needs certain conduct is necessary, +and this in itself involves ways of acting which are +more or less rational and social. The conduct may be <i>in +accordance with</i> moral laws, though not directed by moral +judgments. We consider this level in the present chapter.</p> + +<p>2. Conduct regulated by <i>standards of society</i>, for some +more or less conscious end involving the social welfare. +The level of custom, which is treated in Chapter IV.</p> + +<p>3. Conduct regulated by a standard which is both +social and rational, which is examined and criticized. The +level of conscience. Progress toward this level is outlined +in Chapters V. to VIII.</p> + +<p>The motives in these levels will show a similar scale. +In (1) the motives are external to the end gained. The +man seeks food, or position, or glory, or sex gratification; +he is forced to practice sobriety, industry, courage, gentleness. +In (2) the motive is to seek some good which is +social, but the man acts for the group mainly because he is +<i>of</i> the group, and does not conceive his own good as dis<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>tinct +from that of the group. His acts are only in part +guided by intelligence; they are in part due to habit +or accident. (3) In full morality a man not only intends +his acts definitely, he also values them as what he can +do "with all his heart." He does them <i>because</i> they are +right and good. He chooses them freely and intelligently. +Our study of moral development will consider successively +these three levels. They all exist in present morality. +Only the first two are found in savage life. If (1) +existed alone it was before the group life, which is our +starting-point in this study. We return now to our consideration +of group life, and note the actual forces which +are at work. We wish to discover the process by which +the first and second levels prepare the way for the +third.</p> + +<p><b>The Necessary Activities of Existence Start the +Process.</b>—The prime necessities, if the individual is to +survive, are for food, shelter, defense against enemies. +If the stock is to survive, there must be also reproduction +and parental care. Further, it is an advantage in +the struggle if the individual can master and acquire, +can outstrip rivals, and can join forces with others of +his kind for common ends. To satisfy these needs we find +men in group life engaged in work, in war or blood feuds, +in games and festal activities, in parental care. They +are getting food and booty, making tools and houses, +conquering or enslaving their enemies, protecting the +young, winning trophies, and finding emotional excitement +in contests, dances, and songs. These all help in +the struggle for existence. But the workmen, warriors, +singers, parents, are getting more. They are forming +certain elements of character which, if not necessarily +moral in themselves, are yet indispensable requisites for +full morality. We may say therefore that nature is +doing this part of moral evolution, without the aid +of conscious intention on man's part. To use the terms<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +of Chapter I., we may call this a rationalizing and socializing +process, though not a conscious moral process. +We notice some of the more important agencies that are +operative.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. RATIONALIZING AGENCIES</h4> + +<p><b>1. Work.</b>—The earlier forms of occupation, hunting +and fishing, call for active intelligence, although the activity +is sustained to a great degree by the immediate +interest or thrill of excitement, which makes them a recreation +to the civilized man. Quickness of perception, alertness +of mind and body, and in some cases, physical daring, +are the qualities most needed. But in the pastoral life, +and still more with the beginning of agriculture and commerce, +the man who succeeds must have foresight and +continuity of purpose. He must control impulse by reason. +He must organize those habits which are the basis +of character, instead of yielding to the attractions of +various pleasures which might lead him from the main +purpose. To a certain extent the primitive communism +acted to prevent the individual from feeling the full +force of improvidence. Even if he does not secure a supply +of game, or have a large enough flock to provide for the +necessities of himself and his immediate family, the group +does not necessarily permit him to starve. The law +"Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap" does +not press upon him with such relentless grasp as in the +modern individualistic struggle for existence. Nevertheless +it would be an entirely mistaken view of primitive +group life to suppose that it is entirely a lazy man's +paradise, or happy-go-lucky existence. The varying economic +conditions are important here as measuring the +amount of forethought and care required. It is the +shepherd Jacob whose craft outwits Esau the hunter; and +while the sympathy of the modern may be with Esau, he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> +must remember that forethought like other valuable +weapons may be used in a social as well as a selfish fashion. +The early Greek appreciation of craft is probably expressed +in their deification of theft and deception in +Hermes. Agriculture and commerce, still more than preceding +types of occupation, demand thoughtfulness and +the long look ahead.</p> + +<p>The <i>differentiation of labor</i> has been a powerful influence +for increasing the range of mental life and stimulating +its development. If all do the same thing, all are +much alike, and inevitably remain on a low level. But +when the needs of men induce different kinds of work, +slumbering capacities are aroused and new ones are called +into being. The most deeply-rooted differentiation of +labor is that between the sexes. The woman performs +the work within or near the dwelling, the man hunts or +tends the flocks or ranges abroad. This probably tends +to accentuate further certain organic differences. Among +the men, group life in its simplest phases has little differentiation +except "for counsel" or "for war." But with +metal working and agricultural life the field widens. At +first the specializing is largely by families rather than +by individual choice. Castes of workmen may take the +place of mere kinship ties. Later on the rules of caste +in turn become a hindrance to individuality and must be +broken down if the individual is to emerge to full self-direction.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Arts and Crafts.</b>—Aside from their influence as +work, the arts and crafts have a distinctly elevating and +refining effect. The textiles, pottery, and skilfully made +tools and weapons; the huts or houses when artistically +constructed; the so-called free or fine arts of dance and +music, of color and design—all have this common element: +they give some visible or audible embodiment for order or +form. The artist or craftsman must make definite his +idea in order to work it out in cloth or clay, in wood<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> +or stone, in dance or song. When thus embodied, it is +preserved, at least for a time. It is part of the daily +environment of the society. Those who see or hear are +having constantly suggested to them ideas and values +which bring more meaning into life and elevate its interests. +Moreover, the order, the rational plan or arrangement +which is embodied in all well-wrought objects, as well +as in the fine arts in the narrow sense, deserves emphasis. +Plato and Schiller have seen in this a valuable preparation +for morality. To govern action by law is moral, but +it is too much to expect this of the savage and the child +as a conscious principle where the law opposes impulse. +In art as in play there is direct interest and pleasure in +the act, but in art there is also order or law. In conforming +to this order the savage, or the child, is in +training for the more conscious control where the law, +instead of favoring, may thwart or oppose impulse and +desire.</p> + +<p><b>3. War.</b>—War and the contests in games were serving +to work out characteristics which received also a definite social +reënforcement: namely, courage and efficiency, a sense +of power, a consciousness of achievement. All these, like +craft, may be used for unmoral or even immoral ends, +but they are also highly important as factors in an +effective moral personality.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. SOCIALIZING AGENCIES</h4> + +<p><b>Coöperation and Mutual Aid.</b><a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a>—Aside from their effects +in promoting intelligence, courage, and ideality of +life, industry, art, and war have a common factor by +which they all contribute powerfully to the social basis of +morality. They all require coöperation. They are socializing +as well as rationalizing agencies. Mutual aid is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +foundation of success. "Woe to him who stands alone, e'en +though his platter be never so full," runs the Slav proverb. +"He that belongs to no community is like unto one without +a hand." Those clans or groups which can work +together, and fight together, are stronger in the struggle +against nature and other men. The common activities +of art have value in making this community of action +more possible. Coöperation implies a common end. It +means that each is interested in the success of all. This +common end forms then a controlling rule of action, and +the mutual interest means sympathy. Coöperation is +therefore one of nature's most effective agencies for a +social standard and a social feeling.</p> + +<p><b>1. Coöperation in Industry.</b>—In industry, while there +was not in primitive life the extensive exchange of goods +which expresses the interdependence of modern men, there +was yet much concerted work, and there was a great +degree of community of property. In groups which lived +by hunting or fishing, for instance, although certain kinds +of game might be pursued by the individual hunter, the +great buffalo and deer hunts were organized by the tribe +as a whole. "A hunting bonfire was kindled every morning +at daybreak at which each brave must appear and +report. The man who failed to do this before the party +set out on the day's hunt was harassed by ridicule."<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> +Salmon fishery was also conducted as a joint undertaking. +Large game in Africa is hunted in a similar fashion, and +the product of the chase is not for the individual but for +the group. In the pastoral life the care of the flocks +and herds necessitates at least some sort of coöperation +to protect these flocks from the attacks of wild beasts and +from the more dreaded forays of human robbers. This +requires a considerable body of men, and the journeying +about in company, the sharing together of watch and +ward, the common interest in the increase of flocks and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> +herds, continually strengthens the bonds between the +dwellers in tents.</p> + +<p>In the agricultural stage there are still certain forces +at work which promote the family or tribal unity, although +here we begin to find the forces which make for individuality +at work until they result in individual ownership +and individual property. Just as at the pastoral +stage, so in this, the cattle and the growing grain must +be protected from attacks by man and beast. It is only +the group which can afford such protection, and accordingly +we find the Lowland farmer always at the mercy of +the Highland clan.</p> + +<p><b>2. Coöperation in War.</b>—War and the blood feud, +however divisive between groups, were none the less potent +as uniting factors within the several groups. The members +must not only unite or be wiped out, when the actual +contest was on, but the whole scheme of mutual help in +defense or in avenging injuries and insults made constant +demand upon fellow feeling, and sacrifice for the good +of all. To gain more land for the group, to acquire +booty for the group, to revenge a slight done to some +member of the group, were constant causes for war. +Now although any individual might be the gainer, yet +the chances were that he would himself suffer even +though the group should win. In the case of blood +revenge particularly, most of the group were not individually +interested. Their resentment was a "sympathetic +resentment," and one author has regarded this as perhaps +the most fundamental of the sources of moral emotion. +It was because the tribal blood had been shed, or the +women of the clan insulted, that the group as a whole +reacted, and in the clash of battle with opposing groups, +was closer knit together.</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"Ally thyself with whom thou wilt in peace, yet know<br /> +In war must every man be foe who is not kin."<br /> +</p> + +<p class="noidt">"Comrades in arms" by the very act of fighting together<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +have a common cause, and by the mutual help and protection +given and received become, for the time at least, one +in will and one in heart. Ulysses counsels Agamemnon +to marshal his Greeks, clan by clan and "brotherhood +(phratry) by brotherhood," that thus brother may support +and stimulate brother more effectively; but the effect +is reciprocal, and it is indeed very probable that the +unity of blood which is believed to be the tie binding +together the members of the group, is often an afterthought +or pious fiction designed to account for the +unity which was really due originally to the stress of common +struggle.</p> + +<p><b>3. Art as Socializing Agency.</b>—Coöperation and sympathy +are fostered by the activities of art. Some of these +activities are spontaneous, but most of them serve some +definite social end and are frequently organized for the +definite purpose of increasing the unity and sympathy of +the group. The hunting dance or the war dance represents, +in dramatic form, all the processes of the hunt or +fight, but it would be a mistake to suppose that this takes +place purely for dramatic purposes. The dance and celebration +after the chase or battle may give to the whole +tribe the opportunity to repeat in vivid imagination the +triumphs of the successful hunter or warrior, and thus +to feel the thrill of victory and exult in common over +the fallen prey. The dance which takes place before +the event is designed to give magical power to the hunter +or warrior. Every detail is performed with the most exact +care and the whole tribe is thus enabled to share in the +work of preparation.</p> + +<p>In the act of song the same uniting force is present. +To sing with another involves a contagious sympathy, +in perhaps a higher degree than is the case with any +other art. There is, in the first place, as in the dance, +a unity of rhythm. Rhythm is based upon coöperation +and, in turn, immensely strengthens the possibility of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> +coöperation. In the bas-reliefs upon the Egyptian monuments +representing the work of a large number of men +who are moving a stone, we find the sculptured figure of a +man who is beating the time for the combined efforts. +Whether all rhythm has come from the necessities of common +action or whether it has a physiological basis sufficient +to account for the effect which rhythmic action produces, +in any case when a company of people begin to +work or dance or sing in rhythmic movement, their efficiency +and their pleasure are immensely increased. In +addition to the effect of rhythm we have also in the +case of song the effect of unity of pitch and of melody, +and the members of the tribe or clan, like those who to-day +sing the Marseillaise or chant the great anthems of the +church, feel in the strongest degree their mutual sympathy +and support. For this reason, the Corroborees +of the Australian, the sacred festivals of Israel, the +Mysteries and public festivals of the Greeks, in short, +among all peoples, the common gatherings of the tribe for +patriotic or religious purposes, have been attended with +dance and song. In many cases these carry the members +on to a pitch of enthusiasm where they are ready to die +for the common cause.</p> + +<p>Melodic and rhythmic sound is a unifying force simply +by reason of form, and some of the simpler songs seem +to have little else to commend them, but at very early +periods there is not merely the song but the recital, in +more or less rhythmic or literary form, of the history +of the tribe and the deeds of the ancestors. This adds +still another to the unifying forces of the dance and song. +The kindred group, as they hear the recital, live over +together the history of the group, thrill with pride at +its glories, suffer at its defeats; every member feels that +the clan's history is his history and the clan's blood his +blood.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 4. FAMILY LIFE AS AN IDEALIZING AND SOCIALIZING +AGENCY</h4> + +<p>Family life, so far as it is merely on the basis of instinct, +takes its place with other agencies favored by +natural selection which make for more rational and social +existence. Various instincts are more or less at work. +The sex instinct brings the man and the woman together. +The instinct of jealousy, and the property or possessing +instinct, may foster exclusive and permanent relations. +The parental instinct and affection bind the parents together +and thus contribute to the formation of the social +group described in the preceding chapter. Considering +now the more immediate relations of husband and wife, +parents and children, rather than the more general group +relations, we call attention to some of the most obvious +aspects, leaving fuller treatment for Part III. The +idealizing influences of the sex instinct, when this is subject +to the general influences found in group life, is +familiar. Lyric song is a higher form of its manifestation, +but even a mute lover may be stimulated to fine +thoughts or brave deeds. Courtship further implies an +adaptation, an effort to please, which is a strong socializing +force. If "all the world loves a lover," it must be +because the lover is on the whole a likable rôle. But +other forces come in. Sex love is intense, but so far as +it is purely instinctive it may be transitory. Family life +needed more permanence than sex attraction could provide, +and before the powerful sanctions of religion, society, +and morals were sufficient to secure permanence, it is +probable that the property interest of the husband was +largely effective in building up a family life, requiring +fidelity to the married relation on the part of the wife.</p> + +<p>But the most far-reaching of the forces at work in +the family has been the parental instinct and affection +with its consequences upon both parents and children. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> +contributes probably more than any other naturally +selected agency to the development of the race in sympathy; +it shares with work in the development of responsibility. +It is indeed one of the great incentives to industry +throughout the higher species of animals as well as in +human life. The value of parental care in the struggle +for existence is impressively presented by Sutherland.<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> +Whereas the fishes which exercise no care for their eggs +preserve their species only by producing these in enormous +numbers, certain species which care for them maintain +their existence by producing relatively few. Many species +produce hundreds of thousands or even millions of eggs. +The stickleback, which constructs a nest and guards the +young for a few days, is one of the most numerous of +fishes, but it lays only from twenty to ninety eggs. Birds +and mammals with increased parental care produce few +young. Not only is parental care a valuable asset, it is +an absolute necessity for the production of the higher +species. "In the fierce competition of the animated forms +of earth, the loftier type, with its prolonged nervous +growth, and consequently augmented period of helplessness, +can never arise but with concomitant increases of +parental care." Only as the emotional tendency has kept +pace with the nerve development has the human race been +possible. The very refinements in the organism which +make the adult a victor would render the infant a victim +if it were without an abundance of loving assistance.<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> + +<p>Whether, as has been supposed by some, the parental +care has also been the most effective force in keeping the +parents together through a lengthened infancy, or whether +other factors have been more effective in this particular, +there is no need to enlarge upon the wide-reaching moral +values of parental affection. It is the atmosphere in which +the child begins his experience. So far as any environ<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span>ment +can affect him, this is a constant influence for sympathy +and kindness. And upon the parents themselves +its transforming power, in making life serious, in overcoming +selfishness, in projecting thought and hope on +into the future, cannot be measured. The moral order +and progress of the world might conceivably spare some +of the agencies which man has devised; it could not spare +this.</p> + + +<h4>§ 5. MORAL INTERPRETATION OF THIS FIRST LEVEL</h4> + +<p>On this first level we are evidently dealing with forces +and conduct, not as moral in purpose, but as valuable +in result. They make a more rational, ideal, and social +life, and this is the necessary basis for more conscious +control and valuation of conduct. The forces are biological +or sociological or psychological. They are not +that particular kind of psychological activities which +we call moral in the proper sense, for this implies not only +getting a good result but aiming at it. Some of the +activities, such as those of song and dance, or the simpler +acts of maternal care, have a large instinctive element. +We cannot call these moral in <i>so far as</i> they are purely +instinctive. Others imply a large amount of intelligence, +as, for example, the operations of agriculture and the +various crafts. These have purpose, such as to satisfy +hunger, or to forge a weapon against an enemy. But the +end is one set up by our physical or instinctive nature. +So long as this is merely <i>accepted</i> as an end, and not +compared with others, valued, and <i>chosen</i>, it is not +properly moral.</p> + +<p>The same is true of emotions. There are certain emotions +on the instinctive level. Such are parental love in +its most elemental form, sympathy as mere contagious +feeling, anger, or resentment. So far as these are at this +lowest level, so far as they signify simply a bodily thrill,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +they have no claim to proper moral value. They are tremendously +important as the source from which strong +motive forces of benevolence, intelligent parental care, and +an ardent energy against evil may draw warmth and fire.</p> + +<p>Finally, even the coöperation, the mutual aid, which +men give, so far as it is called out purely by common +danger, or common advantage, is not in the moral sphere +in so far as it is instinctive, or merely give and take. +To be genuinely moral there must be some thought of +the danger as touching others and <i>therefore</i> requiring our +aid; of the advantage as being common and <i>therefore</i> +enlisting our help.</p> + +<p>But even although these processes are not consciously +moral they are nevertheless fundamental. The activities +necessary for existence, and the emotions so intimately +bound up with them, are the "cosmic roots" of the moral +life. And often in the higher stages of culture, when +the codes and instruction of morality and society fail +to secure right conduct, these elementary agencies of +work, coöperation, and family life assert their power. +Society and morality take up the direction of the process +and carry it further, but they must always rely largely +on these primary activities to afford the basis for intelligent, +reliable, and sympathetic conduct.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Bagehot, <i>Physics and Politics</i>, 1890; Bücher, <i>Industrial Evolution</i>, +Eng. tr., 1901, <i>Arbeit und Rythmus</i>, 3rd ed., 1901; Schurtz, <i>Urgeschichte +der Kultur</i>, 1900; Fiske, <i>Cosmic Philosophy</i>, Vol. II., <i>The +Cosmic Roots of Love and Self-sacrifice</i> in Through Nature to God, +1899; Dewey, <i>Interpretation of the Savage Mind</i>, Psychological Review, +Vol. IX., 1892, pp. 217-230; Durkheim, <i>De la Division du +Travail Social</i>, 1893; P. Kropotkin, <i>Mutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution</i>, +1902; <span class="smcap">Ross</span>, <i>Foundations of Society</i>, 1905, Chap. VII.; Baldwin, +Article <i>Socionomic Forces</i> in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology; +Giddings, <i>Inductive Sociology</i>, 1901; Small, <i>General Sociology</i>, +1906; Tarde, <i>Les Lois de l'Imitation</i>, 1895; W. I. Thomas, <i>Sex +and Society</i>, 1907, pp. 55-172; Gummere, <i>The Beginnings of Poetry</i>, +1901; Hirn, <i>The Origin of Art</i>, 1900.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> P. Kropotkin, <i>Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution</i>; Bagehot, +<i>Physics and Politics</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Eastman, <i>Indian Boyhood</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct</i>, Chs. II.-V.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 99.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER IV</small> + +<br /><br /> + +GROUP MORALITY—CUSTOMS OR MORES</h2> + + +<p>We have seen how the natural forces of instinct +lead to activities which elevate men and knit them together. +We consider next the means which society +uses for these purposes, and the kind of conduct which +goes along with the early forms of society's agencies. +The organization of early society is that of group life, +and so far as the individual is merged in the group the +type of conduct may be called "group morality." +Inasmuch as the agencies by which the group controls its +members are largely those of custom, the morality may be +called also "customary morality." Such conduct is what +we called at the opening of the previous chapter "the second +level." It is "ethical" or "moral" in the sense of conforming +to the <i>ethos</i> or <i>mores</i> of the group.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. MEANING, AUTHORITY, AND ORIGIN OF CUSTOMS</h4> + +<p><b>Meaning of Customs or Mores.</b>—Wherever we find +groups of men living as outlined in Chapter II., we find +that there are certain ways of acting which are common +to the group—"folkways." Some of these may be due +merely to the fact that the members are born of the same +stock, just as all ducks swim. But a large part of human +conduct, in savage as truly as in civilized life, is not merely +instinctive. There are <i>approved</i> ways of acting, common +to a group, and handed down from generation to generation. +Such approved ways of doing and acting are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> +customs, or to use the Latin term, which Professor Sumner +thinks brings out more clearly this factor of approval, +they are <i>mores</i>.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> They are habits—but they are more. +They imply the judgment of the group that they are to +be followed. The welfare of the group is regarded as in +some sense imbedded in them. If any one acts contrary +to them he is made to feel the group's disapproval. The +young are carefully trained to observe them. At times +of special importance, they are rehearsed with special +solemnity.</p> + +<p><b>Authority Behind the Mores.</b>—The old men, or the +priests, or medicine men, or chiefs, or old women, may +be the especial guardians of these customs. They may +modify details, or add new customs, or invent explanations +for old ones. But the authority back of them is the +group in the full sense. Not the group composed merely +of visible and living members, but the larger group which +includes the dead, and the kindred totemic or ancestral +gods. Nor is it the group considered as a collection of +individual persons. It is rather in a vague way the whole +mental and social world. The fact that most of the customs +have no known date or origin makes them seem a part +of the nature of things. Indeed there is more than a +mere analogy between the primitive regard for custom +and that respect for "Nature" which from the Stoics to +Spencer has sought a moral standard in living "according +to nature." And there is this much in favor of taking the +world of custom as the standard: the beings of this system +are like the person who is expected to behave like them; +its rules are the ways in which his own kin have lived and +prospered, and not primarily the laws of cosmic forces, +plants, and animals.</p> + +<p><b>Origin of Customs; Luck.</b>—The origin of customs is +to be sought in several concurrent factors. There are in +the first place the activities induced by the great primi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>tive +needs and instincts. Some ways of acting succeed; +some fail. Man not only establishes habits of acting in +the successful ways; he remembers his failures. He hands +successful ways down with his approval; he condemns those +that fail.</p> + +<p>This attitude is reënforced by the views about good luck +and bad luck. Primitive man—and civilized man—is not +ruled by a purely rational theory of success and failure. +"One might use the best known means with the greatest +care, yet fail of the result. On the other hand, one might +get a great result with no effort at all. One might +also incur a calamity without any fault of his own."<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> +"Grimm gives more than a thousand ancient German +apothegms, dicta, and proverbs about 'luck.'"<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Both +good and bad fortune are attributed to the unseen powers, +hence a case of bad luck is not thought of as a mere +chance. If the ship that sailed Friday meets a storm, +or one of thirteen falls sick, the inference is that this is +sure to happen again. And at this point the conception +of the group welfare as bound up with the acts of every +member, comes in to make individual conformity a matter +for group concern—to make conduct a matter of mores and +not merely a private affair. One most important, if not +the most important, object of early legislation was the +enforcement of lucky rites to prevent the individual from +doing what might bring ill luck on all the tribe. For +the conception always was that the ill luck does not +attach itself simply to the doer, but may fall upon any +member of the group. "The act of one member is conceived +to make all the tribe impious, to offend its particular +god, to expose all the tribe to penalties from heaven. +When the street statues of Hermes were mutilated, all the +Athenians were frightened and furious; they thought they +should all be ruined because some one had mutilated a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +god's image and so offended him."<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> "The children were +reproved for cutting and burning embers, on the ground +that this might be the cause for the accidental cutting +of some member of the family."<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> In the third place, besides +these sources of custom, in the usefulness or lucky +character of certain acts, there is also the more immediate +reaction of individuals or groups to certain ways of acting +according "as things jump with the feelings or displease +them."<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> An act of daring is applauded, whether +useful or not. The individual judgment is caught up, repeated, +and plays its part in the formation of group opinion. +"Individual impulse and social tradition are thus +the two poles between which we move." Or there may even +be a more conscious discussion analogous to the action of +legislatures or philosophic discussion. The old men among +the Australians deliberate carefully as to each step of the +initiation ceremonies. They make customs to be handed +down.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. MEANS OF ENFORCING CUSTOMS</h4> + +<p>The most general means for enforcing customs are public +opinion, taboos, ritual or ceremony, and physical force.</p> + +<p><b>Public Approval</b> uses both language and form to express +its judgments. Its praise is likely to be emphasized +by some form of art. The songs that greet the returning +victor, the decorations, costumes, and tattoos for those +who are honored, serve to voice the general sentiment. On +the other hand ridicule or contempt is a sufficient penalty +to enforce compliance with many customs that may be +personally irksome. It is very largely the ridicule of the +men's house which enforces certain customs among the men +of peoples which have that institution. It is the ridicule or +scorn of both men and women which forbids the Indian to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> +marry before he has proved his manhood by some notable +deed of prowess in war or chase.</p> + +<p><b>Taboos.</b>—Taboos are perhaps not so much a means for +enforcing custom, as they are themselves customs invested +with peculiar and awful sanction. They prohibit or ban +any contact with certain persons or objects under penalty +of danger from unseen beings. Any events supposed +to indicate the activity of spirits, such as birth and death, +are likely to be sanctified by taboos. The danger is contagious; +if a Polynesian chief is taboo, the ordinary man +fears even to touch his footprints. But the taboos are +not all based on mere dread of the unseen.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"They include such acts as have been found by experience +to produce unwelcome results.—The primitive taboos correspond +to the fact that the life of man is environed by perils: +His food quest must be limited by shunning poisonous plants. +His appetite must be restrained from excess. His physical +strength and health must be guarded from dangers. The +taboos carry on the accumulated wisdom of generations which +has almost always been purchased by pain, loss, disease, and +death. Other taboos contain inhibitions of what will be injurious +to the group. The laws about the sexes, about property, +about war, and about ghosts, have this character. They +always include some social philosophy." (<span class="smcap">Sumner</span>, <i>Folkways</i>, +pp. 33 f.)</p></div> + +<p>They may be used with conscious purpose. In order +to have a supply of cocoanuts for a religious festival +the head men may place a taboo upon the young cocoanuts +to prevent them from being consumed before they +are fully ripe. The conception works in certain respects +to supply the purpose which is later subserved by ideas +of property. But it serves also as a powerful agency to +maintain respect for the authority of the group.</p> + +<p><b>Ritual.</b>—As taboo is the great negative guardian of +customs, ritual is the great positive agent. It works by +forming habits, and operates through associations formed +by actually doing certain acts, usually under conditions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> +which appeal to the emotions. The charm of music and of +orderly movement, the impressiveness of ordered masses +in processions, the awe of mystery, all contribute to stamp +in the meaning and value. Praise or blame encourages +or inhibits; ritual secures the actual doing and at the +same time gives a value to the doing. It is employed by +civilized peoples more in the case of military or athletic +drill, or in training children to observe forms of etiquette, +so that these may become "second nature." Certain religious +bodies also use its agency. But in primitive life +it is widely and effectively used to insure for educational, +political, and domestic customs obedience to the group +standards, which among us it secures to the codes of the +army, or to those of social etiquette. Examples of its +elaborate and impressive use will be given below under +educational ceremonies.</p> + +<p><b>Physical Force.</b>—When neither group opinion, nor +taboo, nor ritual secures conformity, there is always in +the background physical force. The chiefs are generally +men of strength whose word may not be lightly disregarded. +Sometimes, as among the Sioux, the older braves +constitute a sort of police. Between different clans the +blood feud is the accepted method of enforcing custom, +unless a substitute, the wergeld, is provided. For homicide +within a clan the remaining members may drive the +slayer out, and whoever meets such a Cain may slay him. +If a man murdered his chief of kindred among the ancient +Welsh he was banished and "it was required of every +one of every sex and age within hearing of the horn +to follow that exile and to keep up the barking of dogs, +to the time of his putting to sea, until he shall have passed +three score hours out of sight."<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> It should be borne in +mind, however, that physical pains, either actual or +dreaded, would go but a little way toward maintaining +authority in any such group as we have regarded as typi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>cal. +Absolutism, with all its cruel methods of enforcing +terror, needs a more highly organized system. In primitive +groups the great majority support the authority of +the group as a matter of course, and uphold it as a sacred +duty when it is challenged. Physical coercion is not the +rule but the exception.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. CONDITIONS WHICH BRING OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF +GROUP STANDARDS AND RENDER GROUP CONTROL +CONSCIOUS</h4> + +<p>Although customs or mores have in them an element of +social approval which makes them vehicles of moral judgment, +they tend in many cases to sink to the level of mere +habits. The reason—such as it was—for their original +force—is forgotten. They become, like many of our +forms of etiquette, mere conventions. There are, however, +certain conditions which center attention upon their importance +and lift them to the level of conscious agencies. +These conditions may be grouped under three heads. (1) +The education of the younger, immature members of the +group and their preparation for full membership. (2) +The constraint and restraint of refractory members and +the adjustment of conflicting interests. (3) Occasions +which involve some notable danger or crisis and therefore +call for the greatest attention to secure the favor of the +gods and avert disaster.</p> + +<p><b>1. Educational Customs.</b>—Among the most striking +and significant of these are the initiation ceremonies which +are so widely observed among primitive peoples. They +are held with the purpose of inducting boys into the privileges +of manhood and into the full life of the group. They +are calculated at every step to impress upon the initiate +his own ignorance and helplessness in contrast with the +wisdom and power of the group; and as the mystery with +which they are conducted imposes reverence for the elders<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +and the authorities of the group, so the recital of the +traditions and performances of the tribe, the long series +of ritual acts, common participation in the mystic dance +and song and decorations, serve to reënforce the ties that +bind the tribe.</p> + +<p>Initiation into the full privileges of manhood among the +tribes of Central Australia, for instance, includes three +sets of ceremonies which occupy weeks, and even months, +for their completion. The first set, called "throwing up +in the air," is performed for the boy when he has reached +the age of from ten to twelve. In connection with being +thrown up in the air by certain prescribed members of +his tribe, he is decorated with various totem emblems and +afterward the septum of his nose is bored for the insertion +of the nose-bone. At a period some three or four years +later a larger and more formidable series of ceremonies is +undertaken, lasting for ten days. A screen of bushes is +built, behind which the boy is kept during the whole period, +unless he is brought out on the ceremonial ground to witness +some performance. During this whole period of +ten days, he is forbidden to speak except in answer to +questions. He is decorated with various totem emblems, +for which every detail is prescribed by the council of the +tribal fathers and tribal elder brothers. He is charged to +obey every command and never to tell any woman or boy +what he may see. The sense that something out of the +ordinary is to happen to him helps to impress him strongly +with a feeling of the deep importance of compliance with +the tribal rules, and further still, with a strong sense of +the superiority of the older men who know and are familiar +with the mysterious rites of which he is about to learn the +meaning for the first time. At intervals he watches symbolic +performances of men decorated like various totem +animals, who represent the doings of the animal ancestors +of the clan; he hears mysterious sounds of the so-called +bull-roarers, which are supposed by the women and un<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>initiated +to be due to unseen spirits; and the whole ends +with the operation which symbolizes his induction into +young manhood. But even this is not all; when the young +man has reached the age of discretion, when it is felt that +he can fully comprehend the traditions of the tribe, at the +age of from twenty to twenty-five, a still more impressive +series of ceremonies is conducted, which in the instance reported +lasted from September to January. This period +was filled up with dances, "corroborees," and inspection +of the churinga or sacred emblems—stones or sticks which +were supposed to be the dwellings of ancestral spirits and +which are carefully preserved in the tribe, guarded from +the sight of women and boys, but known individually +to the elders as the sacred dwelling-place of father or +grandfather. As these were shown and passed around, +great solemnity was manifest and the relatives sometimes +wept at the sight of the sacred object. Ceremonies imitating +various totem animals, frequently of the most elaborate +sort, were also performed. The young men were +told the traditions of the past history of the tribe, and +at the close of the recital they felt added reverence for the +old men who had been their instructors, a sense of pride in +the possession of this mysterious knowledge, and a deeper +unity because of what they now have in common. One is +at a loss whether to wonder most at the possibility of the +whole tribe devoting itself for three months to these elaborate +functions of initiation, or at the marvelous adaptability +of such ceremonies to train the young into an +attitude of docility and reverence. A tribe that can enforce +such a process is not likely to be wanting in one +side, at least, of the moral consciousness, namely, reverence +for authority and regard for the social welfare.<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> + +<p><b>2. Law and Justice.</b>—The occasions for some control +over refractory members will constantly arise, even though<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> +the conflict between group and individual may need no +physical sanctions to enforce the authority of the group +over its members. The economic motive frequently prompts +an individual to leave the tribe or the joint family. +There was a constant tendency, Eastman states, among +his people, when on a hunting expedition in the enemy's +country, to break up into smaller parties to obtain food +more easily and freely. The police did all they could +to keep in check those parties who were intent on stealing +away. Another illustration of the same tendency is +stated by Maine with reference to the joint families of +the South Slavonians:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The adventurous and energetic member of the brotherhood +is always rebelling against its natural communism. He +goes abroad and makes his fortune, and as strenuously resists +the demands of his relatives to bring it into the common account. +Or perhaps he thinks that his share of the common +stock would be more profitably employed by him as capital +in a mercantile venture. In either case he becomes a dissatisfied +member or a declared enemy of the brotherhood."<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p></div> + +<p>Or covetousness might lead to violation of the ban, +as with Achan. Sex impulse may lead a man to seek for +his wife a woman not in the lawful group. Or, as one of +the most dangerous offenses possible, a member of the +group may be supposed to practice witchcraft. This is +to use invisible powers in a selfish manner, and has been +feared and punished by almost all peoples.</p> + +<p>In all these cases it is of course no abstract theory of +crime which leads the community to react; it is self-preservation. +The tribe must be kept together for protection +against enemies. Achan's sin is felt to be the cause +of defeat. The violation of sex taboos may ruin the +clan. The sorcerer may cause disease, or inflict torture +and death, or bring a pestilence or famine upon the whole +group. None the less all such cases bring to conscious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>ness +one aspect of moral authority, the social control over +the individual.</p> + +<p>And it is a <i>social</i> control—not an exercise of brute force +or a mere terrorizing by ghosts. For the chief or judge +generally wins his authority by his powerful service to +his tribesmen. A Gideon or Barak or Ehud or Jephthah +judged Israel because he had delivered them. "Three +things, if possessed by a man, make him fit to be a chief +of kindred: That he should speak on behalf of his kin +and be listened to, that he should fight on behalf of his +kin and be feared, and that he should be security on behalf +of his kin and be accepted."<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> If, as is often the case, the +king or judge or chief regards himself as acting by divine +right, the authority is still <i>within the group</i>. It is the +group judging itself.</p> + +<p>In its <i>standards</i> this primitive court is naturally on the +level of customary morality, of which it is an agent. +There is usually neither the conception of a general principle +of justice (our Common Law), nor of a positive law +enacted as the express will of the people. At first the +judge or ruler may not act by any fixed law except that +of upholding the customs. Each decision is then a special +case. A step in advance is found when the heads or +elders or priests of the tribe decide cases, not independently +of all others, but in accordance with certain precedents or +customs. A legal tradition is thus established, which, +however imperfect, is likely to be more impartial than the +arbitrary caprice of the moment, influenced as such special +decisions are likely to be by the rank or power of the +parties concerned.<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> A law of precedents or tradition is +thus the normal method at this level. The progress toward +a more rational standard belongs under the next +chapter, but it is interesting to note that even at an +early age the myths show a conception of a divine judge<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +who is righteous, and a divine judgment which is ideal. +Rhadamanthus is an embodiment of the demand for justice +which human collisions and decisions awakened.</p> + +<p>The conscious authority of the group is also evoked in +the case of feuds or disputes between its members. The case +of the blood feud, indeed, might well be treated as belonging +under war and international law rather than as a case +of private conflict. For so far as the members of the +victim's clan are concerned, it is a case of war. It is +a patriotic duty of every kinsman to avenge the shed +blood. The groups concerned were smaller than modern +nations which go to war for similar reasons, but the principle +is the same. The chief difference in favor of modern +international wars is that since the groups are larger +they do not fight so often and require a more serious +consideration of the possibility of peaceable adjustment. +Orestes and Hamlet feel it a sacred duty to avenge their +fathers' murders.</p> + +<p>But the case is not simply that of clan against clan. +For the smaller group of kin, who are bound to avenge, +are nearly always part of a larger group. And the larger +group may at once recognize the duty of vengeance and +also the need of keeping it within bounds, or of substituting +other practices. The larger group may see in the +murder a pollution, dangerous to all;<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> the blood which +"cries from the ground"<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> renders the ground "unclean" +and the curse of gods or the spirits of the dead may +work woe upon the whole region. But an unending blood +feud is likewise an evil. And if the injured kin can be appeased +by less than blood in return, so much the better. +Hence the wergeld, or indemnity, a custom which persisted +among the Irish until late, and seemed to the English +judges a scandalous procedure.</p> + +<p>For lesser offenses a sort of regulated duel is sometimes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> +allowed. For example, among the Australians the incident +is related of the treatment of a man who had eloped +with his neighbor's wife. When the recreant parties returned +the old men considered what should be done, and +finally arranged the following penalty. The offender +stood and called out to the injured husband, "I stole your +woman; come and growl." The husband then proceeded to +throw a spear at him from a distance, and afterwards to +attack him with a knife, although he did not attempt to +wound him in a vital part. The offender was allowed +to evade injury, though not to resent the attack. Finally +the old men said, "Enough." A curious form of private +agencies for securing justice is also found in the Japanese +custom of hara-kiri, according to which an injured man +kills himself before the door of his offender, in order that +he may bring public odium upon the man who has injured +him. An Indian custom of Dharna is of similar significance, +though less violent. The creditor fasts before the +door of the debtor until he either is paid, or dies of starvation. +It may be that he thinks that his double or spirit +will haunt the cruel debtor who has thus permitted him +to starve to death, but it also has the effect of bringing +public opinion to bear.</p> + +<p>In all these cases of kindred feuds there is little +personal responsibility, and likewise little distinction between +the accidental and intentional. These facts are +brought out in the opening quotations in Chapter II. The +important thing for the student to observe is that like +our present practices in international affairs they show a +<i>grade</i> of morality, a limited social unity, whether it is +called kinship feeling or patriotism; complete morality is +not possible so long as there is no complete way of settling +disputes by justice instead of force.<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>3. Occasions Which Involve Some Special Danger or +Crisis.</b>—Such occasions call for the greatest attention +to secure success or avoid disaster. Under this head we +note as typical (a) the occasions of birth, marriage, +death; (b) seed time and harvest, or other seasons important +for the maintenance of the group; (c) war; (d) +hospitality.</p> + +<p><b>(a) Birth and Death Customs.</b>—The entrance of a +new life into the world and the disappearance of the animating +breath (<i>spiritus</i>, <i>anima</i>, <i>psyche</i>), might well impress +man with the mysteries of his world. Whether the +newborn infant is regarded as a reincarnation of an +ancestral spirit as with the Australians, or as a new creation +from the spirit world as with the Kafirs, it is a time +of danger. The mother must be "purified,"<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> the child, +and in some cases the father, must be carefully guarded. +The elaborate customs show the group judgment of the +importance of the occasion. And the rites for the dead +are yet more impressive. For as a rule the savage has no +thought of an entire extinction of the person. The dead +lives on in some mode, shadowy and vague, perhaps, but +he is still potent, still a member of the group, present +at the tomb or the hearth. The preparation of the body +for burial or other disposition, the ceremonies of interment +or of the pyre, the wailing, and mourning costumes, +the provision of food and weapons, or of the favorite +horse or wife, to be with the dead in the unseen world, the +perpetual homage paid—all these are eloquent. The event, +as often as it occurs, appeals by both sympathy and awe +to the common feeling, and brings to consciousness the +unity of the group and the control exercised by its +judgments.</p> + +<p>The regulations for marriage are scarcely less important; +indeed, they are often seemingly the most important +of the customs. The phrases "marriage by capture" and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> +"marriage by purchase," are quite misleading if they give +the impression that in early culture any man may have +any woman. It is an almost universal part of the clan +system that the man must marry out of his own clan or +totem (exogamy), and it is frequently specified exactly +into what other clan he must marry. Among some the +regulations are minute as to which of the age classes, as +well as to which of the kin groups, a man of specific group +must choose from. The courtship may follow different +rules from ours, and the relation of the sexes in certain +respects may seem so loose as to shock the student, but +the regulation is in many respects stricter than with +us, and punishment of its violation often severer. There +can be no doubt of the meaning of the control, however mistaken +some of its features. Whether the regulations for +exogamy, which provide so effectually for avoiding incest, +are reinforced by an instinctive element of aversion to sex +relations with intimates, is uncertain; in any case, they are +enforced by the strongest taboos. Nor does primitive society +stop with the negative side. The actual marriage is +invested with the social values and religious sanctions which +raise the relation to a higher level. Art, in garments and +ornament, in dance and epithalamium, lends ideal values. +The sacred meal at the encircled hearth secures the participation +of the kindred gods.</p> + +<p><b>(b) Certain Days or Seasons Important for the Industrial +Life.</b>—Seed time and harvest, the winter and summer +solstices, the return of spring, are of the highest +importance to agricultural and pastoral peoples, and are +widely observed with solemn rites. Where the rain is +the center of anxiety, a whole ritual may arise in connection +with it, as among the Zuñi Indians. Ceremonies +lasting days, involving the preparation of special symbols +of clouds and lightning, and the participation of +numerous secret fraternities, constrain the attention of +all. Moreover, this constraint of need, working through<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> +the conception of what the gods require, enforces some +very positive moral attitudes:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A Zuñi must speak with one tongue (sincerely) in order to +have his prayers received by the gods, and unless his prayers +are accepted no rains will come, which means starvation. He +must be gentle, and he must speak and act with kindness to all, +for the gods care not for those whose lips speak harshly. He +must observe continence four days previous to, and four days +following, the sending of breath prayers through the spiritual +essence of plume offerings, and thus their passions are brought +under control." (<span class="smcap">Mrs. M. C. Stevenson</span> in 23d Report, +<i>Bureau of Ethnology</i>.)</p></div> + +<p>Phases of the moon give other sacred days. Sabbaths +which originally are negative—the forbidding of labor—may +become later the bearers of positive social and spiritual +value. In any case, all these festivals bring the group +authority to consciousness, and by their ritual promote +the intimate group sympathy and consciousness of a common +end.</p> + +<p><b>(c) War.</b>—War as a special crisis always brings out +the significance and importance of certain customs. The +deliberations, the magic, the war paint which precede, the +obedience compelled by it to chiefs, the extraordinary +powers exercised by the chief or heads at such crises, the +sense of danger which strains the attention, all insure +attention. No carelessness is permitted. Defeat is interpreted +as a symbol of divine anger because of a violated +law or custom. Victory brings all together to celebrate +the glory of the clan and to mourn in common the warriors +slain in the common cause. Excellence here may be so +conspicuous in its service, or in the admiration it calls +out, as to become a general term for what the group +approves. So the <i>aretē</i> of the Greeks became their general +term, and the Latin <i>virtus</i>, if not so clearly military, +was yet largely military in its early coloring. The "spirit +of Jehovah," the symbol of divine approval and so of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> +group approval, was believed to be with Samson and Jephthah +in their deeds of prowess in Israel's behalf.</p> + +<p><b>(d) Hospitality.</b>—To the modern man who travels without +fear and receives guests as a matter of almost daily +practice, it may seem strained to include hospitality along +with unusual or critical events. But the ceremonies observed +and the importance attached to its rites, show that +hospitality was a matter of great significance; its customs +were among the most sacred.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"But as for us," says Ulysses to the Cyclops, "we have +lighted here, and come to these thy knees, if perchance they +will give us a stranger's gift, or make any present, as is the +due of strangers. Nay, lord, have regard to the gods, for we +are thy suppliants, and Zeus is the avenger of suppliants and +sojourners, Zeus, the god of the stranger, who fareth in the +company of reverend strangers."</p></div> + +<p>The duty of hospitality is one of the most widely +recognized. Westermarck has brought together a series +of maxims from a great variety of races which show this +forcibly.<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> Indians, Kalmucks, Greeks, Romans, Teutons, +Arabs, Africans, Ainos, and other peoples are drawn upon +and tell the same story. The stranger is to be respected +sacredly. His person must be guarded from insult even +if the honor of the daughter of the house must be sacrificed.<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> +"Jehovah preserveth the sojourners," and they +are grouped with the fatherless and the widow in Israel's +law.<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> The Romans had their <i>dii hospitales</i> and the "duties +toward a guest were even more stringent than those toward +a relative"—<i>primum tutelæ</i>, <i>delude hospiti</i>, <i>deinde clienti</i>, +<i>tum cognato</i>, <i>postea affini</i>.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> "He who has a spark of +caution in him," says Plato, "will do his best to pass +through life without sinning against the stranger." And +there is no doubt that this sanctity of the guest's person<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +was not due to pure kindness. The whole conduct of group +life is opposed to a general spirit of consideration for +those outside. The word "guest" is akin to <i>hostis</i>, from +which comes "hostile." The stranger or the guest was +looked upon rather as a being who was specially potent. +He was a "live wire." He might be a medium of blessing, +or he might be a medium of hurt. But it was highly +important to fail in no duty toward him. The definite +possibility of entertaining angels unawares might not be +always present to consciousness, but there seems reason to +believe that the possibility of good luck or bad luck +as attending on a visitor was generally believed in. It is +also plausible that the importance attached to sharing a +meal, or to bodily contact, is based on magical ideas of +the way in which blessing or curse may be communicated. +To cross a threshold or touch a tent-rope or to eat "salt," +gives a sacred claim. In the right of asylum, the refugee +takes advantage of his contact with the god. He lays +hold of the altar and assumes that the god will protect +him. The whole practice of hospitality is thus the converse +of the custom of blood revenge. They are alike sacred—or +rather the duty of hospitality may protect even the man +whom the host is bound to pursue. But, whereas the one +makes for group solidarity by acts of exclusive and hostile +character, the other tends to set aside temporarily the +division between the "we-group" and the "others-group." +Under the sanction of religion it keeps open a way of communication +which trade and other social interchange will +widen. It adds to family and the men's house a powerful +agency in maintaining at least the possibility of humaneness +and sympathy.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. VALUES AND DEFECTS OF CUSTOMARY MORALITY</h4> + +<p>These have been suggested, in the main, in the description +of the nature of custom and its regulation of conduct.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> +We may, however, summarize them as a preparation for +the next stage of morality.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Forming of Standards.</b>—There is a standard, +a "good," a "right," which is to some degree rational +and to some degree social. We have seen that custom rests +in part on rational conceptions of welfare. It is really +nothing against this that a large element of luck enters +into the idea of welfare. For this means merely that the +actual conditions of welfare are not understood. The next +generation may be able to point out as equally absurd our +present ignorance about health and disease. The members +of the group embodied in custom what they thought +to be important; they were approving some acts and forbidding +or condemning others; they were using the elders, +and the wisdom of all the past, in order to govern life. +So far, then, they were acting morally. They were also, +to a degree, using a rational and social standard when they +made custom binding on all, and conceived its origin as +immemorial. When further they conceived it as approved +by the gods, they gave it all the value they knew how to +put into it.</p> + +<p>The standards and valuations of custom are, however, +only partly rational. Many customs are irrational; some +are injurious. But in them all the habitual is a large, +if not the largest, factor. And this is often strong enough +to resist any attempt at rational testing. Dr. Arthur +Smith tells us of the advantage it would be in certain parts +of China to build a door on the south side of the house +in order to get the breeze in hot weather. The simple +and sufficient answer to such a suggestion is, "We don't +build doors on the south side."</p> + +<p>An additional weakness in the character of such irrational, +or partly rational standards, is the misplaced energy +they involve. What is merely trivial is made as important +and impressive as what has real significance. +Tithing mint, anise, and cummin is quite likely to involve<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> +neglect of the weightier matters of the law. Moral life +requires men to estimate the value of acts. If the irrelevant +or the petty is made important, it not only prevents +a high level of value for the really important act, +it loads up conduct with burdens which keep it back; +it introduces elements which must be got rid of later, often +with heavy loss of what is genuinely valuable. When there +are so many ways of offending the gods and when these +turn so often upon mere observance of routine or formula, +it may require much subsequent time and energy to make +amends. The morals get an expiatory character.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Motives.</b>—In the motives to which it appeals, +custom is able to make a far better showing than earlier +writers, like Herbert Spencer, gave it credit for. It doubtless +employs fear in its taboos; it doubtless enlists the +passion of resentment in its blood feuds. Even these are +modified by a social environment. For the fear of violating +a taboo is in part the fear of bringing bad luck +on the whole group, and not merely on the violator. We +have, therefore, a quasi-social fear, not a purely instinctive +reaction. The same is true in perhaps a stronger +degree of the resentments. The blood revenge is in a +majority of cases not a personal but a group affair. It +is undertaken at personal risk and for others' interest—or +rather for a common interest. The resentment is thus a +"<i>sympathetic resentment</i>."<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Regarded as a mere reaction +for self-preservation this instinctive-emotional process is +unmoral. As a mere desire to produce pain it would be immoral. +But so far as it implies an attitude of reacting +from a general point of view and to aid others, it is moral. +Aside from the passions of fear and resentment, however, +there is a wide range of motives enlisted. Filial and parental +affection, some degree of affection between the sexes +over and above sex passion, respect for the aged and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> +beings who embody ideals however crude, loyalty to fellow +clansmen,—all these are not only fostered but actually secured +by the primitive group. But the motives which +imply reflection—reverence for duty as the imperious law +of a larger life, sincere love of what is good for its +own sake—cannot be brought to full consciousness until +there is a more definite conception of a moral authority, a +more definite contrast between the one great good and the +partial or temporary satisfactions. The development of +these conceptions requires a growth in individuality; it +requires conflicts between authority and liberty, and those +collisions between private interests and the public welfare +which a higher civilization affords.</p> + +<p><b>3. The Content.</b>—When we consider the "what" of +group and customary morality we note at once that the +factors which make for the idealizing and expansion of interests +are less in evidence than those which make for a common +and social interest and satisfaction. There is indeed, as +we have noted, opportunity for memory and fancy. The +traditions of the past, the myths, the cultus, the folk songs—these +keep up a mental life which is as genuinely valued +as the more physical activities. But as the mode of life in +question does not evoke the more abstractly rational activities—reasoning, +selecting, choosing—in the highest degree, +the ideals lack reach and power. It needs the incentives +described in the following chapters to call out a true +life of the spirit. The social aspects of the "what," on the +other hand, are well rooted in group morality. It is unnecessary +to repeat what has been dwelt upon in the +present and preceding chapters so fully. We point out now +that while the standard is social, it is unconsciously rather +than consciously social. Or perhaps better: it is a standard +of society but not a standard which each member deliberately +makes his own. He takes it as a matter of course. +He is in the clan, "with the gang"; he thinks and acts +accordingly. He cannot begin to be as selfish as a modern<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> +individualist; he simply hasn't the imagery to conceive such +an exclusive good, nor the tools with which to carry it out. +But he cannot be as broadly social either. He may not be +able to sink so low as the civilized miser, or debauchee, or +criminal, but neither can he conceive or build up the character +which implies facing opposition. The moral hero +achieves full stature only when he pits himself against +others, when he recognizes evil and fights it, when he "overcomes +the world."</p> + +<p><b>4. Organization of Character.</b>—In the organization of +stable character the morality of custom is strong on one +side. The group trains its members to act in the ways it +approves and afterwards holds them by all the agencies in +its power. It forms habits and enforces them. Its weakness +is that the element of habit is so large, that of freedom +so small. It holds up the average man; it holds back +the man who might forge ahead. It is an anchor, and a +drag.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Much of the literature at the close of Chapters II. and III., particularly +the works of Spencer and Gillen and Schurtz, belongs here +also. Schoolcraft, <i>Indian Tribes</i>, 1851-57; Eastman, <i>Indian Boyhood</i>, +1902. Papers on various cults of North American Indians in reports +of the <i>Bureau of Ethnology</i>, by Stevenson, 8th, 1886-87; Dorsey, 11th, +1889-90; Fewkes, 15th, 1893-94, 21st, 1899-1900; Fletcher, 22nd, +1900-01; Stevenson, 23d, 1901-02; Kidd, <i>Savage Childhood</i>, 1906; +<i>The Essential Kaffir</i>, 1904; Skeat, <i>Malay Magic</i>, 1900; N. W. Thomas, +general editor of Series, <i>The Native Races of the British Empire</i>, +1907-; Barton, <i>A Sketch of Semitic Origins</i>, 1902; Harrison, <i>Prolegomena +to the Study of Greek Religion</i>, 1903; Reinach, <i>Cultes, +Mythes et Religions</i>, 2 vols., 1905; Frazer, <i>The Golden Bough</i>, 3 +vols., 1900; Marett, <i>Is Taboo Negative Magic?</i> in Anthropological +Essays, presented to E. B. Tylor, 1907; Crawley, <i>The Mystic Rose</i>, +1902; Spencer, <i>Sociology</i>, 1876-96; Clifford, <i>On the Scientific Basis of +Morals</i> in Lectures and Essays, 1886; Maine, <i>Early History of Institutions</i>, +1888; <i>Early Law and Custom</i>, 1886; Post, <i>Die Grundlagen +des Rechts und die Grundzüge seiner Entwicklungsgeschichte</i>, 1884; +<i>Ethnologische Jurisprudenz</i>, 1894-95; Pollock and Maitland, <i>History +of English Law</i>, 1899; Steinmetz, <i>Ethnologische Studien zur ersten +Entwicklung der Strafe</i>, 1894.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> W. G. Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>, p. 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Bagehot, <i>Physics and Politics</i>, p. 103.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Eastman, <i>Indian Boyhood</i>, p. 31.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Hobhouse, <i>Morals in Evolution</i>, Part I., p. 16. Hume pointed out +this twofold basis of approval.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Seebohm, <i>The Tribal System of Wales</i>, p. 59.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> The account is based on Spencer and Gillen, <i>The Native Tribes +of Central Australia</i>, chs. vii.-ix.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Maine's <i>Early Law and Custom</i>, p. 264.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Welsh Triads</i>, cited by Seebohm, op. cit., p. 72.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Post, <i>Grundlagen des Rechts</i>, pp. 45 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Deuteronomy 21:1-9; Numbers 35:33, 34.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Genesis 4:10-12; Job 16:18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> On the subject of early justice Westermarck, <i>The Origin and +Development of Moral Ideas</i>, ch. vii. ff.; Hobhouse, <i>Morals in +Evolution</i>, Part I., ch. ii.; Pollock and Maitland, <i>History of English +Law</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Leviticus, ch. xii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> "The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships" in <i>Sociological +Papers</i>, II., 1905. Cf. also Morgan, <i>House-life</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Genesis 19:8; Judges 19:23, 24.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Psalms 146:9; Deuteronomy 24:14-22.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Gellius, in Westermarck, op. cit., p. 155.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Westermarck regards this as one of the fundamental elements +in the beginnings of morality.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER V</small> + +<br /><br /> + +FROM CUSTOM TO CONSCIENCE; FROM GROUP +MORALITY TO PERSONAL MORALITY</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. CONTRAST AND COLLISION</h4> + +<p><b>1. What the Third Level Means.</b>—Complete morality +is reached only when the individual recognizes the right or +chooses the good freely, devotes himself heartily to its fulfillment, +and seeks a progressive social development in which +every member of society shall share. The group morality +with its agencies of custom set up a standard, but one that +was corporate rather than personal. It approved and disapproved, +that is it had an idea of good, but this did not +mean a good that was personally valued. It enlisted its +members, but it was by drill, by pleasure and pain, and by +habit, rather than by fully voluntary action. It secured +steadiness by habit and social pressure, rather than by +choices built into character. It maintained community of +feeling and action, but of the unconscious rather than the +definitely social type. Finally it was rather fitted to maintain +a fixed order than to promote and safeguard progress. +Advance then must (1) substitute some rational method of +setting up standards and forming values, in place of habitual +passive acceptance; (2) secure voluntary and personal +choice and interest, instead of unconscious identification +with the group welfare, or instinctive and habitual response +to group needs; (3) encourage at the same time individual +development and the demand that all shall share in this +development—the worth and happiness of the person and +of <i>every</i> person.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>2. Collisions Involved.</b>—Such an advance brings +to consciousness two collisions. The oppositions were +there before, but they were not felt as oppositions. So +long as the man was fully with his group, or satisfied +with the custom, he would make no revolt. When the +movement begins the collisions are felt. These collisions +are:</p> + +<p>(1) The collision between the authority and interests of +the group, and the independence and private interests of +the individual.</p> + +<p>(2) The collision between order and progress, between +habit and reconstruction or reformation.</p> + +<p>It is evident that there is a close connection between +these two collisions; in fact, the second becomes in practice +a form of the first. For we saw in the last chapter that +custom is really backed and enforced by the group, and its +merely habitual parts are as strongly supported as those +parts which have a more rational basis. It would perhaps +be conceivable that a people should move on all together, +working out a higher civilization in which free thought +should keep full reverence for social values, in which political +liberty should keep even pace with the development of +government, in which self-interest should be accompanied +by regard for the welfare of others, just as it may be possible +for a child to grow into full morality without a period +of "storm and stress." But this is not usual. Progress +has generally cost struggle. And the first phase of this +struggle is opposition between the individual and the +group. The self-assertive instincts and impulses were present +in group life, but they were in part undeveloped because +they had not enough stimulus to call them out. A man +could not develop his impulse for possession to its full extent +if there was little or nothing for him to possess. In +part they were not developed because the group held them +back, and the conditions of living and fighting favored +those groups which did keep them back. Nevertheless they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> +were present in some degree, always contending against the +more social forces. Indeed what makes the opposition between +group and individual so strong and so continuous is +that both the social and the individual are rooted in human +nature. They constitute what Kant calls the <i>unsocial sociableness</i> +of man. "Man cannot get on with his fellows and +he cannot do without them."</p> + +<p><b>Individualism.</b>—The assertion by the individual of his +own opinions and beliefs, his own independence and interests, +as over against group standards, authority, and interests, +is known as individualism. It is evident that such +assertion will always mark a new level of conduct. Action +must now be personal and voluntary. It is also evident +that it may be either better or worse than the level of custom +and group life. The first effect is likely to be, in appearance +at least, a change for the worse. The old restraints are +tossed aside; "creeds outworn" no longer steady or direct; +the strong or the crafty individual comes to the fore and +exploits his fellows. Every man does what is "right in his +own eyes." The age of the Sophists in Greece, of the Renaissance +in Italy, of the Enlightenment and Romantic +movement in western Europe, and of the industrial revolution +in recent times illustrate different phases of individualism. +A people, as well as an individual, may "go to +pieces" in its reaction against social authority and custom. +But such one-sided individualism is almost certain to call +out prophets of a new order; "organic filaments" of new +structures appear; family, industry, the state, are organized +anew and upon more voluntary basis. Those who accept +the new conditions and assume responsibility with +their freedom, who direct their choices by reason instead of +passion, who "aim at justice and kindness" as well as at +happiness, become moral persons and gain thereby new +worth and dignity. While, then, the general movement is on +the whole a movement of individualism, it demands just as +necessarily, if there is to be moral progress, a <i>recon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>structed +individual</i>—a person who is individual in choice, +in feeling, in responsibility, and at the same time social in +what he regards as good, in his sympathies, and in his purposes. +Otherwise individualism means progress toward the +immoral.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. SOCIOLOGICAL AGENCIES IN THE TRANSITION</h4> + +<p>The agencies which bring about the change from customary +and group morality to conscious and personal +morality are varied. Just as character is developed in +the child and young man by various means, sometimes +by success, sometimes by adversity or loss of a parent, +sometimes by slow increase in knowledge, and sometimes +by a sudden right-about-face with a strong emotional basis, +so it is with peoples. Some, like the Japanese at the present, +are brought into sudden contact with the whole set of +commercial and military forces from without. Among +others, as with the Greeks, a fermentation starts within, +along intellectual, economic, political, and religious lines. +Or again, national calamities may upset all the old values, +as with the Hebrews. But we may note four typical agencies +which are usually more or less active.</p> + +<p><b>1. Economic Forces.</b>—The action of economic forces in +breaking up the early kinship group or joint family may +be noticed in the history of many peoples. The clan flourishes +in such conditions of hunting life or of simple agriculture +as were found among Australians and Indians, or +among the Celts in Ireland and the Scottish Highlands. +It cannot survive when a more advanced state of agriculture +prevails. A certain amount of individualism will appear +wherever the advantage for the individual lies in separate +industry and private ownership. If buffalo was to +be hunted it was better to pool issues, but for smaller game +the skilful or persistent huntsman or shepherd will think +he can gain more by working for himself. This is intensi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>fied +when agriculture and commerce take the place of +earlier modes of life. The farmer has to work so hard and +long, his goal is so far in the future, that differences of +character show themselves much more strongly. Hunting +and fishing are so exciting, and the reward is so near, that +even a man who is not very industrious will do his part. +But in agriculture only the hard and patient worker gets +a reward and he does not like to share it with the lazy, or +even with the weaker. Commerce, bargaining, likewise puts +a great premium on individual shrewdness. And for a +long time commerce was conducted on a relatively individual +basis. Caravans of traders journeyed together for +mutual protection but there was not any such organization +as later obtained, and each individual could display +his own cunning or ability. Moreover commerce leads to +the comparison of custom, to interchange of ideas as well +as goods. All this tends to break down the sanctity of +customs peculiar to a given group. The trader as well as +the guest may overstep the barriers set up by kin. The +early Greek colonists, among whom a great individualistic +movement began, were the traders of their day. The parts +of Europe where most survives of primitive group life are +those little touched by modern commerce.</p> + +<p>But we get a broader view of economic influences if we +consider the methods of organizing industry which have +successively prevailed. In early society, and likewise in +the earlier period of modern civilization, the family was a +great economic unit. Many or most of the industries could +be advantageously carried on in the household. As in the +cases cited above (p. 60) the stronger or adventurous member +would be constantly trying to strike out for himself. +This process of constant readjustment is, however, far less +thoroughgoing in its effects on mores than the three great +methods of securing a broader organization of industry. +In primitive society large enterprises had to be carried on +by the co-operation of the group. Forced labor as used<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +by the Oriental civilizations substituted a method by which +greater works like the pyramids or temples could be built, +but it brought with it the overthrow of much of the old +group sympathies and mutual aid. In Greece and Rome +slavery did the drudgery and left the citizens free to cultivate +art, letters, and government. It gave opportunity +and scope for the few. Men of power and genius arose, +and at the same time all the negative forces of individualism +asserted themselves. In modern times capitalism is the +method for organizing industry and trade. It proves +more effective than forced labor or slavery in securing +combination of forces and in exploiting natural resources. +It likewise gives extraordinary opportunities for the rise +of men of organizing genius. The careers of "captains +of industry" are more fascinating than those of old-time +conquerors because they involve more complex situations, +and can utilize the discoveries and labors of more men. But +modern capitalism has been as destructive to the morality +of the Middle Ages, or even of a hundred years ago, as +was forced labor or slavery to the group life and mores +which they destroyed.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Progress of Science and the Arts.</b>—The effect +of the progress of science and intelligence upon the mores +is direct. Comparisons of the customs of one people with +those of another bring out differences, and arouse questions +as to the reasons for such diversity. And we have +seen that there is more or less in the customs for which no +reason can be given. Even if there was one originally +it has been forgotten. Or again, increasing knowledge of +weather and seasons, of plants and animals, of sickness +and disease, discredits many of the taboos and ceremonials +which the cruder beliefs had regarded as essential +to welfare. Certain elements of ritual may survive under +the protection of "mysteries," but the more enlightened +portion of the community keeps aloof. Instead of the +mores with their large infusion of the accidental, the ha<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>bitual, +and the impulsive, increasing intelligence demands +some rational rule of life.</p> + +<p>And science joins with the various industrial and fine +arts to create a new set of interests for the individual. +Any good piece of workmanship, any work of art however +simple, is twice blest. It blesses him that makes and him +that uses or enjoys. The division of labor, begun in group +life, is carried further. Craftsmen and artists develop +increasing individuality as they construct temples or palaces, +fashion statues or pottery, or sing of gods and heroes. +Their minds grow with what they do. Side by side with +the aspect of art which makes it a bond of society is the +aspect which so frequently makes the skilled workman the +critic, and the artist a law to himself. In the next place +note the effect on those who can use and enjoy the products +of the arts. A new world of satisfaction and happiness is +opened which each person can enter for himself. In cruder +conditions there was not much out of which to build up +happiness. Food, labor, rest, the thrill of hunt or contest, +the passion of sex, the pride in children—these made up the +interests of primitive life. Further means of enjoyment were +found chiefly in society of the kin, or in the men's house. +But as the arts advanced the individual could have made +for him a fine house and elaborate clothing. Metal, wood, +and clay minister to increasing wants. A permanent and +stately tomb makes the future more definite. The ability +to hand down wealth in durable form places a premium on +its acquirement. Ambition has more stuff to work with. +A more definite, assertive self is gradually built up. +"Good" comes to have added meaning with every new +want that awakes. The individual is not satisfied any +longer to take the group's valuation. He wants to get his +own good in his own way. And it will often seem to him +that he can get his own good most easily and surely +either by keeping out of the common life or by using +his fellow men to his own advantage. Men of culture<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> +have frequently shown their selfishness in the first way; +men of wealth in the second. An aristocracy of culture, +or birth, or wealth may come to regard the whole +process of civilization as properly ministering to the wants +of the select few. Nearly every people which has developed +the arts and sciences has developed also an aristocracy. +In the ancient world slavery was a part of the process. In +modern times other forms of exploitation may serve the +purpose better. Individualism, released from the ties +which bound up the good of one with the good of all, tends +to become exclusive and selfish; civilization with all its opportunities +for increasing happiness and increasing life +has its moral risks and indirectly, at least, its moral evils.</p> + +<p>These evils may appear as the gratification of sense and +appetite and thus may be opposed to the higher life of the +spirit, which needs no outer objects or luxuries. Or they +may appear as rooted in selfishness, in the desire for gratifying +the exclusive self of material interests or ambition, +as over against sympathy, justice, and kindness, which +mark a broadly human and social life. In both cases serious +men have sought to overcome by some form of "self-denial" +the evils that attend on civilization, even if they are +not due to it.</p> + +<p><b>3. Military Forces.</b>—The kinship group is a protection +so long as it has to contend only with similar groups. The +headlong valor and tribal loyalty of German or Scottish +clans may even win conflicts with more disciplined troops +of Rome or England. But permanent success demands +higher organization than the old clans and tribes permitted. +Organization means authority, and a single directing, +controlling commander or king. As Egypt, Assyria, +Phœnicia show their strength the clans of Israel cry, "Nay, +but we will have a king over us; that we may also be like all +the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out +before us, and fight our battles."<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Wars afford the oppor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>tunity +for the strong and unscrupulous leader to assert +himself. Like commerce they may tend also to spread culture +and thus break down barriers of ancient custom. The +conquests of Babylon and Alexander, the Crusades and the +French Revolution, are instances of the power of military +forces to destroy old customs and give individualism new +scope. In most cases, it is true, it is only the leader or "tyrant" +who gets the advantage. He uses the whole machinery +of society for his own elevation. Nevertheless +custom and group unity are broken for all. Respect for +law must be built new from the foundation.</p> + +<p><b>4. Religious Forces.</b>—While in general religion is a +conservative agency, it is also true that a new religion or +a new departure in religion has often exercised a powerful +influence on moral development. The very fact that religion +is so intimately bound up with all the group mores +and ideals, makes a change in religion bear directly on +old standards of life. The collision between old and new +is likely to be fundamental and sharp. A conception of +God may carry with it a view of what conduct is pleasing +to him. A doctrine as to the future may require a certain +mode of life. A cultus may approve or condemn certain +relations between the sexes. Conflicting religions may then +force a moral attitude in weighing their claims. The contests +between Jehovah and Baal, between Orphic cults and +the public Greek religion, between Judaism and Christianity, +Christianity and Roman civilization, Christianity +and Germanic religion, Catholicism and Protestantism, +have brought out moral issues. We shall notice this factor +especially in Chapters VI. and VIII.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AGENCIES</h4> + +<p>The psychological forces which tend toward individualism +have been already stated to be the self-assertive instincts +and impulses. They are all variations of the effort<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> +of the living being first to preserve itself and then to rise +to more complicated life by entering into more complex +relations and mastering its environment. Spinoza's "<i>sui +esse conservare</i>," Schopenhauer's "will to live," Nietzsche's +"will to power," the Hebrew's passionate ideal of "life", +and Tennyson's "More life, and fuller" express in varying +degree the meaning of this elemental bent and process. +Growing intelligence adds to its strength by giving +greater capacity to control. Starting with organic needs, +this developing life process may find satisfactions in +the physical world in the increasing power and mastery +over nature gained by the explorer or the hunter, the discoverer, +the craftsman, or the artist. It is when it enters +the world of persons that it displays a peculiar intensity +that marks the passions of individualism <i>par excellence</i>. +We note four of these tendencies toward self-assertion.</p> + +<p><b>1. Sex.</b>—The sex instinct and emotion occupies a peculiar +position in this respect. On the one hand it is a +powerful socializing agency. It brings the sexes together +and is thus fundamental to the family. But on the other +hand it is constantly rebelling against the limits and conventions +established by the social group for its regulation. +The statutes against illicit relations, from the codes of +Hammurabi and Moses to the latest efforts for stricter +divorce, attest the collision between the individual's inclination +and the will of the group. Repeatedly some passion +of sex has broken over all social, legal, and religious sanctions. +It has thus been a favorite theme of tragedy from +the Greeks to Ibsen. It finds another fitting medium in +the romance. It has called into existence and maintains +in every large city an outcast colony of wretched creatures, +and the evils which attend are not limited in their results +to those who knowingly take the risks. It has worked repeated +changes in the structure of the family authorized +by society. Its value and proper regulation were points +at issue in that wide-reaching change of mores attendant<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +upon the Reformation, and apparently equilibrium has not +yet been reached.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Demand for Possession and Private Property.</b>—In +the primitive group we have seen that there might be +private property in tools or weapons, in cattle or slaves. +There was little private property in land under the maternal +clan; and indeed in any case, so long as the arts were +undeveloped, private property had necessary limits. The +demand for private property is a natural attendant upon +individual modes of industry. As we have said, it was a +common principle that what the group produced was owned +by the group, and what the individual made or captured +was treated as his. When individual industry came to +count for more, the individual claimed more and more as +private possession.</p> + +<p>The change from the maternal clan to the paternal +family or household was a reënforcement to the individual +control of property. The father could hand down his cattle +or his house to his son. The joint family of India is +indeed a type of a paternal system. Nevertheless the +tendency is much stronger to insist on individual property +where the father's goods pass to his son than where they go +to his sister's children.</p> + +<p>The chiefs or rulers were likely to gain the right of private +property first. Among certain families of the South +Slavs to-day, the head has his individual eating utensils, +the rest share. Among many people the chiefs have cattle +which they can dispose of as they will; the rest have simply +their share of the kin's goods. The old Brehon laws of +Ireland show this stage.</p> + +<p>But however it comes about, the very meaning of property +is, in the first place, exclusion of others from some +thing which I have. It is therefore in so far necessarily +opposed to group unity, opposed to any such simple solidarity +of life as we find in group morality. As the American +Indian accepts land in severalty, the old group life,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> +the tribal restraints and supports, the group custom and +moral unity that went with it, are gone. He must find a +new basis or go to pieces.</p> + +<p><b>3. Struggles for Mastery or Liberty.</b>—In most cases +these cannot be separated from economic struggles. Masters +and slaves were in economic as well as personal relations, +and nearly all class contests on a large scale have +had at least one economic root, whatever their other +sources. But the economic is not their only root. There +have been wars for glory or for liberty as well as for +territory or booty or slaves. As the struggle for existence +has bred into the race the instinct of self-defense +with its emotion of anger, the instinct to rivalry and +mastery, and the corresponding aversion to being ruled, +so the progress of society shows trials of strength between +man and man, kin and kin, tribe and tribe. And while, +as stated in the preceding chapter, the coöperation made +necessary in war or feud is a uniting force, there is +another side to the story. Contests between individuals +show who is master; contests between groups tend to +bring forward leaders. And while such masterful men +may serve the group they are quite as likely to find +an interest in opposing group customs. They assert an +independence of the group, or a mastery over it, quite incompatible +with the solidarity of the kinship clan, although +the patriarchal type of household under a strong head +may be quite possible. There comes to be one code for +rich and another for poor, one for Patricians and another +for Plebs, one for baron and another for peasant, one for +gentry and another for the common folk. For a time this +may be accepted patiently. But when once the rich become +arrogant, the feudal lord insolent, the bitter truth is faced +that the customs have become mere conventions. They no +longer hold. All the old ties are cast off. The demand for +freedom and equality rises, and the collision between authority +and liberty is on.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span></p> + +<p>Or the contest may be for intellectual liberty—for free +thought and free speech. It is sometimes considered that +such liberty meets its strongest opponent in the religious +or ecclesiastical organization. There is no doubt a conservative +tendency in religion. As we have pointed out, +religion is the great conservator of group values and group +standards. Its ritual is most elaborate, its taboos most +sacred. Intellectual criticism tends to undermine what is +outgrown or merely habitual here as elsewhere. Rationalism +or free thought has set itself in frequent opposition +likewise to what has been claimed to be "above reason." +Nevertheless it would be absurd to attribute all the individualism +to science and all the conservatism to religion. +Scientific dogmas and "idols" are hard to displace. Schools +are about as conservative as churches. And on the other +hand the struggle for religious liberty has usually been +carried on not by the irreligious but by the religious. The +prophet Amos found himself opposed by the religious organization +of his day when he urged social righteousness, +and the history of the noble army of martyrs is a record +of appeal to individual conscience, or to an immediate personal +relation to God, as over against the formal, the traditional, +the organized religious customs and doctrines of +their age. The struggle for religious toleration and religious +liberty takes its place side by side with the struggles +for intellectual and political liberty in the chapters +of individualism.</p> + +<p><b>4. The Desire for Honor, or Social Esteem.</b>—James, +in his psychology of the self, calls the recognition which +a man gets from his mates his "social self." "We are not +only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, +but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves +noticed, and noticed favorably by our kind. No more fiendish +punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically +possible, than that one should be turned loose in +society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> +thereof."<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> From such a punishment "the cruelest bodily +tortures would be a relief; for this would make us feel that +however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such +depth as to be unworthy of attention at all."<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Honor or +fame is a name for one of the various "social selves" which +a man may build up. It stands for what those of a given +group may think or say of him. It has a place and a +large place in group life. Precedence, salutations, decorations +in costume and bodily ornament, praises in song +for the brave, the strong, the cunning, the powerful, with +ridicule for the coward or the weakling are all at work. +But with the primitive group the difference between men +of the group is kept within bounds. When more definite +organization of groups for military or civil purposes begins, +when the feudal chief gathers his retainers and +begins to rise above the rest of the community in strength, +finally when the progress of the arts gives greater means +for display, the desire for recognition has immensely +greater scope. It is increased by the instinct of emulation; +it often results in envy and jealousies. It becomes then a +powerful factor in stimulating individualism.</p> + +<p>But while desires for honor and fame provoke individualism, +they carry with them, like desires for property and +power, elements that make for reconstruction of the social +on a higher level. For honor implies some common sentiment +to which the individual can make appeal. Group members +praise or blame what accords with their feeling or desire, +but they do not act as individuals merely, praising +what pleases them as individuals. They react more or less +completely from the group point of view; they honor the +man who embodies the group-ideal of courage, or other admirable +and respected qualities. And here comes the +motive which operates to force a better ideal than mere +desire of praise. No group honors the man who is definitely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> +seeking merely its applause rather than its approval—at +least not after it has found him out. The force of public +opinion is therefore calculated to elicit a desire to be +<i>worthy</i> of honor, as well as to be honored. This means a +desire to act as a true social individual, for it is only the +true member of the group,—true clansman,—true patriot,—true +martyr,—who appeals to the other members when +they judge as members, and not selfishly. When now the +group whose approval is sought is small, we have class +standards, with all the provincialism, narrowness, and +prejudice that belong to them. As the honor-seeker is +merely after the opinion of his class, he is bound to be +only partly social. So long as he is with his kin, or his +set, or his "gang," or his "party," or his "union," or +his "country"—regardless of any wider appeal—he is +bound to be imperfectly rational and social in his conduct. +The great possibilities of the desire for honor, +and of the desire to be worthy of honor, lie then in the +constant extension of the range. The martyr, the seeker +for truth, the reformer, the neglected artist, looks for +honor from posterity; if misjudged or neglected, he appeals +to mankind. He is thus forming for himself an +ideal standard. And if he embodies this ideal standard +in a personal, highest possible judging companion, his +desire to be worthy of approval takes a religious form. +He seeks "the honor that is from God." Though "the +innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a self +of the <i>social</i> sort, it yet can find its only adequate <i>socius</i> +in an ideal world."<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> + +<p>The moral value of these three forces of individualism +was finely stated by Kant:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The means which nature uses to bring about the development +of all the capacities she has given man is their <i>antagonism</i> +in society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the end +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>a cause of social order. Men have an inclination to <i>associate</i> +themselves, for in a social state they feel themselves more +completely men: i.e., they are conscious of the development +of their natural capacities. But they have also a great propensity +to <i>isolate</i> themselves, for they find in themselves at the +same time this unsocial characteristic: each wishes to direct +everything solely according to his own notion, and hence +expects resistance, just as he knows that he is inclined to resist +others. It is just this resistance which awakens all man's +powers; this brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence, +and drives him through the lust for honor, power, or +wealth to win for himself a rank among his fellowmen. Man's +will is for concord, but nature knows better what is good for +the species, and she wills discord. He would like a life of +comfort and pleasure; nature wills that he be dragged out of +idleness and inactive content, and plunged into labor and +trouble in order that he may find out the means of extricating +himself from his difficulties. The natural impulses which +prompt this effort, the sources of unsociableness and of the +mutual conflict from which so many evils spring, are then +spurs to a more complete development of man's powers."<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p></div> + +<p>We have spoken of the "forces" which tend to break +down the old unity of the group and bring about new +organization. But of course these forces are not impersonal. +Sometimes they seem to act like the ocean +tide, pushing silently in, and only now and then sending +a wave a little higher than its fellows. Frequently, however, +some great personality stands out preëminent, either +as critic of the old or builder of the new. The prophets +were stoned because they condemned the present; the next +generation was ready to build their sepulchers. Socrates +is the classic example of the great man who perishes in +seeking to find a rational basis to replace that of custom. +Indeed, this conflict—on the one hand, the rigid system of +tradition and corporate union hallowed by all the sanctions +of religion and public opinion; upon the other, the individual +making appeal to reason, or to his conscience, or to +a "higher law"—is the tragedy of history.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 4. POSITIVE RECONSTRUCTION</h4> + +<p>It must not be supposed that the moral process stops +at the points indicated under the several divisions of this +last section. As already stated, if the people really +works out a higher type of conscious and personal morality, +it means not only a more powerful individual, but +a reconstructed individual and a reconstructed society. +It means not only the disintegration of the old kinship or +family group, which is an economic, political, and religious +unity as well. It means the construction of a new +basis for the family; new moral principles for business; +a distinct political state with new means for government, +new conceptions of authority and liberty; finally, a national +or universal religion. And the individual must on +this higher level choose all these voluntarily. More than +this: as he chooses in the presence of the new conflicting +ends presented by individualism, he sets up or adopts a +standard for himself. He thinks definitely of what is +"good" and "right." As he recognizes its claim, he is +responsible as well as free. As he identifies himself heartily +with it, he becomes sincerely and genuinely moral. Reverence, +duty, and love for what is good become the +quickening emotions. Thoughtfulness, self-control, aspiration +toward an ideal, courageous venturing in its achievement, +kindness and justice, become the dominant temper, +or at least are recognized as the temper that should +be dominant. The conception of moral character and +moral personality is brought to consciousness. The development +of the Hebrews and Greeks will show how these +positive values emerge.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p><i>Kant's Principles of Politics</i>, tr. by Hastie, 1891, especially the +essay <i>The Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitical History</i>; Hegel, +<i>Phi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span>losophy of History</i>, tr. by Sibree, 1881; Darwin, <i>The Descent of +Man</i>, 1871, 1882-87; Schurman, <i>The Ethical Import of Darwinism</i>, +1888; Seth, <i>The Evolution of Morality</i>, Mind, XIV., 1889, pp. 27-49; +Williams, <i>A Review of Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory +of Evolution</i>, 1893; Harris, <i>Moral Evolution</i>, 1895; Tufts, <i>On Moral +Evolution</i>, in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology (<i>Garman Commemorative +Volume</i>), 1906; Ihering, <i>Der Kampf ums Recht</i>; Simcox, +<i>Natural Law</i>, 1877; Sorley, <i>Ethics of Naturalism</i>, 1885.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> 1 Sam. 8:19, 20.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Psychology</i>, Vol. I., ch. x.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 293 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> James, <i>Psychology</i>, I., 316.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitical History.</i></p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER VI</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE HEBREW MORAL DEVELOPMENT</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. GENERAL CHARACTER AND DETERMINING PRINCIPLES</h4> + +<p><b>1. The Hebrew and the Greek.</b>—The general character +of the Hebrew moral development may be brought +out by a contrast with that of the Greeks.<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> While many +phases are common, there is yet a difference in emphasis +and focus. There were political and economic forces at +work in Israel, and religious forces in Greece. Nevertheless, +the moral life in one people kept close to the religious, +and in the other found independent channels. Conscientious +conduct for the Hebrew centered in doing the +will of God; for the Greek, in finding rational standards +of good. For the Hebrew, righteousness was the typical +theme; for the Greek, the ideal lay rather in measure +and harmony. For the Greek, wisdom or insight was +the chief virtue; for the Hebrew, the fear of the Lord +was the beginning of wisdom. The social ideal of the +Hebrews was the kingdom of God; of the Greeks, a political +State. If we distinguish in conscience two aspects, +thoughtfulness in discovering what to do and hearty desire +to do the right when found, then the Greeks emphasize +the former, the Hebrews the latter. Intellect plays a +larger part with the Greek; emotion and the voluntary +aspect of will with the Hebrew. Feeling plays its part +with the Greeks largely as an æsthetic demand for measure +and harmony; with the Hebrews it is chiefly prominent +in motivation, where it is an element in what is called<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> +"the heart," or it functions in appreciation of acts performed, +as the joy or sorrow felt when God approves or +condemns. Both peoples are interesting for our study, +not only as illustrating different kinds of moral development, +but also as contributing largely to the moral consciousness +of western peoples to-day.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Early Morality.</b>—The accounts of the tribal +life and customs in the early period after the settlement +in Canaan, show the main features of group life which are +already familiar to us. Clan or kinship loyalty was strong +on both its good and its defective sides. There were fidelity, +a jeoparding of lives unto death, honor for group heroes, +joint responsibility, and blood revenge. There were respect +for hospitality and regulation of marriage, though not according +to later standards. A rough measure of justice +was recognized in "as I have done, so God hath requited +me." But there was no public authority to restrain the +wrongdoer, except when a particularly revolting brutality +shocked public sentiment. Festivals and sacrificial meals +united the members of the family or clan more closely +to each other and to their god. Vows must be kept +inviolable even if they involved human sacrifice. The interests +and ends of life were simple. The satisfaction +of bodily wants, the love of kin and above all of children, +the desire to be in right relation of favor and harmony +with the unseen deity who protected from enemies and sent +fruitful seasons,—these made their chief good. The line +of their progress from these rude beginnings to a lofty +moral ideal lay through religion. But the religious conceptions +were directly related to political, social, and +economic conditions; hence, both aspects must be briefly +characterized.</p> + +<p><b>3. Political Development.</b>—The political development +(a) built up a national unity which worked to break down +old group units, (b) strengthened military ambition and +race pride, (c) stimulated the prophets to their highest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> +conceptions of the divine majesty and universality, but, +finally when the national power and hope were shattered, +(d) compelled the most thoroughgoing reconstruction +of all the values, ideals, and meaning of life. It is not +possible or necessary to trace this process in detail, but +we may point out here the general effect of the political +development in bringing into clearer consciousness the +conceptions of authority and law which were important +factors in Hebrew morality. The earlier patriarchal +head of the clan or family exercised certain political +power, but there was no explicit recognition of this. Government +by the "elders" or by the heads of the household +makes no clear distinction between the common kinship +and the political and legal authority of the sovereign. +The "judges," whose rule preceded the kingdom, were +military deliverers who owed their authority to personal +powers rather than to a definite provision. To establish +an organized political community, a kingdom, was then +to bring into clearer recognition this element of authority +which was merely implicit in the tribal organization. It +allowed a more distinctly voluntary relationship to be +differentiated from the involuntary relationship of kinship, +or the personal relationship of the hero. While, therefore, +in the formation of the kingdom the earlier prophets +saw only a rejection of God, the later prophets saw in +it the symbol of a higher type of relation between God and +people. It was given religious sanction and the king was +regarded as the son of Jehovah. It was thus ready to +serve as the scheme or setting for the moral unity and +order of a people.</p> + +<p><b>4. The Economic Factors.</b>—The organization and growing +prosperity of the political power were attended by economic +and social changes. The simple agricultural life +of the early period had not caused entire loss of clan +organization and customs. But the growth of trade and +commerce under Solomon and later kings brought in wealth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +and shifted the center of power and influence from country +to city. Wealth and luxury had their usual results. +Clashing interests asserted their strength. Economic and +social individualism destroyed the old group solidarity. +At the times of the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, there +were classes of rich and poor. Greed had asserted itself +in rulers, judges, priests, and "regular" prophets. Oppression, +land monopoly, bribery, extortion, stirred moral +indignation. The fact that these were practiced by the +most zealous observers of ritual and guardians of religion +roused in the great reformers a demand for a change in +religion itself. Not sacrifices but justice is the need of +the hour and the demand of God.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. RELIGIOUS AGENCIES</h4> + +<p>The interaction between the religious and the moral +education of the Hebrews was so intimate that it is difficult +to distinguish the two, but we may abstract certain conceptions +or motives in Israel's religion which were especially +significant. The general conception was that of +the close personal relation between god and people. Israel +should have no other god; Jehovah—at least this was the +earlier thought—would have no other people. He had +loved and chosen Israel; Israel in gratitude, as well as +in hope and fear, must love and obey Jehovah. Priests +maintained his cultus; prophets brought new commands +according to the requirements of the hour; the king represented +his sovereignty and justice; the course of events +exhibited his purpose. Each of these elements served to +provoke or elicit moral reflection or moral conduct.</p> + +<p><b>1. The "Covenant" Relation was a Moral Conception.</b>—The +usual religious conception is that of some blood +or kin relation between people and deity. This has the +same potential meaning and value as that of the other +relations of group life outlined in Chapter II. But it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> +rather a natural than a "moral"—i.e., conscious and +voluntary—tie. To conceive of the relation between god +and people as due to voluntary choice, is to introduce +a powerful agency toward making morality conscious. +Whatever the origin of the idea, the significant fact is +that the religious and moral leaders present the relation +of Israel to Jehovah as based on a covenant. On the +one hand, Jehovah protects, preserves, and prospers; on +the other, Israel is to obey his laws and serve no other +gods. This conception of mutual obligation is presented +at the opening of the "Ten Commandments," and to this +covenant relation the prophets again and again make +appeal. The obligation to obey the law is not "This is +the custom," or "Our fathers did so"; it is placed on the +ground that the people has voluntarily accepted Jehovah +as its god and lawgiver.</p> + +<p>The meaning of this covenant and the symbols by which +it was conceived, changed with the advance of the social +relationships of the people. At first Jehovah was "Lord +of Hosts," protector in war, and giver of prosperity, +and the early conceptions of the duty of the people seemed +to include human sacrifice, at least in extreme cases. But +with later prophets we find the social and family relationship +of husband and father brought increasingly into +use. Whether by personal experience or by more general +reflection, we find Hosea interpreting the relationship +between God and his people in both of these family conceptions. +The disloyalty of the people takes on the more +intimate taint of a wife's unfaithfulness, and, conversely, +in contrast to the concepts of other religions, the people +may call Jehovah "my husband" and no longer "my +master" (Baal). The change from status to contract is +thus, in Israel's religion, fruitful with many moral results.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Conception of a Personal Lawgiver.</b>—The conception +of a personal lawgiver raises conduct from the +level of custom to the level of conscious morality. So<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> +long as a child follows certain ways by imitation or suggestion, +he does not necessarily attach any moral meaning +to them. But if the parent expressly commands or +prohibits, it becomes a matter of obedience or disobedience. +Choice becomes necessary. Character takes the +place of innocence. So Jehovah's law compelled obedience +or rebellion. Customs were either forbidden or enjoined. +In either case they ceased to be merely customs. In the +law of Israel the whole body of observances in private +life, in ceremonial, and in legal forms, is introduced with +a "Thus saith the Lord." We know that other Semitic +people observed the Sabbath, practiced circumcision, distinguished +clean from unclean beasts, and respected the +taboos of birth and death. Whether in Israel all these observances +were old customs given new authority by statute, +or were customs taken from other peoples under the authority +of the laws of Jehovah, is immaterial. The ethical significance +of the law is that these various observances, instead +of being treated merely as customs, are regarded as +personal commands of a personal deity.</p> + +<p>This makes a vital difference in the view taken of the violation +of these observances. When a man violates a custom +he fails to do the correct thing. He misses the mark.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> +But when the observance is a personal command, its violation +is a personal disobedience; it is rebellion; it is an act +of will. The evil which follows is no longer bad luck; it +is punishment. Now punishment must be either right +or wrong, moral or immoral. It can never be merely non-moral. +Hence the very conception of sin as a personal +offense, and of ill as a personal punishment, forces a moral +standard. In its crudest form this may take the god's +commands as right simply because he utters them, and +assume that the sufferer is guilty merely because he suffers. +We find this in the penitential psalms of the Babylonians. +These express the deepest conviction of sin and the utmost<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> +desire to please the god, but when we try to discover +what the penitent has done that wakens such remorse +within him, we find that he seems merely to feel that in +some way he has failed to please God, no matter how. He +experiences misfortune, whether of disease, or ill-luck, or +defeat, and is sure that this must be due to some offense. +He does not know what this may be. It may have been +that he has failed to repeat a formula in the right manner; +it is all one. He feels guilty and even exaggerates +his own guilt in view of the punishment which has befallen +him. Job's three friends apply the same logic to his case.<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> + +<p>But side by side with the conception that the laws of +Jehovah must be obeyed because they were his commands, +there was another doctrine which was but an extension of +the theory that the people had freely accepted their ruler. +This was that Jehovah's commands were not arbitrary. +They were right; they could be placed before the people +for their approval; they were "life"; "the judge of all +the earth" would "do right." We have here a striking +illustration of the principle that moral standards, at first +embodied in persons, slowly work free, so that persons are +judged by them.</p> + +<p><b>3. The Cultus as Morally Symbolical.</b>—The elaborate +cultus carried on by the priests, symbolized, however +imperfectly, certain moral ideas. The solicitous care for +ceremonial "purity" might have no direct moral value; +the contamination from contact with birth or death or +certain animals might be a very external sort of "un<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span>cleanness." +Nevertheless, they emphasized in the most +forcible manner a constant control over conduct by a +standard which was set by a divine law. The "holiness" +of the priests, as set apart to special service of Jehovah, +emphasized the seriousness of their work; and further, +it contributed to that distinction between spiritual and +material, between higher and lower, which is a part of +moral life. Moreover, while part of this value inheres in +all ritual, the contrast between Jehovah's worship and +that of other deities challenged moral attention. The gods +of the land, the various Baals, were worshipped "upon +every high hill and under every green tree." As gods +of fertility, they were symbolized by the emblems of sex, +and great freedom prevailed at their festivals. At certain +shrines men and women gave themselves for the service +of the god. The first born children were not infrequently +sacrificed.<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> These festivals and shrines seem to have been +adopted more or less fully by Israel from the Canaanites, +but the prophets have an utterly different idea of Jehovah's +worship. The god of Sinai rejects utterly such +practices. License and drunkenness are not, as the cultus +of Baal and Astarte implied, the proper symbols of life +and deity. The sensual cannot fitly symbolize the spiritual.</p> + +<p>Moreover, one part of the cultus, the "sin offering," +directly implied transgression and the need of forgiveness. +The "sins" might themselves be ceremonial rather than +moral, and the method of removing them might be external—especially +the process of putting the sins upon +a scapegoat which should "bear upon him all their iniquities +into a solitary land,"—nevertheless, the solemn confession, +and the shedding of the blood which was the +"life," could not but remind of responsibility and deepen +reflection. The need of atonement and reconciliation, thus +impressed, symbolized the moral process of reconstructing,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> +of putting away a lower past, and readjusting life to +meet an ideal.</p> + +<p><b>4. The Prophets as a Moral Force.</b>—The prophets +were by far the most significant moral agency in Israel's +religion. In the first place, they came to the people +bearing a message from a living source of authority, intended +for the immediate situation. They brought a present +command for a present duty. "Thou art the man," +of Nathan to David, "Hast thou killed, and also taken +possession?" of Elijah to Ahab, had personal occasions. +But the great sermons of Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, were +no less for the hour. A licentious festival, an Assyrian +invasion, an Egyptian embassy, a plague of locusts, an +impending captivity—these inspire demand for repentance, +warnings of destruction, promises of salvation. The +prophet was thus the "living fountain." The divine will +as coming through him "was still, so to speak, fluid, and +not congealed into institutions."</p> + +<p>In the second place, the prophets seized upon the inward +purpose and social conduct of man as the all-important +issues; cultus, sacrifice, are unimportant. "I hate, I despise +your feasts, and I will take no delight in your +solemn assemblies," cries Amos in Jehovah's name, "But +let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a +mighty stream." "I have had enough of the burnt offerings +of rams, and the fat of fed beasts," proclaims Isaiah, +"new moons, and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies,—I +cannot away with iniquity and the solemn meeting." You +need not ceremonial, but moral, purity. "Wash you, make +you clean; put away the evil of your doings;—seek justice, +relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead +for the widow." Micah's "Shall I give my first-born for +my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my +soul?" seized upon the difference once for all between the +physical and the moral; a completely ethical standpoint +is gained in his summary of religious duty: "What doth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +God require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, +and to walk humbly with thy God?" And the New Testament +analogue marks the true ethical valuation of all the +external religious manifestations, even of the cruder forms +of prophecy itself. Gifts, mysteries, knowledge, or the +"body to be burned"—there is a more excellent way than +these. For all these are "in part." Their value is but +temporary and relative. The values that abide, that stand +criticism, are that staking of oneself upon the truth and +worth of one's ideal which is faith; that aspiration and +forward look which is hope; that sum of all social charity, +sympathy, justice, and active helpfulness, which is love. +"But the greatest of these is love."</p> + +<p><b>5. The Religious View of the Kingdom Gave the +Setting for a Social Ideal.</b>—Jehovah was the king of +his people. The human ruler in Jerusalem was his representative. +The kingdom of Israel was under divine care +and had on the other hand a serious purpose. The expansion +and glory of the kingdom under Solomon showed +the divine favor. Division and calamity were not mere +misfortunes, or the victory of greater armies; they were +divine rebukes. Only in righteousness and justice could +the nation survive. On the other hand, the confidence in +Jehovah's love for Israel guaranteed that he would never +forsake his people. He would purify them and redeem +them even from the grave. He would establish a kingdom +of law and peace, "an everlasting kingdom that should +not be destroyed." Politics in Israel had a moral goal.</p> + +<p><b>6. Religion Gave the Problem of Evil a Moral Significance.</b>—The +Greek treatment of the problem of evil +is found in the great tragedies. An ancestral curse follows +down successive generations, dealing woe to all the +unhappy house. For the victims there seems to be nothing +but to suffer. The necessity of destiny makes the +catastrophe sublime, but also hopeless. Ibsen's <i>Ghosts</i> +is conceived in a similar spirit. There is a tremendous<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> +moral lesson in it for the fathers, but for the children +only horror. The Greek and the Scandinavian are doubtless +interpreting one phase of human life—its continuity +and dependence upon cosmical nature. But the Hebrew +was not content with this. His confidence in a divine government +of the world forced him to seek some moral value, +some purpose in the event. The search led along one path +to a readjustment of values; it led by another path to a +new view of social interdependence.</p> + +<p>The book of Job gives the deepest study of the first +of these problems. The old view had been that virtue +and happiness always went together. Prosperity meant +divine favor, and therefore it must be the good. Adversity +meant divine punishment; it showed wrongdoing +and was itself an evil. When calamity comes upon Job, his +friends assume it to be a sure proof of his wickedness. +He had himself held the same view, and since he refuses +to admit his wickedness and "holds fast to his integrity," +it confounds all his philosophy of life and of God. It +compels a "reversal and revaluation of all values." If +he could only meet God face to face and have it out +with him he believes there would be some solution. But +come what may, he will not sell his soul for happiness. +To "repent," as his friends urge, in order that he may +be again on good terms with God, would mean for him to +call sin what he believes to be righteousness. And he will +not lie in this way. God is doubtless stronger, and if +he pursues his victim relentlessly, may convict him. But +be this as it may, Job will not let go his fundamental +consciousness of right and wrong. His "moral self" +is the one anchor that holds, is the supreme value of life.</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"As God liveth, who hath taken away my right,<br /> +And the Almighty who hath vexed my soul;<br /> +Surely my lips shall not speak unrighteousness.<br /> +Till I die, I will not put away my integrity from me,<br /> +My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go."<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> +</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span></p> + +<p class="noidt">Another suggestion of the book is that evil comes to +prove man's sincerity: "Does Job serve God for naught?" +and from that standpoint the answer is, Yes; he does. +"There is a disinterested love of God."<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> In this setting, +also, the experience of suffering produces a shifting of +values from the extrinsic to the internal.</p> + +<p>The other treatment of the problem of suffering is +found in the latter half of Isaiah. It finds an interpretation +of the problem by a deeper view of social interdependence, +in which the old tribal solidarity is given, as it +were, a transfigured meaning. The individualistic interpretation +of suffering was that it meant personal guilt. +"We did esteem him stricken of God." This breaks down. +The suffering servant is not wicked. He is suffering for +others—in some sense. "He hath borne our griefs and +carried our sorrows." The conception here reached of +an interrelation which involves that the suffering of the +good may be due to the sin or the suffering of others, +and that the assumption of this burden marks the higher +type of ethical relation, is one of the finest products of +Israel's religion. As made central in the Christian conception +of the Cross, it has furnished one of the great elements +in the modern social consciousness.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. THE MORAL CONCEPTIONS ATTAINED</h4> + +<p>The moral conceptions which were thus worked out may +now be brought together for convenient summary under +the two heads of the "How" and the "What" indicated +in our introductory chapter. Under the first we +specify the conceptions resulting (1) from recognition of +a standard of right, and an ideal of good, (2) from +free choice of this ideal. Under the What we indicate +the content of the ideal on both its personal and its social +sides.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>1. Righteousness and Sin.</b>—Righteousness and sin +were not exact or contradictory opposites. The righteous +man was not necessarily sinless. Nevertheless, the consciousness +of sin, like a dark background, brought out +more emphatically the conception of righteousness. This +conception had its two aspects, derived from the civil and +the religious spheres of life—spheres which were not +separate for the Hebrew. On the one hand, the just or +righteous respected the moral order in human society. +The unrighteous was unjust, extortionate, cruel. He did +not respect the rights of others. On the other hand, +the righteous man was in "right" relation to God. This +right relation might be tested by the divine law; but as +God was conceived as a living person, loving his people, +"forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin," it might +also be measured by an essential harmony of spirit with +the divine will. There was the "righteousness of the law," +and the "righteousness of faith." The first implies complete +obedience; the second implies that in spite of transgressions +there is room for atonement<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> or reconciliation. +As the first means ethically the testing of conduct by a +moral standard, a "moral law," so the second stands for +the thought that character is rather a matter of spirit +and of constant reconstruction than of exact conformity +once for all to a hard and fast rule. Specific acts may +fail to conform, but the life is more than a series of specific +acts. The measurement of conduct by the law has its +value to quicken a sense of shortcoming, but alone it may +also lead either to self-righteous complacency or to despair. +The possibility of new adjustment, of renewal, of +"a new birth," means liberation and life. As such it may +be contrasted with the Buddhist doctrine of Karma, the +causality from which there is no escape but by the extinction +of desire.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> + +<p>"Sin" had likewise its various aspects. It stood for +missing the mark, for violating the rules of clean and unclean; +but it stood also for personal disobedience to the +divine will, for violation of the moral order of Israel. In +this latter sense, as identified by the prophets with social +unrighteousness, it is a significant ethical conception. It +brings out the point that evil and wrongdoing are not +merely individual matters, not merely failures; they offend +against a law which is above the private self, against a +moral order which has its rightful demands upon us.</p> + +<p><b>2. Personal Responsibility.</b>—The transition from group +to individual responsibility was thoroughly worked out by +the prophets, even if they were not able to carry full popular +assent. In early days the whole kin was treated as guilty +for the offense of the kinsman. Achan's case has already +been cited; and in the case of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, +"Their wives and their sons and their little ones" were +all treated alike.<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> In like manner, the family of the +righteous man shared in the divine favor. The later +prophets pronounced a radical change. The proverb, +"The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's +teeth are set on edge," is no more to be used, declares +Ezekiel, speaking for Jehovah. "The soul that sinneth, it +shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, +neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son;" +and it is especially interesting to note that the Lord is +represented as pleading with the people that this is fair, +while the people say, "Wherefore doth not the son bear +the iniquity of the father?" The solidarity of the family +resisted the individualism of the prophetic conception, and +five hundred years after Ezekiel the traces of the older +conception still lingered in the question, "Who did sin, +this man or his parents, that he was born blind?"<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> For +another aspect of responsibility, viz., intent, as distinct<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> +from accidental action,<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> we have certain transitional steps +shown in the interesting "cities of refuge"<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> for the accidental +homicide in which he might be safe from the +avenger of blood, provided he was swift enough of foot to +reach a city of refuge before he was caught. But the fullest +development in the ethics of responsibility along this +line seemed to take the form described under the next head.</p> + +<p><b>3. Sincerity, and Purity of Motive.</b>—The Hebrew had +a philosophy of conduct which made it chiefly a matter +of "wisdom" and "folly," but the favorite term of prophet +and psalmist to symbolize the central principle was rather +"the heart." This term stood for the voluntary disposition, +especially in its inner springs of emotions and sentiments, +affections and passions. The Greek was inclined +to look askance at this side of life, to regard the emotions +as perturbations of the soul, and to seek their control +by reason, or even their repression or elimination. The +Hebrew found a more positive value in the emotional side +of conduct, and at the same time worked out the conception +of a sincere and thoroughgoing interest as lying +at the very root of all right life. The religious influence +was as elsewhere the important agency. "Man +looketh on the outward appearance, but Jehovah looketh +on the heart," "If I regard iniquity in my heart, Jehovah +will not hear me," are characteristic expressions. A divine +vision, which penetrates to the deepest springs of purpose +and feeling, will not tolerate pretense. Nor will it be satisfied +with anything less than entire devotion: the Israelite +must serve Jehovah with all his heart. Outer con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>formity +is not enough: "Rend your heart and not your +garments." It is the "pure in heart" who have the +beatific vision. Not external contacts, or ceremonial +"uncleanness," on which earlier ritual had insisted, defile +the man, but rather what proceeds from the heart. For +the heart is the source of evil thoughts and evil deeds.<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> +And conversely, the interests, the emotions, and enthusiasms +which make up the man's deepest self do not spring +forth in a vacuum; they go with the steadfast purpose +and bent, with the self of achievement. "Where your +treasure is, there will your heart be also."</p> + +<p>Purity of motive in a full moral consciousness means +not only (formal) sincerity, but sincere love of good +and right. This was not stated by the Hebrew in abstract +terms, but in the personal language of love to God. In +early days there had been more or less of external motives +in the appeals of the law and the prophets. Fear +of punishment, hope of reward, blessings in basket and +store, curses in land and field, were used to induce fidelity. +But some of the prophets sought a deeper view, which +seems to have been reached in the bitterness of human +experience. Hosea's wife had forsaken him, and should not +the love of people to Jehovah be as personal and sincere +as that of wife to husband? She had said, "I will go +after my lovers <i>that give me my bread and my water, my +wood and my flax, my oil and my drink</i>."<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> Is not serving +God for hire a form of prostitution?<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> The calamities +of the nation tested the disinterestedness of its fidelity. +They were the challenge of the Adversary, "Doth Job +fear God for naught?" And a remnant at least attested +that fidelity did not depend on rewards. The moral maxim +that virtue is its own reward is put in personal terms +by the prophet after the exile:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For though the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall +fruit be in the vines; the labor of the olive shall fail, and the +fields shall yield no meat; the flock shall be cut off from the +fold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls: Yet I will +rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation."<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>4. The Conception of "Life" as an Ideal.</b>—The content +of Israel's moral ideal on its individual side was +expressed by the term "Life." All the blessings that the +leader of Israel could offer his people were summarized +in the phrase, "I have set before you life and death; +wherefore choose life." The same final standard of value +appears in the question of Jesus, "What shall it profit +a man to gain the whole world and lose his own life?" +When we inquire what life meant, so far as the early +sources give us data for judgment, we must infer it +to have been measured largely in terms of material comfort +and prosperity, accompanied by the satisfaction of +standing in right relations to the god and ruler. This +latter element was so closely united with the first that +it was practically identical with it. If the people were +prosperous they might assume that they were right; if +they suffered they were surely wrong. Good and evil +were, therefore, in this stage, measured largely in terms +of pleasure and pain. The end to be sought and the ideal +to be kept in mind was that of long and prosperous life—"in +her right hand length of days, in her left hand +riches and honor." Intellectual and æsthetic interests +were not prized as such. The knowledge which was +valued was the wisdom for the conduct of life, of which +the beginning and crown was "the fear of the Lord." +The art which was valued was sacred song or poetry. +But the ideal values which came to bulk most in the expanding +conception of "life" were those of personal relation. +Family ties, always strong among Oriental peoples, +gained in purity. Love between the sexes was refined and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> +idealized.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> National feeling took on added dignity, because +of the consciousness of a divine mission. Above all, +personal union with God, as voiced in the psalms and +prophets, became the desire. He, and not his gifts, was +the supreme good. He was the "fountain of life." His +likeness would satisfy. In his light the faithful would +see light.</p> + +<p>But even more significant than any specific content put +into the term "life," was <i>what was involved in the idea +itself</i>. The legalists had attempted to define conduct +by a code, but there was an inherent vitality in the ideal +of life, which refused to be measured or bounded. The +"words of eternal life," which began the new moral movement +of Christianity, had perhaps little definite content +to the fishermen, and it is not easy to say just what they +meant in moral terms to the writer of the Fourth Gospel +who uses the phrase so often. With Paul, life as the realm +of the spirit gets definition as it stands over against +the "death" of sin and lust. But with all writers of Old +or New Testament, whatever content it had, life meant +above all the suggestion of something beyond, the gleam +and dynamic power of a future not yet understood. It +meant to Paul a progress which was governed not by +law or "rudiments," but by freedom. Such a life would +set itself new and higher standards; the laws and customs +that had obtained were felt to be outgrown. The significance +of early Christianity as a moral movement, aside +from its elements of personal devotion and social unity to +be noticed below, was the spirit of movement, the sense of +newly forming horizons beyond the old, the conviction +that as sons of God its followers had boundless possibilities, +that they were not the children of the bond woman, +but of the free.</p> + +<p><b>5. The Social Ideal of Justice, Love, and Peace.</b>—We +have seen how this ideal was framed in the setting of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> +a kingdom of God. At first national, it became universal, +and with a fraternity which the world is far from having +realized, it was to know "neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor +free." At first military, it took on with seer and psalmist +the form of a reign of peace and justice. After the fierce +and crude powers typified by the lion and the bear and +the leopard had passed, the seer saw a kingdom represented +by a human form. Such a kingdom it was that +should not pass away. Such was the kingdom "not of this +world" which Jesus presented as his message. Membership +in this moral kingdom was for the poor in spirit, +the pure in heart, the merciful, the peace-makers, the +hungerers after righteousness. Greatness in this moral +community was to depend on service, not on power. The +king should not fail till he had "set justice in the earth." +He should "deliver the needy, and the poor."</p> + +<p>Certain features of this ideal order have since found +embodiment in social and political structures; certain +features remain for the future. Certain periods in history +have transferred the ideal entirely to another world, regarding +human society as hopelessly given over to evil. +Such theories find a morality possible only by renouncing +society. The Hebrews presented rather the ideal of a +moral order on earth, of a control of all life by right, of +a realization of good, and of a completeness of life. It +was an ideal not dreamed out in ecstatic visions of pure +fancy, but worked out in struggle and suffering, in confidence +that moral efforts are not hopeless or destined to +defeat. The ideal order is to be made real. The divine +kingdom is to come, the divine will to be done "<i>on earth</i> +as it is in heaven."</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>The works of W. R. Smith (<i>Religion of the Semites</i>) and Barton +(<i>A Sketch of Semitic Origins</i>) already mentioned. Schultz, <i>Old +Testament Theology</i>, tr. <i>1892</i>; Marti, <i>Religion of the Old Testament</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span>, +tr. 1907; Budde, <i>Religion of the Old Testament to the Exile</i>, +1899; H. P. Smith, <i>Old Testament History</i>, 1903; W. R. Smith, <i>The +Prophets of Israel</i>, 1895; Bruce, <i>Ethics of the Old Testament</i>, 1895; +Peake, <i>Problem of Suffering in the Old Testament</i>, 1904; Royce, <i>The +Problem of Job</i> in Studies of Good and Evil, 1898; Pratt, <i>The +Psychology of Religious Belief</i>, 1907, ch. v.; Harnack, <i>What is +Christianity?</i> tr. 1901; Cone, <i>Rich and Poor in the New Testament</i>, +1902; Pfleiderer, <i>Primitive Christianity</i>, tr. 1906; Matthews, <i>The +Social Teaching of Jesus</i>, 1897; Wendt, <i>The Teaching of Jesus</i>, 1899; +Pfleiderer, <i>Paulinism</i>, 1891; Cone, <i>Paul, The Man, the Missionary, +and the Teacher</i>, 1898; Beyschlag, <i>New Testament Theology</i>, tr. 1895; +The <i>Encyclopedia Biblica</i>, <i>The Jewish Encyclopedia</i>, and Hastings' +<i>Dictionary</i>, have numerous valuable articles.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> M. Arnold, "Hebraism and Hellenism," in <i>Culture and Anarchy</i>, +ch. iv.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> The Hebrew and Greek words for sin both mean "to miss."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> The general function of punishment as bringing home to the individual +the consciousness of guilt and thus awakening the action of +conscience, has an illustration in Shakespere's conception of the +prayer of Henry Vth before the battle of Agincourt. In ordinary +life the bluff King Harry devotes little time to meditation upon +his own sin or that of his father, but on the eve of possible calamity +the old crime rises fresh before him. Stimulated by the thought of +an actual penalty to be imposed by a recognized authority, he cried: +"Not to-day, O Lord! Oh, not to-day! Think not upon the fault +my father made in compassing the crown."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> Recent excavations are held to confirm the prophets on this +(Marti, <i>Religion of the Old Testament</i>, pp. 78 ff.).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Job 27:1-6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Genung, <i>Job, The Epic of the Inner Life</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> See <i>Atonement in Literature and in Life</i>, by Charles A. Dinsmore. +Boston, 1906.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> Numbers 16, Joshua 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> John 9:2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Hammurabi's code showed a disregard of intent which would +make surgery a dangerous profession: "If a physician operate on a +man for a severe wound with a bronze lancet and cause the man's +death; or open an abscess [in the eye] of a man with a bronze lancet +and destroy the man's eye, they shall cut off his fingers." Early +German and English law is just as naïve. If a weapon was left to be +repaired at a smith's and was then caught up or stolen and used +to do harm, the original owner was held responsible.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Numbers 35, Deuteronomy 19, Joshua 20.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Mark 7:1-23.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Hosea 2:5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> H. P. Smith, <i>Old Testament History</i>, p. 222.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Habakkuk 3:17, 18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> The Song of Songs.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER VII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEKS</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. THE FUNDAMENTAL NOTES</h4> + +<p><b>Convention versus Nature.</b>—The Hebrew moral life +was developed under the relation, first of the people, then +of the individuals, to God,—a relation at once of union +and of conflict. It was out of the relation of the individual +to social traditions and political order that the +Greek came to full consciousness of moral law on the +one hand, and a moral personality on the other. And +just as in Jewish life the law and the prophets (or, +later, the "law and the gospel") stood for the conflicting +forces, so in Greek life the opposition between the authority +of the group, embodied in custom and institutions, on +the one hand, and the urging claims of developing personality, +manifest in both intelligence and desire, on the +other, found expression in contrasted terms. The authority +of the group embodied in customs and institutions, came +to be regarded by the radicals as relatively external, artificial, +and rigid. It was dubbed "convention," or "institution" +(<i>thesis</i>, what is set up). The rapidly developing +intelligence challenged the merely customary and traditional; +the increasing individuality challenged the superior +authority of the group, especially when this manifested +itself apparently in a government of force. Personal +intelligence and personal feeling asserted a more elemental +claim, felt themselves rooted in a more original source, +and called this source "nature" (<i>physis</i>). Social tradition +and authority, individual reason and feeling, thus +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>confronted each other as "convention" and "nature." It +was a struggle which has its analogy in the development of +many a young man or young woman who is emerging from +parental control to self-direction. But in Greek life more +distinctly than elsewhere we see the steps of the process +as a civic and not merely an individual development. +Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides presented this conflict +of the individual with law or destiny as the great, +oft-repeated tragedy of human life. Aristophanes mocked +with bitter satire the "new" views. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, +Cynics, Cyrenaics, Epicureans, and Stoics took part +in the theoretical discussions.</p> + +<p><b>Measure.</b>—The fundamental note of all Greek life, +before, during, and after this development, was <i>Measure</i>, +<i>Order</i>, <i>Proportion</i>. This note found expression in religion, +science, art, and conduct. Among their gods, the +Greeks set Moira, "Destiny," and Themis, "Custom," +"Law," "Right." They found order in the universe, +which on this account they called the "cosmos." They +expressed it in their arts, especially in architecture, sculpture, +the choral dance, and the more highly developed +tragedy or lyric:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And all life is full of them [of form and measure]," says +Plato, "as well as every constructive and creative art. And +surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive +art are full of them,—weaving, embroidery, architecture, +and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and +vegetable,—in all of them there is grace or the absence of +grace; and if our youth are to do their work in life, must they +not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?"</p></div> + +<p>The best people, the "gentlemen," were styled kaloika-gathoi—"fair +and good." The motto at the Delphic +shrine was, "Nothing in excess." Insolent disregard of +propriety, "hybris," was the quality most denounced by the +early moralizing poets. Tityus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus, +the three special subjects of divine punishment, suffered the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> +penalty of insatiate desire, or limits overstepped. And +after criticism and individualism had done their work, +Plato's conception of justice, Aristotle's doctrine of the +"mean," the Stoic maxim of "life according to nature," +have but discovered a deeper significance for the fundamental +law of Greek life.</p> + +<p><b>The Good and the Just.</b>—The conceptions of the Good +and the Just are developed from the two notes just presented. +The motive for challenge to established institutions +was the awakening desire of the individual to seek +his own good and to live his own life. Commerce was +bringing a great variety of rewards to the shrewd merchant +and a great variety of goods to evoke and gratify +wants. Slavery set free the citizen from the need of +manual labor and gave him leisure to cultivate his tastes. +The forces of individualism, described in Chapter V., were +all at work to bring the process and object of desire to +consciousness. Moreover, the term "good" was also in use +to mark the popular ideal. It was applied to what we +should call the "successful" men of the day. In present +life our term "good" has become so definitely moral that +probably most young persons would hesitate to say that +they have it as their ideal to become good, although few +would hesitate to say that they wish to be capable and +successful. For social and political recognition seems to +be based rather on achievement of striking results than +upon what is technically called "goodness." But in Greece +moral goodness was not used to designate "character" as +contrasted with "results." The "good man" was like the +"good lawyer" or "good athlete" or "good soldier," the +man who was efficient and conspicuous. It was in the process +which we are to trace that the ambiguities and deeper +meanings of the term came to definition.</p> + +<p>The terms Just and Justice were not of course merely +synonyms for order and measure. They had likewise +the social significance coming from the courts and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> +assembly. They stood for the control side of life, as Good +stood for its aspect of valuation and desire. But as compared +with the Hebrew conception of righteousness, they +meant much less a conformity to a law divine or human +which had been already set up as standard, and much +more, an ordering, a regulating, a harmonizing. The +rational element of measure or order was more prominent +than the personal note of authority. Hence we shall find +Plato passing easily back and forth between justice or +order in the individual and justice or order in the State. +On the other hand, the radicals of the day could seize +upon the legal usage and declare that Justice or the Law +was purely a matter of self-interest or class interest.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. INTELLECTUAL FORCES OF INDIVIDUALISM</h4> + +<p><b>The Scientific Spirit.</b>—The older standards were embodied +in religious and political ideas and institutions; +the agency which was to disentangle and bring into clear +consciousness the standards <i>as such</i>, was the scientific +spirit, the knowledge and reflection of an intellectual people +at a period of extraordinarily rapid development. The +commercial life, the free intercourse with other peoples +and civilizations, especially in the colonies, the absence +of any generally dominating political authority, the architectural +problems suggested by a beauty-loving people,—all +promoted alertness and flexibility of mind.</p> + +<p>In a concrete form, this rational character had already +found expression in the quality of Greek art. Reference +has already been made to the formal side of Greek art, +with its embodiment of rhythm and measure; the subject-matter +shows the same element. The Greek world, as contrasted +with the barbarian world, was conceived by the +Greek as the realm of light contrasted with darkness; the +national God, Apollo, embodied this ideal of light and +reason, and his fitting symbol was the sun. The great<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> +Pan-Athenaic procession, as reproduced in the Parthenon +frieze, celebrated the triumph of Greek light and intelligence +over barbarian darkness. Athena, goddess of wisdom, +was a fitting guardian of the most Greek of all +Greek cities. Greek tragedy, beginning in hymns of +worship, soon passed over into a portrayal of the all-controlling +laws of life, as these are brought into stronger +relief by a tragic collision with human agents.</p> + +<p>It was, however, in the realm of science that this intellectual +genius found field for expression in a clearly conscious +manner. Almost all our sciences were originated +by the Greeks, and they were particularly successful in +those which called for abstract thinking in the highest +degree. Euclid's geometry and Aristotle's logic are conspicuous +illustrations of this ability. The most general +conceptions of natural science: e.g., the conception of the +atom and the whole materialistic theory of the universe; +the conception of evolution, meaning by this the process +of change according to an all-controlling law; the conception +of natural selection, according to which those organisms +survive which are fitted for their environment,—all +these were the product of the keen intelligence of the +Greeks. Nor was their scientific ability expended upon +external nature alone. The conception of history as more +than a series of events, the comparative method in the +study of political systems, the analysis of literary and +artistic effects, attest the same clarity of mind and the +same eager search for the most general laws of every aspect +of experience.</p> + +<p><b>Science and Religion.</b>—When, now, this scientific mind +began to consider the practical guidance of life, the older +political and religious controls presented serious difficulty. +The gods were supposed to reward the good and punish +the evil,<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> but how could this be reconciled with their practices?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> +Æschylus attempted a purifying and elevating of +the divine ideal, similar to that which Israel's conception +underwent in the work of the prophets. He magnified the +dignity and providential government of Zeus, which, +though dark, is yet just and certain. But the great +obstacle was that the earlier and cruder conceptions of +the gods had been fixed in literary form; the tales of +Cronos's impiety to Uranos, of Zeus' deceitful messenger +and marital unfaithfulness, of Aphrodite's amours, and +Hermes' gift of theft, were all written in Hesiod and +Homer. The cruder conceptions of the gods had thus become +too firmly fixed in the popular imagination to be +capable of becoming the bearers of advancing ethical +ideals, and so not merely the irreverent scoffer, but the +serious tragedian, Euripides, and the religious idealist, +Plato, do not hesitate to challenge boldly the older conceptions, +or to demand a revision of all this literature before +it comes into the hands of the young.</p> + +<p><b>Social Standards.</b>—The social standards of propriety +and honorable conduct were likewise brought in question +by advancing intelligence. The word which summed up +the early Greek idea of the best type was <i>Kalokagathos</i>. +This word was very nearly the equivalent of our English +word "gentleman." It combined the elements of birth, +ability, and refinement, but in the earlier usage the emphasis +was upon the fact of birth, even as our terms "generous," +"noble," "gentle," originally referred to membership +in a "gens." Socrates investigated the current estimates +and found that the people who were generally regarded +as the "respectable," or, as we should say, the "best" +people of Athens, were not necessarily either "fine" or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> +"good" in person or character; the term had come to be +one of "convention," without basis in reason. Plato goes +still further and with a direct application of the rational +standard to the current estimates, pokes fun at the conventional +judgment of what constitutes the respectable +gentleman.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When they sing the praises of family and say that some +one is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of +wealthy ancestors, he [the philosopher] thinks that their sentiments +only betray the dullness and narrowness of vision of +those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to +look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had +thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them have +been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, +many times over. And when some one boasts of a catalogue +of twenty-five ancestors, and goes back to Heracles, the son +of Amphitryon, he cannot understand his poverty of ideas. +Why is he unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth +ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as +fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He is +amused at the notion that he cannot do a sum, and thinks that +a little arithmetic would have got rid of his senseless vanity."</p></div> + +<p>The type of life that is really noble or fine and good +is to be found in the seeker for true beauty and goodness. +External beauty of form and appearance has its +value in kindling the desire for the higher forms of beauty,—beauty +of mind, of institutions and laws, of science,—until +finally the conception of the true beauty is reached. +This true beauty, as distinct from the particular beauties, +and true good, as distinct from seeming or partial good, +are discovered only by the "philosopher," the seeker for +wisdom.</p> + +<p><b>Popular Morals.</b>—Nor did the more positively recognized +types of moral excellence fare better. As recognized +in common life, they were courage, prudence or moderation, +holiness or a certain respect for the serious things +of life, and justice: but none of these, Plato argues, is +really an independent excellence, apart from conscious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> +and intelligent action. Courage, for example, is not really +courage unless one knows and foresees the danger in all +its strength; otherwise there is merely reckless bravery. +Prudence or moderation, to be really excellent, must be +measured by wisdom. Even justice cannot be regarded +as at bottom distinct from wisdom, the true measure of +all the relations of life.</p> + +<p><b>Science and the Laws.</b>—The political control was likewise +involved in question by the same forces of intelligence +which had challenged the religious authority. The frequent +changes of government, and the more or less +arbitrary measures that were oftentimes adopted, were +adapted to awaken doubt as to the absolute right and +authority of the laws. The despot who gained control +in many a Greek city was not bound by ties of blood +to all members of the community, nor did he govern in +accordance with the ancestral traditions of the tribe. +The political authority frequently clashed with the instincts +and traditions of family and kinship. Under such +circumstances, the political authority was likely to be +challenged and its constraining power stretched to the +breaking point. So in the <i>Antigone</i> of Sophocles, the +command of the ruler is opposed to the "higher law" of +kinship and nature. The law of man is not the law of +nature or of God. To disobey this conventional law of +man is to be guilty of "holiest crime." The old standards, +both of religion and of political life, crumbled before the +analysis of the developing intelligence, and the demand +for some standard could be met only by the intelligence +itself. To question the old must inevitably seem irreverent +and anarchical. Some questioned merely to doubt; others, +and of these Socrates was the leader, questioned in order +to find a firmer basis, a more authoritative standard. But +naturally the popular mind did not distinguish between +these two classes of questioners, and so Socrates perished, +not merely as the victim of unjust popular calumny, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> +as the victim of the tragedy of moral progress, of the +change from the established to the new.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL INDIVIDUALISM</h4> + +<p>A further line of development joined forces with this +growth of intelligence, to emphasize the problem of moral +control, and to set the individual with his standards over +against the objective standards of society. This was the +rapidly growing consciousness of individual goods and +interests. The commercial life, with its possibilities of +individual property, the rapid changes of political life, +with the rise of individuals to power and privilege, the +increasing opportunities which a high civilization brought +both men and women for personal enjoyment and gratification +of rapidly increasing wants, all tended to make the +individual seek his own good, and to shift the emphasis +of life from the question, What is proper, or honorable? +to the question, What is <i>good</i>—good for <i>me</i>?</p> + +<p><b>Class Interests.</b>—The conviction that the authority of +government and law was largely dictated by the very considerations +of private interests which they were supposed +to overrule and eliminate, made the situation more acute. +For the Greek States were no longer groups with common +interests. The growth of capital, the corresponding eagerness +for gain, the formation of distinct classes, each intent +on its interests, supplanted the older, more homogeneous +State. "The whole development of the political +life of the Hellenic republics depended ultimately on the +decision of the question, which of the different social +classes—the capitalistic minority, the middle class, or +the poor—should obtain the dominant place." Aristotle +defines an oligarchy as a State governed in the interest +of the rich; a democracy, as a State governed in the +interest of the poor. Another contemporary writer explains +a democracy as consulting the interests of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> +democrats, the "lower classes," and considers this a matter +of course, "for if the rich had the say, they would do +what was good for themselves but not for the multitude." +Naturally such dominance by classes called out vigorous +criticisms upon the laws and standards so established. +The aristocratic minority inveighed against "custom" or +conventions which would tame the strong to the level of the +weak. Nature demands rather the "survival of the fittest," +i.e., of the strong. The enlightened spectator of the game +of government, on the other hand, declares that all laws +are made in the interest of ruling classes. The reader of +current criticisms on laws and courts will see how close +is the parallel to present complaints. We have to-day +the same two classes: One inveighs against governmental +interference with the right to combine, to contract, and +in general to get from the earth or from men, women, +and children all that superior power and shrewdness can +possibly extract. The other complains that legislatures +are owned by wealth, that judges are appointed from corporation +lawyers, that common law is a survival of ancient +aristocratic status, and that for these reasons labor can +get no justice.</p> + +<p>Let us first hear the plea for inequality:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Custom and nature are generally at variance with one another; +... for by the rule of nature, that only is the more +disgraceful which is the greater evil; as, for example, to suffer +injustice; but by the rule of custom, to do evil is the more +disgraceful. For this suffering of injustice is not the part of +a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; for +when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help +himself or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I +conceive, is that the makers of laws are the many weak; and +they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a +view to themselves and their own interests; and they terrify +the mightier sort of men, and those who are able to get the +better of them, in order that they may not get the better of +them; and they say that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; +meanwhile, when they speak of injustice, they desire to have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> +more than their neighbors, for knowing their own inferiority, +they are only too glad of equality. And therefore, this seeking +to have more than the many is conventionally said to be +shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature +herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more +than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in +many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, +and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists +in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. +For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or +his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other +examples). They, I conceive, act according to nature; yes, +and according to the law of nature; not perhaps, according to +that artificial law which we frame and fashion, taking the best +and strongest of us from their youth upwards, and taming +them like young lions, and charming them with the sound of +the voice, saying to them that with equality they must be content, +and that this is the honorable and the just. But if there +were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and +break through and escape from all this; he would trample +under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our +laws, sinning against nature; the slave would rise in rebellion +and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would +shine forth. And this I take to be the lesson of Pindar, in +the poem in which he says that</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"'Law is the King of all, mortals as well as immortals!'<br /> +</p> + +<p class="noidt">This, as he says:</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"'Makes might to be right, and does violence with exalted hand; as<br /> +I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them——'<br /> +</p> + +<p>"I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, +that he carried off the oxen of Geryon without buying them, +and without their being given to him by Geryon, according +to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions +of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the +stronger and superior." (<span class="smcap">Plato</span>, <i>Gorgias</i>, 482-4.)</p></div> + +<p>The essence of this view is, therefore, that might is +right, and that no legislation or conventional code ought +to stand in the way of the free assertion of genius and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> +power. It is similar to the teaching of Nietzsche in +recent times.</p> + +<p>But the other side had its complaint also. The laws +are made by the "shepherds" of the people, as Homer +called them. But who is now so simple as to suppose that +the "shepherds" fatten or tend the sheep with a view to +the good of the sheep, and not to their own good? All +laws and governments really exist for the interest of the +ruling class.<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> They rest upon convention or "institution," +not upon "nature."</p> + +<p><b>Why Obey Laws?</b>—And if laws and social codes are but +class legislation, conventional, why obey them? The older +Greek life had felt the motives described in Chapter IV., +though it had embodied them in symbolism and imagery. +The Nemesis that followed the guilty, the Erinnys, or +avenging goddesses, were the personified wrath of outraged +law; <i>aidōs</i>, respect or reverence, <i>aischyne</i>, regard for public +opinion, were the inner feelings. But with the advancing +tide of intellectual criticism and individual interest, these +sanctions were discredited; feelings of personal enjoyment +demanded recognition, and the moralists at first appealed +to this. "Parents and tutors are always telling their sons +and their wards that they are to be just; but only not for +the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and +reputation." But if the only reason for justice is reputation, +there might seem to be no sufficient reason for +taking the thorny path, if there be an easier. Will not +the youth say, in the words of Pindar:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Can I by justice, or by crooked ways of deceit, ascend a +loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?"<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p></div> + +<p>And if I decide that the crooked way is the easier, why +shall I not follow it? My party, or my "union", or my +lawyer will stand by and see me through:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of +wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great +is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we +would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. +With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods +and political clubs. And there are professors of +rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; +and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall +make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a +voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they +be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose +them to have no care of human things, why in either case +should we mind about concealment?"<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p></div> + +<p>Besides, the greatest prizes, not only in material goods, +but even in the line of reputation, seemed to fall to the +individualist if he could only act on a sufficiently large +scale. He could then be both prosperous and "respectable." +If he could steal the government, or, in modern +phrase, bribe a legislature to elect him to Congress, pass +special legislation, or grant a franchise, he could not +merely escape punishment, but be honored by his fellows.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I am speaking of injustice on a large scale, in which the +advantage of the unjust is most apparent, and my meaning +will be most clearly seen in that highest form of injustice, the +perpetrator of which is the happiest of men, as the sufferers +of these who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—I +mean tyranny which by fraud and force takes away the property +of others, not retail but wholesale; comprehending in one +things sacred as well as profane, private and public, for any +one of which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating +them singly, he would be punished and incur great dishonor; +for they who are guilty of any of these crimes in single +instances are called robbers of temples and man-stealers and +burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man has +taken away the money of the citizens and made slaves of them, +then instead of these dishonorable names, he is called happy +and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his +having achieved the consummation of injustice. For injustice +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span>is censured because the censurers are afraid of suffering, and +not from any fear which they have of doing injustice. And +thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient +scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; +and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the +stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest."<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p></div> + + +<h4>§ 4. INDIVIDUALISM AND ETHICAL THEORY</h4> + +<p><b>The Question Formulated.</b>—The outcome of this first +movement was thus twofold: (a) It forced the questions, +"What is just?" "What is good?" into clear and +definite consciousness. The very necessity of comparison +and of getting a <i>general standard</i>, forced the inquirer +to disentangle the concepts previously embodied in customs +and laws. But when the essence was thus found and +freed, or disembodied, as it were, the custom seemed lifeless, +merely "convention", and the essence often quite opposed +to the form. (b) It emphasized the <i>personal interest</i>, the +affective or emotional side of conduct, and made the moral +problem take the form, "What is the good?"</p> + +<p>Furthermore, two positive theses have been established +by the very forces which have been active in disintegrating +the old status. If custom no longer suffices, then reason +must set the standard; if society cannot prescribe the good +to the individual, then the individual must find some method +of defining and seeking it for himself unless he is to make +shipwreck of his whole venture.</p> + +<p>We may bring both aspects of the problem under the +conception of "nature", as opposed to convention or institution. +Convention is indeed outgrown, nature is the imperious +authority. But granting that nature is rightful +master, is "nature" to be sought in the primitive beginnings, +or in the fullest development? in a life of isolation, +or in a life of society? in the desires and passions, or in +reason and a harmonious life?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span></p> + +<p>Or, stating the same problem otherwise: granting that +reason must fix the measure, and the individual must define +and seek the good for himself, is the good to be found in +isolation, or is it to be sought in human society with its +bonds of family, friendship, and justice? Is the end to +be pleasure, found in the gratification of desires, irrespective +of their quality, and is it the business of reason +merely to measure one gratification with another and get +the most? or is wisdom itself a good, and is it better to +satisfy certain impulses rather than others? i.e., shall +reason form the standard as well as apply it?</p> + +<p>These contrasting solutions of the problem of life may +be stated then under the two pairs of antitheses: (1) The +Individual <i>versus</i> the Social; (2) The Immediate Satisfaction +<i>versus</i> an Ideal Standard, at once higher and more +permanent.</p> + +<p><b>Typical Solutions.</b>—Poets, radicals, sensualists, individualists +of no philosophic school, as well as the historic +philosophic schools, contributed to the discussion and solution +of these problems. All sought the "natural" life; but +it is noteworthy that all the philosophic schools claimed +Socrates as their master, and all sought to justify their +answers by reason, all made the wise man the ideal. The +Cynics and Cyrenaics, Stoics and Epicureans, Plato and +Aristotle represent the various philosophic answers to these +alternatives. Cynics and Cyrenaics both answer (1) by +individualism, but diverge on (2), the Cynics placing emphasis +on independence from wants, the Cyrenaics on gratification +of wants. Stoics and Epicureans represent +broader and more social development of the same principles, +the Stoics seeking a cosmopolitan state, the Epicureans +a community of friends; the Stoics emphasizing +reason or wisdom as the only good; the Epicureans finding +for wisdom a field in the selection of refined pleasures. +Plato and Aristotle, with varying emphasis but essential +agreement, insist (1) that the good of man is found in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> +fulfilling completely his highest possible functions, which +is possible only in society; (2) that wisdom is not merely +to apply a standard but to form one; that while neither +reason alone nor feeling alone is enough for life, yet that +pleasure is rather for life than life for pleasure. Finally, +Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, as well as the tragic poets, +contribute successively to the formation of an ideal of +responsible character.</p> + +<p><b>Early Individualistic Theories.</b>—Cynics and Cyrenaics +were alike individualists. Society, they held, is artificial. +Its so-called goods, on the one hand, and its restrictions +on the other, are to be rejected unless they favor the +individual's happiness. Independence was the mark of wisdom +among the Cynics; Antisthenes, proud of the holes in +his garment; Diogenes, dwelling in his tent or sleeping in +the street, scoffing at the current "conventions" of decency, +asking from Philip only that he would get out of his sunshine—are +the characteristic figures. The "state of nature" +was opposed to the State. Only the primitive wants +were recognized as natural. "Art and science, family and +native land, were indifferent. Wealth and refinement, fame +and honor, seemed as superfluous as those enjoyments of +the senses which went beyond the satisfaction of the natural +wants of hunger and sex."</p> + +<p>The Cyrenaics, or hedonists (<i>hēdonē</i>, pleasure), gave a +different turn to wisdom. The good is pleasure, and wisdom +is found in that prudence which selects the purest and +most intense. Hence, if this is the good, why should a man +trouble himself about social standards or social obligations? +"The hedonists gladly shared the refinement of enjoyment +which civilization brought with it; they found it +convenient and permissible that the intelligent man should +enjoy the honey which others prepared; but no feeling of +duty or thankfulness bound them to the civilization whose +fruits they enjoyed. Sacrifice for others, patriotism, and +devotion to a general object, Theodorus declared to be a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> +form of foolishness which it did not become the wise man to +share."<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p> + + +<h4>§ 5. THE DEEPER VIEW OF NATURE AND THE GOOD; OF THE +INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL ORDER</h4> + +<p><b>Value of a State.</b>—Plato and Aristotle take up boldly +the challenge of individualism. It may indeed be granted +that existing states are too often ruled by classes. There +are oligarchies in which the soldier or the rich control for +their own interests; there are tyrannies in which the despot +is greed and force personified; there are democracies +(Plato was an aristocrat) in which the mob bears rule, +and those who flatter and feed its passions are in authority. +But all these do but serve to bring out more clearly the +conception of a true State, in which the rule is by the wisest +and best and is not for the interest of a class, but for the +welfare of all. Even as it was, the State of Athens +in Plato's day—except when it condemned a Socrates—meant +completeness and freedom of life. It represented +not merely a police force to protect the individual, but stood +for the complete organization of all the life which needs +coöperation and mutual support. The State provided instruction +for the mind and training for the body. It +surrounded the citizen with an atmosphere of beauty and +provided in the tragedy and comedy opportunities for +every citizen to consider the larger significance of life or to +join in the contagious sympathy of mirth. In festivals +and solemn processions it brought the citizen into unity +of religious feeling. To be an Athenian citizen meant to +share in all the higher possibilities which life afforded. Interpreting +this life, Aristotle proclaims that it is not in +isolation, but in the State, that "the goal of full independence +may be said to be first attained."</p> + +<p><b>The Natural.</b>—Aristotle goes directly to the heart of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> +the problem as to what is natural by asserting that +nature is not to be found in the crude beginning, but +rather in the complete development. "The nature of +anything, e.g., of a man, a horse, or a house, may +be defined to be its condition when the process of production +is complete." Hence the State "in which alone completeness +of life is attained" is in the highest sense natural:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The object proposed or the complete development of a +thing is its highest good; but independence which is first +attained in the State is a complete development or the highest +good and is therefore natural." "For as the State was formed +to make life possible, so it exists to make life good."</p> + +<p>"Thus we see that the State is a natural institution, that +man is naturally a political animal and that one who is not a +citizen of any State, if the cause of his isolation be natural +and not accidental, is either a superhuman being or low in +the scale of human civilization, as he stands alone like a 'blot' +on the backgammon board. The 'clanless, lawless, hearthless +man,' so bitterly described by Homer, is a case in point, for +he is naturally a citizen of no state and a lover of war."<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p></div> + +<p>Nor does Aristotle stop here. With a profound insight +into the relation of man to society, and the dependence of +the individual upon the social body, a relation which modern +social psychology has worked out in greater detail, +Aristotle asserts that the State is not merely the goal of the +individual's development, but the source of his life.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Again, in the order of nature the State is prior to the +household or individual. For the whole must needs be prior +to its part. For instance, if you take away the body which +is the whole, there will not remain any such thing as a hand +or foot, unless we use the same word in a different sense, as +when we speak of a stone hand as a hand. For a hand +separated from the body will be a disabled hand; whereas it +is the faculty or function of a thing which makes it what it is, +and therefore when things lose their function or faculty, it +is not correct to call them the same things, but rather +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span>homonymous, i.e., different things having the same name. We +see, then, the State is a natural institution, and also that it +is prior to the individual. For if the individual as a separate +unit is not independent, he must be a part and must bear the +same relation to the State as the other parts to their wholes; +and one who is incapable of association with others or is +independent and has no need of such association, is no member +of a State; in other words, he is either a brute or a God."<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p></div> + +<p>And, moreover, when we look into the nature of the individual, +we do not find him a being devoid of the sympathies +and qualities which find their natural expression not only +in the State, but in various social and friendly relations. +There is "an impulse toward the life in common" (φιλία) +which expresses itself in friendship, but which is also so +essential to that recognition of others called justice that +we may say "it is the most just of all just things." There +is also a unity of disposition and purpose (ὁμόνοια) which +may be called "political friendship."<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> + +<p><b>Plato's Ideal State.</b>—How then is the State constituted +and governed which is to provide for man's full development, +his complete good? Evidently two principles must +control. In the first place, it must be so constituted that +every man may develop in it the full capacities of his nature, +and thereby serve at once the perfection of the State +and his own completeness; and in the second place, the State +or social whole must be ruled by those best fitted for this +work. Not the soldier, nor the plutocrat, nor the artisan, +but the man who knows, is the suitable ruler for our ideal +community. The soldier may defend, the artisan may support, +but the scientific or intelligent man should rule. And +it is evident that in settling this principle, we have also answered +our first problem; for the soldier and the artisan +will find his full development by doing the work which he +can do well, not by meddling with a task in which he must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> +necessarily fail. In order to guard against the greed +which was so characteristic of the governments of his day, +Plato would provide that the rulers and warriors should +have no private property, and not even private families. +Their eye should be single to the good of the whole. When +asked as to the practicability of a State governed by such +disinterested rulers, and with such wisdom, he admits indeed +its difficulty, but he stoutly demands its necessity:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes +of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, +and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those +commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the +other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have +rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as I believe,—and +then only will this our State have a possibility of life and +behold the light of day."<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p></div> + +<p>And yet the question of the actual existence of a perfect +State is not the question of supreme importance. For Plato +has grasped the thought that man is controlled not only +by what he sees, but by what he images as desirable. And +if a man has once formed the image of an ideal State or +city of this kind, in which justice prevails, and life reaches +fuller and higher possibilities than it has yet attained, this +is the main thing:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"In heaven, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, +which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set +his own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or +ever will exist in fact, is no matter: for he will live after the +manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other."<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>The Social as Law of Nature.</b>—The social nature of +man, thus vindicated by Plato and Aristotle, remained as +the permanent possession of Greek thought. Even the +Epicureans, who developed further the hedonistic theory of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> +life, emphasized the values of friendship as among the +choicest and most refined sources of pleasure. The Stoics, +who in their independence of wants took up the tradition of +the Cynics, were yet far from interpreting this as an independence +of society. The disintegration of the Greek +states made it impossible to find the social body in the old +city-state, and so we find with the Stoics a certain cosmopolitanism. +It is the highest glory of man to be a citizen +not of Athens but of the universe,—not of the city of Cecrops, +but of the city of Zeus. And through this conception +the social nature of man was made the basis of a "natural +law," which found its expression in the principles of +Roman and modern jurisprudence.</p> + +<p><b>Passion or Reason.</b>—In answering the question as to +the true nature of man, Plato and Aristotle found the suggestions +likewise for the problem of individual good. For +if the soldier as the seeker for fame and honor, the avaricious +man embodying the desire for wealth, and still more, +the tyrant personifying the unbridled expression of every +lust and passion, are abhorrent, is it not easy to see that +an orderly and harmonious development of impulses under +the guidance and control of reason, is far better than that +uncramped expression of desires and cravings for which +some of the radical individualists and sensualists of the +day were clamoring? As representative of this class, hear +Callicles:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I plainly assert that he who would truly live ought to +allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise +them; but when they have grown to their greatest, he should +have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to +satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice +and nobility." The temperate man is a fool. It is only in +hungering and eating, in thirsting and drinking, in having +all his desires about him, and gratifying every possible desire, +that man lives happily.<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p></div><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> + +<p>But even Callicles himself admits that there are certain +men, the creatures of degraded desire, whose lives are not +ideal, and hence that there must be some choice of pleasure. +And carrying out in the individual life the thought above +suggested by the State, Plato raises the question as to +whether man, a complex being, with both noble and ignoble +impulses, and with the capacity of controlling reason, can +be said to make a wise choice if he lets the passions run +riot and choke out wholly his rational nature:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, +or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects +the man to the beast? He can hardly avoid admitting +this,—can he now? Not if he has any regard for my opinion. +But, if he admits this, we may ask him another question: +How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the +condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the +worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or +daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them +into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, +however large might be the sum which he received? And will +any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his own +divine being to that which is most atheistical and detestable +and has no pity? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of +her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass +a worse ruin."<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>Necessity of a Standard for Pleasure.</b>—If, for the +moment, we rule out the question of what is noble or +"kalon," and admit that the aim of life is to live pleasantly, +or if, in other words, it is urged as above that justice +is not profitable and that hence he who would seek the +highest good will seek it by some other than the thorny +path, we must recognize that the decision as to which kind +of pleasure is preferable will depend on the character of +the man who judges:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Then we may assume that there are three classes of men,—lovers +of wisdom, lovers of ambition, lovers of gain? Exactly. +And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>several objects? Very true. Now, if you examine the three +classes and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, +each of them will be found praising his own and deprecating +that of others; the money-maker will contrast the +vanity of honor or of learning with the solid advantages of +gold and silver? True, he said. And the lover of honor,—what +will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure +of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, which has +no need of honor, he regards as all smoke and nonsense? +True, he said. But may we not suppose, I said, that philosophy +estimates other pleasures as nothing in comparison with +knowing the truth, and in that abiding, ever learning, in the +pursuit of truth, not far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? +The other pleasures the philosopher disparages by calling +them necessary, meaning that if there were no necessity for +them, he would not have them. There ought to be no doubt +about that, he replied. Since, then, the pleasure of each class +and the life of each is in dispute, and the question is not which +life is most honorable, or better or worse, but which is the +more pleasant or painless,—how shall we know? I cannot +tell, he said. Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is +any better than experience and wisdom and reason? There +cannot be a better, he said. If wealth and gain were the +criterion, then what the lover of gain praised and blamed +would surely be the truest? Assuredly. Of if honor or +victory or courage, in that case the ambitions or contentments +would decide best? Clearly. But since experience and +wisdom and reason are the judges, the inference of course is, +that the truest pleasures are those which are approved by the +lover of wisdom and reason."<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p></div> + +<p>It is thus evident that even if we start out to find the +good in pleasure, we need some kind of measuring art. We +need a "standard for pleasure," and this standard can be +found only in wisdom. And this forces us to maintain that +wisdom is after all <i>the</i> good. Not merely intellectual attainment—a +life of intellect without feeling would be just +as little a true human life as would the life of an oyster, +which has feeling with no intelligence. A life which includes +sciences and arts, and the pure pleasures of beauty,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> +presided over by wisdom and measure and symmetry,—this +is Plato's vision of the life of the individual, viewed from +within.</p> + +<p><b>Eudaemonism.</b>—Aristotle's conception of the good is +fundamentally the same. It is a full development of man's +capacities, culminating in a rational and harmonious life. +If, says Aristotle, we are to find the ultimate good, we must +try to find, if possible, some one end which is pursued as an +end in itself, and never as a means to something else, and +the most general term for this final end is "eudaimonia," +or well-being, "for we also choose it for itself and never for +the sake of something else." What is the essence of well-being? +This, according to Aristotle, is to be found by asking +what is the function of man. The life of nutrition and +growth man has in common with the plants; the life of +sense in common with the animal. It is in the life of his rational +nature that we must find his especial function. "The +good of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with +their appropriate excellence." External goods are valuable +because they may be instruments toward such full +activity. Pleasure is to be valued because it "perfects the +activities, and therefore perfects life, which is the aim of +human desire"—rather than valued as an end in itself. +No one would choose to live on condition of having a child's +intellect all his life, though he were to enjoy in the highest +possible degree all the pleasures of a child.<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> + +<p><b>The "Mean."</b>—The crowning importance of wisdom as +the rational measure of the ideal life is also illustrated in +Aristotle's theory of excellence (or virtue) as a "mean". +This phrase is somewhat ambiguous, for some passages +would seem to indicate that it is merely striking an average +between two kinds of excesses, and finding, as it were, +a moderate amount of feeling or action; but there is evidently +involved here just the old thought of measure, and +"the mean is what right reason prescribes." It is not every<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> +one who can find the mean, but only he who has the requisite +knowledge. The supreme excellence or virtue is, therefore, +the wisdom which can find the true standard for +action.<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a></p> + +<p><b>The Wise Man.</b>—Finally the conception of virtue as +wisdom is illustrated in the ideals of the three prominent +schools in later Greek thought,—the Sceptics, Epicureans, +and Stoics. The wise man among Sceptics is he who +suspends judgment where it is impossible to be certain. +The wise man among Epicureans is he who chooses the finest +and surest and most lasting pleasures. The wise man +among Stoics is he who overcomes his emotions. But in +every case the ideal is expressed in the same phrase, "the +wise man."</p> + +<p><b>Man and the Cosmos.</b>—We see thus how Greek +thought, starting out to challenge all society's laws and +standards and bring them to the bar of knowledge, has +found a deeper value and higher validity in the true social +and moral order. The appeal was to the Cæsar of reason, +and reason taken in its full significance carries us beyond +the immediate and transient to the broader and more permanent +good. Nor can reason in its search for good be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> +content, urges Plato, with the superficial facts of life and +society. He who would find and achieve his complete function, +his full development, must broaden his horizon still +further. As his own particular life is but a part of the ongoing +of the larger world, whose forces act upon him, limit +him, and determine his possibilities, it becomes absolutely +necessary to study not merely his own end and purpose, but +the end and purpose of the universe. Human good requires +us to know the larger good, <i>the</i> Good, in the full and complete +sense. And this perfect Good which is, in truth, the +very essence of the universe, is but another term for God, +and Plato often uses the two as interchangeable terms.</p> + +<p>So the "Nature" which Greek life was seeking gets its +deepest significance and reinterprets the old religious demand +for unity of the life of man with the forces of the +unseen. And the Stoic later, in his maxim "Follow Nature," +gives more explicit recognition to the return of the circle. +For the great work of Greek science had brought out into +complete clearness the idea of Nature as a system of law. +The universe is a rational universe, a cosmos, and man, as +above all else a rational being, finds thus his kinship to the +universe. To follow Nature, therefore, means to know the +all-pervading law of Nature and submit to it in calm acceptance +or resignation.</p> + +<p>"All is harmonious to me that is harmonious to thee, O +universe; all is fruit to me which thy seasons bring."<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> + + +<h4>§ 6. THE CONCEPTION OF THE IDEAL</h4> + +<p><b>Contrast of Actual and Ideal.</b>—The two stages of +Greek thought which we have sketched did more than to readjust +Greek life to deeper views of the State and the individual; +of the good and of nature. The very challenge +and process brought into explicit consciousness a new +feature of the moral life, which is fundamental to true<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> +moral consciousness, viz., the factor of contrast between +the actual and the ideal. We have seen that the clash of +one-sided interests and political institutions and, in the case +of Plato, the tragic execution of Socrates, obliged Plato +and Aristotle to admit that the actual State did not subserve +the real purpose which they were forced to seek in +social organization. Both Plato and Aristotle, therefore, +draw the picture of a State that should serve the complete +purposes of human development. And again, in the individual +life, both the conception of the development of man's +highest possibilities and the conception of a measure or +standard for the conflicting desires and purposes lead on +to a conception which shall embody not merely the existing +status but the goal of yet unrealized purpose.</p> + +<p><b>The Ideal as the True Reality.</b>—Various qualities and +aspirations are embodied by Plato in this conception, and +with characteristic Greek genius he has given to this conception +of the ideal almost as concrete and definite a form +as the Greek sculptor of Apollo gave to his ideal of light +and clarity, or the sculptor of Aphrodite to the conception +of grace. As contrasted with the flux of transient emotions, +or the uncertain play of half-comprehended or futile +goods, this ideal good is conceived as eternal, unchanging, +ever the same. It is superhuman and divine. As contrasted +with various particular and partial goods on which +the sons of men fix their affections, it is the one universal +good which is valid for all men everywhere and forever. +In his effort to find suitable imagery for this conception, +Plato was aided by the religious conceptions of the Orphic +and Pythagorean societies, which had emphasized the pre-existence +and future existence of the soul, and its distinction +from the body. In its previous life, said Plato, +the soul has had visions of a beauty, a truth, and a goodness +of which this life affords no adequate examples. And +with this memory within it of what it has looked upon before, +it judges the imperfect and finite goods of this present<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> +world and longs to fly away again and be with God. This +thought of contrast between ideal and actual, to which +Plato in some of his writings gave the turn of a contrast +between soul and body, passed on with increased emphasis +into Stoic and later Platonist schools, and furnished a philosophic +basis for the dualism and asceticism which is found +in Hellenistic and mediæval morality.</p> + +<p><b>Ethical Significance.</b>—While the true ethical contrast +between the actual and the ideal was thus shifted over into +a metaphysical contrast between soul and body, or between +what is fixed and what is changing, the fundamental +thought is highly significant, for it merely symbolizes +in objective form the characteristic of every moral +judgment, viz., the testing and valuing of an act by some +standard, and what is even more important, the forming +of a standard by which to do the testing. Even Aristotle, +who is frequently regarded as the mere describer of what +is, rather than the idealistic portrayer of what ought to +be, is no less insistent upon the significance of the ideal. +In fact, his isolation of reflection or <i>theoria</i> from the civic +virtues was used by the mediæval church in its idealization +of the "contemplative life." Like Plato, he conceives the +ideal as a divine element in human nature:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nevertheless, instead of listening to those who advise us as +men and mortals not to lift our thoughts above what is human +and mortal, we ought rather, as far as possible, to put off our +mortality and make every effort to live in the exercise of the +highest of our faculties; for though it be but a small part of +us, yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest."<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a></p></div> + + +<h4>§ 7. THE CONCEPTION OF THE SELF; OF CHARACTER AND +RESPONSIBILITY</h4> + +<p><b>The Poets.</b>—Out of the fierce competition of individual +desires, the clashing of individual ambitions, the conflict<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> +between the individual and the state, and the deepening of +the conception of the individual's "nature," emerged also +another conception of fundamental importance for the +more highly developed reflective moral life, viz., that +of the moral personality, its character and its responsibility. +We may trace the development of this conception +through the poets, as well as in the philosophers. Æschylus +set man over against the gods, subject to their divine +laws, but gave little play to human character or conscious +self-direction. With Sophocles, the tragic situation +was brought more directly into the field of human character, +although the conception of destiny and the limitations +marked thereby were still the dominant note. With Euripides, +human emotions and character are brought into the +foreground. Stout-heartedness, the high spirit that can +endure in suffering or triumph in death, which shows not +merely in his heroes but in the women, Polyxena and Medea, +Phædra and Iphigenia, evinces the growing consciousness +of the self—a consciousness which will find further +development in the proud and self-sufficient endurance of +the Stoic. In more directly ethical lines, we find increasing +recognition of the self in the motives which are set up +for human action, and in the view which is formed of +human character. Conscience in the earlier poets and moralists, +was largely a compound of Nemesis, the external +messenger and symbol of divine penalty, on the one hand, +and Aidos, the sense of respect or reverence for public +opinion and for the higher authority of the gods, on the +other. But already in the tragedians we find suggestions +of a more intimate and personal conception. Pains sent by +Zeus in dreams may lead the individual to meditate, and +thus to better life. Neoptolemus, in Sophocles, says,</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"All things are noisome when a man deserts<br /> +His own true self and does what is not meet."<br /> +</p> + +<p class="noidt">and Philoctetes replies,</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"Have mercy on me, boy, by all the gods,<br /> +And do not shame thyself by tricking me."<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p> + +<p class="noidt">The whole <i>Antigone</i> of Sophocles is the struggle between +obedience to the political rulers and obedience to the higher +laws which as "laws of reverence" become virtually inner +laws of duty:</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"I know I please the souls I ought to please."<br /> +</p> + +<p><b>Plato.</b>—Here, as in the formulation of his conception of +the ideal, religious imagery helped Plato to find a more objective +statement for the conception of a moral judgment +and a moral character. In the final judgment of the soul +after death, Plato sees the real self stripped bare of all +external adornments of beauty, rank, power, or wealth, +and standing as naked soul before the naked judge, to receive +his just reward. And the very nature of this reward +or penalty shows the deepening conception of the self, and +of the intrinsic nature of moral character. The true penalty +of injustice is not to be found in anything external, +but in the very fact that the evil doers become base and +wicked:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"They do not know the penalty of injustice, which above +all things they ought to know,—not stripes and death, as they +suppose, which evil doers often escape, but a penalty which +cannot be escaped.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Theod.</span> What is that?</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Soc.</span> There are two patterns set before them in nature; the +one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and +they do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they +are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of +their evil deeds; and the penalty is that they lead a life +answering to the pattern which they resemble."<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>The Stoics.</b>—It is, however, in the Stoics that we find +the conception of inner reflection reaching clearest expression. +Seneca and Epictetus repeat again and again +the thought that the conscience is of higher importance +than any external judgment,—that its judgment is inevitable. +In these various conceptions, we see attained the +third stage of Adam Smith's description of the formation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> +of conscience.<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> Man who read his duty at first in the judgments +of his fellows, in the customs and laws and codes of +honor, and in the religious precepts of the gods, has again +come to find in gods and laws, in custom and authority, the +true rational law of life; but it is now a law of self. Not +a particular or individual self, but a self which embraces +within it at once the human and the divine. The individual +has become social and has recognized himself as such. +The religious, social, and political judgments have become +the judgments of man upon himself. "Duty," what is +binding or necessary, takes its place as a definite moral +conception.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Besides the writings of Plato (especially, the <i>Apology</i>, <i>Crito</i>, +<i>Protagoras</i>, <i>Gorgias</i>, and <i>Republic</i>), Xenophon (<i>Memorabilia</i>), Aristotle +(<i>Ethics</i>, <i>Politics</i>), Cicero (<i>On Ends, Laws, Duties</i>; <i>On the +Nature of the Gods</i>), Epictetus, Seneca, M. Aurelius, Plutarch, and +the fragments of various Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, the tragedies +of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comedies of +Aristophanes (especially the <i>Clouds</i>) afford valuable material.</p> + +<p>All the histories of philosophy treat the theoretical side; among +them may be mentioned Gompérz (<i>Greek Thinkers</i>, 1900-05), Zeller +(<i>Socrates</i>; <i>Plato</i>; <i>Aristotle</i>; <i>Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics</i>), +Windelband, Benn (<i>Philosophy of Greece</i>, 1898, chs. i., v.).</p> + +<p>On the Moral Consciousness: Schmidt, <i>Ethik der alten Griechen</i>, +1882. On the social conditions and theories: Pöhlmann, <i>Geschichte des +antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus</i>, 1893-1901; Döring, <i>Die Lehre +des Sokrates als sociales Reformsystem</i>, 1895. On the religion: Farnell, +<i>Cults of the Greek States</i>, 3 vols., 1896; Rohde, <i>Psyche</i>, 1894.</p> + +<p>On Political Conditions and Theory: Newman, Introd. to <i>Politics of +Aristotle</i>, 1887; Bradley, <i>Aristotle's Theory of the State in Hellenica</i>; +Wilamovitz-Möllendorf, <i>Aristotle und Athen</i>, 1900.</p> + +<p>On Nature and Law of Nature: Ritchie, <i>Natural Rights</i>, 1895; +Burnet, <i>Int. Journal of Ethics</i>, vii., 1897, pp. 328-33; Hardy, <i>Begriff +der Physis</i>, 1884; Voigt, <i>Die Lehre vom jus naturale</i>, 1856-75.</p> + +<p>General: Denis, <i>Histoire des Théories et des Idées Morales dans +l'Antiquité</i>, 1879; Taylor, <i>Ancient Ideals</i>, 1900; Caird, <i>Evolution of +Theology in the Greek Philosophers</i>, 1904; Janet, <i>Histoire de la +Science Politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale</i>, 1887; Grote, <i>History +of Greece</i>, 4th ed., 1872; <i>Plato and the Other Companions of +Socrates</i>, 1888.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Cf. Xenophon's account of the impressive appeal of Clearchus: +"For, first and greatest, the oaths which we have sworn by the gods +forbid us to be enemies to each other. Whoever is conscious of +having transgressed these,—him I could never deem happy. For if +one were at war with the gods, I know not with what swiftness +he might flee so as to escape, or into what darkness he might run, +or into what stronghold he might retreat and find refuge. For +all things are everywhere subject to the gods, and the gods rule all +everywhere with equity."—<i>Anabasis</i>, II., v.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, I., 343.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, II., 365.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, II., 365.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, I., 343 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Windelband, <i>History of Philosophy</i>, p. 86.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> <i>Politics</i>, I., ii. Welldon's translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>Politics</i>, I., ii. Welldon's translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> <i>Ethics</i>, VIII., i.; IX., vi.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, V., 473.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, IX., 592.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> <i>Gorgias</i>, 491 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, IX., 589 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, IX., 581 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> <i>Ethics</i>, X., ii.-iv.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> Among the various types of excellence which Aristotle enumerates +as exemplifying this principle, the quality of high-mindedness +(μεγαλοψυχία) +is pre-eminent, and may be taken as embodying the trait +most prized in an Athenian gentleman. The high-minded man claims +much and deserves much; lofty in his standard of honor and excellence +he accepts tributes from good men as his just desert, but +despises honor from ordinary men or on trivial grounds; good and +evil fortune are alike of relatively small importance. He neither +seeks nor fears danger; he is ready to confer favors and forget +injuries, slow to ask favors or cry for help; fearless in his love and +hatred, in his truth and his independence of conduct; "not easily +moved to admiration, for nothing is great to him. He loves to +possess beautiful things that bring no profit, rather than useful +things that pay; for this is characteristic of the man whose resources +are in himself. Further, the character of the high-minded man seems +to require that his gait should be slow, his voice deep, his speech +measured; for a man is not likely to be in a hurry when there +are few things in which he is deeply interested, nor excited when he +holds nothing to be of very great importance; and these are the +causes of a high voice and rapid movements" (<i>Ethics</i>, IV., vi.-viii.).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Marcus Aurelius, <i>Thoughts</i>, IV., 23.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> <i>Ethics</i>, X., vii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>Theætetus</i>, 176.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> Smith held that we (1) approve or disapprove the conduct of +others; (2) see ourselves as others see us, judging ourselves from +their standpoint; (3) finally, form a true social standard, that of +the "impartial spectator." This is an inner standard—conscience.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER VIII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE MODERN PERIOD</h2> + + +<p>The moral life of the modern western world differs from +both Hebrew and Greek morality in one respect. The Hebrews +and Greeks were pioneers. Their leaders had to +meet new situations and shape new conceptions of righteousness +and wisdom. Modern civilization and morality, +on the other hand, received certain ideals and standards +already worked out and established. These came to it +partly through the literature of Hebrews, Greeks, and +Latins, partly through Greek art and Roman civilization, +but chiefly, perhaps, through two institutions: (1) Roman +government and law embodied Stoic conceptions of a natural +law of reason and of a world state, a universal rational +society. This not only gave the groundwork of government +and rights to the modern world; it was a constant +influence for guiding and shaping ideas of authority +and justice. (2) The Christian Church in its cathedrals, +its cloisters, its ceremonials, its orders, and its doctrines had +a most impressive system of standards, valuations, motives, +sanctions, and prescriptions for action. These were +not of Hebrew origin solely. Greek and Roman philosophy +and political conceptions were fused with more primitive +teaching and conduct. When the Germans conquered +the Empire they accepted in large measure its institutions +and its religion. Modern morality, like modern civilization, +shows the mingled streams of Hebrew, Greek, Roman, and +German or Celtic life. It contains also conceptions due +to the peculiar industrial, scientific, and political development +of modern times. Thus we have to-day such inherited<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> +standards as that of "the honor of a gentleman" side by +side with the modern class standard of business honesty, +and the labor union ideal of class solidarity. We have the +aristocratic ideals of chivalry and charity side by side with +more democratic standards of domestic and social justice. +We find the Christian equal standard for the two sexes +side by side with another which sets a high value on woman's +chastity, but a trivial value on man's. We find a +certain ideal of self-sacrifice side by side with an ideal of +"success" as the only good. We cannot hope to disentangle +all the threads that enter this variegated pattern, +or rather collection of patterns, but we can point out certain +features that at the same time illustrate certain general +lines of development. We state first the general attitude +and ideals of the Middle Ages, and then the three lines +along which individualism has proceeded to the moral consciousness +of to-day.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. THE MEDIÆVAL IDEALS</h4> + +<p>The mediæval attitude toward life was determined in part +by the character of the Germanic tribes with their bold, +barbaric strength and indomitable spirit, their clan and +other group organizations, their customs or mores belonging +to such a stock; and in part by the religious ideals +presented in the church. The presence of these two factors +was manifest in the strong contrasts everywhere present.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Associated with mail-clad knights whose trade is war and +whose delight is to combat are the men whose sacred vocation +forbids the use of force altogether. Through lands +overspread with deeds of violence, the lonely wayfarer with +the staff and badge of a pilgrim passes unarmed and in safety. +In sight of castles, about whose walls fierce battles rage, are +the church and the monastery, within the precincts of which +quiet reigns and all violence is branded as sacrilege."<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p></div> + +<p>The harsh clashes of the Venus music over against<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> +the solemn strains from the Pilgrim's Chorus in Tannhäuser +might well symbolize not only the specific collision +of the opera but the broader range of passions opposed +to the religious controls and values in this mediæval +society.</p> + +<p><b>The Group and Class Ideal.</b>—The early Germans and +Celts in general had the clan system, the group ideals, +and group virtues which belonged to other Aryan peoples, +but the very fact of the Germanic victories shows +a military spirit which included both personal heroism +and good capacity for organization. Group loyalty was +strong, and the group valuation of strength and courage +was unbounded. A high value was also set on woman's +chastity. These qualities, particularly the loyalty +to the clan and its head, survived longest in Celtic +peoples like the Scots and Irish who were not subjected +to the forces of political organization. Every reader of +Scott is familiar with the values and defects of the type; +and the problems which it causes in modern democracy have +been acutely described by Jane Addams.<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> Among the +Germanic peoples, when the clan and tribal systems were +followed by the more thoroughgoing demarcation of +classes, free and serfs, lords and villains, chevalier or +knight, and churl, the old Latin terms "gentle" and "vulgar" +found a fitting application. The term "gentle" +was indeed given in one of its usages the force of the +kindred term "kind" to characterize the conduct appropriate +within the kin, but in the compound "gentleman" +it formed one of the most interesting conceptions of class +morality. The "honor" of a gentleman was determined +by what the class demanded. Above all else the gentleman +must not show fear. He must be ready to fight at +any instant to prove his courage. His word must not +be doubted. This seems to have been on the ground that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> +such doubt would be a refusal to take the man at his own +estimate, rather than because of any superlative love of +truth, for the approved way to prove the point at issue was +by fighting, not by any investigation. But the class character +appears in the provision that no insult from one of +a lower class need be noticed. Homicide was not contrary +to the character and honor of a gentleman. Nor did this +require any such standard in sex relations as a "woman's +honor" requires of a woman. In conduct toward others, +the "courtesy" which expresses in ceremony and manner +respect for personal dignity was a fine trait. It +did not always prevent insolence toward inferiors, although +there was in many cases the feeling, <i>noblesse oblige</i>. What +was needed to make this ideal of gentleman a moral and +not merely a class ideal, was that it should base treatment +of others on personal worth rather than on birth, or +wealth, or race, and that it should not rate reputation for +courage above the value of human life. This has been +in part effected, but many traits of the old conception +live on to-day.</p> + +<p><b>The Ideal of the Church.</b>—The ideal of life which the +church presented contained two strongly contrasting +elements, which have been frequently found in religion +and are perhaps inevitably present. On the one hand, a +spiritual religion implies that man in comparison with +God is finite, weak, and sinful; he should therefore be of +"a humble and contrite heart." On the other hand, as a +child of God he partakes of the divine and is raised to +infinite worth. On the one hand, the spiritual life is not +of this world and must be sought in renouncing its pleasures +and lusts; on the other hand, if God is really the +supreme governor of the universe, then this world also +ought to be subject to his rule. In the mediæval view of +life, the humility and withdrawal from the world were +assigned to the individual; the sublimity and the ruling +authority to the church. Ethically this distribution had<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> +somewhat the effect of group morality in that it minimized +the individual and magnified the corporate body +of which he was a part. Asceticism and humility go hand +in hand with the power of the hierarchy. Individual +poverty—wealth of the church; individual meekness and +submission—unlimited power and authority in the church; +these antitheses reflect the fact that the church was the heir +both of a kingdom of God and of a Roman Empire. The +humility showed itself in extreme form in the ascetic type +of monasticism with its vows of poverty, chastity, and +obedience. It was reflected in the art which took for its +subjects the saints, conceived not individually, but typically +and according to tradition and authority. Their thin +attenuated figures showed the ideal prescribed. The same +humility showed itself in the intellectual sphere in the +preëminence given to faith as compared with reason, while +the mystic losing himself in God showed yet another phase +of individual renunciation. Even charity, with which the +church sought to temper the hardship of the time, took +a form which tended to maintain or even applaud the +dependent attitude of the recipient. So far as life for +the individual had a positive value, this lay not in living +oneself out, but rather in the calm and the support afforded +by the church:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A life in the church, for the church, through the church; +a life which she blessed in mass at morning and sent to peaceful +rest by the vesper hymn; a life which she supported by +the constantly recurring stimulus of the sacraments, relieving +it by confession, purifying it by penance, admonishing it by +the presentation of visible objects for contemplation and worship—this +was the life which they of the Middle Ages conceived +of as the rightful life of man; it was the actual life +of many, the ideal of all."<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p></div> + +<p>On the other side, the church boldly asserted the right +and duty of the divine to control the world,—the reli<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span>gious +symbol of the modern proposition that conscience +should dominate political and business affairs. "No institution +is apart from the authority of the church," wrote +Ægidius Colonna. "No one can legitimately possess field +or vine except under its authority or by it. Heretics are +not owners, but unjustly occupy." Canossa symbolized +the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal power, +and there is a sublime audacity, moral as well as political, +in the famous Bull of Boniface VIII., "We declare that +every human creature is subject to the Roman pontiff."</p> + +<p>The church as a corporate society expressed also the +<i>community</i> of its members. It was indeed no mere collection +of individual believers. As a divine institution, +the "body of Christ on earth," it gave to its members +rather than received from them. It invested them with +new worth, instead of getting its own worth from them. +Nevertheless, it was not an absolute authority; it represented +the union of all in a common fellowship, a common +destiny, and a common cause against the powers +of evil.</p> + +<p>The massive cathedrals which remain as the monuments +of the ages of faith, are fitting symbols of these +aspects of mediæval life. They dominate their cities +architecturally, as the church dominated the life of the +ages which built them. They inspired within the worshipper, +on the one hand, a sense of finiteness in the presence +of the sublime; on the other, an elevation of soul +as he became conscious of union with a power and presence +not his own. They awed the worshiping assembly +and united it in a common service.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. MAIN LINES OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT</h4> + +<p>We have seen that the mediæval life had two sets of +standards and values: one set by the tribal codes and the +instinct of a warlike people; the other set by a church<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> +which required renunciation while it asserted control. +Changes may be traced in both ideals. The group morality +becomes refined and broadened. The church standards +are affected in four ways: (a) The goods of the secular +life, art, family, power, wealth, claim a place in the system +of values. (b) Human authority asserts itself, at +first in sovereign states with monarchs, then in the growth +of civil liberty and political democracy. (c) Instead of +faith, reason asserts itself as the agency for discovering +the laws of nature and of life. (d) As the result of the +greater dignity and worth of the individual which is +worked out in all these lines, social virtue tends to lay +less value on charity and more on social justice.</p> + +<p>It must not be supposed that the movements to be +outlined have resulted in the displacement or loss of +the positive values in the religious ideal. The morality +of to-day does not ignore spiritual values; it aims rather +to use them to give fuller meaning to all experience. It +does not abandon law in seeking freedom, or ignore +duty because it is discovered by reason. Above all, it +is seeking to bring about in more intimate fashion that +supremacy of the moral order in all human relations for +which the church was theoretically contending. And in +recent times we are appreciating more thoroughly that +the individual cannot attain a full moral life by himself. +Only as he is a member of a moral society can he find +scope and support for full development of will. In concrete +phrase, it is just as necessary to improve the general +social environment in which men, women, and children +are to live, in order to make better individuals, as it +is to improve the individuals in order to get a better +society. This was a truth which the religious conception +of salvation through the church taught in other +terms.</p> + +<p>To follow the development of the modern moral consciousness, +we shall rely not so much on the formal writ<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span>ings +of moral philosophers as on other sources. What men +value most, and what they recognize as right, is shown +in what they work for and fight for and in how they spend +their leisure. This is reflected more immediately in their +laws, their art and literature, their religion, and their +educational institutions, although it finds ultimate expression +in moral theories. The more concrete aspects are +suggested in this chapter, the theories in Chapter XII.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. THE OLD AND NEW IN THE BEGINNINGS OF +INDIVIDUALISM</h4> + +<p>An interesting blending of the class ideal of the warrior +and "gentleman" with the religious ideals of devotion to +some spiritual service, and of protection to the weak, is +afforded by <i>chivalry</i>. The knights show their faith by +their deeds of heroism, not by renunciation. But they +fight for the Holy Sepulcher, or for the weak and oppressed. +Their investiture is almost as solemn as that +of a priest. Honor and love appear as motives side by +side with the quest of the Holy Grail. Chevalier Bayard +is the gallant fighter for country, but he is also the +passionate admirer of justice, the knight <i>sans peur et +sans reproche</i>. Moreover, the literature which embodies +the ideal exhibits not only feats of arms and religious +symbolism. Parsifal is not a mere abstraction; he has +life and character. "And who will deny," writes Francke,<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> +"that in this character Wolfram has put before us, within +the forms of chivalrous life, an immortal symbol of +struggling, sinning, despairing, but finally redeemed, +humanity?"</p> + +<p>If chivalry represented in some degree a moralizing +of the warrior class, the mendicant orders represented +an effort to bring religion into secular life. The followers +of St. Dominic and St. Francis were indeed ascetic, but +instead of maintaining the separate life of the cloister<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> +they aimed to awaken a personal experience among the +whole people. Further, the Dominicans adopted the methods +and conceptions of Greek philosophy to support the +doctrines of the church, instead of relying solely on faith. +The Franciscans on their part devoted an ecstatic type +of piety to deeds of charity and beneficence. They aimed +to overcome the world rather than to withdraw from it. +A bolder appeal to the individual, still within the sphere +of religion, was made when Wyclif asserted the right of +every instructed man to search the Bible for himself, +and a strong demand for social justice found expression in +Wyclif's teaching as well as in the vision of Piers Plowman.</p> + +<p>In the political world the growing strength of the +empire sought likewise a religious sanction in its claim of +a divine right, independent of the church. The claims of +the civic life find also increasing recognition with the +spiritual teachers.</p> + +<p>The State had been regarded by Augustine as a consequence +of the fall of man, but it now comes to claim +and receive a moral value: first, with Thomas Aquinas, +as the institution in which man perfects his earthly nature +and prepares for his higher destiny in the realm +of grace; then, with Dante, as no longer subordinate to +the church, but coördinate with it.</p> + +<p>Finally, the rise of the universities shows a most significant +appearance of the modern spirit under the old +sanctions. The range of secular studies was limited and +the subject-matter to be studied was chiefly the doctrine +of the Fathers. The teachers who drew thousands of eager +young men about them were clerics. But the very fact +that dialectics—the art of reasoning—was the focus of +interest, shows the dawn of a spirit of inquiry. Such +a book as Abelard's <i>Sic et Non</i>, which marshaled the +opposing views of the Fathers in "deadly parallel," was +a challenge to tradition and an assertion of reason. And +it is not without significance that the same bold thinker was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> +the first of the mediæval scholars to treat ethics again as +a field by itself. The title "<i>Know Thyself</i>" suggests its +method. The essence of the moral act is placed in the +intent or resolve of the will; the criterion for judgment is +agreement or disagreement with conscience.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. INDIVIDUALISM IN THE PROGRESS OF LIBERTY AND +DEMOCRACY</h4> + +<p><b>Rights.</b>—It is not possible or necessary here to sketch the +advance of political and civil liberty. Finding its agents +sometimes in kings, sometimes in cities, sometimes in an +aristocracy or a House of Commons, and sometimes in a +popular uprising, it has also had as its defenders with +the pen, Churchmen, Protestants, and freethinkers, lawyers, +publicists, and philosophers. All that can be done +here is to indicate briefly the moral significance of the +movement. Some of its protagonists have been actuated +by conscious moral purpose. They have fought with +sword or pen not only in the conviction that their cause +was just, but because they believed it just. At other times, +a king has favored a city to weaken the power of the +nobility, or the Commons have opposed the king because +they objected to taxation. What makes the process significant +morally is that, whatever the motives actuating +those who have fought its battles with sword or pen, they +have nearly always claimed to be fighting for "rights." +They have professed the conviction that they are engaged +in a just cause. They have thus made appeal to a moral +standard, and in so far as they have sincerely sought to +assert rights, they have been recognizing in some sense +a social and rational standard; they have been building up +a moral personality. Sometimes indeed the rights have +been claimed as a matter of "possession" or of tradition. +This is to place them on the basis of customary +morality. But in such great crises as the English Revo<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span>lutions +of the seventeenth century, or the French and +American Revolutions of the eighteenth, some deeper basis +has been sought. A Milton, a Locke, a Rousseau, a Jefferson, +has but voiced the sentiments of a people in +formulating an explicitly moral principle. Sometimes this +has taken the form of an appeal to God-given rights. All +men are equal before God; why should one man assume to +command another because of birth? In this sense the +Puritans stood for liberty and democracy as part of their +creed of life. But often the appeal to a moral principle +borrowed the conceptions of Greek philosophy and Roman +law, and spoke of "natural rights" or a "law of nature."<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a></p> + +<p><b>Natural Rights.</b>—This conception, as we have noted, +had its origin in Greece in the appeal from custom or convention +to Nature. At first an appeal to the natural +impulses and wants, it became with the Stoics an appeal +to the rational order of the universe. Roman jurists found +in the idea of such a law of nature the rational basis +for the law of society. Cicero had maintained that every +man had its principles innate within him. It is obvious +that here was a principle with great possibilities. The +Roman law itself was most often used in the interest of +absolutism, but the idea of a natural law, and so of a +natural right more fundamental than any human dictate, +proved a powerful instrument in the struggle for personal +rights and equality. "All men naturally were born free," +wrote Milton. "To understand political power right," +wrote Locke, "and derive it from its original, we must +consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is +a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose +of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, +within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking +leave or depending on the will of any other man. A state +also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is +reciprocal." These doctrines found eloquent portrayal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> +in Rousseau, and appear in the Declaration of Independence +of 1776. Finally, the effort to find in nature some +basis for independence and freedom is given a new turn +by Herbert Spencer when he points to the instinct for +liberty in animals as well as in human beings as the origin +of the law of freedom.</p> + +<p>By one of the paradoxes of history, the principle is now +most often invoked in favor of "vested interests." "Natural" +easily loses the force of an appeal to reason and +to social good, and becomes merely an assertion of ancient +usage, or precedent, or even a shelter for mere selfish +interests. Natural rights in property may be invoked +to thwart efforts to protect life and health. Individualism +has been so successful in asserting rights that it is +now apt to forget that there are no rights morally except +such as express the will of a good <i>member of society</i>. But +in recognizing possible excesses we need not forget the +value of the idea of rights as a weapon in the struggle +in which the moral personality has gradually won its +way. The other side of the story has been the growth +of responsibility. The gain in freedom has not meant +an increase in disorder; it has been marked rather by gain +in peace and security, by an increasing respect for law, +and an increasing stability of government. The external +control of force has been replaced by the moral control +of duty.</p> + + +<h4>§ 5. INDIVIDUALISM AS AFFECTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF +INDUSTRY, COMMERCE, AND ART</h4> + +<p>The development of industry, commerce, and art affects +the moral life in a variety of ways, of which three are of +especial importance for our purpose.</p> + +<p>(1) It gives new interests, and new opportunities for +individual activity.</p> + +<p>(2) This raises the question of <i>values</i>. Are all the ac<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>tivities +good, and shall one satisfy whatever interest +appeals to him, or are some better than others?—the old +question of "kinds of happiness."</p> + +<p>(3) It raises further the question of sharing and distribution. +How far may one enjoy the goods of life in +an exclusive way and how far is it his duty to share with +others? Do society's present methods of industry, commerce, +art, and education distribute these goods in a +just manner?</p> + +<p>The examination of these questions will be made in Part +III. It is our purpose at this point merely to indicate +the trend of the moral consciousness with regard to them.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Increasing Power and Interests of the Individual.</b>—Power +for the mediæval man could be sought in +war or in the church; interests were correspondingly limited. +The Crusades, contact, through them and later +through commerce, with Arabian civilization, growing +acquaintance with the literature and art of Greece and +Rome, were effective agencies in stimulating the modern +development. But when once started it needed but the +opportunities of sufficient wealth and freedom to go on. +Art and letters have depicted a variety and richness of +experience which the ancient world did not feel. Shakspere, +Rembrandt, Bunyan, Beethoven, Goethe, Balzac, +Shelley, Byron, Hugo, Wagner, Ibsen, Thackeray, Eliot, +Tolstoy, to name almost at random, reflect a wealth of +interests and motives which show the range of the modern +man. Commerce and the various lines of industry have +opened new avenues for power. No one can see the palaces +or dwellings of Venice or the old Flemish ports, or consider +the enormous factories, shops, and office buildings +of to-day, without a sense of the accession to human +power over nature and over the activities of fellow men +which trade and industry have brought with them. The +use of money instead of a system of personal service—slavery +or serfdom—has not only made it possible to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> +have men's labor without owning the men, it has aided in +a vastly more effective system than the older method +allowed. The industrial revolution of the past century +has had two causes: one the use of machinery; the other +the combination of human labor which this makes possible. +So far this has greatly increased the power of the +few leaders, but not of the many. It is the present problem +to make possible a larger opportunity for individual +freedom and power.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Values of Art and Industry.</b>—Are all these wider +interests and fuller powers good? The church ideal +and the class ideal already described gave different +answers. The class ideal of gentleman really expressed a +form of self-assertion, of living out one's powers fully, +and this readily welcomed the possibilities which art and +its enjoyment afforded.<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> The gentleman of the Renaissance, +the cavalier of England, the noblesse of France, +were patrons of art and letters. The Romanticist urged +that such free and full expression as art afforded was +higher than morality with its control and limitation. The +church admitted art in the service of religion, but was +chary of it as an individual activity. The Puritans +were more rigorous. Partly because they associated its +churchly use with what they regarded as "idolatry," +partly as a protest against the license in manners which +the freedom of art seemed to encourage, they frowned +upon all forms of art except sacred literature or music. +Their condemnation of the stage is still an element, though +probably a lessening element, and it is not long since fiction +was by many regarded with suspicion. On the whole, +the modern moral consciousness accepts art as having a +place in the moral life, although it by no means follows +that art can be exempt from moral criticism as to its sincerity, +healthfulness, and perspective.</p> + +<p>In the case of industry the church ideal has prevailed.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> +The class ideal of gentleman was distinctly opposed to +industry, particularly manual labor. "Arms" or the +Court was the proper profession. This was more or less +bound up with the fact that in primitive conditions labor +was mainly performed by women or by slaves. It was the +business, the "virtue" of men to fight. So far as this +class ideal was affected by the models of ancient culture, +the prejudice was strengthened. The classic civilization +rested on slave labor. The ideal of the gentleman of +Athens was the free employment of leisure, not active +enterprise. The church, on the other hand, maintained +both the dignity and the moral value of labor. Not only +the example of the Founder of Christianity and his early +disciples, who were for the most part manual laborers, but +the intrinsic moral value of work, already referred to, +entered into the appraisal.<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> The Puritans, who have had +a wide-reaching influence upon the standards of the middle +and lower classes of England, and upon the northern and +western portions of America, were insistent upon industry, +not merely for the sake of its products,—they were frugal +in their consumption,—but as expressing a type of character. +Idleness and "shiftlessness" were not merely ineffective, +they were sinful. "If any will not work, neither +let him eat," commended itself thoroughly to this moral +ideal. That the laborer brought something to the common +weal, while the idler had to be supported, was a reënforcement +to the motives drawn from the relation of work to +character. As the middle and lower classes became increasingly +influential, the very fact that they were laborers +and traders strengthened the religious ideal by a class +motive. It was natural that a laboring class should regard +labor as "honest," though from the history of the word +such a collocation of terms as "honest labor" would once +have been as absurd as "honest villain."<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> A further<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> +influence effective in America has been the fluidity of class +distinctions in a new country. The "influence of the +frontier" has been all on the side of the value of work +and the reprobation of idleness. At least this is true for +men. A certain tendency has been manifest to exempt +women of the well-to-do classes from the necessity of labor, +and even by training and social pressure to exclude them +from the opportunity of work, and make of them a "leisure +class," but this is not likely to establish itself as a permanent +moral attitude. The woman will not be content +to live in "The Doll's House" while the man is in the +real work of the world.</p> + +<p><b>3. The Distribution of the Goods of Life.</b>—Mediæval +society made provision for both benevolence and justice. +Charity, the highest of the virtues, had come to mean +specifically the giving of goods. The monasteries relieved +the poor and the infirm. Hospitals were established. +The gentleman felt it to be not only a religious duty, but +a tradition of his class to be liberal. To secure justice +in the distribution of wealth, various restrictions were +imposed. Goods were not to be sold for whatever they +could bring, nor was money to be loaned at whatever rate +of interest the borrower was willing to pay. Society +aimed to find out by some means what was a "reasonable +price" for products. In the case of manufactured goods +this could be fixed by the opinion of fellow craftsmen. A +"common estimation," where buyers and sellers met and +bargained in an open market, could be trusted to give a +fair value. A maximum limit was set for victuals in +towns. Or, again, custom prescribed what should be the +money equivalent for payments formerly made in kind, +or in personal service.<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> Money-lending was under especial +guard. To ask interest for the use of money, provided +the principal was returned intact, seemed to be taking +advantage of another's necessity. It was usury. Class<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> +morality added a different kind of restrictions. As embodied +in the laws, it bound the tenants to the soil and +forbade the migration of laborers. The significant thing +in the whole mediæval attitude was that <i>society attempted +to control business and industry by a moral standard</i>. It +did not trust the individual to make his own bargains or +to conduct his business as he pleased.</p> + +<p><b>Modern Theory: Free Contract.</b>—The distinctive feature +of the modern development has been the tendency to +abandon moral restrictions and to substitute a wage +system, freedom of exchange, and free contract. It was +maintained by the advocates of the new method that it +was both more efficient and at least as just as the old. +It was more efficient because it stimulated every one to +make the best possible bargain. Surely every man is the +most interested, and therefore the best promoter of his +own welfare. And if each is getting the best results for +himself, the good of the whole community will be secured. +For—so ran the theory, when individualism had so far +advanced—society is simply the aggregate of its members; +the good of all is the sum of the goods of the +members. The system also claimed to provide for justice +between buyer and seller, capitalist and laborer, by the +agencies noticed in the next paragraph.</p> + +<p><b>Competition.</b>—To prevent extortionate prices on the +one hand, or unduly low prices or wages on the other, +the reliance was on <i>competition</i> and the general principle +of supply and demand. If a baker charges too high for +his bread, others will set up shops and sell cheaper. If +a money-lender asks too high interest, men will not borrow +or will find a loan elsewhere. If a wage is too low, labor +will go elsewhere; if too high, capital will not be able +to find a profit and so will not employ labor—so runs +the theory. Without analyzing the moral value of the +theory at this point, we notice only that, so far as it +assumes to secure fair bargains and a just distribution,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> +it assumes the parties to the free contract to be really +free. This implies that they are upon nearly equal footing. +In the days of hand work and small industries this +was at least a plausible assumption. But a new face was +placed upon the situation by the <i>industrial revolution</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Problem Raised by the Industrial Revolution.</b>—The +introduction of machinery on a large scale near the end +of the eighteenth century brought about a change which +has had extraordinary economic, social, and moral effects. +The revolution had two factors: (1) it used steam power +instead of human muscle; (2) it made possible the greater +subdivision of labor, and hence it made it profitable to +organize large bodies of men under a single direction. Both +these factors contributed to an enormous increase in productive +power. But this increase made an overwhelming +difference in the status of capitalist and laborer. Without +discussing the question as to whether capital received +more than a "fair" share of the increased profit, it was +obvious that if one "Captain of Industry" were receiving +even a small part of the profits earned by each of his +thousand workmen, he would be immeasurably better off +than any one of them. Like the mounted and armored +knight of the Middle Ages, or the baron in his castle, he +was more than a match for a multitude of poorly equipped +footmen. There seemed to be in the nineteenth century +an enormous disproportion between the shares of wealth +which fell to capitalist and to laborer. If this was the +result of "free contract," what further proof was necessary +that "freedom" was a mere empty term—a name with +no reality? For could it be supposed that a man would +<i>freely</i> make an agreement to work harder and longer than +any slave, receiving scarcely the bare necessities of existence, +while the other party was to gain enormous wealth +from the bargain?</p> + +<p>The old class morality was not disturbed by such contrasts. +Even the religious morality was apt to consider +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span>the distinction between rich and poor as divinely ordered, +or else as insignificant compared with eternal destiny of +weal or woe. But the individualistic movements have made +it less easy to accept either the class morality or the religious +interpretation. The latter lends itself equally well to +a justification of disease because it is providentially permitted. +Moreover, the old group morality and religious +ideal had this in their favor: they recognized an obligation +of the strong to the weak, of the group for every +member, of master for servant. The cash basis seemed to +banish all responsibility, and to assert the law of "each +for himself" as the supreme law of life—except so far as +individuals might mitigate suffering by voluntary kindness. +Economic theory seemed to show that wages must +always tend toward a starvation level.</p> + +<p><b>Sympathy.</b>—Such tendencies inevitably called out response +from the sentiments of benevolence and sympathy. +For the spread of civilization has certainly made man more +sensitive to pain, more capable of sympathy and of entering +by imagination into the situations of others. It is +noteworthy that the same Adam Smith who argued so +forcibly the cause of individualism in trade, made sympathy +the basis of his moral system. Advance in sympathy +has shown itself in the abolition of judicial torture, +in prison reform, in the improved care of the insane and +defective; in the increased provision for hospitals, and +asylums, and in an innumerable multitude of organizations +for relief of all sorts and conditions of men. Missions, +aside from their distinctly ecclesiastical aims, represent +devotion of human life and of wealth to the relief +of sickness and wretchedness, and to the education of children +in all lands. Sympathy has even extended to the +animal world. And the notable fact in modern sympathy +and kindness, as contrasted with the mediæval type, is +that the growth in individuality has demanded and evoked +a higher kind of benevolence. Instead of fostering de<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>pendence +and relieving wants, the best modern agencies aim +to promote independence, to set the man upon his own +feet and enable him to achieve self-respect. "Social settlements" +have been strong factors in bringing about this +change of attitude.</p> + +<p><b>Justice.</b>—Various movements looking toward greater +justice in distribution have likewise been called out by +the conditions since the industrial revolution. Naturally +one reaction was to denounce the whole individualistic +tendency as represented in the "cash-payment" basis. This +found its most eloquent expositor in Carlyle. His <i>Past +and Present</i> is a bitter indictment of a system "in which +all working horses could be well fed, and innumerable +workingmen should die starved"; of a <i>laissez-faire</i> theory +which merely says "impossible" when asked to remedy evils +supposedly due to "economic laws"; of a "Mammon Gospel" +which transforms life into a mutual hostility, with +its laws-of-war named "fair competition." The indictment +is convincing, but the remedy proposed—a return to strong +leaders with a reëstablishment of personal relations—has +rallied few to its support. Another reaction against individualistic +selfishness has taken the form of communism. +Numerous experiments have been made by voluntary associations +to establish society on a moral basis by abolishing +private property. "These new associations," said Owen, +one of the most ardent and generous of social reformers, +"can scarcely be formed before it will be discovered that +by the most simple and easy regulations all the natural +wants of human nature may be abundantly supplied; +and the principle of selfishness will cease to exist for want +of an adequate motive to produce it."</p> + +<p>In contrast with these plans for a return to earlier conditions, +the two most conspicuous tendencies in the thought +of the past century have claimed to be advancing toward +freedom and justice along the lines which we have just +traced. The one, which we may call "individualistic" re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span>form, +has sought justice by giving free play to individual +action. The other, socialism, has aimed to use the power +of the State to secure more adequate justice and, as it +believes, a more genuine freedom. The great reform +movement in Great Britain during the nineteenth century +emphasized free trade and free contracts. It sought the +causes of injustice in the survival of some privilege or +vested interest which prevents the full working of the +principles of free contract and competition. Let every +man "count as one"; make laws for "the greatest good +of the greatest number." The trouble is not that there +is too much individualism, but that there is too little. +Tax reformers like Henry George have urged the same +principle. If land is monopolized by a few who can levy +a toll upon all the rest of society, how can justice obtain? +The remedy for injustice is to be found in promoting +greater freedom of industry and trade. Socialism on the +other hand claims that individualism defeats itself; it +results in tyranny, not freedom. The only way to secure +freedom is through united action. The merits of some +of these programs for social justice will be examined +in Part III. They signify that the age is finding its +moral problem set anew by the collision between material +interests and social good. Greek civilization used the industry +of the many to set free the higher life—art, government, +science—of a few. The mediæval ideal recognized +the moral value of industry in relation to character. +The modern conscience, resting back upon a higher appreciation +of human dignity and worth, is seeking to work +out a social and economic order that shall combine both +the Greek and the mediæval ideas. It will require work +and secure freedom. These are necessary for the individual +person. But it is beginning to be seen that these +values cannot be divided so that one social class shall perform +the labor and the other enjoy the freedom. The +growth of democracy means that all members of society<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> +should share in the value and the service of work. It +means that all should share according to capacity in the +values of free life, of intelligence and culture. Can material +goods be so produced and distributed as to promote +this democratic ideal?</p> + + +<h4>§ 6. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF +INTELLIGENCE</h4> + +<p>The development of intelligence in the modern world, +as in Greece, has two sides: on the one hand, a working-free +from the restrictions which theology or the State or +other social authorities imposed; on the other hand, positive +progress in knowledge of nature and of human life. +Under its first aspect it is known as the growth of rationalism; +under its second aspect, as the growth of science and +education. We cannot separate the development into two +periods, the one negative, the other positive, as was convenient +in the case of Greece. The negative and the positive +in the modern world have gone on contemporaneously, +although the emphasis has sometimes been on one side and +sometimes upon the other. We may, however, indicate +three periods as standing out with clearly defined characteristics.</p> + +<p>(1) The Renaissance, in which the Greek spirit of +scientific inquiry found a new birth; in which the discovery +of new continents stimulated the imagination; and in +which new and more fruitful methods of investigation were +devised in mathematics and the natural sciences.</p> + +<p>(2) The period of the Enlightenment, in which the +negative aspect of the process reached its sharpest definition. +The doctrines of revealed religion and natural religion +were criticised from the standpoint of reason. Mysteries +and superstition were alike rejected. General intelligence +made rapid progress. It was the "Age of Reason."</p> + +<p>(3) The Nineteenth Century, in which both the natural<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> +and social sciences underwent an extraordinary development. +The doctrine of evolution has brought a new +point of view for considering the organic world and human +institutions. Education has come to be regarded as both +the necessary condition for the safety of society and as +the right of every human being; Science, in large measure +set free from the need of fighting for its right to exist, +is becoming constructive; it is assuming increasingly the +duty of preserving human life and health, of utilizing +and preserving natural resources, of directing political +and economic affairs.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Renaissance.</b>—It would be giving a wrong impression +to imply that there was no inquiry, no use of +reason in the mediæval world. The problems set by the +inheritance of old-world religion and politics, forced themselves +upon the builders of castles and cathedrals,<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> of law +and of dogma. As indicated above, the universities were +centers of discussion in which brilliant minds often challenged +received opinions. Men like Roger Bacon sought +to discover nature's secrets, and the great scholastics +mastered Greek philosophy in the interest of defending +the faith. But theological interest limited freedom and +choice of theme. It was not until the expansion of the +individual along the lines already traced—in political freedom, +in the use of the arts, in the development of commerce—that +the purely intellectual interest such as had +once characterized Greece awoke. A new world of possibilities +seemed dawning upon the Italian Galileo, the +Frenchman Descartes, the Englishman Francis Bacon. +The instruments of thought had been sharpened by the +dialectics of the schools; now let them be used to analyze +the world in which we live. Instead of merely observing +nature Galileo applied the experimental method, putting +definite questions to nature and thus preparing the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> +way for a progress step by step toward a positive knowledge +of nature's laws. Descartes found in mathematics +a method of analysis which had never been appreciated +before. What seemed the mysterious path of bodies in +curved lines could be given a simple statement in his analytic +geometry. Leibniz and Newton carried this method +to triumphant results in the analysis of forces. Reason +appeared able to discover and frame the laws of the universe—the +"principles" of nature. Bacon, with less of +positive contribution in method, sounded another note +which was equally significant. The human mind is liable +to be clouded and hindered in its activities by certain +inveterate sources of error. Like deceitful images or obsessions +the "idols" of the tribe, of the cave, of the +market, and of the theater—due to instinct or habit, +to language or tradition—prevent the reason from doing +its best work. It needs vigorous effort to free the mind +from these idols. But this can be done. Let man turn +from metaphysics and theology to nature and life; let him +follow reason instead of instinct or prejudice. "Knowledge +is power." Through it may rise above the kingdom +of nature the "kingdom of man." In his <i>New Atlantis</i>, +Bacon foresees a human society in which skill and invention +and government shall all contribute to human welfare. +These three notes, the experimental method, the power of +rational analysis through mathematics, and the possibility +of controlling nature in the interests of man, were +characteristic of the period.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Enlightenment.</b>—A conflict of reason with authority +went on side by side with the progress of science. +Humanists and scientists had often set themselves against +dogma and tradition. The Reformation was not in form +an appeal to reason, but the clash of authorities stimulated +men to reasoning upon the respective claims of Catholic +and Protestant. And in the eighteenth century, under +the favoring influence of a broad toleration and a gen<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>eral +growth of intelligence, the conflict of reason with +dogma reached its culmination. The French call the +period "<i>l'Illumination</i>"—the illumination of life and experience +by the light of reason. The Germans call it the +<i>Aufklärung</i>, "the clearing-up." What was to be cleared +up? First, ignorance, which limits the range of man's +power and infects him with fear of the unknown; then +superstition, which is ignorance consecrated by wont and +emotion; finally, dogma, which usually embodies irrational +elements and seeks to force them upon the mind by the +power of authority, not of truth. Nor was it merely a +question of intellectual criticism. Voltaire saw that dogma +was often responsible for cruelty. Ignorance meant belief +in witchcraft and magic. From the dawn of civilization +this had beset man's progress and quenched many of the +brightest geniuses of the past. It was time to put an +end once for all to the remnants of primitive credulity; +it was time to be guided by the light of reason. The +movement was not all negative. Using the same appeal +to "nature," which had served so well as a rallying cry +in the development of political rights, the protagonists of +the movement spoke of a "natural light" which God had +placed in man for his guidance—"the candle of the Lord +set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible +for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish." +A natural and rational religion should take the place +of supposed revelation.</p> + +<p>But the great achievement of the eighteenth century in +the intellectual development of the individual was that +the human mind came to realize the part it was itself +playing in the whole realm of science and conduct. Man +began to look within. Whether he called his work an +<i>Essay concerning Human Understanding</i>, or a <i>Treatise +of Human Nature</i>, or a <i>Theory of Moral Sentiments</i>, +or a <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>, the aim was +to study human experience. For of a sudden it was dawn<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>ing +upon man that, if he was then living upon a higher +level of knowledge and conduct than the animal or the +savage, this must be due to the activity of the mind. +It appeared that man, not satisfied with "nature," had +gone on to build a new world with institutions and morality, +with art and science. This was no creation of +instinct or habit; nor could it be explained in terms of +sense, or feeling, or impulse alone; it was the work of +that more active, universal, and creative type of intelligence +which we call reason. Man, as capable of such +achievements in science and conduct, must be regarded +with new respect. As having political rights, freedom, +and responsibility, man has the dignity of a citizen, +sovereign as well as subject. As guiding and controlling +his own life and that of others by the power of ideas, not +of force, he has the dignity of a moral person, a moral +sovereignty. He does not merely take what nature brings; +he sets up ends of his own and gives them worth. In this, +Kant saw the supreme dignity of the human spirit.</p> + +<p><b>3. The Present Significance and Task of Scientific +Method.</b>—In the thought that man is able to form ends +which have value for all, to set up standards which all +respect, and thus to achieve worth and dignity in the +estimation of his fellows, the Individualism of the eighteenth +century was already pointing beyond itself. For +this meant that the individual attains his highest reach +only as a member of a moral society. But it is one thing +to point out the need and meaning of a moral society, it is +another thing to bring such a society into being. It has +become evident during the past century that this is the +central problem for human reason to solve. The various +social sciences, economics, sociology, political science, +jurisprudence, social psychology, have either come into +being for the first time, or have been prosecuted with new +energy. Psychology has assumed new significance as +their instrument. Not that the scientific progress of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> +century has seen its greatest triumphs in these fields. The +conspicuous successes have been rather in such sciences +as biology, or in the applications of science to engineering +and medicine. The social sciences have been occupied +largely in getting their problems stated and their methods +defined. But the discoveries and constructions of the +nineteenth century are none the less indispensable prerequisites +for a moral society. For the new conditions of +city life, the new sources of disease, the new dangers which +attend every successive step away from the life of the +savage, demand all the resources of the sciences.<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> And as +the natural sciences overcome the technical difficulties +which obstruct their work of aiding human welfare, the +demand will be more insistent that the social sciences contribute +their share toward enabling man to fulfil his moral +life. Some of the specific demands will become more evident, +as we study in subsequent chapters the present +problems of political, economic, and family life.</p> + +<p><b>Education.</b>—The importance for the moral life of the +modern development of science is paralleled by the significance +of modern education. The universities date from +the Middle Ages. The classical interest of humanism found +its medium in the college or "grammar school." The in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span>vention +of printing and the growth of commerce promoted +elementary schools. Supposed necessities of popular government +stimulated a general educational movement in the +United States. Modern trade and industry have called +out the technical school. Germany has educated for +national defense and economic advance; England has concerned +itself preëminently for the education of statesmen +and administrators; and the United States for the education +of voters. But, whatever the motive, education +has been made so general as to constitute a new element +in the modern consciousness and a new factor to be reckoned +with. The moral right of every child to have an +education, measured not by his parents' abilities, but by +his own capacity, is gaining recognition. The moral value +of a possession, which is not, like material goods, exclusive, +but common, will be more appreciated when we +have worked out a more social and democratic type of +training.<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> + +<p><b>Theoretical Interpretation of this Period in Ethical +Systems.</b>—While the theoretical interpretation of this +period is to be treated in Part II., we may point out here +that the main lines of development which we have traced +find expression in the two systems which have been most +influential during the past century. These are the systems +of Kant and of the Utilitarians. The political and +certain aspects of the intellectual development are reflected +in the system of Kant. He emphasized freedom, the power +and authority of reason, human dignity, the supreme value +of character, and the significance of a society in which +every member is at once sovereign and subject. The Utilitarians +represent the values brought out in the development +of industry, education, and the arts. They claimed that +the good is happiness, and happiness of the greatest number. +The demands for individual satisfaction and for +social distribution of goods are voiced in this system.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>The histories of philosophy and of ethics give the theoretical side. +In addition to those previously mentioned the works of Höffding, +Falckenberg, and Fischer may be named. Stephen, <i>English Thought +in the Eighteenth Century</i>, and <i>The Utilitarians</i>; Fichte, <i>Characteristics +of the Present Age</i> (in <i>Popular Works</i>, tr. by Smith); Stein, +<i>Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie</i>, 1897; Comte, <i>Positive +Philosophy</i>, tr. by Martineau, 1875, Book VI. Tufts and Thompson, +<i>The Individual and His Relation to Society as Reflected in British +Ethics</i>, 1896, 1904; Merz, <i>History of European Thought in the 19th +Century</i>, 1904; Robertson, <i>A Short History of Free Thought</i>, 1899; +Bonar, <i>Philosophy and Political Economy in Some of Their Historical +Relations</i>, 1893.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Mediæval and Renaissance Attitude</span>: Lecky, <i>History +of European Morals</i>, 3rd ed., 1877; Adams, <i>Civilization during the +Middle Ages</i>, 1895; Rashdall, <i>The Universities of Europe in the +Middle Ages</i>, 1895; Eicken, <i>Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen +Weltanschauung</i>, 1877; Burckhardt, <i>The Civilization of the Renaissance +in Italy</i>, 1892; Draper, <i>History of the Intellectual Development +of Europe</i>, 1876.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Industrial and Social Side</span>: Ashley, <i>English Economic +History</i>; Cunningham, <i>Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects</i>, +1900; and <i>Growth of English Industry and Commerce</i>, 3rd ed., 1896-1903; +Hobson, <i>The Evolution of Modern Capitalism</i>, 1894; Traill, +<i>Social England</i>, 1894; Rambaud, <i>Histoire de Civilization Française</i>, +1897; Held, <i>Zwei Bücher zur socialen Geschichte Englands</i>, 1881; +Carlyle, <i>Past and Present</i>; Ziegler, <i>Die Geistigen und socialen Strömungen +des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts</i>, 1901.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Political and Jural Development</span>: Hadley, <i>Freedom and +Responsibility in the Evolution of Democratic Government</i>, 1903; +Pollock, <i>The Expansion of the Common Law</i>, 1904; Ritchie, <i>Natural +Rights</i>, 1895; <i>Darwin and Hegel</i>, 1893, ch. vii.; Dicey, <i>Lectures on +the Relation of Law and Public Opinion in England during the +Nineteenth Century</i>, 1905.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Literary Side</span>: Brandes, <i>The Main Currents in the Literature +of the Nineteenth Century</i>, 1905; Francke, <i>Social Forces in German +Literature</i>, 1895; Carriere, <i>Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der +Culturentwicklung und die Ideale der Menschheit</i>, 3rd ed., 1877-86.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> Fisher, <i>History of the Christian Church</i>, p. 227.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>Democracy and Social Ethics</i>, pp. 222-77; <i>Newer Ideals of Peace</i>, +ch. v.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> Bryce, <i>Holy Roman Empire</i>, p. 367.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> <i>Social Forces in German Literature</i>, p. 93.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> Pp. 130 f., 136.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> Tolstoy, <i>What is Art?</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> P. 40.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> See p. 176.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> Cunningham, <i>An Essay on Western Civilization</i>, pp. 77 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> The writer is indebted to his colleague Professor Mead for the +significance of this for the beginnings of modern science.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> "Civilized man has proceeded so far in his interference with +extra-human nature, has produced for himself and the living organisms +associated with him such a special state of things by his rebellion +against natural selection and his defiance of Nature's prehuman +dispositions, that he must either go on and acquire firmer +control of the conditions or perish miserably by the vengeance certain +to fall on the half-hearted meddler in great affairs.... We may +think of him as the heir to a vast and magnificent kingdom who has +been finally educated so as to fit him to take possession of his property, +and is at length left alone to do his best; he has wilfully +abrogated, in many important respects, the laws of his Mother Nature +by which the kingdom was hitherto governed; he has gained some +power and advantage by so doing, but is threatened on every hand +by dangers and disasters hitherto restrained: no retreat is possible—his +only hope is to control, as he knows that he can, the sources of +these dangers and disasters. They already make him wince: how long +will he sit listening to the fairy-tales of his boyhood and shrink +from manhood's task?"—<span class="smcap">Ray Lankester</span>, <i>The Kingdom of Man</i>, +1907, pp. 31 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> John Dewey, <i>The School and Society</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER IX</small> + +<br /><br /> + +A GENERAL COMPARISON OF CUSTOMARY AND +REFLECTIVE MORALITY</h2> + + +<p>To eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of +good and evil may result in ultimate gain. A more +conscious and individualistic attitude may result in definite +conceptions of duty and rights, of values and ideals. At +the same time, as humanity's eyes have been opened and its +wisdom increased, many forms of nakedness unknown in +ruder conditions have been disclosed. With every increase +of opportunity and efficiency for good there is a +corresponding opportunity for evil. An immensely more +complex environment gives scope for correspondingly more +capable and subtle personalities. Some will react to the +situation in such a way as to rise to a higher moral level, +both in personal integrity and in public usefulness. Others +will find in facilities for gratifying some appetite or +passion a temptation too strong for their control and +will become vicious, or will seize the chances to exploit +others and become unjust in their acquirement and use of +power and wealth. There will be a Nero as well as an +Aurelius, a Cæsar Borgia as well as a Savonarola, a +Jeffreys as well as a Sidney, a Bentham, or a Howard. +For an Eliot or a Livingston or an Armstrong, there are +the exploiters of lower races; and for an Elizabeth Fry, +the women who trade in the wretchedness of their kind. +By the side of those who use great abilities and resources +unselfishly are those who view indifferently the sacrifice +of human health or life, and pay no heed to human misery. +Such contrasts show that the "evolution of morality" is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> +also an evolution of weakness, wretchedness, evil, and crime. +They suggest some general comparisons between custom +and reflective morality. They require from every age a +renewed analysis of conduct and the social system. As a +preliminary to such an analysis, we review in this chapter +some of the general relations between the morality of custom +and the morality of reflection.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT AND CONTINUITY</h4> + +<p>The moral life shows its continuity in two ways. First, +the earlier type of group and customary morality persists +in part; in the second place, when the moral is differentiated +from the other spheres of life in which it was embedded, +it does not have to find entirely new conceptions. +It borrows its terms from the group life or from the various +spheres, religious, political, æsthetic, economic, which +separate out from the older group unity.</p> + +<p>The following quotation from Grote will serve as a vivid +restatement of the régime of custom:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, +Ethical, Religious, Æsthetical, and Social, respecting what is +true or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy +or unholy, honorable or base, respectable or contemptible, +pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obligatory +to do or obligatory to avoid, respecting the status and +relations of each individual in the society, respecting even the +admissible fashions of amusement and recreation—this is an +established fact and condition of things, the real origin of +which is for the most part unknown, but which each new +member of the group is born to and finds subsisting.... It +becomes a part of each person's nature, a standing habit of +mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which +particular experience is interpreted and particular persons +appreciated.... The community hate, despise or deride any +individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social +creed.... Their hatred manifests itself in different ways +... at the very least by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, +good will and estimation without which the life of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> +an individual becomes insupportable.... 'Nomos (Law and +Custom), king of all' (to borrow the phrase which Herodotus +cites from Pindar) exercises plenary power, spiritual and +temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as +well as the intellect, according to the local type ... and +reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested +tendencies."<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p></div> + +<p>The important facts brought out are (1) the existence +in a social group of certain habits not only of acting, but +of feeling and believing about actions, of valuing or approving +and disapproving. (2) The persistent forcing +of these mental habitudes upon the attention of each new +member of the group. The newcomer, whether by birth +or adoption, is introduced into a social medium whose +conditions and regulations he can no more escape than +he can those of his physical environment. (3) Thus the +mental and practical habits of the newly introduced individual +are shaped. The current ways of esteeming and +behaving in the community become a "standing habit" of +his own mind; they finally reign as "habitual, self-suggested +tendencies." Thus he becomes a full member of the social +group, interested in the social fabric to which he belongs, +and ready to do his part in maintaining it.</p> + +<p><b>1. Persistence of Group Morality.</b>—Comparing this +state of affairs with what obtains to-day in civilized communities, +we find certain obvious points of agreement. The +social groups with which an individual comes in touch are +now more numerous and more loosely formed. But everywhere +there are customs not only of acting, but of thinking +and feeling about acting. Each profession, each institution, +has a <i>code</i> of which the individual has to take account. +The nature of this code, unexpressed as well as +formulated, is brought to the attention of the individual +in countless ways; by the approval and disapproval of its +public opinion; by his own failures and successes; by his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> +own tendency to imitate what he sees about him, as well as +by deliberate, intentional instruction.</p> + +<p>In other words, group morality does not vanish in order +that conscious and personal morality may take its place. +Group and customary morality is still the morality of many +of us most of the time, and of all of us for a good deal +of the time. We do not any of us think out all of our +standards, weigh independently our values, make all our +choices in a rational manner, or form our characters by +following a clearly conceived purpose. As children we +all start in a family group. We continue in a school +group and perhaps a church group. We enter an occupation +group, and later, it may be, family, political, social, +and neighborhood groups. In every one of these if we are +members, we must to a certain degree accept standards +that are given. We have to play according to the rules +of the game. As children we do this unconsciously. We +imitate, or follow suggestions; we are made to conform +by all the agencies of group morality—group opinion, +ritual, pleasure and pain, and even by taboos;<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> above all, +we act as the others act, and coöperate more or less to +a common end. We form habits which persist, many of +them as long as we live. We accept many of the traditions +without challenge. Even when we pass from the +early family group to the new situations and surroundings +which make us repeat more or less of the experience +of the race, a large share of our conduct and of our +judgments of others is determined by the influences of +group and custom. And it is fortunate for progress that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> +this is true. If every one had to start anew to frame +all his ideals and make his laws, we should be in as melancholy +a plight morally as we should be intellectually if +we had to build each science anew. The fundamental safeguards +which the group provides against individual impulse +and passion, the condition of close association, interdependence +and mutual sympathy which the group affords, +the habituation to certain lines of conduct valued by the +group—all this is a root on which the stem and flower of +personal morality may grow. Individualism and intellectual +activity, however necessary to man's progress, would +give no morality did they not start out of this deeper +level of common feeling and common destiny. The rational +and personal agencies of the "third level" come not +to destroy, but to fulfill the meaning of the forces and +agencies of the first and second levels described in Chapters +III and IV.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Moral Conceptions.</b>—The conceptions for the +moral are nearly all taken from the group relations or +from the jural and religious aspects, as these have been +gradually brought to clearer consciousness. As already +noted, the Greek term "ethical," the Latin "moral," the +German "<i>sittlich</i>," suggest this—<i>ethos</i> meant the "sum of +the characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by +which a group was differentiated and individualized in +character from other groups."<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a></p> + +<p>Some specific moral terms come directly from group +relations. The "kind" man acts as one of the kin. When +the ruling or privileged group is contrasted with the man +of no family or of inferior birth, we get a large number +of terms implying "superiority" or "inferiority" in birth, +and so of general value. This may or may not be due +to some inherent superiority of the upper class, but it +means at least that the upper class has been most effectual +in shaping language and standards of approval. So<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> +"noble" and "gentle" referred to birth before they had +moral value; "duty" in modern usage seems to have been +principally what was due to a superior. Many words for +moral disapproval are very significant of class feeling. +The "caitiff" was a captive, and the Italians have their +general term for morally bad, "<i>cattivo</i>," from the same +idea. The "villain" was a feudal tenant, the "blackguard" +looked after the kettles, the "rascal" was one of +the common herd, the "knave" was the servant; the "base" +and "mean" were opposed to the gentle and noble. Another +set of conceptions reflects the old group <i>approvals</i> +or combines these with conceptions of birth. We have +noted the twofold root of <i>kalokagathia</i> in Greek. "Honor" +and "honesty" were what the group admired, and conversely +"<i>aischros</i>" and "<i>turpe</i>" in Greek and Latin, like +the English "disgraceful" or "shameful," were what the +group condemned. "Virtue" was the manly excellence +which called out the praise of a warlike time, while one +of the Greek terms for morally bad originally meant +cowardly, and our "scoundrel" has possibly the same +origin. The "bad" was probably the weak or the womanish. +The economic appears in "merit," what I have earned, +and likewise in "duty" and "ought," what is due or owed—though +duty seems to have made itself felt especially, as +noted above, toward a superior. Forethought and skill +in practical affairs provided the conception of "wisdom," +which was highest of the virtues for the Greeks, and as +"prudence" stood high in mediæval systems. The conception +of valuing and thus of forming some permanent +standard of a better and a worse, is also aided, if not +created, by economic exchange. It appears in almost +identical terms in Plato and the New Testament in the +challenge, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole +world and lose his own life?"<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> From the processes of fine +or useful arts came probably the conceptions of measure,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> +order, and harmony. A whole mode of considering the +moral life is jural. "Moral law," "authority," "obligation," +"responsibility," "justice," "righteousness," bring +with them the associations of group control and of the more +definitely organized government and law. Finally the last +named terms bear also a religious imprint, and numerous +conceptions of the moral come from that sphere or get their +specific flavor from religious usage. The conceptions of the +"soul" have contributed to the ideal of a good which is permanent, +and which is made rather by personal companionship, +than by sensuous gratification. "Purity" began +as a magical and religious idea; it came to symbolize +not only freedom from contamination but singleness of +purpose. "Chastity" lends a religious sacredness to a +virtue which had its roots largely in the conception of +property. "Wicked" is from witch.</p> + +<p>We have indeed certain conceptions drawn from individual +experiences of instinct, or reflection. From the sense +recoil from what was disgusting such conceptions as "foul," +and from kindred imagery of what suits eye or muscular +sense come "straightforward," "upright," "steady." +From the thinking process itself we have "conscience." +This word in Greek and Latin was a general term for +consciousness and suggests one of the distinctive, perhaps +the most distinctive characteristic of the moral. For it +implies a "conscious" thoughtful attitude, which operates +not only in forming purposes, but in measuring and valuing +action by the standards it approves. But it is evident +that by far the larger part of our ethical terms are derived +from social relations in the broad sense.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. ELEMENTS OF CONTRAST</h4> + +<p><b>Differentiation of the Moral.</b>—The most obvious difference +between the present and the early attitude is that +we now make a clear distinction between the moral aspect<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> +of behavior and other aspects such as the conventional, +the political, the legal; while in customary morality all activities +esteemed by society were put upon the same level and +enforced with the same vigor. Matters which we should +regard as purely matters of fashion or etiquette, or as +modes of amusement, such as styles of wearing the hair, +were imperative. To mutilate the body in a certain way +was as exigent as to observe certain marriage customs; +to refrain from speaking to the mother-in-law as +binding as to obey the chieftain; not to step over the +shadow of the chief was even more important than not to +murder the member of another tribe. In general we make +a clear distinction between "manners" and morals, while +in customary morality manners <i>are</i> morals, as the very +words "ethical," "moral" still testify.</p> + +<p>When Grote speaks of "Ethical, Religious, Æsthetical, +and Social" beliefs, the term "ethical" belongs with the +other terms only from a modern standpoint. The characteristic +thing about the condition of which he is speaking +is that the "religious, æsthetical, and social" beliefs +brought to bear upon the individual <i>constitute</i> the ethical. +We make the distinction between them as naturally +as the régime of custom failed to make it. Only by imagining +a social set in which failure to observe punctiliously +the fashions of the set as to the proper style of dress +makes the person subject to a disparagement which influences +his feelings and ideas as keenly <i>and in the same +way</i> as conviction of moral delinquency, can we realize +the frame of mind characteristic of the ethics of +custom.</p> + +<p><b>Observing versus Reflecting.</b>—Customs may be "observed." +Indeed, customary morality made goodness or +rightness of character practically identical with observing +the established order of social estimations in all departments. +This word <i>observe</i> is significant: it means to note, +or notice as matter of fact, by perception; and it means<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> +to yield allegiance, to conform to, in action.<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> The element +of intelligence, of reason, is thus reduced to a minimum. +The moral values are <i>there</i>, so to speak, palpably, tangibly; +and the individual has only to use his mind enough +to notice them. And since they are forced upon his notice +by drastic and unrelaxing methods of discipline, little initiative +is required for even the attitude of attention. But +when the moral is something which is in customs and +habits, rather than those customs themselves, the good and +right do not stand out in so obvious and external fashion. +Recognition now demands thought, reflection; the power of +abstraction and generalization. A child may be shown in +a pretty direct and physical fashion the difference between +<i>meum</i> and <i>tuum</i> in its bearing upon his conduct: +a fence may be pointed at which divides his yard from that +of a neighbor and which draws as well the moral line between +what is permissible and what is forbidden; a whipping +may intensify the observation. But modern business +knows also of "intangible" property—good will, reputation, +credit. These, indeed, can be bought and sold but +the detection of their existence and nature demands an intelligence +which is more than perception. The greater +number of duties and rights of which present morality +consists are of just this type. They are relations, not just +outward habits. Their acknowledgment requires accordingly +something more than just to follow and reproduce +existing customs. It involves power to see <i>why</i> certain +habits are to be followed, what <i>makes</i> a thing good or bad. +<i>Conscience</i> is thus substituted for <i>custom</i>; <i>principles</i> take +the place of external <i>rules</i>.</p> + +<p>This is what we mean by calling present morality reflective +rather than customary. It is not that social customs +have ceased to be, or even have been reduced in number. +The exact contrary is the case. It is not that they have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> +shrunk in importance, or that they have less significance +for the individual's activity, or claim less of his attention. +Again, the reverse is the case. But the individual has to +grasp the <i>meaning</i> of these customs over and above the +bare fact of their existence, and has to guide himself by +their <i>meaning</i> and not by the mere fact noted.<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p> + +<p><b>Custom is Static.</b>—This difference introduces a second +very important difference. In customary morality, there +is no choice between being enmeshed in the net of social +rules which control activity, and being an outlaw—one beyond +the pale, whose hand is against every man's, and +every man's against him. The extent to which social customs +are regarded as of divine origin and are placed under +the protection of the gods, i.e., the tendency of all sanctions +to become religious and supernatural, is evidence of +the binding force of institutions upon the individual. To +violate them is impiety, sacrilege, and calls down the wrath +of gods, as well as of men. The custom cannot be questioned. +To inquire means uncertainty, and hence it is immoral, +an attack upon the very foundations of the life of +the group. The apparent exception, which after all exhibits +the rule, is the case of great reforming heroes who +demarcate epochs of history even in customary societies. +Such individuals meet contemporary opposition and persecution; +it is only by victory, by signal success over a +rival faction at home, over plague and famine, or over an +enemy abroad, that the hero is justified. Thereby it is +proved that the gods are with him and sanction his +changes—indeed that he is their own chosen instrument. +Then the modified or new customs and institutions have +all the binding sacredness and supernatural sanction of +the old. It is not yet an outgrown story for the fathers +to kill the prophets, and for the sons to build and adorn +their tombs, and make them into shrines.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Reflection Discovers a Higher Law.</b>—But in so far +as the individual's activity is directed by his comprehension +of the <i>meaning</i> of customs, not by his apprehension of +their <i>existence</i>, so far the notion of moral progress or reform +in social affairs becomes ethically important and +greater moral responsibility is put upon the individual +just as greater practical freedom is secured to him. For +(a) the individual may set the meaning of a custom <i>against</i> +its present form; or (b) he may find the meaning of +some custom much more commanding in value than that of +others, and yet find that its realization is hindered by the +existence of these other customs of less moral importance. +On the basis of such discrimination, the abolition or, at +least, the modification of certain social habits is demanded. +So far as this sort of situation frequently recurs, the individual +(c) becomes more or less vaguely aware that he +<i>must not accept the current standard</i> as justification of +his own conduct, unless <i>it also</i> justify itself to his own +moral intelligence. The fact that it exists gives it indeed +a certain <i>prima facie</i> claim, but no ultimate moral warrant. +Perhaps the custom is itself wrong—and the individual +is responsible for bearing this possibility in mind.</p> + +<p><b>Consequent Transformation of Custom.</b>—Of course +the plane of customary morality still persists; no wholesale +divergence of reflective from customary morality exists. +Practically, for example, many business men do not +bother themselves about the morality of certain ways of doing +business. Such and such is the custom of the trade, and +if a man is going to do business at all he must follow its +customs—or get out. Law, medicine, the ministry, journalism, +family life, present, in considerable extent, the same +phenomenon. Customary morality persists, almost as the +core of present morality. But there is still a difference. +A few, at least, are actively engaged in a moral criticism +of the custom, in a demand for its transformation; and almost +everybody is sufficiently affected by the discussions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> +and agitations thus called out to have some lingering and +uneasy idea of responsibility for his part in the maintenance +of a questionable custom. The duty of some exercise +of discriminating intelligence as to existing customs +for the sake of improvement and progress, is thus a mark +of reflective morality—of the régime of conscience as over +against custom. In the morally more advanced members +of contemporary society, the need of fostering a habit of +examination and judgment, of keeping the mind open, +sensitive, to the defects and the excellences of the existing +social order is recognized as obligation. To reflect +on one's own behavior in relation to the existing order is a +standing habit of mind.</p> + +<p><b>Deepening of Meaning.</b>—While the materials and conceptions +of more conscious morality are provided by the +earlier stages, and taken from other spheres of life, +we find that these conceptions naturally undergo a deepening +of meaning when they are used to express the more +intimate and personal attitude. Take, for example, the +conceptions borrowed from the jural sphere. It is in +the school of government and courts that man has learned +to talk and think of right and law, of responsibility and +justice. To make these moral instead of jural terms, +the first thing that is needed is that we make the whole +process an inward one. The person must himself set +up a standard, recognize it as "law," judge his conduct +by it, hold himself responsible to himself, and seek to do +justice. It takes several persons to carry on these processes +in the realm of government. Legislators, judges, +jury, executive officers, all represent the State, organized +society. That a single person can be himself lawgiver, +judge, and jury, as well as claimant or defendant, shows +that he is himself a complex being. He is a being +of passions, appetites, and individual interests, but he +is also a being who has a rational and social nature. +As a member of society he not only feels his individual<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> +interest but recognizes social interests. As a rational +being he not only feels the thrill of passion but responds +to the authority of a law and obeys the voice of duty. +Like a member of a democratic State he finds himself in +the sphere of conduct, not only a subject but a sovereign, +and feels the dignity of a <i>person</i>. A conscientious person +is in so far one who has made the law of God or man +an inward law of life—a "moral law." But the act of +making the process inward makes possible a deepening +of meaning. Governments and courts are necessarily +limited in purview and fallible in decisions. They are sometimes +too lenient, sometimes too severe. Conscience implies +a knowledge of the whole act—purpose, motive, and deed. +Its authority makes claim for absolute obedience. The +laws of the State are felt to be binding just because they +are believed to be, on the whole, right and just as measured +by this moral court of appeal. When they conflict, the +power may be with the political sovereign, but the man +whose conscience is clear believes that he follows a "higher +law." Much of the great literature of the world draws +its interest from its portrayal of this fundamental fact +of human experience. "Two things fill the mind with +ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener +and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry +heavens above and the moral law within."</p> + +<p>The conceptions taken from the economic sphere show +similar deepening. In the economic world things are +good or have value if people want them. It is in the +experience of satisfying wants that man has learned the +language of "good and evil," and to compare one good +with another; it is doubtless by the progress of science +and the arts that objective standards of more permanent, +rational, and social "goods" are provided. When this +term is taken up to a higher level and given moral meaning, +two new factors appear. First the individual begins +to consider his various goods and values in relation to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> +each other and to his life as a whole. In the second +place, in thus comparing the various goods and the desires +they satisfy, he begins to realize that in some way +he is himself more than the mere sum of his natural +instincts and appetites. He finds that he can take an +interest in certain things, and is not merely passive. He +<i>gives</i> value as well as measures it. He feels that as such +an active and organizing judge and creator of value, he +himself has a higher worth than any of the particular +things that gratify particular desires. "A man's life +consisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth." +"The life is more than meat." Or, to use the +phrase which will be explained later, moral good implies +purpose, character, "good will." In common language, it +implies being, and not merely having.</p> + +<p>The term good where used in our judgments upon others +(as in a "good" man), may have a different history. +As has been noted, it may come from class feeling, or +from the praise we give to acts as they immediately please. +It may be akin to noble or fine or admirable. All such +conceptions undergo a similar transformation as they +pass from the sphere of class or public opinion to become +moral terms. As moral they imply in the first place that +we consider not merely outward acts, but inward purpose +and character. They imply in the second place that we +who judge are ourselves acting not as members of a +class, not as merely emotional beings, but as social and +rational. Our moral judgments in this sense are from +a general, a universal standard; those of a class are +partial.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. OPPOSITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL AIMS +AND STANDARDS</h4> + +<p><b>Withdrawal from the Social Order.</b>—The development +of reflection tends to set up a moral opposition<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> +between the individual and society. Sometimes "conscience" +goes beyond the need of criticizing, of discriminating, +of interpreting social customs, of following their +spirit rather than their letter; it takes the form of an +assertion of a purely inner, personal morality, so distinct +from the conditions of social life that the latter are +conceived to be totally lacking in positive moral significance. +The prescriptions of morality are thought to be +revealed in conscience, as a faculty of pure intuition or +revelation, receiving neither material nor warrant from +social conditions. The distinction already spoken of between +the moral and the economic, legal, or conventional, +is conceived as a complete separation; customs and +institutions are external, indifferent, irrelevant, or even +hostile to the ideal and personally perceived demands of +morality. Such a conception of morality is especially +likely to arise in a period when through the clash of ways +and standards of living, all customs, except those maintained +by force and authority, are disintegrating or +relaxing. Such a state existed in the early years of the +Roman empire when, for the first time in history, local +boundaries were systematically overstepped; when the +empire was a seething mixture of alien and unlike gods, +beliefs, ideals, standards, practices. In the almost universal +flux and confusion, <i>external</i> order was maintained +by the crystallized legislation and administration of Rome; +but personal aims and modes of behavior had to be ascertained +by the individual thrown back upon himself. +Christian, Stoic, Epicurean, alike found the political order +wholly external to the moral, or in chronic opposition to +it. There was a withdrawal into the region of personal +consciousness. In some cases the withdrawal was pushed +to the point where men felt that they could be truly +righteous only by going by themselves into the desert, to +live as hermits; or by forming separate communities of +those who agreed in their conceptions of life; mental<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> +and moral aloofness from prevailing social standards and +habitudes was preached by all.</p> + +<p><b>Individual Emancipation.</b>—In other cases, what takes +place is a consciousness of liberation; of assertion of +personal rights and privileges, claims for new modes of +activity and new kinds of enjoyment. The individual +feels that he is his own end; that the impulses and capacities +which he finds in himself are sacred, and afford the +only genuine law for his behavior; that whatever restricts +the full exercise of these personal powers and hampers the +satisfaction of personal desires is coercive and morally abnormal. +Existing social institutions may be practically +necessary, but they are morally undesirable; they are to +be used, or got around in the interests of personal gratifications. +As some feel that social conditions are hostile +to the realization of the highest moral <i>obligations</i>, so +others feel that they are hostile to the full possession of +their <i>rights</i>, of that to which they are properly entitled.</p> + +<p><b>Eventual Transformation of Social Values and Aims.</b>—In +extreme cases, the individual may come to believe +that, either on the basis of his true obligations or his +true rights, the very principle of society is morally indifferent +or even unworthy; that the moral life is eventually +or intrinsically an individual matter, although it happens +to be outwardly led under social conditions. But in the +main the opposition is not to the social relations as such, +but to existing institutions and customs as inadequate. +Then the reaction of the individual against the existing +social scheme, whether on the ground of ideals too high +to be supported by it or on the ground of personal claims +to which it does not afford free play, becomes a means +to the reconstruction and transformation of social habits. +In this way, <i>reflective morality is a mark of a progressive +society, just as customary morality is of a stationary +society</i>. Reflection on values is the method of their +modification.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span></p> + +<p>The monastic Christian in his outward withdrawal +from social life, still maintained the conception of a perfected +society, of a kingdom of God or Heaven to be +established. This ideal became to some extent the working +method for changing the existing order. The Stoics, +who held in light esteem existing community ties, had the +conception of a universal community, a cosmopolis, ruled +by universal law, of which every rational being was a +member and subject. This notion became operative to +some extent in the development of judicial and administrative +systems much more generalized and equitable than +the purely local customs, laws, and standards which it +swept away. The Epicurean had the ideal of friendship +on the basis of which were formed groups of congenial +associates held together neither by legal ties, nor by universal +laws of reason, nor by unity of religious aspiration +and belief, but by friendship and companionable intercourse. +Thus were afforded other centers of social +reconstruction.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. EFFECTS UPON THE INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER</h4> + +<p><b>General Effects.</b>—The characteristic differences which +have been pointed out in the preceding section, when taken +together with the specific conditions of change—liberty +of action and thought, incentives to private acquisition, +facilities for power and pleasure—enable us to understand +the contrasts referred to at the opening of the +chapter. We have, on the one hand, the inbred craving +for power, for acquisition, for excitement, for gratification +of sense and appetite, enhanced by what it feeds on. We +have, on the other hand, the progressive differentiation +of the moral, tearing the individual loose from the bonds +of the external moral order and forcing him to stand +on his own feet—or fall. Note how each of the points +brought out in the preceding section operates.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span></p> + +<p>(1) To separate out the moral as a distinct element +from certain spheres of life, allows the less seriously +minded and the less sympathetic individuals to live complacently +a trivial or unscrupulous life. Fashion, "social +duties," amusements, "culture" emptied of all earnest +meaning, "business" and "politics" divorced from any +humane or public considerations, may be regarded as justifiable +vocations. A "gentleman" who no longer has the +occupation of his fighting predecessors as an excuse for +a distinct type of life, may find the support of a large +leisure class in declining any useful service to the community +and devoting himself to "sport"; a "lady" may +be so engaged by the multifarious demands of "society" +as never to notice what an utterly worthless round she +follows.</p> + +<p>(2) The fact that the morality of conscience requires +reflection, progress, and a deeper meaning for its conception, +makes it obvious why many fail to grasp any +moral meaning at all. They fail to put forth the effort, +or to break with habit. Under customary morality +it was enough to "observe" and to continue in the mores. +It requires a higher degree of insight and a greater +initiative to get any moral attitude at all when the forms +have become mere forms and the habits mere habits. +Hence when a change in personal environment or in +general social and economic conditions comes, many fail +to see the principles involved. They remain completely +satisfied with the "old-fashioned virtues" or intrench +themselves in the "righteousness" and "honesty" of a +past generation. This habitual and "painless" morality +will often mean a "virtue" or "righteousness" which involves +no conflict with present conditions. A man who +feels honest because he does not break contracts or defraud +in old-fashioned ways, may be quite at ease about +watering stock or adulterating goods. A society which +abhors murder with iron and explosives in the form of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> +daggers and bombs, may feel quite unconcerned about the +preventable homicides by iron machinery, or by explosives +used in coal mines.</p> + +<p>(3) The conflict with society which reflective morality +requires, works to thrust some below the general level, +while it raises others above it. To criticize the general +moral order may make a man a prophet, but it may also +make him a Pharisee. Practical reaction may make +reformers, but it is likely to make another set of +men dissolute; to make them feel superior to the morality +of "Philistines" and therefore exempt from social +restraints.</p> + +<p><b>Vices Incident to Reflective Stage.</b>—The vices increase +with civilization, partly because of increased opportunity, +partly because of increased looseness in social restraint. +There is a further element. When any activity of man +is cut off from its original and natural relations and +made the object of special attention and pursuit, the +whole adjustment is thrown out of balance. What was +before a useful function becomes pathological. The +craving for excitement or stimulation is normal within +certain limits. In the chase or the battle, in the venture +of the explorer or the merchant, it functions as a healthy +incentive. When isolated as an end in itself, taken out +of the objective social situation, it becomes the spring +of gambling or drunkenness. The instincts and emotions +of sex, possessing power and interest necessitated by their +place in the continuance of the race, become when isolated +the spring of passion or of obscenity or lubricity. Avarice +and gluttony illustrate the same law. The gladiatorial +shows at Rome became base and cowardly when the +Romans were themselves no longer fighters.<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> Even the +aspiration for what is higher and better may become an +"otherworldliness" which leaves this world to its misery +and evil. Such a series of pictures as Balzac has given in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> +his <i>Comédie Humaine</i>, shows better than any labored +description the possibilities of modern civilization.</p> + +<p>There is, moreover, in civilized society a further most +demoralizing agency unknown to earlier life. As the vices +are specialized and pursued they become economic and +political interests. Vast capital is invested in the business +of ministering to the vicious appetites. It is pecuniarily +desirable that these appetites should be stimulated +as greatly as possible. It makes "business." The tribute +levied by public officials upon the illegal pursuits forms +a vast fund for carrying elections. The multitude engaged +in the traffic or dependent upon it for favors, can +be relied upon to cast their votes as a unit for men who +will guarantee protection.</p> + +<p><b>Relations to Fellow Men.</b>—The motives and occasions +for selfishness and injustice have been indicated sufficiently +perhaps in preceding chapters. As the general +process of increasing individuality and reflection goes on, +it is an increasingly easy matter to be indifferent or +even unjust. When all lead a common life it is easy to +enter into the situation of another, to appreciate his +motives, his needs, and in general to "put yourself in his +place." The external nature of the conduct makes it +easy to hold all to a common standard. The game must +be shared; the property—so far as there is property—respected; +the religious rites observed. But when standards +becomes more inward the more intelligent or rigorous +may find sympathy less easy. When they attempt to be +"charitable" they may easily become condescending. The +pure will not soil their skirts by contact with the fallen. +The "high-minded citizen" refuses to mix in politics. The +scholar thinks the business man materialistic. The man +of breeding, wealth, and education finds the uneducated +laborer lacking in courtesy and refinement and argues +that it is useless to waste sympathy upon the "masses." +The class terms which have become moral terms are illus<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span>trations +of this attitude. Finally, the moral process +of building up freedom and right easily leads to a disposition +to stand on rights and let other persons look +out for themselves. Kant's doctrine, that since all morality +is personal I can do nothing to promote my neighbor's +perfection, is a <i>laissez faire</i> in ethics which he did not +carry out, but it is a not unnatural corollary of reflective +morality. "Am I my brother's keeper?" is much more +likely to be the language of reflective, than of customary +and group life.</p> + +<p><b>Reconstructive Forces.</b>—We have dwelt at length upon +the disintegrating forces, not because civilization necessarily +grows worse, but because, having pointed out in +earlier chapters the positive advances, it becomes necessary +to allude also to the other aspect of the process. Otherwise +it might appear that there is no problem. If the +evolution were supposed to be all in one direction there +would be no seriousness in life. It is only in the pressure +of constantly new difficulties and evils that moral character +adds new fiber, and moral progress emerges. Individualism, +self-seeking, and desire for property force +the establishment of governments and courts which protect +poor as well as rich. Luxury and ostentation have +not only called out the asceticism which renounces the +world and sees in all gratification of appetite an evil; +they have brought into the fore the serious meaning of +life; they have served to emphasize the demand for social +justice. The countless voluntary associations for the +relief of sickness, misfortune, and poverty; for aiding +the defective, dependent, and criminal; for promoting numberless +good causes—enlist a multitude in friendly co-operation. +The rising demand for legislation to embody +the new sentiments of justice is part of the process of +reconstruction. And now when all the arts and goods of +civilization are becoming more and more fully the work, not +of any individual's labor or skill, but rather of the com<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span>bined +labor and intelligence of many, when life in cities is +necessitating greater interdependence, finally when contrasts +in conditions are brought more forcibly to notice by +the very progress of knowledge and the means of knowledge,—the +more thoroughly social use of all that civilization +produces becomes more insistent and compelling. It +is not a matter of sentiment but of necessity. If any one +is disposed to deny the claim, it becomes increasingly certain +that Carlyle's Irish widow will prove her sisterhood by +infecting the denier with fever;<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> that the ignorant, or +criminal, or miserable will jeopardize his happiness.</p> + + +<h4>§ 5. MORAL DIFFERENTIATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER</h4> + +<p>Two processes went on side by side in the movement we +have traced. (1) The primitive group, which was at once +a kinship or family, an economic, a political, a religious, +an educational, and a moral unit, was broken down and +replaced by several distinct institutions, each with its +own special character. (2) The moral, which was so +largely unreflective that it could be embodied in every +custom and observance, became more personal and subjective. +The result of this was either that the moral +was now more consciously and voluntarily <i>put into</i> the +social relations, thereby raising them all to a higher moral +level, or that, failing such a leavening of the distinct<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> +spheres of the social order, the latter were emptied of moral +value and lost moral restraints. We notice very briefly +certain illustrations of this, leaving a fuller treatment +for Part III.</p> + +<p><b>The Family.</b>—When the family was largely determined +by status, when it was an economic, a political, and +a religious unit, it had a strong support. But the support +was largely external to the true purpose and meaning +of the family. Only as these other elements were +separated, and the family placed on a voluntary basis, +could its true significance emerge. Affection and mutual +supplementation of husband and wife, love and devotion +to offspring, must stand the strains formerly distributed +over several ties. The best types of family life which +have resulted from this more moral basis are unquestionably +far superior to the older form. At the same time +the difficulties and perversion or subversion of the more +voluntary type are manifest. When no personal attachment +was sought or professed, or when marriage by +purchase was the approved custom, the marriage contracted +under these conditions might have all the value +which the general state of intelligence and civilization allowed. +When the essential feature which hallows the +union has come to be recognized as a union of will and +affection, then marriage without these, however "solemnized," +almost inevitably means moral degradation. And +if the consent of the parties is regarded as the basis +of the tie, then it is difficult to make sure that this +"consent" has within it enough of steadfast, well-considered +purpose and of emotional depth to take the place +of all the older sanctions and to secure permanent unions. +The more complete responsibility for the children which +has been gained by the separation of the family, has also +proved susceptible of abuse as well as of service. For +while savages have often practiced infanticide for economic +reasons, it is doubtful if any savage family ever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> +equaled the more refined selfishness and cruelty of the +child labor which modern families have furnished and +modern society has permitted.</p> + +<p><b>The Economic and Industrial.</b>—The economic lost powerful +restraints when it became a separate activity +divorced from family, religious, and, in the view of some, +from moral considerations. It has worked out certain important +moral necessities of its own. Honesty, the keeping +of contracts, the steadiness and continuity of character +fostered by economic relations, are important +contributions. Modern business, for example, is the most +effective agency in securing sobriety. It is far more +efficient than "temperance societies." Other values of the +economic and industrial process—the increase of production, +the interchange of services and goods, the new means +of happiness afforded by the increase of wealth—are +obvious. On the other hand, the honesty required by +business is a most technical and peculiarly limited sort. +It does not interfere with adulteration of goods under +certain conditions, nor with corrupt bargains with public +officials. The measurement of values on a purely pecuniary +basis tends to release a large sphere of activity from any +moral restraints. The maxim "Business is business" may +be made the sanction for any kind of conduct not excluded +by commercial standards. Unless there is a constant injection +of moral valuation and control, there is a tendency +to subvert all other ends and standards to the purely +economic.</p> + +<p><b>Law and Government.</b>—To remove these functions +from the kinship group as such, is at once to bring the +important principles of authority and duty, and gradually +of rights and freedom, to consciousness. Only by +such separation could the universality and impartiality +of law be established. And only by universality can the +judgment of the society as a whole be guaranteed its +execution as over against the variations in intelligence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> +and right purpose of individual rulers and judges. Moreover, +the separation of law from morality has likewise +its gain or loss. On the one hand, to separate off a definite +sphere of external acts to which alone physical constraints +or penalties may attach, is at once to free a +great sphere of inner thought and purpose and to enable +purely psychical values and restraints to attain far +greater power in conduct. Liberty of thought and religious +belief, sincerity and thorough responsibility, require +such a separation. It is also to make possible a +general law which rises above the conscience of the lower +even if it does not always reach the level of the most +enlightened and just. To make a command a "universal +law" is itself a steadying and elevating influence, and +it is only by a measure of abstraction from the individual, +inner aspect of conduct that this can be achieved. +On the other hand, the not infrequent contrast between +law and justice, the substitution of technicality for substantials, +the conservatism which made Voltaire characterize +lawyers as the "conservators of ancient barbarous +usages," above all the success with which law has been +used to sanction or even facilitate nearly every form of +oppression, extortion, class advantage, or even judicial +murder, is a constant attestation of the twofold possibilities +inherent in all institutions. Government in other +functions exhibits similar possibilities. At first it was +tyranny against which the subject had to defend himself. +Now it is rather the use of political machinery for private +gain. "Eternal vigilance" is the price not only of freedom, +but of every moral value.</p> + +<p><b>The Religious Life.</b>—When freed from interdependence +with kinship, economic, and political association, +religion has an opportunity to become more personal and +more universal. When a man's religious attitude is not +fixed by birth, when worship is not so closely bound up +with economic interests, when there is not only religious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> +"toleration," but religious liberty, the significance of religion +as a personal, spiritual relation comes to view. The +kinship tie is sublimated into a conception of divine fatherhood. +It becomes credible that Job does serve God "for +naught." Faith and purity of heart are not secured by +magistrates or laws.</p> + +<p>And the universality of religion is no less a gain. So +far as religion was of the group it tended to emphasize +the boundary between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, +between the "we-group" and the "others-group." +But when this group religion gave place to a more universal +religion, the kingdom of Israel could give place +to the kingdom of God; brotherhood could transcend +family or national lines. In the fierce struggles of the +Middle Ages the church was a powerful agency for restraining +the powerful and softening the feuds of hostile +clans and peoples. The "peace of God" was not only +a symbol of a far-off ideal, but an actual relief. The +universality might indeed be sought by force in a crusade +of Christian against Moslem, or in the horror of a thirty +years' war between Catholic and Protestant. But as the +conception of religion as a spiritual relation becomes +clearer, the tendency must inevitably be to disclose religion +as essentially a unifying rather than a divisive and discordant +force. If any religion becomes universal it will +be because of its universal appeal. And so far as it does +make universal appeal, like science, like art, it invites +its followers.</p> + +<p>The differentiation of the moral from the religious +is often difficult to trace. For the religious has often been +the agency through which certain of the characteristics +of the moral have been brought about. The inward and +voluntary aspect of the moral, as compared with the verdicts +of law or public opinion, has been emphasized. But this +is often developed by the religious conceptions of an all-seeing +God, an all-wise judge. "Man looketh on the outer<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> +appearance, but the Lord looketh upon the heart" has its +literary parallels in Xenophon and Plato and Shakspere. +The distinction between higher and lower values has +received its most impressive symbol in the conception of +"another world," in which there is neither pain nor sin, +but eternal blessedness and eternal life. Ideals of character, +when embodied in divine persons, command love, +reverence, and devotion in supreme degree. A society +in which love and justice are the law of life has seemed +more possible, more potent to inspire sacrifice and enthusiasm, +when envisaged as the Kingdom of God. But +in all these illustrations we have, not the religious as +distinct from the moral, but the religious as modified +by the moral and embodying the moral in concrete examples +and imagery. We can see the two possible types +of development, however, in the concrete instances of the +Hebrews and the Greeks. In Israel religion was able to +take up the moral ideals and become itself more completely +ethical. The prophets of religion were at the same +time the moral reformers. But in Greece, in spite of the +efforts of some of the great poets, the religious conceptions +for the most part remained set and hence became +superstition, or emotional orgy, or ecstasy, while the moral +found a distinct path of its own. Religion at present +is confronting the problem of whether it will be able to +take up into itself the newer ethical values—the scientific +spirit which seeks truth, the enhanced value of human +worth which demands higher types of social justice.</p> + +<hr style='width: 15%;' /> + +<p>A brief characterization of the respective standpoints +of religion and morality may be added, as they both aim +to control and give value to human conduct. The religious +has always implied some relation of man's life +to unseen powers or to the cosmos. The relation may be +the social relation of kin or friend or companion, the +political of subject to a sovereign, the cosmic relation of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> +dependence, or that of seeking in the divine completer +meaning or more perfect fulfillment for what is fragmentary +and imperfect. In its aspect of "faith" it holds +all these ideals of power, wisdom, goodness, justice, to +be real and effective. The moral, on the other hand, concerns +itself, not with unseen beings or cosmic reality, but +with human purposes and the relations of a man to his +fellows. For religion, conscience may be the "voice of +God"; for morality, it must be stated in terms of thought +and feeling. The "moral law" must be viewed as a law +which is capable of being approved, at least—and this +implies that it may also be criticized—by the mind. The +difference which religion states as a choice between "God +and mammon," between heaven and earth, morality must +state in terms of good and evil, right and wrong, ideal +interests and natural appetites. Instead of regarding +its standards as laws established once for all by a divine +authority, morality seeks to reach <i>principles</i>. Instead +of embodying its ideals in persons, the moral seeks to +reshape them continually. It is for religion to hold +that "God reigns," and therefore "All's right with the +world." The moral as such must be continually overcoming +evil, continually working out ideals into conduct, +and changing the natural order into a more rational and +social order.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Grote, <i>Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates</i>, Vol. I., p. +249.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> Nearly every railway journey or other occasion for observing +family discipline discloses the prevalence of this agency of savage +morality. "If you are not quiet I'll give you to the conductor," +"the black man will get you," "Santa Claus will not give presents +to naughty children." That persons who in many respects are kindly +and decent should aim to cultivate morality by a system of deliberate +lying and more or less brutal cruelty is one of the interesting +phenomena of education. The savages who used taboos believed what +they said.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>, p. 36.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> Plato's wording is given on p. 132.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> "Recognition" has the same double sense. So has "acknowledgment," +with greater emphasis upon rendering allegiance in action.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> Logically, this means that intelligence works conceptually, not +perceptually alone.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>, p. 570.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> "One of Dr. Alison's Scotch facts struck us much. A poor Irish +Widow, her husband having died in one of the Lanes of Edinburgh, +went forth with her three children, bare of all resources, to solicit help +from the Charitable Establishments of that City. At this Charitable +Establishment and then at that she was refused; referred from one +to the other, helped by none; till she had exhausted them all; till her +strength and heart failed her; she sank down in typhus-fever; died, +and infected her Lane with fever, so that 'seventeen other persons' +died of fever there in consequence.... The forlorn Irish Widow +applies to her fellow creatures, as if saying, 'Behold I am sinking, +bare of help; ye must help me! I am your sister, bone of your bone; +one God made us; ye must help me.' They answer, 'No, impossible; +thou art no sister of ours.' But she proves her sisterhood; her typhus +fever kills <i>them</i>:" (<i>Past and Present</i>, Book III., ch. ii.)</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II"></a>PART II + +<br /><br /> + +THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE</h2> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>GENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART II</h3> + +<p>Among the works which have had the most influence upon the +development of the theory of morals are: Plato, dialogues entitled +<i>Republic, Laws</i>, <i>Protagoras</i> and <i>Gorgias</i>; Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>; Cicero, +<i>De Finibus</i> and <i>De Officiis</i>; Marcus Aurelius, <i>Meditations</i>; Epictetus, +<i>Conversations</i>; Lucretius, <i>De Rerum Natura</i>; St. Thomas Aquinas +(selected and translated by Rickaby under title of <i>Aquinas Ethicus</i>); +Hobbes, <i>Leviathan</i>; Spinoza, <i>Ethics</i>; Shaftesbury, <i>Characteristics</i>, and +<i>Inquiry concerning Virtue</i>; Hutcheson, <i>System of Moral Philosophy</i>; +Butler, <i>Sermons</i>; Hume, <i>Essays, Principles of Morals</i>; Adam Smith, +<i>Theory of Moral Sentiments</i>; Bentham, <i>Principles of Morals and +Legislation</i>; Kant, <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i>, and <i>Foundations of +the Metaphysics of Ethics</i>; Comte, Social Physics (in his <i>Course +of Positive Philosophy</i>); Mill, <i>Utilitarianism</i>; Spencer, <i>Principles +of Ethics</i>; Green, <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of +Ethics</i>; Selby-Bigge, <i>British Moralists</i>, 2 vols. (a convenient collection +of selections). For contemporary treatises, and histories consult +the literature referred to in ch. i. of Part I.</p> +</div> + + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER X</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE MORAL SITUATION</h2> + + +<p><b>Object of Part Two and of Present Chapter.</b>—From +the history of morals, we turn to the theoretical analysis +of reflective morality. We are concerned to discover +(1) just what in conduct it is that we judge good and +evil, right and wrong (conduct being a complicated +thing); (2) what we mean by good and evil, right and +wrong; (3) on what basis we apply these conceptions +to their appropriate objects in conduct. But before +we attempt these questions, we must detect and identify +the <i>moral situation</i>, the situation in which considerations +of good and evil, right and wrong, present themselves +and are employed. For some situations we employ +the ideas of true and false; of beautiful and ugly; +of skilful and awkward; of economical and wasteful, +etc. We may indeed apply the terms right and wrong +to these same situations; but if so, it is to them +in some other light. What then are the differentiating +traits, the special earmarks, presented by the situation +which we identify as distinctively moral? For we use +the term moral in a broad sense to designate that which +is either moral or immoral: i.e., right or wrong in the +narrower sense. It is the moral situation in the broad +sense as distinct from the non-moral, not from the immoral, +that we are now concerned with.</p> + +<p><b>The Moral Situation Involves Voluntary Activity.</b>—It +will be admitted on all hands that the moral situation +is one which, whatever else it may or may not be,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> +involves a voluntary factor. Some of the chief traits of +voluntary activity we have already become acquainted +with, as in the account by Aristotle, already noted (<i>ante</i>, +p. 12). The agent must know what he is about; he +must have some idea of what he is doing; he must not +be a somnambulist, or an imbecile, or insane, or an infant +so immature as to have no idea of what he is doing. +He must also have some wish, some desire, some preference +in the matter. A man overpowered by superior force +might be physically compelled by some ingenious device +to shoot a gun at another, knowing what he was doing, +but his act would not be voluntary because he had no +choice in the matter, or rather because his preference +was not to do the act which he is aware he is doing. But +if he is ordered to kill another and told if he does not he +will himself be killed, he has <i>some</i> will in the matter. He +may do the deed, not because he likes it or wishes it in +itself, but because he wishes to save his own life. The +attendant circumstances may affect our judgment of the +kind and degree of morality attaching to the act; but they +do not take it entirely out of the moral sphere.<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Aristotle +says the act must also be the expression of a disposition +(a habit or ἕξις), a more or less settled tendency +on the part of the person. It must bear some relation to +his character. Character is not, we may say, a third factor, +It is making clear what is implied in deliberation and wish. +There may be little deliberation in a child's act and little +in an adult's, and yet we may regard the latter as much +more voluntary than the child's. With the child, the +thought is superficial and casual, because of the restricted +stage of organization or growth reached (see p. 10): +his act flows from organic instinct or from accidental +circumstances—whim, caprice, and chance suggestion, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> +fancy. The adult's act may flow from habitual tendencies +and be accompanied by an equally small amount of conscious +reflection. But the tendencies themselves are the outcome +of prior deliberations and choices which have finally +got funded into more or less automatic habits. The child's +act is to a slight extent the expression of character; the +adult's to a large extent. In short, we mean by character +whatever lies behind an act in the way of deliberation and +desire, whether these processes be near-by or remote.</p> + +<p><b>Not Everything Voluntary is Morally Judged.</b>—A +voluntary act may then be defined as one <i>which manifests +character</i>, the test of its presence being the presence +of desire and deliberation; these sometimes being present +directly and immediately, sometimes indirectly and remotely +through their effects upon the agent's standing +habits. But we do not judge all voluntary activity from +the moral standpoint. Some acts we judge from the +standpoint of skill or awkwardness; others as amusing +or boring; others as stupid or highly intelligent, and so +on. We do not bring to bear the conceptions of right +and wrong. And on the other hand, there are many +things called good and bad which are not voluntary. +Since what we are in search of must lie somewhere between +these two limits, we may begin with cases of the +latter sort.</p> + +<p><i>(1) Not Everything Judged Good or Right is Moral.</i>—We +speak, for example, of an ill-wind; of a good +engine; of a watch being wrong; or of a screw being set +right. We speak of good and bad bread, money, or +soil. That is, from the standpoint of value, we judge +things as <i>means</i> to certain results in themselves desirable +or undesirable. A "good" machine does efficiently the +work for which it is designed; "bad" money does not +subserve the ends which money is meant to promote; +the watch that is wrong comes short of telling us time +correctly. We have to use the notion of value and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> +of contribution to value; that is a positive factor. But +this contribution to valuable result is not, in inanimate +objects, something meant or intended by the things themselves. +If we thought the ill-wind had an idea of its +own destructive effect and took pleasure in that idea, we +should attribute moral quality to it—just as men did in +early times, and so tried to influence its behavior in order +to make it "good." Among things that promote favorable +or unfavorable results a line is drawn between those +which just do so as matter of fact, and those in which +meaning so to do, or intention, plays a part.</p> + +<p><b>(2) Good in Animal Conduct.</b>—Let us now consider +the case of good and bad animal conduct. We speak of a +good watch-dog; of a bad saddle-horse, and the like. +Moreover, we <i>train</i> the dog and the horse to the right or +desired kind of action. We make, we repair the watch; +but we do not <i>train</i> it. Training involves a new factor: +enlistment of the animal's tendencies; of its own conscious +attitudes and reactions. We pet, we reward by feeding, we +punish and threaten. By these means we induce animals to +exercise in ways that form the habits we want. We modify +the animal's behavior by modifying its own impulses. But +we do not give moral significance to the good and bad, for +we are still thinking of means to ends. We do not suppose +that we have succeeded in supplying the hunting +dog, for example, with <i>ideas</i> that certain results are more +excellent than others, so that henceforth he acts on the +basis of his own discrimination of the less and the more +valuable. We just induce certain habits by managing +to make certain ways of acting <i>feel</i> more agreeable than +do others. Thus James says: "Whether the dog has the +notion of your being angry or of your property being +valuable in any such abstract way as <i>we</i> have these notions, +is more than doubtful. The conduct is more likely +an impulsive result of a conspiracy of outward stimuli; +the beast <i>feels like</i> acting so when these stimuli are pres<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>ent, +though conscious of no definite reason why"<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> (<i>Psychology</i>, +Vol. II., p. 350, note). Or putting it the other +way: if the dog has an idea of the results of guarding +the house, and is controlled in what he does by loyalty to +this idea, by the satisfaction which he takes in it, then +in calling the dog good we mean that in being good for +a certain result, he is also morally good.</p> + +<p><b>(3) Non-moral Human Acts.</b>—There are also acts +evoked by an idea of value in the results to be reached, +which are not judged as coming within the moral sphere. +"Conduct is three-fourths of life," but in some sense it is +more: it is four-fourths. All conscious human life is +concerned with ends, and with selecting, arranging, and +employing the means, intellectual, emotional, and practical, +involved in these ends. This makes <i>conduct</i>. But +it does not follow that all conduct has <i>moral</i> import. +"As currently conceived, stirring the fire, reading a newspaper, +or eating a meal, are acts with which morality +has no concern. Opening the window to air the room, +putting on an overcoat when the weather is cold, are +thought of as having no ethical significance. These, however, +are all portions of conduct" (Spencer, <i>Principles of +Ethics</i>, Vol. I., p. 5). They all involve the idea of some +result worth reaching, and the putting forth of energy +to reach the result—of intelligently selected and adapted +means. But this may leave the act morally indifferent—innocent.</p> + +<p><b>Introduction of Moral Factor.</b>—A further quotation +from Spencer may introduce discussion of the needed +moral qualification:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As already said, a large part of the ordinary conduct is indifferent. +Shall I walk to the water fall today? or, shall I +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>ramble along the sea shore? Here the ends are ethically +indifferent. If I go to the water fall, shall I go over the +moor or take the path through the wood? Here the means +are ethically indifferent.... But if a friend who is with me +has explored the sea shore, but has not seen the water fall, +the choice of one or other end is no longer ethically indifferent. +Again, if a probable result of making the one excursion +rather than the other, is that I shall not be back in +time to keep an appointment, or if taking the longer route entails +this risk while the shorter does not, the decision in favor +of one end or means acquires in another way an ethical +character" (Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, pp. 5-6).</p></div> + +<p>This illustration suggests two differing types of conduct; +two differing ways in which activity is induced and guided +by ideas of valuable results. In one case the end presents +itself directly as desirable, and the question is only as +to the steps or means of achieving this end. Here we have +conduct which, although excited and directed by considerations +of value, is still morally indifferent. Such is the +condition of things <i>wherever one end is taken for granted +by itself without any consideration of its relationship +to other ends</i>. It is then a technical rather than a +moral affair. It is a question of taste and of skill—of +personal preference and of practical wisdom, or of +economy, expediency. There are many different roads to +most results, and the selection of this path rather than +that, on the assumption that either path actually leads +to the end, is an intellectual, æsthetic, or executive, rather +than an ethical matter. I may happen to prefer a marine +view to that of the uplands—that is an æsthetic interest. +I may wish to utilize the time of the walk for thinking, +and may find the moor path less distracting; here is a +matter of intellectual economy. Or I may conclude that +I shall best get the exercise I want by going to the water +fall. Here it is a question of "prudence," of expediency, +or practical wisdom. Let any one of the ends, æsthetic, +intellectual, hygienic, stand alone and it is a fit and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> +proper consideration. The moral issue does not arise. +Or the various ends may be regarded as means to a +further unquestioned end—say a walk with the maximum +of combined æsthetic interest and physical exercise.</p> + +<p><b>(4) Criterion for Moral Factor.</b>—But let the value of +one proposed end be felt to be really incompatible with +that of another, let it be felt to be so opposed as +to appeal to a different kind of interest and choice, in +other words, to different kinds of disposition and agency, +and we have a moral situation. This is what occurs when +one way of traveling means self-indulgence; another, +kindliness or keeping an engagement. There is no longer +one end, nor two ends so homogeneous that they may be +reconciled by both being used as means to some more +general end of undisputed worth. We have alternative +ends so heterogeneous that choice has to be made; an +end has to be developed out of conflict. The problem now +becomes what <i>is</i> really valuable. It is the <i>nature</i> of the +valuable, of the desirable, that the individual has to pass +upon.<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> + +<p>Suppose a person has unhesitatingly accepted an end, +has acquiesced in some suggested purpose. Then, starting +to realize it, he finds the affair not so simple. He is led to +review the matter and to consider what really constitutes +worth for him. The process of attainment calls for toil +which is disagreeable, and imposes restraints and abandonments +of accustomed enjoyments. An Indian boy, +for example, thinks it desirable to be a good rider, a skilful +shot, a sagacious scout. Then he "naturally," as we +say, disposes of his time and energy so as to realize +his purpose. But in trying to become a "brave," he finds +that he has to submit to deprivation and hardship, to +forego other enjoyments and undergo arduous toil. He<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> +finds that the end does not mean in actual realization what +it meant in original contemplation—something that often +happens, for, as Goldsmith said: "In the first place, we +cook the dish to our own appetite; in the latter, nature +cooks it for us."</p> + +<p>This change in apparent worth raises a new question: +Is the aim first set up of the value it seemed to be? Is +it, after all, so important, so desirable? Are not other +results, playing with other boys, convivial companionship, +which are reached more easily and pleasantly, really more +valuable? The labors and pains connected with the means +employed to reach an end, have thrown another and incompatible +end into consciousness. The individual no +longer "naturally," but "morally," follows the selected +end, whichever of the two it be, because it has been chosen +after conscious valuation of competing aims.</p> + +<p>Such competitions of values for the position of control +of action are inevitable accompaniments of individual +conduct, whether in civilized or in tribal life. A child, +for example, finds that the fulfillment of an appetite +of hunger is not only possible, but that it is desirable—that +fulfillment brings, or is, satisfaction, not mere satiety. +Later on, moved by the idea of this sort of value, he +snatches at food. Then he is made aware of other sorts +of values involved in the act performed—values incompatible +with just the value at which he aimed. He brings down +upon himself social disapproval and reproach. He is +termed rude, unmannerly, greedy, selfish. He acted in +accordance with an unhesitatingly accepted idea of value. +But while reaching one result he accomplished also certain +other results which he did not intend, results in the +way of being thought ill of, results which are disagreeable: +<i>negative values</i>. He is taught to raise the question +of what, after all, in such cases is the <i>really</i> desirable or +valuable. Before he is free to deliberate upon means, he +has to form an estimate of the relative worth of various<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> +possible ends, and to be willing to forego one and select +the other. The chapters on Hebrew and Greek moral +development have shown this same process at work in the +life of a people.</p> + +<p><b>Summary and Definition.</b>—If we sum up the three +classes of instances thus far considered, we get the following +defining traits of a moral situation, that is, +of one which is an appropriate subject of determinations +of right and wrong: Moral experience is (1) a matter +of <i>conduct</i>, <i>behavior</i>; that is, of activities which are called +out by <i>ideas of the worth, the desirability of results</i>. This +evocation by an <i>idea</i> discriminates it from the so-called +behavior of a pump, where there is no recognition of results; +and from conduct attributed to the lower animals, +where there are probably feelings and even dim imagery, +but hardly ideas of the comparative desirability or value +of various ends. Moral experience is (2) that kind of +conduct in which there are ends so discrepant, so incompatible, +as to require selection of one and rejection of +the other. This perception of, and selection from, incompatible +alternatives, discriminates moral experience from +those cases of conduct which are called out and directed +by ideas of value, but which do not necessitate passing +upon the <i>real worth</i>, as we say, of the value selected. +It is incompatibility of ends which necessitates consideration +of the true worth of a given end; and such +consideration it is which brings the experience into the +moral sphere. Conduct as moral may thus be defined as +<i>activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or +worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible +as to require consideration and selection before an +overt action is entered upon</i>.</p> + +<p><b>End Finally at Issue.</b>—Many questions about ends are +in reality questions about means: the artist considers +whether he will paint a landscape or a figure; this or +that landscape, and so on. The general character of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> +end is unchanged: it is to paint. But let this end persist +and be felt as desirable, as valuable; let at the same +time an alternative end presents itself as also desirable +(say keeping an engagement), so that the individual does +not find any way of adjusting and arranging them into +a common scheme (like doing first one and then the other), +and the person has a moral problem on his hands. Which +shall he decide for, and why? The appeal is to himself; +what does <i>he</i> really think the desirable end? What +makes the supreme appeal to him? What sort of an +agent, of a person, shall he be? This is the question finally +at stake in any genuinely moral situation: What shall the +agent <i>be</i>? What sort of a character shall he assume? +On its face, the question is what he shall <i>do</i>, shall he act +for this or that end. But the incompatibility of the ends +forces the issue back into the question of the kinds of +selfhood, of agency, involved in the respective ends. The +distinctively moral situation is then one in which elements +of value and control are bound up with the processes +of deliberation and desire; and are bound up in a peculiar +way: <i>viz.</i>, they decide what kind of a character shall +control further desires and deliberations. When ends are +genuinely incompatible, no common denominator can be +found except by deciding what sort of character is most +highly prized and shall be given supremacy.</p> + +<p><b>The Moral and Indifferent Situations.</b>—This criterion +throws lights upon our earlier discussion of morally indifferent +acts. Persons perform the greater bulk of their activities +without any conscious reference to considerations +of right and wrong, as any one may verify for himself by +recollecting the general course of his activity on any ordinary +day from the time he arises in the morning to the +time he goes to bed at night. His deliberations and wants +are mostly concerned with the ends involved in his regular +vocation and recreations. But at any time the question of +his character as concerned with what he is doing may arise<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> +for judgment. The person may later on realize that the +type or kind of character which is to prevail in his further +activity was involved in deeds which were performed without +any such thought. He <i>then</i> judges them morally, approving +or disapproving. On the other hand, a course of +action which at the time presented a moral crisis even, may +afterwards come to be followed as a matter of course. +There is then no <i>fixed</i> line between the morally indifferent +and the morally significant. Every act is <i>potential</i> subject-matter +of moral judgment, for it strengthens or weakens +some habit which influences whole classes of judgments.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>There are comparatively few distinct analyses of the moral situation, +the topic generally being treated as a running part of the +theory of the author, or in connection with an account of character +or conduct (see references at end of ch. xiii.). See, however, Mezes, +<i>Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory</i>, ch. ii.; Martineau, <i>Types of +Ethical Theory</i>, Vol. II., pp. 17-54; Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, +Vol. I.; <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, Stuart, essay on Valuation as a +Logical Process, pp. 237-241, 257-258, 273-275, 289-293; Dewey, <i>Logical +Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality</i>; Mead, <i>Philosophical +Basis of Ethics</i>, International Journal of Ethics, April, +1908; Fite, <i>Introductory Study of Ethics</i>, chs. ii., xviii., and xix.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Aristotle illustrates by a man who throws his goods overboard in +a storm at sea. He does not wish absolutely to lose his goods, but +he prefers losing them to losing the ship or his own life: he wishes +it <i>under the circumstances</i> and his act is so far voluntary.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> Of course, this is also true of a large part of human activity. But +these are also the cases in which we do not ascribe moral value; or +at least we do not except when we want to make the agent conscious +of some reason why.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> While we have employed Spencer's example, it should be noted +that incompatibility of ends is not the criterion of the distinctively +moral situation which Spencer himself employs.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XI</small><br /><br /> + +PROBLEMS OF MORAL THEORY</h2> + + +<p>We have identified in its framework and main outlines +the sort of voluntary activity in which the problem of +good and evil appears and in which the ideas of right and +wrong are employed. This task, however, is only preliminary +to theoretical analysis. For it throws no light upon +just what we mean by good and bad; just what elements of +complex voluntary behavior are termed right or wrong; or +why they are so termed. It does not even indicate what +must be discovered before such questions can be answered. +It only sets forth the limits of the subject-matter within +which such questions arise and in reference to which +they must be answered. What are the distinctive problems +which must be dealt with in the course of such a +discussion?</p> + +<p><b>Growth of Theory from Practical Problems.</b>—Of one +thing we may be sure. If inquiries are to have any substantial +basis, if they are not to be wholly up in the air, +the theorist must take his departure from the problems +which men actually meet in their own conduct. He may +define and refine these; he may divide and systematize; he +may abstract the problems from their concrete contexts +in individual lives; he may classify them when he has thus +detached them; but if he gets away from them he is talking +about something which his own brain has invented, +not about moral realities. On the other hand, the perplexities +and uncertainties of direct and personal behavior invite +a more abstract and systematic impersonal treatment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> +than that which they receive in the exigencies of their occurrence. +The recognition of any end or authority going beyond +what is embodied in existing customs, involves some +appeal to thought, and moral theory makes this appeal more +explicit and more complete. If a child asks why he should +tell the truth, and is answered, "because you ought to and +that is reason enough"; or, "because it will prove profitable +for you to do so"; or, "because truth-telling is a condition +of mutual communication and common aims," the answer +implies a principle which requires only to be made explicit +to be full-fledged theory. And when this principle is +compared with those employed in other cases to see if they +are mutually consistent; and if not, to find a still more +fundamental reconciling principle, we have passed over +the border into ethical system.</p> + +<p><b>Types of Theoretical Problems.</b>—The practical problems +which a thoughtful and progressive individual must +consider in his own conduct will, then, give the clue to the +genuine problems of moral theory. The framework of +one is an outline of the other. The man who does not satisfy +himself with sheer conventional conformity to the customs, +the <i>ethos</i>, of his class will find such problems as the following +forced upon his attention:—(1) He must consider +the <i>meaning</i> of habits which have been formed more or less +unreflectively—by imitation, suggestion, and inculcation +from others—and he must consider the meaning of those customs +about him to which he is invited to conform till they +have become personal habits. This problem of discovering +the meaning of these habits and customs is the problem of +stating what, after all, is <i>really</i> good, or worth while in +conduct. (2) The one whose morality is of the reflective +sort will be faced by the problem of moral advance, of +progress beyond the level which has been reached by this +more or less unreflective taking on of the habits and ideas +of those about him, progress up to the level of his own +reflective insight. Otherwise put, he has to face the prob<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>lem +of what is to be the place and rôle in his own conduct +of ideals and principles generated not by custom but by +deliberation and insight. (3) The individual must consider +more consciously the relation between what is currently +regarded as good by the social groups in which he +is placed and in which he has to act, and that regarded as +good by himself. The moment he ceases to accept conformity +to custom as an adequate sanction of behavior, he is met by +discrepancy between his personally conceived goods and +those reigning in the customs about him. Now while this +detachment makes possible the birth of higher and more +ideal types of morality, and hence of systematic effort for +social reform and advance; it also makes possible (as we +have seen on the historical side, p. 189) a more generalized +and deliberate selfishness; a less instinctive and more intentional +pursuit of what the individual judges to be good +<i>for himself</i> against what society exacts as good for itself. +The same reflective attitude which generates the conscientious +moral reformer may generate also a more deliberate +and resolute anti-social egoism. In any case, the individual +who has acquired the habit of moral reflection, is +conscious of a new problem—the relation of public good +to individual good. In short, the individual who is +thoughtfully serious and who aims to bring his habit of reflection +to bear on his conduct, will have occasion (1) to +search for the elements of good and bad, of positive and +negative, value in the situations that confront him; (2) +to consider the methods and principles by which he shall +reach conclusions, and (3) to consider the relations between +himself, his own capacities and satisfactions, and +the ends and demands of the social situations in which he +is placed.</p> + +<p><b>The Corresponding Problems of Theory.</b>—Theory will +then have similar problems to deal with. (1) What is the +Good, the end in any voluntary act? (2) How is this +good known? Is it directly perceived, and if so, how? Or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> +is it worked out through inquiry and reflection? And if +so, how? (3) When the good is known, how is it <i>acknowledged</i>; +how does it acquire authority? What is the place +of <i>law</i>, of control, in the moral life? Why is it that some +ends are attractive of themselves, while others present +themselves as <i>duties</i>, as involving subordination of what +is naturally attractive? (4) What is the place of selfhood +in the moral process? And this question assumes +two forms: (a) What is the relation of the good of the self +to the good of others? (b) What is the difference between +the morally good and the morally bad in the self? What +are virtues and vices as dispositions of the self? These +abstract and formal questions will become more concrete if +we consider them briefly in the order of their development +in the history of the moral theory.</p> + +<p><b>Problem of Knowledge of Good Comes First in Theory.</b>—The +clash and overlapping of customs once so local as +to be isolated, brought to Athenian moral philosophers the +problem of discovering the underlying and final good to +which all the conflicting values of customs might be referred +for judgment. The movement initiated by Socrates +was precisely the effort to find out what is the real +good, the true end, of all the various institutions, customs, +and procedures current among men. The explanation of +conflict among men's interests, and of lack of consistency +and unity in any given person's behavior, of the division of +classes in the state, of the diverse recommendations of different +would-be moral teachers, was that they were ignorant +of their own ends. Hence the fundamental precept +is "Know thyself," one's own end, one's good and one's +proper function. Different followers of Socrates gave +very different accounts of knowledge, and hence proposed +very different final aims. But they all agreed that the +problem of knowing the good was the central problem, and +that if this were settled, action in accord with good would +follow of itself. Could it be imagined that man could know<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> +his own good and yet not seek it? Ignorance of good is +evil and the source of evil; insight into the real good will +clear up the confusion and partiality which makes men +pursue false ends and thus straighten out and put in +order conduct. Control would follow as a matter of +course from <i>knowledge</i> of the end. Such control would be +no matter of coercion or external restriction, but of subordination +and organization of minor ends with reference to +the final end.</p> + +<p><b>Problem of Motive Force.</b><a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a>—The problem of attaining +this knowledge was seen to be attended, however, by peculiar +obstructions and difficulties, the growing recognition +of which led to a shifting of the problem itself. The +dilemma, in brief, was this: The man who is already good +will have no difficulty in knowing the good both in general +and in the specific clothing under which it presents +itself in particular cases. But the one who does not yet +know the good, does not know <i>how</i> to know it. His ignorance, +moreover, puts positive obstacles in his way, for +it leads him to delight in superficial and transitory +ends. This delight increases the hold of these ends upon +the agent; and thus it builds up an <i>habitual</i> interest in +them which renders it impossible for the individual to get +a glimpse of the final end, to say nothing of a clear and +persisting view. <i>Only if the individual is habituated, exercised, +practiced in good ends so as to take delight in them, +while he is still so immature as to be incapable of really +knowing how and why they are good, will he be capable of +knowing the good when he is mature.</i> Pleasure in right +ends and pain in wrong must operate as a motive force in +order to give experience of the good, before knowledge +can be attained and operate as the motor force.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Division of Problem.</b>—But the exercise and training +requisite to form the habits which make the individual rejoice +in right activity before he knows how and why it is +right, presuppose adults who already have knowledge of +the good. They presuppose a social order capable not +merely of giving theoretic instruction, but of habituating +the young to right practices. But where shall such adults +be found, and where is the social order so good that it is +capable of right training of its own immature members? +Hence the problem again shifts, breaking up into two +parts. On the one hand, attention is fixed upon the irrational +appetites, desires, and impulses, which hinder apprehension +of the good; on the other, it is directed to the political +laws and institutions which are capable of training +the members of the State into a right manner of living. +For the most part, these two problems went their +own way independently of each other, a fact which resulted +in the momentous breach between the inner and +"spiritual," and the outer and "physical" aspects of +behavior.</p> + +<p><b>Problem of Control of Affections and Desires.</b>—If it is +the lively movements of natural appetites and desires +which make the individual apprehend false goods as true +ones, and which present obstacles to knowledge of the true +good, the serious problem is evidently to check and so far +as possible to abolish the power of desire to move the mind. +Since it is anger, fear, hope, despair, sexual desire which +make men regard particular things instead of the final end +as good, the great thing is wholly to free attention and +judgment from the influence of such passions. It may be +impossible to prevent the passions; they are natural perturbations. +But man can at least prevent his judgment +of what is good or bad from being modified by them. +The Stoic moral philosophers most emphasized the misleading +influence of desire and passion, and set up the +ideal of apathy (lack of passion) and "ataraxy" (ab<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>sence +of being stirred up). The other moral schools, the +Sceptics and Epicureans, also made independence of mind +from influence of passion the immediate and working end; +the Sceptics because they emphasized the condition of mental +detachment and non-committal, which is the state appropriate +to doubt and uncertainty; the Epicureans because +the pleasures of the mind are the only ones not at +the mercy of external circumstances. Mental pleasures are +equable, and hence are the only ones which do not bring +reactions of depression, exhaustion, and subsequent pain. +The problem of moral theory is now in effect, if not in +name, that of <i>control</i>, of authority and subordination, of +checking and restraining desire and passion.</p> + +<p><b>Problem of Control of Private Interests by Law.</b>—Such +views could at the best, however, affect only a comparatively +small number, the philosophers. For the great +masses of men in the Roman Empire, the problem existed +on the other line: by what laws and what administration +of laws to direct the outward acts of men into right +courses, courses at least sufficiently right so as to maintain +outward peace and unity through the vast empire. In the +Greek city-state, with its small number of free citizens all +directly participating in public affairs, it was possible to +conceive an ideal of a common good which should bind all +together. But in an Empire covering many languages, +religions, local customs, varied and isolated occupations, +a single system of administration and law exercised from +a single central source could alone maintain the requisite +harmony. The problems of legislations, codification, and +administration were congenial to the Latin mind, and were +forced by the actual circumstances. From the external +side, then, as well as from the internal, the problem of +control became dominant over that of value and the +good.</p> + +<p><b>Problem of Unification.</b>—It was the province of the +moral philosophers, of the theologians, of the church to at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>tempt +a fusion of these elements of inner and outer control. +It was their aim to connect, to synthesize these factors into +one commanding and comprehensive view of life. But the +characteristic of their method was to suppose that the combination +could be brought about, whether intellectually or +practically, only upon a supernatural basis, and by supernatural +resources. From the side of the natural constitution +of both man and the State, the various elements of behavior +are so hopelessly at war with one another that +there is no health in them nor help from them. The appetites +and desires are directed only upon carnal goods and +form the dominant element in the person. Even when +reason gets glimpses of the good, the good seen is narrow +in scope and temporal in duration; and even then reason +is powerless as an adequate motive. "We perceive the better +and we follow the worse." Moreover, it is useless to +seek aid from the habituation, the education, the discipline +and restraint of human institutions. They themselves +are corrupt. The product of man's lower nature cannot be +capable of enlightening and improving that nature; at +most it can only restrain outer action by appealing to +fear. Only a divine revelation can make known man's +true end; and only divine assistance, embodied in the ordinances +and sacraments of the supernaturally founded +and directed church, can bring this knowledge home to +erring individuals so as to make it effectual. In theory +the conception of the end, the good, was supreme; but man's +true good is supernatural and hence can be achieved only +by supernatural assistance and in the next world. In +practice, therefore, the important thing for man in his +present condition is implicit reliance upon and obedience +to the requirements of the church. This represents on +earth the divine sovereign, ultimate source of all moral +law. In effect, the moral law became a net-work of ordinances, +prescriptions, commands, rewards, penalties, penances, +and remissions. The jural point of view was com<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>pletely +enthroned.<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> There was no problem; there was a +final, because a supernatural solution.</p> + +<p><b>The Problems of Individuality and Citizenship.</b>—With +the Renaissance began the revolt against the jural view of +life. A sense of the joys and delights which attend the +free and varied exercise of human capacities in this world +was reborn. The first results were a demand for natural +satisfaction; the next a profound reawakening of the antique +civic and political consciousness. The first in its reaction +against the Middle Ages was more individualistic +than the Greek ideal, to which it was in some respects allied. +The Greek had emphasized the notion of value, but had conceived +this as generic, as the fulfillment of the essential nature +of man as man. But with the moderns, satisfaction, +the good, meant something direct, specific, personal; something +the individual as an individual could lay hold of and +possess. It was an individual right; it was final and inalienable. +Nothing had a right to intervene or deprive +the individual of it.</p> + +<p>This extreme individualistic tendency was contemporaneous +with a transfer of interest from the supernatural +church-state over to the commercial, social, and political +bodies with which the modern man found himself identified. +The rise of the free cities, and more especially the development +of national states, with the growth of commerce and +exchange, opened to the individual a natural social whole. +With this his connections were direct, in this he gained +new outlets and joys, and yet it imposed upon him definite +responsibilities and exacted of him specific burdens. +If the individual had gained a new sense of himself as an +individual, he also found himself enmeshed in national +states of a power constantly increasing in range and intensity. +The problem of the moral theorists was to recon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span>cile +these two tendencies, the individualistic and that of political +centralization. For a time, the individual felt the +social organization in which he was set to be, with whatever +incidental inconveniences, upon the whole an outlet +and reënforcement of prized personal powers. Hence in +observing its conditions, he was securing the conditions of +his own peace and tranquillity or even of his own freedom +and achievement. But the balance was easily upset, and +the problem of the relation of the individual and the social, +the private and the public, was soon forced into prominence; +a problem which in one form or other has been the central +problem of modern ethical theory.</p> + +<p><b>Individualistic Problem.</b>—Only for a short time, during +the first flush of new achievement and of hopeful adventure, +did extreme individualism and social interests remain +naïvely combined. The individualistic tendency +found a convenient intellectual tool in a psychology which +resolved the individual into an association or series of +particular states of feeling and sensations; and the good +into a like collection of pleasures also regarded as particular +mental states. This psychological atomism made individuals +as separate and disconnected as the sensations +which constituted their selves were isolated and mutually +exclusive. Social arrangements and institutions were, in +theory, justifiable only as they could be shown to augment +the sum of pleasurable states of feeling of individuals. +And as, quite independent of any such precarious theory, +the demand for reform of institutions became more and +more imperative, the situation was packed by Rousseau +into a formula that man was naturally both free and good, +and that institutional life had enslaved and thereby depraved +him. At the same time, there grew up an enthusiastic +and optimistic faith in "Nature," in her kindly intentions +for the happiness of humanity, and in her potency to +draw it to perfection when artificial restrictions were once +out of the way. Individuals, separate in themselves and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> +in their respective goods, were thereby brought into a complete +coincidence and harmony of interests. Nature's laws +were such that if the individual obeyed them in seeking his +own good he could not fail to further the happiness of +others. While there developed in France (with original +initiative from England) this view of the internal isolation +and external harmony of men, a counterpart movement +took place in Germany.</p> + +<p><b>The Rationalistic Problem.</b>—German thought inherited +through both Roman law and the natural theology and +ethics of the church, the conception that man's rational +nature makes him sociable. Stoicism, with its materialistic +idealism, had taught that all true laws are natural, while +all laws of nature are diffusions and potencies of reason. +As they bind things together in the world, so they +bind men together in societies. Moral theory is "Natural +Law" conceived in this sense. From the laws of reason, regarded +as the laws of man's generic and hence sociable +nature, all the principles of jurisprudence and of individual +morals may be deduced. But man has also a sensuous +nature, an appetitive nature which is purely private and +exclusive. Since reason is higher than sense, the authority +of the State is magnified. The juristic point of view was +reinstated, but with the important change that the law +was that of a social order which is the realization of man's +own rational being.<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> If the laws of the State were criticized, +the reply was that however unworthy the civic +regulations and however desirable their emendation, still +the State is the expression of the idea of reason, that is of +man in his true generic nature. Hence to attempt to overthrow +the government is to attack the fundamental and +objective conditions of moral or rational life. Without +the State, the particularistic, private side of man's nature<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> +would have free sway to express itself. Man's true moral +nature is within. We are then left, from both the English-French +and the German sides, with the problem of the relation +of the individual and the social; of the relation of the +inner and outer, of the psychological structure of the +person and the social conditions and results of his behavior.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>See the references on the scope and methods of ethics at the end +of ch. i. of Part I., and also, Sorley, <i>Ethics of Naturalism</i>, ch. i., and +his <i>Recent Tendencies in Ethics</i>; Fite, <i>An Introductory Study of +Ethics</i>, ch. ii.; Bowne, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, ch. i.; Seth, <i>Ethical +Principles</i>, ch. i.; Martineau, <i>Types of Ethical Theory</i>, Vol. I., Introduction; +Hensel, <i>Problems of Ethics</i>, in Vol. I. of St. Louis +Congress of Arts and Science.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> On the <i>practical</i> side, this was always, as we have seen, the +prominent problem of Hebrew thought. But we are concerned here +with the statement of the problem by Plato and Aristotle from the +theoretical side.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> The Ten Commandments, divided and subdivided into all their +conceivable applications, and brought home through the confessional, +were the specific basis.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> The idealistic philosophic movement beginning with Kant is in +many important respects the outgrowth of the earlier <i>Naturrecht</i> of +the moral philosophers from Grotius on.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +TYPES OF MORAL THEORY</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. TYPICAL DIVISIONS OF THEORIES</h4> + +<p><b>Problems and Theories.</b>—We were concerned in the +last chapter with the typical <i>problems</i> of moral theory. +But it was evident that theories themselves developed and +altered as now this, now that, problem was uppermost. To +regard the question of how to know the good as the central +problem of moral inquiry is already to have one type +of theory; to consider the fundamental problem to be +either the subordination or the satisfaction of desire is +to have other types. A classification of types of theory is +rendered difficult, a thoroughly satisfactory classification +almost impossible, by the fact that the problems arrange +themselves about separate principles leading to cross-divisions. +All that we may expect to do is somewhat arbitrarily +to select that principle which seems most likely to be +useful in conducting inquiry.</p> + +<p><b>(1) Teleological and Jural.</b>—One of the fundamental +divisions arises from taking either Value or Duty, Good +or Right, as the fundamental idea. Ethics of the first +type is concerned above all with <i>ends</i>; hence it is frequently +called <i>teleological</i> theory (Greek τέλος, end). To +the other type of theory, obligations, imperatives, commands, +law, and authority, are the controlling ideas. By +this emphasis, arise the <i>jural</i> theories (Latin, <i>jus</i>, law). +At some point, of course, each theory has to deal with the +factor emphasized by its rival. If we start with Law as +central, the good resides in these acts which conform to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> +its obligations. The good is obedience to law, submission +to its moral authority. If we start from the Good, laws, +rules, are concerned with the means of defining or achieving +it.</p> + +<p><b>(2) Individual and Institutional.</b>—This fundamental +division is at once cut across by another, arising from emphasizing +the problem of the individual and the social. +This problem may become so urgent as to force into +the background the conflict between teleological and jural +theories, while in any case it complicates and subdivides +them. We have individualistic and institutional types of +theory. Consider, for example, the following representative +quotations: "No school can avoid taking for the ultimate +moral aim a desirable <i>state of feeling</i> called by whatever +name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure +somewhere, at some time, <i>to some being or beings</i>, is an +element of the conception";<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> and again,<a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> "the good is universally +the pleasurable." And while the emphasis is here +upon the good, the desirable, the same type of statement, +<i>as respects emphasis upon the individual</i>, may be made +from the side of duty. For example, "it is the very essence +of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself."<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> +Contrast both of these statements with the following: +"What a man ought to do, or what duties he should fulfill +in order to be virtuous, is in an ethical community not +hard to say. He has to do nothing except what is presented, +expressed, and recognized in his established relations."<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> +"The individual has his truth, real existence, and +ethical status only in being a member of the State. His +particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in +this authenticated, substantive principle, their origin and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> +result."<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> And in another connection: "The striving for a +morality of one's own is futile and by its very nature impossible +of attainment. In respect to morality the saying +of one of the wisest men of antiquity is the true one. To +be moral is to live in accord with the moral tradition of +one's country."<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> Here both the good and the law of the +individual are placed on a strictly institutional basis.</p> + +<p><b>(3) Empirical and Intuitional.</b>—Another cross-division +arises from consideration of the method of ascertaining +and determining the nature of moral distinctions: the +method of knowledge. From this standpoint, the distinction +of ethical theories into the <i>empirical</i> (ἐμπειριϰός) +and the <i>intuitional</i> (Latin, <i>intueor</i>, to look at or upon) +represents their most fundamental cleavage. One view +makes knowledge of the good and the right dependent +upon recollection of prior experiences and their conditions +and effects. The other view makes it an immediate apprehension +of the quality of an act or motive, a trait so intrinsic +and characteristic it cannot escape being seen. While +in general the empirical school has laid stress upon the +consequences, the consequences to be searched for were +considered as either individual or social. Some, like +Hobbes, have held that it was directed upon law; to knowledge +of the commands of the state. And similarly the direct +perception or intuition of moral quality was by +some thought to apply to recognition of differences of +value, and by others to acknowledgment of law and authority, +which again might be divine, social, or personal. +This division cleaves straight across our other bases of +classification. To describe a theory definitely, it would +then be necessary to state just where it stood with reference +to each possible combination or permutation of elements +of all three divisions. Moreover, there are theories<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> +which attempt to find a deeper principle which will bridge +the gulf between the two opposites.</p> + +<p><b>Complexity of Subject-matter and Voluntary Activity.</b>—This +brief survey should at least warn us of the complexity +of the attempt to discriminate types of theory, and +put us on our guard against undue simplification. It may +also serve to remind us that various types of theory are not +arbitrary personal devices and constructions, but arise +because, in the complexity of the subject-matter, one element +or another is especially emphasized, and the other +elements arranged in different perspectives. As a rule, all +the elements are recognized in some form or other by all +theories; but they are differently placed and accounted for. +In any case, it is voluntary activity with which we are concerned. +The problem of analyzing voluntary activity into +its proper elements, and rightly arranging them, must +coincide finally with the problem of the relation of good +and law of control to each other, with the problem of the +nature of moral knowledge, and with that of the relation +of the individual and social aspects of conduct.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. DIVISION OF VOLUNTARY ACTIVITY INTO INNER AND +OUTER</h4> + +<p><b>The What and How of Activity.</b>—Starting from the +side of the voluntary act, we find in it one distinction which +when forced into an extreme separation throws light upon +all three divisions in theory which have been noted. This +is the relation between desire and deliberation as mental +or private, and the deed, the doing, as overt and public. +Is there any intrinsic moral connection between the <i>mental</i> +and the <i>overt</i> in activity? We may analyze an act which +has been accomplished into two factors, one of which is +said to exist within the agent's own consciousness; while +the other, the external execution, carries the mental into +operation, affects the world, and is appreciable by others.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> +Now on the face of the matter, these two things, while capable +of intellectual discrimination, are incapable of real +separation. The "mental" side, the desire and the deliberation, +is for the sake of determining what shall be <i>done</i>; +the overt side is for the sake of making real certain precedent +mental processes, which are partial and inadequate +till carried into effect, and which occur for the sake of +that effect. The "inner" and "outer" are really only the +"how" and the "what" of activity, neither being real or +significant apart from the other. (See <i>ante</i>, p. 6).</p> + +<p><b>Separation into Attitude and Consequences.</b>—But +under the strain of various theories, this organic unity has +been denied; the inner and the outer side of activity have +been severed from one another. When thus divided, the +"inner" side is connected exclusively with the will, the disposition, +the character of the person; the "outer" side is +connected wholly with the consequences which flow from it, +the changes it brings about. Theories will then vary radically +according as the so-called inner or the so-called +outer is selected as the bearer and carrier of moral distinctions. +One theory will locate the moral quality of an +act in that <i>from</i> which it issues; the other in that <i>into</i> +which it issues.</p> + +<p>The following quotations put the contrast in a nutshell, +though unfortunately the exact meaning of the second is +not very apparent apart from its context.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or +pain operating in a certain manner. Now pleasure is in itself +a good; nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only +good.... It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably +that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is +in itself a bad one. If motives are good or bad, it is only on +account of their effects" (Bentham, <i>Principles of Morals and +Legislation</i>, ch. x., §2). Over against this, place the following +from Kant: "Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and +gives to man a universal law which we call the Moral Law.... +If this law determines the will directly [without any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> +reference to objects and to pleasure or pain] the action conformed +to it is good in itself; a will whose principle always +conforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and +is the supreme condition of all good."</p></div> + +<p>If now we recur to the distinction between the "what" +and the "how" of action in the light of these quotations, +we get a striking result. "What" one does is to pay +money, or speak words, or strike blows, and so on. The +"how" of this action is the spirit, the temper in which it is +done. One pays money with a hope of getting it back, or to +avoid arrest for fraud, or because one wishes to discharge +an obligation; one strikes in anger, or in self-defense, or in +love of country, and so on. Now the view of Bentham says +in effect that the "what" is significant, and that the "what" +consists ultimately only of the pleasures it produces; the +"how" is unimportant save as it incidentally affects resulting +feelings. The view of Kant is that the moral core +of every act is in its "how," that is in its spirit, its actuating +motive; and that the law of reason is the only right +motive. <i>What</i> is aimed at is a secondary and (except as +determined by the inner spirit, the "how" of the action) an +irrelevant matter. In short the separation of the mental +and the overt aspects of an act has led to an equally complete +separation of its initial spirit and motive from its +final content and consequence. And in this separation, one +type of theory, illustrated by Kant, takes its stand on the +actuating source of the act; the other, that of Bentham, +on its outcome. For convenience, we shall frequently refer +to these types of theories as respectively the "attitude" +and the "content"; the formal and the material; the disposition +and the consequences theory. The fundamental +thing is that <i>both</i> theories separate character and conduct, +disposition and behavior; which of the two is most emphasized +being a secondary matter.</p> + +<p><b>Different Ways of Emphasizing Results.</b>—There are, +however, different forms of the consequences or "content"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> +theory—as we shall, for convenience, term it. Some writers, +like Spencer as quoted, say the only consequences that are +good are simply pleasures, and that pleasures differ only in +<i>intensity</i>, being alike in everything but degree. Others +say, pleasure is the good, but pleasures differ in quality +as well as intensity and that a certain <i>kind</i> of pleasure +is the morally good. Others say that natural satisfaction +is not found in any one pleasure, or in any number of +them, but in a more permanent mood of experience, which +is termed <i>happiness</i>. Happiness is different from a pleasure +or from a collection of pleasures, in being an abiding +consequence or result, which is not destroyed even by the +presence of pains (while a pain ejects a pleasure). The +pleasure view is called Hedonism; the happiness view, +Eudaimonism.<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> + +<p><b>Different Forms of the "Attitude" Theory.</b>—The opposite +school of theory holds that the peculiar character +of "moral" good is precisely that it is <i>not</i> found in consequences +of action. In this negative feature of the definition +many different writers agree; there is less harmony +in the positive statement of just what the moral +good is. It is an attribute or disposition of character, +or the self, not a trait of results experienced, and in general +such an attribute is called <i>Virtue</i>. But there are +as many differences of opinion as to what constitutes +virtue as there are on the other side as to what pleasure +and happiness are. In one view, it merges, in its outcome +at least, very closely with one form of eudaimonism. +If happiness be defined as the fulfillment of satisfaction +of the characteristic functions of a human being, +while a certain function, that of reason, is regarded as +<i>the</i> characteristic human trait whose exercise is <i>the</i> virtue<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> +or supreme excellence, it becomes impossible to maintain +any sharp line of distinction. Kant, however, attempted +to cut under this union of happiness and virtue, which +under the form of <i>perfectionism</i> has been attempted by +many writers, by raising the question of <i>motivation</i>. Why +does the person aim at perfection? Is it for the sake of +the resulting happiness? Then we have only Hedonism. +Is it because the moral law, the law of reason, requires +it? Then we have law morally deeper than the end +aimed at.</p> + +<p>We may now consider the bearing of this discussion +upon theories of moral knowledge and (2) of moral +authority.<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a></p> + +<p><b>I. Characteristic Theories of Moral Knowledge.</b>—(1) +Those who set chief store by the goods naturally experienced, +find that past experiences supply all the data required +for moral knowledge. Pleasures and pains, satisfactions +and miseries, are recurrent familiar experiences. All +we have to do is to note them and their occasions (or, put +the other way, to observe the tendency of some of our impulses +and acts to bring pleasure as a consequence, of +others to effect misery), and to make up our ends and +aims accordingly. As a theory of moral knowledge, +Hedonism is thus almost always allied with <i>empiricism</i>, +understanding by empiricism the theory that particular +past experiences furnish the method of all ideas and +beliefs.</p> + +<p>(2) The theory that the good is some type of virtuous +character requires a special organ to give moral knowledge. +Virtue is none the less the Good, even when it is +not attained, when it is not experienced, that is, as we +experience a pleasure. In any case, it is not good because +it is experienced, but because it <i>is</i> virtue. Thus the "attitude" +theory tends to connect itself with some form of In<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>tuitionalism, +Rationalism, or Transcendentalism, all of +these terms meaning that there is something in knowledge +going beyond the particular experiences. Intuitionalism +holds there is a certain special faculty which reveals +truths beyond the scope of experience; Rationalism, that +beside the particular elements of experience there are +universal and necessary conceptions which regulate it; +Transcendentalism, that within experience there is a +factor derived from a source transcending experience.<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></p> + +<p><b>II. Characteristic Theories of Moral Control.</b>—The +result school tends to view authority, control, law, obligation +from the standpoint of <i>means to an end</i>; the +moralistic, or virtue, school to regard the idea of <i>law</i> as +more fundamental than that of the good. From the first +standpoint, the authority of a given rule lies in its power +to regulate desires so that after all pleasures—or a maximum +of them, and a minimum of pains—may be had. At +bottom, it is a principle of expediency, of practical wisdom, +of adjustment of means to end. Thus Hume said: +"Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions"—that +is, the principles and rules made known by reason +are, at last, only instruments for securing the fullest satisfaction +of desires. But according to the point of view +of the other school, no satisfaction is <i>really</i> (i.e., morally) +good unless it is acquired in accordance with a law existing +independently of pleasurable satisfaction. Thus the +good depends upon the law, not the law upon the desirable +end.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THESE THEORIES</h4> + +<p><b>The Opposition in Ordinary Life.</b>—To some extent, +similar oppositions are latent in our ordinary moral convictions, +without regard to theory. Indeed, we tend, at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> +different times, to pass from one point of view to the +other, without being aware of it. Thus, as against the +identification of goodness with a <i>mere</i> attitude of will; +we say, "It is not enough for a man to be good; he must +be good for something." It is not enough to mean well; +one must mean to do well; to excuse a man by saying +"he <i>means</i> well," conveys a shade of depreciation. "Hell +is paved with good intentions." Good "resolutions," in +general, are ridiculed as not modifying overt action. A +tree is to be judged by its fruits. "Faith without works +is dead." A man is said "to be too good for this world" +when his motives are not effective. Sometimes we say, +"So and so is a <i>good</i> man," meaning to say that that is +about all that can be said for him—he does not count, +or amount to anything, practically. The objection to +identifying goodness with inefficiency also tends to render +suspected a theory which seems to lead logically to such +identification. More positively we dwell upon goodness +as involving <i>service</i>; "love is the fulfilling of the law," +and while love is a trait of character, it is one which takes +immediate action in order to bring about certain definite +consequences. We call a man Pharisaical who cherishes his +own good character as an end distinct from the common +good for which it may be serviceable.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, indicating the supremacy of the +voluntary attitude over consequences, we have, "What +shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" "What shall +it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his +own life?" "Let us do evil that good may come, whose damnation +is just." The deep-seated objection to the maxim +that the end justifies the means is hard to account for, +except upon the basis that it is possible to attain ends +otherwise worthy and desirable at the expense of conduct +which is immoral. Again, compare Shakspere's +"There's nothing right or wrong, but thinking makes +it so" with the Biblical "As a man thinketh in his heart,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> +so is he." And finally we have such sayings as, "Take +the will for the deed"; "His heart is in the right place"; +<i>Pereat mundus, fiat justitia</i>.</p> + +<p>Passing from this popular aspect of the matter, we +find the following grounds for the "content" theory:</p> + +<p><b>1. It Makes Morality Really Important.</b>—Would there +be any use or sense in moral acts if they did not tend +to promote welfare, individual and social? If theft uniformly +resulted in great happiness and security of life, +if truth-telling introduced confusion and inefficiency into +men's relations, would we not consider the first a virtue, +and the latter a vice?<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> So far as the identification of +goodness with mere motive (apart from results effected by +acts) reduces morality to nullity, there seems to be furnished +a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> of the theory that results +are not the decisive thing.</p> + +<p><b>(2) It Makes Morality a Definite, Concrete Thing.</b>—Morality +is found in consequences; and consequences +are definite, observable facts which the individual can be +made responsible for noting and for employing in the direction +of his further behavior. The theory gives morality +an objective, a tangible guarantee and sanction. Moreover, +results are something objective, common to different +individuals because outside them all. But the doctrine +that goodness consists in motives formed by and within +the individual without reference to obvious, overt results, +makes goodness something vague or else whimsical and +arbitrary. The latter view makes virtue either something +unattainable, or else attained by merely cultivating certain +internal states having no outward results at all, or even +results that are socially harmful. It encourages fanaticism, +moral crankiness, moral isolation or pride; obstinate +persistence in a bad course in spite of its demonstrable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> +evil results. It makes morality non-progressive, since by +its assumption no amount of experience of consequences +can throw any light upon essential moral elements.</p> + +<p><b>(3) The Content Theory Not Only Puts Morality +Itself upon a Basis of Facts, but Also Puts the Theory of +Morality upon a Solid Basis.</b>—We know what we mean +by goodness and evil when we discuss them in terms of +results achieved or missed, and can therefore discuss them +intelligibly. We can formulate concrete ends and lay +down rules for their attainment. Thus there can be +a science of morals just as there can be a science of any +body of observable facts having a common principle. +But if morality depends upon purely subjective, personal +motives, no objective observation and common interpretation +are possible. We are thrown back upon the capricious +individual <i>ipse dixit</i>, which by this theory is made final. +Ethical theory is rendered impossible. Thus Bentham, +who brings these charges (and others) against the +"virtue" theory of goodness, says at the close of the +preface to his <i>Principles of Morals and Legislation</i> (ed. +of 1823):</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Truths that form the basis of political and moral science +are not to be discovered but by investigations as severe as +mathematical ones, and beyond all comparison more intricate +and extensive.... They are not to be forced into detached +and general propositions, unincumbered with explanations +and exceptions. They will not compress themselves into epigrams. +They recoil from the tongue and the pen of the declaimer. +They flourish not in the same soil with sentiment. +They grow among thorns; and are not to be plucked, like +daisies, by infants as they run.... There is no <i>King's Road</i> +... to legislative, any more than to mathematical science."<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></p></div><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span></p> + +<p>Arguments not unlike, however, may be adduced in +favor of the attitude theory.</p> + +<p><b>1. It, and It Alone, Places Morality in the High and +Authoritative Place Which by Right Characterizes It.</b>—Morality +is not just a means of reaching other ends; +it is an end in itself. To reduce virtue to a tool or instrumentality +for securing pleasure is to prostitute and destroy +it. Unsophisticated common sense is shocked at +putting morality upon the same level with prudence, policy, +and expediency. Morality is morality, just because +it possesses an absolute authoritativeness which they lack.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Morally Good Must be Within the Power of the +Individual to Achieve.</b>—The amount of pleasure and +pain the individual experiences, his share of satisfaction, +depends upon outward circumstances which are beyond +his control, and which accordingly have no moral significance. +Only the beginning, the willing, of an act lies +with the man; its conclusion, its outcome in the way of +consequences, lies with the gods. Accident, misfortune, +unfavorable circumstance, may shut the individual within +a life of sickness, misery, and discomfort. They may deprive +him of external goods; but they cannot modify the moral +good, for that resides in the attitude with which one faces +these conditions and results. Conditions hostile to pros<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>perity +may be only the means of calling forth virtues +of bravery, patience, and amiability. Only consequences +within character itself, the tendency of an act to form a +habit or to cultivate a disposition, are really of moral +significance.</p> + +<p><b>3. Motives Furnish a Settled and Workable Criterion +by Which to Measure the Rightness or Wrongness of +Specific Acts.</b>—Consequences are indefinitely varied; they +are too much at the mercy of the unforeseen to serve as +basis of measurement. One and the same act may turn +out in a hundred different ways according to accidental +circumstances. If the individual had to calculate consequences +before entering upon action, he would engage in +trying to solve a problem where each new term introduced +more factors. No conclusion would ever be reached; +or, if reached, would be so uncertain that the agent would +be paralyzed by doubt. But since the motives are within +the person's own breast, the problem of knowing the right +is comparatively simple: the data for the judgment are +always at hand and always accessible to the one who +sincerely wishes to know the right.</p> + +<p><b>Conclusion.</b>—The fact that common life recognizes, +under certain conditions, both theories as correct, and +that substantially the same claims may be made for both, +suggests that the controversy depends upon some underlying +misapprehension. Their common error, as we shall +attempt to show in the sequel, lies in trying to split a +voluntary act which is single and entire into two unrelated +parts, the one termed "inner," the other, "outer"; +the one called "motive," the other, "end." A voluntary +act is always a disposition, or habit of the agent <i>passing +into an overt act</i>, which, so far as it can, produces certain +consequences. A "mere" motive which does not do +anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine +motive at all, and hence is not a voluntary act. On the +other hand, consequences which are not intended, which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> +are not personally wanted and chosen and striven for, +are no part of a voluntary act. <i>Neither the inner +apart from the outer, nor the outer apart from the inner, +has any voluntary or moral quality at all. The former +is mere passing sentimentality or reverie; the latter is +mere accident or luck.</i></p> + +<p><b>Tendency of Each Theory to Pass into the Other.</b>—Hence +each theory, realizing its own onesidedness, tends +inevitably to make concessions, and to borrow factors +from its competitor, and thus insensibly to bridge the gap +between them. Consequences are emphasized, but only +<i>foreseen</i> consequences; while to <i>foresee</i> is a mental act whose +exercise depends upon character. It is disposition, interest, +which leads an agent to estimate the consequences +at their true worth; thus an upholder of the "content" +theory ends by falling back upon the <i>attitude</i> taken in +forecasting and weighing results. In like fashion, the +representative of the motive theory dwells upon the tendency +of the motive to bring about certain effects. The +man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one who +indulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers +the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon +society. While lauding the motive as the sole bearer of +moral worth, the motive is regarded as a force working +towards the production of certain <i>results</i>. When the +"content" theory recognizes disposition as an inherent +factor in bringing about consequences, and the "attitude" +theory views motives as forces tending to effect consequences, +an approximation of each to the other has taken +place which almost cancels the original opposition. It +is realized that a complete view of the place of motive +in a voluntary act will conceive motive as a motor force; +as inspiring to action which will inevitably produce +certain results unless this is prevented by superior external +force. It is also realized that only <i>those</i> consequences +are any part of voluntary behavior which are so con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>genial +to character as to appeal to it as good and stir +it to effort to realize them. <i>We may begin the analysis of a +voluntary act at whichever end we please, but we are +always carried to the other end in order to complete the +analysis.</i> The so-called distinction between the "inner" +and "outer" parts of an act is in reality a distinction +between the <i>earlier</i> and the <i>later</i> period of its development.</p> + +<p>In the following chapter we shall enter upon a direct +discussion of the relation of conduct and character to one +another; we shall then apply the results of the discussion, +in successive chapters, to the problems already raised: +The Nature of Good; of Knowledge; of Moral Authority; +The Relation of the Self to Others and Society; The +Characteristics of the Virtuous Self.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Many of the references in ch. xi. trench upon this ground. Compare, +also, Lecky, <i>History of European Morals</i>, Vol. I., pp. 1-2, and +122-130; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, pp. 6-11, 77-88 and 494-507; +Wundt, <i>Ethics</i>, Vol. II., ch. iv.; Mackenzie, <i>Manual of Ethics</i>, Book +II., ch. ii.; Murray, <i>Introduction to Ethics</i>, p. 143; Paulsen, <i>System +of Ethics</i>, Introduction, and Book II., ch. i.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. I., p. 46, and p. 30. (Italics +not in original.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> Green, <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 354.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Philosophy of Right</i>, translated by Dyde, Part III., 150 +(p. 159).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Philosophy of Right</i>, translated by Dyde, Part III., 258 +(p. 241).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> <i>Werke</i>, Book I., 389.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> The Greek words +ἡδονή, pleasure, and +εὐδαιμονία, happiness. The +latter conception is due chiefly to Aristotle. Happiness is, however, +a good translation only when taken very vaguely. The Greek term +has a peculiar origin which influenced its meaning.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> The differences as regards self and society will be considered in +later chapters.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> For similar reasons, the "content" theories tend to ally themselves +with the positive sciences; the "attitude" theories with philosophy +as distinct from sciences.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> "Suppose that picking a man's pocket excited in him joyful emotions, +by brightening his prospects, would theft be counted among +crimes?"—<span class="smcap">Spencer.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> Mill in his <i>Autobiography</i> has given a striking account of how +this phase of Utilitarianism appealed to him. (See pp. 65-67 of London +edition of 1874; see also his <i>Dissertations and Discussions</i>, Vol. +I., Essay on Bentham, especially pp. 339 and ff.) Bentham "introduced +into morals and politics those habits of thought, and modes +of investigation, which are essential to the idea of science; and the +absence of which made these departments of inquiry, as physics had +been before Bacon, a field of interminable discussion, leading to +no result. It was not his <i>opinions</i>, in short, but his <i>method</i>, that +constituted the novelty and value of what he did.... Bentham's +method may be shortly described as the method of <i>detail</i>.... Error +lurks in generalities." +</p><p> +Mill finally says: "He has thus, it is not too much to say, for the +first time introduced precision of thought in moral and political +philosophy. Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by +ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and +couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly +whether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand +one another, to break down the generality of their propositions, +and join a precise issue in every dispute. This is nothing +less than a revolution in philosophy." In view of the character +of the larger amount of discussions in moral and political philosophy +still current, Mill perhaps took a too optimistic view of the extent +to which this "revolution" had been accomplished.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XIII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +CONDUCT AND CHARACTER</h2> + + +<p><b>Problem of Chapter.</b>—We have endeavored in the preceding +chapters (1) to identify the sort of situation in +which the ideas of good and evil, right and wrong, in +their moral sense, are employed; (2) to set forth the +typical problems that arise in the analysis of this situation; +and (3) to name and describe briefly the types of +theory which have developed in the course of the history of +the problems. We have now to return to the moral situation +as described, and enter upon an independent analysis +of it. We shall commence this analysis, as was indicated +in the last chapter, by considering the question of the +relation of attitude and consequences to each other in +voluntary activity,—not that this is the only way to +approach the problem, but that it is the way which brings +out most clearly the points at issue among types of +moral theory which since the early part of the nineteenth +century have had the chief currency and influence. +Accordingly the discussion will be introduced by a statement +of the two most extreme doctrines that separate the +"inner" and the "outer," the "psychical" and the "overt" +aspects of activity: <i>viz.</i>, the Kantian, exclusively emphasizing +the "how," the spirit, and motive of conduct; +the Utilitarian, dwelling exclusively upon its "what," its +effects and consequences. Our positive problem is, of +course, by means of arraying these two extreme views +against each other, to arrive at a statement of the mutual +relations of attitude and act, motive and consequence, +character and conduct.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span></p> + +<p>We shall begin with Kant as a representative of the +attitude theory.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. THE GOOD WILL OF KANT</h4> + +<p>Kant says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nothing can possibly be conceived, in the world or out of +it, which can be called Good without qualification, except a +Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents +of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, +perseverance as qualities of temperament are individually +good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of +nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous, if +the will which is to make use of them and which, therefore, +constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the +same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even +health ... inspire pride and often presumption if there is +not a Good Will to correct the influence of these on the mind. +Moderation of the affections and passions, self-control and +calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even +seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; +but they are far from deserving to be called good without +qualification ... for without the principles of a good will +they may become extremely bad. The coolness of a villain +makes him both more dangerous and more abominable" (Kant: +<i>Theory of Ethics</i>, tr. by Abbott, pp. 9-10).</p></div> + +<p><b>Element of Truth in Statement.</b>—There can be no +doubt that in some respects these ideas of Kant meet +a welcome in our ordinary convictions. Gifts of fortune, +talents of mind, qualities of temperament, are regarded +as desirable, as good, but we qualify the concession. We +say they are good, if a good use is made of them; but +that, administered by a bad character, they add to power +for evil. Moreover, Kant's statement of the <i>intrinsic</i> +goodness of the Good Will, "A jewel which shines by its +own light" (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 10), awakens ready response in us. +Some goods we regard as means and conditions—health, +wealth, business, and professional success. They afford<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> +moral opportunities and agencies, but need not possess +moral value in and of themselves; when they become parts, +as they may, of a moral good, it is because of their place +and context. Personality, character, has a dignity of +its own, which forbids that it be considered a simple +means for the acquisition of other goods. The man who +makes his good character a simple tool for securing +political preferment, is, we should say, prostituting and +so destroying his own goodness.</p> + +<p><b>Ambiguity of Statement.</b>—The statement made by +Kant, however, is ambiguous and open to opposed interpretations. +The notion that the Good Will is good in +and of itself may be interpreted in two different ways: +(i) We may hold, for example, that honesty is good as +a trait of will because it tends inevitably to secure a +desirable relationship among men; it removes obstructions +between persons and keeps the ways of action clear and +open. Every man can count upon straightforward action +when all act from honesty; it secures for each singleness +of aim and concentration of energy. (ii) But we may +also mean that honesty is absolutely good as a trait +of character just in and by itself, quite apart from any +influence this trait of character has in securing and promoting +desirable ends. In one case, we emphasize its +goodness because it arranges for and tends towards certain +results; in the other case, we ignore the factor of +tendency toward results.</p> + +<p><b>Kant's Interpretation of Goodness of Will is Formal.</b>—Kant's +further treatment leaves us in no doubt in which +of these two senses he uses the term Good Will. He goes +on (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 10):</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A Good Will is good, not because of what it performs or +effects, <i>not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed +end</i>, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is +good in itself.... Even if it should happen that, owing to +the special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> +a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power +to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should +yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the Good +Will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the assuming of all +means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine +by its own light as a thing which has its whole value in +itself. Its fruitfulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor +take away anything from this value."</p></div> + +<p>And again he says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"An action ... derives its moral worth not from the <i>purpose</i> +which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by +which it is determined and therefore depends ... merely on +the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, +without regard to any <i>object of desire</i>.... The purposes +which we may have in view in our actions or their effect +regarded as ends and springs of will cannot give the actions +an unconditional or moral worth.... It cannot lie anywhere +but in the principle of the Will, without regard to the +ends which can be attained by the action" (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 16).</p></div> + +<p><b>Relation of Endeavor and Achievement to Will.</b>—Here, +also, we find a certain agreement with our every-day +moral experience. It is undoubtedly true that in many +cases we ascribe moral worth or goodness to acts without +reference to the results actually attained by them; a man +who tries to rescue a drowning child is not judged only +on the basis of success. If he is prevented, because he +is crippled, or because the current is too rapid for him, +we do not refuse hearty moral approbation. We do not +judge the goodness of the act or of the agent from the +standpoint of its attained result, which here is failure. +We regard the man as good because he proposed to himself +a worthy end or aim, the rescue of another, even +at the risk of harm to himself. We should agree with +Kant in saying that the moral worth does not depend +on the <i>realization</i> of the object of desire. But we should +regard the worth of the man to consist precisely in the +fact that, so far as he was concerned, he <i>aimed at a good +result</i>. We do not rule out purpose, but we approve because<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> +the purpose was good. By will we mean tendencies, +desires, and habits operating to realize results regarded +as desirable. Will is not the <i>sole</i> condition of reaching +a result—that is, of making the aim an actual fact. Circumstances +need to coöperate to insure a successful issue; +and if these fail, the best will in the world cannot secure +the transformation of desire for an end into that end. +We know that sometimes it is only by accident that the +desirable end is not effected, but we also know that without +the proper disposition it is only by accident that the +results <i>are</i> achieved. Moreover, we know that our own +attitude is not only an important condition of securing +the results, but that it is the only condition <i>constantly</i> +under our control. What we mean by calling it "ours" +is precisely that it is that condition whose operation lies +with us. Accordingly, it is the key and clue to the results, +so far as they concern us. So far, given desire and endeavor, +achievement is not necessary to volition.</p> + +<p>"<b>Meaning Well.</b>"—On the other hand, can a man justify +himself on the ground that he "means well," if the +"meaning well" does not <i>regulate the overt acts</i> that he +performs, and hence the consequences that proceed from +them? Are we not justified in suspecting a person's good +faith when his good intentions uniformly bring suffering +to others? If we do not question his good faith, do we +not regard him as needing moral enlightenment, and a +change of disposition? We distinguish in our judgments +of good between the fanatic and the thoroughly selfish +man, but we do not carry this distinction to the point +of approving the fanatic; of saying, "Let him alone; he +means well, he has a good will, he is actuated by a sense +of duty." On the contrary, we condemn his aims; and in +so far we censure him for willingly entertaining ans approving +them. We may, indeed, approve of his character +with respect to its sincerity, singleness of aim, and its thoroughness +of effort, for such things, <i>taken by themselves</i>, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> +in the abstract, are good traits of character. We esteem +them highly, however, just because they have so much +to do with results; they are, <i>par excellence</i>, executive +traits. But we do not approve of the man's whole character +in approving these traits. There is something the +matter with the man in whom good traits are put to a +bad use. It is not true in such cases that we approve +the <i>agent</i> but condemn his <i>acts</i>. We approve certain +phases of conduct, and in so far regard the doer as +praiseworthy; we condemn other features of acts, and in +so far disapprove him.<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a></p> + +<p><b>Overt Action Proves Will.</b>—Again, under what circumstances +do we actually "take the will for the deed"? +When do we assume that so far as the will was concerned +it did aim at the result and aimed at it thoroughly, without +evasion and without reservation? Only when there +is <i>some</i> action which testifies to the real presence of the +motive and aim.<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> The man, in our earlier instance, must +have made some effort to save the drowning child to justify +either us or himself in believing that he <i>meant</i> to do it; +that he had the right intent. The individual who habitually +justifies himself (either to others or to himself) by +insisting upon the rightness of his motives, lays himself +open to a charge of self-deception, if not of deliberate +hypocrisy, if there are no outward evidences of effort +towards the realization of his pretended motive. A +habitually careless child, when blamed for some disorder +or disturbance, seeks to excuse himself by saying he +"didn't mean to": i.e., he had no intention or aim; the +results did not flow morally from him. We often reply, +in effect, "that is just the trouble; you didn't mean at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> +all; you ought to have meant <i>not</i> to do this." In other +words, if you had thought about what you were doing +you would not have done this and would not have brought +about the undesirable results. With adults there is such +a thing as culpable carelessness and blameworthy negligence. +So far as the individual's conscious will was +concerned, everything he deliberately intended may have +been entirely praiseworthy; but we blame him because +his character was such that the end appropriate to the +circumstances did not occur to him. We do not disapprove +when the failure to think of the right purpose +is due to inexperience or to lack of intellectual development; +but we do blame when the man does not employ his +attained experience and intellectual capacity. Given +these factors, if the right end is not thought of or is +quickly dismissed, indisposition is the only remaining +explanation. These two facts, that we require effort or evidence +of sincerity of good will and that the character is +disapproved for <i>not</i> entertaining certain aims, are sufficient +to prove that we do not identify will and motive +with something which has nothing to do with "aptness for +attaining ends." Will or character <i>means intelligent +forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve +them</i>. It cannot be conceived apart from <i>ends</i> purposed +and desired.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. THE "INTENTION" OF THE UTILITARIANS</h4> + +<p><b>Emphasis of Utilitarians upon Ends.</b>—We are brought +to the opposite type of moral theory, the utilitarian, +which finds moral quality to reside in consequences, that +is to say, in the ends achieved. To the utilitarians, motive +means simply certain states of consciousness which happen +to be uppermost in a man's mind as he acts. Not +this subjective feeling existing only in the inner consciousness, +but the external outcome, the objective change which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> +is made in the common world, is what counts. If we can +get the act done which produces the right sort of changes, +which brings the right kind of result to the various persons +concerned, it is irrelevant and misleading to bother +with the private emotional state of the doer's mind. +Murder would be none the less murder even if the consciousness +of the killer were filled with the most maudlin +sentiments of general philanthropy; the rescue of a +drowning man would be none the less approvable even +if we happened to know that the consciousness of the +rescuer were irritable and grumpy while he was performing +the deed. Acts, not feelings, count, and acts mean +changes actually effected.<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> + +<p><b>Distinction of Intention from Motive.</b>—The utilitarians +make their point by distinguishing between intention +and motive, attributing moral value exclusively to the +former. According to them, intention is <i>what</i> a man +means to do; motive is the personal frame of mind which +indicates <i>why</i> he means to do it. Intention is the concrete +aim, or purpose; the results which are foreseen and +wanted. Motive is the state of mind which renders these +consequences, rather than others, interesting and attractive. +The following quotations are typical. Bentham +says concerning motives:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If they are good or bad, it is only on account of their +effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, +or avert pain: bad, on account of their tendency to produce +pain, or avert pleasure. Now the case is, that from one +and the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may +proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others +that are indifferent."</p></div> + +<p>Consequently the question of motive is totally irrelevant. +He goes on to give a long series of illustrations, from +which we select one:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"1. A boy, in order to divert himself, reads an inspiring book; +the motive is accounted, perhaps, a good one: at any rate, not +a bad one. 2. He sets his top a-spinning: the motive is +deemed at any rate not a bad one. 3. He sets loose a mad ox +among a crowd: his motive is now, perhaps, termed an +abominable one. Yet in all three cases the motive may be the +very same: it may be neither more nor less than curiosity."<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> +Mill writes to the following effect: "The morality of the action +depends entirely upon the <i>intention</i>——that is, upon <i>what</i> +the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling +which made him will so to do, when it makes no difference in +the act, makes none in the morality."<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a></p></div> + +<p>Now if motives were merely inert feelings or bare states +of consciousness happening to fill a person's mind apart +from his desires and his ideas, they certainly would not +modify his acts, and we should be compelled to admit the +correctness of this position. But Mill gives the whole +case away when he says that the motive which makes a +man will something, "<i>when it makes no difference in the +act</i>," makes none in its morality. Every motive does +make a difference in the act; it makes precisely the difference +between one act and another. It is a contradiction +in terms to speak of the motive as that <i>which +makes a man</i> will to do an act or intend to effect certain +consequences, and then speak of the motive making no +difference to the act! How can that which makes an +intention make no difference to it, and to the act which +proceeds from it?</p> + +<p><b>Concrete Identity of Motive and Intention.</b>—Ordinary +speech uses motive and intention interchangeably. It +says, indifferently, that a man's motive in writing a letter +was to warn the person addressed or was friendliness. +According to Bentham and Mill, only so-called +states of consciousness in which one feels friendly can +be called motive; the object aimed at, the warning of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> +the person, is intention, not motive. Again ordinary +speech says either that a doctor's intention was to relieve +his patient, or that it was kind and proper, although the +act turned out badly. But the utilitarians would insist +that only the first usage is correct, the latter confounding +intent with motive. In general, such large terms as +ambition, revenge, benevolence, patriotism, justice, avarice, +are used to signify both motives and aims; both +dispositions <i>from</i> which one acts and results <i>for</i> which +one acts. It is the gist of the following discussion that +common speech is essentially correct in this interchangeable +use of intention and motive. The same set of real +facts, <i>the entire voluntary act</i>, is pointed to by both +terms.</p> + +<p><b>Ambiguity in Term "Feelings."</b>—There is a certain +ambiguity in the term "feelings" as employed by Mill +and Bentham. It may mean feelings apart from ideas, +blind and vague mental states unenlightened by thought, +propelling and impelling tendencies undirected by either +memory or anticipation. Feelings then mean sheer instincts +or impulses. In this sense, they are, as Bentham +claims, without moral quality. But also in this sense +there are no intentions with which motives may be contrasted. +So far as an infant or an insane person is impelled +by some blind impulsive tendency, he foresees nothing, +has no object in view, means nothing, in his act; he +acts without premeditation and intention. "Curiosity" of +this sort may be the source of acts which are harmful or +useful or indifferent. But no consequences were intelligently +foreseen or deliberately wished for, and hence the +acts in question lie wholly outside the scope of morals, even +according to the utilitarian point of view. Morality is a +matter of intent, and intent there was none.</p> + +<p><b>Motive as Intelligent.</b>—In some cases, then, motives have +no moral quality whatsoever, and, <i>in these cases</i>, it is true +that intention has no moral quality either, because there<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> +is none. Intention and motive are morally on the same +level, not opposed to one another. But motive means not +only blind feeling, that is, impulse without thought; it +also means a tendency which is aware of its own probable +outcome when carried into effect, and which is interested in +the resulting effect. It is perhaps conceivable that a +child should let loose a bull in a crowd from sheer innocent +curiosity to see what would happen—just as he might +pour acid on a stone. But if he were a normal child, the +next time the impulse presented itself he would recall +the previous result: the fright, the damage, the injury to +life and limb, and would foresee that similar consequences +are likely to happen if he again performs a like act. He +now has what Bentham and Mill call an intention. Suppose +he again lets loose the bull. Only verbally is motive +now the same that it was before. In fact, curiosity is a +very different thing. If the child is still immature and inexperienced +and unimaginative, we might content ourselves +with saying that his motive is egoistic amusement; but +we may also say it is downright malevolence characteristic +of a criminal. In no case should we call it curiosity. +When foresight enters, intent, purpose enters also, and +with it a change of motive from innocent, because blind, +impulse, to deliberate, and hence to virtuous or blameworthy +interest in effecting a certain result. Intention and motive +are upon the same moral level. Intention is the +<i>outcome</i> foreseen and wanted; motive, this outcome <i>as</i> +foreseen and wanted. But the voluntary act, as such, +is an <i>outcome, forethought and desired</i>, and hence +attempted.</p> + +<p>This discussion brings out the positive truth for which +Bentham and Mill stand: <i>viz.</i>, that <i>the moral quality of +any impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing +the sort of consequences to which it leads in actual +practice</i>. As against those who insist that there are certain +feelings in human nature so sacred that they do not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> +need to be measured or tested by noting the consequences +which flow from them, so sacred that they justify an act +<i>no matter what its results</i>, the utilitarians are right. +It is true, as Bentham says, that if motives are good or +bad it is on account of their effects. Hence we must be +constantly considering the effects of our various half-impulsive, +half-blind, half-conscious, half-unconscious motives, +in order to find out what sort of things they are—whether +to be approved and encouraged, or disapproved +and checked.</p> + +<p><b>Practical Importance of Defining Springs to Action +by Results.</b>—This truth is of practical as well as of +theoretical significance. Many have been taught that +certain emotions are inherently so good that they are +absolutely the justification of certain acts, so that the +individual is absolved from any attention whatsoever to +results. Instance "charity," or "benevolence." The belief +is engrained that the emotion of pity, of desire +to relieve the sufferings of others, is intrinsically noble +and elevating. Hence it has required much discussion and +teaching to bring home, even partially, the evils of indiscriminate +giving. The fact is that pity, sympathy, apart +from forecast of specific results to be reached by acting +upon it, is a mere psychological reaction, as much so as is +shrinking from suffering, or as is a tendency to run away +from danger; in this blind form it is devoid of any moral +quality whatsoever. Hence to teach that the feeling +is good in itself is to make its mere discharge an end in +itself. This is to overlook the evil consequences in the +way of fraud, laziness, inefficiency, parasitism produced in +others, and of sentimentality, pride, self-complacency produced +in the self. There is no doubt that the effect +of some types of moral training is to induce the belief +that an individual may develop goodness of character +simply by cultivating and keeping uppermost in his consciousness +certain types of feelings, irrespective of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> +objective results of the acts they lead to—one of the +most dangerous forms of hypocrisy and of weakened +moral fiber. The insistence of utilitarianism that we must +become aware of the moral quality of our impulses and +states of mind on the basis of the results they effect, and +must control them—no matter how "good" they feel—by +their results, is a fundamental truth of morals.</p> + +<p><b>Existence and Influence of Idea of Consequences Depends +upon Disposition.</b>—But the converse is equally +true. Behind every concrete purpose or aim, as idea +or thought of results, lies something, some passion, instinct, +impulse, habit, interest, which gives it a hold on +the person, which gives it motor and impelling force; +and which confers upon it the capacity to operate as +motive, as spring to action. Otherwise, foreseen consequences +would remain mere intellectual entities which +thought might speculatively contemplate from afar, but +which would never possess weight, influence, power to stir +effort. But we must go further. Not only is some active +tendency in the constitution of the man responsible for +the motive power, whether attractive or otherwise, which +foreseen consequences possess, but it is responsible for the +fact that this rather than that consequence is suggested. +A man of consistently amiable character will not be +likely to have thoughts of cruelty to weigh and to dismiss; +a man of greed will be likely to have thoughts of +personal gain and acquisition constantly present to him. +What an individual is interested in occurs to him; what he +is indifferent to does not present itself in imagination or +lightly slips away. Active tendencies, personal attitudes, +are thus in the end the determining causes of our having +certain intentions in mind, as well as the causes of their +active or moving influence. As Bentham says, motives +<i>make</i> intentions.</p> + +<p><b>Influence of Interest on Ideas.</b>—"Purpose is but the +slave of memory." We can anticipate this or that only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> +as from past experience we can construct it. But recall, +re-membering (rearticulation) is selective. We pick out +certain past results, certain formerly experienced results, +and we ignore others. Why? Because of our present +interests. We are interested in this or that, and accordingly +it comes to mind and dwells there; or it fails to +appear in recollection, or if appearing, is quickly dismissed. +It is important that the things from the past, which are +relevant to our present activity, should come promptly to +mind and find fertile lodgment, and character decides how +this happens.</p> + +<p>Says James:<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What constitutes the difficulty for a man laboring under +an unwise passion acting as if the passion were unwise?... +The difficulty is mental; it is that of getting the idea of the +wise action to stay before our mind at all. When any strong +emotional state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no +images but such as are congruous with it to come up. If +others by chance offer themselves, they are instantly smothered +and crowded out.... By a sort of self-preserving instinct +which our passion has, it feels that these chill objects +[the thoughts of what is disagreeable to the passion] if they +once but gain a lodgment, will work and work until they have +frozen the very vital spark from out of all our mood.... +Passion's cue accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent +their still small voice from being heard at all."</p></div> + +<p>This quotation refers to a strong passion. It is important +to note <i>that every interest, every emotion, of +whatever nature or strength, works in precisely the +same way</i>. Upon this hangs the entertaining of memories +and ideas about things. Hence interest is the central<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> +factor in the development of any concrete intention, both +as to what it is and as to what it is not—that is, what +the aim would have been if the emotional attitude had +been different. Given a certain emotional attitude, and +the consequences which are pertinent to it are thought +of, while other and equally probable consequences are ignored. +A man of a truly kindly disposition is sensitive +to, aware of, probable results on other people's welfare; +a cautious person sees consequences with reference to his +own standing; an avaricious man feels results in terms of +the probable increase or decrease of his possessions; and +so on. The intimate relation of interest and attention +forms the inseparable tie of intention, <i>what</i> one will, to +motive, <i>why</i> he so wills. When Bentham says that "Motives +are the causes of intentions," he states the fact, and +also reveals motive as the proper final object of moral +judgment.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER</h4> + +<p>The discussion enables us to place conduct and character +in relation to each other. Mill, after the passage +already quoted (see above, p. 248), to the effect that motive +makes no difference to the morality of the act, says +it "makes a great difference in our moral estimation of +the <i>agent</i>, especially if it indicates a good or a bad +habitual <i>disposition</i>—a bent of character from which +useful, or from which hurtful, actions are likely to arise." +To like effect Bentham:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Is there nothing, then," he asks,<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> "about a man which can +be termed good or bad, when on such or such an occasion, +he suffers himself to be governed by such and such a motive? +Yes, certainly, his <i>disposition</i>. Now disposition is a +kind of fictitious entity,<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> feigned for the convenience of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>discourse, in order to express what there is supposed to be +<i>permanent</i> in a man's frame of mind, where, on such or such +an occasion, he has been influenced by such or such a motive, +to engage in an act, which, as it appeared to him, was of +such or such a tendency." He then goes on to say that disposition +is good or bad according to its effects. "A man is +said to be of a mischievous<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> disposition, when by the influence +of no matter what motives, he is <i>presumed</i> to be more apt +to engage, or form intentions of engaging, in acts which +are <i>apparently</i> of a pernicious tendency than in such as are +apparently of a beneficial tendency: of a meritorious or +beneficent disposition in the opposite case."<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> And again: +"It is evident that the nature of a man's disposition must +depend upon the nature of the motives he is apt to be influenced +by; in other words, upon the degree of his sensibility +to the force of such and such motives. For his disposition +is, as it were, the sum of his intentions.... Now, +intentions, like everything else, are produced by the things +that are their causes: <i>and the causes of intentions are +motives</i>. If, on any occasion, a man forms either a good or +a bad intention, it must be by the influence of some +motive."<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>Rôle of Character.</b>—Here we have an explicit recognition +of the fundamental rôle of character in the moral life; +and also of why it is important. Character is that body +of active tendencies and interests in the individual which +make him open, ready, warm to certain aims, and callous, +cold, blind to others, and which accordingly habitually +tend to make him acutely aware of and favorable to certain +sorts of consequences, and ignorant of or hostile to +other consequences. A selfish man need not consciously +think a great deal of himself, nor need he be one who, +after deliberately weighing his own claims and others' +claims, consciously and persistently chooses the former. +The number of persons who after facing the entire situation, +would still be anti-social enough deliberately to sacrifice +the welfare of others is probably small. But a man<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> +will have a selfish and egoistic character who, irrespective +of any such conscious balancing of his own and others' welfare, +is habitually more accessible to the thought of those +consequences which affect himself than he is to those which +bear upon others. It is not so much that <i>after</i> thinking of +the effect upon others he declines to give these thoughts any +weight, as that he habitually fails to think at all, or to +think in a vivid and complete way, of the interests of +others. As we say, he does not care; he does not consider, +or regard, others.<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p> + +<p><b>Partial and Complete Intent.</b>—To Mill's statement that +morality depends on intention not upon motive, a critic +objected that on this basis a tyrant's act in saving a man +from drowning would be good—the intent being rescue of +life—although his motive was abominable, namely cruelty, +for it was the reservation of the man for death by torture. +Mill's reply is significant. Not so, he answered; there +is in this case a difference of intention, not merely of motive. +The rescue was not the whole act, but "only the +necessary first step of an act." This answer will be found +to apply to every act in which a superficial analysis would +seem to make intent different in its moral significance from +motive. Take into account the remote consequences in +view as well as the near, and the seeming discrepancy disappears. +The intent of rescuing a man and the motive of +cruelty are both descriptions of the same act, the same +moral reality; the difference lying not in the fact, but in +the point of view from which it is named. Now there is +in every one a tendency to fix in his mind only a part of +the probable consequences of his deed; the part which is +most innocent, upon which a favorable construction may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> +most easily be put, or which is temporarily most agreeable +to contemplate. Thus the person concentrates his thought, +his forecast of consequences upon external and indifferent +matters, upon distribution of commodities, increase of +money or material resources, and upon positively valuable +results, at the expense of other changes——changes for the +worse in his disposition and in the well-being and freedom +of others. Thus he causes to stand out in strong light +all of those consequences of his activity which are beneficial +and right, and dismisses those of another nature +to the dim recesses of consciousness, so they will not +trouble him with scruples about the proper character of +his act. Since consequences are usually more or less +mixed, such half-conscious, half-unconscious, half-voluntary, +half-instinctive selection easily becomes a habit. +Then the individual excuses himself with reference to the +actual bad results of his behavior on the ground that +he "meant well," his "intention was good"! Common +sense disposes of this evasion by recognizing the +reality of "willing." We say a man is "willing" to +have things happen when, in spite of the fact that +in and of themselves they are objectionable and hence +would not be willed in their isolation, they are consented to, +because they are bound up with something else the person +wants. And to be "willing" to have the harm follow is +really to will it. <i>The agent intends or wills all those consequences +which his prevailing motive or character makes +him willing under the circumstances to accept or tolerate.</i></p> + +<p>Exactly the same point comes out from the side of +motive. Motives are complex and "mixed"; ultimately +the motive to an act is that <i>entire</i> character of an +agent on account of which one alternative set of possible +results appeal to him and stir him. Such motives as pure +benevolence, avarice, gratitude, revenge, are abstractions; +we name the motive from the <i>general trend of the issue</i>, +ignoring contributing and indirect causes. All <i>assigned</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> +motives are more or less <i>post-mortem</i> affairs. No <i>actuating</i> +motive is ever as simple as reflection afterwards makes +it. But the justification of the simplification is that it +brings to light some factor which needs further attention. +No one can read his own motives, much less those of +another, with perfect accuracy;—though the more sincere +and transparent the character the more feasible is the +reading. Motives which are active in the depths of +character present themselves only obscurely and subconsciously. +Now if one has been trained to think that +motive apart from intention, apart from view of consequences +flowing from an act, is the source and justification +of its morality, a false and perverse turn is almost sure to +be given to his judgment. Such a person fosters and +keeps uppermost in the focus of his perceptions certain +states of feeling, certain emotions which he has been +taught are good; and then excuses his act, in face of bad +consequences, on the ground that it sprang from a good +motive. Selfish persons are always being "misunderstood." +Thus a man of naturally buoyant and amiable disposition +may unconsciously learn to cultivate superficially certain +emotions of "good-feeling" to others, and yet act in ways +which, judged by consequences that the man might have +foreseen if he had chosen to, are utterly hostile to the +interests of others. Such a man may feel indignant when +accused of unjust or ungenerous behavior, and calling +others to account for uncharitableness, bear witness in his +own behalf that he never entertained any "feelings" of +unkindness, or any "feelings" except those of benevolence, +towards the individual in question.<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> Only the habit of +reading "motives" in the light of persistent, thorough, and +minute attention to the consequences which flow from them +can save a man from such moral error.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 4. MORALITY OF ACTS AND OF AGENTS</h4> + +<p><b>Subjective and Objective Morality.</b>—Finally we may +discuss the point at issue with reference to the supposed +distinction between subjective and objective morality—an +agent may be good and his act bad or <i>vice-versa</i>. Both +of the schools which place moral quality either in attitude +or in content, in motive or intent independently of +each other, agree in making a distinction between the morality +of an act and the morality of the agent—between +objective and subjective morality.<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Thus, as we have seen, +Mill says the motive makes a difference in our moral estimate +of its doer, even when it makes none in our judgment +of his action. It is a common idea that certain acts are +right no matter what the motive of the doer, even when +done by one with a bad disposition in doing them. There +can be no doubt that there is a serious difficulty in the facts +themselves. Men actuated by a harsh and narrow desire +for industrial power or for wealth produce social benefits, +stimulate invention and progress, and raise the level of +social life. Napoleon was doubtless moved by vanity and +vainglory to an extent involving immense disregard of +others' rights. And yet in jurisprudence, civil arrangements, +and education he rendered immense social service. +Again, the "conscientious man" is often guilty of bringing +great evils upon society. His very conviction of his own +rightness may only add to the intense vigor which he puts +into his pernicious acts. Surely, we cannot approve the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> +conduct, although we are not entitled morally to condemn +the conscientious doer, who does "the best he knows"—or +believes.</p> + +<p><b>Moral Quality of Doer and Deed Proportionate.</b>—If +we rule out irrelevant considerations, we find that +we never, without qualification, invert our moral judgments +of doer and deed. So far as we regard Napoleon's +actions as <i>morally</i> good (not merely as happening to effect +certain desirable results) we give Napoleon credit +for interest in bringing about those results, <i>and in so far +forth</i>, call him good. Character, like conduct, is a highly +complex thing. No human being is all good or all bad. +Even if we were sure that Napoleon was an evil-minded +man, our judgment is of him as evil <i>upon the whole</i>. Only +if we suppose him to be bad and only bad all the time is +there the opposition of evil character and good actions. +We may believe that even in what Napoleon did in the way +of legal and civic reform he was actuated by mixed motives—by +vanity, love of greater, because more centralized, +power, etc. But these interests in and of themselves could +not have effected the results he accomplished. He must have +had some insight into a better condition of affairs, and +this insight evidences an interest in so far good. Moreover, +so far as we judge Napoleon bad as to his character +and motive in these acts, we are entitled to hold that the +actions and also the outward results were also partially +evil. That is, while to some extent, socially beneficial, +they would have been still more so if Napoleon had been +actuated by less self-centred considerations. If his character +had been simpler, more sincere, more straightforward, +then certain evil results, certain offsets to the good +he accomplished, would not have occurred. The mixture +of good and evil in the results and the mixture of good +and evil in the motives are proportionate to each other. +Such is the conclusion when we recognize the complexities<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> +of character and conduct, and do not allow ourselves to +be imposed upon by a fictitious simplicity of analysis.</p> + +<p><b>Summary.</b>—The first quality which is the object of +judgment primarily resides then in intention: in the consequences +which are foreseen and desired. Ultimately it resides +in that disposition or characteristics of a person +which are responsible for his foreseeing and desiring just +such consequences rather than others. The ground for +judging an act on the basis of consequences not foreseen +is that the powers of a man are not fixed, but capable of +modification and redirection. It is only through taking +into account in <i>subsequent</i> acts consequences of <i>prior</i> acts +not intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the +fuller significance of his own power and thus of himself. +Every builder builds other than he knows, whether better +or worse. In no case, can he foresee all the consequences +of his acts.</p> + +<p>In subsequent experience these results, mere by-products +of the original volition, enter in. "Outer" and non-moral +for the original act, they are within subsequent +voluntary activity, because they influence desire and +make foresight more accurate in detail and more extensive +in range. This translation of consequences once +wholly unforeseeable into consequences which have to be +taken in account is at its maximum in the change of impulsive +into intelligent action. But there is no act so intelligent +that its actual consequences do not run beyond its +foreseen ones, and thus necessitate a subsequent revision of +intention. Thus the distinction of "inner" and "outer" is +one involved in the <i>growth of character and conduct</i>. Only +if character were not in process of change, only if conduct +were a fixed because isolated thing, should we have that +separation of the inner and the outer which underlies alike +the Kantian and the utilitarian theories. In truth, there +is no separation, but only a contrast of the different levels +of desire and forethought of earlier and later activities.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> +The great need of the moral agent is thus a character +which will make him as open, as accessible as possible, to the +recognition of the consequences of his behavior.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>On <span class="smcap">Conduct and Character</span> in general, see Paulsen, <i>System of +Ethics</i>, pp. 468-472; Mackenzie, <i>Manual of Ethics</i>, Book I., ch. iii.; +Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Part I., chs. i.-viii.; Green, <i>Prolegomena +to Ethics</i>, pp. 110-117, 152-159; Alexander, <i>Moral Order and Progress</i>, +pp. 48-52; Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, ch. ii.; Mezes, <i>Ethics</i>, ch. iv.; +Seth, <i>Ethical Principles</i>, ch. iii.</p> + +<p>Upon <span class="smcap">Motive and Intention</span> consult Bentham, <i>Principles of +Morals and Legislation</i>, chs. viii. and x.; James Mill, <i>Analysis of +Human Mind</i>, Vol. II., chs. xxii. and xxv.; Austin, <i>Jurisprudence</i>, +Vol. I., chs. xviii.-xx.; Green, <i>Prolegomena</i>, pp. 315-325; Alexander, +<i>Moral Order and Progress</i>, pp. 36-47; Westermarck, <i>Origin and +Development of the Moral Ideas</i>, chs. viii., xi., and xiii.; Ritchie, +<i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. IV., pp. 89-94, and 229-238, where +farther references are given.</p> + +<p>Upon <span class="smcap">Formal and Material</span> (or subjective and objective) <span class="smcap">Rightness</span> +see Sidgwick, <i>History of Ethics</i>, p. 200; Rickaby, <i>Moral Philosophy</i>, +p. 3, pp. 33-40; Bowne, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, pp. 39-40; +Brown, <i>Philosophy of Mind</i>, Vol. III., p. 489 and pp. 499-500; Paulsen, +<i>System of Ethics</i>, pp. 227-233; Green, <i>Prolegomena</i>, pp. 317-323; +Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, pp. 206-207.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> When Kant says that the coolness of a villain makes him "more +dangerous and more abominable," it is suggested that it is more abominable +<i>because</i> it is more dangerous—surely a statement of the value +of will in terms of the results it tends to effect.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> Kant's distinction between a mere wish, and "assuming all the +means in our power," appears to recognize this fact, but he does not +apply the fact in his theory.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> But, as we shall see, the utilitarians make finally a distinction +between ends <i>achieved</i> and ends <i>attempted</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> Bentham, <i>Principles of Morals and Legislation</i>, ch. x., § 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> Mill, <i>Utilitarianism</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> <i>Psychology</i>, Vol. II., pp. 562-563. The whole passage, pp. 561-569, +should be thoroughly familiar to every ethical student; and should +be compared with what is said in Vol. I., pp. 284-290, about the +selective tendency of feelings; and Vol. I., ch. xi., upon attention, and +Vol. I., pp. 515-522, upon discrimination. +</p><p> +Höffding, <i>Psychology</i> (translated), is also clear and explicit with +reference to the influence of our emotions upon our ideas. (See +especially pp. 298-307.) The development of this fact in some of +its aspects is one of the chief traits of the Ethics of Spinoza.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> <i>Principles of Morals and Legislation</i>, ch. xi., § 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> Bentham does not mean "unreal" by a fictitious entity. According +to his logic, all general and abstract terms, all words designating +relations rather than elements, are "fictitious entities."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> By mischievous he means pernicious, bad, vicious, or even depraved +in extreme cases.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, ch. xi., § 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, §§ 27 and 28.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> The fact that common moral experience, as embodied in common +speech, uses such terms as "think of," "consider," "regard," "pay +attention to" (in such expressions as he is thoughtful of, considerate +of, regardful of, mindful of, attentive to, the interests of others) +in a way implying both the action of intelligence and of the affections, +is the exact counterpart of the interchangeable use, already +mentioned, of the terms intention and motive.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> In short, the way an individual favors himself in reading his own +motives is as much an evidence of his egoism as the way he favors +himself in outward action. Criminals can almost always assign +"good" motives.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> "Formally" and "materially" good or bad are terms also employed +to denote the same distinction. (See Sidgwick, <i>History of +Ethics</i>, pp. 199-200; so Bowne, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, pp. 39-40.) +"The familiar distinction between the formal and the material rightness +of action: The former depends upon the attitude of the agent's +will towards his ideal of right; the latter depends upon the harmony +of the act with the laws of reality and its resulting tendency to +produce and promote well-being." Bowne holds that both are necessary, +while formal rightness is ethically <i>more</i> important, though not +all important.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XIV</small> + +<br /><br /> + +HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND +DESIRE</h2> + + +<p>We have reached a conclusion as to our first inquiry +(p. 201), and have decided that the appropriate subject-matter +of moral judgment is the disposition of the person +as manifested in the tendencies which cause certain consequences, +rather than others, to be considered and esteemed—foreseen +and desired. Disposition, motive, intent +are then judged good or bad according to the consequences +they tend to produce. But what are the consequences by +which we determine anything to be good or bad? We turn +from the locus or residence of the distinctions of good and +bad to the nature of the distinctions themselves. What +do good and bad mean as terms of voluntary behavior?</p> + +<p><b>Happiness and Misery as the Good and Bad.</b>—There is +one answer to this question which is at once so simple and +so comprehensive that it has always been professed by some +representative ethical theory: the good is happiness, well-being, +pleasure; the bad is misery, woe, pain.<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> The agreeableness +or disagreeableness attending consequences differentiates +them into good and bad; and it is because some +deeds are found to lead to pleasure, while others lead to +pain, that they are adjudged virtuous or vicious. In its +modern form, this theory is known as utilitarianism. Bentham +has given it a sweeping and clear formulation.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two +sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone +to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what +we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and +wrong, on the other chain of causes and effects, are fastened +to their throne."</p> + +<p>"Strictly speaking nothing can be said to be good or bad +but either in itself, which is the case only with pain or pleasure; +or on account of its effects, which is the case only with +things that are the cause or preventive of pain or pleasure." +Again: "By the principle of utility is meant that principle +which approves or disapproves of every action whatever according +to the tendency it appears to have to augment or +diminish the happiness of the party whose interests are in +question."<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Once more: "The greatest happiness of all those +whose interest is in question is the right and proper, and the +only right and proper and universally desirable end of human +action." "Only on the basis of this principle do the words +'right and wrong' and 'ought' have an intelligent meaning as +applied to actions; otherwise they have not."</p></div> + +<p>This last statement need not mean, however, that all judgments +of right and wrong are as matter of fact derived +from a consideration of the results of action in the way of +pain and pleasure, but that upon this ground alone <i>should</i> +our judgments be formed, since upon this basis alone can +they be justified.<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p> + +<p><b>Axiomatic Identification of Good with Happiness.</b>—The +principle that happiness is the ultimate aim of human +action and the ultimate standard of the moral value of +that action is generally regarded by the utilitarians as +axiomatic and not susceptible of proof. As Bentham says, +"that which is used to prove everything else cannot itself +be proved. A chain of proofs must have their commence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span>ment +somewhere." So Bain says (<i>Moral Science</i>, p. 27), +"Now there can be no proof offered for the position that +happiness is the proper end of all human procedures, the +criterion of all right conduct. It is an ultimate or final +assumption to be tested by reference to the individual judgments +of mankind." Thus also Mill (<i>Utilitarianism</i>): +"The only proof capable of being given that an object +is visible is that people actually see it. In like manner +the sole proof that it is possible to produce that anything +is desirable is that people do actually desire it."<a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p> + +<p><b>Extreme Opposition to Happiness Theory.</b>—In striking +contrast to this view of the self-evident character +of happiness as the all-desirable, is the view of those to +whom it is equally self-evident that to make pleasure the +end of action is destructive of all morality. Carlyle is an +interesting illustration of a violent reaction against utilitarianism. +His more moderate characterization of it is +"mechanical profit and loss" theory. It is "an upholstery +and cookery conception of morals." It never gets above +the level of considerations of comfort and expediency. +More vehemently, it is a "pig philosophy" which regards +the universe as a "swine trough" in which virtue is thought +of as the attainment of the maximum possible quantity of +"pig's wash." Again, apostrophizing man, he says: "Art +thou nothing else than a Vulture that flies through the Universe +seeking after Somewhat to eat; shrieking dolefully because +Carrion enough is not given thee?" Of the attempt +to make general happiness the end, he says it proposes the +problem of "Given a world of Knaves, to produce honesty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> +from their united action," the term "knave" referring to +the individualistic self-seeking character of pleasure and +"honesty" to the social outcome desired. As a political +theory, he thought that utilitarianism subordinated justice +to benevolence, and in that light he referred to it as +a "universal syllabub of philanthrophic twaddle."</p> + +<p><b>Ambiguity in Notion of Happiness.</b>—If to some it is +self-evident that happiness is the aim of action, and success +in achieving it the test both of the act and the disposition +from which it proceeds; while to others it is equally obvious +that such a view means immorality or at least a base +and sordid morality, it is reasonable to suppose that the +"happiness" does not mean the same to both parties; that +there is some fundamental ambiguity in the notion.</p> + +<p><b>Source of Ambiguity.</b>—The nature of this ambiguity +may be inferred from the fact that Bentham himself—and +in this he is typical of all the utilitarians—combines +in his statement two aspects of happiness, or two views of +pleasure. He says it is for pleasure and pain alone to +"<i>point out what we ought to do</i>," that they are the only +basis upon which our judgments of right and wrong <i>ought</i> +to be formed, or upon which they can be justified. Other +things <i>may</i> be taken as pointing out what we ought to do; +other standards of judgment—caprice, sympathy, dogma—are +employed. But they are not the right and proper +ones. Consideration of consequences of the act in the way +of effect upon the happiness and misery of all concerned, +furnishes the only proper way of regulating the formation +of right ends. A certain happiness, that of results, +is the standard. But this presupposes that, in any case +there is some end, and one which may be improper because +not in accord with the standard. Yet this end also must be +pleasure. Pleasure and pain "determine what we <i>shall</i> +do," whether we act for the maximum of pleasures or not. +The "chain of causes" as well as the "standard of right" +is fastened to them. We act for pleasure, even when we do<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> +not act for the pleasures for which we ought to act. +Pleasure or happiness thus appears in a double rôle. Only +in the case of <i>right</i> ends, is it the same happiness which +serves as a moving spring and as standard of judgment. +In other cases, it is one pleasure which is the end in view, +and another pleasure, one not in view, or at least not influencing +action, which measures rightness. The essence, +so to speak, of a wrong act is precisely that the pleasures +which produce it are not these pleasures which measure +its goodness; the agent is not moved to act by those pleasures +and pains which as consequences settle its moral value, +but by some pleasure or pain which happens to be strongly +felt at the moment of action.</p> + +<p><b>Two Sorts of Good.</b>—Thus, even from Bentham's point +of view, there is a difference between real and apparent +happiness, between the good which moves to action and +that which, being the standard, should move. If the end +of <i>all</i> acts is happiness and yet we require a consideration +of results to show us <i>what</i> happiness we are justified in +seeking, then "happiness" is in a highly ambiguous position. +While from one standpoint, it furnishes the standard +of right and wrong; from another, it furnishes the +moving spring of all wrong action; it is that which so +solicits and tempts us that we fail to employ the right +standard for the regulation of our action, and hence go +astray. It seems to some (as to Carlyle) that this distinction +is so fundamental that it is absurd to say that one +and the same thing can be the standard of all right action +and the moving spring of all wrong action. Hence they +insist upon the fundamental opposition of virtue and happiness.</p> + +<p>Moreover, from Bentham's own point of view, there is +a difference between the good which <i>first</i> presents itself, +which <i>first</i> stirs desire and solicits to action, and the good +which being formed <i>after and upon the basis of consideration +of consequences</i>, is the <i>right</i> good. In calling the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> +latter the <i>right</i>, we mean that it has authority over the +end which first appears; and hence has supreme claim +over action. So it is again evident that we are using happiness +in two quite different senses; so that if we call the +first end that presents itself happiness, the right end will +be something else; or if we call the consequences which +measure the worth of the act happiness, then the first end +ought to be called something else. If happiness is the +<i>natural</i> end of all desire and endeavor, it is absurd to say +that the same happiness ought to be the end. If all objects +fall to the ground any way, we do not say they +ought to fall. If all our acts are moved any way by +pleasure and pain, this fact, just because it applies +equally to all acts, throws no lights upon the rightness +or wrongness of any one of them. Or, on the other +hand, if that for which we <i>should</i> act is a kind of happiness +which involves full consideration of consequences, +it is misleading to call that happiness from which we act +"blindly" or without proper forethought.</p> + +<p>If happiness is to be the same as the moral good, it +must be after the right kind of happiness has been distinguished; +namely, that which commends itself after adequate +reflection. Our criticism of Bentham will be directed +to showing that, so far as he conceives of happiness as +simply a sum of pleasures alike in quality, but differing +only in quantity, he cannot make this distinction. As an +early critic (Hazlitt) of Bentham said: "Pleasure is that +which is so in itself. Good is that which approves itself +on reflection, or the <i>idea</i> of which is a source of satisfaction. +All pleasure is not, therefore (morally speaking), +equally a good; for all pleasure does not equally bear reflecting +upon." We shall further try to show that the +reason for Bentham's conceiving happiness as simply a +sum of pleasures is that he falls into the error already +discussed, of separating consequences from the disposition +and capacities or active tendencies of the agent. And that,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> +when we correct this error, the proper meaning of happiness +turns out to be the satisfaction, realization, or fulfillment +of some <i>purpose and power of the agent</i>. Thus +we can distinguish between the false and unsatisfactory +happiness found in the expression of a more or less isolated +and superficial tendency of the self, and the true or +genuine good found in the adequate fulfillment of a fundamental +and fully related capacity. We shall first take +up the discussion under the heads just brought out: I. +Happiness <i>as the Natural End or Object of Desire</i>; II. +Happiness <i>as Standard of Judgment</i>.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. THE OBJECT OF DESIRE</h4> + +<p><b>Hedonistic Theory of Desire.</b>—That phase of utilitarianism +which holds that the object of desire is pleasure, +is termed hedonism, or sometimes psychological hedonism +to distinguish it from ethical hedonism, the theory that +pleasure is the standard for judging acts. The fundamental +fallacy of psychological hedonism has been well +stated by Green to be supposing that a desire can be +aroused or created by the anticipation of its own satisfaction—i.e., +in supposing that the idea of the pleasure of +exercise arouses desire for it, when in fact the idea of +exercise is pleasant only if there be already some desire for +it (Green, <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 168). Given a desire +already in existence, the idea of an object which is thought +of as satisfying that desire will always arouse pleasure, or +be thought of as pleasurable. But hedonism fails to consider +the radical difference between an object's arousing +pleasure, because it is regarded as satisfying desire, and +the thought of a pleasure arousing a desire:—although the +feeling of agreeableness may intensify the movement towards +the object. A hungry man thinks of a beefsteak as +that which would satisfy his appetite; his thought is at +once clothed with an agreeable tone and the conscious force<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> +of the appetite is correspondingly intensified; the miser +thinks of gold in a similar way; the benevolent of an act +of charity, etc. But in each case the presence of the pleasurable +element is dependent upon the thought of an object +which is not pleasure—the beefsteak, the gold. The +thought of the object <i>precedes</i> the pleasure and excites +it because it is felt to promise the satisfaction of a desire.</p> + +<p><b>Pleasure is the Felt Concomitant of Imagining a Desire +Realized in Its Appropriate Object.</b>—The object of +desire is not pleasure, but some object is pleasurable because +it is the congenial terminus of desire. The pleasure +felt is a <i>present</i> pleasure, the pleasure which <i>now</i> accompanies +the idea of the satisfied desire. It intensifies the desire +in its present character, through opposition to the disagreeable +tone of the experienced lack and want.</p> + +<p><b>1. Pleasures and Original Appetites.</b>—Biological instincts +and appetites exist not for the sake of furnishing +pleasure, but as activities needed to maintain life—the life +of the individual and the species. Their adequate fulfillment +is attended with pleasure. Such is the undoubted biological +fact. Now if the animal be gifted with memory and +anticipation, this complicates the process, but does not +change its nature. The animal in feeling hungry may now +consciously anticipate the getting of food and may feel +pleasure in the idea of food. The pleasure henceforth attends +not merely upon attained satisfaction of appetite, +but also upon appetite prior to satisfaction, so far as that +anticipates its future satisfaction. But desire is still for +the object, for the food. If the desire is healthy, it will +not depend for its origin upon the recollection of a prior +pleasure; the animal does not happen to recall that it got +pleasure from food and thus arouse a desire for more food. +The desire springs up naturally from the state of the organism. +Only a jaded and unhealthy appetite has to +whip itself up by recalling previous pleasures. But if +there are many obstacles and discouragements in the way<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> +of getting the object which satisfies want, the anticipation +of pleasure in its fulfillment may normally intensify the +putting forth of energy, may give an extra reënforcement +to flagging effort. In this way, the anticipation of pleasure +has a normal place in the effective direction of activities. +But in any case, the desire and its own object are +primary; the pleasure is secondary.</p> + +<p><b>2. Pleasure and Acquired Desires.</b>—The same point +comes out even more clearly when we take into account +the so-called higher desires and sentiments—those which +usually enter into distinctively moral questions. In these +cases it is no longer a matter of the original instincts +and appetites of the organism. Their place is taken by +acquired habits and dispositions. The object of a benevolent +desire is the supplying of another's lack, or the +increase of his good. The pleasure which accompanies +the doing of a kindness to others is not the object, for the +individual thinks of the kindly act as pleasure-giving +only because he already has a benevolent character which +naturally expresses itself in amiable desires. So far as +he is not benevolent, the act will appear repulsive rather +than attractive to him; and if it is done, it will be not from +a benevolent desire, but from a cowardly or an avaricious +desire, the pleasure in that case attending the thought +of some other objective consequence, such as escaping unpopularity. +In like manner, the aim to behave honestly, +or to obey the civil law, or to love one's country, leads +to dwelling upon the acts and objects in which these desires +and intents may be fulfilled; and those objects which +are thought of as affording fulfillment are necessarily put +in a favorable and attractive light—they are regarded as +sources of happiness. To a patriot the thought even of +possible death may arouse a glow of satisfaction as he +thinks of this act as strengthening his country's existence. +But to suppose that this attendant pleasure is the aim +and object of desire is to put the cart before the horse.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>3. Happiness and Desire.</b>—All men, then, may be said +to desire happiness. But this happiness is not dependent +upon prior experiences of pleasure, which, coming up in +memory, arouse desire and rivet attention upon themselves. +To say that the desire of a man is for happiness is only +to say that happiness comes in the fulfillment of desire, +the desires arising on their own account as expressions of +a state of lack or incompletion in which the person finds +himself. Happiness thus conceived <i>is dependent upon the +nature of desire and varies with it, while desire varies +with the type of character</i>. If the desire is the desire +of an honest man, then the prosperous execution of some +honorable intent, the payment of a debt, the adequate termination +of a trust, is conceived as happiness, as good. +If it be the desire of a profligate, then entering upon +the riotous course of living now made possible by inheritance +of property is taken as happiness—the one consummation +greatly to be wished. If we know what any person +really finds desirable, what he stakes his happiness upon, +we can read his nature. In happiness, as the anticipation +of the satisfaction of desire, there is, therefore, no sure or +unambiguous quality; for it may be a token of good or of +bad character, according to the sort of object which appeals +to the person. The present joy found in the idea of +the completion of a purpose cannot be the object of desire, +for we desire only things absent. But the joy is a mark of +the congruity or harmony of the thought of the object, +whatever it be—health, dissipation, miserliness, prodigality, +conquest, helpfulness—with the character of the agent. +It is an evidence of the moving force, the influence, the +weight, of the conceived end; it registers the extent in +which the end is not a mere intellectual abstraction, but is a +<i>motive</i> (see p. 252). But the moral worth of this motive +depends upon the character of the end in which the person +finds his satisfaction.</p> + +<p><b>4. Confusion of Future and Present Pleasure.</b>—It is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> +confusion of <i>present</i> pleasure, attendant upon the thought +of an object as satisfying desire, with the pleasure that +<i>will come when the desire is satisfied</i>, that accounts for +the persistence of the idea that pleasure is the object of +desire. The fact that the object of desire is <i>now</i> pleasurable +is distorted into the statement that we <i>seek</i> for an +absent pleasure.<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> A good illustration of the confusion is +seen in the following quotation:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The love of happiness must express the sole possible motive +of Judas Iscariot and of his Master; it must explain the +conduct of Stylites on his pillar or Tiberius at Capræ or +à Kempis in his cell or of Nelson in the cockpit of the Victory. +It must be equally good for saints and martyrs, heroes, +cowards, debauchés, ascetics, mystics, misers, prodigals, men, +women and babes in arms" (Leslie Stephen, <i>Science of +Ethics</i>, p. 44).</p></div> + +<p>This statement is true, as we have just seen, in the sense +that different persons find different things good in accordance +with their different characters or habitually +dominant purposes; that each finds his happiness in whatever +he most sets his affections upon. Where a man's heart +is, there will his treasure be also, and where that is which +a man regards as treasure, there also is the heart. A +man's character is revealed by the objects which make him +happy, whether anticipated or realized.</p> + +<p><b>Our Ends are Our Happiness, Not a Means to It.</b>—But +the fallacy is in the words "love of happiness." They +suggest that all alike are seeking for some one and the +same thing, some one thing labeled "happiness," identical +in all cases, differing in the way they look for it—that +saints and martyrs, heroes and cowards, all have +just the same objective goal in view—if they only knew +it! In so far as it is true that there are certain funda<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>mental +conditions of the self which have to be satisfied in +order that there shall be a <i>true self and a true satisfaction</i>, +happiness is the same for all, and is the ultimate +good of all. But this holds only of the <i>standard</i> of happiness +which makes any particular conception of happiness +right or wrong, not to the conceptions actually entertained. +To say that all are consciously and deliberately after +the same happiness is to pervert the facts. Happiness as +standard means the genuine fulfillment of whatever is +necessary to the development and integrity of the self. In +this sense, it is what men <i>ought</i> to desire; it is what they +do desire so far as they understand themselves and the +conditions of their satisfaction. But as natural or psychological +end, it means that in which a man happens at +a given time to find delectation, depending upon his uppermost +wishes and strongest habits. Hence the objection +which almost every one, including the hedonists, feels to +the statement that happiness is the conscious aim of conduct. +It suggests that the objects at which we ordinarily +aim are not sought for themselves, but for some ulterior +gratification to ourselves. In reality these ends, so far +as they correspond to our capacity and intention, <i>are</i> our +happiness. All men love happiness—yes, in the sense +that, having desires, they are interested in the objects in +which the desires may be realized, no matter whether they +are worthy or degraded. No; if by this be meant that +happiness is something other than and beyond the conditions +in which the powers of the person are brought out, +and made effective; no, or if it means that all love that +which really will bring happiness.</p> + +<p><b>Necessity for Standard.</b>—As many sorts of character, +so many sorts of things regarded as satisfactory, as constitutive +of good. Not all anticipations when realized +are what they were expected to be. The good in prospect +may be apples of Sodom, dust and ashes, in attainment. +Hence some ends, some forms of happiness, are regarded<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> +as unworthy, not as "real" or "true." While they appeared +to be happiness during the expectancy of desire, they are +not approved as such in later reflection. Hence the demand +for some standard good or happiness by which +the individual may regulate the formation of his desires +and purposes so that the present and the permanent +good, the good in desire and in reflection, will coincide—so +that the individual will find that to be satisfactory in +his present view which will also permanently satisfy him. +From happiness as a conceived good we turn to happiness +as <i>rightly</i> conceived good; from happiness as result to happiness +as standard. As before, we begin with the narrower +utilitarian conception.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. THE CONCEPTION OF HAPPINESS AS A STANDARD</h4> + +<p><b>Utilitarian Method.</b>—Hedonism means that pleasure is +the end of human action, because the end of desire. Utilitarianism +or universalistic hedonism holds that the pleasure +of all affected is the standard for judging the worth +of action,—not that conduciveness to happiness is the sole +measure actually employed by mankind for judging moral +worth, but that it is the sole standard that should be +employed. Many other tests may actually be used, sympathy, +prejudice, convention, caprice, etc., but "utility" +is the one which will enable a person to judge <i>truly</i> what +is right or wrong in any proposed course of action. The +method laid down by Bentham is as follows: Every proposed +act is to be viewed with reference to its probable +consequences in (a) <i>intensity</i> of pleasure and pains; (b) +their duration; (c) their certainty or uncertainty; (d) +their nearness or remoteness; (e) their fecundity—i.e., +the tendency of a pleasure to be followed by others, or +a pain by other pains; (f) their <i>purity</i>—i.e., the tendency +of a pleasure to be followed by pains and <i>vice versa</i>; (g) +their extent, that is, the number or range of persons<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> +whose happiness is affected—with reference to whose +pleasures and pains each one of the first six items ought +also in strictness to be calculated! Then sum up all the +pleasures which stand to the credit side of the account; +add the pains which are the debit items, or liabilities, on +the other; then take their algebraic sum, and "the balance +of it on the side of pleasure will be the good tendency of +the act upon the whole."</p> + +<p><b>Circle in Method.</b>—Bentham's argument depends wholly +upon the possibility of both foreseeing and accurately +measuring the amount of future pleasures and pains that +will follow from the intention if it is carried into effect, +and of being able to find their algebraic sum. Our examination +will be directed to showing that we have here +the same fallacy that we have just discussed; and that +Bentham argues in a circle. For the argument purports +to measure present disposition or intent by summing up +future units of pleasure or pain; but there is no way +of estimating amounts of future satisfaction, the relative +intensity and weight of future possible pain and pleasure +experiences, except upon the basis of present tendencies, +the habitual aims and interests, of the person. (1) +The only way to estimate the relative amount (bulk, intensity, +etc.) of a future "lot" of pleasure or pain, is by +seeing how agreeable to <i>present</i> disposition are certain +anticipated consequences, themselves not pleasures or pains +at all. (2) The only basis upon which we can be sure +that there is a <i>right</i> estimate of future satisfactions, is +that we already have a good character as a basis and +organ for forming judgment.</p> + +<p><b>(1) How Pleasures and Pains are Measured.</b>—If we +keep strictly to Bentham's own conception of pleasures +as isolated entities, all just alike in quality, but differing +in quantity—in the two dimensions of intensity and +duration—the scheme he recommends is simply impossible. +What does it mean to say that one pleasure, as an ex<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span>ternal +and future fact, is equal to another? What practical +sense is there in the notion that a pain may be found +which is exactly equal to a pleasure, so that it may just +offset it or reduce it to zero? How can one weigh the +amount of pain in a jumping and long-continued toothache +against, say, the pleasure of some charitable deed +performed under conditions which may bring on the toothache? +What relevancy has the quantitative comparison +to a judgment of moral worth? How many units of +pleasure are contained in the fulfillment of the intention +to go to war for one's country? How many in the fulfillment +of the intention to remain at home with one's +family and secure profitable contracts from the government? +How shall the pains involved in each set be detected +and have their exact numerical force assigned them? +How shall one set be measured over against the other? +If a man is already a patriot, one set of consequences +comes into view and has weight; if one is already a coward +and a money-grubber, another set of consequences looms up +and its value is measured on a rule of very different scale.</p> + +<p><b>Present Congeniality to Character Measures Importance.</b>—When +we analyze what occurs, we find that this +process of comparing future possible satisfactions, to see +which is the greater, takes place on exactly the opposite +basis from that set forth by Bentham. We do not compare +results in the way of fixed amounts of pleasures and +pains, but we compare <i>objective</i> results, changes to be +effected in ourselves, in others, in the whole social situation; +during this comparison desires and aversions take +more definite form and strength, so that we find the idea +of one result more agreeable, more harmonious, to our +present character than another. <i>Then</i> we say it is more +satisfying, it affords more pleasure than another. The +satisfaction <i>now</i> aroused in the mind at the thought of +getting even with an enemy may be stronger than the painfulness +of the thought of the harm or loss that will come<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> +to him or than the thought of danger itself,—then the +pleasures to follow from vengeance are esteemed more numerous, +stronger, more lasting, etc., than those which +would follow from abstinence. Or, to say that satisfactions +are about equal means that we are <i>now</i> at a loss +to choose between them. But we are not at a loss to choose +because certain future pains and pleasures present themselves +in and of themselves as fixed amounts irrespective +of our own wishes, habits, and plans of life. Similarly +we may speak of satisfactions being added to one another +and the total sum increased; or of dissatisfaction coming +in as offsets and reducing the amount of satisfaction. But +this does not mean that pains and pleasures which we expect +to arrive in the future are added and subtracted—what +intelligible meaning can such a phrase possess? It +means that as we think first of this result and then of +another, the present happiness found in the anticipation +of one is increased by the anticipation of the other; or that +the results are so incompatible that the present satisfaction, +instead of swelling and expanding as from one +thought to another, is chilled and lessened. Thus we might +find the thought of revenge sweet (and thus give a high +valuation to the units of pleasure to result from it), but +be checked by the thought of the meanness of the act, or +of how we would feel if some one else, whose good opinion +we highly esteem, should hear of it.</p> + +<p><b>(2) Congeniality to a Good Character the Right Measure.</b>—The +net outcome of this discussion is that the practical +value of our acts is defined to us at any given time +by the satisfaction, or displeasure, we take in the ideas of +changes we foresee in case the act takes place. The present +happiness or distaste, depending upon the harmony between +the idea in question and the character, defines for +us the value of the future consequences: which is the +reverse of saying that a calculation of future pains and +pleasures determines for us the value of the act and char<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span>acter. +But this applies to any end as it happens to arise, +not to the end as we ought to form it; we are still without +a standard. What has been said applies to the criminal +as well as to the saint; to the miser and the prodigal +and the wisely generous alike. The idea of a certain result +warms the heart of each, his heart being what it is. +The assassin would not be one if the thought of a murder +had not been entertained by him and if the thought had +not been liked and welcomed—made at home. Only upon +the supposition that character is already good can we +trust judgment, first, to foresee all the consequences that +should be foreseen; and, secondly, to respond to each foreseen +consequence with the right emotional stamp of like +and dislike, pleasure and pain. The Greeks said it is the +object of a moral education to see that the individual finds +his pleasure in the thought of noble ends and finds his pain +in the contemplation of base ends. Again, as Aristotle +said:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The good man wills the real object of intent, but what the +bad man desires may be anything; just as physically those +in good condition want things that are wholesome, while the +diseased may take anything to be healthful; for the good man +judges correctly" (<i>Ethics</i>, Book III., 4, 4). And again: +"The good man is apt to go right about pleasure, and the bad +man is apt to go wrong" (Book II., 3, 7), and, finally, "It +is only to the good man that the good presents itself as good, +for vice perverts us and causes us to err about the principle +of action" (Book III., 12, 10).</p></div> + +<p><b>Principle of Quality of Pleasure as Criterion.</b>—Mill, +still calling himself a utilitarian, reaches substantially the +same result by (a) making the <i>quality</i> of pleasure, not +its bulk or intensity, the standard; and (b) referring differences +in quality to differences in the <i>characters</i> which +experience them.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is," he says, "quite compatible with the principle of utility +to recognize the fact that some <i>kinds</i> of pleasure are more<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> +desirable and more valuable than others. Human beings have +faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and, when +once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness +that does not include their gratification."</p></div> + +<p>The higher the capacity or faculty, the higher in quality +the pleasure of its exercise and fulfillment, irrespective +of bulk. But how do we know which faculty <i>is</i> higher, +and hence what satisfaction is more valuable? By reference +to the experience of the man who has had the best +opportunity to exercise all the powers in question.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any +of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance +of a beast's pleasure; no intelligent human being would consent +to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, +no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, +even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the +dunce or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than +they are with theirs." And again, "It is indisputable that +the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low has the +greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly +endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he +can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect.... It +is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; +better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And +if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because +he only knows his own side of the question. The other party +to the comparison knows both sides."</p></div> + +<p>The net result of our discussion is, then, (1) that happiness +consists in the fulfillment in their appropriate objects +(or the anticipation of such fulfillment) of the powers +of the self manifested in desires, purposes, efforts; (2) +true happiness consists in the satisfaction of those powers +of the self which are of higher quality; (3) that the man +of good character, the one in whom these high powers are +already active, is the judge, in the concrete, of happiness +and misery. We shall now discuss</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 3. THE CONSTITUTION OF HAPPINESS</h4> + +<p>Happiness consists in the agreement, whether anticipated +or realized, of the objective conditions brought about +by our endeavors with our desires and purposes. This conception +of happiness is contrasted with the notion that it +is a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or +feeling.</p> + +<p><b>1. One View Separates, while the Other Connects, +Pleasure and Objective Conditions.</b>—In one case, the +agreeable feeling is a kind of psychical entity, supposed +to be capable of existence by itself and capable of abstraction +from the objective end of action. The pleasant +<i>thing</i> is one thing; the pleasure, another; or, rather, the +<i>pleasant thing</i> must be analyzed into two independent elements, +the pleasure as <i>feeling</i> and the <i>thing</i> with which +it happens to be associated. It is the pleasure alone, <i>when +dissociated</i>, which is the real end of conduct, an object +being at best an external means of securing it. It is the +pleasurable feeling which happens to be <i>associated</i> with +food, with music, with a landscape, that makes it good; +health, art, are not good in themselves. The other view +holds that pleasure has no such existence by itself; that +it is only a name for the <i>pleasant object</i>; that by pleasure +is meant the agreement or congruity which exists between +some capacity of the agent and some objective fact +in which this capacity is realized. It expresses the way +some object meets, fits into, responds to, an activity of +the agent. To say that food is agreeable, means that food +satisfies an organic function. Music is pleasant because +by it certain capacities or demands of the person with respect +to rhythm of hearing are fulfilled; a landscape is +beautiful because it carries to fulfillment the visual possibilities +of the spectator.</p> + +<p><b>2. Qualities of Pleasure Vary with Objects, and with +Springs to Action.</b>—When happiness is conceived as an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> +aggregate of states of feeling, these are regarded as +homogeneous in quality, differing from one another only +in intensity and duration. Their qualitative differences +are not intrinsic, but are due to the different objects with +which they are associated (as pleasures of hearing, or +vision). Hence they disappear when the pleasure is taken +by itself as an end. But if agreeableness is precisely the +agreeableness or congruousness of some objective condition +with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent, +then, of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure +is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of +one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The +pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing +music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; +the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another. +Hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values +attaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect +of character which they express. But if the good is only +a sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as +good as any other—the pleasure of malignity as good as +the pleasure of kindliness, simply as pleasure. Accordingly +Bentham said, the pleasure of push-pin (a game) +is as good as that of poetry. And as he said again, since +pleasure is the motive of every act, there is no motive +which <i>in itself</i>, and as far as it goes, is not good—it is +bad only if it turns out in the end to produce more pain +than pleasure. The pleasure of malignant gossip is so +far as it is pleasure a mitigation of the badness of the +act. Not so, if happiness is the experience into which +pleasures enter so far as the tendencies of character +that produce them are approved of. An act may bring +a pleasure and yet that pleasure be no part of happiness, +but rather a blot and blemish. Such would be the +case, for example, with the pleasure which one might take +in an act of charity because one had thereby put himself +in a position superior to that of the recipient. A<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> +good man who caught himself feeling pleasure from this +phase of the act would not regard this pleasure as a +further element of good attained, but as detracting from +his happiness. A pleasure may be accepted or reacted +against. So far as not acquiesced in it is, from the standpoint +of happiness, positively disagreeable. Surrender +to a pleasure, taking it to be one's happiness, is one of +the surest ways of revealing or discovering what sort of +a man one is. On the other hand, the pain which a +miserly man feels in his first acts of generosity may be +welcomed by him as, under the circumstances, an element +in his good, since it is a sign of and factor in the improvement +of character.</p> + +<p><b>3. The Unification of Character.</b>—Happiness as a sum +of pleasures does not afford a basis for unifying or organizing +the various tendencies and capacities of the self. +It makes possible at best only a mechanical compromise +or external adjustment. Take, for example, the satisfaction +attendant upon acting from a benevolent or a malicious +impulse. There can be no question that some +pleasure is found in giving way to either impulse when +it is strongly felt. Now if we regard the pleasure as +a fixed state in itself, and good or happiness as a sum +of such states, the only moral superiority that can attach +to acting benevolently is that, upon the whole, <i>more</i> units +of pleasure come from it than from giving way to the +opposite spring of action. It is simply a question of +greater or less quantity in the long run. Each trait +of character, each act, remains morally independent, cut +off from others. Its only relation to others is that which +arises when its results in the way of units of agreeable +or painful feeling are compared, as to bulk, with analogous +consequences flowing from some other trait, or act. But if +the fundamental thing in happiness is the relation of the +desire and intention of the agent to its own successful outlet, +there is an inherent connection between our different<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> +tendencies. The satisfaction of one tendency strengthens +itself, and strengthens allied tendencies, while it weakens +others. A man who gives way easily to anger (and finds +gratification in it) against the acts of those whom he +regards as enemies, nourishes unawares a tendency to irritability +in all directions and thus modifies the sources and +nature of all satisfaction. The man who cherishes the satisfaction +he derives from a landscape may increase his +susceptibility to enjoyment from poetry and pictures.</p> + +<p><b>The Final Question.</b>—The final question of happiness, +the question which marks off true and right happiness +from false and wrong gratification, comes to this: Can +there be found ends of action, desirable in themselves, +which reënforce and expand not only the motives from +which they directly spring, but also the other tendencies +and attitudes which are sources of happiness? Can there be +found powers whose exercise confirms ends which are stable +and weakens and removes objects which occasion only restless, +peevish, or transitory satisfaction, and ultimately +thwart and stunt the growth of happiness? Harmony, +reënforcement, expansion are the signs of a true or moral +satisfaction. What is the good which while good in direct +enjoyment also brings with it fuller and more continuous +life?</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>For pleasure as the object of desire and the psychology of hedonism, +see Bain, <i>Emotions and Will</i>, Part II., ch. viii.; Rickaby, <i>Moral +Philosophy</i>, pp. 54-61, and <i>Aquinas Ethicus</i>, Vol. I., pp. 104-121; +Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, pp. 34-47, and the whole of Book II., +and Book III., chs. xiii. and xiv.; Mackenzie, <i>Manual of Ethics</i>, +Book II., ch. iv.; Muirhead, <i>Elements of Ethics</i>, Book III., ch. i.; +Gizyeki, <i>A Student's Manual of Ethical Philosophy</i>; Green, <i>Prolegomena +to Ethics</i>, pp. 163-177, 226-240, 374-388; James, <i>Principles of +Psychology</i>, Vol. II., pp. 549-559; Martineau, <i>Types of Ethical +Theory</i>, Vol. II., Part II., Book II., Branch iv.</p> + +<p>For the history of hedonism, see Wallace, <i>Epicureanism</i>; Pater, +<i>Marius the Epicurean</i>; Sidgwick, <i>History of Ethics</i>, ch. ii., <i>passim</i> and +ch. iv., §14-17; Hume, <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i>, Book III., and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> +references to Bentham and Mill in the text; Watson, <i>Hedonistic +Theories from Aristippus to Spencer</i>.</p> + +<p>For the utilitarian standard, see Lecky, <i>History of European +Morals</i>, Vol. I., ch. i.; Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, chs. iv. and v.; +Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Part I.; Höffding, <i>Ethik</i>, ch. vii., and +<i>Monist</i>, Vol. I., p. 529; Paulsen, <i>System of Ethics</i>, pp. 222-286, and +404-414; Grote, <i>Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy</i>; Wilson +and Fowler, <i>Principles of Morals</i>, Vol. I., pp. 98-112; Vol. II., pp. +262-273; Green, <i>Prolegomena</i>, pp. 240-255, 399-415; Martineau, <i>Types</i>, +pp. 308-334; Alexander, <i>Moral Order and Progress</i>, pp. 204-211; Seth, +<i>Principles of Ethics</i>, pp. 94-111; Sidgwick, <i>The Ethics of T. H. Green, +Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau</i>, Lectures I.-IV. of the Criticism +of Spencer. Compare the references <i>sub voce</i> Happiness, 899-903, in +Rand's <i>Bibliography</i>, Vol. III. of Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy +and Psychology.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> Later we shall see reasons for discriminating between happiness +and pleasure. But here we accept the standpoint of those who +identify them.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> The context shows that this "party" may be either the individual, +or a limited social group or the entire community. Even the pleasures +and pains of animals, of the sentient creation generally, may +come into the account.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> These quotations are all taken from Bentham's <i>Principles of +Morals and Legislation</i>; the first, third, and fourth from ch. i.; the +second from ch. xiii.; and the last from ch. ii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> With these statements may he compared Spencer, <i>Principles of +Ethics</i>, pp. 30-32: Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, pp. 42. Sidgwick, in +his <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, holds that the axiomatic character of happiness +as an end proves that the position is not empirical but intuitional +or <i>a priori</i>. Only as we base ourselves on certain ultimate deliverances +of conscience can we he said to know that happiness is the +desirable end and that the happiness of one is just as intrinsically +desirable as the happiness of another. (See his <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, +Book III., chs. xiii. and xiv.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> This ambiguity affects the statement quoted from Bentham that +pleasure and pain determine what we shall do. His implication is +that pleasure as <i>object</i> of desire moves us; the fact is that <i>present</i> +pleasure, aroused by the idea of some object, influences us.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XV</small> + +<br /><br /> + +HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a></h2> + + +<p>In form, the true good is thus an inclusive or expanding +end. In substance, the only end which fulfills these conditions +is the social good. The utilitarian standard is +social consequences. To repeat our earlier quotation from +Bentham (above, p. 264):</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in +question is the right and proper, and the only right and +proper and <i>universally desirable</i> end of human action." Mill +says, "To do as you would be done by, and to love your +neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian +morality." And again: "The happiness which is the +Utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the +agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned; as between +his own happiness and that of others, Utilitarianism requires +him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent +spectator." So Sidgwick (<i>Methods of Ethics</i>, p. 379): +"By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, first distinctly +formulated by Bentham, that the conduct which under +any given circumstances is externally or objectively right is +that which produces the greatest amount of happiness <i>on the +whole</i>; that is taking into account all whose happiness is +affected by the conduct. It would tend to clearness if we +might call this principle, and the method based upon it, by +some such name as Universalistic hedonism." And finally, +Bain (<i>Emotions and Will</i>, p. 303): "Utility is opposed to the +selfish principle, for, as propounded, it always implies the +good of society generally and the subordination of individual +interests to the general good."</p></div><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Social Purpose of Utilitarianism.</b>—Its aim, then, was +the "greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible +number," a democratic, fraternal aim. In the computation +of the elements of this aim, it insisted upon the +principle of social and moral equality: "every one to count +for one, and only for one." The standard was the well-being +of the community conceived as a community of individuals, +all of whom had equal rights and none of whom had +special privileges or exclusive avenues of access to happiness. +In a period in which the democratic spirit in England +was asserting itself against vested interests and +class-distinctions, against legalized inequalities of all sorts, +the utilitarian philosophy became the natural and perhaps +indispensable adjunct of the liberal and reforming +spirit in law, education, and politics. Every custom, +every institution, was cross-questioned; it was not allowed +to plead precedent and prior existence as a basis for continued +existence. It had to prove that it conduced to +the happiness of the community as a whole, or be legislated +out of existence or into reform. Bentham's fundamental +objection to other types of moral theories than his +own was not so much philosophic or theoretic as it was +practical. He felt that every intuitional theory tended +to dignify prejudice, convention, and fixed customs, +and so to consecrate vested interests and inequitable +institutions.</p> + +<p><b>Recognition by an Opponent.</b>—The following remarks +by T. H. Green are the more noteworthy because coming +from a consistent opponent of the theory:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The chief theory of conduct which in Modern Europe has +afforded the conscientious citizen a vantage ground for judging +of the competing claims on his obedience, and enabled +him to substitute a critical and intelligent for a blind and +unquestioning conformity, has no doubt been the Utilitarian. +... Whatever the errors arising from its hedonistic psychology, +no other theory has been available for the social or +political reformer, combining so much truth with such ready<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> +applicability. No other has offered so commanding a point +of view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions +presented as authoritative."<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a></p></div> + +<p>And again, speaking of the possibility of practical +service from theory, he says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The form of philosophy which in the modern world has +most conspicuously rendered this service has been the Utilitarian, +because it has most definitely announced the interest +of humanity without distinction of persons or classes, as the +end by reference to which all claims upon obedience are +ultimately to be measured.... Impartiality of reference to +human well-being has been the great lesson which the Utilitarian +has had to teach."<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>Irreconcilable Conflict of Motive and End.</b>—But unfortunately +the assertion that the happiness of all concerned +is the "universally <i>desirable</i> end," is mixed up by +early utilitarianism with an hedonistic psychology, according +to which the <i>desired</i> object is private and personal +pleasure. What is <i>desirable</i> is thus so different from what +is <i>desired</i> as to create an uncrossable chasm between the +true end of action—the happiness of all,—and the moving +spring of desire and action—private pleasure. That +there is a difference between what is <i>naturally</i> desired +(meaning by "naturally" what first arouses interest and +excites endeavor) and what is morally desirable (understanding +by this the consequences which present themselves +in adequate deliberation), is certain enough. But +the desirable must be <i>capable of becoming</i> desired, or +else there is such a contradiction that morality is impossible. +If, now, the object of desire is always private +pleasure, how can the recognition of the consequences +upon the happiness or misery of others ever become an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> +effective competitor with considerations of personal well-being, +when the two conflict?<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> + +<p><b>Lack of Harmony among Pleasurable Ends.</b>—If it so +happens that the activities which secure the personal +pleasure also manage to affect others favorably, so much +the better; but since, by the theory, the individual <i>must</i> +be moved exclusively by desire for his own pleasure, woe +betide others if their happiness happens to stand in the +way.<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> It could only be by accident that activities of a +large number of individuals all seeking their own private +pleasures should coincide in effecting the desirable end +of the common happiness. The outcome would, more likely, +be a competitive "war of all against all." It is of such +a situation that Kant says: "There results a harmony +like that which a certain satirical poem depicts as existing +between a married couple bent on going to ruin, +'Oh, marvelous harmony! what he wishes, she wishes too'; +or like what is said of the pledge of Francis I. to the +Emperor Charles V., 'What my brother wants, that I want +too' (namely Milan)."<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> The existence already noted of +an unperceived and unreconcilable division between happiness +<i>in the form of future consequences</i>, and pleasure <i>as +object of desire and present moving spring</i>, thus becomes +of crucial and, for hedonistic utilitarianism, of catastrophic +importance. We shall first discuss the efforts of +utilitarianism to deal with the problem.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Mill's Formal Method.</b>—We mention first a purely +logical or formal suggestion of Mill's, not because it is +of very much significance one way or the other, but because +it helps to bring out the problem.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, +except that each person, so far as he believes it to +be obtainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being +a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits +of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a +good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person; +and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate +of all persons."<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p></div> + +<p>It clearly does not follow that because the good of A and +B and C, etc., is <i>collectively</i>, or aggregately, a good to A +and B and C, etc., that therefore the good of A and B and +C, etc., or of anybody beyond A himself, is regarded as a +good by A—especially when the original premise is that +A seeks his own good. Because all men want to be happy +themselves, it hardly follows that each wants all to be +so. It does follow, perhaps, that that would be the <i>reasonable</i> +thing to want. If each man desires happiness +for himself, to an outside spectator looking at the matter +in the cold light of intelligence, there might be no reason +why the happiness of one should be any more precious or +desirable than that of another. From a mathematical +standpoint, the mere fact that the individual knows he +wants happiness, and knows that others are like himself, +that they too are individuals who want happiness, might +commit each individual, theoretically, to the necessity +of regarding the happiness of every other as equally +sacred with his own. But the difficulty is that there is +no chance, upon the hedonistic psychology of desire, for +this rational conviction to get in its work, even if it be +intellectually entertained. The intellectual perception and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> +the mechanism of human motivation remain opposed. +Mill's statement, in other words, puts the problem which +hedonistic utilitarianism has to solve.</p> + +<p>Materially, as distinct from this formal statement, +utilitarianism has two instrumentalities upon which it +relies: one, internal, found in the nature of the individual; +the other, external, or in social arrangements.</p> + +<p><b>I. Bentham's View of Sympathetic Pleasures.</b>—In the +long list of pleasures moving men to action which Bentham +drew up, he included what he called the social and +the semi-social. The social are the pleasures of benevolence; +the semi-social, the pleasures of amity (peace with +one's fellows) and of reputation.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting +from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by +the beings who may be the objects of benevolence" (<i>Principles +of Morals and Legislation</i>). And if it be asked what +motives lying within a man's self he has to consult the happiness +of others, "in answer to this, it cannot but be admitted +that the only interests which a man at all times and upon +all occasions is sure to find <i>adequate</i> motives for consulting +are his own. Notwithstanding this there are no occasions on +which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness +of other men. In the first place, he has, on all occasions, +the purely social motive of sympathy and benevolence; in the +next place, he has, on most occasions, the semi-social motives +of amity and love of reputation" (<i>Ibid.</i>, ch. xix., § 1). So +important finally are the sympathetic motives that he says +"The Dictates of Utility are neither more nor less than the +dictates of the most extensive and enlightened (that is, well +advised)<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> benevolence" (<i>Ibid.</i>, ch. x., § 4).</p></div> + +<p>In short, we are so constituted that the happiness of +others gives us happiness, their misery creates distress in +us. We are also so constituted that, even aside from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> +direct penalties imposed upon us by others, we are made +to suffer more or less by the knowledge that they have +a low opinion of us, or that we are not "popular" with +them. The more enlightened our activity, the more we +shall see how by sympathy our pleasures are directly bound +up with others, so that we shall get more pleasure by +encouraging that of others. The same course will also +indirectly increase our own, because others will be likely +to esteem and honor us just in the degree in which our +acts conduce to their pleasure. A wise or enlightened +desire for our own pleasure will thus lead us to regard the +pleasures of others in our activities.</p> + +<p><b>Limitations of Doctrine.</b>—To state the doctrine is +almost to criticize it. It comes practically to saying +that a sensible and prudent self-love will make us pay +due heed to the effect of our activities upon the welfare +of others. We are to be benevolent, but the reason is +that we get more pleasure, or get pleasure more surely +and easily, that way than in any other. We are to be +kind, because upon the whole the net return of pleasure +is greater that way. This does not mean that Bentham +denied the existence of "disinterested motives" in man's +make-up; or that he held that all sympathy is coldly +calculating. On the contrary, he held that sympathetic +reactions to the well-being and suffering of others are involved +in our make-up. But as it relates to <i>motives</i> for +action he holds that the sympathetic affections influence +us only under the form of desire for our own pleasure: +they make us rejoice in the rejoicing of others, and +move us to act that others may rejoice so that we may +thereby rejoice the more. They do not move us to act +as direct interests in the welfare of others for their own +sake.<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> We shall find that just as Mill transformed the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> +utilitarian theory of motives by substituting quality of +happiness for quantity of pleasures, so he also transformed +the earlier Benthamite conception of both the internal and +the external methods for relating the happiness of the +individual and the welfare of society.</p> + +<p><b>II. Mill's Criticism.</b>—Mill charges Bentham with overlooking +the motive in man which makes him love excellence +for its own sake. "Even under the head of sympathy," +he says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"his recognition does not extend to the more complex forms +of the feeling—the love of <i>loving</i>, the need of a sympathizing +support, or of an object of admiration and reverence."<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> +"Self culture, the training by the human being himself of his +affections and will ... is a blank in Bentham's system. The +other and co-equal part, the regulation of his outward actions, +must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first; +for how can we judge in what manner many an action will +affect the worldly interests of ourselves or others unless we +take in, as part of the question, its influence on the regulation +of our or their affections and desires?"<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p></div> + +<p>In other words, Mill saw that the weakness of Bentham's +theory lay in his supposition that the factors of character, +the powers and desires which make up disposition, +are of value only as moving us to seek pleasure; to Mill +they have a worth of their own or are <i>direct</i> sources and +ingredients of happiness. So Mill says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I regard any considerable increase of human happiness, +through mere changes in outward circumstances, unaccompanied +by changes in the state of desires, as hopeless."<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> And +in his <i>Autobiography</i> speaking of his first reaction against +Benthamism, he says: "I, for the first time, gave its proper +place, among the prime necessities of human well-being, to +the internal culture of the individual. I ceased to attach almost +exclusive importance to the ordering of outward circum<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span>stances.... +The cultivation of the feelings became one of +the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed."<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p></div> + +<p><b>The Social Affections as Direct Interest in Others.</b>—The +importance of this changed view lies in the fact that +it compels us to regard certain desires, affections, and +motives as inherently worthy, because intrinsic constituent +factors of happiness. Thus it enables us to <i>identify</i> our +happiness with the happiness of others, to find our good +in their good, not just to seek their happiness as, upon +the whole, the most effective way of securing our own. +Our social affections are direct interests in the well-being +of others; their cultivation and expression is at one and +the same time a source of good to ourselves, and, intelligently +guided, to others. Taken in this light, it is sympathetic +emotion and imagination which make the standard +of general happiness not merely the "desirable end," +but the desired end, the effectively working object of +endeavor.</p> + +<p><b>Intrinsic Motivation of Regard for Others.</b>—If it is +asked <i>why</i> the individual should thus regard the well-being +of others as an inherent object of desire, there is, +according to Mill, but one answer: We cannot think of +ourselves save as to some extent <i>social</i> beings. Hence we +cannot separate the idea of ourselves and of our own +good from our idea of others and of their good. The +natural sentiment which is the basis of the utilitarian +morality, which gives the idea of the social good weight +with us, is the</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures.... The +social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual +to man, that except in some unusual circumstances or by an +effort of voluntary abstraction, <i>he never conceives himself +otherwise than as a member of a body</i>.... Any condition, +therefore, which is essential to a state of society becomes +more and more an inseparable part of every person's concep<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span>tion +of the state of things he is born into and which is the +destiny of a human being." This strengthening of social +ties leads the individual "to identify his <i>feelings</i> more and +more with the good" of others. "He comes, as though instinctively, +to be conscious of himself as a being, who, <i>of +course</i>, pays regard to others. The good of others becomes +to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, +like any of the physical conditions of our existence." This +social feeling, finally, however weak, does not present itself +"as a superstition of education, or a law despotically imposed +from without, but as an attribute which it would not be well +to be without.... Few but those whose mind is a moral +blank could <i>bear</i> to lay out their course of life on the line +of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private +interest compels."<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a></p></div> + +<p>The transformation is tremendous. It is no longer a +question of acting for the general interest because that +brings most pleasure or brings it more surely and easily. +It is a question of finding one's good in the good of +others.</p> + +<p><b>III. The Benthamite External Ties of Private and +General Interests.</b>—Aside from sympathy and love of +peaceful relations and good repute, Bentham relied upon +law, changes in political arrangements, and the play of +economic interests which make it worth while for the individual +to seek his own pleasure in ways that would also +conduce to the pleasure of others. Penal law can at +least make it painful for the individual to try to get +his own good in ways which bring suffering to others. +Civil legislation can at least abolish those vested interests +and class privileges which inevitably favor one at the +expense of others, and which make it customary and +natural to seek and get happiness in ways which disregard +the happiness of others. In the industrial life each +individual seeks his own advantage under such conditions +that he can achieve his end only by rendering service to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> +others, that is, through exchange of commodities or +services. The proper end of legislation is then to make +political and economic conditions such that the individual +while seeking his own good will at least not inflict suffering +upon others, and positively, so far as possible, will +promote their good.<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p> + +<p><b>IV. Mill's Criticism.</b>—Mill's criticism does not turn +upon the importance of legislation and of social economic +arrangements in promoting the identity of individual +and general good. On the contrary, after identifying +(in a passage already quoted, <i>ante</i>, p. 286) the +ideal of utilitarian morality with love of neighbor, he +goes on:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal +utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements +should place the happiness of every individual as nearly as +possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and, +secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a +power over human character, should so use that power as to +establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association +between his own happiness and the good of the +whole."</p></div> + +<p>The criticism turns upon the fact that <i>unless</i> the intrinsic +social idea, already discussed, be emphasized, any association +of private and general happiness which law and social +arrangements can effect will be external, more or less artificial +and arbitrary, and hence dissoluble either by intellectual +analysis, or by the intense prepotency of egoistic +desire.</p> + +<p><b>Mill's Transformation.</b>—If, however, this idea of inherent +social ties and of oneself as a social being is presupposed, +the various external agencies have something +internal to work upon; and their effect is internal, +not external. Their effect is not to establish a mere<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> +<i>coincidence</i> (as with Bentham) between pleasure to oneself +and pleasure to others, but to protect, strengthen, and +foster the sense, otherwise intermittent and feeble, of the +social aspects and relations of one's own being. It is for +this reason that Mill lays more stress on <i>education</i> than +on mere external institutional changes, and, indeed, conceives +of the ultimate moral value of the institutional arrangements +as itself educative. Their value to him is +not that they are contrivances or pieces of machinery for +making the behavior of one conduce more or less automatically +to the happiness of others, but that they train and +exercise the individual in the recognition of the social elements +of his own character.</p> + +<p><b>Summary of Previous Discussion.</b>—We have carried +on our discussion of the relation between the common good +as the standard for measuring rightness, and pleasure +as the end and spring of the individual's activity, in +terms of Mill's development of Bentham's utilitarianism. +But of course our results are general, and they may be +detached not only from this particular discussion, but +from the truth or falsity of utilitarianism as a technical +theory. Put positively, our results are these: (1) Moral +quality is an attribute of character, of dispositions and +attitudes which express themselves in desires and efforts. +(2) Those attitudes and dispositions are morally good +which aim at the production, the maintenance, and development +of ends in which the agent and others affected +alike find satisfaction. There is no difference (such as +early utilitarianism made) between good as standard and +as aim, because <i>only a voluntary preference for and interest +in a social good is capable, otherwise than by coincidence +or accident, of producing acts which have common +good as their result</i>. Acts which are not motivated by it as +aim cannot be trusted to secure it as result; <i>acts which +are motived by it as a living and habitual interest are +the guarantee, so far as conditions allow, of its realization</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> +Those who care for the general good for its own sake are +those who are surest of promoting it.</p> + +<p><b>The Good Moral Character.</b>—The genuinely moral +person is one, then, in whom the habit of regarding all +capacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is +formed and active. Such an one forms his plans, regulates +his desires, and hence performs his acts with reference +to the effect they have upon the social groups of +which he is a part. He is one whose dominant attitudes +and interests are bound up with associated activities. Accordingly +he will find his happiness or satisfaction in the +promotion of these activities irrespective of the particular +pains and pleasures that accrue.</p> + +<p><b>Social Interests and Sympathy.</b>—A genuine social interest +is then something much broader and deeper than an +instinctive sympathetic reaction. Sympathy is a genuine +natural instinct, varying in intensity in different individuals. +It is a precious instrumentality for the development +of social insight and socialized affection; but in +and of itself it is upon the same plane as any natural +endowment. It may lead to sentimentality or to selfishness; +the individual may shrink from scenes of misery just +because of the pain they cause him, or may seek jovial +companions because of the sympathetic pleasures he gets. +Or he may be moved by sympathy to labor for the good +of others, but, because of lack of deliberation and thoughtfulness, +be quite ignorant of what their good really is, and +do a great deal of harm. One may wish to do unto others +as he would they should do unto him, but may err egregiously +because his conception of what is desirable for +himself is radically false; or because he assumes arbitrarily +that whatever he likes is good for others, and may thus +tyrannically impose his own standards upon them. Again +instinctive sympathy is partial; it may attach itself vehemently +to those of blood kin or to immediate associates +in such a way as to favor them at the expense of others,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> +and lead to positive injustice toward those beyond the +charmed circle.<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a></p> + +<p><b>Transformation of Instinctive Sympathies.</b>—It still +remains true that the instinctive affectionate reactions in +their various forms (parental, filial, sexual, compassionate, +sympathetic) are the sole portions of the psychological +structure or mechanism of a man which can be relied upon +to work the identification of other's ends with one's own +interests. What is required is a <i>blending</i>, a <i>fusing</i> of the +sympathetic tendencies with all the other impulsive and +habitual traits of the self. When interest in power is +permeated with an affectionate impulse, it is protected +from being a tendency to dominate and tyrannize; it becomes +an interest in <i>effectiveness of regard for common +ends</i>. When an interest in artistic or scientific objects is +similarly fused, it loses the indifferent and coldly impersonal +character which marks the specialist as such, and +becomes an interest in the adequate æsthetic and intellectual +development of the conditions of a common life. +Sympathy does not merely <i>associate</i> one of these tendencies +<i>with</i> another; still less does it make one a means to the +other's end. It so intimately permeates them as to transform +them both into a single new and moral interest. This +same fusion protects sympathy from sentimentality and +narrowness. Blended with interest in power, in science, +in art, it is liberalized in quality and broadened in range. +In short, the fusion of affectionate reactions with the +other dispositions of the self <i>illuminates, gives perspective +and body to the former</i>, while it <i>gives social quality and +direction to the latter</i>. The result of this reciprocal absorption +is the disappearance of the natural tendencies in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> +their original form <i>and the generation of moral</i>, i.e., <i>socialized +interests</i>. It is sympathy transformed into a +habitual standpoint which satisfies the demand for a standpoint +which will render the person interested in foresight of +all obscure consequences (<i>ante</i>, p. 262).</p> + +<p><b>1. Social Interest and the Happiness of the Agent.</b>—We +now see what is meant by a distinctively <i>moral</i> happiness, +and how this happiness is supreme in quality as +compared with other satisfactions, irrespective of superior +intensity and duration on the part of the latter. It is +impossible to draw any fixed line between the <i>content</i> of +the moral good and of natural satisfaction. The end, the +right and only right end, of man, lies in the fullest and +freest realization of powers in their appropriate objects. +The good consists of friendship, family and political relations, +economic utilization of mechanical resources, science, +art, in all their complex and variegated forms and elements. +There is no separate and rival moral good; no +separate empty and rival "good will."</p> + +<p><b>Nature of Moral Interest and Motivation.</b>—Yet <i>the interest</i> +in the social or the common and progressive realization +of these interests may properly be called a distinctive +moral interest. The degree of actual objective realization +or achievement of these ends, depends upon circumstances +and accidents over which the agent has little or +no control. The more happily situated individual who +succeeds in realizing these ends more largely we may call +more fortunate; we cannot call him morally better. The +interest in all other interests, the voluntary desire to discover +and promote them within the range of one's own +capacities, one's own material resources, and the limits +of one's own surroundings, is, however, under one's control: +<i>it is one's moral self</i>. <i>The nature and exercise of +this interest constitutes then the distinctively moral +quality in all good purposes.</i> They are morally good +not so far as objectively accomplished and possessed,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> +but so far as cherished in the dominant affections of the +person.</p> + +<p><b>The Moral Interest as Final Happiness.</b>—Consequently +the true or final happiness of an individual, the happiness +which is not at the mercy of circumstance and change of +circumstance, lies not in objective achievement of results, +but in the supremacy within character of an alert, sincere, +and persistent interest in those habits and institutions +which forward common ends among men. Mill insisted +that quality of happiness was morally important, not +quantity. Well, that quality which is most important +is the peace and joy of mind that accompanies the abiding +and equable maintenance of socialized interests as +central springs of action. To one in whom these interests +live (and they live to some extent in every individual +not completely pathological) their exercise brings happiness +because it fulfills his life. To those in whom it is the +supreme interest it brings supreme or final happiness. It +is not preferred because it is the greater happiness, but +in being preferred as expressing the only kind of self +which the agent fundamentally wishes himself to be, it constitutes +a kind of happiness with which others cannot be +compared. It is unique, final, invaluable.<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a></p> + +<p><b>Identity of the Individual and General Happiness.</b>—No +algebraic summing up of sympathetic pleasures, utilities +of friendship, advantages of popularity and esteem, +profits of economic exchange among equals, over against +pains from legal penalties and disapproving public opinion, +and lack of sympathetic support by others, can ever +make it even approximately certain that an individual's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> +own interest, in terms of quantity of pleasures and pains, +is to regard the interest of others.<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> Such a demonstration, +moreover, if possible, would not support but would weaken +the moral life. It would reduce the manifestation of character +to selecting greater rather than less amounts of +homogeneous ends. It would degrade reflection and consideration +to ingenuity in detecting where larger quantities +of pleasures lie, and to skill in performing sums of +addition and subtraction. Even if such a scheme could be +demonstrated, every one except the most languid and +phlegmatic of pleasure-seekers would reject a life built +upon it. Not only the "good," but the more vigorous and +hearty of the "bad," would scorn a life in which character, +selfhood, had no significance, and where the experimental +discovery and testing of destiny had no place. The identity +of individual and general happiness is a <i>moral</i> matter; +it depends, that is, upon the reflective and intentional development +of that type of character which identifies itself +with common ends, and which is happy in these ends +just because it has made them its own.</p> + +<p><b>2. Social Ends and the Happiness of Others.</b>—The +same principle holds of the happiness of others. Happiness +means the expression of the active tendencies of a self +in their appropriate objects. Moral happiness means the +satisfaction which comes when the dominant active tendencies +are made interests in the maintenance and propagation +of the things that make life worth living. Others, also, +can be happy and should be happy only upon the same +terms. Regard for the happiness of others means <i>regard +for those conditions and objects which permit others freely +to exercise their own powers from their own initiative, reflection, +and choice</i>. Regard for their final happiness (i.e.,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> +for a happiness whose <i>quality</i> is such that it cannot be +<i>externally</i> added to or subtracted from) demands that +these others shall find the controlling objects of preference, +resolution, and endeavor in the things that are worth +while.</p> + +<p><b>3. Happiness and Common Ends.</b>—For all alike, in +short, the chief thing is the discovery and promotion of +those activities and active relationships in which the capacities +of all concerned are effectively evoked, exercised, and +put to the test. It is difficult for a man to attain a point +of view from which steadily to apprehend how his own +activities affect and modify those of others. It is hard, +that is, to learn to accommodate one's ends to those of +others; to adjust, to give way here, and fit in there with +respect to our aims. But difficult as this is, it is easy compared +with the difficulty of acting <i>in such a way</i> for ends +which are helpful to others as will call out and make effective +their activities.</p> + +<p><b>Moral Democracy.</b>—If the vice of the criminal, and of +the coarsely selfish man is to disturb the aims and the good +of others; if the vice of the ordinary egoist, and of every +man, upon his egoistic side, is to neglect the interests of +others; the vice of the social leader, of the reformer, of +the philanthropist and the specialist in every worthy cause +of science, or art, or politics, is to seek ends which promote +the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the +active interest and coöperation of others.<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> The conception +of conferring the good upon others, or at least of attaining +it for them, which is our inheritance from the aristocratic +civilization of the past, is so deeply embodied +in religious, political, and charitable institutions and in +moral teachings, that it dies hard. Many a man, feeling +himself justified by the social character of his ultimate aim<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> +(it may be economic, or educational, or political), is +genuinely confused or exasperated by the increasing antagonism +and resentment which he evokes, because he has +not enlisted in his pursuit of the "common" end the freely +coöperative activities of others. This coöperation must be +the root principle of the morals of democracy. It must be +confessed, however, that it has as yet made little progress.</p> + +<p>Our traditional conceptions of the morally great man, +the moral hero and leader, the exceptionally good social +and political character, all work against the recognition +of this principle either in practice or theory. They foster +the notion that it is somebody's particular business to reach +by his more or less isolated efforts (with "following," or +obedience, or unreflective subordination on the part of +others) a needed social good. Some genius is to lead the +way; others are to adopt and imitate. Moreover, the +method of awakening and enlisting the activities of all +concerned in pursuit of the end seems slow; it seems to +postpone accomplishment indefinitely. But in truth a +common end which is not made such by common, free voluntary +coöperation in process of achievement is common in +name only. It has no support and guarantee in the activities +which it is supposed to benefit, because it is not the +fruit of those activities. Hence, it does not stay put. +It has to be continually buttressed by appeal to external, +not voluntary, considerations; bribes of pleasure, threats +of harm, use of force. It has to be undone and done over. +There is no way to escape or evade this law of happiness, +that it resides in the exercise of the active capacities of +a voluntary agent; and hence no way to escape or evade +the law of a common happiness, that it must reside in +the congruous exercise of the voluntary activities of all +concerned. The inherent irony and tragedy of much +that passes for a high kind of socialized activity is precisely +that it seeks a common good by methods which forbid +its being either common or a good.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>See references upon utilitarianism at end of ch. xiv. For happiness, +see Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>, Book I., and Book X., chs. vi.-ix.; Dickinson, +<i>The Meaning of Good</i>; Paulsen, <i>System of Ethics</i>, pp. 268-286; +Rickaby, <i>Aquinas Ethicus</i>, Vol. I., pp. 6-39; Mezes, <i>Ethics</i>, ch. xv.; +Santayana, <i>The Life of Reason</i>; Rashdall, <i>The Theory of Good and +Evil</i>.</p> + +<p>The following histories of utilitarianism bring out the social side +of the utilitarian theory: Albee, <i>History of Utilitarianism</i>; Stephen, +<i>The English Utilitarians</i>; Halévy, <i>La Formation du Radicalisme +Philosophique</i>, especially Vols. I. and II.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> The discussion of altruism and egoism in ch. xviii. on the Self, +considers some aspects of this question from another point of view.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 361.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 365-66. Green then goes on to argue that this service +has been in spite of its hedonistic factor, and that if the theory were +generally applied with all the hedonistic implications to personal +behavior in private life, it would put impediments in the way of moral +progress.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> It will be noted that we have here the same double rôle of +pleasure that met us at the outset (see <i>ante</i>, p. 267): one sort of +happiness is the moving spring of action, because object of desire; +another and incompatible sort is the standard, and hence proper +or right end.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> It is this hedonistic element of the object of desire and moving +spring which calls forth such denunciations as Carlyle's; on the +other hand, it is the assertion of the common happiness as the +standard which calls out the indignant denial of the utilitarians; +which, for example, leads Spencer to retort upon Carlyle's epithet of +"pig-philosophy" with a counter charge that Carlyle's epithet is a +survival of "devil-worship," since it assumes pain to be a blessing. +(<i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. I., pp. 40-41).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> Abbott's <i>Kant's Theory of Ethics</i>, p. 116.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> <i>Utilitarianism</i>, third paragraph of ch. iv.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> By this phrase Bentham refers to the necessity of controlling this +spring to activity just as any other is regulated, by reference to +its consequences.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> Bentham himself was not a psychologist, and he does not state +the doctrine in this extreme form. But those of the Benthamites +who were psychologists, being hedonistic in their psychology, gave +the doctrine this form.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> <i>Early Essays</i>, p. 354. (Reprint by Gibbs, London, 1897.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 357.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 404.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> <i>Autobiography</i>, London, 1884, p. 143.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> <i>Utilitarianism</i>, ch. iii., <i>passim</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Some phases of this view as respects legislation, etc., are touched +upon later in ch. xviii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> Mill in his article on Bentham says of him: "Personal affection, he +well knew, is as liable to operate to the injury of third parties, and +requires as much to be kept in check, as any other feeling whatever: +and general philanthropy ... he estimated at its true value when +divorced from the feeling of duty, as the very weakest and most +unsteady of all feelings" (<i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 356).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> "It is only a poor sort of happiness that could ever come by caring +very much about our own narrow pleasures. We can only have the +highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by having +wide thought and much feeling for the rest of the world as well +as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain +with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would +choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."—<span class="smcap">George +Eliot</span> in <i>Romola</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> The recognition of this by many utilitarian hedonists has caused +them to have recourse to the supernaturally inflicted penalties and +conferred delights of a future life to make sure of balancing up +the account of virtue as self-sacrificing action with happiness, its +proper end.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> The recognition of this type of spiritual selfishness is modern. +It is the pivot upon which the later (especially) of Ibsen's tragedies +turn.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XVI</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE; +MORAL KNOWLEDGE</h2> + + +<h4>§ 1. PROBLEM OF REASON AND DESIRE</h4> + +<p><b>Intelligence and Reason in a Moral Act.</b>—A voluntary +act is one which involves intention, purpose, and thus +some degree of deliberateness. It is this trait which marks +off the voluntary act from a purely unconscious one (like +that of a machine) and from one which yields to the superior +urgency of present feeling, one which is pushed on +from behind, as an instinctive or impulsive act, instead +of being called out by some possibility ahead. This factor +of forethought and of preference after comparison for +some one of the ends considered, is the factor of intelligence +involved in every voluntary act. To be intelligent in action +is, however, a far-reaching affair. To know what one +is really about is a large and difficult order to fill; so large +and difficult that it is the heart of morality.<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> The relevant +bearings of any act are subtler and larger than those +which can be foreseen and than those which will be <i>unless</i> +special care is taken. The tendencies which strongly move +one to a certain act are often exactly those which tend +to prevent one's seeing the effect of the act upon his own +habits and upon the well-being of others. The internal +forces and the external circumstance which evoke the idea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> +of an end and of the means of attaining it are frequently +also those which deflect intelligence to a narrow and partial +view. The demand for a standard by which to regulate +judgment of ends is thus the demand not only for intelligence, +but for a certain kind of intelligence.</p> + +<p>In short, a truly moral (or right) act is one which is +intelligent in an emphatic and peculiar sense; it is a <i>reasonable</i> +act. It is not merely one which is thought of, and +thought of as good, at the moment of action, but one which +will continue to be thought of as "good" in the most alert +and persistent reflection.<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> For by "reasonable" action we +mean such action as recognizes and observes all the necessary +conditions; action in which impulse, instinct, inclination, +habit, opinion, prejudice (as the case may be) are +moderated, guided, and determined by considerations +which lie outside of and beyond them. Not merely to form +ends and select means, but to judge the <i>worth</i> of these +means and ends by a standard, is then the distinctive province +of reason in morals. Its outcome is <i>moral knowledge</i>; +that is judgments of right and wrong, both in general, +and in the particular and perplexing cases as they arise. +This is the topic of the present chapter.</p> + +<p><b>Typical Problems.</b>—The problem of moral knowledge is +in its general form: Is there a distinct and separate faculty +of moral reason and knowledge, or is there but one power +of judgment which varies with its object? The former +view is the intuitional (from Latin, <i>intueor</i>: to look at); +it is associated with theories, which, like the Kantian, emphasize +attitudes, not results and intentions; while the view +which holds that there is but one form of thought which, +in morals, concerns itself with results, and with their association +with the present aim, is the empirical. There +are two especial difficulties which lead to the upholding of +the intuitional point of view, difficulties which any theory +of moral knowledge has to meet. They are (I) The Rela<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span>tion +of Desire and Reason, and (II) the Knowledge of +Private and General Good.</p> + +<p><b>1. Desire and Reason.</b>—Ordinary knowledge in practical +matters follows the line set by desire. Hunger makes +us think of food and of how to get it; sociable desire, of +friends, and how to secure their companionship, and so on. +Now a surging mass of desires, vehement and bulky, may +concentrate itself upon the idea of any end; and as soon as +it does so, it tends to shut out wider considerations. As +we have just seen, it is the object of reason to give us a +calm, objective, broad, and general survey of the field. +Desires work against this, and unless (so runs the argument) +there is a faculty which works wholly independent of +desires, as our ordinary practical knowledge does not, it +is absurd to suppose there can be a rational principle which +will correct and curb desire.</p> + +<p><b>2. Private and General Good.</b>—Since the wide and +permanent good is social, it is urged that unless we +have an independent faculty of moral knowledge, our judgment +will be subservient to the ends of private desire, and +hence will not place itself at the public point of view. Or, +if it does so, it will be simply as a matter of expediency +to calculate better the means for getting our own pleasure. +In general, it is urged that only a faculty of knowledge +completely independent of personal wishes, habits, purposes +can secure judgments possessing inherent dignity +and authoritativeness; since these require an elevated, +impartial, universal, and necessary point of view. We shall +in the sequel attempt to show that this view of knowledge +results from the false conception of desire as having pleasure +for its object, and from a false conception of the relation +of intent and motive. When these errors are corrected, +there is no ground to assume any special faculty of +moral intelligence, save as the one capacity of thought is +specialized into a particular mental habit by being constantly +occupied in judging values. We shall try to show<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> +that the broad and public point of view is secured by fusion +of impulses with sympathetic affections. We shall begin +with stating and criticizing the views of Kant, who upholds +the doctrine of a separate independent Moral Reason +in its most extreme form.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. KANT'S THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASON</h4> + +<p>Kant is at one with the hedonist as regards the natural +object of desire; it is pleasure. All purposes and ends that +spring from inclination and natural tendency come under +one head: self-love. Hence, the ordinary use of intelligence +is confined to the matter of passing upon what constitutes +the individual's private happiness and how he shall secure +it. There are then fundamental contrasts between ordinary +practical activity and genuinely moral activity, +contrasts which reflect themselves in the theory of the nature +and function of moral knowledge. (1) The moral end +is <i>unqualified</i>, absolute, categorical. It is not something +which we can pick or leave at our option. Morality is the +region of final ends, ends not to be disputed or questioned; +and reason must set forth such final ends. Since, however, +happiness is not a morally necessary end, intelligence in its +behalf can only give hypothetical counsel and advice: <i>if</i> +you would be happy, or happy in this, or that way, then +take such and such measures. Reason which promulgates +ends must be of a different sort from the intelligence which +simply searches for means.</p> + +<p>(2) Morality is not qualified, but <i>certain</i> in its requirements. +The most inexperienced, the humblest, the one +most restricted in his circumstances and opportunities, +must know what is morally required as surely as the +wisest and most educated. Hence moral reason must utter +its precepts clearly and unambiguously. But no one can be +<i>sure</i> what happiness is, or whether a given act will bring joy +or sorrow. "The problem of determining certainly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> +what action would promote the happiness of a rational +being is insoluble." (Abbott's <i>Kant</i>, p. 36.) The demand +for <i>certainty</i> of precepts in moral matters also requires +a special faculty.</p> + +<p>(3) Morality, which is inexorable and certain in its demands, +is also <i>universal</i> in its requirements. Its laws are +the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, the same for one +as for another. Now happiness notoriously varies with the +condition and circumstances of a person, as well as with +the conditions of different peoples and epochs. Intelligence +with reference to happiness can only give counsel, +not even rules, so variable is happiness. It can only advise +that upon the average, under certain conditions, a given +course of action has usually promoted happiness. When +we add that the commands of morality are also universal +with respect to the different inclinations of different individuals, +we are made emphatically aware of the necessity of +a rational standpoint, which in its impartiality totally +transcends the ends and plans that grow out of the ordinary +experience of an individual.</p> + +<p><b>An A Priori Reason Kant's Solution.</b>—The net outcome +is that only a reason which is separate and independent +of all experience is capable of meeting the requirements +of morality. What smacks in its origin and aim +of experience is tainted with self-love; is partial, temporary, +uncertain, and relative or dependent. The moral law +is unqualified, necessary, and universal. Hence we have to +recognize in man as a moral being a faculty of reason +which expresses itself in the law of conduct <i>a priori</i> to all +experience of desire, pleasure, and pain. Besides his sensuous +nature (with respect to which knowledge is bound +up with appetite) man has a purely rational nature, which +manifests itself in the consciousness of the absolute authority +of universal law.<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Formal Character of Such Reason.</b>—This extreme separation +of reason from experience brings with it, however, +a serious problem. We shall first state this problem; and +then show that its artificial and insoluble character serves +as a refutation of Kant's theory of a transcendental, +or wholly non-natural and non-empirical, mode of knowledge. +Reason which is wholly independent of experience +of desires and their results is, as Kant expressly declares, +purely <i>formal</i>. (Abbott's <i>Kant</i>, p. 33; p. 114.) That is +to say, it is <i>empty</i>; it does not point out or indicate anything +particular to be done. It cannot say be industrious, +or prudent, generous; give, or refrain from giving, so much +money to this particular man at this particular time under +just these circumstances. All it says is that morality is +rational and requires man to follow the law of reason. But +the law of reason is just that a man should follow the law +of reason. And to the inevitable inquiry "What then is the +law of reason?" the answer still is: To follow the law of +reason. How do we break out of this empty circle into +specific knowledge of the specific right things to be done? +Kant has an answer, which we shall now consider.</p> + +<p><b>Kant's Method.</b>—He proceeds as follows: The law is +indeed purely formal or empty (since, once more, all specific +ends are "empirical" and changeable), but it is so +because it is universal. Now nothing which is universal can +contradict itself. All we need to do is to take any proposed +principle of any act and ask ourselves whether it +can be universalized without self-inconsistency. If it cannot +be, the act is wrong. If it can be, the act is right. +For example:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"May I, when in distress, make a promise with the intention +not to keep it?... The shortest way, and an unerring one to +discover the answer to the question whether a lying promise +is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content +that my maxim (to extricate myself from trouble by a +false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself +as well as for others? And should I be able to say to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> +myself, every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds +himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate +himself? Then I personally become aware that while I +can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should +be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no +such thing as a promise. No one should have any faith in +the proffered intention, or, if they do so over hastily, would +pay one back in one's own coin at the first opportunity" (<i>Op. +cit.</i>, p. 19).</p></div> + +<p>The principle if made universal simply contradicts itself, +and thus reveals that it is no principle at all, not rational. +Summing this up in a formula, we get as our standard of +right action the principle: "Act as if the maxim of thy +action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature" +(<i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 39).</p> + +<p>The procedure thus indicated seems simple. As long as +an individual considers the purpose or motive of his action +as if it were merely a matter of that one deed; as if it were +an isolated thing, there is no rationality, no consciousness +of moral law or principle. But let the individual imagine +himself gifted with such power that, if he acts, the motive +of his act will become a fixed, a regular law in the constitution +of things. Would he, as a rational being, be willing to +bring about such a universalization,—can he, with equanimity +as a reasonable being, contemplate such an outcome? +If he can, the act is right; if not (as in the case of making +a lying promise), wrong.</p> + +<p>No sensible person would question the instructiveness of +this scheme in the concrete. It indicates that the value of +reason—of abstraction and generalization—in conduct is +to help us escape from the partiality that flows from desire +and emotion in their first and superficial manifestations, +and to attain a more unified and permanent end. As a +method (though not the only one) of realizing the <i>full +meaning</i> of a proposed course of action, nothing could be +better than asking ourselves how we should like to be +committed forever to its principle; how we should like<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> +to have others committed to it and to treat us according +to it? Such a method is well calculated to make us face +our proposed end in its impartial consequences; to teach the +danger of cherishing merely those results which are most +congenial to our passing whim and our narrow conception +of personal profit. In short, by generalizing a purpose +we make its <i>general</i> character evident.</p> + +<p>But this method does not proceed (as Kant would have +it) from a mere consideration of moral law <i>apart from a +concrete end, but from an end in so far as it persistently +approves itself to reflection after an adequate survey of +it in all its bearings</i>. It is the possibility of <i>generalizing +the concrete end</i> that Kant falls back upon.</p> + +<p>Other illustrations which Kant offers enforce the same +lesson. He suggests the following:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>(1) A man in despair from misfortune considers suicide. +"Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become +a universal law of nature." We see at once that a +system of nature by which it should be a law to destroy life +by means of the very feeling—self-love—whose nature it is +to impel to the maintenance of life, would contradict itself +and therefore could not exist.</p> + +<p>(2) A man who has a certain talent is tempted from sluggishness +and love of amusement not to cultivate it. But if he +applies the principle he sees that, while a system of nature +might subsist if his motive became a law (so that all people +devoted their lives to idleness and amusement), yet he cannot +<i>will</i> that such a system should receive absolute realization. +As a rational being he necessarily also wills that faculties +be developed since they serve for all sorts of possible +purposes.</p> + +<p>(3) A prosperous man, who sees some one else to be +wretched, is tempted to pay no attention to it, alleging that +it is no concern of his. Now, if this attitude were made a +universal law of nature, the human race might subsist and +even get on after a fashion; but it is impossible to will that +such a principle should have the validity of a law of nature. +Such a will would contradict itself, for many cases would +occur in which the one willing would need the love and +sympathy of others; he could not then without contradicting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> +himself wish that selfish disregard should become a regular, a +fixed uniformity.</p></div> + +<p><b>The Social End is the Rational End.</b>—These illustrations +make it clear that the "contradiction" Kant really +depends upon to reveal the wrongness of acts, is the introduction +of friction and disorder among the various concrete +ends of the individual. He insists especially that the social +relations of an act bring out its general purport. A +right end is one which can be projected harmoniously +into the widest and broadest survey of life which the +individual can make. A "system of nature" or of conduct +in which love of life should lead to its own destruction +certainly contradicts itself. A course of action which +should include all the tendencies that make for amusement +and sluggishness would be inconsistent with a scheme +of life which would take account of other tendencies—such +as interest in science, in music, in friendship, in business +achievement, which are just as real constituents of the +individual, although perhaps not so strongly felt at the +moment. A totally callous and cruel mode of procedure +certainly "contradicts" a course of life in which every +individual is so placed as to be dependent upon the sympathy +and upon the help of others. It is the province +of reason to call up a sufficiently wide view of the consequences +of an intention as to enable us to realize such +inconsistencies and contradictions if they exist; to put +before us, not through any logical manipulation of the +principle of contradiction, but through memory and imagination +a particular act, proposal, or suggestion as a portion +of a connected whole of life; to make real to us that +no man, no act, and no satisfaction of any man, falls or +stands to itself, but that it affects and is affected by others. +Our conclusion is: the right as the <i>rational</i> good means +that which is harmonious with all the capacities and desires +of the self, that which expands them into a coöperative +whole.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Kant's Introduction of Social Factors.</b>—The further +development which Kant gives the formula already quoted +(p. 312) goes far to remove the appearance of opposition +between the utilitarian social standard and his own abstract +rationalism. Kant points out that according to +his view the moral or rational will is its own end. Hence +every rational person is always an end, never a means:—this, +indeed, is what we mean by a person. But every normal +human being is a rational person. Consequently +another formula for his maxim is: "So act as to treat +humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any +other, as an end, never as a means merely." The man who +contemplates suicide "uses a person merely as a means to +maintaining a tolerable condition of life." He who would +make a lying promise to another makes that other one +merely a means to his profit, etc. Moreover, since all persons +are equally ends in themselves and are to be equally +regarded in behavior, we may say the standard of right is +the notion of a "Kingdom of Ends"—the idea of "the union +of different rational beings in a system by common laws."<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p> + +<p>These propositions are rather formal, but the moment +we put definite meaning into them, they suggest that the +good for any man is that in which the welfare of others +counts as much as his own. The right is that action +which, so far as in it lies, combines into a whole of common +interests and purposes the otherwise conflicting aims and +interests of different persons. So interpreted, the Kantian +formula differs in words, rather than in idea, from Bentham's +happiness of all concerned "each counting for one +and only one"; from Mill's statement that the "deeply +rooted conception which every individual even now has of +himself as a social being tends to make him feel it as one +of his natural wants, that there should be harmony between +his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> +In all of these formulæ we find re-statements of our conception +that the good is the activities in which all men +participate so that the powers of each are called out, put +to use, and reënforced.</p> + +<p><b>Consequent Transformation of Theory of Reason.</b>—Now +if the common good, in the form of a society of individuals, +as a kingdom of ends, is the object with reference +to which the ends of desire have to be rationalized, Kant's +theory of an <i>a priori</i> and empty Reason is completely made +over. In strict logic Kant contradicts himself when he +says that we are to generalize the end of desire, so as to +see whether it could become a universal law. For according +to him no end of desire (since it is private and a +form of self-love) <i>can possibly be generalized</i>. He is setting +up as a method of enlightenment precisely the very +impossibility (impossible, that is, on his own theory that +private happiness is the end of desire) which made him +first resort to his <i>a priori</i> and transcendental reason. No +more complete contradiction can be imagined.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, if we neglect the concrete, empirical +conditions and consequences of the object of desire, +there is no motive whatsoever that may not be generalized. +There is no <i>formal</i> contradiction in acting always on a +motive of theft, unchastity, or insolence. All that Kant's +method can require, in strict logic, is that the individual +always, under similar circumstances, act from the same motive. +Be willing to be always dishonest, or impure, or proud +in your intent; achieve consistency in the badness of your +motives, and you will be good! Doubtless no one, not even +the worst man, would be willing to be universally consistent +in his badness. But this is not in the least a matter +of a purely formal, logical inconsistency of the motive +with itself;<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> it is due rather to that <i>conflict among diverse<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> +desires, and different objects for which one strives, which +makes him aware that at some time he should want to act +kindly and fairly</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Organization of Desires from the Social Standpoint.</b>—What +Kant is really insisting upon at bottom is, then, the +demand for such a revision of desire as it casually and +unreflectively presents itself as would make the desire a +consistent expression of the whole body of the purposes of +the self. What he demands is that a desire shall not be +accepted as an adequate motive till it has been organized +into desire for an end which will be compatible with the +whole system of ends involved in the capacities and tendencies +of the agent. This is true rationalization. And +he further warns us that only when a particular desire +has in view a good which is social will it meet this requirement. +This brings us to our next problem. Just +what is the process by which we judge of the worth of particular +proposals, plans, courses of actions, desires? +Granted that a generalized good, a socialized happiness, +is the point of view at which we must place ourselves to +secure the reasonable point of view, how does this point of +view become an operative method?</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. MORAL SENSE INTUITIONALISM</h4> + +<p>So far, our conclusions are (1) that the province of +reason is to enable us to generalize our concrete ends; to +form such ends as are consistent with one another, and +reënforce one another, introducing continuity and force, +where otherwise there would be division and weakness; and +(2) that only social ends are ultimately reasonable, since +they alone permit us to organize our acts into consistent +wholes. We have now, however, to consider how this conception +takes effect in detail; how it is employed to determine +the right or the reasonable in a given situation. We +shall approach this problem by considering a form of in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span>tuitionalism +historically prior to that of Kant. This emphasizes +the direct character of moral knowledge in particular +cases, and assimilates moral knowledge to the +analogy of sense perception, which also deals directly with +specific objects; it insists, however, that a different kind +of faculty of knowledge operates in the knowledge of acts +from that which operates in the knowledge of things. Our +underlying aim here is to bring out the relation of immediate +appreciation to deliberate reflection, with a view to +showing that the reasonable standpoint, that of the common +good, becomes effective through the socialized attitudes +and emotions of a person's own character.</p> + +<p><b>Moral Sense.</b>—This theory holds that rightness is an +intrinsic, absolute quality of special acts, and as such is +immediately known or recognized for what it is. Just as +a white color is known as white, a high tone as high, a +hard body as existent, etc., so an act which is right is +known as right. In each case, the quality and the fact are +so intimately and inherently bound together that it is absurd +to think of one and not know the other. As a theory +of moral judgment, intuitionalism is thus opposed to utilitarianism, +which holds that rightness is not an inherent +quality but one relative to and borrowed from external +and more or less remote consequences. While some +forms of intuitionalism hold that this moral quality belongs +to general rules or to classes of ends, the form we +are now to consider holds that the moral quality of an +individual act cannot be borrowed even from a moral law, +but shines forth as an absolute and indestructible part of +the motive of the act itself. Because the theory in question +sticks to the direct perception of the immediately present +quality of acts, it is usually called, in analogy with +the direct perception of eye or ear, the moral sense theory.</p> + +<p><b>Objections to Theory.</b>—The objections to this theory +in the extreme form just stated may be brought under +two heads: (1) There is no evidence to prove that all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> +acts are directly characterized by the possession of absolute +and self-evident rightness and wrongness; there is +much evidence to show that this quality when presented by +acts can, as a rule, be traced to earlier instruction, to the +pressure of correction and punishment, and to association +with other experiences. (2) While in this way many acts, +perhaps almost all, of the average mature person of a good +moral environment, have acquired a direct moral coloring, +making unnecessary elaborate calculation or reference to +general principles, yet there is nothing infallible in such +intuitively presented properties. An act may present itself +as thoroughly right and yet may be, in reality, wrong. +The function of conscious deliberation and reasoning is +precisely to detect the existence of and to correct such +intuitive cases.<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> + +<p><b>I. Direct Perception as Effect of Habits.</b>—It must be +admitted, as a result of any unprejudiced examination, +that a large part of the acts, motives, and plans of the +adult who has had favorable moral surroundings seem to +possess directly, and in their own intrinsic make-up, rightness +or wrongness or moral indifference. To think of +lying or stealing is one with thinking of it as wrong; +to recall or suggest an act of kindness is the same as +thinking of it as right; to think of going after mail is to +think of an act free from either rightness or wrongness. +With the average person it is probably rare for much +time to be spent in figuring out whether an act is right +or wrong, after the idea of that act has once definitely +presented itself. So far as the facts of moral experience +in such cases are concerned, the "moral sense" theory +appears to give a correct description.</p> + +<p>(1) But the conclusion that, therefore, moral goodness +or badness is and always has been an inherent, abso<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span>lute +property of the act itself, overlooks well-known psychological +principles. In all perception, in all recognition, +there is a funding or capitalizing of the results of past +experience by which the results are rendered available in +new experiences. Even a young child recognizes a table, +a chair, a glass of milk, a dog, as soon as he sees it; +there is no analysis, no conscious interpretation. Distance, +direction, size, under normal circumstances, are +perceived with the same assurance and ease. But there +was a time when all these things were learning; when conscious +experimentation involving interpretation took +place. Such perceptions, moreover, take place under +the guidance of others; pains are taken indelibly +to stamp moral impressions by associating them with +intense, vivid, and mysterious or awful emotional +accompaniments.<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a></p> + +<p>Anthropological and historical accounts of different +races and peoples tell the same story. Acts once entirely +innocent of moral distinctions have acquired, under differing +circumstances and sometimes for trivial and absurd +reasons, different moral values:—one and the same sort +of act being stamped here as absolute guilt, there as an +act of superior and heroic virtue. Now it would be fallacious +to argue (as some do) that because distinctions of +moral quality have been acquired and are not innate, they +are therefore unreal when they are acquired. Yet the +fact of gradual development proves that no fixed line exists +where it can be said the case is closed; that just this is +henceforth forever right or wrong; that there shall be no +further observation of consequences, no further correction +and revision of present "intuitions."</p> + +<p>(2) Our immediate moral recognitions take place, moreover, +only under usual circumstances. There is after all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> +no such thing as complete moral maturity; all persons +are still more or less children—in process of learning +moral distinctions. The more intense their moral interests, +the more childlike, the more open, flexible, and growing +are their minds. It is only the callous and indifferent, +or at least the conventional, who find all acts and projects +so definitely right and wrong as to render reflection +unnecessary. "New occasions teach new duties," but they +teach them only to those who recognize that they are not +already in possession of adequate moral judgments. Any +other view destroys the whole meaning of reflective morality +and marks a relapse to the plane of sheer custom. Extreme +intuitionalism and extreme moral conservatism; dislike +to calculation and reflection, for fear of innovations +with attendant trouble and discomfort, are usually found +to go together.</p> + +<p><b>II. Direct Perception No Guarantee of Validity.</b>—This +suggests our second objection. The existence of immediate +moral quality, the direct and seemingly final +possession of rightness, as matter of fact, is not adequate +proof of validity. At best, it furnishes a presumption +of correctness, in the absence of grounds for questioning +it, in fairly familiar situations. (a) There is nothing +more direct, more seemingly self-evident, than inveterate +prejudice. When class or vested interest is enlisted in +the maintenance of the custom or institution which is +expressed in a prejudice, the most vicious moral judgments +assume the guise of self-conscious sanctity. (b) +A judgment which is correct under usual circumstances +may become quite unfit, and therefore wrong, if persisted +in under new conditions. Life, individual and social, is in +constant process of change; and there is always danger +of error in clinging to judgments adjusted to older circumstances. +"The good is the enemy of the better." It +is not merely false ideas of the values of life that have to +be re-formed, but ideas once true. When economic, politi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span>cal, +and scientific conditions are modifying themselves as +rapidly and extensively as they are in our day, it is reconstruction +of moral judgment that needs emphasis, +rather than the existence of a lot of ready-made "intuitions." +When readjustment is required, deliberate inquiry +is the only alternative to inconsiderate, undirected, +and hence probably violent changes:—changes involving +undue relaxation of moral ties on one side and arbitrary +reactions on the other.</p> + +<p><b>Deliberation and Intuition.</b>—It is indeed absurd to +set immediate recognition of quality and indirect calculation +of more or less remote consequences, intuition +and thought, over against each other as if they were rivals. +For they are mutually supplementary. As we saw in a +previous chapter, the foresight of future results calls +out an <i>immediate reaction</i> of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, +of happiness or dislike. (See p. 272.) It is +just as false to say that we calculate only future pains +and pleasures (instead of changes in the world of things +and persons) as it is to say that anticipations of the +changes to be wrought in the world by our act are not +accompanied by an immediate emotional appreciation of +their value. The notion that deliberation upon the various +alternatives open to us is simply a cold-blooded setting +down of various items to our advantage, and various other +items to our disadvantage (as Robinson Crusoe wrote +down in bookkeeping fashion his miseries and blessings), +and then striking an algebraic balance, implies something +that never did and never could happen. Deliberation +is a process of active, suppressed, rehearsal; of imaginative +dramatic performance of various deeds carrying +to their appropriate issues the various tendencies which +we feel stirring within us. When we see in imagination this +or that change brought about, there is a direct sense of +the amount and kind of worth which attaches to it, as +real and as direct, if not as strong, as if the act were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> +really performed and its consequence really brought home +to us.</p> + +<p><b>Deliberation as Dramatic Rehearsal.</b>—We, indeed, estimate +the import or significance of any present desire +or impulse by forecasting what it would come or amount +to if carried out; literally its consequences define its <i>consequence</i>, +its meaning and importance. But if these +consequences were conceived <i>merely as remote</i>, if their +picturing did not at once arouse a present sense of peace, +of fulfillment, or of dissatisfaction, of incompletion and +irritation, the process of thinking out consequences would +remain purely intellectual. It would be as barren of +influence upon behavior as the mathematical speculations +of a disembodied angel. Any actual experience of reflection +upon conduct will show that every foreseen result +at once stirs our present affections, our likes and dislikes, +our desires and aversions. There is developed a running +commentary which stamps values at once as good or evil. +It is this direct sense of value, not the consciousness of +general rules or ultimate goals, which finally determines +the worth of the act to the agent. Here is the inexpugnable +element of truth in the intuitional theory. Its +error lies in conceiving this immediate response of appreciation +as if it excluded reflection instead of following +directly upon its heels. Deliberation is actually an imaginative +rehearsal of various courses of conduct. We +give way, <i>in our mind</i>, to some impulse; we try, <i>in our +mind</i>, some plan. Following its career through various +steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of +the consequences that would follow: and as we then like +and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences, +we find the original impulse or plan good or bad. +Deliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and +impersonal; and hence it has the intuitive, the direct factor +in it. The advantage of a mental trial, prior to the overt +trial (for the act after all is itself also a trial, a prov<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span>ing +of the idea that lies back of it), is that it is retrievable, +whereas overt consequences remain. They cannot be recalled. +Moreover, many trials may mentally be made in a +short time. The imagining of various plans carried out +furnishes an opportunity for many impulses which at +first are not in evidence at all, to get under way. Many +and varied direct sensings, appreciations, take place. +When many tendencies are brought into play, there is +clearly much greater probability that the capacity of self +which is really needed and appropriate will be brought +into action, and thus a truly reasonable happiness result. +The tendency of deliberation to "polarize" the various lines +of activity into opposed alternatives, into incompatible +"either this or that," is a way of forcing into clear recognition +the importance of the issue.</p> + +<p><b>The Good Man's Judgments as Standard.</b>—This explains +the idea of Aristotle that only the good man is a +good judge of what is really good. Such an one will take +satisfaction in the thought of noble ends and will recoil +at the idea of base results. Because of his formed capacities, +his organized habits and tendencies, he will respond +to a suggested end with an emotion which confers its +appropriate kind and shade of value. The brave man +is sensitive to all acts and plans so far as they involve +energy and endurance in overcoming painful obstacles; +the kindly man responds at once to the elements that +affect the well-being of others. The moral sense or direct +appreciations of the good man may thus be said to furnish +the standard of right and wrong. There are few persons +who, when in doubt regarding a difficult matter of conduct, +do not think of some other person in whose goodness +they believe, and endeavor to direct and clinch their +own judgment by imagining how such an one would react +in a similar situation—what he would find congenial and +what disagreeable. Or else they imagine what that other +person would think of them if he knew of their doing such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> +and such an act. And while this method cannot supply the +standard of their own judgment, cannot determine the +right or wrong for their own situations, it helps emancipate +judgment from selfish partialities, and it facilitates +a freer and more flexible play of imagination in construing +and appreciating the situation.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. THE PLACE OF GENERAL RULES</h4> + +<p>Between such a highly generalized and formal principle +as that of Kant, and the judgment of particular cases, we +have intermediate generalizations; rules which are broad +as compared with individual deeds, but narrow as compared +with some one final principle. What are their rational +origin, place, and function? We have here again +both the empirical and the intuitional theories of knowledge, +having to deal with the same fundamental difficulty: +What is the relation of the special rule to the general +principle on one side and to the special case on the other? +The more general, the more abstractly rational the rule, +the vaguer and less applicable it is. The more definite +and fixed it is, the greater the danger that it will be a +Procrustean bed, mutilating the rich fullness of the individual +act, or destroying its grace and freedom by making +it conform servilely to a hard and fast rule. Our analysis +will accordingly be devoted to bringing to light the conditions +under which a rule may be rational and yet be of +specific help.</p> + +<p><b>I. Intuitionalism and Casuistry.</b>—Utilitarianism at +least holds that rules are derived from actual cases of conduct; +hence there must be points of likeness between the +cases to be judged and the rules for judging them. But +rules which do not originate from a consideration of +special cases, which simply descend out of the blue sky, +have only the most mechanical and external relation to the +individual acts to be judged. Suppose one is convinced<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> +that the rule of honesty was made known just in and of +itself by a special faculty, and had absolutely nothing +to do with the recollection of past cases or the forecast +of possible future circumstances. How would such a rule +apply itself to any particular case which needed to be +judged? What bell would ring, what signal would be +given, to indicate that just <i>this</i> case is the appropriate +case for the application of the rule of honest dealing? +And if by some miracle this question were answered so one +knows that here is a case for the rule of honesty, how would +we know just what course in detail the rule calls for? +For the rule, to be applicable to all cases, must omit the +conditions which differentiate one case from another; it +must contain only the very few similar elements which are +to be found in all honest deeds. Reduced to this skeleton, +not much would be left save the bare injunction to be honest +whatever happens, leaving it to chance, the ordinary judgment +of the individual, or to external authority to find +out just <i>what</i> honesty specifically means in the given case.</p> + +<p>This difficulty is so serious that all systems which have +committed themselves to belief in a number of hard and +fast rules having their origin in conscience, or in the word +of God impressed upon the human soul or externally revealed, +always have had to resort to a more and more +complicated procedure to cover, if possible, all the cases. +The moral life is finally reduced by them to an elaborate +formalism and legalism.</p> + +<p><b>Illustration in Casuistry.</b>—Suppose, for example, we +take the Ten Commandments as a starting-point. They +are only ten, and naturally confine themselves to general +ideas, and ideas stated mainly in negative form. Moreover, +the same act may be brought under more than one +rule. In order to resolve the practical perplexities and +uncertainties which inevitably arise under such circumstances, +<i>Casuistry</i> is built up (from the Latin <i>casus</i>, +case). The attempt is made to foresee all the different<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> +cases of action which may conceivably occur, and provide +in advance the exact rule for each case. For example, with +reference to the rule "do not kill," a list will be made of +all the different situations in which killing might occur:—accident, +war, fulfillment of command of political superior +(as by a hangman), self-defense (defense of one's +own life, of others, of property), deliberate or premeditated +killing with its different motives (jealousy, avarice, +revenge, etc.), killing with slight premeditation, from sudden +impulse, from different sorts and degrees of provocation. +To each one of these possible cases is assigned +its exact moral quality, its exact degree of turpitude +and innocency. Nor can this process end with overt acts; +all the inner springs of action which affect regard for life +must be similarly classified: envy, animosity, sudden rage, +sullenness, cherishing of sense of injury, love of tyrannical +power, hardness or hostility, callousness—all these +must be specified into their different kinds and the exact +moral worth of each determined. What is done for this +one kind of case must be done for every part and phase +of the entire moral life until it is all inventoried, catalogued, +and distributed into pigeon-holes definitely labelled.</p> + +<p><b>Dangers of Casuistry.</b>—Now dangers and evils attend +this way of conceiving the moral life, (a) <i>It tends to +magnify the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit.</i> +It fixes attention not upon the positive good in an act, +not upon the underlying agent's disposition which forms its +spirit, nor upon the unique occasion and context which +form its atmosphere, but upon its literal conformity with +Rule A, Class I., Species 1, sub-head (1), etc. The +effect of this is inevitably to narrow the scope and lessen +the depth of conduct. (i.) It tempts some to hunt for that +classification of their act which will make it the most convenient +or profitable for themselves. In popular speech, +"casuistical" has come to mean a way of judging acts +which splits hairs in the effort to find a way of acting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> +that conduces to personal interest and profit, and which +yet may be justified by some moral principle. (ii.) With +others, this regard for the letter makes conduct formal +and pedantic. It gives rise to a rigid and hard type of +character illustrated among the Pharisees of olden and +the Puritans of modern time—the moral schemes of both +classes being strongly impregnated with the notion of fixed +moral rules.</p> + +<p>(b) <i>This ethical system also tends in practice to +a legal view of conduct.</i>—Historically it always has +sprung from carrying over legal ideas into morality. +In the legal view, liability to blame and to punishment +inflicted from without by some superior authority, is necessarily +prominent. Conduct is regulated through specific +injunctions and prohibitions: Do this, Do not do that. +Exactly the sort of analysis of which we have spoken +above (p. 327) in the case of killing is necessary, so that +there may be definite and regular methods of measuring +guilt and assigning blame. Now the ideas of liability and +punishment and reward are, as we shall see in our further +discussion (chs. xvii. and xxi.), important factors in the +conduct of life, but any scheme of morals is defective +which puts the question of avoiding punishment in the +foreground of attention, and which tends to create a Pharisaical +complacency in the mere fact of having conformed +to command or rule.</p> + +<p>(c) <i>Probably the worst evil of this moral system is +that it tends to deprive moral life of freedom and spontaneity</i> +and to reduce it (especially for the conscientious +who take it seriously) to a more or less anxious and +servile conformity to externally imposed rules. Obedience +as loyalty to principle is a good, but this scheme practically +makes it the only good and conceives it not as loyalty +to ideals, but as conformity to commands. Moral +rules exist just as independent deliverances on their own +account, and the right thing is merely to follow them. This<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> +puts the center of moral gravity outside the concrete +processes of living. All systems which emphasize the letter +more than the spirit, legal consequences more than vital +motives, put the individual under the weight of external +authority. They lead to the kind of conduct described by +St. Paul as under the law, not in the spirit, with its constant +attendant weight of anxiety, uncertain struggle, +and impending doom.</p> + +<p><b>All Fixed Rules Have Same Tendencies.</b>—Many who +strenuously object to all of these schemes of conduct, to +everything which hardens it into forms by emphasizing +external commands, authority and punishments and rewards, +fail to see that such evils are logically connected +with any acceptance of the finality of fixed rules. They +hold certain bodies of people, religious officers, political +or legal authorities, responsible for what they object to +in the scheme; while they still cling to the idea that morality +is an effort to apply to particular deeds and projects a +certain number of absolute unchanging moral rules. They +fail to see that, if this were its nature, those who attempt +to provide the machinery which would render it practically +workable deserve praise rather than blame. In fact, the +notion of absolute rules or precepts cannot be made workable +except through certain superior authorities who declare +and enforce them. Said Locke: "It is no small power +it gives one man over another to be the dictator of principles +and teacher of unquestionable truths."</p> + +<p><b>II. Utilitarian View of General Rules.</b>—The utilitarians +escape the difficulties inherent in the application to +particular cases of a rule which has nothing to do with +particular cases. Their principles for judging right and +wrong in particular cases are themselves generalizations +from particular observations of the effect of certain acts +upon happiness and misery. But if we take happiness +in the technical sense of Bentham (as meaning, that is, +an aggregate of isolated pleasures) it is impossible for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> +general rules to exist—there is nothing to generalize. +If, however, we take happiness in its common-sense form, +as welfare, a state of successful achievement, satisfactory +realization of purpose, there can be no doubt of the existence +of maxims and formulæ in which mankind has registered +its experience. The following quotations from Mill +bring out the essential points:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"We think utility or happiness much too complex and indefinite +an end to be sought except through the medium of +various secondary ends concerning which there may be, and +often is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate +standard; and about which there does in fact prevail a much +greater unanimity among thinking persons, than might be supposed +from their diametrical divergence on the great questions +of moral metaphysics" (<i>Essay on Bentham</i>).</p></div> + +<p>These secondary ends or principles are such matters as +regard for health, honesty, chastity, kindness, and the +like. Concerning them he says in his <i>Utilitarianism</i> +(ch. ii.):</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as +to the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs +which have thus come down are rules of morality for the +multitude and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in +finding better.... To consider the rules of morality as improvable +is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalizations +entirely and endeavor to test each individual action +directly by the first principle, is another.... Nobody argues +that the act of navigation is not founded on astronomy, +because sailors cannot wait to calculate the nautical almanac. +Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it already calculated; +and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life +with their minds made up on the common questions of right +and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions +of wise and foolish."</p></div> + +<p><b>Empirical Rules Run into Fixed Customs.</b>—It cannot +be denied that Mill here states considerations which are of +great value in aiding present judgments on right and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> +wrong. The student of history will have little doubt that +the rules of conduct which the intuitionalist takes as ultimate +deliverances of a moral faculty are in truth generalizations +of the sort indicated by Mill. But the truth +brought out by Mill does not cover the ground which +needs to be covered. Such rules at best cover customary +elements; they are based upon past habits of life, past +natural economic and political environments. And, as the +student of customs knows, greater store is often set upon +trivial, foolish, and even harmful things than upon serious +ones—upon fashions of hair-dressing, ablutions, worship +of idols. Coming nearer our own conditions, past customs +certainly tolerate and sanction many practices, such +as war, cruel business competition, economic exploitation +of the weak, and absence of coöperative intelligent foresight, +which the more sensitive consciences of the day will +not approve.</p> + +<p><b>Hence are Unsatisfactory.</b>—Yet such things have been +so identified with happiness that to forego them means +misery, to alter them painful disturbance. To take the +rules of the past with any literalness as criteria of judgment +in the present, would be to return to the unprogressive +morality of the régime of custom—to surrender +the advance marked by reflective morality. Since Bentham +and Mill were both utilitarians, it is worth noting that +Bentham insisted upon the utilitarian standard just because +he was so convinced of the unsatisfactory character +of the kind of rules upon which Mill is dwelling. The +"Nautical Almanac" has been <i>scientifically</i> calculated; it +is adapted rationally to its end; but the rules which sum +up custom are a confused mixture of class interest, irrational +sentiment, authoritative pronunciamento, and genuine +consideration of welfare.</p> + +<p><b>Empirical Rules Also Differ Widely.</b>—The fact is, +moreover, that it is only when the "intermediate generalizations" +are taken vaguely and abstractly that there is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> +as much agreement as Mill claims. All educated and +virtuous persons in the same country practically agree +upon the rules of justice, benevolence, and regard for life, +so long as they are taken in such a vague way that they +mean anything in general and nothing in particular. +Every one is in favor of justice in the abstract; but existing +political and economic discussions regarding tariff, +sumptuary laws, monetary standards, trades unions, +trusts, the relation of capital and labor, the regulation +or ownership of public utilities, the nationalization of land +and industry, show that large bodies of intelligent and +equally well-disposed people are quite capable of finding +that the principle of justice requires exactly opposite +things.</p> + +<p>Custom still forms the background of all moral life, +nor can we imagine a state of affairs in which it should +not. Customs are not external to individuals' courses +of action; they are embodied in the habits and purposes +of individuals; in the words of Grote (quoted above, p. +173), they "reign under the appearance of habitual, <i>self-suggested</i> +tendencies." Laws, formulated and unformulated, +social conventions, rules of manners, the general +expectations of public opinion, are all of them sources +of instruction regarding conduct. Without them the +individual would be practically helpless in determining the +right courses of action in the various situations in which +he finds himself. Through them he has provided himself +in advance with a list of questions, an organized series of +points-of-view, by which to approach and estimate each +state of affairs requiring action. Most of the moral judgments +of every individual are framed in this way.</p> + +<p><b>For Customs Conflict.</b>—If social customs, or individual +habits, never conflicted with one another, this sort +of guidance would suffice for the determination of right +and wrong. But reflection is necessitated because opposite +habits set up incompatible ends, forms of happiness be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span>tween +which choice has to be made. Hence the need of +<i>principles in judging</i>. Principles of judgment cannot +simply reinstate past rules of behavior, for the simple reason +that as long as these rules suffice there is no reflection +and no demand for principles. Good and evil, right and +wrong, are embodied in the injunctions and prohibitions of +customs and institutions and are not thought about.</p> + +<p><b>Moral Import of Principles is Intellectual, Not Imperative.</b>—This +brings us to the essential point in the consideration +of the value of general principles. <i>Rules are +practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But +principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of +judging things.</i> The fundamental error of the intuitionalist +and of the utilitarian (represented in the quotation +from Mill) is that they are on the lookout for rules which +will of themselves tell agents just what course of action to +pursue; <i>whereas the object of moral principles is to supply +standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to +make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and +evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself</i>. +No genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of +action; rules<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> like cooking recipes, may tell just what to +do and how to do it. A moral principle, such as that of +chastity, of justice, of the golden rule, gives the agent a +basis for looking at and examining a particular question +that comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects +of the act; it warns him against taking a short or +partial view of the act. It economizes his thinking by +supplying him with the main heads by reference to which +to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it +guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important +considerations for which he should be on the +lookout.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Golden Rule as a Tool of Analysis.</b>—A moral principle, +then, is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given +way: <i>it is a tool for analyzing a special situation</i>, the right +or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety, +and not by the rule as such. We sometimes hear it stated, +for example, that the universal adoption of the Golden +Rule would at once settle all industrial disputes and difficulties. +But supposing that the principle were accepted in +good faith by everybody; it would not at once tell everybody +just what to do in all the complexities of his relations +to others. When individuals are still uncertain of what +their real good may be, it does not finally decide matters +to tell them to regard the good of others as they would +their own. Nor does it mean that whatever in detail we +want for ourselves we should strive to give to others. +Because I am fond of classical music it does not follow that +I should thrust as much of it as possible upon my neighbors. +But the "Golden Rule" does furnish us a <i>point +of view from which to consider acts</i>; it suggests the necessity +of considering how our acts affect the interests of +others as well as our own; it tends to prevent partiality +of regard; it warns against setting an undue estimate +upon a particular consequence of pain or pleasure, simply +because it happens to affect us. In short, the Golden Rule +does not issue special orders or commands; but it does +simplify judgment of the situations requiring intelligent +deliberation.</p> + +<p><b>Sympathy as Actuating Principle of a Reasonable +Judgment.</b>—We have had repeated occasion (as in the +discussion of intent and motive, of intuition and deliberate +calculation) to see how artificial is the separation of emotion +and thought from one another. As the only effective +thought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest, +so the only truly general, the reasonable as distinct +from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the <i>generous</i> +thought. Sympathy widens our interest in consequences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> +and leads us to take into account such results as affect +the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these +consequences as counting for as much as those which touch +our own honor, purse, or power. To put ourselves in the +place of another, to see from the standpoint of his purposes +and values, to humble our estimate of our own claims +and pretensions to the level they would assume in the +eyes of a sympathetic and impartial observer, is the surest +way to attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge. +Sympathy, in short, is the general principle of +moral knowledge, not because its commands take precedence +of others (which they do not necessarily), but because +it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious <i>intellectual</i> +standpoint. It supplies the tool, <i>par excellence</i>, for +analyzing and resolving complex cases. As was said in +our last chapter, it is the <i>fusion</i> of the sympathetic impulses +with others that is needed; what we now add is +that in this fusion, sympathy supplies the <i>pou sto</i> for an +effective, broad, and objective survey of desires, projects, +resolves, and deeds. It translates the formal and empty +reason of Kant out of its abstract and theoretic character, +just as it carries the cold calculations of utilitarianism +into recognition of the common good.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>For criticisms of Kant's view of reason, see Caird, <i>Philosophy of +Kant</i>, Vol. II., Book II., ch. ii.; Paulsen, <i>System of Ethics</i>, pp. 194-203 +and 355-363; Fite, <i>Introductory Study</i>, pp. 173-188; Muirhead, +<i>Elements of Ethics</i>, pp. 112-124.</p> + +<p>For intuitionalism, see Calderwood, <i>Handbook of Moral Philosophy</i>; +Maurice, <i>Conscience</i>; Whewell, <i>The Elements of Morality</i>; +Martineau, <i>Types of Ethical Theory</i>, Vol. II., pp. 96-115; Mezes, +<i>Ethics</i>, ch. iii.; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, Book I., chs. viii.-ix., +and Book III. entire, but especially ch. i.; <i>History of Ethics</i>, 170-204, +and 224-236, and <i>Lectures on Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau</i>, +361-374.</p> + +<p>For the moral sense theory, see Sidgwick, <i>History of Ethics</i>, p. +189; Shaftesbury, <i>Characteristics</i>; Hutcheson, <i>System of Moral +Philosophy</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span></p> + +<p>For casuistry, see references in Rand's <i>Bibliography</i>, Vol. III., +Part II., p. 880.</p> + +<p>For the variability of moral rules, see Locke, <i>Essay on the Human +Understanding</i>, Book I.; Bain, <i>Moral Science</i>, Part I., ch. iii.; Spencer, +<i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. I., Part II.; Williams, <i>Review of Evolutional +Ethics</i>, pp. 423-465; Bowne, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, ch. v.; +Schurman, <i>The Ethical Import of Darwinism</i>; the writings of Westermarck +and Hobhouse elsewhere referred to, and Darwin, <i>Descent of +Man</i>, Part I., chs. iv.-v.</p> + +<p>For the nature of moral judgment and the function of reason in +conduct, see Aristotle, Book III., chs. ii.-iii., and Book VI.; Ladd, +<i>Philosophy of Conduct</i>, ch. vii.; Sharp, <i>Essay on Analysis of the +Moral Judgment</i>, in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology (Garman +Commemorative Volume); Santayana, <i>Life of Reason</i>, Vol. I., chs. +x.-xii.; Bryant, <i>Studies in Character</i>, Part II., chs. iv.-v.</p> + +<p>For the social character of conscience, see Cooley, <i>Human Nature +and the Social Order</i>, ch. x.</p> + +<p>For sympathy and conscience, see Adam Smith, <i>Theory of Moral +Sentiments</i>, especially Part III., chs. i. and iv., and Part IV., chs. +i.-iii.; Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, pp. 228-238.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> "Any one can be angry: that is quite easy. Any one can give +money away or spend it. But to do these things to the right person, +to the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim and in the +right manner—this is not what any one can easily do."—<span class="smcap">Aristotle</span>, +<i>Ethics</i>, Book II., ch. ix.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> Compare the sentence quoted on p. 268 from Hazlitt.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> This means Duty. This phase will be discussed in the next +chapter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> <i>Kant's Theory of Ethics</i>, trans. by Abbott, pp. 47-51.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> In last analysis Kant is trying to derive moral enlightenment +from the most abstract principle of formal logic, the principle of +Identity, that A is A!</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> A student in an ethics class once made this remark: "Conscience +is infallible, but we should not always follow it. Sometimes we +should use our reason."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> Compare Locke, <i>Essay on the Human Understanding</i>, Book I., +ch. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> Of course, the word "rule" is often used to designate a principle—as +in the case of the phrase "golden-rule." We are speaking not +of the words, but of their underlying ideas.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XVII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE PLACE OF DUTY IN THE MORAL LIFE: +SUBJECTION TO AUTHORITY</h2> + + +<p><b>Conflict of Ends as Attractive and as Reasonable.</b>—The +previous discussion has brought out the contrast between +a Good or Satisfaction which is such <i>directly</i>, +immediately, by appealing attractively to desire; and +one which is such indirectly, through considerations which +reflection brings up. As we have seen, the latter must, +if entertained at all, arouse some direct emotional response, +must be felt to be in some way satisfactory. But the +<i>way</i> may be quite unlike that of the end which attracts +and holds a man irrespective of the principle brought +to light by reflection. The one may be intense, vivid, +absorbing, passing at once into overt action, unless +checked by a contrary reason. The good whose claim to +be good depends mainly on projection of remote considerations, +may be theoretically recognized and yet the direct +appeal to the particular agent at the particular time be +feeble and pallid. The "law of the mind" may assert itself +less urgently than the "law of the members" which wars +against it.</p> + +<p><b>Two Senses of Term Duty.</b>—This contrast gives rise +to the fact of Duty. On one side is the rightful supremacy +of the reasonable but remote good; on the other side is +the aversion of those springs to action which are immediately +most urgent. Between them exists the necessity +of securing for the reasonable good efficacy in operation; +or the necessity of redirecting the play of naturally +dominant desires. Duty is also used, to be sure, in a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> +looser and more external sense. To identify the dutiful +with the right apart from conflict, to say that a man did +his duty, may mean that he did right, irrespective of the +prior state of his inclinations. It frequently happens +that the wider and larger good which is developed through +reflective memory and foresight is welcomed, is directly +appreciated as good, since it is thoroughly attractive. +Without stress and strain, without struggle, it just displaces +the object which unreflective impulse had suggested. +It is the fit and proper, the only sensible and +wise thing, under the circumstances. The man does his +duty, but is glad to do it, and would be troubled by the +thought of another line of action. So far as calling the +act "duty" brings in any new meaning, it means that the +right act is one which is found to meet the demands, the +necessities, of the situation in which it takes place. The +Romans thus spoke of duties as <i>offices</i>, the performance +of those functions which are appropriate to the status +which every person occupies because of his social relations.</p> + +<p><b>Conscious Conflict.</b>—But there are other cases in which +the <i>right</i> end is distinctly apprehended by the person +as standing in opposition to his natural inclinations, as +a principle or law which <i>ought</i> to be followed, but which +<i>can</i> be followed only by constraining the inclinations, by +snubbing and coercing them. This state of affairs is +well represented by the following quotation from Matthew +Arnold, if we take it as merely describing the facts, not +as implying a theory as to their explanation:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"All experience with conduct brings us at last to the fact +of two selves, or instincts, or forces—name them, however +we may and however we may suppose them to have arisen—contending +for the mastery over men: one, a movement of +first impulse and more involuntary, leading us to gratify any +inclination that may solicit us and called generally a movement +of man's ordinary or passing self, of sense, appetite, +desire; the other a movement of reflection and more voluntary,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> +leading us to submit inclination to some rule, and called generally +a movement of man's higher or enduring self, of reason, +spirit, will."<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a></p></div> + +<p>We shall (I.) present what we consider the true account +of this situation of conflict in which the sense of duty +is found; (II.) turn to explanations which are one-sided, +taking up (1) the intuitive, (2) the utilitarian theory; +and finally (III.) return with the results of this criticism +to a restatement of our own theory.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. THE SUBJECTION OF DESIRE TO LAW</h4> + +<p>Ordinary language sets before us some main facts: +duty suggests what is due, a debt to be paid; ought is +connected with owe; obligation implies being bound to +something—as we speak of "bounden duty." We speak +naturally of "meeting obligations"; of duties being "imposed," +"laid upon" one. The person who is habitually +careless about his duties is "unruly" or "lawless"; one +who evades or refuses them is "unprincipled." These ideas +suggest there is something required, exacted, having the +sanction of law, or a regular and regulative principle; +and imply natural aversion to the requirements exacted, a +preference for something else. Hence duty as a conscious +factor means constraint of inclination; an unwillingness or +reluctance which <i>should</i> be overcome but which it is difficult +to surmount, requiring an effort which only adequate +recognition of the rightful supremacy of the dutiful end +will enable one to put forth. Thus we speak of interest +conflicting with principle, and desire with duty. While +they are inevitably bound together, it will be convenient to +discuss separately (1) Inclination and impulse as averse to +duty, and (2) Duty as having authority, as expressing +law.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>1. Inclination Averse to Duty.</b>—Directly and indirectly, +all desires root in certain fundamental organic +wants and appetites. Conduct, behavior, implies a living +organism. If this organism were not equipped with an +intense instinctive tendency to keep itself going, to sustain +itself, it would soon cease to be amid the menaces, +difficulties, rebuffs, and failures of life. Life means appetites, +like hunger, thirst, sex; instincts like anger, fear, +and hope, which are almost imperious in their struggles +for satisfaction. They do not arise from reflection, but +antedate it; their existence does not depend upon consideration +of consequences, but their existence it is which tends +to call out reflection. Their very presence in a healthy +organism means a certain reservoir of energy which overflows +almost spontaneously. They are impulsive. Such +tendencies, then, constitute an essential and fundamental +part of the capacities of a person; their realization is +involved in one's happiness. In all this there is nothing +abnormal nor immoral. But a human being is something +more than a mere demand for the satisfaction of instincts +of food, sex, and protection. If we admit (as the theory +of organic evolution requires) that all other desires and +purposes are <i>ultimately</i> derived from these tendencies of +the organism, still it is true that the refined and highly +developed forms exist side by side with crude, organic +forms, and that the simultaneous satisfaction of the two +types, just as they stand, is impossible.</p> + +<p><b>Organic and Reflectively Formed Tendencies Conflict.</b>—Even +if it be true, as it may well be, that the desires and +purposes connected with property were developed out +of instincts having to do with food for self and offspring, +it is still true that the developed desires do not wholly +displace those out of which they developed. The presence +of the purposes elaborated by thought side by side +with the more organic demands causes strife and the +need of resolution. The accumulation of property may +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span>involve subordinating the immediate urgency of hunger; +property as an institution implies that one is not free +to satisfy his appetite just as he pleases, but may have +to postpone or forego satisfaction, because the food supply +belongs to another; or that he can satisfy hunger only +through some labor which in itself is disagreeable to him. +Similarly the family springs originally out of the instinct +of reproduction. But the purposes and plans which +go with family life are totally inconsistent with the mere +gratification of sexual desire in its casual and spontaneous +appearance. The refined, highly developed, and complex +purposes exact a checking, a regulation and subordination +of inclinations as they first spring up—a +control to which the inclinations are not of themselves +prone and against which they may rebelliously assert +themselves.</p> + +<p><b>Duty May Reside on the More Impulsive Side.</b>—It +would be a great mistake, however, to limit the need +of subordination simply to the unruly agencies of appetite. +Habits which have been consciously or reflectively +formed, even when in their original formation these habits +had the sanction and approval of reason, require control. +The habits of a professional man, of an investigator, or +a lawyer, for example, have been formed through careful +and persistent reflection directed upon ends adjudged +right. Virtues of painstaking industry, of perseverance, +have been formed; untimely and unseemly desires have +been checked. But as an outcome these habits, and the +desires and purposes that express them, have perhaps +become all-engrossing. Occupation is preoccupation. It +encroaches upon the attention needed for other concerns. +The skill gained tends to shut the individual up to narrow +matters and to shut out other "universes" of good which +should be desired. Domestic and civic responsibilities are +perhaps felt to be insignificant details or irritating burdens +unworthy of attention. Thus a reflective habit, legiti<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span>mate +in itself, right in its right place, may give rise to +desires and ends which involve a corrosive selfishness.</p> + +<p>Moreover, that the insubordination does not reside in +appetites or impulses just as appetites and impulses, is +seen in the fact that duty may lie on the side of a purpose +connected with them, and be asserted against the force of +a habit formed under the supervision of thought. The +student or artist may find his pursuit makes him averse to +satisfying the needful claims of hunger and healthy exercise. +The prudent business man may find himself undutifully +cold to the prompting of an impulse of pity; +the student of books or special intellectual or artistic +ends may find duty on the side of some direct human +impulse.</p> + +<p><b>Statement of Problem.</b>—Such considerations show that +we cannot attribute the conflict of duty and inclination +simply to the existence of appetites and unreflective impulses, +as if these were in and of themselves opposed to +regulation by any principle. We must seek for an explanation +which will apply equally to appetites and to +habits of thought. What is there common to the situations +of him who feels it his duty to check the satisfaction of +strong hunger until others have been properly served, and +of the scientific investigator who finds it his duty to check +the exercise of his habit of thinking in order that he may +satisfy the demands of his body?</p> + +<p><b>Statement of Explanation.</b>—Any habit, like any appetite +or instinct, represents something formed, set; whether +this has occurred in the history of the race or of the +individual makes little difference to its established urgency. +Habit is second, if not first, nature. (1) Habit represents +<i>facilities</i>; what is set, organized, is relatively easy. It +<i>marks the line of least resistance</i>. A habit of reflection, +so far as it is a specialized habit, is as easy and natural +to follow as an organic appetite. (2) Moreover, the exercise +of any easy, frictionless habit is pleasurable. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> +is a commonplace that use and wont deprive situations of +originally disagreeable features. (3) Finally, a formed +habit is an active <i>tendency</i>. It only needs an appropriate +stimulus to set it going; frequently the mere absence +of any strong obstacle serves to release its pent-up energy. +It is a propensity to act in a certain way whenever opportunity +presents. Failure to function is uncomfortable and +arouses feelings of irritation or lack.</p> + +<p>Reluctance to the right end, an aversion requiring to +be overcome, if at all, by recognition of the superior value +of the right end, is then to be accounted for <i>on the +ground of the inertia or momentum of any organized, +established tendency</i>. This momentum gives the common +ground to instinctive impulses and deliberately formed +habits. The momentum represents the <i>old</i>, an adaptation +to familiar, customary conditions. So far as similar +conditions recur, the formed power functions economically +and effectively, supplying ease, promptness, certainty, and +agreeableness to the execution of an act.</p> + +<p>But if new, changed conditions require a serious readjustment +of the old habit or appetite, the natural tendency +will be to resist this demand. Thus we have precisely +the traits of reluctance and constraint which mark +the consciousness of duty. A self without habits, one loose +and fluid, in which change in one direction is just as easy +as in another, would not have the sense of duty. A self +with no new possibilities, rigidly set in conditions and perfectly +accommodated to them, would not have it. But +definite, persistent, urgent tendencies to act in a given way, +occurring at the same time with other incompatible tendencies +which represent the self more adequately and yet +are not organized into habits, afford the conditions of the +sense of restraint. If for any reason the unorganized +tendency is judged to be the truer expression of self, we +have also the sense of lawful constraint. <i>The constraint +of appetite and desire is a phenomenon of practical read<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span>justment, +within the structure of character, due to conflict +of tendencies so irreconcilable in their existing forms +as to demand radical redirection.</i></p> + +<p>When an appetite is in accord with those habits of +an individual which enable him to perform his social +functions, or which naturally accrue from his social relations, +it is legitimate and good; when it conflicts, it is +illicit, it is lust; we call it by hard names and we demand +that it be curbed; we regard its force as a menace to +the integrity of the agent and a threat to social order. +When the reflective habits of an individual come into +conflict with natural appetites and impulses, the manifestation +of which would enlarge or make more certain +the powers of the individual in his full relations to others, +it is the reflective habits which have to be held in and +redirected at the cost of whatever disagreeableness.</p> + +<p><b>(2) The Authority of Duty.</b>—A duty, in Kant's words, +is a <i>categorical</i> imperative—it claims the absolute right +of way as against immediate inclination. That which, on +one side, is the constraint of natural desire, is, on the +other, the authoritative claim of the right end to regulate. +Over against the course of action most immediately urgent, +most easy and comfortable, so congenial as at once +to motivate action unless checked, stands another course, +representing a wider and more far-reaching point of +view, and hence furnishing the rational end of the situation. +However lacking in intensity, however austere this +end, it stands for the whole self, and is therefore felt to +be rightly supreme over any partial tendency. But since +it looks to realization in an uncertain future, rather than +permission just to let go what is most urgent at the moment, +it requires effort, hard work, work of attention more +or less repulsive and uncongenial. Hence that sense of +stress and strain, of being pulled one way by inclination +and another by the claims of right, so characteristic of +an experience of obligation.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Social Character of Duties.</b>—But this statement describes +the experience only on its formal side. In the concrete, +that end which possesses claim to regulate desire is +the one which grows out of the social position or function +of the agent, out of <i>a course of action to which he is committed +by a regular, socially established connection between +himself and others</i>. The man who has assumed the position +of a husband and a parent has by that very fact +entered upon a <i>line</i> of action, something continuous, running +far into the future; something so fundamental that +it modifies and pervades his other activities, requiring them +to be coördinated or rearranged from its point of view. +The same thing holds, of course, of the calling of a doctor, +a lawyer, a merchant, a banker, a judge, or other officer +of the State. Each social calling implies a continuous, +regular mode of action, binding together into a whole a +multitude of acts occurring at different times, and giving +rise to definite expectations and demands on the part of +others. Every relationship in life, is, as it were, <i>a tacit +or expressed contract with others</i>, committing one, by the +simple fact that he occupies that relationship, to a corresponding +mode of action. Every one, willy-nilly, occupies +a social position; if not a parent, he is a child; if not +an officer, then a citizen of the State; if not pursuing an +occupation, he is in preparation for an occupation, or +else is living upon the results of the labors of others.</p> + +<p><b>Connection with Selfhood.</b>—Every one, in short, is in +<i>general relations to others</i>,—relationships which enter so +internally and so intimately into the very make-up of his +being that he is not morally free to pick and choose, saying, +this good is really my affair, that other one not. The +mode of action which is required by the fact that the +person is a member of a complex social network is a more +final expression of his own nature than is the temporarily +intense instinctive appetite, or the habit which has become +"second nature." It is not for the individual to say, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> +latter is attractive and therefore really mine, while the +former is repellant and therefore an alien intruder, to +be surrendered to only if it cannot be evaded. From this +point of view, the conflict of desire and duty, of interest +and principle, expresses itself as a conflict between tendencies +which have got organized into one's <i>fixed character</i> +and which therefore appeal to him just as he is; and those +tendencies which relate to the development of a larger +self, a self which should take fuller account of social relations. +The Kantian theory emphasizes the fact brought +out above: <i>viz.</i>, that duty represents the authority of an +act expressing the reasonable and "universal" self over +a casual and partial self; while the utilitarian theory emphasizes +the part played by social institutions and demands +in creating and enforcing both special duties and the +sense of duty in general.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. KANTIAN THEORY</h4> + +<p><b>"Accord with" Duty versus "from" Duty.</b>—Kant +points out that acts may be "in accordance with duty" +and yet not be done "from duty." "It is always, for example, +a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge +an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is +much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge.... +Men are thus honestly served; but this is +not enough to prove that the tradesman so acted from duty +and from principles of honesty; his own advantage required +it" (<i>Kant's Theory of Ethics</i>, Abbott's translation, +p. 13). In such a case the act externally viewed is in <i>accordance</i> +with duty; morally viewed, it proceeds from selfish +calculation of personal profit, not from duty. This is +true in general of all acts which, though outwardly right, +spring from considerations of expediency, and are based +on the consideration that "honesty (or whatever) is the +best policy." Persons are naturally inclined to take care<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> +of their health, their property, their children, or whatever +belongs to them. Such acts, no matter how much they +accord with duty, are not done <i>from duty</i>, but from inclination. +If a man is suffering, unfortunate, desirous +of death, and yet cherishes his life with no love for it, but +from the duty to do so, his motive has truly moral value. +So if a mother cares for her child, <i>because</i> she recognizes +that it is her duty, the act is truly moral.</p> + +<p><b>From Duty alone Moral.</b>—According to Kant, then, +acts alone have moral import that are consciously performed +"from duty," that is, with recognition of its authority +as their animating spring. "<i>The idea of good and +evil (in their moral sense) must not be determined before +the moral law, but only after it and by means of it</i>" (<i>Ibid.</i>, +p. 154). All our desires and inclinations seek naturally +for an <i>end</i> which is good—for happiness, success, +achievement. No one of them nor all of them put together, +then, can possibly supply the motive of acting <i>from</i> +duty. Hence duty and its authority must spring +from another source, from reason itself, which supplies +the consciousness of a law which <i>ought</i> to be the motive +of every act, whether it is or not. The utilitarians completely +reverse the truth of morals when they say that the +idea of the good end comes first and the "right" is that +which realizes the good end.</p> + +<p><b>Dual Constitution of Man.</b>—We are all familiar with +the notion that man has a dual constitution; that he is +a creature both of sense and spirit; that he has a carnal +and an ideal nature; a lower and a higher self, a self of +appetite and of reason. Now Kant's theory of duty is a +peculiar version of this common notion. Man's special ends +and purposes all spring from desires and inclinations. +These are all for personal happiness and hence without +moral worth. They form man's sensuous, appetitive nature, +which if not "base" in itself easily becomes so, +because it struggles with principle for the office of supply<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span>ing +motives for action. The principle of a law absolutely +binding, requires the complete expulsion of the claim of +desires to <i>motivate</i> action. (See <i>Kant's Theory</i>, pp. 70-79; +132-136; 159-163.) If a man were an animal, he +would have only appetite to follow; if he were a god or +angel, he would have only reason. Being man, being a +peculiar compound of sense and reason, he has put upon +him the problem of resisting the natural prompting of +inclination and of accepting the duty of acting from +reverence for duty.</p> + +<p><b>Criticism of Kant's Theory.</b>—There is an undoubted +fact back of Kant's conception which gives it whatever +plausibility it has—the fact that inclinations which are +not necessarily evil tend to claim a controlling position, a +claim which has to be resisted. The peculiarity of Kant's +interpretation lies in its complete and final separation of +the two aspects, "higher" and "lower," the appetitive and +rational, of man's nature, and it is upon this separation, +accordingly, that our discussion will be directed.</p> + +<p><b>I. Duty and the Affections.</b>—In the first place, Kant's +absolute separation of sense or appetite from reason and +duty, because of its necessary disparagement of the affections +leads to a formal and pedantic view of morality. +It is one thing to say that desire as it <i>first</i> shows itself +<i>sometimes</i> prompts to a morally inadequate end; it is quite +another thing to say that <i>any</i> acceptance of an end of +desire as a motive is morally wrong—that the act to be +right must be first brought under a conscious acknowledgment +of some law or principle. Only the exigencies of a +ready-made theory would lead any one to think that habitual +purposes that express the habitually dominant tendencies +and powers of the agent, may not suffice to keep +morally sound the main tenor of behavior; that it is impossible +for regard for right ends to become organized +into character and to be fused into working unity with +natural impulses. Only a metaphysical theory regarding<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> +the separation of sense and reason in man leads to the +denial of this fact.</p> + +<p>Between the merchant who is honest in his weights and +fixed in his prices merely because he calculates that such a +course is to his own advantage, and the merchant (if such +a person could exist) who should never sell a spool of thread +or a paper of pins without having first reminded himself +that his ultimate motive for so doing was respect for +the law of duty, there is the ordinary merchant who is +honest because he has the desires characteristic of an honest +man. Schiller has made fun of the artificial stringency +of Kant's theory in some verses which represent a disciple +coming to Kant with his perplexity:</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"Willingly serve I my friends, but I do it, alas with affection.<br /> +Hence I am plagued with this doubt, virtue I have not attained!"<br /> +</p> + +<p class="noidt">to which he received the reply:</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"This is your only resource, you must stubbornly seek to abhor them;<br /> +Then you can do with disgust that which the law may enjoin."<br /> +</p> + +<p>These verses are a caricature of Kant's position; he +does not require that affections should be crushed, but that +they should be stamped with acknowledgment of law before +being accepted as motives. But the verses bring out +the absurd element in the notion that the affections and +inclinations may not of themselves be morally adequate +springs to action,—as if a man could not eat his dinner +simply because he was hungry, or be amiable to a companion +because he wanted to be, or relieve distress because +his compassionate nature urged him to it.</p> + +<p>It is worth while noting that some moralists have gone +to the opposite extreme and have held that an act is not +right unless it expresses the overflowing spontaneity of the +affections; that a man's act is only imperfectly right when +he performs it not from affection, but from coercion by +duty. Thus Emerson speaks of men who "do by knowledge +what the stones do by structure." And again, "We<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> +love characters in proportion as they are impulsive and +spontaneous. When we see a soul whose acts are all regal, +graceful, and pleasant as roses, we must thank God that +such things can be and are, and not turn sourly on the +angel and say, 'Crump is a better man with his grunting +resistance to all his native devils.'" The facts seem to be +that while, in a good man, natural impulses and formed +habits are adequate motive powers under ordinary conditions, +there are times when an end, somewhat weak in +its motive force because it does not express an habitually +dominant power of the self, needs to be reënforced by +associations which have gathered at all periods of his +past around the experience of good. There is a certain +reservoir of emotional force which, while far from +fluid, is capable of transfer and application, especially +in a conscientious person. Kant criticizes the moral +sense theory on the ground that "in order to imagine +the vicious man tormented with a sense of his transgressions, +it must first represent him as morally good in the +main trend of his character" (Abbott, p. 128). Well, a +man who is capable of making appeal to the sense of duty +in general, is the one in whom love of good is already +dominant.</p> + +<p><b>II. Tendency to Fanaticism and Idealization of Authority.</b>—Kant's +theory of fixed and final separation +between desire and reason leads us into a fatal dilemma; +either a right end is impossible, or any end is right +provided we fall back on a belief that it is our duty +to perform it. Kant holds that every concrete end, +every definite purpose which we entertain, comes from +desire. Law utters no specific command except "do your +duty"; it stamps an end of desire as right only when it is +pursued, not because it is an end of desire, but "from +duty." The actual end which is before us is, in any +case, supplied through inclination and desire. Reason +furnishes <i>principle</i> as a <i>motive</i>. We have here, in an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span>other +form, the separation of end and motive which has +already occupied us (p. 248). End and motive are so +disconnected, so irrelevant to one another, that we have +no alternative except either to condemn every end, because, +being prompted by desire, it falls so far short of +the majesty of duty; or else fanatically to persist in any +course when once we have formally brought it under the +notion of duty.</p> + +<p>The latter alternative would be the one chosen by a truly +Kantian agent because it is alone possible in practice. +But the moral fanatic does about as much evil in the world +as the man of no moral principle. Religious wars, persecutions, +intolerance, harsh judgment of others, obstinate +persistence in a course of action once entered upon in spite +of the testimony of experience to the harm that results; +blind devotion to narrow and one-sided aims; deliberate +opposition to art, culture, social amenities, recreations, or +whatever the "man of principle" happens to find obnoxious: +pharisaical conviction of superiority, of being the +peculiar, chosen instrument of the moral law;—these and +the countless ills that follow in their wake, are inevitable effects +of erecting the isolated conviction of duty into a sufficient +motive of action. So far as these evils do not +actually flow from an acceptance of the Kantian principle, +it is because that has been promulgated and for the most +part adopted, where reverence for authority and law is +strong. In Germany the Kantian philosophy has, upon +the whole, served as a help in criticizing law and procedure +on the basis of their rationality, while it has also served +as a convenient stamp of rational sanction upon a politically +authoritative régime, already fairly reasonable, as +such matters go, in the content of its legislation and +administration.</p> + +<p><b>III. Meaning of Duty for Duty's Sake.</b>—It is a sound +principle to do our duty <i>as</i> our duty, and not for the sake +of something else. "Duty for duty's sake" means, in truth,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> +<i>an act for the act's own sake</i>; the gift of cold water, the +word of encouragement, the sweeping of the room, the +learning of the lesson, the selling of the goods, the painting +of the picture, because they are the things really +called for at a given time, and hence their own excuses +for being. <i>No moral act is a means to anything beyond +itself,—not even to morality.</i> But, upon Kant's theory, +duty for duty's sake means a special act not for its own +sake, but for the sake of abstract principle. Just as the +hedonists regard a special act as a mere means to happiness, +so Kant makes the concrete act a mere means to virtue. +As there is a "hedonistic paradox," namely that the +way to get happiness is to forget it, to devote ourselves +to things and persons about us; so there is a "moralistic" +paradox, that the way to get goodness is to cease to think +of it—as something separate—and to devote ourselves to +the realization of the full value of the practical situations +in which we find ourselves. Men can really think of their +"duty" only when they are thinking of specific things to +be done; to think of Duty at large or in the abstract is +one of the best ways of avoiding doing it, or of doing it in +a partial and perverted way.</p> + +<p><b>Summary of Criticism of Kant.</b>—To sum up, the +theory which regards duty as having its source in a +rational self which is independent of and above the self +of inclination and affection (1) deprives the habitual +desires and affections, which make the difference between +one concrete character and another, of moral significance; +(2) commits us to an unenlightened performance of what +is called duty irrespective of its real goodness; and (3) +makes moral principle a remote abstraction, instead of the +vivifying soul of a concrete deed. Its strongest point, its +insistence upon the <i>autonomous</i> character of duty, or that +duty is organically connected with the self in some of +its phases or functions, will appear more clearly as we contrast +it with the utilitarian theory.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 3. THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF DUTY</h4> + +<p><b>Problem of Duty on Hedonistic Basis.</b>—The utilitarians' +explanation of the constraint of desire by the authority +of right is framed to meet the peculiar difficulty +in which their hedonistic theory places them. If pleasure +is the good, and if all desire is naturally for the good, why +should desire have to be constrained? How can such a +thing as "duty" exist at all? For to say that a man is +obliged or bound to seek that which he just can't help +seeking is absurd. There is, according to the utilitarian, +a difference, however, between the pleasure which is the +object of desire and that which is the standard of judgment. +The former is the person's own pleasure; it is +private. The happiness which measures the rightness +of the act is that of all persons who are affected by it. In +view of this divergence, there must, if right action is to +occur, be agencies which operate upon the individual so as +to make him find his personal pleasure in that which +conduces to the general welfare. These influences +are the expectations and demands of <i>others so far as +they attach consequences in the way of punishment, of +suffering, and of reward and pleasure, to the deeds of an +individual</i>.</p> + +<p>In this way the natural inclination of an individual towards +a certain pleasure, or his natural revulsion from a +certain pain, may be checked and transformed by recognition +that if he seeks the pleasure, others will inflict more +than an equivalent pain, or if he bears the pain, others will +reward him with more than compensating pleasures. In +such cases, we have the fact of duty or obligation. There +is constraint of first inclination through recognition of +superior power, this power being asserted in its expressly +declared intention of rewarding and penalizing according +as its prescriptions are or are not followed. These +are the factors: (1) demands, expectations, rules exter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span>nally +imposed; (2) consequences in the way of proffered +reward of pleasure, and penalty of pain; (3) resulting +constraint of the natural manifestation of desires. In the +main, the theory is based on the analogy of legal obligations.<a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a></p> + +<p><b>(a) Bentham's Account.</b>—Bentham dislikes the very +word duty; and speaks preferably of the "sanctions" +of an act. The following quotations will serve to confirm +the foregoing statements.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The happiness of the individuals of whom a community is +composed is ... the sole standard, in conformity to which +each individual <i>ought</i> to be made to fashion his behavior. But +whether it be this, or anything else that is to be done, there +is nothing by which a man can ultimately be <i>made</i> to do it, +but either pain or pleasure."</p></div> + +<p>A kind of pain or pleasure which tends to <i>make</i> an individual +find his own good in the good of the community is +a <i>sanction</i>. Of these Bentham mentions four kinds, of +which the first alone is not due to the will of others, but +is <i>physical</i>. Thus the individual may check his inclination +to drink by a thought of the ills that flow from drunkenness. +Metaphorically, then, he may be said to have a duty +not to drink; strictly speaking, however, this is his own +obvious interest. The sanctions proper are (a) political, +consequences in the way of pleasure and pain (especially +pain) attached to injunctions and prohibitions by a legal +superior; (b) popular, the consequences following from +the more indefinite influence of public opinion—such as +being "sent to Coventry," being shunned, rendered unpopular, +losing reputation, or honor, etc.; and (3) religious, +penalties of hell and rewards of heaven attached to +action by a divine being, or similar penances and rewards<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> +by the representatives on earth (church, priests, etc.) of +this divine being.<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p> + +<p><b>Value and Deficiencies of This View.</b>—The strong +point of this explanation of duty is obviously that it recognizes +the large, the very large, rôle played by social institutions, +regulations, and demands in bringing home to a +person the fact that certain acts, whether he is naturally +so inclined or not, should be performed. But its +weak point is that it tends to identify duty with coercion; +to change the "ought" if not into a physical "must," at +least into the psychological "must" of fear of pain and +hope of pleasure. Hope of reward and fear of penalty +are real enough motives in human life; but acts performed +mainly or solely on their account do not, in the +unprejudiced judgment of mankind, rank very high morally. +Habitually to appeal to such motives is rather +to weaken than to strengthen the tendencies in the individual +which make for right action. The difficulty +lies clearly in the purely <i>external</i> character of the "sanctions," +and this in turn is due to the fact that the obligations +imposed by the demands and expectancies of others +do not have any intrinsic connection with the character +of the individual of whom they are exacted. They are +wholly external burdens and impositions.</p> + +<p>The individual, with his desires and his pleasures, being +made up out of particular states of feeling, is complete in +himself. Social relationships must then be alien and external; +if they modify in any way the existing body of feelings +they are artificial constraints. One individual merely +<i>happens</i> to live side by side with other individuals, who are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> +in themselves isolated, and are complete in their isolation. +If their external acts conflict, it may be necessary to +invade and change the body of feelings which make up the +self from which the act flows. Hence duty.</p> + +<p>The later development of utilitarianism tended to get +away from this psychical and atomic individualism; and to +conceive the good of an individual as including <i>within</i> himself +relations to others. So far as this was done, the demands +of others, public opinion, laws, etc., became factors +<i>in the development of the individual, and in arousing him +to an adequate sense of what his good is, and of interest +in effecting it</i>. Later utilitarianism dwells less than Bentham +upon external sanctions, and more upon an unconscious +shaping of the individual's character and motives +through imitation, education, and all the agencies which +mould the individual's desires into natural agreement with +the social type. While it is John Stuart Mill who insists +most upon the internal and qualitative change of disposition +that thus takes place,<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> it is Bain and Spencer who +give the most detailed account of the methods by which +it is brought about.</p> + +<p><b>(b) Bain's Account.</b>—His basis agrees with Bentham's: +"The proper meaning, or import, of the terms (duty, obligation) +refers to that class of action which is enforced by +the sanction of punishment" (Bain, <i>Emotions and Will</i>, +p. 286). But he sets less store by political legislation and +the force of vague public opinion, and more by the gradual +and subtle processes of family education. The lesson of +obedience, that there are things to be done whether one +wishes or no, is impressed upon the child almost unremittingly +from the very first moment of life. There are three +stages in the complete evolution of the sense of duty. The +first, the lowest and that beyond which some persons never +go, is that in which "susceptibility to pleasure and pain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> +is made use of to bring about obedience, and a mental association +is rapidly formed between the obedience and apprehended +pain, more or less magnified by fear." The fact +that punishment may be kept up until the child desists +from the act "leaves on his mind a certain dread and awful +impression as connected with forbidden actions." Here +we have in its germ conscience, acknowledgment of duty, +in its most external form.</p> + +<p>A child in a good home (and a citizen in a good state) +soon adds other associations. The command is uttered, +the penalty threatened, by those whom he admires, respects, +and loves. This element brings in a new dread—the fear +of giving pain to the beloved object. Such dread is more +disinterested. It centers rather about the point of view +from which the act is held wrong than about the thought +of harm to self. As intelligence develops, the person apprehends +the positive ends, the goods, which are protected +by the command put on him; he sees the use and reason +of the prohibition to which he is subject, and approving +of what it safeguards, approves the restriction itself. "A +new motive is added on and begirds the action with a threefold +fear.... If the duty prescribed has been approved +of by the mind as <i>protective of the general interests of +persons engaging our sympathies</i>, the violation of this on +our part affects us with all the pain that we feel from +inflicting <i>an injury upon those interests</i>."</p> + +<p><b>Transformation into an Internal Power.</b>—When the +child appreciates "<i>the reasons for the command, the character +of conscience is entirely transformed</i>." The fear +which began as fear of the penalty that a superior power +may inflict, adds to itself the fear of displeasing a beloved +person; and is finally transformed into the dread of injuring +interests the worth of which the individual appreciates +and in which he shares. The sense of duty now "stands +upon an independent foundation." It is an internal "ideal +resemblance of public authority," "an imitation (or fac<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span>simile) +within ourselves of the government without us." +"Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law +and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some +power." Thus there is developed a sense of obligation in +general, which may be detached from the particular deeds +which were originally imposed under the sanction of penalty, +and transferred to new ends which have never even +been socially imposed, which the individual has perhaps for +the first time conceived within himself. "The feeling and +habit of obligation" which was generated from social pressure +remains, but as a distinct individually cherished +thing (Bain, <i>Emotions and Will</i>, p. 319 n.). This view of +the <i>final</i> sense of obligation thus approximates Kant's view +of the autonomous character of duty.</p> + +<p><b>(c) Spencer's Account.</b>—Herbert Spencer (like Bentham) +lays emphasis upon the restraining influence of various +social influences, but lays stress, as Bentham does +not, upon the <i>internal</i> changes effected by long-continued, +unremitting pressure exercised through the entire period +of human evolution. Taken in itself, the consciousness +of duty—the distinctively moral consciousness—is the control +of proximate ends by remote ones, of simple by complex +aims, of the sensory or presentative by the ideal or +representative. An undeveloped individual or race lives +and acts in the present; the mature is controlled by foresight +of an indefinitely distant future. The thief who +steals is actuated by a simple feeling, the mere impulse of +acquisition; the business man conducts his acquisition in +view of highly complex considerations of property and +ownership. A low-grade intelligence acts only upon +sensory stimulus, immediately present; a developed mind +is moved by elaborate intellectual constructions, by imaginations +and ideas which far outrun the observed or observable +scene. Each step of the development of intelligence, +of culture, whether in the individual or the race, +is dependent upon ability to <i>subordinate</i> the immediate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> +simple, physically present tendency and aim to the remote, +compound, and only ideally present intention (Spencer, +<i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. I., Part I, ch. vii.).</p> + +<p><b>Subordination of Near to Remote Good Dependent +on Social Influences.</b>—"The conscious relinquishment of +immediate and special good to gain distant and general +good ... is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called +moral." But this develops out of forms of restraint which +are not moral; where the "relinquishment" and subordination +of the present and temporary good is not consciously +willed by the individual in view of a conscious appreciation +of a distant and inclusive good; but where +action in view of the latter is forced upon the individual +by outside authority, operating by menace, and having +the sanction of fear. These outside controls are three in +number: political or legal; supernatural, priestly, or religious; +and popular. All these external controls, working +through dread of pain and promise of reward, bring +about, however, in the individual a habit of looking to the +remote, rather than to the proximate, end. At first the +thought of these extrinsic consequences, those which do +not flow from the act but from the reaction of others to +it, is mixed up with the thought of its own proper consequences. +But this association causes attention at least +to be fixed upon intrinsic consequences that, because of +their remoteness and complexity, might otherwise escape +attention. Gradually the thought of them grows in clearness +and efficacy and dissociates itself as a motive from +the externally imposed consequences, and there is a control +which alone is truly moral.</p> + +<p><b>The Internal Sanction.</b>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The truly moral deterrent from murder, is not constituted +by a representation of hanging as a consequence, or by a representation +of tortures in hell as a consequence, or by a representation +of the horror and hatred excited in fellow-men; but +by a representation of the <i>necessary natural results</i>—the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span>infliction of death agony on the victim, the destruction of all +his possibilities of happiness, the entailed sufferings to his +belongings" (Spencer, <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 120).</p></div> + +<p>The external constraints thus serve as a schoolmaster to +bring the race and the individual to internal restraint. +Gradually the abstract sense of coerciveness, authoritativeness, +the need of controlling the present by the future good +is disentangled, and there arises the sense of duty in general. +But even this "is transitory and will diminish as fast +as moralization increases" (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 127). Persistence in +performance of a duty makes it a pleasure; an habitually +exercised obligation is naturally agreeable.</p> + +<p>In the present state of evolutionary development, obligation, +or the demands made by the external environment, and +spontaneous inclination, or the demand of the organism, +cannot coincide. But at the goal of evolution, the organism +and environment will be in perfect adjustment. Actions +congenial to the former and appropriate to the latter will +completely coincide. "In their proper times and places, +and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just +as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations" +(<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 129).</p> + +<p><b>Criticism of Utilitarianism.</b>—The utilitarian account +of the development of the consciousness of duty or its +emphasis upon concrete facts of social arrangements and +education affords a much-needed supplement to the empty +and abstract formalism of Kant. (i.) The individual is +certainly brought to his actual recognition of specific duties +and to his consciousness of obligation or moral law in general +through social influences. Bain insists more upon the +family training and discipline of its immature members; +Bentham and Spencer more upon the general institutional +conditions, or the organization of government, law, judicial +procedure, crystallized custom, and public opinion. In +reality, these two conditions imply and reënforce each +other. It is through the school of the family, for the most<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> +part, that the meaning of the requirements of the larger +and more permanent institutions are brought home to +the individual; while, on the other hand, the family derives +the aims and values which it enforces upon the attention +of its individual members mainly from the larger society +in which it finds its own setting. (ii.) The later utilitarianism, +in its insistence upon an "internal sanction," upon +the ideal personal, or free facsimile of public authority, +upon regard for "intrinsic consequences," corrects the +weak point in Bentham (who relies so unduly upon mere +threat of punishment and mere fear of pain) and approximates +in practical effect, though not in theory, Kant's +doctrine of the connection of duty with the rational or +"larger" self which is social, even if individual. Even in +its revised version utilitarianism did not wholly escape +from the rigid unreal separation between the selfhood +of the agent and his social surroundings forced upon it +by its hedonistic psychology.</p> + +<p><b>Fictitious Theory of Nature of Self.</b>—The supposition +that the individual starts with mere love of private pleasure, +and that, if he ever gets beyond to consideration of the +good of others, it is because others have forced their good +upon him by interfering with his private pleasures, is pure +fiction. The requirements, encouragements, and approbations +of others react not primarily upon the pleasures and +calculations of the individual, but upon his <i>activities</i>, upon +his inclinations, desires, habits. There is a common defect +in the utilitarian and Kantian psychology. Both neglect +the importance of the active, the organically spontaneous +and direct tendencies which enter into the individual. +Both assume unreal "<i>states</i> of consciousness," passive +sensations, and feelings. Active tendencies may be internally +modified and redirected by the very conditions and +consequences of their own exercise. Family discipline, +jural influences, public opinion, may do little, or they may +do much. But their educative influence is as far from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> +mere association of feelings of pleasure and pain as it is +from Kant's purely abstract law. <i>Social influences enable +an individual to realize the weight and import of the +socially available and helpful manifestations of the tendencies +of his own nature and to discriminate them from +those which are socially harmful or useless.</i> When the +two conflict, the perception of the former is the recognition +of duties as distinct from <i>mere</i> inclinations.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. FINAL STATEMENT</h4> + +<p><b>Duty and a Growing Character.</b>—Duty is what is owed +by a partial isolated self embodied in established, facile, and +urgent tendencies, to that ideal self which is presented in +aspirations which, since they are not yet formed into +habits, have no organized hold upon the self and which +can get organized into habitual tendencies and interests +only by a more or less painful and difficult reconstruction +of the habitual self. For Kant's fixed and absolute separation +between the self of inclination and the self of reason, +we substitute the relative and shifting distinction between +those factors of self which have become so definitely organized +into set habits that they take care of themselves, +and those other factors which are more precarious, less +crystallized, and which depend therefore upon conscious +acknowledgment and intentionally directed affection. The +consciousness of duty grows out of the complex character +of the self; the fact that at any given time, it has tendencies +relatively set, ingrained, and embodied in fixed +habits, while it also has tendencies in process of making, +looking to the future, taking account of unachieved possibilities. +The former give the solid relatively formed +elements of character; the latter, its ideal or unrealized +possibilities. Each must play into the other; each must +help the other out.</p> + +<p>The conflict of duty and desire is thus an accom<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span>paniment +of a <i>growing</i> self. Spencer's complete disappearance +of obligation would mean an exhausted and fossilized +self; wherever there is progress, tension arises between +what is already accomplished and what is possible. In a +being whose "reach should exceed his grasp," a conflict +within the self making for the readjustment of the direction +of powers must always be found. The value of continually +<i>having to meet the expectations and requirements +of others is in keeping the agent from resting on his oars, +from falling back on habits already formed as if they +were final</i>. The phenomena of duty in all their forms are +thus phenomena attendant upon the expansion of ends +and the reconstruction of character. So far, accordingly, +as the recognition of duty is capable of operating as a +distinct rëenforcing motive, it operates most effectively, +not as an interest in duty, or law in the abstract, but as +an interest in progress in the face of the obstacles found +within character itself.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>The most important references on the subject of duty are given +in the text. To these may be added: Ladd, <i>Philosophy of Conduct</i>, +chs. v. and xv.; Mackenzie, <i>Manual</i>, Part I., ch. iv.; Green, <i>Prolegomena</i>, +pp. 315-320, 353-354 and 381-388; Sharp, <i>International Journal +of Ethics</i>, Vol. II., pp. 500-513; Muirhead, <i>Elements of Ethics</i>, +Book II., ch. ii.; McGilvary, <i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XI., pp. 333-352; +Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, pp. 161-171; Sturt, <i>International +Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. VII., 334-345; Schurman, <i>Philosophical Review</i>, +Vol. III., pp. 641-654; Guyau, <i>Sketch of Morals, without Obligation +or Sanction</i>.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> <i>Last Essays on Church and Religion</i>, preface.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> Historically it has often taken theological form. Thus Paley +defined virtue as "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will +of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." Of obligation +he said, "A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent +motive resulting from the command of another."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> The earlier English utilitarians (though not called by that name), +such as Tucker and Paley, assert that upon this earth there is no exact +coincidence of the right and the pleasure-giving; that it is future +rewards and punishments which make the equilibrium. Sidgwick, +among recent writers, has also held that no complete identification +of virtue and happiness can be found apart from religious considerations. +(See <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, p. 505. For theological utilitarianism +see Albee, <i>History</i>.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> See his <i>Utilitarianism</i>, ch. iii.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XVIII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE PLACE OF THE SELF IN THE MORAL LIFE</h2> + + +<p>We have reached the conclusion that disposition as +manifest in endeavor is the seat of moral worth, and that +this worth itself consists in a readiness to regard the general +happiness even against contrary promptings of personal +comfort and gain. This brings us to the problems +connected with the nature and functions of the self. We +shall, in our search for the moral self, pass in review the +conceptions which find morality in (1) Self-Denial or Self-Sacrifice, +(2) Self-Assertion, (3) Combination of Regard +for Self and for Others, (4) Self-Realization.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DENIAL</h4> + +<p><b>Widespread Currency of the Doctrine.</b>—The notion +that real goodness, or virtue, consists essentially in abnegation +of the self, in denying and, so far as may be, eliminating +everything that is of the nature of the self, is one +of the oldest and most frequently recurring notions of +moral endeavor and religion, as well as of moral theory. It +describes Buddhism and, in large measure, the monastic +ideal of Christianity, while, in Protestantism, Puritanism +is permeated with its spirit. It characterized Cynicism +and Stoicism. Kant goes as far as to say that every rational +being must wish to be wholly free from inclinations. +Popular morality, while not going so far as to hold that +all moral goodness is self-denial, yet more or less definitely +assumes that self-denial on its own account, irrespective of +what comes out of it, is morally praiseworthy. A notion +so deeply rooted and widely flourishing must have strong<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> +motives in its favor, all the more so because its practical +vogue is always stronger than any reasons which are theoretically +set forth.</p> + +<p><b>Origin of the Doctrine.</b>—The notion arises from the +tendency to identify the self with one of its own factors. +It is one and the same self which conceives and is interested +in some generous and ideal good that is also tempted by +some near, narrow, and exclusive good. The force of the +latter resides in the <i>habitual</i> self, in purposes which have +got themselves inwrought into the texture of ordinary +character. Hence there is a disposition to overlook the +complexity of selfhood, and to identify it with those factors +in the self which resist ideal aspiration, and which are +recalcitrant to the thought of duty; to identify the self +with impulses that are inclined to what is frivolous, sensuous +and sensual, pleasure-seeking. All vice being, then, +egoism, selfishness, self-seeking, the remedy is to check it +at its roots; to keep the self down in its proper place, denying +it, chastening it, mortifying it, refusing to listen to its +promptings. Ignoring the variety and subtlety of the +factors that make up the self, all the different elements of +right and of wrong are gathered together and set over +against each other. All the good is placed once for all in +some outside source, some higher law or ideal; and the +source of all evil is placed within the corrupted and vile +self. When one has become conscious of the serious nature +of the moral struggle; has found that vice is easy, and to +err "natural," needing only to give way to some habitual +impulse or desire; that virtue is arduous, requiring resistance +and strenuous effort, one is apt to overlook the +habitual tendencies which are the ministers of the higher +goods. One forgets that unless ideal ends were also +rooted in some natural tendencies of the self, they could +neither occur to the self nor appeal to the self. Hence +everything is swept into the idea that the self is inherently +so evil that it must be denied, snubbed, sacrificed, mortified.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span></p> + +<p>In general, to point out the truth which this theory perverts, +to emphasize the demand for constant reconstruction +and rearrangement of the habitual powers of the +self—is sufficient criticism of it. But in detail the theory +exercises such pervasive influence that it is worth +while to mention specifically some of the evils that accrue +from it.</p> + +<p><b>1. It so Maims and Distorts Human Nature as to +Narrow the Conception of the Good.</b>—In its legitimate +antagonism to pleasure-seeking, it becomes a foe to happiness, +and an implacable enemy of all its elements. Art is +suspected, for beauty appeals to the lust of the eye. Family +life roots in sexual impulses, and property in love of +power, gratification, and luxury. Science springs from the +pride of the intellect; the State from the pride of will. <i>Asceticism</i> +is the logical result; a purely negative conception +of virtue. But it surely does dishonor, not honor, to the +moral life to conceive it as mere negative subjection of the +flesh, mere holding under control the lust of desire and +the temptations of appetite. All positive content, all liberal +achievement, is cut out and morality is reduced to a +mere struggle <i>against</i> solicitations to sin. While asceticism +is in no danger of becoming a popular doctrine, there +is a common tendency to conceive self-control in this negative +fashion; to fail to see that the important thing is some +positive good <i>for</i> which a desire is controlled. In general +we overemphasize that side of morality which consists +in abstinence and <i>not</i> doing wrong.</p> + +<p><b>2. To Make so Much of Conflict with the "Flesh," is +to Honor the Latter too Much.</b>—It is to fix too much +attention on it. It is an open lesson of psychology that to +oppose doing an act by mere injunction not to do it, is to +increase the power of the thing <i>not</i> to be done, and to +weaken the spring and effectiveness of the other motives, +which, if positively attended to, might keep the obnoxious +motive from gaining supremacy. The "expulsive power"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> +of a generous affection is more to be relied upon than effort +to suppress, which keeps alive the very thing to be suppressed. +The history of monks and Puritan saints alike +is full of testimony to the fact that withdrawal from +positive generous and wholesome aims reënforces the vitality +of the lower appetites and stimulates the imagination +to play about them. Flagellation and fasting work as +long as the body is exhausted; but the brave organism +reasserts itself, and its capacities for science, art, the life +of the family and the State not having been cultivated, +sheer ineradicable physical instinct is most likely to come +to the front.</p> + +<p><b>3. We Judge Others by Ourselves Because We Have +No Other Way to Judge.</b>—It is impossible for a man +who conceives his own good to be in "going without," in +just restricting himself, to have any large or adequate +idea of the good of others. Unconsciously and inevitably +a hardening and narrowing of the conditions of the lives +of others accompanies the reign of the Puritanic ideal. +The man who takes a high view of the capacities of human +nature in itself, who reverences its possibilities and +is jealous for their high maintenance in himself, is the +one most likely to have keen and sensitive appreciation +of the needs of others. There is, moreover, no selfishness, +no neglect of others more thoroughgoing, more effectively +cruel than that which comes from preoccupation with the +attainment of personal goodness, and this interest is an +almost inevitable effect of devotion to the negative ideal +of self-denial.</p> + +<p><b>4. The Principle Radically Violates Human Nature.</b>—This +indeed is its claim—that human nature, just as +human nature, requires to have violence done it. But the +capacities which constitute the self demand fulfillment. +The place, the time, the manner, the degree, and the proportion +of their fulfillment, require infinite care and pains, +and to secure this attention is the business of morals.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> +Morals is a matter of direction, not of suppression. The +urgency of desires and capacities for expression cannot be +got rid of; nature cannot be expelled. If the need of +happiness, of satisfaction of capacity, is checked in one +direction, it will manifest itself in another. If the direction +which is checked is an unconscious and wholesome one, +that which is taken will be likely to be morbid and perverse. +The one who is conscious of continually denying himself +cannot rid himself of the idea that it ought to be "made +up" to him; that a compensating happiness is due him +for what he has sacrificed, somewhat increased, if anything, +on account of the unnatural virtue he has displayed.<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> +To be self-sacrificing is to "lay up" merit, and +this achievement must surely be rewarded with happiness—if +not now, then later. Those who habitually live on the +basis of conscious self-denial are likely to be exorbitant +in the demands which they make on some one near them, +some member of their family or some friend; likely to blame +others if their own "virtue" does not secure for itself an +exacting attention which reduces others to the plane of +servility. Often the doctrine of self-sacrifice leads to an +inverted hedonism: we are to be good—that is, to forego +pleasure—now, that we may have a greater measure of +enjoyment in some future paradise of bliss. Or, the individual +who has taken vows of renunciation is entitled by +that very fact to represent spiritual authority on earth +and to lord it over others.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. SELF-ASSERTION</h4> + +<p>The idea that morality consists in an unbridled assertion +of self, in its forceful aggressive manifestation, rarely +receives consistent theoretical formulation—possibly because +most men are so ready to act upon it practically +that explicit acknowledgment would be a hindrance rather<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> +than a help to the idea. But it is a doctrine which tends +to be invoked more or less explicitly as a reaction from +the impotency of the self-denial dogma. In reference +to some superior individual or class, some leader or group +of aristocratically ordained leaders, it is always a more +or less conscious principle. Concerning these it is held that +ordinary morality holds eventually only for the "common +herd," the activities of the leader being amenable to +a higher law than that of common morality.<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> Moreover, +since the self-sacrifice morality is almost never carried out +consistently—that is, to the point of monastic asceticism,—much +popular morality is an unbalanced combination of +self-sacrifice in some regards and ruthless self-assertion in +others. It is not "practicable" to carry out the principle +of self-denial everywhere; it is reserved for the family +life, for special religious duties; in business (which is business, +not morals), the proper thing is aggressive and unremitting +self-assertion. In business, the end is success, to +"make good"; weakness is failure, and failure is disgrace, +dishonor. Thus in practice the two conceptions of self-denial +in one region and self-assertion in another mutually +support each other. They give occasion for the more or +less unformulated, yet prevalent, idea that moral considerations +(those of self-denial) apply to a limited phase +of life, but have nothing to do with other regions in which +accordingly the principle of "efficiency" (that is, personal +success, wealth, power obtained in competitive victory) +holds supreme sway.</p> + +<p>Recently, however, there has sprung up a so-called +"naturalistic" school of ethics which has formulated explicitly +the principle of self-assertion, and which claims to +find scientific sanction for it in the evolutionary doctrine +of Darwin. Evolution, it says, is the great thing, and +evolution means the <i>survival of the fit in the struggle for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> +existence</i>. Nature's method of progress is precisely, so it +is said, ruthless self-assertion—to the strong the victory, +to the victorious the spoils, and to the defeated, woe. Nature +affords a scene of egoistic endeavor or pressure, suffer +who may, of struggle to get ahead, that is, ahead of others, +even by thrusting them down and out. But the justification +of this scene of rapine and slaughter is that out of +it comes progress, advance, everything that we regard +as noble and fair. Excellence is the sign of excelling; +the goal means outrunning others. The morals of humility, +of obedience to law, of pity, sympathy, are merely +a self-protective device on the part of the weak who try +to safeguard their weakness by setting fast limitations to +the activities of the truly strong (compare what was said of +the not dissimilar doctrine among the Greeks, pp. 120-22). +But the truly moral man, in whom the principle of progress +is embodied, will break regardlessly through these +meshes and traps. He will carry his own plans through +to victorious achievement. He is the super-man. The +mass of men are simply food for his schemes, valuable as +furnishing needed material and tools.<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> + +<p><b>Practical Vogue of the Underlying Idea.</b>—Such a +theory, in and of itself, is a literary diversion for those +who, not being competent in the fields of outer achievement, +amuse themselves by idealizing it in writing. Like most +literary versions of science, it rests upon a pseudo-science, +a parody of the real facts. But at a time when economic +conditions are putting an extraordinary emphasis upon +outward achievement, upon success in manipulating nat<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span>ural +and social resources, upon "efficiency" in exploiting +both inanimate energies and the minds and bodies of other +persons, the underlying principle of this theory has a +sanction and vogue which is out of all proportion to the +number of those who consciously entertain it as a theory. +For a healthy mind, the frank statement and facing of the +theory is its best criticism. Its bald brutalism flourishes +freely only when covered and disguised. But in view of the +forces at present, and especially in America, making for +a more or less unconscious acceptance of its principle in +practice, it may be advisable to say something (1) regarding +its alleged scientific foundation, and (2) the +inadequacy of its conception of efficiency.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Theory Exaggerates the Rôle of Antagonistic +Competitive Struggle in the Darwinian Theory.</b>—(a) +The initial step in any "progress" is <i>variation</i>; this is +not so much struggle <i>against</i> other organisms, as it is +<i>invention</i> or discovery of some <i>new</i> way of acting, involving +better adaptation of hitherto merely latent natural +resources, use of some possible food or shelter not previously +utilized. The struggle against other organisms +at work preserves from elimination a species already +fixed—quite a different thing from the variation which +occasions the introduction of a higher or more complex +species. (b) Moreover, so far as the Darwinian theory +is concerned, the "struggle for existence" may take any +conceivable form; rivalry in generosity, in mutual aid +and support, may be the kind of competition best fitted +to enable a species to survive. It not only may be so, but +it is so within certain limits. The rage for survival, for +power, must not be asserted indiscriminately; the mate of +the other sex, the young, to some extent other individuals +of the same kin, are spared, or, in many cases, protected +and nourished.<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> (c) The higher the form of life, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> +<i>more</i> effective the two methods just suggested: namely, +the method of intelligence in discovering and utilizing new +methods, tools, and resources as substituted for the direct +method of brute conflict; and the method of mutual protection +and care substituted for mutual attack and combat. +It is among the lower forms of life, not as the theory +would require among the higher types, that conditions +approximate its picture of the gladiatorial show. The +higher species among the vertebrates, as among insects +(like ants and bees), are the "sociable" kinds. It is sometimes +argued that Darwinism carried into morals would +abolish charity: all care of the hopelessly invalid, of the +economically dependent, and in general of all the weak and +helpless except healthy infants. It is argued that our current +standards are sentimental and artificial, aiming to +make survive those who are unfit, and thus tending to +destroy the conditions that make for advance, and to introduce +such as make towards degeneration. But this +argument (1) wholly ignores the reflex effect of interest +in those who are ill and defective in strengthening social +solidarity—in promoting those ties and reciprocal interests +which are as much the prerequisites of strong individual +characters as they are of a strong social group. +And (2) it fails to take into account the stimulus to foresight, +to scientific discovery, and practical invention, which +has proceeded from interest in the helpless, the weak, the +sick, the disabled, blind, deaf, and insane. Taking the +most coldly scientific view, the gains in these two respects +have, through the growth of social pity, of care for the +unfortunate, been purchased more cheaply than we can +imagine their being bought in any other way. In other +words, the chief objection to this "naturalistic" ethics is +that it overlooks the fact that, even from the Darwinian +point of view, the human <i>animal</i> is a <i>human</i> animal. It +forgets that the sympathetic and social instincts, those +which cause the individual to take the interests of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> +others for his own and thereby to restrain his sheer +brute self-assertiveness, are the highest achievements, the +high-water mark of evolution. The theory urges a systematic +relapse to lower and foregone stages of biological +development.</p> + +<p><b>2. Its Conception of "Power," "Efficiency," "Achievement" +is Perverse.</b>—Compared with the gospel of abstinence, +of inefficiency, preached by the self-denial school, +there is an element of healthy reaction in any ethical system +which stresses positive power, positive success, positive +attainment. Goodness has been too much identified +with practical feebleness and ineptitude; strength and +solidity of accomplishment, with unscrupulousness. But +power for the sake of power is as unreal an abstraction +as self-denial for the sake of sacrifice, or self-restraint +for the sake of the mere restraint. Erected into a central +principle, it takes means for end—the fallacy of all materialism. +It makes little of many of the most important +and excellent <i>inherent ingredients</i> of happiness in its +eagerness to master <i>external conditions</i> of happiness. +Sensitive discrimination of complex and refined distinctions +of worth, such as good taste, the resources of poetry and +history, frank and varied social converse among intellectual +equals, the humor of sympathetic contemplation of +the spectacle of life, the capacity to extract happiness +from solitude and society, from nature and from art:—all +of these, as well as the more obvious virtues of sympathy +and benevolence, are swept aside for one coarse undiscriminating +ideal of external activity, measured by sheer quantity +of external changes made and external results accumulated. +Of such an ideal we may say, as Mill said, +that the judge of good, of happiness, is the one who has +experienced its various forms; and that as "no intelligent +person would consent to be a fool" on account of the pleasures +of the fool, so no man of cultivated spirit would +consent to be a lover of "efficiency" and "power" for the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> +sake of brute command of the external commodities of +nature and man.</p> + +<p><b>Present Currency of This Ideal.</b>—In spite of the extraordinary +currency of this ideal at present, there is +little fear that it will be permanently established. Human +nature is too rich and varied in its capacities and demands; +the world of nature and society is too fruitful in sources +of stimulus and interest for man to remain indefinitely +content with the idea of power for power's sake, command +of means for the mere sake of the means. Humanity has +long lived a precarious and a stunted life because of its +partial and easily shaken hold on natural resources. +Starved by centuries of abstinence enforced through lack +of control of the forces and methods of nature, taught +the gospel of the merit of abstention, it is not surprising +that it should be intoxicated when scientific discovery +bears its fruit of power in utilization of natural +forces, or that, temporarily unbalanced, it should take the +external conditions of happiness for happiness itself. But +when the values of material acquisition and achievement +become familiar they will lose the contrast value they now +possess; and human endeavor will concern itself mainly +with the problem of rendering its conquests in power and +efficiency tributary to the life of intelligence and art and +of social communication.<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> Such a moral idealism will rest +upon a more secure and extensive natural foundation than +that of the past, and will be more equitable in applica<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span>tion +and saner in content than that with which aristocracies +have made us familiar. It will be a democratic ideal, +a good for all, not for a noble class; and it will include, +not exclude, those physical and physiological factors which +aristocratic idealisms have excluded as common and +unclean.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. SELF-LOVE AND BENEVOLENCE; OR, EGOISM AND +ALTRUISM</h4> + +<p>For the last three centuries, the most discussed point +in English ethical literature (save perhaps whether moral +knowledge is intuitive or derived from experience) has +been the relation of regard for one's own self and for +other selves as motives of action—"the crux of all ethical +speculation," Spencer terms it. All views have been represented: +(a) that man naturally acts from purely selfish +motives and that morality consists in an enforced subjection +of self-love to the laws of a common social order, +(b) That man is naturally selfish, while morality is an +"enlightened selfishness," or a regard for self based upon +recognition of the extent to which its happiness requires +consideration of others. (c) That the tendencies of the +agent are naturally selfish, but that morality is the subjection +of these tendencies to the law of duty. (d) That +man's interests are naturally partly egoistic and partly +sympathetic, while morality is a compromise or adjustment +of these tendencies. (e) That man's interests are naturally +both, and morality a subjection of both to conscience as +umpire. (f) That they are both, while morality is a subjection +of egoistic to benevolent sentiments. (g) That the +individual's interests are naturally in objective ends which +primarily are neither egoistic nor altruistic; and these +ends become either selfish or benevolent at special crises, +at which times morality consists in referring them, equally +and impartially for judgment, to a situation in which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> +the interests of the self and of others concerned are involved: +<i>to a common good</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Three Underlying Psychological Principles.</b>—We shall +make no attempt to discuss these various views in detail; +but will bring into relief some of the factors in the discussion +which substantiate the view (g) stated last. It will be +noted that the theories rank themselves under three heads +with reference to the constitution of man's tendencies: +holding they (1) naturally have in view personal ends exclusively +or all fall under the principle of self-love or self-regard; +that (2) some of them contemplate one's own happiness +and some of them that of others; that (3) primarily +they are not <i>consciously</i> concerned with either one's own +happiness or that of others. Memory and reflection may +show (just as it shows other things) that their consequences +affect both the self and others, when the recognition +of this fact becomes an additional element, either for +good or for evil, in the motivation of the act. We shall +consider, first, the various senses in which action occurs, +or is said to occur, in behalf of the person's own self; +and then take up, in similar fashion, its reference to the +interests of others.</p> + +<p><b>I. Action in Behalf of Self.</b>—1. <i>Motives as Selfish</i>: +The Natural Selfishness of Man is maintained from such +different standpoints and with such different objects in +view that it is difficult to state the doctrine in any one +generalized form. By some theologians, it has been associated +with an innate corruption or depravity of human +nature and been made the basis of a demand for supernatural +assistance to lead a truly just and benevolent life. +By Hobbes (1588-1679) it was associated with the anti-social +nature of individuals and made the basis for a plea +for a strong and centralized political authority<a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> to con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span>trol +the natural "war of all against all" which flows inevitably +from the psychological egoism. By Kant, it was +connected with the purely sense origin of desires, and +made the basis for a demand for the complete subordination +of desire to duty as a motive for action. Morals, like +politics, make strange bedfellows! The common factor in +these diverse notions, however, is that every act of a self +must, when left to its <i>natural</i> or psychological course, +have the interest of the self in view; otherwise there would +be no motive for the deed and it would not be done. This +theoretical and <i>a priori</i> view is further supported by pointing +out, sometimes in reprobation of man's sinful nature, +sometimes in a more or less cynical vein, the lurking presence +of some subtle regard for self in acts that apparently +are most generous and "disinterested."<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p> + +<p><b>Ambiguity of the Psychological Basis.</b>—The notion +that all action is "for the self" is infected with the same +ambiguity as the (analogous) doctrine that all desire +is for happiness. Like that doctrine, in one sense it is +a truism, in another a falsity—this latter being the sense +in which its upholders maintain it. Psychologically, any +object that moves us, any object in which we imagine our +impulses to rest satisfied or to find fulfillment, <i>becomes</i>, in +virtue of that fact, a factor in the self. If I am enough +interested in collecting postage stamps, a collection of +postage stamps becomes a part of my "ego," which is incomplete +and restless till filled out in that way. If my +habits are such that I am not content when I know my +neighbor is suffering from a lack of food until I have +relieved him, then relief of his suffering becomes a part +of my selfhood. If my desires are such that I have no +rest of mind until I have beaten my competitor in business, +or have demonstrated my superiority in social gifts +by putting my fellow at some embarrassing disadvantage,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> +then that sort of thing constitutes my self. Our instincts, +impulses, and habits all demand appropriate objects in +order to secure exercise and expression; and these ends +in their office of furnishing outlet and satisfaction to our +powers form a cherished part of the "me." In this sense +it is true, and a truism, that all action involves the interest +of self.</p> + +<p><b>True and False Interpretation.</b>—But this doctrine is +the exact opposite of that intended by those who claim +that all action is from self-love. The true doctrine says, +<i>the self is constituted and developed through instincts and +interests which are directed upon their own objects with +no conscious regard necessarily for anything except those +objects themselves</i>. The false doctrine implies that the +self <i>exists by itself apart from these objective ends, and +that they are merely means for securing it a certain profit +or pleasure</i>.</p> + +<p>Suppose, for example, it is a case of being so disturbed +in mind by the thought of another in pain that one is +moved to do something to relieve him. This means that +certain native instincts or certain acquired habits demand +relief of others as part of themselves. The well-being of +the other is an interest of the self: is a part of the self. +This is precisely what is meant ordinarily by unselfishness: +not lack or absence of a self, but <i>such</i> a self as +identifies itself in action with others' interests and hence +is satisfied only when they are satisfied. To find pain in +the thought of others pained and to take pleasure in the +thought of their relief, is to have and to be moved by +personal motives, by states which are "selfish" in the sense +of making up the self; but which are the exact opposite +of selfish in the sense of being the thought of some private +advantage to self.<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> Putting it roundly, then, the fallacy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> +of the selfish motive theory is that it fails to see that +<i>instincts and habits directed upon objects are primary</i>, +and that they come before any conscious thought of self +as end, since they are necessary to the constitution of +that thought.</p> + +<p>The following quotation from James<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> states the true +doctrine:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When I am led by selflove to keep my seat whilst ladies +stand, or to grab something first and cut out my neighbor, +what I really love is the comfortable seat; it is the thing +itself which I grab. I love <i>them</i> primarily, as the mother +loves her babe, or a generous man an heroic deed. Wherever, +as here, selfseeking is the outcome of simple instinctive propensity, +it is but a name for certain reflex acts. Something +rivets my attention fatally and fatally provokes the 'selfish' +response.... It is true I am no automaton, but a thinker. +But my thoughts, like my acts, are here concerned only with +the outward things.... In fact the more utterly selfish I +am in this primitive way, the more blindly absorbed my +thought will be in the objects and impulses of my lust and +the more devoid of any inward looking glance."</p></div> + +<p><b>2. Results as Selfish: Ambiguity in the Notion.</b>—We +must then give up the notion that motives are inherently +self-seeking, in the sense that there is in voluntary +acts a thought of the self as the end for the sake of which +the act is performed. The self-seeking doctrine may, +however, be restated in these terms: Although there is +no thought of self or its advantage consciously entertained, +yet our original instincts are such that their +objects do as <i>matter of result</i> conduce primarily to the +well-being and advantage of the self. In this sense, anger,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> +fear, hunger, and thirst, etc., are said to be egoistic or self-seeking—not +that their <i>conscious</i> object is the self, but +that their inevitable effect is to preserve and protect the +self. The fact that an instinct secures self-preservation +or self-development does not, however, make it "egoistic" or +"selfish" in the moral sense; nor does it throw any light +upon the moral status of the instinct. <i>Everything depends +upon the sort of self which is maintained.</i> There is, +indeed, some presumption (see <i>ante</i>, p. 294) that the act +sustains a <i>social</i> self, that is, a self whose maintenance is of +social value. If the individual organism did not struggle +for food; strive aggressively against obstacles and interferences; +evade or shelter itself against menacing superior +force, what would become of children, fathers and +mothers, lawyers, doctors and clergymen, citizens and +patriots—in short, of society? If we avoid setting up a +purely abstract self, if we keep in mind that every actual +self is a self which <i>includes</i> social relations and offices, +both actual and potential, we shall have no difficulty +in seeing that self-preservative instincts <i>may</i> be, and taken +by and large, <i>must</i> be, socially conservative. Moreover, +while it is not true that if "a man does not look after his +own interests no one else will" (if that means that his interests +are no one else's affair in any way), it is true +that no one has a right to neglect his own interests in +the hope that some one else will care for them. "His own +interests," properly speaking, are precisely the ends which +concern him more directly than they concern any one else. +Each man is, so to say, nearer himself than is any one +else, and, therefore, has certain duties to and about himself +which cannot be performed by any other one. Others +may present food or the conditions of education, but the +individual alone can digest the food or educate himself. +It is profitable for society, not merely for an individual, +that each of us should instinctively have his powers most +actively and intensely called out by the things that dis<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span>tinctively +affect him and his own welfare. Any other +arrangement would mean waste of social energy, inefficiency +in securing social results.</p> + +<p>The quotation from James also makes it clear, however, +that under certain circumstances the mere absorption in +a thing, even without conscious thought of self, is morally +offensive. The "pig" in manners is not necessarily thinking +of himself; all that is required to make him a pig +is that he should have too narrow and exclusive an object +of regard. The man sees simply the seat, not the seat +<i>and</i> the lady. The boor in manners is unconscious of +many of the objects in the situation which <i>should</i> operate +as stimuli. One impulse or habit is operating at the +expense of others; the self in play is too petty or narrow. +Viewed from the standpoint of results, the fact which constitutes +selfishness in the moral sense is not that certain +impulses and habits secure the well-being of the self, <i>but +that the well-being secured is a narrow and exclusive one</i>. +The forms of coarse egoism which offend us most in ordinary +life are not usually due to a deliberate or self-conscious +seeking of advantage for self, but to such preoccupation +with certain ends as blinds the agent to the +thought of the interests of others. Many whose behavior +seems to others most selfish would deny indignantly (and, +from the standpoint of their <i>definite</i> consciousness, honestly) +any self-seeking motives: they would point to certain +objective results, which in the abstract are desirable, as +the true ends of their activities. But none the less, they +<i>are</i> selfish, because the limitations of their interests make +them overlook the consequences which affect the freedom +and happiness of others.</p> + +<p><b>3. There are also Cases in Which the Thought of +the Resulting Consequence to the Self Consciously +Enters in and Modifies the Motive of the Act.</b>—With +increasing memory and foresight, one can no more ignore +the lesson of the past as to the consequences of an act<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> +upon himself than he can ignore other consequences. A +man who has learned that a certain act has painful consequences +to himself, whether to his body, his reputation, +his comfort, or his character, is quite likely to have the +thought of himself present itself as part of the foreseen +consequences when the question of a similar act recurs. +In and of itself, once more, this fact throws no light upon +the moral status of the act. Everything depends upon +what sort of a self moves and how it moves. A man who +hesitated to rush into a burning building to rescue a suit +of clothes because he thought of the danger to himself, +would be sensible; a man who rushed out of the +building just because he thought of saving himself when +there were others he might have assisted, would be contemptible.</p> + +<p>The one who began taking exercise because he thought +of his own health, would be commended; but a man who +thought so continually of his own health as to shut out +other objects, would become an object of ridicule or worse. +<i>There is a moral presumption that a man should make +consideration of himself a part of his aim and intent.</i> A +certain care of health, of body, of property, of mental +faculty, because they are one's own is not only permissible, +but obligatory. This is what the older moral writers +spoke of as "prudence," or as "reasonable self-love."</p> + +<p>(i.) It is a stock argument of the universal selfishness +theory to point out that a man's acknowledgment of some +<i>public need or benefit</i> is quite likely to coincide with his +recognition of some private advantage. A statesman's +recognition of some measure of public policy happens to +coincide with perceiving that by pressing it he can bring +himself into prominence or gain office. A man is more +likely to see the need of improved conditions of sanitation +or transportation in a given locality if he has property +there. A man's indignation at some prevalent public ill +may sleep till he has had a private taste of it. We may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> +admit that these instances describe a usual, though not +universal, state of affairs. But does it follow that such +men are moved <i>merely</i> by the thought of gain to themselves? +Possibly this sometimes happens; then the act is +selfish in the obnoxious sense. The man has isolated his +thought of himself as an end and made the thought of +the improvement or reform merely an external means. +The latter is not truly his <i>end</i> at all; he has not identified +it with himself. In other cases, while the individual would +not have recognized the end if the thought of himself had +not been implicated, yet <i>after</i> he has recognized it, the +two—the thought of himself and of the public advantage—may +blend. His thought of himself may lend warmth and +intimacy to an object which otherwise would have been +cold, <i>while, at the same time, the self is broadened and +deepened by taking in the new object of regard</i>.</p> + +<p>(ii.) Take the case of amusement or recreation. To an +adult usually engaged in strenuous pursuits, the thought +of a pleasure for the mere sake of pleasure, of enjoyment, +of having a "good time," may appeal as an end. And if +the pleasure is itself "innocent," only the requirements of +a preconceived theory (like the Kantian) would question +its legitimacy. Even its moral necessity is clear when +relaxation is conducive to cheerfulness and efficiency +in more serious pursuits. But if a man discriminates +mentally between himself and the play or exercise in +which he finds enjoyment and relief, thinking of himself +as a distinct end to which the latter is merely means, +he is not likely to get the recreation. It is by forgetting +the self, that is by taking the light and easy activity <i>as</i> +the self of the situation, that the benefit comes. To be +a "lover of pleasure" in the bad sense is precisely to +seek amusements as excitements for a self which somehow +remains outside them as their fixed and ulterior +end.</p> + +<p>(iii.) Exactly the same analysis applies to the idea of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> +the moral culture of the self, of its moral perfecting. +Every serious-minded person has, from time to time, to +take stock of his status and progress in moral matters—to +take thought of the moral self just as at other times +he takes thought of the health of the bodily self. But +woe betides that man who, having entered upon a course of +reflection which leads to a clearer conception of his own +moral capacities and weaknesses, maintains that thought +as a distinct mental end, and thereby makes his subsequent +acts simply means to improving or perfecting his moral +nature. Such a course defeats itself. At the least, it +leads to priggishness, and its tendency is towards one of +the worst forms of selfishness: a habit of thinking and feeling +that persons, that concrete situations and relations, +exist simply to render contributions to one's own precious +moral character. The worst of such selfishness is that +having protected itself with the mantle of interest in moral +goodness, it is proof against that attrition of experience +which may always recall a man to himself in the case of +grosser and more unconscious absorption. A sentimentally +refined egoism is always more hopeless than a brutal and +naïve one—though a brutal one not infrequently protects +itself by adoption and proclamation of the language of +the former.</p> + +<p><b>II. Benevolence or Regard for Others.</b>—<i>Ambiguity in +Conception</i>: There is the same ambiguity in the idea of +sympathetic or altruistic springs to action that there is +in that of egoistic and self-regarding. Does the phrase +refer to their conscious and express intent? or to their +objective results when put into operation, irrespective +of explicit desire and aim? And, if the latter, are we +to believe contribution to the welfare of others to be +the sole and exclusive character of some springs of +action, or simply that, under certain circumstances, the +<i>emphasis</i> falls more upon the good resulting to others +than upon other consequences? The discussion will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> +show that the same general principles hold for "benevolent" +as for self-regarding impulses: namely (1) that +there are none which from the start are consciously such; +(2) that while reflection may bring to light their bearing +upon the welfare of others so that it becomes an element +in the conscious desire, this is a matter of relative preponderance, +not of absolute nature; and (3) that just as +conscious regard for self is not necessarily bad or "selfish," +so conscious regard for others is not necessarily good: +the criterion is the whole situation in which the desire +takes effect.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Existence of Other-Regarding Springs to +Action.</b>—Only the preconceptions of hedonistic psychology +would ever lead one to deny the existence of reactions +and impulses called out by the sight of others' misery +and joy and which tend to increase the latter and to relieve +the former. Recent psychologists (writing, of course, +quite independently of ethical controversies) offer lists +of native instinctive tendencies such as the following: +Anger, jealousy, rivalry, secretiveness, acquisitiveness, +fear, shyness, sympathy, affection, pity, sexual love, curiosity, +imitation, play, constructiveness.<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> In this inventory, +the first seven may be said to be aroused specially +by situations having to do with the preservation of the +self; the next four are responses to stimuli proceeding +especially from others and tending to consequences favorable +to them, while the last four are mainly impersonal. +But the division into self-regarding and other-regarding +is not exclusive and absolute. Anger <i>may</i> be wholly other-regarding, +as in the case of hearty indignation at wrongs +suffered by others; rivalry may be generous emulation or +be directed toward surpassing one's own past record. +Love between the sexes, which should be the source of +steady, far-reaching interest in others, and which at times +expresses itself in supreme abnegation of devotion, easily<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> +becomes the cause of brutal and persistent egoism. In +short, the division into egoistic and altruistic holds only +"other things being equal."</p> + +<p>Confining ourselves for the moment to the native psychological +equipment, we may say that man is endowed +with instinctive promptings which naturally (that is, without +the intervention of deliberation or calculation) tend to +preserve the self (by aggressive attack as in anger, or in +protective retreat as in fear); and to develop his powers +(as in acquisitiveness, constructiveness, and play); and +which equally, without consideration of resulting ulterior +benefit either to self or to others, tend to bind the +self closer to others and to advance the interests of others—as +pity, affectionateness, or again, constructiveness and +play. Any given individual is <i>naturally</i> an erratic mixture +of fierce insistence upon his own welfare and of profound +susceptibility to the happiness of others—different individuals +varying much in the respective intensities and proportions +of the two tendencies.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Moral Status of Altruistic Tendencies.</b>—We +have expressly devoted considerable space (ch. xiii.) to +showing that there are no motives which in and of themselves +are right; that any tendency, whether original +instinct or acquired habit, requires sanction from the +special consequences which, in the special situation, are +likely to flow from it. The mere fact that pity in general +tends to conserve the welfare of others does not guarantee +the rightness of giving way to an impulse of pity, +just as it happens to spring up. This might mean sentimentalism +for the agent, and weakening of the springs of +patience, courage, self-help, and self-respect in others. +The persistence with which the doctrine of the evils of +indiscriminate charity has to be taught is sufficient evidence +that the so-called other-regarding impulses require +the same control by reason as do the "egoistic" ones. +They have no inherent sacredness which exempts them from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> +the application of the standard of the common and reasonable +happiness.</p> + +<p><b>Evils of Unregulated Altruism.</b>—So much follows from +the general principles already discussed. But there are +special dangers and evils attendant upon an exaggeration +of the altruistic idea. (i.) <i>It tends to render others dependent</i>, +and thus contradicts its own professed aim: the +helping of others. Almost every one knows some child who +is so continuously "helped" by others, that he loses his +initiative and resourcefulness. Many an invalid is confirmed +in a state of helplessness by the devoted attention +of others. In large social matters there is always danger +of the substitution of an ideal of conscious "benevolence" +for justice: it is in aristocratic and feudal periods that +the idea flourishes that "charity" (conceived as conferring +benefits <i>upon</i> others, doing things <i>for</i> them) is inherently +and absolutely a good. The idea assumes the continued +and necessary existence of a dependent "lower" class to +be the recipients of the kindness of their superiors; a class +which serves as passive material for the cultivation in +others of the virtue of charity, the higher class "acquiring +merit" at expense of the lower, while the lower +has gratitude and respect for authority as its chief virtues.</p> + +<p>(ii.) <i>The erection of the "benevolent" impulse into a +virtue in and of itself tends to build up egoism in others.</i> +The child who finds himself unremittingly the object of +attention from others is likely to develop an exaggerated +sense of the relative importance of his own <i>ego</i>. The +chronic invalid, conspicuously the recipient of the conscious +altruism of others, is happy in nature who avoids the slow +growth of an insidious egoism. Men who are the constant +subjects of abnegation on the part of their wives +and female relatives rarely fail to develop a self-absorbed +complacency and unconscious conceit.</p> + +<p>(iii.) Undue emphasis upon altruism as a motive is quite +likely to react to form a <i>peculiarly subtle egoism in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> +person who cultivates it</i>. Others cease to be <i>natural</i> objects +of interest and regard, and are converted into excuses for +the manifestation and nurture of one's own generous goodness. +Underlying complacency with respect to social ills +grows up because they afford an opportunity for developing +and displaying this finest of virtues. In our interest +in the maintenance of our own benign altruism we cease +to be properly disturbed by conditions which are intrinsically +unjust and hateful.<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> (iv.) As present circumstances +amply demonstrate, there is the danger that +the erection of benevolence into a conscious principle in +some things will serve to supply rich persons with a cloak +for selfishness in other directions. Philanthropy is made +an offset and compensation for brutal exploitation. A +man who pushes to the breaking-point of legality aggressively +selfish efforts to get ahead of others in business, +squares it in his own self-respect and in the esteem of +those classes of the community who entertain like conceptions, +by gifts of hospitals, colleges, missions, and +libraries.</p> + +<p><b>Genuine and False Altruism.</b>—These considerations +may be met by the obvious retort that it is not true +altruism, genuine benevolence, sincere charity, which we +are concerned with in such cases. This is a true remark. +We are not of course criticizing true but spurious interest +in others. But why is it counterfeit? What is the nature +of the genuine article? The danger is not in benevolence +or altruism, but in that conception of them which makes +them equivalent to regard for others <i>as others</i>, irrespective +of a social situation to which all alike belong. There is +nothing in the selfhood of others, because they are others, +which gives it any supremacy over selfhood in oneself. +Just as it is exclusiveness of objective ends, the ignoring<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> +of relations, which is objectionable in selfishness, so it is +taking the part for the whole which is obnoxious in so-called +altruism. To include in our view of consequences the +needs and possibilities of others on the same basis as our +own, is to take the only course which will give an adequate +view of the situation. There is no situation into which +these factors do not enter. To have a generous view of +others is to have a larger world in which to act. To +remember that they, like ourselves, are persons, are individuals +who are centers of joy and suffering, of lack and +of potentiality, is alone to have a just view of the conditions +and issues of behavior. Quickened sympathy means +liberality of intelligence and enlightened understanding.</p> + +<p><b>The Social Sense versus Altruism.</b>—There is a great +difference in principle between modern philanthropy and +the "charity" which assumes a superior and an inferior +class. The latter principle tries to acquire merit by employing +one's superior resources to lessen, or to mitigate, the +misery of those who are fixed in a dependent status. Its +principle, so far as others are concerned, is negative and +palliative merely. The motive of what is vital in modern +philanthropy is constructive and expansive because it +looks to the well-being of society as a whole, not to +soothing or rendering more tolerable the conditions of a +class. It realizes the interdependence of interests: that +complex and variegated interaction of conditions which +makes it impossible for any one individual or "class" really +to secure, to assure, its own good as a separate thing. Its +aim is general social advance, constructive social reform, +not merely doing something kind for individuals who are +rendered helpless from sickness or poverty. Its aim is +the equity of justice, not the inequality of conferring +benefits. That the sight of the misery that comes from +sickness, from insanity, from defective organic structure +(as among the blind and deaf), from poverty that destroys +hope and dulls initiative, from bad nutrition, should stim<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span>ulate +this general quickening of the social sense is natural. +But just as the activities of the parent with reference +to the welfare of a helpless infant are wisely directed in +the degree in which attention is mainly fixed not upon +weakness, but upon positive opportunities for growth, so +the efforts of those whose activities, by the nature of circumstances, +have to be especially remedial and palliative +are most effective when centered on the social rights and +possibilities of the unfortunate individuals, instead of +treating them as separate individuals to whom, in their +separateness, "good is to be done."</p> + +<p>The best kind of help to others, whenever possible, is +indirect, and consists in such modifications of the conditions +of life, of the general level of subsistence, as enables +them independently to help themselves.<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> Whenever conditions +require purely direct and personal aid, it is best +given when it proceeds from a natural social relationship, +and not from a motive of "benevolence" as a separate +force.<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> The gift that pauperizes when proceeding from +a philanthropist in his special capacity, is a beneficent +acknowledgment of the relationships of the case when it +comes from a neighbor or from one who has other interests +in common with the one assisted.</p> + +<p><b>The Private and the Social Self.</b>—The contrast between +the narrow or restrictive and the general or +expansive good explains why evil presents itself as a +selfish end in contrast with an authoritative, but faint, +good of others. This is not, as we have seen, because +regard for the good of self is inherently bad and regard +for that of others intrinsically right; but because we are +apt to identify the self with the habitual, with that to +which we are best adjusted and which represents the cus<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span>tomary +occupation. Any moral crisis is thus fairly pictured +as a struggle to overcome selfishness. The tendency +under such circumstances is to contract, to secrete, to hang +on to what is already achieved and possessed. The habitual +self needs to go out of the narrowness of its accustomed +grooves into the spacious air of more generous +behavior.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION</h4> + +<p>We now come to the theory which attempts to do justice +to the one-sided truths we have been engaged with, <i>viz.</i>, +the idea that the moral end is <i>self-realization</i>. Like self-assertion +in some respects, it differs in conceiving the self +to be realized as universal and ultimate, involving the fulfillment +of <i>all</i> capacities and the observance of <i>all</i> +relations. Such a comprehensive self-realization includes +also, it is urged, the truth of altruism, since the "universal +self" is realized only when the relations that bind +one to others are fulfilled. It avoids also the inconsistencies +and defects of the notion of self-sacrifice for its own sake, +while emphasizing that the present incomplete self must be +denied for the sake of attainment of a more complete and +final self. A discussion of this theory accordingly furnishes +the means of gathering together and summarizing +various points regarding the rôle of the self in the moral +life.</p> + +<p><b>Ambiguity in the Conception.</b>—Is self-realization the +end? As we have had such frequent occasion to observe, +"end" means either the consequences actually effected, the +closing and completing phase of an act, or the aim held +deliberately in view. Now realization of self is an end +(though not the only end) in the former sense. Every +moral act in its outcome marks a development or fulfillment +of selfhood. But the very nature of right action +forbids that the self should be the end in the sense of +being the conscious aim of moral activity. For there<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> +is no way of discovering the nature of the self except in +terms of objective ends which fulfill its capacities, and +there is no <i>way</i> of realizing the self except as it is forgotten +in devotion to these objective ends.</p> + +<p><b>1. Self-Realization as Consequence of Moral Action.</b>—Every +good act realizes the selfhood of the agent who performs +it; every bad act tends to the lowering or destruction +of selfhood. This truth is expressed in Kant's maxim +that every personality should be regarded as always an end, +never as a means, with its implication that a wrong intent +always reduces selfhood to the status of a mere tool or +device for securing some end beyond itself—the self-indulgent +man treating his personal powers as mere means to +securing ease, comfort, or pleasure. It is expressed by +ordinary moral judgment in its view that all immoral +action is a sort of prostitution, a lowering of the dignity +of the self to base ends. The destructive tendency of evil +deeds is witnessed also by our common language in its conception +of wrong as dissipation, dissoluteness, duplicity. +The bad character is one which is shaky, empty, +"naughty," unstable, gone to pieces, just as the good +man is straight, solid, four-square, sound, substantial. +This conviction that at bottom and in the end, in spite +of all temporary appearance to the contrary, the right +act effects a realization of the self, is also evidenced in +the common belief that virtue brings its own bliss. No +matter how much suffering from physical loss or from +material and mental inconvenience or loss of social repute +virtue may bring with it, the <i>quality of happiness</i> that +accompanies devotion to the right end is so unique, +so <i>invaluable</i>, that pains and discomforts do not weigh +in the balance. It is indeed possible to state this truth in +such an exaggerated perspective that it becomes false; but +taken just for what it is, it acknowledges that whatever +harm or loss a right act may bring to the self in some of +its aspects,—even extending to destruction of the bodily<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> +self,—the inmost moral self finds fulfillment and consequent +happiness in the good.</p> + +<p><b>2. Self-Realization as Aim of Moral Action.</b>—This +realization of selfhood in the right course of action is, +however, not <i>the</i> end of a moral act—that is, it is not +the only end. The moral act is one which sustains a whole +complex system of social values; one which keeps vital +and progressive the industrial order, science, art, and the +State. The patriot who dies for his country may find +in that devotion his own supreme realization, but none the +less the aim of his act is precisely that for which he performs +it: the conservation of his nation. He dies <i>for</i> his +country, not <i>for</i> himself. He is what he would be in dying +for his country, not in dying for himself. To say that +his conscious aim is self-realization is to put the cart +before the horse. That his willingness to die for his country +proves that his country's good is taken by him to +constitute himself and his own good is true; but his aim +is his country's good <i>as constituting</i> his self-realization, +not the self-realization. It is impossible that genuine +artistic creation or execution should not be accompanied +with the joy of an expanding selfhood, but the artist +who thinks <i>of</i> himself and allows a view of himself to intervene +between his performance and its result, has the +embarrassment and awkwardness of "self-consciousness," +which affects for the worse his artistic product. And it +makes little difference whether it is the thought of himself +as materially profiting, or as famous, or as technical +performer, or as benefiting the public, or as securing +his own complete artistic culture, that comes in between. +In any case, there is loss to the work, and loss in the +very thing taken as end, namely, development of his +own powers. The problem of morality, upon the intellectual +side, is the discovery of, the finding of, the self, in +the objective end to be striven for; and then upon the +overt practical side, it is the losing of the self in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> +endeavor for the objective realization. This is the lasting +truth in the conception of self-abnegation, self-forgetfulness, +disinterested interest.</p> + +<p><b>The Thought of Self-Realization.</b>—Since, however, the +realization of selfhood, the strengthening and perfecting +of capacity, is as matter of fact one phase of the objective +end, it may, <i>at times</i>, be definitely present in +thought as part of the foreseen consequences; and even, +<i>at times</i>, may be the most prominent feature of the conceived +results. The artist, for example a musician or +painter, may practice for the sake of acquiring skill, that +is, of developing capacity. In this case, the usual relationship +of objective work and personal power is reversed; +the product or performance being subordinated to the +perfecting of power, instead of power being realized in +the use it is put to. But the development of power is +not conceived as a final end, but as <i>desirable because of an +eventual more liberal and effective use</i>. It is matter of +temporary emphasis. Something of like nature occurs in +the moral life—not that one definitely rehearses or practices +moral deeds for the sake of acquiring more skill +and power. At times the effect upon the self of a deed +becomes the conspicuously controlling element in the forecast +of consequences. (See p. 382.) For example, a person +may realize that a certain act is trivial in its effects +upon others and in the changes it impresses upon the +world; and yet he may hesitate to perform it because he +realizes it would intensify some tendency of his own in +such a way as, in the delicate economy of character, to disturb +the proper balance of the springs to action. Or, on +the other hand, the agent may apprehend that some consequences +that are legitimate and important in themselves +involve, in their attainment, an improper sacrifice of personal +capacity. In such cases, the consideration of the +effect upon self-realization is not only permissible, but +imperative as <i>a part or phase of the total end</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>The Problem of Equating Personal and General Happiness.</b>—Much +moral speculation has been devoted to +the problem of equating personal happiness and regard for +the general good. Right moral action, it is assumed, +consists especially of justice and benevolence,—attitudes +which aim at the good of others. But, it is also assumed, +a just and righteous order of the universe requires +that the man who seeks the happiness of others should +also himself be a happy man. Much ingenuity has been +directed to explaining away and accounting for the seeming +discrepancies: the cases where men not conspicuous for +regard for others or for maintaining a serious and noble +view of life seem to maintain a banking-credit on the side +of happiness; while men devoted to others, men conspicuous +for range of sympathetic affections, seem to have a +debit balance. The problem is the more serious because +the respective good and ill fortunes do not seem to be +entirely accidental and external, but to come as results +from the moral factors in behavior. It would not be +difficult to build up an argument to show that while extreme +viciousness or isolated egoism is unfavorable to +happiness, so also are keenness and breadth of affections. +The argument would claim that the most comfortable +course of life is one in which the man cultivates enough +intimacies with enough persons to secure for himself their +support and aid, but avoids engaging his sympathies too +closely in their affairs and entangling himself in any associations +which would require self-sacrifice or exposure to +the sufferings of others: a course of life in which the +individual shuns those excesses of vice which injure health, +wealth, and lessen the decent esteem of others, but also +shuns enterprises of precarious virtue and devotion to +high and difficult ends.</p> + +<p><b>Real and Artificial Aspects of the Problem.</b>—The +problem thus put seems insoluble, or soluble only upon +the supposition of some prolongation of life under condi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span>tions +very different from those of the present, in which the +present lack of balance between happiness and goodness +will be redressed. <i>But the problem is insoluble because it +is artificial.</i><a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> It assumes a ready-made self and hence a +ready-made type of satisfaction of happiness. It is not +the business of moral theory to demonstrate the existence +of mathematical equations, in this life or another one, between +goodness and virtue. It is the business of men +to develop such capacities and desires, such selves as +render them capable of finding their own satisfaction, +their invaluable value, in fulfilling the demands which +grow out of their associated life. Such happiness may +be short in duration and slight in bulk: but that it outweighs +in quality all accompanying discomforts as well as +all enjoyments which may have been missed by not doing +something else, is attested by the simple fact that men do +consciously choose it. Such a person has found <i>himself</i>, +and has solved the problem in the only place and in the +only way in which it can be solved: <i>in action</i>. To demand +in advance of voluntary desire and deliberate choice that +it be demonstrated that an individual shall get happiness +in the measure of the rightness of his act, is to demand +the obliteration of the essential factor in morality: +the constant discovery, formation, and reformation of the +self in the ends which an individual is called upon to +sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> +social whole. The solution of the problem through the +individual's voluntary identification of himself with social +relations and aims is neither rare nor utopian. It is +achieved not only by conspicuous social figures, but by +multitudes of "obscure" figures who are faithful to the +callings of their social relationships and offices. That the +conditions of life for all should be enlarged, that wider +opportunities and richer fields of activity should be opened, +in order that happiness may be of a more noble and variegated +sort, that those inequalities of status which lead men +to find their advantage in disregard of others should be +destroyed—these things are indeed necessary. But under +the most ideal conditions which can be imagined, if there +remain any moral element whatsoever, it will be only +through personal deliberation and personal preference as +to objective and social ends that the individual will discover +and constitute himself, and hence discover the sort +of happiness required as his good.</p> + +<p>Our final word about the place of the self in the moral +life is, then, that the problem of morality is the formation, +out of the body of original instinctive impulses which compose +the natural self, of a voluntary self in which socialized +desires and affections are dominant, and in which the last +and controlling principle of deliberation is the love of the +objects which will make this transformation possible. If +we identify, as we must do, the interests of such a character +with the virtues, we may say with Spinoza that happiness +is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself. What, +then, are the virtues?</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>For asceticism, see Lecky, <i>History of European Morals</i>.</p> + +<p>For self-denial, Mackenzie, <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. V., +pp. 273-295.</p> + +<p>For egoism and altruism: Comte, <i>System of Positive Politics</i>, Introduction, +ch. iii., and Part II., ch. ii.; Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, +Vol. I., Part I., chs. xi.-xiv.; Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, ch. vi.;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> +Paulsen, <i>System of Ethics</i>, pp. 379-399; Sorley, <i>Recent Tendencies +in Ethics</i>; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, pp. 494-507.</p> + +<p>For the doctrine of self-interest, see Mandeville, <i>Fable of Bees</i>; +Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, Book I., ch. vii., and Book II., ch. v.; +Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, ch. x.; Martineau, <i>Types of Ethical +Theory</i>, Part II., Book II., Branch I., ch. i.; Fite, <i>Introductory Study</i>, +ch. ii.</p> + +<p>For historic development of sympathy, see Sutherland, <i>Origin and +Growth of the Moral Instinct</i>.</p> + +<p>For the doctrine of self-realization, see Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>; Green, +<i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>; Seth, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Part I., ch. iii.; +Bradley, <i>Ethical Studies</i>, Essay II.; Fite, <i>Introductory Study</i>, ch. +xi.; Paulsen, <i>System of Ethics</i>, Book II., ch. i.; Taylor, <i>International +Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. VI., pp. 356-371; Palmer, <i>The Heart of +Ethics</i>, and <i>The Nature of Goodness</i>; Calderwood, <i>Philosophical +Review</i>, Vol. V., pp. 337-351; Dewey, <i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. II., +pp. 652-664; Bryant, <i>Studies in Character</i>, pp. 97-117.</p> + +<p>For the ethics of success, besides the writings of Nietzsche, see +Plato, <i>Gorgias</i> and <i>Republic</i>, Book I., and Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>, +ch. xx.</p> + +<p>For the social self: Cooley, <i>Human Nature and the Social Order</i>, +chs. v. and vi.; for the antagonistic self, chs. vii.-ix.</p> + +<p>For a general discussion of the Moral Self, see Bosanquet, <i>Psychology +of the Moral Self</i>; Ladd, <i>Philosophy of Conduct</i>, ch. ix. +(see also ch. xviii. on the Good Man).</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_170_170" id="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> Compare the opening words of Emerson's <i>Essay on Compensation</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_171_171" id="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> The principle of a "higher law" for the few who are leaders was +first explicitly asserted in modern thought by Machiavelli.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_172_172" id="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> Some phases of the writings of Nietzsche supply relevant material +for this sketch. See especially his <i>Will for Power, Beyond Good +and Evil</i>, and such statements as: "The loss of force which suffering +has already brought upon life is still further increased and multiplied +by sympathy. Suffering itself becomes contagious through +sympathy" (overlooking the reaction of sympathy to abolish the source +of suffering and thus increase force). "Sympathy thwarts, on the +whole, in general, the law of development, which is the law of selection."—<i>Works</i>, +Vol. XI., p. 242.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_173_173" id="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> This phase of the matter has been brought out (possibly with +some counter-exaggeration) by Kropotkin in his <i>Mutual Aid</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_174_174" id="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> Spencer puts the matter truly, if ponderously, in the following: +"The citizens of a large nation industrially organized, have reached +their possible ideal of happiness when the producing, distributing +and other activities, are such in their kinds and amounts, that each +individual finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes, +while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires. Once more +we may recognize as not only possible, but probable, the eventual +existence of a community, also industrial, the members of which, +having natures similarly responding to these requirements, are also +characterized by dominant æsthetic faculties, and achieve complete +happiness only when a large part of life is filled with æsthetic activities" +(<i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. I., p. 169).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_175_175" id="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> Machiavelli, transferring from theology to statecraft the notion +of the corruption and selfishness of all men, was the first modern +to preach this doctrine.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176_176" id="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> See, for example, Hobbes, <i>Leviathan</i>; Mandeville, <i>Fable of the +Bees</i>; and Rochefoucauld, <i>Maxims</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_177_177" id="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> Compare what was said above, p. 273, on the confusion of +pleasure as end, and as motive. Compare also the following from +Leslie Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, p. 241. It is often "insinuated +that I dislike your pain because it is painful to me in some special +relation. I do not dislike it as your pain, but in virtue of some +particular consequence, such, for example, as its making you less +able to render me a service. In that case I do not really object +to your pain as your pain at all, but only to some removable and +accidental consequences." The entire discussion of sympathy (pp. +230-245), which is admirable, should be consulted.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_178_178" id="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> <i>Psychology</i>, Vol. I., p. 320. The whole discussion, pp. 317-329, +is very important.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_179_179" id="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> See, for example, James, <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, Vol. II., ch. +xxiv.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_180_180" id="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> Measures of public or state activity in the extension, for example, +of education (furnishing free text-books, adequate medical inspection, +and remedy of defects), are opposed by "good people" because +there are "charitable" agencies for doing these things.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_181_181" id="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> Compare Spencer's criticisms of Bentham's view of happiness +as a social standard in contrast with his own ideal of freedom. +See <i>Ethics</i>, Vol. I., pp. 162-168.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182_182" id="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> See Addams, <i>Democracy and Social Ethics</i>, ch. ii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_183_183" id="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> Compare the following extreme words of Sumner (<i>Folkways</i>, +p. 9): "The great question of world philosophy always has been, +what is the real relation between happiness and goodness? It is +only within a few generations that men have found courage to say +there is none." But when Sumner, in the next sentence, says, "The +whole strength of the notion that they are correlated is in the +opposite experience which proves that no evil thing brings happiness," +one may well ask what more relation any reasonable man +would want. For it indicates that "goodness" consists in active +interest in those things which really bring happiness; and while +it by no means follows that this interest will <i>bring</i> even a preponderance +of pleasure over pain to the person, it is always open to him +to <i>find</i> and <i>take</i> his dominant happiness in making this interest +dominant in his life.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XIX</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE VIRTUES</h2> + + +<h4>INTRODUCTORY</h4> + +<p><b>Definition of Virtue.</b>—It is upon the self, upon the +agent, that ultimately falls the burden of maintaining and +of extending the values which make life reasonable and +good. The worth of science, of art, of industry, of relationship +of man and wife, parent and child, teacher and +pupil, friend and friend, citizen and State, exists only as +there are characters consistently interested in such goods. +Hence any trait of character which makes for these +goods is esteemed; it is given positive value; while any +disposition of selfhood found to have a contrary tendency +is condemned—has negative value. The habits of character +whose effect is to sustain and spread the rational +or common good are virtues; the traits of character which +have the opposite effect are vices.</p> + +<p><b>Virtue and Approbation; Vice and Condemnation.</b>—The +approbation and disapprobation visited upon conduct +are never purely intellectual. They are also emotional and +practical. We are stirred to hostility at whatever disturbs +the order of society; we are moved to admiring sympathy +of whatever makes for its welfare. And these emotions +express themselves in appropriate conduct. To disapprove +and dislike is to reprove, blame, and punish. To approve +is to encourage, to aid, and support. Hence the judgments +express the character of the one who utters them—they +are traits of his conduct and character; and they +react into the character of the agent upon whom they are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> +directed. They are part of the process of forming character. +The commendation is of the nature of a reward +calculated to confirm the person in the right course of +action. The reprobation is of the nature of punishment, +fitted to dissuade the agent from the wrong course. This +encouragement and blame are not necessarily of an external +sort; the reward and the punishment may not be +in material things. It is not from ulterior design that +society esteems and respects those attributes of an agent +which tend to its own peace and welfare; it is from natural, +instinctive response to acknowledge whatever makes for its +good. None the less, the social esteem, the honor which +attend certain acts inevitably educate the individual +who performs these acts, and they strengthen, emotionally +and practically, his interest in the right. Similarly, +there is an instinctive reaction of society against an +infringement of its customs and ideals; it naturally +"makes it hot" for any one who disturbs its values. And +this disagreeable attention instructs the individual as to +the consequences of his act, and works to hinder the formation +of dispositions of the socially disliked kind.</p> + +<p><b>Natural Ability and Virtue.</b>—There is a tendency to +use the term virtue in an abstract "moralistic" sense—a +way which makes it almost Pharisaic in character. Hard +and fast lines are drawn between certain traits of character +labeled "virtues" and others called talents, natural +abilities, or gifts of nature. Apart from deliberate or +reflective nurture, modesty or generosity is no less and no +more a purely natural ability than is good-humor, a turn +for mechanics, or presence of mind. Every natural capacity, +every talent or ability, whether of inquiring mind, +of gentle affection or of executive skill, becomes a virtue +when it is turned to account in supporting or extending +the fabric of social values; and it turns, if not to vice +at least to delinquency, when not thus utilized. The important +habits conventionally reckoned virtues are barren<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> +unless they are the cumulative assemblage of a multitude +of anonymous interests and capacities. Such natural aptitudes +vary widely in different individuals. Their endowments +and circumstances occasion and exact different +virtues, and yet one person is not more or less virtuous +than another because his virtues take a different form.</p> + +<p><b>Changes in Virtues.</b>—It follows also that the meaning, +or content, of virtues changes from time to time. Their +abstract form, the man's attitude towards the good, remains +the same. But when institutions and customs +change and natural abilities are differently stimulated and +evoked, ends vary, and habits of character are differently +esteemed both by the individual agent and by others who +judge. No social group could be maintained without +patriotism and chastity, but the actual meaning of chastity +and patriotism is widely different in contemporary +society from what it was in savage tribes or from what +we may expect it to be five hundred years from now. Courage +in one society may consist almost wholly in willingness +to face physical danger and death in voluntary devotion to +one's community; in another, it may be willingness to +support an unpopular cause in the face of ridicule.</p> + +<p><b>Conventional and Genuine Virtue.</b>—When we take +these social changes on a broad scale, in the gross, the point +just made is probably clear without emphasis. But we are +apt to forget that minor changes are going on all the +while. The community's formulated code of esteem and +regard and praise at any given time is likely to lag somewhat +behind its practical level of achievement and possibility. +It is more or less traditional, describing what used +to be, rather than what are, virtues. The "respectable" +comes to mean tolerable, passable, conventional. Accordingly +the prevailing scheme of assigning merit and blame, +while on the whole a mainstay of moral guidance and instruction, +is also a menace to moral growth. Hence men +must look behind the current valuation to the real value.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> +Otherwise, mere conformity to custom is conceived to be +virtue;<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> and the individual who deviates from custom in +the interest of wider and deeper good is censured.</p> + +<p><b>Moral Responsibility for Praise and Blame.</b>—The practical +assigning of value, of blame and praise, is a measure +and exponent of the character of the one from whom it +issues. In judging others, in commending and condemning, +we judge ourselves. What we find to be praiseworthy +and blameworthy is a revelation of our own affections. +Very literally the measure we mete to others is meted to +us. To be free in our attributions of blame is to be +censorious and uncharitable; to be unresentful to evil is to +be indifferent, or interested perhaps chiefly in one's own +popularity, so that one avoids giving offense to others. +To engage profusely in blame and approbation in speech +without acts which back up or attack the ends verbally +honored or condemned, is to have a perfunctory morality. +To cultivate complacency and remorse apart from effort +to improve is to indulge in sentimentality. In short, to +approve or to condemn is itself a moral act for which we +are as much responsible as we are for any other deed.</p> + +<p><b>Impossibility of Cataloguing Virtues.</b>—These last three +considerations: (1) the intimate connection of virtues with +all sorts of individual capacities and endowments, (2) the +change in types of habit required with change of social +customs and institutions, (3) the dependence of judgment +of vice and virtue upon the character of the one judging,<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> +make undesirable and impossible a catalogued list of vir<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span>tues +with an exact definition of each. Virtues are numberless. +Every situation, not of a routine order, +brings in some special shading, some unique adaptation, +of disposition.</p> + +<p><b>Twofold Classification.</b>—We may, however, classify +the chief institutions of social life—language, scientific investigation, +artistic production, industrial efficiency, family, +local community, nation, humanity—and specify the +types of mental disposition and interest which are fitted to +maintain them flourishingly; or, starting from typical impulsive +and instinctive tendencies, we may consider the +form they assume when they become intelligently exercised +habits. A virtue may be defined, accordingly, either as +<i>the settled intelligent identification of an agent's capacity +with some aspect of the reasonable or common happiness</i>; +or, as <i>a social custom or tendency organized into a personal +habit of valuation</i>. From the latter standpoint, +truthfulness is the social institution of language maintained +at its best pitch of efficiency through the habitual +purposes of individuals; from the former, it is an instinctive +capacity and tendency to communicate emotions +and ideas directed so as to maintain social peace and +prosperity. In like fashion, one might catalogue all forms +of social custom and institution on one hand; and all the +species and varieties of individual equipment on the other, +and enumerate a virtue for each. But the performance is +so formal as not to amount to much.</p> + +<p><b>Aspects of Virtue.</b>—Any virtuous disposition of character +exhibits, however, certain main traits, a consideration +of which will serve to review and summarize our analysis +of the moral life.</p> + +<p><b>I. The Interest Must be Entire or Whole-hearted.</b>—The +whole self, without division or reservation, must go +out into the proposed object and find therein its own satisfaction. +Virtue is integrity; vice duplicity. Goodness is +straight, right; badness is crooked, indirect. Interest that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> +is incomplete is not interest, but (so far as incomplete) indifference +and disregard. This totality of interest we call +affection, love; and love is the fulfilling of the law. A +grudging virtue is next to no virtue at all; thorough heartiness +in even a bad cause stirs admiration, and lukewarmness +in every direction is always despised as meaning lack +of character. Surrender, abandonment, is of the essence +of identification of self with an object.</p> + +<p><b>II. The Interest Must be Energetic and Hence Persistent.</b>—One +swallow does not make a summer nor a sporadic +right act a virtuous habit. Fair-weather character +has a proverbially bad name. Endurance through discouragement, +through good repute and ill, weal and woe, tests +the vigor of interest in the good, and both builds up and +expresses a formed character.</p> + +<p><b>III. The Interest Must be Pure or Sincere.</b>—Honesty +is, doubtless, the best policy, and it is better a man should +be honest from policy than not honest at all. If genuinely +honest from considerations of prudence, he is on the road +to learn better reasons for honesty. None the less, we are +suspicious of a man if we believe that motives of personal +profit are the only stay of his honesty. For circumstances +might arise in which, in the exceptional case, it would be +clear that personal advantage lay in dishonesty. The motive +for honesty would hold in most cases, in ordinary and +routine circumstances and in the glare of publicity, but +not in the dark of secrecy, or in the turmoil of disturbed +circumstance. The eye single to the good, the "disinterested +interest" of moralists, is required. The motive +that has to be coaxed or coerced to its work by some +promise or threat is imperfect.</p> + +<p><b>Cardinal or Indispensable Aspects of Virtue.</b>—Bearing +in mind that we are not attempting to classify various +acts or habits, but only to state traits essential to all morality, +we have the "cardinal virtues" of moral theory. +As whole-hearted, as complete interest, any habit or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> +attitude of character involves justice and love; as persistently +active, it is courage, fortitude, or vigor; as unmixed +and single, it is temperance—in its classic sense. +And since no habitual interest can be integral, enduring, +or sincere, save as it is reasonable, save, that is, as it is +rooted in the deliberate habit of viewing the part in the +light of the whole, the present in the light of the past and +future, interest in the good is also wisdom or conscientiousness:—interest +in the discovery of the true good of +the situation. Without this interest, all our interest is +likely to be perverted and misleading—requiring to be +repented of.</p> + +<p>Wisdom, or (in modern phrase) conscientiousness, is the +nurse of all the virtues. Our most devoted courage is in +the will to know the good and the fair by unflinching attention +to the painful and disagreeable. Our severest discipline +in self-control is that which checks the exorbitant +pretensions of an appetite by insisting upon knowing it in +its true proportions. The most exacting justice is that of +an intelligence which gives due weight to each desire and +demand in deliberation before it is allowed to pass into +overt action. That affection and wisdom lie close to each +other is evidenced by our language; thoughtfulness, regard, +consideration for others, recognition of others, +attention to others.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. TEMPERANCE</h4> + +<p>The English word "temperance" (particularly in its +local association with agitation regarding use of intoxicating +liquors) is a poor substitute for the Greek <i>sophrosyne</i> +which, through the Latin <i>temperantia</i>, it represents. +The Athenian Greek was impressed with the fact that just +as there are lawless, despotically ruled, and self-governed +communities, so there are lawless, and servile, and self-ruled +individuals. Whenever there is a self-governed soul,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> +there is a happy blending of the authority of reason with +the force of appetite. The individual's diverse nature is +tempered into a living harmony of desire and intelligence. +Reason governs not as a tyrant from without, but as a +guide to which the impulses and emotions are gladly responsive. +Such a well-attuned nature, as far from asceticism +on one side as from random indulgence on the other, +represented the ideal of what was fair and graceful in +character, an ideal embodied in the notion of <i>sophrosyne</i>. +This was a <i>whole-mindedness</i> which resulted from the +happy furtherance of all the elements of human nature +under the self-accepted direction of intelligence. It implied +an <i>æsthetic</i> view of character; of harmony in +structure and rhythm in action. It was the virtue of +judgment exercised in the estimate of pleasures:—since +it is the agreeable, the pleasant, which gives an end +excessive hold upon us.</p> + +<p><b>Roman Temperantia.</b>—The Roman conceived this virtue +under the term <i>temperantia</i>, which conveys the same +idea, but accommodated to the Roman genius. It is connected +with the word <i>tempus</i>, time, which is connected also +with a root meaning divide, distribute; it suggests a consecutive +orderliness of behavior, a freedom from excessive +and reckless action, first this way, and then that. It means +seemliness, decorum, decency. It was "moderation," not +as quantity of indulgence, but as a moderating of each act +in a series by the thought of other and succeeding acts—keeping +each in sequence with others in a whole. The idea +of time involves time to think; the sobering second thought +expressed in seriousness and gravity. The negative side, +the side of restraint, of inhibition, is strong, and functions +for the consistent calm and gravity of life.</p> + +<p><b>Christian Purity.</b>—Through the Christian influence, the +connotation which is marked in the notion of control of +sexual appetite, became most obvious—<i>purity</i>. Passion is +not so much something which disturbs the harmony of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> +man's nature, or which interrupts its orderliness, as it is +something which defiles the purity of spiritual nature. It +is the grossness, the contamination of appetite which is +insisted upon, and temperance is the maintenance of the +soul spotless and unsullied.</p> + +<p><b>Negative Phase</b>:—Self-control. A negative aspect of +self-control, restraint, inhibition is everywhere involved.<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> +It is not, however, desire, or appetite, or passion, or impulse, +which has to be checked (much less eliminated); it +is rather that tendency of desire and passion so to engross +attention as to destroy our sense of the other ends which +have a claim upon us. This moderation of pretension is +indispensable for every desire. In one direction, it is modesty, +humility; the restraint of the tendency of self-conceit +to distort the relative importance of the agent's and others' +concerns; in another direction, it is chastity; in another, +"temperance" in the narrower sense of that word—keeping +the indulgence of hunger and thirst from passing reasonable +bounds; in another, it is calmness, self-possession—moderation +of the transporting power of excitement; in +yet another, it is discretion, imposing limits upon the use +of the hand, eye, or tongue. In matters of wealth, it is +decent regulation of display and ostentation. In general, +it is prudence, control of the present impulse and desire +by a view of the "long run," of proximate by remote +consequences.<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> + +<p><b>Positive Phase: Reverence.</b>—The tendency of dominant +passion is to rush us along, to prevent our thinking. +The one thing that desire emphasizes is, for the time being, +the most important thing in the universe. This is necessary +to heartiness and effectiveness of interest and be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span>havior. +But it is important that the thing which thus absorbs +desire should be an end capable of justifying its +power to absorb. This is possible only if it expresses the +entire self. Otherwise capacities and desires which will +occur later will be inconsistent and antagonistic, and +conduct will be unregulated and unstable. The underlying +idea in "temperance" is then a care of details for the +sake of the whole course of behavior of which they are +parts; heedfulness, painstaking devotion. Laxness in conduct +means carelessness; lack of regard for the whole life +permits temporary inclinations to get a sway that the +outcome will not justify. In its more striking forms, +we call this care and respect <i>reverence</i>; recognition of the +unique, invaluable worth embodied in any situation or +act of life, a recognition which checks that flippancy of +surrender to momentary excitement coming from a superficial +view of behavior. A sense of momentous issues +at stake means a sobering and deepening of the mental +attitude. The consciousness that every deed of +life has an import clear beyond its immediate, or first +significance, attaches dignity to every act. To live +in the sense of the larger values attaching to our passing +desires and deeds is to be possessed by the virtue of +temperance.</p> + +<p><b>Control of Excitement.</b>—What hinders such living is, +as we have seen, the exaggerated intensity, the lack of proportion +and perspective, with which any appetite or desire +is likely to present itself. It is this which moralists of +all ages have attacked under the name of pleasure—the alluring +and distracting power of the momentarily agreeable. +Seeing in this the enemy which prevents the rational +survey of the whole field and the calm, steady insight into +the true good, it is hardly surprising that moralists have +attacked "pleasure" as the source of every temptation to +stray from the straight path of reason. But it is not +pleasure, it is one form of pleasure, the <i>pleasure of excite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span>ment</i>, +which is the obstacle and danger.<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> Every impulse +and desire marks a certain disturbance in the order of +life, an exaltation above the existing level, a pressure +beyond its existing limit. To give way to desire, to let it +grow, to taste to the full its increasing and intensifying +excitement, is the temptation. The bodily appetites of +hunger and thirst and sex, with which we associate the +grossest forms of indulgence and laxity, exemplify the +principle of expanding waves of organic stimulation. But +so also do many of the subtler forms of unrestraint or intemperate +action. The one with a clever and lively tongue +is tempted to let it run away with him; the vain man +feeds upon the excitement of a personality heightened by +display and the notice of others; the angry man, even +though he knows he will later regret his surrender, gives +away to the sense of expanding power coincident with +his discharge of rage. The shiftless person finds it easier +to take chances and let consequences take care of themselves, +while he enjoys local and casual stimulations. Trivialities +and superficialities entangle us in a flippant life, +because each one as it comes promises to be "thrilling," +while the very fear that this promise will not +be kept hurries us on to new experiences. To think of +alternatives and consequences is not "thrilling," but +serious.</p> + +<p><b>Necessity of Superior Interest.</b>—Now calculation of +the utilitarian type is not adequate to deal with this temptation. +Those who are prone to reflection upon results +are just those who are least likely to be carried away by +excitement—unless, as is the case with some specialists,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> +thinking is itself the mode of indulgence in excitement.<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> +With those who are carried away habitually by some mode +of excitement, the disease and the incapacity to take the +proffered remedy of reflection are the same thing. Only +some <i>other</i> passion will accomplish the desired control. +With the Greeks, it was æsthetic passion, love of the grace +and beauty, the rhythm and harmony, of a self-controlled +life. With the Romans, it was the passion for dignity, +power, honor of personality, evidenced in rule of appetite. +Both of these motives remain among the strong allies of +ordered conduct. But the passion for purity, the sense +of something degrading and foul in surrender to the base, +an interest in something spotless, free from adulteration, +are, in some form or other, the chief resource in overcoming +the tendency of excitement to usurp the governance +of the self.<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p> + + +<h4>§ 2. COURAGE<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> OR PERSISTENT VIGOR</h4> + +<p>While love of excitement allures man from the path of +reason, fear of pain, dislike to hardship, and laborious +effort, hold him back from entering it. Dislike of the disagreeable +inhibits or contracts the putting forth of energy, +just as liking for agreeable stimulation discharges and +exhausts it. Intensity of active interest in the good alone +subdues that instinctive shrinking from the unpleasant +and hard which slackens energy or turns it aside. Such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> +energy of devotion is courage. Its etymological connection +with the Latin word for <i>heart</i>, suggests a certain +abundant spontaneity, a certain overflow of positive +energy; the word was applied to this aspect of virtue when +the heart was regarded as literally (not metaphorically) +the seat of vital impulse and abundant forcefulness.</p> + +<p><b>Courage and the Common Good.</b>—One of the problems +of early Greek thought was that of discriminating +courage as virtuous from a sort of animal keenness and +alacrity, easily running into recklessness and bravado. It +was uniformly differentiated from mere overflow of physical +energy by the fact that it was exhibited in support of +some common or social good. It bore witness to its voluntary +character by abiding in the face of threatened evil. +Its simplest form was patriotism—willingness to brave the +danger of death in facing the country's enemy from love +of country. And this basic largeness of spirit in which +the individual sinks considerations of personal loss and +harm in allegiance to an objective good remains a cardinal +aspect of all right disposition.</p> + +<p><b>Courage is Preëminently the Executive Side of Every +Virtue.</b>—The good will, as we saw, means endeavor, effort, +towards certain ends; unless the end stirs to strenuous exertion, +it is a sentimental, not a moral or practical end. And +endeavor implies obstacles to overcome, resistance to what +diverts, painful labor. It is the degree of threatened harm—in +spite of which one does not swerve—which measures +this depth and sincerity of interest in the good.</p> + +<p><b>Aspects of Interest in Execution.</b>—Certain formal +traits of courage follow at once from this general definition. +In its onset, willingness in behalf of the common +good to endure attendant private evils is alacrity, promptness. +In its abiding and unswerving devotion, it is constancy, +loyalty, and faithfulness. In its continual resistance +to evil, it is fortitude, patience, perseverance, willingness +to abide for justification an ultimate issue. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> +<i>totality</i> of commitment of self to the good is decision and +firmness. Conviction and resolution accompany all true +moral endeavor. These various dimensions (intensity, duration, +extent, and fullness) are, however, only differing +expressions of one and the same attitude of vigorous, energetic +identification of agency with the object.</p> + +<p><b>Goodness and Effectiveness.</b>—It is the failure to give +due weight to this factor of morality (the "works" of theological +discussion) which is responsible for the not uncommon +idea that moral goodness means loss of practical efficacy. +When inner disposition is severed from outer action, +wishing divorced from executive willing, morality is +reduced to mere harmlessness; outwardly speaking, the best +that can then be said of virtue is that it is innocent and +innocuous. Unscrupulousness is identified with energy of +execution; and a minute and paralyzing scrupulosity with +goodness. It is in reaction from such futile morality that +the gospel of force and of shrewdness of selecting and +adapting means to the desired end, is preached and gains +hearers—as in the Italy of the Renaissance<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> in reaction +against mediæval piety, and again in our own day (see +<i>ante</i>, p. 374).</p> + +<p><b>Moral Courage and Optimism.</b>—A characteristic modern +development of courageousness is implied in the phrase +"moral courage,"—as if all genuine courage were not +moral. It means devotion to the good in the face of the +customs of one's friends and associates, rather than against +the attacks of one's enemies. It is willingness to brave +for sake of a new idea of the good the unpopularity that +attends breach of custom and convention. It is this +type of heroism, manifested in integrity of memory and +foresight, which wins the characteristic admiration of +to-day, rather than the outward heroism of bearing +wounds and undergoing physical dangers. It is <i>attention</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> +upon which the stress falls.<a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> This supplies, perhaps, +the best vantage point from which to survey optimism +and pessimism in their direct moral bearings. The individual +whose pursuit of the good is colored by honest +recognition of existing and threatening evils is almost always +charged with being a pessimist; with cynical delight +in dwelling upon what is morbid, base, or sordid; and he is +urged to be an "optimist," meaning in effect to conceal +from himself and others evils that obtain. Optimism, thus +conceived, is a combination of building rosy-colored castles +in the air and hiding, ostrich-like, from actual facts. +As a general thing, it will be those who have some interest +at stake in evils remaining unperceived, and hence unremedied, +who most clamor in the cause of such "optimism." +Hope and aspiration, belief in the supremacy of good in +spite of all evil, belief in the realizability of good in spite +of all obstacles, are necessary inspirations in the life of +virtue. The good can never be demonstrated to the senses, +nor be proved by calculations of personal profit. It involves +a radical venture of the will in the interest of what is +unseen and prudentially incalculable. But such optimism +of <i>will</i>, such determination of the man that, so far as his +choice is concerned, only the good shall be recognized as +real, is very different from a sentimental refusal to look at +the realities of the situation just as they are. In fact a certain +intellectual pessimism, in the sense of a steadfast willingness +to uncover sore points, to acknowledge and search +for abuses, to note how presumed good often serves as a +cloak for actual bad, is a necessary part of the moral optimism +which actively devotes itself to making the right +prevail. Any other view reduces the aspiration and hope, +which are the essence of moral courage, to a cheerful animal +buoyancy; and, in its failure to see the evil done to +others in its thoughtless pursuit of what it calls good, is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> +nextdoor to brutality, to a brutality bathed in the atmosphere +of sentimentality and flourishing the catchwords of +idealism.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. JUSTICE</h4> + +<p><b>In Ethical Literature Justice Has Borne at Least +Three Different Senses.</b><a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a>—In its widest sense, it means +righteousness, uprightness, rectitude. It sums up morality. +It is not <i>a</i> virtue, but it is virtue. The just act is +the <i>due</i> act; justice is fulfillment of obligation. (2) This +passes over into fairness, equity, impartiality, honesty in +all one's dealing with others. (3) The narrowest meaning +is that of <i>vindication</i> of right through the administration +of law.<a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> Since Aristotle's time (and following his treatment) +this has been divided into (i.) the <i>distributive</i>, having +to do with the assignment of honor, wealth, etc., in proportion +to desert, and (ii.) the <i>corrective</i>, vindicating the +law against the transgressor by effecting a requital, redress, +which restores the supremacy of law.</p> + +<p><b>A Thread of Common Significance Runs through +These Various Meanings.</b>—The rational good means a +comprehensive or complete end, in which are harmoniously +included a variety of special aims and values. The just +man is the man who takes in the whole of a situation and +reacts to it in its wholeness, not being misled by undue +respect to some particular factor. Since the general or +inclusive good is a common or social good, reconciling and +combining the ends of a multitude of private or particular +persons, justice is the preëminently social virtue: that +which maintains the due order of individuals in the interest +of the comprehensive or social unity.</p> + +<p>Justice, as equity, fairness, impartiality, honesty, +carries the recognition of the whole over into the question +of right distribution and apportionment among its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> +parts. The equitable judge or administrator is the one +who makes no unjustifiable distinctions among those dealt +with. A fair price is one which recognizes the rights of +both buyer and seller. An honest man is the one who, with +respect to whatever he has to distribute to others and to +receive from them, is desirous of giving and taking just +what belongs to each party concerned. The fair-minded +man is not bribed by pleasure into giving undue importance +to some element of good nor coerced by fear of pain +into ignoring some other. He <i>distributes</i> his attention, +regard, and attachment according to the reasonable or +objective claims of each factor.</p> + +<p><b>Justice and Sympathy or Love.</b>—The most significant +questions regarding justice are as to its connection with +love and with condemnation and punishment. It is a common +notion that justice is harsh or hard in its workings and +that it requires to be supplemented, if not replaced, by +mercy. Taken literally this would mean that justice +is not just in its workings. The truth contained is that +what is frequently regarded as justice is not justice, but +an imperfect substitute for it. When a legal type of morality +is current, justice is regarded as the working of +some fixed and abstract law; it is the law as law which is +to be reverenced; it is law as law whose majesty is to be +vindicated. It is forgotten that the nobility and dignity +of law are due to the place of law in securing the order +involved in the realization of human happiness. Then the +law instead of being a servant of the good is put arbitrarily +above it, as if man was made for law, not law for +man. The result is inevitably harshness; indispensable +factors of happiness are ruthlessly slighted, or ruled out; +the loveliness and grace of behavior responding freely +and flexibly to the requirements of unique situations are +stiffened into uniformity. The formula <i>summum jus +summa injuria</i> expresses the outcome when abstract law +is insisted upon without reference to the needs of con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span>crete +cases. Under such conditions, there arises a demand +for tempering the sternness of justice with mercy, and +supplementing the severity of law with grace. This demand +means that the neglected human values shall be +restored into the idea of what is just.</p> + +<p><b>"Social Justice."</b>—Our own time has seen a generous +quickening of the idea of social justice due to the growth +of love, or philanthropy, as a working social motive. In +the older scheme of morals, justice was supposed to meet +all the necessary requirements of virtue; charity was doing +good in ways not obligatory or strictly exacted. Hence +it was a source of peculiar merit in the doer, a means of +storing up a surplus of virtue to offset vice. But a +more generous sense of inherent social relationships binding +the aims of all into one comprehensive good, which +is the result of increase of human intercourse, democratic +institutions, and biological science, has made men recognize +that the greater part of the sufferings and miseries +which afford on the part of a few the opportunity for +charity (and hence superior merit), are really social inequities, +due to causes which may be remedied. That justice +requires radical improvement of these conditions displaces +the notion that their effects may be here and there +palliated by the voluntary merit of morally superior individuals. +The change illustrates, on a wide scale, the +transformation of the conception of justice so that it joins +hands with love and sympathy. That human nature should +have justice done it under all circumstances is an infinitely +complicated and difficult requirement, and only a vision +of the capacities and accomplishments of human beings +rooted in affection and sympathy can perceive and execute +justly.</p> + +<p><b>Transformation of Punitive Justice.</b>—The conception +of punitive or corrective justice is undergoing the same +transformation. Aristotle stated the rule of equity in +the case of wrongdoing as an arithmetical requital: the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> +individual was to suffer according to his deed. Later, +through conjunction with the idea of a divine judge inflicting +retribution upon the sinner, this notion passed into +the belief that punishment is a form of justice restoring +the balance of disturbed law by inflicting suffering upon +the one who has done wrong. The end and aim of punishment +was retribution, bringing back to the agent the evil +consequences of his own deed. That punishment is suffering, +that it inevitably involves pain to the guilty one, there +can be no question; this, whether the punishment is externally +inflicted or is in the pangs of conscience, and +whether administered by parent, teacher, or civil authority. +But that suffering is for the sake of suffering, or +that suffering can in any way restore or affect the violated +majesty of law, is a different matter.</p> + +<p>What erring human nature deserves or merits, it is just +it should have. But in the end, a moral agent deserves +to <i>be</i> a moral agent; and hence deserves that punishments +inflicted should be <i>corrective</i>, not merely retributive. +Every wrongdoer should have his due. But what is his +due? Can we measure it by his past alone; or is it due +every one to regard him as a man with a future as well? +as having possibilities for good as well as achievements in +bad? Those who are responsible for the infliction of punishment +have, as well as those punished, to meet the requirements +of justice; and failure to employ the means +and instrumentalities of punishment in a way to lead, so +far as possible, the wrongdoer to reconsideration of conduct +and re-formation of disposition, cannot shelter itself +under the plea that it vindicates law. Such failure comes +rather from thoughtless custom; from a lazy unwillingness +to find better means; from an admixture of pride +with lack of sympathy for others; from a desire to maintain +things as they are rather than go to the causes which +generate criminals.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 4. WISDOM OR CONSCIENTIOUSNESS</h4> + +<p>As we have repeatedly noted, the heart of a voluntary +act is its intelligent or deliberate character. The individual's +<i>intelligent</i> concern for the good is implied in his +sincerity, his faithfulness, and his integrity. Of all the +habits which constitute the character of an individual, the +habit of <i>judging</i> moral situations is the most important, +for this is the key to the <i>direction</i> and to the <i>remaking</i> of +all other habits. When an act is overt, it is irretrievably +launched. The agent has no more control. The moral +life has its center in the periods of suspended and postponed +action, when the energy of the individual is spent +in recollection and foresight, in severe inquiry and serious +consideration of alternative aims. Only through reflection +can habits, however good in their origin and past exercise, +be readapted to the needs of the present; only through +reflection can impulses, not yet having found direction, be +guided into the haven of a reasonable happiness.</p> + +<p><b>Greek Emphasis upon Insight or Wisdom.</b>—It is not +surprising that the Greeks, the first seriously to inquire +into the nature of behavior and its end or good, should +have eulogized <i>wisdom</i>, <i>insight</i>, as the supreme virtue and +the source of all the virtues. Now, indeed, it seems paradoxical +to say with Socrates that ignorance is the only +vice; that man is bad not voluntarily, from deliberate +choice, but only from ignorance. But this is largely because +we discriminate between different kinds of knowledge +as the Greek did not, and as they had no occasion for +doing. We have a second-hand knowledge, a knowledge +from books, newspapers, etc., which was practically non-existent +even in the best days of Athens. Knowledge meant +to them something more personal; something like what we +call a "realizing sense"; an intimate and well-founded conviction. +To us knowledge suggests information about what +others have found out, and hence is more remote in its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> +meaning. Greek knowledge was mostly directly connected +with the affairs of their common associated life. The very +words for knowledge and art, understanding and skill, were +hardly separated. Knowledge was knowledge about the +city, its traditions, literature, history, customs, purposes, +etc. Their astronomy was connected with their civic religion; +their geography with their own topography; their +mathematics with their civil and military pursuits. Now +we have immense bodies of impersonal knowledge, remote +from direct bearing upon affairs. Knowledge has accordingly +subdivided itself into theoretical or scientific and +practical or moral. We use the term knowledge usually +only for the first kind; hence the Socratic position seems +gratuitously paradoxical. But under the titles of <i>conscience</i> +and <i>conscientiousness</i> we preserve the meaning +which was attached to the term knowledge. It is not paradoxical +to say that unconscientiousness is the fundamental +vice, and genuine conscientiousness is guarantee of all +virtue.</p> + +<p><b>Conscientiousness.</b>—In this change from Greek wisdom +to modern conscientiousness there have been some loss and +some gain. The loss lies in a certain hardening of the +idea of insight and deliberation, due to the isolation of the +moral good from the other goods of life. The good man +and the bad man have been endowed with the same faculty; +and this faculty has been treated as automatically delivering +correct conclusions. On the other hand, modern conscientiousness +contains less of the idea of intellectual accomplishment, +and more of the idea of interest in finding +out the good in conduct. "Wisdom" tended to emphasize +achieved insight; knowledge which was proved, guaranteed, +and unchangeable. "Conscientiousness" tends rather +to fix attention upon that voluntary attitude which is +interested in <i>discovery</i>.</p> + +<p>This implies a pretty radical change in wisdom as virtue. +In the older sense it is an attainment; something possessed.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> +In the modern, it resides in the active desire and effort, +in pursuit rather than in possession. The <i>attainment</i> of +knowledge varies with original intellectual endowment; +with opportunity for leisurely reflection; with all sorts of +external conditions. Possession is a <i>class</i> idea and tends to +mark off a moral aristocracy from a common herd. Since +the activities of the latter must be directed, on this assumption, +by attained knowledge, its practical outcome is +the necessity of the regulation of their conduct by the +wisdom possessed by the superior class. When, however, +the morally important thing is the desire and effort to +discover the good, every one is on the same plane, in spite +of differences in intellectual endowment and in learning.</p> + +<p>Moral knowing, as a fundamental or cardinal aspect of +virtue, is then the completeness of the interest in good +exhibited in effort to discover the good. Since knowing +involves two factors, a direct and an indirect, conscientiousness +involves both <i>sensitiveness</i> and <i>reflectiveness</i>.<a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a></p> + +<p><b>(1) Moral Sensitiveness.</b>—The individual who is not +directly aware of the presence of values needing to be perpetuated +or achieved, in the things and persons about him, +is hard and callous or tough. A "tender" conscience is one +which is immediately responsive to the presentation of good +and evil. The modern counterpart to the Socratic doctrine +that ignorance is the root of vice, is that being +morally "cold" or "dead," being indifferent to moral distinctions, +is the most hopeless of all conditions. One who +cares, even if he cares in the wrong way, has at least a +spring that may be touched; the one who is just irresponsive +offers no leverage for correction or improvement.</p> + +<p><b>(2) Thoughtfulness.</b>—While the possession of such +an immediate, unreflective responsiveness to elements of +good and bad must be the mainstay of moral wisdom, the +character which lies back of these intuitive apprehensions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> +must be thoughtful and serious-minded. There is no individual +who, however morally sensitive, can dispense with +cool, calm reflection, or whose intuitive judgments, if +reliable, are not largely the funded outcome of prior +thinking. Every voluntary act is intelligent: i.e., includes +an idea of the end to be reached or the consequences to +accrue. Such ends are ideal in the sense that they are +present to thought, not to sense. But special ends, because +they are limited, are not what we mean by ideals. +They are specific. With the growth of the habit of reflection, +agents become conscious that the values of their particular +ends are not circumscribed, but extend far beyond +the special case in question; so far indeed that their range +of influence cannot be foreseen or defined. A kindly act +may not only have the particular consequence of relieving +present suffering, but may make a difference in the entire +life of its recipient, or may set in radically different directions +the interest and attention of the one who performs it. +These larger and remoter values in any moral act transcend +the end which was consciously present to its doer. +The person has always to aim at something definite, but +as he becomes aware of this penumbra or atmosphere of +far-reaching ulterior values the meaning of his special act +is thereby deepened and widened. An act is outwardly +temporary and circumstantial, but its meaning is permanent +and expansive. The act passes away; but its significance +abides in the increment of meaning given to +further growth. To live in the recognition of this deeper +meaning of acts is to live in the ideal, in the only sense +in which it is profitable for man to dwell in the ideal.</p> + +<p><i>Our "ideals," our types of excellence, are the various +ways in which we figure to ourselves the outreaching and +ever-expanding values of our concrete acts.</i> Every +achievement of good deepens and quickens our sense of +the inexhaustible value contained in every right act. With +achievement, our conception of the possible goods of life<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> +increases, and we find ourselves called to live upon a still +deeper and more thoughtful plane. An ideal is not some +remote all-exhaustive goal, a fixed <i>summum bonum</i> with +respect to which other things are only means. It is not +something to be placed in contrast to the direct, local, +and tangible quality of our actual situations, so that by +contrast these latter are lightly esteemed as insignificant. +On the contrary, an ideal is the conviction that each of +these special situations carries with it a final value, a meaning +which in itself is unique and inexhaustible. To set up +"ideals" of perfection which are other than the serious +recognition of the possibilities of development resident +in each concrete situation, is in the end to pay ourselves +with sentimentalities, if not with words, and meanwhile +it is to direct thought and energy away from the situations +which need and which welcome the perfecting care of +attention and affection.</p> + +<p><b>Thoughtfulness and Progress.</b>—This sense of wider +values than those definitely apprehended or definitely attained +is a constant warning to the individual not to be +content with an accomplishment. Conscientiousness takes +more and more the form of interest in improvement, in +progress. Conscientiousness as sensitiveness may rest upon +the plane of already secured satisfactions, upon discriminating +with accuracy their quality and degree. As +thoughtfulness, it will always be on the lookout for the +better. The good man not only measures his acts by a +standard, but he is concerned to revise his standard. His +sense of the ideal, of the undefinable because ever-expanding +value of special deeds, forbids his resting satisfied with +any formulated standard; for the very formulation gives +the standard a technical quality, while the good can be +maintained only in enlarging excellence. The highest form +of conscientiousness is interest in constant progress.</p> + +<p><b>Love and Courage Required for Thoughtfulness.</b>—We +may close this chapter by repeating what we have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> +already noted, that genuine moral knowledge involves the +affections and the resolute will as well as the intelligence. +We cannot know the varied elements of value in the lives +of others and in the possibilities of our own, save as our +affections are strong. Every narrowing of love, every +encroachment of egoism, means just so much blindness +to the good. The man who pleads "good motives" as excuse +for acts which injure others is always one whose absorption +in himself has wrought harm to his powers of perception. +Every widening of contact with others, every deepening +of the level of sympathetic acquaintance, magnifies in +so much vision of the good. Finally, the chief ally of +moral thoughtfulness is the resolute courage of willingness +to face the evil for the sake of the good. Shrinking +from apprehension of the evil to others consequent upon +our behavior, because such realization would demand painful +effort to change our own plans and habits, maintains +habitual dimness and narrowness of moral vision.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Upon the principle of virtue in general, see Plato, <i>Republic</i>, 427-443; +Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>, Books II. and IV.; Kant, <i>Theory of Ethics</i> +(Abbott's trans.), pp. 164-182, 305, 316-322; Green, <i>Prolegomena</i>, pp. +256-314 (and for conscientiousness, 323-337); Paulsen, <i>System of +Ethics</i>, pp. 475-482; Alexander, <i>Moral Order and Progress</i>, pp. 242-253; +Ladd, <i>Philosophy of Conduct</i>, chs. x. and xiv.; Stephen, <i>Science +of Ethics</i>, ch. v.; Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. II., pp. 3-34 and +263-276; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, pp. 2-5 and 9-10; Rickaby, +<i>Aquinas Ethicus</i>, Vol. I., pp. 155-195; Mezes, <i>Ethics</i>, chs. ix. and xvi.</p> + +<p>For natural ability and virtue: Hume, <i>Treatise</i>, Part II., Book III., +and <i>Inquiry</i>, Appendix IV.; Bonar, <i>Intellectual Virtues</i>.</p> + +<p>For discussions of special virtues: Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>, Book III., +and Book VII., chs. i.-x.; for justice: Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>, Book V.; +Rickaby, <i>Moral Philosophy</i>, pp. 102-108, and <i>Aquinas Ethicus</i> (see +Index); Paulsen, <i>System of Ethics</i>, pp. 599-637; Mezes, <i>Ethics</i>, ch. +xiii.; Mill, <i>Utilitarianism</i>, ch. v.; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, Book +III., ch. v., and see Index; also criticism of Spencer in his <i>Lectures +on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau</i>, pp. 272-302; Spencer, +<i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. II.; Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, ch. v.</p> + +<p>For benevolence, see Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>, Books VII.-IX. (on friendship); +Rickaby, <i>Moral Philosophy</i>, pp. 237-244, and <i>Aquinas Ethicus</i> +(see charity and almsgiving in Index); Paulsen, <i>System</i>, chs. viii.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> +and x. of Part III.; Mezes, <i>Ethics</i>, ch. xii.; Sidgwick, <i>Methods of +Ethics</i>, Book II., ch. iv.; Spencer, <i>Principles of Ethics</i>, Vol. II.; see +also the references under sympathy and altruism at end of ch. xviii. +Courage and temperance are discussed in chs. x. and xi. of Mezes; in +pp. 485-504 of Paulsen; pp. 327-336 of Sidgwick; ch. xi. of Ladd's +<i>Philosophy of Conduct</i>.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184_184" id="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> This is, of course, the point made in ch. iv. on "<i>Customs or +Mores</i>," save that there the emphasis was upon the epoch of customary +as distinct from the reflective morals, while here it is upon +the customary factor in the present.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_185_185" id="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> This fact might be employed to reënforce our prior conclusion +that moral rules, classifications, etc., are not of final importance but +are of value in clarifying and judging individual acts and situations. +Not the rule, but the use which the person makes of the rule +in approving and disapproving himself and others, is the significant +thing.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_186_186" id="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> Less is said on this point because this phase of the matter has +been covered in the discussion of self-denial in the previous chapter. +See pp. 364-68.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_187_187" id="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> Strict hedonism would tend to reduce all virtue to prudence—the +calculation of subtler and remoter consequences and the control of +present behavior by its outcome.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_188_188" id="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> Says Hazlitt, "The charm of criminal life, like that of savage +life, consists in liberty, in hardship, in danger, and in the contempt +of death: in one word, in <i>extraordinary excitement</i>" (Essay on +Bentham). But this is equally true in principle (though not in +degree) of every temptation to turn from the straight and narrow +path. Virtue seems dull and sober, uninteresting, in comparison +with the increasing excitation of some desire. There are as many +forms of excitement as there are individual men.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_189_189" id="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> There is something of the nature of gambling, of taking chances +on future results for the sake of present stimulation, in all unrestraint +or intemperate action. And the reflection of the specialist—that +is, the one whose reflection is not subjected to responsible tests +in social behavior—is a more or less exciting adventure—a "speculation."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_190_190" id="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> In the last words of Spinoza's <i>Ethics</i>, "No one delights in the +good because he curbs his appetites, but because we delight in the +good we are able to curb our lusts."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_191_191" id="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> What has been said about Self-assertion, in the last chapter, +anticipates in some measure what holds of this virtue.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_192_192" id="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> See Sumner, <i>Folkways</i>, ch. xx.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_193_193" id="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> Upon this point see James, <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, Vol. II., +pp. 561-567, and Royce, <i>World and Individual</i>, Vol. II., pp. 354-360.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_194_194" id="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> This receives more attention in ch. xxi. of Part III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_195_195" id="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> Compare what was said concerning the intuitive and the discursive +factors in moral knowledge in ch. xvi.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="PART_III" id="PART_III"></a>PART III + +<br /><br /> + +THE WORLD OF ACTION</h2> + +<p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>GENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART III</h3> + +<p>Addams, <i>Democracy and Social Ethics</i>, 1902, <i>Newer Ideals of +Peace</i>, 1907; Santayana, <i>The Life of Reason</i>, Vol. II., 1905; Bergmann, +<i>Ethik als Kulturphilosophie</i>, 1904, especially pp. 154-304; +Wundt, <i>Ethics</i>, Vol. III., <i>The Principles of Morality and the Departments +of the Moral Life</i> (trans. 1901); Spencer, <i>Principles of +Ethics</i>, 1893, Vol. II., <i>Principles of Sociology</i>, 1882, Vol. I., Part II.; +Ritchie, <i>Studies in Political and Moral Philosophy</i>, 1888; Bosanquet, +<i>Philosophical Theory of the State</i>, 1899; Willoughby, <i>Social Justice</i>, +1900; Cooley, <i>Human Nature and the Social Order</i>, 1902; Paulsen, +<i>System der Ethik</i>, 5th ed., 1900, Book IV.; Runze, <i>Praktische Ethik</i>, +1891; Janet, <i>Histoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapports avec +la Morale</i>, 3d ed., 1887; Plato, <i>The Republic</i>; Aristotle, <i>Ethics</i>, Book +V., and <i>Politics</i> (trans. by Welldon, 1883); Hegel, <i>Philosophy of +Right</i> (pub. 1820, trans. by Dyde, 1896); Mackenzie, <i>An Introduction +to Social Philosophy</i>, 1890; Dunning, <i>History of Political Theories</i>, +Vol. I., 1902, Vol. II., 1905; Stein, <i>Die Sociale Frage im Licht der +Philosophie</i>, 1897.</p> +</div> + + + + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XX</small> + +<br /><br /> + +SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL</h2> + + +<p><b>Object of Part and Chapter.</b>—The history of morals +manifests a twofold movement. It reveals, on one side, +constantly increasing stress on <i>individual</i> intelligence and +affection. The transformation of customary into reflective +morals is the change from "Do those things which our +kin, class, or city do" to "Be a person with certain habits +of desire and deliberation." The moral history of the race +also reveals constantly growing emphasis upon the <i>social</i> +nature of the objects and ends to which personal preferences +are to be devoted. While the agent has been learning +that it is his personal attitude which counts in his +deeds, he has also learnt that there is no attitude which is +exclusively private in scope, none which does not need to +be socially valued or judged. Theoretic analysis enforces +the same lesson as history. It tells us that moral quality +<i>resides in</i> the habitual dispositions of an agent; and that +it <i>consists of</i> the tendency of these dispositions to secure +(or hinder) values which are sociably shared or sharable.</p> + +<p>In Part One we sketched the historical course of this development; +in Part Two we traced its theoretic analysis. In +the present and concluding Part, our purpose is to consider +the distinctively social aspects of morality. We shall +consider how social institutions and tendencies supply +value to the activities of individuals, impose the conditions +of the formation and exercise of their desires and aims; +and, especially, how they create the peculiarly urgent +problems of contemporary moral life. The present chap<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span>ter +will take up the general question, that of the relation +of social organization to individual life.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. GROWTH OF INDIVIDUALITY THROUGH SOCIAL +ORGANIZATIONS</h4> + +<p>From one point of view, historic development represents +the increasing liberation of individual powers from rigid +social control. Sir John Lubbock remarks: "No savage +is free. All over the world his daily life is regulated by a +complicated and apparently most inconvenient set of customs +(as forcible as laws), of quaint prohibitions and +privileges." Looked at from another point of view, emancipation +from one sort of social organization means initiation +into some other social order; the individual is liberated +from a small and fixed (customary) social group, to become +a member of a larger and progressive society. The +history of setting free individual power in desire, thought, +and initiative is, upon the whole, the history of the formation +of more complex and extensive social organizations. +Movements that look like the disintegration of the order +of society, when viewed with reference to what has preceded +them, are factors in the construction of a new social +order, which allows freer play to individuals, and yet +increases the number of social groupings and the depth of +social combinations.</p> + +<p>This fact of historical development is well summed up in +the following words of Hobhouse, set forth as a summary +of a comprehensive survey of the historic development of +law and justice, of the family including the status of +women and children, of the relations between communities, +and between classes, the rich and the poor.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>He says: "Amid all the variety of social institutions and the +ebb and flow of historical change, it is possible in the end to +detect a double movement, marking the transition from the +lower to the higher levels of civilized law and custom. On the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> +one hand, the social order is strengthened and extended.... +On this side the individual human being becomes more and +more subject to social constraint, and, as we have frequently +seen, the changes making for the tightening of the social fabric +may diminish the rights which the individual or large classes +of individuals can claim.... In this relation liberty and +order become opposed. But the opposition is not essential. +From the first the individual relies on social forces to maintain +him in his rights, and in the higher form of social organization +we have seen order and liberty drawing together again.... +The best ordered community is that which gives most +scope to its component members to make the best of themselves, +while the 'best' in human nature is that which contributes +to the harmony and onward movement of society.... +The responsible human being, man or woman, is the +center of modern ethics as of modern law, free so far as custom +and law are concerned to make his own life.... The +social nature of man is not diminished either on the side of +its needs or its duties by the fuller recognition of personal +rights. The difference is that, so far as rights and duties are +conceived as attaching to human beings as such, they become +universalized, <i>and are therefore the care of society as a +whole rather than of any partial group organization</i>."<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p></div> + +<p>With this statement may be compared the words of Green +and Alexander. According to Green, moral progress +consists in the <i>extension</i> of the area or range of persons +whose common good is concerned, and in the deepening +or <i>intensification</i> in the individual of his social interest: +"the settled disposition on each man's part to make the +most and best of humanity in his own person and in the +person of others."<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> Alexander's formulæ for moral +growth are the "laws of differentiation and of comprehension." +The first means diversification, specialization, +differentiating the powers of an individual with +increased refinement of each. The law of comprehension +means the steady enlargement of the size and scope of +the social group (as from clan to modern national state)<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> +with its increased complexity of ways in which men are +brought into contact with one another.<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a></p> + +<p><b>Social Life Liberates and Directs Individual Energies.</b>—Breadth +in extent of community life goes hand in hand +with multiplication of the stimuli which call out an individual's +powers. Diversification of social activities increases +opportunities for his initiative and endeavor. Narrow +and meager social life means limitation of the scope +of activities in which its members may engage. It means +little occasion for the exercise of deliberation and choice, +without which character is both immature and fossilized; +it means, in short, restricted personality. But a rich and +varied society, one which liberates powers otherwise torpid +and latent, also exacts that they be employed in ways consistent +with its own interests. A society which is extensive +and complex would dissolve in anarchy and confusion were +not the activities of its various members upon the whole +mutually congruent. The world of action is a world of +which the individual is one limit, and humanity the other; +between them lie all sorts of associative arrangements of +lesser and larger scope, families, friendships, schools, +clubs, organizations for making or distributing goods, for +gathering and supplying commodities; activities politically +organized by parishes, wards, villages, cities, countries, +states, nations. Every maladjustment in relations among +these institutions and associated activities means loss and +friction in the relations between individuals; and thereby +introduces defect, division, and restriction into the various +powers which constitute an individual. All harmonious +coöperation among them means a fuller life and greater +freedom of thought and action for the individual person.</p> + +<p>O<b>rder and Laws.</b>—The world of action as a scene of +organized activities going on in regular ways<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> thus pre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span>sents +a public or common order and authority, with its +established modes of operation, its laws. Organized institutions, +from the more permanent to the more casual, +with their orderly rules of conduct, are not, of course, +prior to individual activity; for their elements are individual +activities related in certain ways. But with respect +to <i>any one</i> individual in his separate or distributive capacity, +there is a genuine and important sense in which the +institution comes first. A child is born into an already +existing family with habits and beliefs already formed, not +indeed rigid beyond readaptation, but with their own +order (arrangements). He goes to schools which have +their established methods and aims; he gradually assumes +membership in business, civic, and political organizations, +with their own settled ways and purposes. Only in participating +in already fashioned systems of conduct does +he apprehend his own powers, appreciate their worth and +realize their possibilities, and achieve for himself a controlled +and orderly body of physical and mental habits. +He finds the value and the principles of his life, his satisfaction +and his norms of authority, in being a member of +associated groups of persons and in playing his part in +their maintenance and expansion.</p> + +<p><b>The Social and the Moral.</b>—In customary society, it +does not occur to any one that there is a difference between +what he ought to do, i.e., the moral, and what those +about him customarily do, i.e., the social. The socially +established is the moral. Reflective morality brings with +it, as we have seen, a distinction. A thoughtfully minded +person reacts against certain institutions and habits which +obtain in his social environment; he regards certain ideas, +which he frames himself and which are not embodied in +social habits, as more moral than anything existing about +him. Such reactions against custom and such projections +of new ideas are necessary if there is to be progress in +society. But unfortunately it has often been forgotten<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> +that this distinctly <i>personal</i> morality, which takes its +stand against some established usage, and which, therefore, +for the time being has its abode only in the initiative +and effort of an individual, is simply the means of <i>social</i> +reconstruction. It is treated as if it were an end in itself, +and as if it were something higher than any morality which +is or can be socially embodied.</p> + +<p>At some periods, this view has led to a monastic retreat +from all social affairs for the sake of cultivating personal +goodness. At other times, it has led to the political indifference +of the Cynic and Stoic. For ages, it led to +a morality of "other worldliness"; to the belief that true +goodness can be attained only in another kind of life and +world—a belief which carried with it relative contempt and +neglect of concrete social conditions in this life. Social +affairs at best were only "secular" and temporal, and, +in contrast with the eternal and spiritual salvation of the +individual's own soul, of little account. After the Renaissance +and the Protestant Revolt, this kind of moral +individualism persisted in different forms. Among the +hedonists, it took the form of assuming that while social +arrangements are of very great importance, their importance +lies in the fact that they hinder or help individuals +in the attainment of their own private pleasures. +The transcendentalists (such as Kant) asserted that, since +morality is wholly a matter of the inner motive, of the +personal attitude towards the moral law, social conditions +are wholly external. Good or evil lies wholly inside the +individual's own will. Social institutions may help or +hinder the outward <i>execution</i> of moral purpose; they may +be favorable or hostile to the successful outward display +of virtue. But they have nothing to do with originating +or developing the moral purpose, the Good Will, and hence, +in themselves, are lacking in moral significance. Thus +Kant made a sharp and fast distinction between <i>morality</i>, +appertaining solely to the individual's own inner conscious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span>ness, +and <i>legality</i>, appertaining to the social and political +conditions of outward behavior. Social institutions and +laws may indeed regulate men's outer acts. So far as men +externally conform, their conduct is legal. But laws cannot +regulate or touch men's motives, which alone determine +the morality of their behavior.</p> + +<p>We shall not repeat here our prior criticisms of hedonism +and utilitarianism in order to point out the falsity of this +division of moral action into unrelated inner (or private) +and outer (or social) factors. We may recall to memory, +however, that Kant himself virtually passed beyond his +own theory of moral individualism in insisting upon the +promotion of a "Kingdom of Ends," in which every person +is to be treated as an end in himself. We may recall +that the later utilitarians (such as Mill, Leslie Stephen, +Bain, and Spencer) insisted upon the <i>educative</i> value of +social institutions, upon their importance in forming certain +interests and habits in the individual. Thus social +arrangements were taken out of the category of mere +means to private good, and made the necessary factors +and conditions of the development of an individuality which +should have a reasonable and just conception of its own +nature and of its own good. We may also enumerate some +of the more fundamental ways in which social institutions +determine individual morality.</p> + +<p>1. Apart from the social medium, the individual would +never "know himself"; he would never become acquainted +with his own needs and capacities. He would live the life +of a brute animal, satisfying as best he could his most +urgent appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, but being, as +regards even that, handicapped in comparison with other +animals. And, as we have already seen, the wider and the +richer the social relationships into which an individual +enters, the more fully are his powers evoked, and the more +fully is he brought to recognize the possibilities latent in +them. It is from seeing noble architecture and hearing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> +harmonious music that the individual learns to know to +what his own constructive and rhythmic tendencies, otherwise +blind and inchoate, may come. It is from achievement +in industrial, national, and family life that he is +initiated into perception of his own energy, loyalty, and +affection.</p> + +<p>2. Social conditions not only evoke what is latent, and +bring to conscious recognition what is blind, but they +select, encourage, and confirm certain tendencies at the +expense of others. They enable the individual to discriminate +the better and the worse among his tendencies +and achievements. There is no limit in the power of +society to awaken and strengthen this habit of discrimination, +of choice after comparison, in its individual members. +A small social group with fixed habits, a clan, a +gang, a narrow sect, a dogmatic party, will restrict the +formation of critical powers—i.e., of conscientiousness or +moral thoughtfulness. But an individual who <i>really</i> becomes +a member of modern society, with its multiple occupations, +its easy intercourse, its free mobility, its rich +resources of art and science, will have only too many +opportunities for reflective judgment and personal valuation +and preference. <i>The very habits of individual moral +initiative, of personal criticism of the existent order, and +of private projection of a better order, to which moral +individualists point as proofs of the purely "inner" nature +of morality, are themselves effects of a variable and +complex social order.</i></p> + +<p><b>The Moral Value of the State.</b>—If then we take modern +social life in its broadest extent, as including not only +what has become institutionalized and more or less fossilized, +but also what is still growing (forming and re-forming), we +may justly say that it is as true of progressive as of stationary +society, that the moral and the social are one. +The virtues of the individual in a progressive society are +more reflective, more critical, involve more exercise of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> +comparison and selection, than in customary society. But +they are just as socially conditioned in their origin and +as socially directed in their manifestation.</p> + +<p>In rudimentary societies, customs furnish the highest +ends of achievement; they supply the principles of social +organization and combination; and they form binding +laws whose breach is punished. The moral, political, and +legal are not differentiated. But village communities and +city-states, to say nothing of kingdoms and empires and +modern national States, have developed special organs +and special regulations for maintaining social unity and +public order. Small groups are usually firmly welded together +and are exclusive. They have a narrow but intense +social code:—like a patriarchal family, a gang, a social +set, they are clannish. But when a large number of such +groups come together within a more inclusive social unity, +some institution grows up to represent the interests and +activities of the whole as against the narrow and centrifugal +tendencies of the constituent factors. A society is then +<i>politically</i> organized; and a true public order with its +comprehensive laws is brought into existence. The moral +importance of the development of this public point of view, +with its extensive common purposes and with a general will +for maintaining them, can hardly be overestimated. Without +such organization, society and hence morality would +remain sectional, jealous, suspicious, unfraternal. Sentiments +of intense cohesion within would have been conjoined +with equally strong sentiments of indifference, +intolerance, and hostility to those without. In the wake of +the formation of States have followed more widely co-operative +activities, more comprehensive and hence more +reasonable principles of judgment and outlook. The individual +has been emancipated from his relative submergence +in the local and fixed group, and set upon his +own feet, with varied fields of activity open to him in which +to try his powers, and furnished with principles of judg<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span>ing +conduct and projecting ideals which in theory, +at least, are as broad as the possibilities of humanity +itself.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. RESPONSIBILITY AND FREEDOM</h4> + +<p>The more comprehensive and diversified the social order, +the greater the responsibility and the freedom of the individual. +His freedom is the greater, because the more numerous +are the effective stimuli to action, and the more varied +and the more certain the ways in which he may fulfill +his powers. His responsibility is greater because there +are more demands for considering the consequences of his +acts; and more agencies for bringing home to him the +recognition of consequences which affect not merely more +persons individually, but which also influence the more +remote and hidden social ties.</p> + +<p><b>Liability.</b>—Freedom and responsibility have a relatively +superficial and negative meaning and a relatively positive +central meaning. In its external aspect, responsibility +is <i>liability</i>. An agent is free to act; yes, but—. He +must stand the consequences, the disagreeable as well as +the pleasant, the social as well as the physical. He may do +a given act, but if so, let him look out. His act is a matter +that concerns others as well as himself, and they will +prove their concern by calling him to account; and if he +cannot give a satisfactory and credible account of his +intention, subject him to correction. Each community and +organization informs its members what it regards as obnoxious, +and serves notice upon them that they have to +answer if they offend. The individual then is (1) likely +or liable to have to explain and justify his behavior, and +is (2) liable or open to suffering consequent upon inability +to make his explanation acceptable.</p> + +<p><b>Positive Responsibility.</b>—In this way the individual is +made aware of the stake the community has in his behavior;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span> +and is afforded an opportunity to take that interest into +account in directing his desires and making his plans. +If he does so, he is a responsible person. The agent who +does not take to heart the concern which others show +that they have in his conduct, will note his liability only +as an evil to which he is exposed, and will take it into +consideration only to see how to escape or evade it. But +one whose point of view is sympathetic and reasonable will +recognize the justice of the community interest in his performances; +and will recognize the value to him of the +instruction contained in its assertions of its interest. Such +an one responds, answers, to the social demands made; +he is not merely called to answer. He holds himself responsible +for the consequences of his acts; he does not wait +to be held liable by others. When society looks for responsible +workmen, teachers, doctors, it does not mean +merely those whom it may call to account; it can do that +in any case. It wants men and women who habitually form +their purposes after consideration of the social consequences +of their execution. Dislike of disapprobation, fear +of penalty, play a part in generating this responsive +habit; but fear, operating directly, occasions only cunning +or servility. Fused, through reflection, with other +motives which prompt to action, it helps bring about that +apprehensiveness, or susceptibility to the rights of others, +which is the essence of responsibility, which in turn is the +sole <i>ultimate</i> guarantee of social order.</p> + +<p><b>The Two Senses of Freedom.</b>—In its external aspect, +freedom is negative and formal. It signifies freedom <i>from</i> +subjection to the will and control of others; exemption +from bondage; release from servitude; capacity to act +without being exposed to direct obstructions or interferences +from others. It means a clear road, cleared of impediments, +for action. It contrasts with the limitations +of prisoner, slave, and serf, who have to carry out the will +of others.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Effective Freedom.</b>—Exemption from restraint and +from interference with overt action is only a condition, +though an absolutely indispensable one, of effective freedom. +The latter requires (1) positive control of the resources +necessary to carry purposes into effect, possession +of the means to satisfy desires; and (2) mental equipment +with the trained powers of initiative and reflection requisite +for free preference and for circumspect and far-seeing desires. +The freedom of an agent who is merely released +from direct external obstructions is formal and empty. +If he is without resources of personal skill, without control +of the tools of achievement, he must inevitably lend +himself to carrying out the directions and ideas of others. +If he has not powers of deliberation and invention, he must +pick up his ideas casually and superficially from the suggestions +of his environment and appropriate the notions +which the interests of some class insinuate into his mind. +If he have not powers of intelligent self-control, he will +be in bondage to appetite, enslaved to routine, imprisoned +within the monotonous round of an imagery flowing from +illiberal interests, broken only by wild forays into the +illicit.</p> + +<p><b>Legal and Moral.</b>—Positive responsibility and freedom +may be regarded as moral, while liability and exemption +are legal and political. A particular individual at a given +time is possessed of certain secured resources in execution +and certain formed habits of desire and reflection. In so +far, he is positively free. Legally, his sphere of activity +may be very much wider. The laws, the prevailing body +of rules which define existing institutions, would protect +him in exercising claims and powers far beyond those +which he can actually put forth. He is exempt from interference +in travel, in reading, in hearing music, in pursuing +scientific research. But if he has neither material means +nor mental cultivation to enjoy these legal possibilities, +mere exemption means little or nothing. It does, however,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> +create a moral demand that the practical limitations which +hem him in should be removed; that practical conditions +should be afforded which will enable him effectively to +take advantage of the opportunities formally open. Similarly, +at any given time, the liabilities to which an individual +is actually held come far short of the accountability +to which the more conscientious members of society hold +themselves. The morale of the individual is in advance of +the formulated morality, or legality, of the community.</p> + +<p><b>Relation of Legal to Moral.</b>—It is, however, absurd +to separate the legal and the ideal aspects of freedom +from one another. It is only as men are held liable that +they become responsible; even the conscientious man, however +much in some respects his demands upon himself +exceed those which would be enforced against him by +others, still needs in other respects to have his unconscious +partiality and presumption steadied by the requirements +of others. He needs to have his judgment balanced against +crankiness, narrowness, or fanaticism, by reference to the +sanity of the common standard of his times. It is only +as men are exempt from external obstruction that they +become aware of possibilities, and are awakened to demand +and strive to obtain more positive freedom. Or, +again, it is the possession by the more favored individuals +in society of an effectual freedom to do and to enjoy things +with respect to which the masses have only a formal and +legal freedom, that arouses a sense of inequity, and that +stirs the social judgment and will to such reforms of law, +of administration and economic conditions as will transform +the empty freedom of the less favored individuals +into constructive realities.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS</h4> + +<p><b>The Individual and Social in Rights and Obligations.</b>—That +which, taken at large or in a lump, is called free<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span>dom +breaks up in detail into a number of specific, concrete +abilities to act in particular ways. These are termed +<i>rights</i>. Any right includes within itself in intimate unity +the individual and social aspects of activity upon which +we have been insisting. As a capacity for exercise of +power, it resides in and proceeds from some special agent, +some individual. As exemption from restraint, a secured +release from obstruction, it indicates at least the permission +and sufferance of society, a tacit social assent and +confirmation; while any more positive and energetic effort +on the part of the community to guarantee and safeguard +it, indicates an active acknowledgment on the part of +society that the free exercise by individuals of the power +in question is positively in its own interest. Thus a +right, individual in residence, is social in origin and intent. +The social factor in rights is made explicit in the demand +that the power in question be exercised in certain ways. A +right is never a claim to a wholesale, indefinite activity, +but to a <i>defined</i> activity; <i>to one carried on</i>, that is, <i>under +certain conditions</i>. This limitation constitutes the <i>obligatory</i> +phases of every right. The individual is free; yes, +that is his right. But he is free to act only according to +certain regular and established conditions. That is the +obligation imposed upon him. He has a right to use +public roads, but he is obliged to turn in a certain way. +He has a right to use his property, but he is obliged to +pay taxes, to pay debts, not to harm others in its use, and +so on.</p> + +<p><b>Correspondence of Rights and Obligations.</b>—Rights +and obligations are thus strictly correlative. This is true +both in their external employment and in their intrinsic +natures. Externally the individual is under obligation to +use his right in a way which does not interfere with the +rights of others. He is free to drive on the public highways, +but not to exceed a certain speed, and on condition +that he turns to right or left as the public order requires.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> +He is entitled to the land which he has bought, but this +possession is subject to conditions of public registration +and taxation. He may use his property, but not so that +it menaces others or becomes a nuisance. Absolute rights, +if we mean by absolute those not relative to any social +order and hence exempt from any social restriction, there +are none. But rights correspond even more intrinsically +to obligations. The right is itself a social outcome: it +is the individual's in so far as he is himself a social member +not merely physically, but in his habits of thought +and feeling. He is under obligation to use his rights in +social ways. The more we emphasize the free right of +an individual to his property, the more we emphasize what +society has done for him: the avenues it has opened to him +for acquiring; the safeguards it has put about him for +keeping; the wealth achieved by others which he may acquire +by exchanges themselves socially buttressed. So +far as an individual's own merits are concerned these +opportunities and protections are "unearned increments," +no matter what credit he may deserve for initiative and +industry and foresight in using them. The only fundamental +anarchy is that which regards rights as private +monopolies, ignoring their social origin and intent.</p> + +<p><b>Classes of Rights and Obligations.</b>—We may discuss +freedom and responsibility with respect to the social organization +which secures and enforces them; or from the +standpoint of the individual who exercises and acknowledges +them. From the latter standpoint, rights are conveniently +treated as physical and mental: not that the +physical and mental can be separated, but that emphasis +may fall primarily on control of the conditions required +to execute ideas and intentions, or upon the control of the +conditions involved in their personal formation and choice. +From the standpoint of the public order, rights and duties +are civil and political. We shall consider them in the next +chapter in connection with the organization of society<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span> +in the State. Here we consider rights as inhering in an +individual in virtue of his membership in society.</p> + +<p><b>I. Physical Rights.</b>—These are the rights to the free +unharmed possession of the body (the rights to life and +limb), exemption from homicidal attack, from assault and +battery, and from conditions that threaten health in more +obscure ways; and positively, the right to free movement +of the body, to use its members for any legitimate purpose, +and the right to unhindered locomotion. Without +the exemption, there is no security in life, no assurance; +only a life of constant fear and uncertainty, of loss of +limb, of injury from others, and of death. Without some +positive assurance, there is no chance of carrying ideas +into effect. Even if sound and healthy and extremely protected, +a man lives a slave or prisoner. Right to the +control and use of physical conditions of life takes effect +then in property rights, command of the natural tools and +materials which are requisite to the maintenance of the +body in a due state of health and to an effective and competent +use of the person's powers. These physical rights +to life, limb, and property are so basic to all achievement +and capability that they have frequently been termed +"natural rights." They are so fundamental to the existence +of personality that their insecurity or infringement +is a direct menace to the social welfare. The struggle +for human liberty and human responsibility has accordingly +been more acute at this than at any other point. +Roughly speaking, the history of personal liberty is the +history of the efforts which have safeguarded the security +of life and property and which have emancipated bodily +movement from subjection to the will of others.</p> + +<p><b>Unsolved Problems: War and Punishment.</b>—While +history marks great advance, especially in the last four +or five centuries, as to the negative aspect of freedom or +release from direct and overt tyranny, much remains undone +on the positive side. It is at this point of free<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> +physical control that all conflicts of rights concentrate +themselves. While the limitation by war of the right +to life may be cited as evidence for the fact that even this +right is not absolute but is socially conditioned, yet that +kind of correspondence between individual activity and social +well-being which exacts exposure to destruction as its +measure, is too suggestive of the tribal morality in which +the savage shows his social nature by participation in +a blood feud, to be satisfactory. Social organization is +clearly defective when its constituent portions are so +set at odds with one another as to demand from individuals +their death as their best service to the community. While +one may cite capital punishment to enforce, as if in large +type, the fact that the individual holds even his right to +life subject to the social welfare, the moral works the other +way to underline the failure of society to socialize its +members, and its tendency to put undesirable results out +of sight and mind rather than to face responsibility for +causes. The same limitation is seen in methods of imprisonment, +which, while supposed to be protective rather +than vindictive, recognize only in a few and sporadic cases +that the sole sure protection of society is through education +and correction of individual character, not by mere +physical isolation under harsh conditions.</p> + +<p><b>Security of Life.</b>—In civilized countries the blood feud, +infanticide, putting to death the economically useless and +the aged, have been abolished. Legalized slavery, serfdom, +the subjection of the rights of wife and child to the will +of husband and father, have been done away with. But +many modern industries are conducted with more reference +to financial gain than to life, and the annual roll of +killed, injured, and diseased in factory and railway practically +equals the list of dead and wounded in a modern +war.<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> Most of these accidents are preventable. The will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span>ingness +of parents on one side and of employers on the +other, conjoined with the indifference of the general public, +makes child-labor an effective substitute for exposure of +children and other methods of infanticide practiced by +savage tribes. Agitation for old-age pensions shows that +faithful service to society for a lifetime is still inadequate +to secure a prosperous old age.</p> + +<p><b>Charity and Poverty.</b>—Society provides assistance and +remedial measures, poorhouses, asylums, hospitals. The +exceedingly poor are a public charge, supported by taxes +as well as by alms. Individuals are not supposed to die +from starvation nor to suffer without any relief or assistance +from physical defects and disease. So far, there is +growth in positive provision for the right to live. But the +very necessity for such extensive remedial measures shows +serious defects farther back. It raises the question of social +responsibility for the causes of such wholesale poverty +and widespread misery. Taken in conjunction with the +idleness and display of the congested rich, it raises the +question how far we are advanced beyond barbarism in +making organic provision for an effective, as distinct +from formal, right to life and movement. It is hard to +say whether the heavier indictment lies in the fact that +so many shirk their share of the necessary social labor +and toil, or in the fact that so many who are willing to +work are unable to do so, without meeting recurrent crises +of unemployment, and except under conditions of hours, +hygiene, compensation, and home conditions which reduce +to a low level the positive rights of life. The social order +protects the property of those who have it; but, although +historic conditions have put the control of the machinery +of production in the hands of a comparatively few per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span>sons, +society takes little heed to see that great masses of +men get even that little property which is requisite to +secure assured, permanent, and properly stimulating conditions +of life. Until there is secured to and imposed upon +all members of society the right and the duty of work in +socially serviceable occupations, with due return in social +goods, rights to life and free movement will hardly advance +much beyond their present largely nominal state.</p> + +<p><b>II. Rights to Mental Activity.</b>—These rights of course +are closely bound up with rights to physical well-being +and activity. The latter would have no meaning were it +not that they subserve purposes and affections; while the +life of mind is torpid or remote, dull or abstract, save as +it gets impact in physical conditions and directs them. +Those who hold that the limitations of physical conditions +have no <i>moral</i> signification, and that their improvement +brings at most an increase of more or less materialistic +comfort, not a moral advance, fail to note that the development +of concrete purposes and desires is dependent upon +so-called outward conditions. These conditions affect the +execution of purposes and wants; and this influence reacts +to determine the further arrest or growth of needs and +resolutions. The sharp and unjustifiable antithesis of +spiritual and material in the current conception of moral +action leads many well-intentioned people to be callous and +indifferent to the moral issues involved in physical and economic +progress. Long hours of excessive physical labor, +joined with unwholesome conditions of residence and work, +restrict the growth of mental activity, while idleness and +excess of physical possession and control pervert mind, as +surely as these causes modify the outer and overt acts.</p> + +<p><b>Freedom of Thought and Affection.</b>—The fundamental +forms of the right to mental life are liberty of judgment +and sympathy. The struggle for spiritual liberty has been +as prolonged and arduous as that for physical freedom. +Distrust of intelligence and of love as factors in concrete<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> +individuals has been strong even in those who have proclaimed +most vigorously their devotion to them as abstract +principles. Disbelief in the integrity of mind, assertion +that the divine principles of thought and love are perverted +and corrupt in the individual, have kept spiritual authority +and prestige in the hands of the few, just as other +causes have made material possessions the monopoly of +a small class. The resulting restriction of knowledge and +of the tools of inquiry have kept the masses where their +blindness and dullness might be employed as further evidence +of their natural unfitness for personal illumination +by the light of truth and for free direction of the energy +of moral warmth.<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> Gradually, however, free speech, freedom +of communication and intercourse, of public assemblies, +liberty of the press and circulation of ideas, freedom +of religious and intellectual conviction (commonly called +freedom of conscience), of worship, and to some extent the +right to education, to spiritual nurture, have been achieved. +In the degree the individual has won these liberties, the +social order has obtained its chief safeguard against explosive +change and intermittent blind action and reaction, +and has got hold of the method of graduated and steady +reconstruction. Looked at as a mere expedient, liberty +of thought and expression is the most successful device +ever hit upon for reconciling tranquillity with progress, +so that peace is not sacrificed to reform nor improvement +to stagnant conservatism.<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a></p> + +<p><b>Right and Duty of Education.</b>—It is through education +in its broadest sense that the right of thought and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> +sympathy become effective. The final value of all institutions +is their educational influence; they are measured +morally by the occasions they afford and the guidance +they supply for the exercise of foresight, judgment, +seriousness of consideration, and depth of regard. The +family, the school, the church, art, especially (to-day) +literature, nurture the affections and imagination, while +schools impart information and inculcate skill in various +forms of intellectual technique. In the last one hundred +years, the right of each individual to spiritual self-development +and self-possession, and the interest of society +as a whole in seeing that each of its members has an +opportunity for education, have been recognized in publicly +maintained schools with their ladder from kindergarten +through the college to the engineering and +professional school. Men and women have had put at +their disposal the materials and tools of judgment; have +had opened to them the wide avenues of science, history, +and art that lead into the larger world's culture. To some +extent negative exemption from arbitrary restriction +upon belief and thought has been developed into positive +capacities of intelligence and sentiment.</p> + +<p><b>Restrictions from Inadequate Economic Conditions.</b>—Freedom +of thought in a developed constructive form is, +however, next to impossible for the masses of men so long +as their economic conditions are precarious, and their +main problem is to keep the wolf from their doors. Lack +of time, hardening of susceptibility, blind preoccupation +with the machinery of highly specialized industries, the +combined apathy and worry consequent upon a life maintained +just above the level of subsistence, are unfavorable +to intellectual and emotional culture. Intellectual cowardice, +due to apathy, laziness, and vague apprehension, takes +the place of despotism as a limitation upon freedom of +thought and speech. Uncertainty as to security of position, +the welfare of a dependent family, close men's mouths<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span> +from expressing their honest convictions, and blind their +minds to clear perception of evil conditions. The instrumentalities +of culture—churches, newspapers, universities, +theatres—themselves have economic necessities which tend +to make them dependent upon those who can best supply +their needs. The congestion of poverty on one side and +of "culture" on the other is so great that, in the words +of a distinguished economist, we are still questioning +"whether it is really impossible that all should start in +the world with a fair chance of leading a cultured life +free from the pains of poverty and the stagnating influences +of a life of excessive mechanical toil."<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> We provide +free schools and pass compulsory education acts, but actively +and passively we encourage conditions which limit +the mass of children to the bare rudiments of spiritual +nurture.</p> + +<p><b>Restriction of Educational Influences.</b>—Spiritual resources +are practically as much the possession of a special +class, in spite of educational advance, as are material +resources. This fact reacts upon the chief educative +agencies—science, art, and religion. Knowledge in its +ideas, language, and appeals is forced into corners; it is +overspecialized, technical, and esoteric because of its isolation. +Its lack of intimate connection with social practice +leads to an intense and elaborate over-training which +increases its own remoteness. Only when science and philosophy +are one with literature, the art of successful communication +and vivid intercourse, are they liberal in effect; +and this implies a society which is already intellectually +and emotionally nurtured and alive. Art itself, the embodiment +of ideas in forms which are socially contagious, +becomes what it is so largely, a development of technical +skill, and a badge of class differences. Religious emotion, +the quickening of ideas and affections by recognition of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span> +their inexhaustible signification, is segregated into special +cults, particular days, and peculiar exercises, and the +common life is left relatively hard and barren.</p> + +<p>In short, the limitations upon freedom both of the physical +conditions and the mental values of life are at bottom +expressions of one and the same divorce of theory and +practice,—which makes theory remote, sterile, and technical, +while practice remains narrow, harsh, and also illiberal. +Yet there is more cause for hope in that so much has been +accomplished, than for despondency because mental power +and service are still so limited and undeveloped. The intermixture +and interaction of classes and nations are very +recent. Hence the opportunities for an effective circulation +of sympathetic ideas and of reasonable emotions have +only newly come into existence. Education as a public +interest and care, applicable to all individuals, is hardly +more than a century old; while a conception of the richness +and complexity of the ways in which it should +touch any one individual is hardly half a century old. +As society takes its educative functions more seriously and +comprehensively into account, there is every promise of +more rapid progress in the future than in the past. For +education is most effective when dealing with the immature, +those who have not yet acquired the hard and fixed directing +forms of adult life; while, in order to be effectively +employed, it must select and propagate that which is +common and hence typical in the social values that form +its resources, leaving the eccentric, the partial, and exclusive +gradually to dwindle. Upon some generous souls of +the eighteenth century there dawned the idea that the cause +of the indefinite improvement of humanity and the cause +of the little child are inseparably bound together.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Kant, <i>Philosophy of Law</i>, 1796 (trans. by Hastie, 1887); Fichte, +<i>The Science of Rights</i>, 1798 (trans. by Kroeger, 1869); Rousseau,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> +<i>Social Contract</i>, 1762 (trans. by Tozer, 1893); Bonar, <i>Philosophy and +Political Economy</i>, 1893; Stephen, <i>Science of Ethics</i>, ch. iii. (on Social +Motives); Caird, <i>Social Philosophy of Comte</i>, 1885; Sidgwick, +<i>Practical Ethics</i>, 1898, Essay on Public Morality; Sidgwick, <i>Elements +of Politics</i>, 1891, ch. iv. on Individualism, vi. on Contract, x. on +Socialistic Interferences, xiii. on Law and Morality; Maine, <i>Ancient +Law</i>, 1861, Pollock's ed., 1906, chs. iii. and iv. on law of nature and +equity; Stephen, <i>Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy</i>, 1888; +Rickaby, <i>Political and Moral Essays</i>, 1902; Hobhouse, <i>Morals in +Evolution</i>, Vol. II., ch. vii. (on the general relation of the social +and the moral). On the development of rights to life, limb, and freedom +of movement, see Westermarck, chs. xiv.-xxii., and Sumner, +<i>Folkways</i>, chs. vi., vii., and viii.; Hobhouse, Vol. I., ch. vii. (on +slavery); Spencer, <i>Ethics</i>, Vol. II., Part IV. For charity, see Loch +on Charity and Charities, <i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i>; Uhlhorn, <i>Christian +Charity in the Ancient Church</i>; L'Allemand, <i>Histoire de la +Charité</i>; Nicholl, <i>History of the English Poor Law</i>, 2 vols., 1898.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_196_196" id="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> Vol. I., pp. 367-368, italics not in original.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_197_197" id="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> P. 262 of <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>; see chs. iii. and iv. of Book III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198_198" id="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> Alexander, <i>Moral Order and Progress</i>, pp. 384-898.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_199_199" id="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> This does not of course exclude change and reform. It means +that, so far as a society is organized, these changes themselves occur +in regular and authorized ways.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_200_200" id="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> It is stated, upon good authority, that a street railway system +in a large American city declined to adopt an improved fender, which +made it practically impossible to kill persons, because the annual cost +would be $5,000 more than the existing expense for damages. This +same system declined to adopt improved brakes which would reduce +accidents to life and limb; and it was discovered that one of its +directors was largely interested in the manufacture of the old brakes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_201_201" id="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> Said Emerson: "If a man is sick, is unable, is mean-spirited +and odious, it is because there is so much of his nature which is unlawfully +withholden from him."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_202_202" id="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> Recent suppression by the police in the larger American cities +of public meetings called to discuss unemployment or other matters +deemed by some dangerous to vested interests, shows that the value +of free speech as a "safety-valve" has not even yet been thoroughly +learned. It also shows how the victories of freedom in the past +have to be fought and won over again under new conditions, if they +are to be kept alive.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_203_203" id="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> Marshall, <i>Principles of Economics</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XXI</small> + +<br /><br /> + +CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL STATE</h2> + + +<p>We have been considering responsible freedom as it +centers in and affects individuals in their distinctive +capacities. It implies a public order which guarantees, +defines, and enforces rights and obligations. This public +order has a twofold relation to rights and duties: (1) +As the social counterpart of their exercise by individuals, +it constitutes <i>Civil Society</i>. It represents those forms of +associated life which are orderly and authorized, because +constituted by individuals in the exercise of their rights, +together with those special forms which protect and insure +them. Families, clubs, guilds, unions, corporations come +under the first head; courts and civil administrative bodies, +like public railway and insurance commissions, etc., come +under the second. (2) The public order also fixes the +fundamental terms and conditions on which at any given +time rights are exercised and remedies secured; it is organized +for the purpose of defining the basic methods of +exercising the activities of its constituent elements, individual +and corporate. In this aspect it is the <i>State</i>.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. CIVIL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS</h4> + +<p>Every act brings the agent who performs it into association +with others, whether he so intends or not. His act +takes effect in an organized world of action; in social +arrangement and institutions. So far as such combinations +of individuals are recurrent or stable, their nature +and operations are definitely formulated and definitely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> +enforceable. Partnerships, clubs, corporations, guilds, +families are such stable unions, with their definite spheres +of action. Buying and selling, teaching and learning, producing +and consuming, are recurrent activities whose legitimate +methods get prescribed. These specific provinces and +methods of action are defined in Civil Rights. They express +the guaranteed and regular ways in which an individual, +through action, voluntarily enters into association or combination +with others for the sake of a common end. They +differ from political rights and obligations in that the latter +concern modes of social organization which are so fundamental +that they are not left to the voluntary choice and purpose +of an individual. As a social being, he must have political +relationships, must be subject to law, pay taxes, etc.</p> + +<p><b>1. Contract Rights.</b>—Modes of association are so numerous +and variable that we can only select those aspects +of civil rights which are morally most significant. We +shall discriminate them according as they have to do (1) +with the more temporary and casual combinations of individuals, +for limited and explicit purposes; and (2) with +more permanent, inclusive, and hence less definable ends; +and (3) with the special institutions which exist for guaranteeing +individuals the enjoyment of their rights and +providing remedies if these are infringed upon. (1) +Contract rights. Rights of the first type are rights resulting +from express or implied agreements of certain +agents to do or refrain from doing specific acts, involving +exchange of services or goods to the mutual benefit of both +parties in the transaction. Every bargain entered into, +every loaf of bread one buys or paper of pins one sells, +involves an implied and explicit contract. A genuinely +free agreement or contract means (i.) that each party +to the transaction secures the benefit he wants; (ii.) +that the two parties are brought into coöperative or +mutually helpful relations; and that (iii.) the vast, vague, +complex business of conducting social life is broken up<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> +into a multitude of specific acts to be performed and of +specific goods to be delivered, at definite times and definite +places. Hence it is hardly surprising that one school of +social moralists has found in the conception of free contract +its social ideal. Every individual concerned assumes +obligations which it is to his interest to perform so that +the performance is voluntary, not coerced; while, at the +same time, some other person is engaged to serve him in +some way. The limitations of the contract idea will concern +us later.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Permanent Voluntary Associations.</b>—Partnerships, +limited liability corporations, guilds, trades +unions, churches, schools, clubs, are more permanent and +comprehensive associations, involving more far-reaching +rights and obligations. Societies organized for conversation +and sociability or conviviality, "corporations not for +profit," but for mutual enjoyment or for benevolent ends, +come under the same head. Most significant are the associations +which, while entered only voluntarily and having +therefore a basis in contract, are for generic ends. Thus +they are permanent, and cover much more than can be +written in the contract. Marriage, in modern society, is +entered into by contract; but married life is not narrowed +to the exchange of specific services at specific times. It is +a union for mutual economic and spiritual goods which +are coextensive with all the interests of the parties. In +its connection with the generation and rearing of children, +it is a fundamental means of guarding all social +interests and of directing their progress. Schools, colleges, +churches, federations of labor, organizations of +employers, and of both together, represent other forms of +permanent voluntary organizations which may have the +most far-reaching influence both upon those directly concerned +and upon society at large.</p> + +<p><b>3. Right to Use of Courts.</b>—All civil rights get their +final application and test in the right to have conflicting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> +rights defined and infringed rights remedied by appeal +to a public authority having general and final jurisdiction. +"The right to sue and be sued" may seem too legal +and external a matter to be worthy of much note in an +ethical treatise; but it represents the culmination of an +age-long experimentation with the problem of reconciling +individual freedom and public order. No civil right is +effective unless it carries with it a statement of a method +of enforcement and, if necessary, of redress and remedy. +Otherwise it is a mere name. Moreover, conflicts of civil +rights are bound to occur even when there is good faith +on the part of all concerned, just because new situations +arise. Unless there is a way of defining the respective +rights of each party in the new situation, each will arbitrarily +and yet in good faith insist upon asserting his +rights on the old basis: private war results. A new order +is not achieved and the one already attained is threatened +or disrupted. The value of rights to the use of courts +resides, then, to a comparatively small degree, in the specific +cases of deliberate wrong which are settled. What is more +important is that men get instruction as to the proper scope +and limits of their activities, through the provision of an +effective mechanism for amicable settlement of disputes +in those cases in which rights are vague and ambiguous +because the situations are novel.</p> + +<p><b>Classes of Wrongs and Remedies.</b>—Infringements +upon rights, such as murder, theft, arson, forgery, imply +a character which is distinctly anti-social in its bent. The +wrong, although done to one, is an expression of a disposition +which is dangerous to all. Such a wrong is a crime; +it is a matter for the direct jurisdiction of public authority. +It is the business of all to coöperate in giving evidence, +and it may render one a criminal accomplice to +conceal or suppress evidence, just as it is "compounding +a felony" for the wronged individual to settle the wrong +done him by arranging privately for compensation. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span> +penalty in such cases is generally personal; imprisonment +or at least a heavy fine. The violation may, however, be +of the nature of a wrong or "tort," rather than of a crime; +it may indicate a disposition indifferent to social interests +or neglectful of them rather than one actively hostile to +them. Such acts as libels, trespasses upon the land of +another, are illustrations. In such cases, the machinery of +justice is put in motion by the injured individual, not +by the commonwealth. This does not mean that society +as a whole has no interest in the matter; but that under +certain circumstances encouraging individuals to look out +for their own rights and wrongs is socially more important +than getting certain wrongs remedied irrespective of +whether men stand up for their own rights or not. Then +again, there are civil disputes which indicate neither a +criminal nor a harmful disposition, but rather uncertainty +as to what the law really is, leading to disputes +about rights—interpretations of a contract, express or +implied. Here the interest of society is to provide a +method of settlement which will hinder the growth of ill +will and private retaliation; and which also will provide +precedents and principles that will lessen uncertainty and +conflict in like cases in the future.</p> + +<p>Peace and tranquillity are not merely the absence of +open friction and disorder. They mean specific, easily-known, +and generally recognized principles which determine +the province and limits of the legitimate activity +of every person. Publicity, standards, rules of procedure, +remedies acknowledged in common, are their essence. <i>Res +publica</i>, the common concern, remains vague and latent +till defined by impartial, disinterested social organs. Then +it is expressed in regular and guaranteed modes of activity. +In the pregnant phrase of Aristotle, the administration +of justice is also its determination: that is, its +discovery and promulgation.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span></p> + +<h4>§ 2. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS</h4> + +<p><b>Contrast of Primitive with Present Justice.</b>—The significance +of the accomplishments and the defects of the +present administration of law may be brought out by a +sketch of its contrast with primitive methods. In savage +and barbarian society, on account of the solidarity of the +kin-group, any member of the group is likely to be attacked +for the offense of any other (see p. 28). He may +not have participated in the act, or have had complicity +in planning it. His guilt is that the same blood runs +in his veins.<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> The punitive attack, moreover, is made +directly and promiscuously by the injured man and by +his blood-relatives; it is made in the heat of passion or in +the vengeance of stealth as custom may decree. Says +Hearn, the state "did not interfere in the private quarrels +of its citizens. Every man took care of his own +property and his own household, and every hand guarded +its own head. If any injury were done to any person, +he retaliated, or made reprisals, or otherwise sought +redress, as custom prescribed."<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> The reprisal may itself +have called for another, and the blood-feud was on. In +any case, the state of affairs was one literally, not metaphorically, +described as "private war."</p> + +<p><b>Changes Now Effected.</b>—This state of affairs has been +superseded by one in which a third, a public and impartial +authority (1) takes cognizance of offenses against another +individual as offenses against the commonwealth; +(2) apprehends the supposed offender; (3) determines +and applies an objective standard of judgment, the same<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span> +for all, the law; (4) tries the supposed offender according +to rules of procedure, including rules of evidence or +proof, which are also publicly promulgated; and (5) +takes upon itself the punishment of the offender, if found +guilty. The history of this change, important and interesting +as it is, does not belong here. We are concerned +here only with the relation of public authority, public +law, and public activity to the development of the freedom +of the individual on one side and of his responsibility +on the other.<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> We shall point out in a number of particulars +that the evolution of freedom and responsibility in +individuals has coincided with the evolution of a public +and impartial authority.</p> + +<p><b>1. Good and Evil as Quasi-Physical.</b>—There are two +alternatives in the judgment of good and evil. (1) They +may be regarded as having <i>moral</i> significance, that is, +as having a voluntary basis and origin. (2) Or they may +be considered as substantial properties of things, as a sort +of essence diffused through them, or as a kind of force +resident in them, in virtue of which persons and things are +noxious or helpful, malevolent or kindly. Savage tribes, +for instance, cannot conceive either sickness or death as +natural evils; they are attributed to the malicious magic +of an enemy. Similarly the evil which follows from the +acts of a man is treated as a sign of some metaphysical +tendency inherent in him. Some men bring bad luck upon +everything and everybody they have anything to do with.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span> +A curse is on their doings. No distinction is made between +such evils and those which flow from intention and +character. The notion of the moral or voluntary nature +of good and evil hardly obtains. The quasi-physical view, +bordering upon the magical, prevails. The result is that +evil is thought of as a contagious matter, transmitted from +generation to generation, from class or person to class or +person; and as something to be got rid of, if at all, by +devices which are equally physical. Natural evils, plagues, +defeats, earthquakes, etc., <i>are treated as quasi-moral, while +moral evils are treated as more than half physical</i>. +Sins are infectious diseases, and natural diseases are +malicious interferences of a human or divine enemy. +Morals are materialized, and nature is moralized or +demoralized.<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> + +<p>Now it is hardly necessary to point out the effect of +such conceptions in restricting the freedom and responsibility +of the individual person. Man is hemmed in as to +thought and action on all sides by all kinds of mysterious +forces working in unforeseeable ways. This is true +enough in his best estate. When to this limitation is added +a direction of energy into magical channels, away from +those controllable sources of evil which reside in human disposition, +the amount of effective freedom possible is slight. +This same misplacing of liability holds men accountable +for acts they have not committed, because some magic +tendency for evil is imputed to them. Famine, pestilence, +defeat in war are evils to be remedied by sacrifice of goods +or persons or by ritualistic ceremonies; while the reme<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span>diable +causes of harm in human ignorance and negligence +go without attention.</p> + +<p><b>2. Accident and Intention.</b>—Under such circumstances, +little distinction can be made between the good and evil +which an individual <i>meant</i> to do and that which he <i>happened</i> +to do. The working presumption of society, up to +a comparatively late stage of its history, was that every +harmful consequence is an evidence of evil disposition +in those who were in any way concerned. This limitation +of freedom was accompanied by a counterpart limitation +of responsibility. Where no harm actually resulted, there +was thought to be no harmful intent. Animals and even +inanimate objects which do injury are baleful things and +come under disapprobation and penalty. Even in civilized +Athens there was a survival of the practice of holding +inanimate things liable. If a tree fell on a man and killed +him, the tree was to be brought to trial, and after condemnation +cast beyond the civic borders, i.e., outlawed.<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> +Anyhow, the owner of an offending article was almost +always penalized. Westermarck,<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> with reference to the +guilt of animals, cites an instance, dated in 1457, "when +a sow and her six young ones were tried on a charge of +their having murdered and partly eaten a child; the sow, +being found guilty, was condemned to death, the young +pigs were acquitted on account of their youth and the +bad example of their mother." When sticks, stones, and +animals are held accountable for evil results, there is little +chance of discriminating intent and accident or misadventure +in the case of personal agents. "The devil himself +knoweth not the intent, the 'thought' of man" was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span> +the mediæval maxim; all that can be certain is that harm +has come and the one who caused it must suffer; or else +no overt harm has come and no one is to blame.<a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> Harm +has been done and any one concerned, even remotely, in +the injurious situation, is <i>ex officio</i> guilty; it will not do +to take chances. The remoteness of an implication which +may involve liability is seen in the condition of English +law in the thirteenth century: "At your request I accompany +you when you are about your own affairs: my +enemies fall upon and kill me: you must pay for my death. +You take me to see a wild-beast show, or that interesting +spectacle a madman: beast or madman kills me; you must +pay. You hang up your sword; some one else knocks it +down so that it cuts me; you must pay."<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> Only gradually +did intent clearly evolve as the central element in an act, +and thus lead to the idea of a voluntary or free act.</p> + +<p>That the limitation upon the side of responsibility was +equally great is obvious. If a man is held liable for what +he did not and could not foresee or desire, there is no +ground for his <i>holding himself</i> responsible for anticipating +the consequences of his acts, and forming his +plans according as he foresees. This comes out clearly +in the obverse of what has just been said. If no harm +results from a willful attempt to do evil, the individual is +not blamed. He goes scot free. "An attempt to commit +a crime is no crime."<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a></p> + +<p><b>3. Character and Circumstances.</b>—Even in law, to say +nothing of personal moral judgments, we now almost as a +matter of course take into account, in judging an agent's +intent, both circumstances, and character as inferred from +past behavior. We extend our view of consequences, tak<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span>ing +into account in judging the moral quality of a particular +deed, consequences its doer is <i>habitually</i> found to +effect. We blame the individual less for a deed if we find it +contrary to his habitual course. We blame him more, if we +find he has a character given to that sort of thing. We +take into account, in short, the permanent attitude and +disposition of the agent. We also discriminate the conditions +and consequences of a deed much more carefully. +Self-defense, protection of others or of property, come +in as "extenuating circumstances"; the degree of provocation, +the presence of immediate impulsive fear or anger, +as distinct from a definitely formed, long-cherished idea, +are considered. The questions of first or of repeated +offense, of prior criminality or good behavior, enter +in. Questions of heredity, of early environment, of early +education and opportunity are being brought to-day into +account.</p> + +<p>We are still very backward in this respect, both in personal +and in public morals; in private judgment and in +legal procedure and penalty. Only recently have we, for +example, begun to treat juvenile delinquents in special +ways; and the effort to carry appropriate methods further +meets with strong opposition and the even stronger inertia +of indifference. It is regarded by many good +people as lowering the bars of responsibility to consider +early training and opportunity, just as in its day it was +so regarded to plead absence of intent in cases where evil +had actually resulted. It is not "safe" to let any one +off from the rigor of the law. The serious barrier, now +as earlier, is upon the scientific or intellectual side. There +was a time when it did not seem feasible to pass upon +intent; it was hidden, known only to God. But we have +now devised ways, adequate in principle, though faulty +in detail, to judge immediate intent; similarly, with the +growth of anthropology, psychology, statistics, and the +resources of publicity in social science, we shall in time<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> +find it possible to consider the effects of heredity, early +environment, and training upon character and so upon +intent. We shall then regard present methods of judging +intent to be almost as barbarous as we now consider the +earlier disregard of accident and provocation. Above +all we shall learn that increased, not relaxed responsibility, +comes with every increase of discrimination of causes lying +in character and conditions.<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p> + +<p><b>4. Intellectual Incapacity and Thoughtlessness.</b>—With +increasing recognition of character as the crucial element +in voluntary action, we now take into account such matters +as age, idiocy, and insanity as factors of judgment. But +this also has been a slow growth. If we take the one +question of insanity, for example, in 1724 exculpation for +harm resulting from a madman's acts required that the +person excused "be a man that is totally deprived of +his understanding and memory, and doth not know what +he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a +wild beast." At the beginning of the nineteenth century, +the excuse was no longer that of being such a raving +lunatic as is here implied; but of knowing right and wrong +from each other <i>in the abstract</i>. By a celebrated case in +1843, the rule was changed, in English law, to knowledge +of the difference between right and wrong in the +particular case. Further advance waits upon progress +of science which will make it more possible to judge the +specific mental condition of the person acting; and thus +do away with the abuses of the present system which tend, +on the one hand, to encourage the pleading of insanity where +none may exist; and, on the other hand (by a rigid application +of a technical rule), to condemn persons really irre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span>sponsible.<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> +Popular judgment still inclines to impute clear +and definite intention on the basis of results; and to ignore +conditions of intellectual confusion and bewilderment, and +justifies itself in its course on the ground that such is the +only "safe" course.<a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a></p> + +<p><b>Responsibility for Thoughtlessness.</b>—But the release +from responsibility for deeds in which the doer is intellectually +incapacitated, is met on the other side by holding +individuals of normal mental constitution responsible for +some consequences which were not thought of at all. We +even hold men accountable for <i>not</i> thinking to do certain +acts. The former are acts of heedlessness or carelessness, +as when a mason on top of a building throws rubbish on +to a street below which injures some one, without any +thought on his part of this result, much less any deliberate +desire to effect it. The latter are acts of negligence, as +when, say, an engineer fails to note a certain signal. In +such cases even when no harm results, we now hold the +agent morally culpable. Similarly we blame children for +<i>not</i> thinking of the consequences of their acts; we blame +them for <i>not</i> thinking to do certain things at a certain +time—to come home when told, and so on. This is not +merely a matter of judgment by others. The more conscientious +a person is, the more occasions he finds to judge +<i>himself</i> with respect to results which <i>happened because he +did not think or deliberate or foresee at all</i>—provided he +has reason to believe he would have thought of the harmful +results if he had been of a different character. Because +we were absorbed in something else we did not think, and +while, in the abstract, this something else may have been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span> +all right, in the concrete it may be proof of an unworthy +character. The very fact that we permitted ourselves to +become so absorbed that the thought of an engagement, +or of an opportunity to help some friend whom we knew +to be in need, did not occur to us, is evidence of a selfish, +i.e., inconsiderate, character.</p> + +<p>The case seems paradoxical and is crucial. Others +hold us responsible because we <i>were</i> irresponsible in action +and <i>in order</i> that we may <i>become</i> responsible. We +blame ourselves precisely because we discover that an +unconscious preference for a private or exclusive good +led us to be careless of the good of others. The effect +(if the regret is genuine, not simulated) is to develop +a habit of greater thoughtfulness in the future. Less and +less do men accept for others or for themselves ignorance +as an excuse for bad consequences, when the ignorance +itself flows from character. Our chief moral business +is to become acquainted with consequences. Our moral +character surely does not depend in this case, then, upon +the fact that we had alternatives clearly in mind and chose +the worse; the difficulty is that we had only one alternative +in mind and did not <i>consciously</i> choose at all. Our +freedom lies in the <i>capacity</i> to alter our mode of action, +through having our ignorance enlightened by being held +for the neglected consequences when brought to accountability +by others, or by holding ourselves accountable in subsequent +reflection. Cases of careless acts and of acts +omitted through negligence are thus crucial for any theory +of freedom and responsibility. Either we are all wrong in +blaming ourselves or others in such cases, because there is +no free or voluntary element in them; or else there is +responsibility when deliberate comparison of alternatives +and conscious preference are absent. There is responsibility +for the absence of deliberation. Nature does not +forbear to attach consequences to acts because of the +ignorance of the one who does the deed. The evil results<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> +that follow in the wake of a thoughtless act are precisely +the reminders that make one take thought the next time. +Similarly, to be held liable by others or to take ourselves to +task for forgetfulness, inconsiderateness, and negligence, +is the way in which to build up conscientious foresight and +deliberate choice. The increased complexity and danger +of modern industrial activity, the menace of electric power, +of high explosives, of railway trains and trolley cars, of +powerful machines, have done much to quicken recognition +that negligence may be criminal, and to reawaken +the conviction of Greek thought that thoughtless ignorance, +where knowledge is possible, is the worst of evils. +The increased interdependence of men, through travel +and transportation, collective methods of production, and +crowding of population in cities, has widened the area +of the harm likely to result from inconsiderate action, and +has strengthened the belief that adequate thoughtfulness is +possible only where there is sympathetic interest in others.</p> + +<p><b>5. The Conflict of Form and Substance.</b>—The technical +forms of procedure concerned in establishing and remedying +rights were, for long ages, more important than +the substantial ends by which alone the forms may be +justified. Any effort for a remedy was nullified if the +minutiæ of complicated formulæ (largely magical or ritualistic +in their origin) were deviated from. Almost any +obligation might be escaped by some quirk or turn in some +slight phrase or motion, without which no agreement was +binding, so sacramental was the importance of the very +words. In early days the rigidity of these semi-ritualistic +performances doubtless served to check arbitrary and +reckless acts, and to impress the sense of the value of a +standard.<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> But they survived as "rudimentary organs"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> +long after they had done their work in this respect; and +after they had been eliminated from legal procedure they +survived as habits of judging conduct.</p> + +<p><b>Survivals of Spirit of Individualistic Litigation.</b>—The +fact that the procedure of justice originated as methods +of supplying impartial umpires for conflicts waged between +individuals, has had serious consequences. It has +had indeed the desirable consequence of quickening men +to the perception of their rights and to their obligation as +social members to maintain them intact. But it has also +had the undesirable result of limiting the function of the +public interest to the somewhat negative one of securing +fair play between contentious individuals. The battle is +not now fought out with fists or spears or oaths or ordeals: +but it is largely a battle of wits and of technical resources +between the opposite parties and their lawyers, with the +State acting the part of a benevolently neutral umpire. +The ignorant, the poor, the foreign, and the <i>merely</i> +honest are almost inevitably at a discount in this battle.<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> +And, in any case, the technical aspect of justice, that is, +the question of proper forms gets out of true perspective. +The "legally-minded" man is likely to be one with whom +technical precedents and rules are more important than +the goods to be achieved and the evils to be avoided. With +increase of publicity and scientific methods of determining +and interpreting facts, and with a public and professional +criticism which is impartial and wise, we may anticipate +that the supremacy of the general good will be increasingly +recognized in cases of litigation, and that the courts, +as organs of public justice, will take a more active and substantial +part in the management of all legal controversies.<a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Legal and Moral.</b>—But, at the best, definitions of rights +and of remedial procedures only (1) lay down general, not +individual conditions, and (2), so far as they are strict, +register precedent and custom rather than anticipate the +novel and variable. They can state what shall not be +done. Except in special cases, they cannot state what +shall be done, much less the spirit and disposition in which +it shall be done. In their formulations, they present a sort +of minimum limit of morality not to be overstepped by +those inclined to ill. They throw little light on the positive +capacities and responsibilities of those who are socially +minded. They have a moral purpose: they free energy +from the friction attendant upon vague, obscure, and +uncertain situations, by enlightening men as to what they +may do and how they may do it. But the exaggeration +of form at the expense of the substantial end and good, +leads to misplaced emphasis and false perspective. The +rules are treated as ends; they are employed not to get +insight into consequences, but as justifying, apart from +consequences, certain acts. The would-be conscientious +agent is led into considering goodness as a matter of obeying +rules, not of fulfilling ends. The average individual +conceives he has satisfied the requirements of morality when +he has conformed to the average level of legal definition +and prescription. Egoistic, self-seeking men regard their +actions as sanctioned if they have <i>not</i> broken the laws; and +decide this question by success in evading penalties. The +intelligence that should go to employing the spirit of laws +to enlighten behavior is spent in ingenious inventions for +observing their letter. The "respectable" citizen of this +type is one of the unsocialized forces that social reformers +find among their most serious obstacles.</p> + +<p>This identification of morality with the legal and jural +leads to a reaction which is equally injurious: the complete +separation of the legal and the moral, the former +conceived as merely "outer," concerned entirely with acts,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> +not at all with motive and character. The effect of this +divorce is perhaps more serious upon the moral than upon +the legal. The separation makes morals sentimental and +whimsical, or else transcendental and esoteric. It leads +to neglect of the social and institutional realities which +form a world of action as surely as natural objects and +energies form a physical world, and ends in the popular +conception of morals as just a matter of "goodness" +(the goody-goodiness) of individuals. One of the most +fundamental of moral duties is that of making the legal +order a more adequate expression of the common good.</p> + +<p><b>Special Problems.</b>—Civil Society thus imposes upon its +members not only specific obligations, but it also imposes +upon all who enjoy its benefits the supreme obligation of +seeing that the civic order is itself intelligently just in +its methods of procedure. The peculiar moral problems +which men have to face as members of civil society change, +of course, from time to time with change of conditions; +among the more urgent of present problems, we may +mention:</p> + +<p><b>1. Reform of Criminal Procedure.</b>—The negative side +of morality is never so important as the positive, because +the pathological cannot be as important as the physiological +of which it is a disturbance and perversion. But +no fair survey of our methods, either of locating criminality +or of punishing it, can fail to note that they contain far +too many survivals of barbarism. Compared with primitive +times we have indeed won a precious conquest. Even as +late as 1813, a proposal to change the penalty for stealing +five shillings from death to transportation to a remote +colony, was defeated in England.<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> But we are likely in +flattering ourselves upon the progress made to overlook +that which it remains to make. Our trials are technical +rather than human: they assume that just about so much<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> +persistent criminality must persist in any case. They +endeavor, in rather routine and perfunctory ways, to label +this and that person as criminal in such and such degrees, +or, by technical devices and resources, to acquit. In many +American states, distrust of government, inherited from +days of tyrannical monarchy or oligarchy, protects the +accused in all sorts of ways. For fear the government +will unjustly infringe upon the liberty of the individual, +the latter is not only—as is just—regarded as innocent till +proved guilty; but is provided with every possible technical +advantage in rules of evidence, postponements and appeals, +advantages backed up, in many cities, by association +with political bosses which gives him a corrupt "pull."</p> + +<p>On the other hand, there is as yet no general recognition +of the possibility of an unbiased scientific investigation +into all the antecedents (hereditary and environmental) of +evildoers; an investigation which would connect the wrong +done with the <i>character of the individual</i> committing it, and +not merely with one of a number of technical degrees of +crime, laid down in the statute books in the abstract, without +reference to particular characters and circumstances. +Thus while the evildoer has in one direction altogether +too much of a chance to evade justice, he has in another +direction a chance at only technical, rather than at moral, +justice—justice as an individual human being. It is not +possible to discuss here various methods which have been +proposed for remedying these defects. But it is clearly +the business of the more thoughtful members of society +to consider the evils seriously and to interest themselves +actively in their reform. We need, above all, a change in +two respects: (a) recognition of the possibilities of new +methods of judgment which the sciences of physiology, +psychology, and sociology have brought about; and (b) +surrender of that feudal conception according to which +men are divided, as it were essentially, into two classes: +one the criminal and the other the meritorious. We need<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span> +to consider the ways in which the pressure and the opportunities +of environment and education, of poverty and comfortable +living, of extraneous suggestion and stimulation, +make the differences between one man and another; and +to recognize how fundamentally one human nature is at +bottom. Juvenile courts, probation officers, detention +officers, mark the beginnings of what is possible, but only +the beginnings. For the most part crime is still treated +sordidly and by routine, except when, being sensational, +it is the occasion for a great battle of wits between keen +prosecuting attorney and clever "criminal lawyer," with +the world through the newspapers watching the display.</p> + +<p><b>2. Reform of Punishment.</b>—Emerson's bitter words are +still too applicable. "Our distrust is very expensive. The +money we spend for courts and prisons is very ill laid out. +We make, by distrust, the thief and burglar and incendiary, +and by our court and jail we keep him so."<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> Reformatories, +whose purpose is change of disposition, not +mere penalization, have been founded; but there are still +many more prisons than reformatories. And, if it be +argued that most criminals are so hardened in evil-doing +that reformatories are of no use, the answer is twofold. +We do not know, because we have never systematically +and intelligently tried to find out; and, even if it were so, +nothing is more illogical than to turn the unreformed criminal, +at the end of a certain number of months or years, +loose to prey again upon society. Either reform or else +permanent segregation is the logical alternative. Indeterminate +sentences, release on probation, discrimination of +classes of offenders, separation of the first and more or +less accidental and immature offender from the old and +experienced hand, special matrons for women offenders, +introduction of education and industrial training into penitentiaries, +the finding of employment for those released<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span>—all +mark improvements. They are, however, as yet inchoate. +Intelligent members of society need to recognize +their own responsibility for the promotion of such reforms +and for the discovery of new ones.</p> + +<p><b>3. Increase of Administrative Efficiency.</b>—In the last +one hundred years, society has rapidly grown in internal +complexity. Commercial changes have brought about +an intense concentration of population in cities; have +promoted migratory travel and intercourse, with destruction +of local ties; have developed world markets and collective +but impersonal (corporate) production and distribution. +Many new problems have been created, while at +the same time many of the old agencies for maintaining +order have been weakened or destroyed, especially such +as were adapted to small groups with fixed habits. A +great strain has thus been put upon the instrumentalities +of justice. Pioneer conditions retarded in America the +development of the problems incident upon industrial +reconstruction. The possibility of moving on, of taking +up new land, finding unutilized resources of forest and +mine, the development of new professions, the growth of +population with new needs to be met, stimulated and rewarded +individual enterprise. Under such circumstances +there could be no general demand for public agencies of +inspection, supervision, and publicity. But the pioneer +days of America are practically ended. American cities +and states find themselves confronted with the same problems +of public health, poverty and unemployment, congested +population, traffic and transportation, charitable +relief, tramps and vagabondage, and so forth, that have +troubled older countries.</p> + +<p>We face these problems, moreover, with traditions which +are averse to "bureaucratic" administration and public +"interference." Public regulation is regarded as a +"paternalistic" survival, quite unsuited to a free and +independent people. It would be foolish, indeed, to over<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span>look +or deny the great gains that have come from our +American individualistic convictions: the quickening of +private generosity, the growth of a generalized sense of +<i>noblesse oblige</i>—of what every successful individual owes +to his community; of personal initiative, self-reliance, +and versatile "faculty"; of interest in all the voluntary +agencies which by education and otherwise develop the +individuality of every one; and of a demand for equality of +opportunity, a fair chance, and a square deal for all. But +it is certain that the country has reached a state of +development, in which these individual achievements and possibilities +require new civic and political agencies if they +are to be maintained as realities. Individualism means +inequity, harshness, and retrogression to barbarism (no +matter under what veneer of display and luxury), unless +it is a <i>generalized</i> individualism: an individualism which +takes into account the real good and effective—not merely +formal—freedom of <i>every</i> social member.</p> + +<p>Hence the demand for civic organs—city, state, +and federal,—of expert inquiry, inspection, and supervision +with respect to a large number of interests +which are too widespread and too intricate to be well +cared for by private or voluntary initiative. The +well-to-do in great cities may segregate themselves in +the more healthful quarters; they may rely upon their +automobiles for local transportation; they may secure pure +milk and unadulterated foods from personal resources; +they may, by their combined "pull," secure good schools, +policing, lighting, and well-paved streets for their own +localities. But the great masses are dependent upon public +agencies for proper air, light, sanitary conditions of +work and residence, cheap and effective transportation, +pure food, decent educative and recreative facilities in +schools, libraries, museums, parks.</p> + +<p>The problems which fall to the lot of the proper organs +of administrative inspection and supervision are essentially<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span> +<i>scientific</i> problems, questions for expert intelligence conjoined +with wide sympathy. In the true sense of the word +political, they are political questions: that is, they relate +to the welfare of society as an organized community of +attainment and endeavor. In the cant sense of the term +political, the sense of conventional party-issues and party-lines, +they have no more to do with politics than have the +multiplication table and the laws of hygiene. Yet they +are at present almost hopelessly entangled with irrelevant +"political" issues, and are almost hopelessly under the +heel of party-politicians whose least knowledge is of the +scientific questions involved, just as their least interest is +for the human issues at stake. So far "civil service reform" +has been mainly negative: a purging away of some +of the grosser causes which have influenced appointments +to office. But now there is needed a constructive reform +of civil administration which will develop the agencies +of inquiry, oversight, and publicity required by modern +conditions; and which will necessitate the selection of +public servants of scientifically equipped powers.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS</h4> + +<p>No hard and fast line can be drawn between civil society +and the State. By the State, however, we denote those +conditions of social organization and regulation which are +most fundamental and most general:—conditions which are +summed up in and expressed through the general will as +manifested in legislation and its execution. As a civil +right is technically focused in the right to use the courts, +"to sue and be sued," that is in the right to have other +claims adjudicated and enforced by a public, impartial +authority, so a political right is technically summed up in +the power to vote—either to vote directly upon laws or +to vote for those who make and carry out laws. To have +the right in a legislative assembly to speak for or against<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> +a certain measure; to be able to say "yea" or "nay" upon +a roll-call; to be able to put into a ballot-box a piece of +paper with a number of names written thereon, are not +acts which of themselves possess the inherent value of many +of the most ordinary transactions of daily life. But the +representative and potential significance of political rights +exceeds that of any other class of rights. Suffrage stands +for direct and active participation in the regulation of +the terms upon which associated life shall be sustained, and +the pursuit of the good carried on. Political freedom and +responsibility <i>express an individual's power and obligation +to make effective all his other capacities by fixing the +social conditions of their exercise</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Growth of Democracy.</b>—The evolution of democratically +regulated States, as distinct from those ordered in the +interests of a small group, or of a special class, is the +social counterpart of the development of a comprehensive +and common good. Externally viewed, democracy is a +piece of machinery, to be maintained or thrown away, like +any other piece of machinery, on the basis of its economy +and efficiency of working. Morally, it is the effective +embodiment of the moral ideal of a good which consists in +the development of all the social capacities of every individual +member of society.</p> + +<p><b>Present Problems: 1. Distrust of Government.</b>—Present +moral problems connected with political affairs have to +do with safeguarding the democratic ideal against the influences +which are always at work to undermine it, and with +building up for it a more complete and extensive embodiment. +The historic antecedent of our own governmental +system was the exercise of a monopoly by a privileged +class.<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> It became a democratic institution partly because<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span> +the King, in order to secure the monopoly, had to concede +and guarantee to the masses of the people certain rights +as against the oligarchical interests which might rival +his powers; and partly because the centralization of power, +with the arbitrary despotism it created, called out protests +which finally achieved the main popular liberties: safety +of life and property from arbitrary forfeiture, arrest, or +seizure by the sovereign; the rights of free assembly, +petition, a free press, and of representation in the law-making +body.</p> + +<p>Upon its face, the struggle for individual liberty was a +struggle against the overbearing menace of despotic rulers. +This fact has survived in an attitude towards government +which cripples its usefulness as an agency of the general +will. Government, even in the most democratic countries, +is still thought of as an external "ruler," operating from +above, rather than as an organ by which people associated +in pursuit of common ends can most effectively coöperate +for the realization of their own aims. Distrust of government +was one of the chief traits of the situation in which +the American nation was born. It is embodied not only +in popular tradition, and party creeds, but in our organic +laws, which contain many provisions expressly calculated +to prevent the corporate social body from effecting its +ends freely and easily through governmental agencies.<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a></p> + +<p>There can be no doubt that the movement to restrict the +functions of government, the <i>laissez-faire</i> movement, was +in its time an important step in human freedom, because<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> +so much of governmental action was despotic in intention +and stupid in execution. But it is also a mistake to continue +to think of a government which is only the people +associated for the assuring of their own ends as if it +were the same sort of thing as a government which represented +the will of an irresponsible class. The advance +of means of publicity, and of natural and social science, +provides not only protection against ignorant and unwise +public action, but also constructive instrumentalities of +intelligent administrative activities. One of the chief +moral problems of the present day is, then, that of making +governmental machinery such a prompt and flexible +organ for expressing the <i>common</i> interest and purpose +as will do away with that distrust of government +which properly must endure so long as "government" is +something imposed from above and exercised from without.</p> + +<p><b>2. Indifference to Public Concerns.</b>—The multiplication +of private interests is a measure of social progress: +it marks the multiplication of the sources and ingredients +of happiness. But it also invites neglect of the fundamental +general concerns which, seeming very remote, get +pushed out of sight by the pressure of the nearer and +more vivid personal interests. The great majority of men +have their thoughts and feelings well occupied with their +family and business affairs; with their clubs for recreation, +their church associations, and so on. "Politics" becomes +the trade of a class which is especially expert in the +manipulation of their fellows and skilled in the "acceleration" +of public opinion. "Politics" then gets a bad +name, and the aloofness from public matters of those best +fitted, theoretically, to participate in them is further promoted. +The saying of Plato, twenty-five hundred years +ago, that the penalty good men pay for not being interested +in government is that they are then ruled by men +worse than themselves, is verified in most of our American +cities.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>3. Corruption.</b>—This indifference of the many, which +throws the management of political affairs into the hands +of a few, leads inevitably to corruption. At the best, government +is administered by human beings possessed of +ordinary human frailties and partialities; and, at the best, +therefore, its ideal function of serving impartially the +common good must be compromised in its execution. But +the control of the inner machinery of governmental power +by a few who can work in irresponsible secrecy because of +the indifference and even contempt of the many, incites to +deliberate perversion of public functions into private advantages. +As embezzlement is appropriation of trust +funds to private ends, so corruption, "graft," is prostitution +of public resources, whether of power or of money, +to personal or class interests. That a "public office is a +public trust" is at once an axiom of political ethics and +a principle most difficult to realize.</p> + +<p>In our own day, a special field has been opened within +which corruption may flourish, in the development of public +utility companies. Railways, city transportation systems, +telegraph and telephone systems, the distribution of water +and light, require public franchises, for they either employ +public highways or they call upon the State to exercise +its power of eminent domain. These enterprises can +be carried on efficiently and economically only as they +are either monopolies, or quasi-monopolies. All modern +life, however, is completely bound up with and dependent +upon facilities of communication, intercourse, and distribution. +Power to control the various public-service corporations +carries with it, therefore, power to control and +to tax all industries, power to build up and cast down +communities, companies, and individuals, to an extent +which might well have been envied by royal houses of the +past. It becomes then a very special object for great +corporations to control the agencies of legislation and +administration; and it becomes a very special object for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span> +party leaders and bosses to get control of party machinery +in order to act as brokers in franchises and in special +favors—sometimes directly for money, sometimes for the +perpetuation and extension of their own power and influence, +sometimes for the success, through influential support +and contribution to party funds, of the national party +with which they are identified.</p> + +<p><b>4. Reforms in Party Machinery.</b>—The last decade or +so of our history has been rife with schemes to improve +political conditions. It has become clear, among other +things, that our national growth has carried with it the +development of secondary political agencies, not contemplated +by the framers of our constitutions, agencies which +have become primary in practical matters. These agencies +are the "machines" of political parties, with their hierarchical +gradation of bosses from national to ward rulers, +bosses who are in close touch with great business interests +at one extreme, and with those who pander to the vices +of the community (gambling, drink, and prostitution) at +the other; parties with their committees, conventions, primaries, +caucuses, party-funds, societies, meetings, and all +sorts of devices for holding together and exciting masses +of men to more or less blind acquiescence.</p> + +<p>It is not necessary to point out the advantages which +parties have subserved in concentrating and defining public +opinion and responsibility in large issues; nor to dwell +upon their value in counteracting tendencies which break +up and divide men into a multitude of small groups having +little in common with one another. But behind these advantages +a vast number of abuses have sheltered themselves. +Recent legislation and recent discussion have shown +a marked tendency formally to recognize the part actually +played by party machinery in the conduct of the State, +and to take measures to make this factor more responsible +in its exercise. Since these measures directly affect the +conditions under which the government as the organ of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_479" id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span> +the general will does its work of securing the fundamental +conditions of equal opportunity for all, they have a direct +moral import. Such questions as the Australian ballot, the +recognition of party emblems and party groupings of +names; laws for direct primary nominations; the registering +of voters for primary as well as for final elections; +legal control of party committees and party conventions; +publicity of accounts as to the reception and use of party +funds; forbidding of contributions by corporations, are +thus as distinctly moral questions as are bribery and ballot-box +stuffing.</p> + +<p><b>5. Reforms in Governmental Machinery.</b>—Questions +that concern the respective advantages of written versus +unwritten constitutions are in their present state problems +of technical political science rather than of morals. But +there are problems, growing out of the fact that for the +most part American constitutions were written and adopted +under conditions radically unlike those of the present, +which have a direct ethical import. As already noted, our +constitutions are full of evidences of distrust of popular +coöperative action. They did not and could not foresee +the direction of industrial development, the increased complexity +of social life, nor the expansion of national territory. +Many measures which have proved indispensable +have had therefore to be as it were smuggled in; they +have been justified by "legal fictions" and by interpretations +which have stretched the original text to uses undreamed +of. At the same time, the courts, which are the +most technical and legal of our political organs, are supreme +masters over the legislative branch, the most popular +and general. The distribution of functions between +the states and the nation is curiously ill-adapted to present +conditions (as the discussions regarding railway regulation +indicate); and the distribution of powers between +the state and its municipalities is hardly less so, resting in +theory upon the idea of local self-government, and in prac<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_480" id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span>tice +doing almost everything possible to discourage responsible +initiative for the conduct of their own affairs on +the part of municipalities.</p> + +<p>These conditions have naturally brought forth a large +crop of suggestions for reforms. It is not intended to +discuss them here, but the more important of them, so far +as involving moral questions, may be briefly noted. The +proposals termed the initiative and the referendum and the +"recall" (this last intended to enable the people to withdraw +from office any one with whose conduct of affairs they +are dissatisfied) are clearly intended to make the ideal of +democratic control more effective in practice. Proposals +for limited or complete woman's suffrage call attention +to the fact that one-half of the citizenship does the political +thinking for the other half, and emphasize the difficulty +under such conditions of getting a comprehensive +social standpoint (which, as we have already seen, is the +sympathetic and reasonable standpoint) from which to +judge social issues. Many sporadic propositions from this +and that quarter indicate a desire to revise constitutions +so as to temper their cast-iron quality and increase their +flexible adaptation to the present popular will, and so as +to emancipate local communities from subjection to State +legislatures in such a way as to give them greater autonomy +and hence greater responsibility, in the management +of their own corporate affairs. It is not the arguments +<i>pro</i> and <i>con</i> that we are here concerned with; +but we are interested to point out that moral issues are +involved in the settlement of these questions. It may, +moreover, be noted that dividing lines in the discussion +are generally drawn, consciously or unconsciously, on the +basis of the degree of faith which exists in the democratic +principle and ideal, as against the class idea in some +of its many forms.</p> + +<p><b>6. Constructive Social Legislation.</b>—The rapid change +of economic methods, the accumulation and concentration<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_481" id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span> +of wealth, the aggregation of capital and labor into distinct +bodies of corporations and trusts, on one side, and +federated labor unions, on the other; the development of +collective agencies of production and distribution, have +brought to the focus of public attention a large number +of proposals for new legislation, almost all of which have +a direct moral import. These matters are discussed at +length in subsequent chapters (chs. xxii.-xxv.); and so are +passed over here with the reminder that, while on one side +they are questions of the ethics of industry, they are +also questions of the right and wrong use of political power +and authority. We may also note that the theoretical +principle at issue, the extension versus the restriction of +governmental agencies, so far as it is not simply a question +of what is expedient under the given circumstances, +is essentially a question of a <i>generalized</i> versus a <i>partial</i> +individualism. The democratic movement of emancipation +of personal capacities, of securing to each individual +an <i>effective</i> right to count in the order and movement +of society as a whole (that is, in the common good), has +gone far enough to secure to many, more favored than +others, peculiar powers and possessions. It is part of the +irony of the situation that such now oppose efforts to secure +equality of opportunity to <i>all</i> on the ground that these +efforts would effect an invasion of individual liberties and +rights: i.e., of privileges based on inequality. It requires +perhaps a peculiarly sympathetic imagination to see that +the question really involved is not one of magnifying the +powers of the State against individuals, but is one of +making individual liberty a more extensive and equitable +matter.</p> + +<p><b>7. The International Problem.</b>—The development of +national States marks a tremendous step forward in the +realization of the principle of a truly inclusive common +good. But it cannot be the final step. Just as clans, sects, +gangs, etc., are intensely sympathetic within and intensely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_482" id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> +exclusive and jealous without, so States are still arrayed +against States, with patriotism, loyalty, as an internal +virtue, and the distrust and hatred of divisive hostility as +the counterpart vice. The idea of humanity in the abstract +has been attained as a moral ideal. But the political +organization of this conception, its embodiment in law and +administrative agencies, has not been achieved. International +law, arbitration treaties, and even a court like the +Hague tribunal, whose power is sentimental rather than +political, mark steps forward. Nothing could be more +absurd, from the historic point of view, than to regard the +conception of an international State of federated humanity, +with its own laws and its own courts and its own rules for +adjudicating disputes, as a mere dream, an illusion of +sentimental hope. It is a very slight step to take forward +compared with that which has substituted the authority +of national States for the conflict of isolated clans and +local communities; or with that which has substituted a +publicly administered justice for the régime of private war +and retaliation. The argument for the necessity (short +of the attainment of a federated international State with +universal authority and policing of the seas) of preparing +in peace by enlarged armies and navies for the possibility +of war, must be offset at least by recognition that the +possession of irresponsible power is always a direct temptation +to its irresponsible use. The argument that war is +necessary to prevent moral degeneration of individuals +may, under present conditions, where every day brings +its fresh challenge to civic initiative, courage, and vigor, +be dismissed as unmitigated nonsense.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. THE MORAL CRITERION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY</h4> + +<p>The moral criterion by which to try social institutions +and political measures may be summed up as follows: The +test is whether a given custom or law sets free individual<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_483" id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span> +capacities in such a way as to make them available for the +development of the general happiness or the common +good. This formula states the test with the emphasis falling +upon the side of the individual. It may be stated from +the side of associated life as follows: The test is whether +the general, the public, organization and order are promoted +in such a way as to equalize opportunity for all.</p> + +<p><b>Comparison with the Individualistic Formula.</b>—The +formula of the individualistic school (in the narrow sense +of that term—the <i>laissez-faire</i> school) reads: The moral +end of political institutions and measures is the maximum +possible freedom of the individual consistent with his not +interfering with like freedom on the part of other individuals. +It is quite possible to interpret this formula +in such a way as to make it equivalent to that just given. +But it is not employed in that sense by those who advance +it. An illustration will bring out the difference. Imagine +one hundred workingmen banded together in a desire to +improve their standard of living by securing higher +wages, shorter hours, and more sanitary conditions of +work. Imagine one hundred other men who, because they +have no families to support, no children to educate, or +because they do not care about their standard of life, +are desirous of replacing the first hundred at lower wages, +and upon conditions generally more favorable to the +employer of labor. It is quite clear that in offering themselves +and crowding out the others, they are not interfering +with the <i>like</i> freedom on the part of others. The +men already engaged are "free" to work for lower wages +and longer time, if they want to. But it is equally certain +that they are interfering with the <i>real</i> freedom of the +others: that is, with the effective expression of their <i>whole</i> +body of activities.</p> + +<p>The formula of "<i>like</i> freedom" artificially isolates some +one power, takes that in the abstract, and then inquires +whether <i>it</i> is interfered with. The one truly moral ques<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_484" id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span>tion +is what relation this particular power, say the power +to do a certain work for a certain reward, sustains to all the +other desires, purposes, and interests of the individual. How +are <i>they</i> affected by the way in which some one activity is +exercised? It is in them that the concrete freedom of +the man resides. We do not know whether the freedom of +a man is interfered with or is assisted until we have taken +into account his whole system of capacities and activities. +The maximum freedom of one individual consistent with +equal <i>concrete</i> or <i>total</i> freedom of others, would indeed +represent a high moral ideal. But the individualistic +formula is condemned by the fact that it has in mind +only an abstract, mechanical, external, and hence formal +freedom.</p> + +<p><b>Comparison with the Collectivistic Formula.</b>—There +is a rival formula which may be summed up as the subordination +of private or individual good to the public or +general good: the subordination of the good of the part +to the good of the whole. This notion also <i>may</i> be interpreted +in a way which renders it identical with our own +criterion. But it is usually not so intended. It tends to +emphasize quantitative and mechanical considerations. +The individualistic formula tends in practice to emphasize +the freedom of the man who has power at the expense of +his neighbor weaker in health, in intellectual ability, in +worldly goods, and in social influence. The collectivistic +formula tends to set up a static social whole and to prevent +the variations of individual initiative which are necessary +to progress. An individual variation may involve +opposition, not conformity or subordination, to the existing +social good taken statically; and yet may be the sole +means by which the existing State is to progress. Minorities +are not always right; but every advance in right begins +in a minority of one, when some individual conceives +a project which is at variance with the social good as it +<i>has</i> been established.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_485" id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span></p> + +<p>A true public or social good will accordingly not subordinate +individual variations, but will encourage individual +experimentation in new ideas and new projects, +endeavoring only to see that they are put into execution +under conditions which make for securing responsibility +for their consequences. A just social order promotes in +all its members habits of criticizing its attained goods and +habits of projecting schemes of new goods. It does not +aim at intellectual and moral subordination. Every form +of social life contains survivals of the past which need to +be reorganized. The struggle of some individuals <i>against</i> +the existing subordination of their good to the good of +the whole is the method of the reorganization of the whole +in the direction of a more generally distributed good. Not +order, but orderly progress, represents the social ideal.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Green, <i>Principles of Political Obligation</i>, 1888; Ritchie, <i>Principles +of State Interference</i>, 1891, <i>Natural Rights</i>, 1895; Lioy, <i>Philosophy +of Right</i>, 2 vols., 1901; Willoughby, <i>An Examination of the Nature +of the State</i>, 1896; Wilson, <i>The State</i>, 1889; Donisthorpe, <i>Individualism</i>, +1889; Giddings, <i>Democracy and Empire</i>, 1900; Mulford, <i>The +Nation</i>, 1882; Spencer, <i>Principles of Sociology</i>, Vol. II., Part V., 1882, +on Political Institutions; Bentham, <i>Fragment on Government</i>, 1776; +Mill, <i>Considerations on Representative Government</i>, 1861, <i>On Liberty</i>, +1859, and <i>The Subjection of Women</i>, 1859; Austin, <i>Jurisprudence</i>, +2 vols., 4th ed., 1873; Hadley, <i>The Relations between Freedom and +Responsibility in the Evolution of Democratic Government</i>, 1903; Pollock, +<i>Expansion of the Common Law</i>, 1904; Hall, <i>Crime in Its Relations +to Social Progress</i>, 1901; <i>Philanthropy and Social Progress</i>, +Seven Essays, 1893; Stephen (J. F.), <i>Liberty, Equality, Fraternity</i>, +1873 (a criticism of Mill's <i>Liberty</i>); Tufts, <i>Some Contributions of +Psychology to the Conception of Justice</i>, Philosophical Review, Vol. +XV., p. 361.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_204_204" id="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> A traveler tells of overhearing children in Australia, when one +of their kin had injured some one in another clan, discuss whether +or no they came within the degree of nearness of relationship which +made them liable to suffer.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_205_205" id="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> Hearn, <i>The Aryan Household</i>, p. 431. Hearn is speaking, moreover, +of a later and more advanced condition of society, one lying +well within "civilization."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_206_206" id="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> Those interested in this important history, as every student of +morals may well be, will find easily accessible material in the following +references: Hobhouse, <i>Morals in Evolution</i>, ch. iii. of Vol. I.; +Hearn, <i>The Aryan Household</i>, ch. xix.; Westermarck, <i>The Origin and +Development of the Moral Ideas</i>, Vol. I., pp. 120-185, and parts of +ch. xx.; Sutherland, <i>Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct</i>, chs. +xx. and xxi.; Pollock and Maitland, <i>History of of English Law</i>, Vol. +II., pp. 447-460 and ch. ix.; Pollock, <i>Oxford Lectures</i> (The King's +Peace); Cherry, <i>Criminal Law in Ancient Communities</i>; Maine, +<i>Ancient Law</i>. References to anthropological literature, dealing with +savage and barbarian customs, will be found especially in Westermarck +and Hobhouse.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_207_207" id="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> For facts regarding the importance and nature of these conceptions, +see Westermarck, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 52-72; Robertson Smith, <i>The +Religion of the Semites</i>, pp. 427-435 and 139-149; Jevons, <i>Introduction +to the History of Religion</i>; Hobhouse, <i>op. cit.</i>, Vol. II., chs. i. and ii.; +and in general facts bearing on the relations between taboos, holiness, +and uncleanness; ablutions, purifications by fire, transference by +scapegoats; also the evil power of curses, and the early conceptions +of doom and fate. For a suggestive interpretation of the underlying +facts, see Santayana, <i>The Life of Reason</i>, Vol. III., chs. iii. and iv.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_208_208" id="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> See Plato, <i>Laws</i>, IX., 873. Compare Holmes, <i>Common Law</i>. In +mediæval and early modern Europe, offending objects were "deodand," +that is, devoted to God. They were to be appropriated by +the proper civil or ecclesiastical authority, and used for charity. In +theory, this lasted in England up to 1846. See Tylor, <i>Primitive Culture</i>, +Vol. I., pp. 286-287; and Pollock and Maitland, <i>op. cit.</i>, II., +pp. 471-472.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_209_209" id="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 257.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_210_210" id="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> The very words cause and to blame are closely connected in their +origin. Cf. the Greek αἵτία.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_211_211" id="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> Pollock and Maitland, <i>op. cit.</i>, II., p. 469; I., 30. For the history +of the idea of accident in English law with reference to homicide, +see also pp. 477-483. Also Stephen, <i>History of the Criminal Law in +England</i>, Vol. III., pp. 316-376.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_212_212" id="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> Pollock and Maitland, II., p. 473; see Westermarck, pp. 240-247.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_213_213" id="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> The slowness and indirectness of change throw light upon the +supposed distinction of justice and mercy (see <i>ante</i>, p. 415). When +the practical injustice of regarding accidental homicide or killing in +self-defense as murder began to be felt, the theory was still that +the man in justice was guilty, but that he was to be recommended +to the crown for mercy or pardon. This was a mean term in the +evolution of our present notion of justice.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_214_214" id="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> For some of the main historic facts on intellectual disability, +see Westermarck, pp. 264-277.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_215_215" id="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> Popular judgment, we may say, tends to be as grossly utilitarian +in its practice as it is grossly intuitional in its theoretical standpoint. +In assuming the possibility of an almost infallible, offhand, pat perception +of right and wrong, it commits itself practically to judging +in an offhand, analyzed way, on the basis of the evils which overtly +result.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_216_216" id="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> See Pollock and Maitland, Vol. II., p. 561, who quote from +Ihering: "Formulation is the sworn enemy of arbitrariness, the twin-sister +of liberty"; and who add: "As time goes on there is always +a larger room for discretion in the law of procedure: but discretionary +powers can only be safely entrusted to judges whose impartiality +is above suspicion and whose every act is exposed to public +and professional criticism."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_217_217" id="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> A lawyer, asked if the poor were not at a disadvantage in the +legal maintenance of their rights, replied: "<i>Not any more than they +are in the other relations of life.</i>"</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_218_218" id="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> The devices of "equity" as distinct from strict legality are of +course in part intended to secure this result.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_219_219" id="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> Robinson and Beard, <i>Development of Modern Europe</i>, Vol. II., +p. 207.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_220_220" id="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> "Man the Reformer."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_221_221" id="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> The term "the King's Peace," as the equivalent in England for +the peace and order of the commonwealth, goes back to a time when +literally it meant a private possession. Pollock says that the desire +to collect larger revenues was the chief motive for pushing the +royal jurisdiction against lesser local authorities. Essay on the +King's Peace in <i>Oxford Essays</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_222_222" id="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> Says President Hadley: "The fundamental division of powers in +the Constitution of the United States is between voters on the one +hand, and property-owners on the other. The forces of democracy +on one side, divided between the executive and the legislature, are set +over against the forces of property on the other side, with the judiciary +as arbiter between them.... The voter could elect what +officers he pleased, so long as these officers did not try to do certain +duties confided by the Constitution to the property-holders. Democracy +was complete as far as it went, but constitutionally it was +bound to stop short of <i>social</i> democracy."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_486" id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XXII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE ETHICS OF THE ECONOMIC LIFE</h2> + + +<p>In considering the ethics of the economic life and of +property, so far as this latter topic has not received treatment +elsewhere, we give (1) a general analysis of the ethical +questions involved, (2) a more specific account of the +problems raised by the present tendencies of industry, business, +and property; we follow these analyses with (3) a +statement of principles, and (4) a discussion of unsettled +problems.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. GENERAL ANALYSIS</h4> + +<p>Both the economic process and property have three +distinct ethical aspects corresponding respectively to the +ethical standpoint of happiness, character, and social +justice. (1) The economic process supplies men with +goods for their bodily wants and with many of the necessary +means for satisfying intellectual, æsthetic, and social +needs; property represents permanence and security in +these same values. (2) Through the difficulties it presents, +the work it involves, and the incitements it offers, the economic +process has a powerful influence in evoking skill, +foresight, and scientific control of nature, in forming character, +and stimulating ambition to excel. Property means +power, control, and the conditions for larger freedom. +(3) The economic process has an important social function. +Through division of labor, coöperation, and exchange +of goods and services, it affords one of the fundamental +expressions of the organic nature of society in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_487" id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span> +which members are reciprocally ends to each other. Property, +likewise, is not only a possessing, but a "right," and +thus, like all rights, involves the questions why and how far +society should support the individual in his interests and +claims. Let us examine each of these aspects further.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Economic in Relation to Happiness.</b>—Subject +to the important qualifications to be made below under +this and the succeeding sections, we note first that the +supply of needs and wants by industry and commerce is +ethically a good. A constant increase in production and +consumption is at least a possible factor in a fuller life. +Wealth is a possible condition of weal, even if it is not +to be gratuitously identified with it. Rome is frequently +cited as an example of the evil effects of material wealth. +But it was not wealth <i>per se</i>, but wealth (a) gained by +conquest, and exploitation, rather than by industry; (b) +controlled by a minority; and (c) used in largesses or in +crude spectacles—rather than democratically distributed +and used to minister to higher wants. The present average +income in the United States is about two hundred +dollars a year per capita, too small a sum to permit +comfortable living, sufficient education for children, and +the satisfaction which even a very moderate taste may +seek. From this point of view we may then ask of any +industrial process or business method whether it is an economical +and efficient method of production, and whether +it naturally tends to stimulate increased production. To +do this is—so far as it goes—ethically as well as economically +desirable.</p> + +<p>If wealth is a good, it might seem that property must +be judged by the same standard, since it represents security +in the satisfactions which wealth affords. But +there is an important distinction. Wealth means enjoyment +of goods and satisfaction of wants. Property means +the title to the exclusive use or possession of goods. Hence +the increase of property may involve increasing exclusion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_488" id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> +of part of the community from wealth, although the owners +of the property may be increasing their own enjoyments. +For, as pointed out very forcibly by Hadley in the first +chapter of his <i>Economics</i>, the public wealth of a community +is by no means equal to the sum of its private property. +If all parks were divided up into private estates, +all schoolhouses controlled by private owners, all water +supplies and highways given into private control, the sum +of private property might be very much increased; but +the public wealth would be decreased. Property is one of +the means of dealing with public wealth. It is important +to bear in mind, however, that it is only one means. Wealth +may be (1) privately owned and privately used; (2) privately +owned and publicly or commonly used; (3) publicly +owned, but privately used; (4) publicly owned and publicly +or commonly used. Illustrations of these four methods +are, for the first, among practically all peoples, clothing +and tools; of the second, a private estate opened to public +use—as a park; of the third, public lands or franchises +leased to individuals; of the fourth, public highways, +parks, navigable rivers, public libraries. Whether property +in any given case is a means to happiness will depend, +then, largely upon whether it operates chiefly to increase +wealth or to diminish it. The view has not been +infrequent that the wealth of the community is the sum +of its private property. From this it is but a step to +believe "that the acquisition of property is the production +of wealth, and that he best serves the common good who, +other things equal, diverts the larger share of the aggregate +wealth to his own possession."<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> The ethical questions +as to the relation of property to happiness involve accordingly +the problem of justice and can be more conveniently +considered under that head.</p> + +<p><b>2. Relation to Character.</b>—Even in its aspect of satisfying +human wants, quantity of production is not the only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_489" id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span> +consideration. As was pointed out in the chapters on Happiness, +the satisfaction of any and every want is not +necessarily a moral good. It depends upon the nature of +the wants; and as the nature of the wants reflects the +nature of the man who wants, the moral value of the economic +process and of the wealth it provides must depend +upon the relation of goods to persons. As economists we +estimate values in terms of external goods or commodities; +as ethical students we estimate values in terms of a certain +quality of life. We must ask first how the satisfaction of +wants affects the consumers.</p> + +<p><b>Moral Cost of Production.</b>—Consider next the producers. +It is desirable to have cheap goods, but the +price of goods or service is not measurable solely in +terms of other commodities or service; the price of an +article is also, as Thoreau has said, what it costs in +terms of human life. There is cheap production which +by this standard is dear. The introduction of machinery +for spinning and weaving cotton cheapened cotton cloth, +but the child labor which was supposedly necessary as a +factor in cheap production, involving disease, physical +stunting, ignorance, and frequently premature exhaustion +or death, made the product too expensive to be tolerated. +At least, it was at last recognized as too expensive in +England; apparently the calculation has to be made over +again in every community where a new system of child +labor is introduced. What is true of child labor is true +of many other forms of modern industry—the price in +human life makes the product dear. The minute subdivision +of certain parts of industry with the consequent monotony +and mechanical quality of the labor, the accidents +and diseases due to certain occupations, the devices to +cheapen goods by ingredients which injure the health of +the consumer, the employment of women under unsanitary +conditions and for excessive hours with consequent +risk to the health of themselves and their offspring—all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_490" id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a></span> +these are part of the moral price of the present processes +of industry and commerce.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the relation of production to physical welfare +is only one aspect of its effects upon life and character. +We may properly ask of any process or system whether +it quickens intelligence or deadens it, whether it necessitates +the degradation of work to drudgery, and whether +it promotes freedom or hampers it. To answer this last +question we shall have to distinguish formal from real +freedom. It might be that a system favorable to the +utmost formal freedom—freedom of contract—would result +in the most entire absence of that real freedom which +implies real alternatives. If the only alternative is, this or +starve, the real freedom is limited.</p> + +<p><b>Property and Character.</b>—Viewed on its positive side, +property means an expansion of power and freedom. +To seize, master, and possess is an instinct inbred by +the biological process. It is necessary for life; it is a +form of the <i>Wille zum Leben</i> or <i>Wille zur Macht</i> which +need not be despised. But in organized society possession +is no longer mere animal instinct; through expression +in a social medium and by a social person it +becomes a <i>right</i> of property. This is a far higher capacity; +like all rights it involves the assertion of personality +and of a rational claim upon fellow members of +society for their recognition and backing. Fichte's doctrine, +that property is essential to the effective exercise +of freedom, is a strong statement of its moral importance +to the individual.</p> + +<p>Over against these positive values of property are certain +evils which moralists have always recognized, evils +both to the property owner and to society. Avarice, covetousness, +hardness toward others, seem to be the natural +effects of the enormous possibilities of power offered +by property, joined with its exclusive character. The +prophets of Israel denounced the rich, and Jesus's image<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_491" id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span> +of the difficulty found by the rich man in entering the +kingdom of God—a moral society—has met general acceptance. +Plato's portrayal of the State in which the +wealthy rule sketches the perversion and disobedience of +laws, the jealousies and class hatred, the evasion of taxes +for public defense, and gives the moral outcome:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And henceforth they press forward on the path of money-getting, +losing their esteem for virtue as the esteem for wealth +grows upon them. For can you deny that there is such a +gulf between wealth and virtue, that when weighed as it +were in the two scales of a balance one of the two always +falls, as the other rises?"<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a></p></div> + +<p>Even apart from questions of just distribution, the +moral question arises as to whether an unlimited power +should be given to individuals in this form, and whether +there should be unlimited right of inheritance. But all +these tend to pass over at once into questions of justice.</p> + +<p><b>3. Social Aspects.</b>—The various relations of man to +man, political, friendly, kindred, are developed forms +of the interdependence implicit in the early group life. +A group of units, each independent of the others, would +represent mass only, but such a group as is made up of +men, women, and children, sustaining all the relations +found in present human life, represents something vastly +more than a mass of individuals. Every life draws from +the rest. Man without friendship, love, pity, sympathy, +communication, coöperation, justice, rights, or duties, +would be deprived of nearly all that gives life its value.</p> + +<p>The necessary help from others is obtained in various +ways. Parental, filial, and other kinship ties, friendship +and pity, give rise to certain services, but they are necessarily +limited in their sphere and exact in return a special +attitude that would be intolerable if made universal. The +modern man does not want to be cousin to every one, to +give every one his personal friendship, to be in a perpetual +attitude of receiving favors, or of asking and not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_492" id="Page_492">[Pg 492]</a></span> +receiving. Formerly the way of getting service from men +outside these means was by slavery. The economic relation +provides for the mutual exchange of goods and +services on a basis of self-respect and equality. Through +its system of contracts it provides for future as well as +present service. It enables each to obtain the services +of all the rest, and in turn to contribute without incurring +any other claims or relations. Nor does it at all diminish +the moral value of these mutual exchanges of goods and +services that they may be paid for. It used to be the +theory that in every bargain one party gained and the +other lost. It is now recognized that a normal transaction +benefits both parties. The "cash payment basis," which +was at first denounced as substituting a mechanical nexus +for the old personal tie, is in reality a means for establishing +a greater independence instead of the older personal +relation of "master" and "servant." It enabled +a man, as Toynbee puts it, to sell his labor like any other +commodity without selling himself.</p> + +<p>But while the economic process has these moral possibilities, +the morality of any given system or practice will +depend on how far these are actually realized.</p> + +<p>First of all, we may fairly ask of a process, Does it +give to each member the kind of service needed by him? +In economic terms, Does it produce the kinds of goods +which society needs and desires? A method which provides +for this successfully will in so far be providing +against scarcity of some goods and oversupply of others, +and thus against one of the sources of crises, irregularity +of work and wages, and ultimately against suffering and +want.</p> + +<p>Secondly, if the process is an expression of the mutual +dependence and service of members who as persons all have, +as Kant puts it, intrinsic worth, and who in our political +society are recognized as equal, we may fairly ask how +it distributes the results of services rendered. Does<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_493" id="Page_493">[Pg 493]</a></span> +the process tend to a broad and general distribution of +goods in return for services rendered, or to make "the +rich richer and the poor poorer?" Or, from another +point of view, we might ask, Does the process tend to +reward members on a moral or equitable basis, or upon a +basis which is non-moral if not immoral or unjust.</p> + +<p>Thirdly, the problem of <i>conflicting services</i> presents +itself under several forms. There is, first, the ever-present +conflict between producer and consumer. Higher wages +and shorter hours are good for the carpenter or the +weaver, until he pays his rent or buys clothes, when he is +interested in cheaper goods. What principle can be employed +to adjust such a question? Again, service to the +consumer may lead a producer to a price-list implying a +minimum of profits. One producer can afford this because +of his larger business, but it will drive his competitor +from the field. Shall he agree to a higher price +at which all can do business, or insist on the lower which +benefits the consumer and also himself? The labor union +is a constant embodiment of the problem of conflicting +services. How far shall it serve a limited group, the +union, at the expense of other workers in the same trade—non-unionists? +Does it make a difference whether the union +is open to all, or whether the dues are fixed so high as to +limit the membership? Shall the apprentices be limited to +keep up the wage by limiting the supply? If so, is this +fair to the boys or unskilled laborers who would like to +enter? And granting that it is a hardship to these, is +it harder or is it kinder to them than it would be to leave +the issue to the natural weeding out or starving-out +procedure of natural selection in case too many enter +the trade? Shall the hours be reduced and wages raised +as high as possible, or is there a "fair" standard—fair to +both consumer and laborer? How far may the union +combine with the capitalist to raise prices to the +consumer?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_494" id="Page_494">[Pg 494]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Private Property and Social Welfare.</b>—The social value +of property is obviously indirect, just as in law, private +rights are regarded as indirectly based on social welfare. +It is society's aim to promote the worth of its members and +to favor the development of their personal dignity and +freedom. Property may, therefore, claim social value in +so far as it serves these ends, unless it interferes with +other social values. The effect of private property has +seemed to some disastrous to community of interest and +feeling. Plato, for example, in his ideal state would +permit his guardians no private property. There would, +then, be no quarrels over "meum" and "tuum," no suits or +divisions, no petty meanness or anxieties, no plundering +of fellow-citizens, no flattery of rich by poor. The mediæval +church carried out his theory. Even modern +society preserves a certain trace of its spirit. For the +classes that Plato called guardians—soldiers, judges, +clergy, teachers—have virtually no property, although +they are given support by society. It would probably +be generally agreed that it is better for the public that +these classes should not have large possessions. But it +is obvious that private property is not the sole cause of +division between individuals and classes. Where there is +a deep-going unity of purpose and feeling, as in the early +Christian community, or in various other companies that +have attempted to practice communism, common ownership +of wealth may be morally valuable as well as practically +possible. But without such unity, mere abolition of property +is likely to mean more bitter divisions, because there +is no available method for giving to each the independence +which is necessary to avoid friction and promote +happiness.</p> + +<p>Granting, however, the general position that some +parts of wealth should be privately owned, we must recognize +that a great number of moral problems remain as +to the precise conditions under which society will find it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_495" id="Page_495">[Pg 495]</a></span> +wise to entrust the control of wealth to private ownership. +For it must be clearly kept in mind that there is no absolute +right of private property. Every right, legal or +moral, derives from the social whole, which in turn, if it +is a moral whole, must respect the individuality of each +of its members. On this basis moral problems, such as the +following, must be considered. What kind of public +wealth should be given into absolute control of private +individuals or impersonal corporations? Does the institution +in its present form promote the good of those +who have no property as well as of those who have it, or +only of those who own? Would the welfare of society as +a whole be promoted by giving a larger portion of public +wealth into private control, or by retaining a larger proportion +than at present under public ownership? Should +there be any limit to the amount of land or other property +which an individual or corporation may own? Are there +any cases in which private ownership operates rather to +exclude the mass of society from the benefits of civilization +than to give them a share of those benefits? Should a man +be allowed to transmit all his property to his heirs, or +should it be in part reserved by society?</p> + +<p>The preceding analysis has aimed to state some of the +problems which belong necessarily to the economic life. +At the present time, however, the moral issues assume a +new and puzzling aspect because of the changes in economic +conditions. It will be necessary to consider briefly +these changed conditions.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. THE PROBLEMS SET BY THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER</h4> + +<p><b>The Collective and Impersonal Organizations.</b>—Two +changes have come over a large part of the economic and +industrial field. The first is the change from an individual +to a collective basis. The second, which is in part +a consequence of the first, is a change from personal to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_496" id="Page_496">[Pg 496]</a></span> +impersonal or corporate relations. Corporations are of +course composed of persons, but when organized for economic +purposes they tend to become simply economic +purpose incorporate, abstracted from all other human +qualities. Although legally they may be subjects of rights +and duties, they have but one motive, and are thus so +abstract as to be morally impersonal. They tend to become +machines for carrying on business, and, as such, may +be as powerful—and as incapable of moral considerations—as +other machines.</p> + +<p><b>Ethical Readjustment.</b>—Both these changes require +readjustment of our ethical conceptions. Our conceptions +of honesty and justice, of rights and duties, got their present +shaping largely in an industrial and business order +when mine and thine could be easily distinguished; when it +was easy to tell how much a man produced; when the producer +sold to his neighbors, and an employer had also +the relations of neighbor to his workmen; when responsibility +could be personally located, and conversely a man +could control the business he owned or make individual +contracts; when each man had his own means of lighting, +heating, water supply, and frequently of transportation, +giving no opportunity or necessity for public service corporations. +Such conceptions are inadequate for the present +order. The old honesty could assume that goods belonged +to their makers, and then consider exchanges and +contracts. The new honesty will first have to face a prior +question, <i>Who owns what is collectively produced</i>, and are +the present "rules of the game" distributing the returns +honestly and fairly? The old justice in the economic +field consisted chiefly in securing to each individual his +rights in property or contracts. The new justice must +consider how it can secure for each individual a standard +of living, and such a share in the values of civilization as +shall make possible a full moral life. The old virtue +allowed a man to act more as an individual; the new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_497" id="Page_497">[Pg 497]</a></span> +virtue requires him to act in concerted effort if he is to +achieve results. Individualist theories cannot interpret +collectivist facts.</p> + +<p>The changes in the economic and industrial processes by +which not only the associated powers of present human +knowledge, skill, and endurance, but also the combined results +of past and future skill and industry are massed +and wielded, depend on several concurrent factors. We +shall notice the social agency, the technique of industry, +the technique of business, the means of fixing value, and +the nature of property.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. THE AGENCIES FOR CARRYING ON COMMERCE AND +INDUSTRY</h4> + +<p><b>Early Agencies.</b>—The early agencies for carrying on +trade and industry were not organized purely for economic +purposes. The kindred or family group engaged in certain +industries, but this was only part of its purpose. +So in the various territorial groups. The Athenian city-state +owned the mines; the German village had its forest, +meadow, and water as a common possession; and the "common" +survived long in English and American custom, +though the cattle pastured on it might be individually +owned. In the United States certain land was reserved for +school purposes, and if retained would now in some cases +be yielding an almost incredible amount for public use; +but it has usually been sold to private individuals. The +national government still retains certain land for forest +reserve, but until the recent movement toward municipal +ownership, the civic community had almost ceased to be +an economic factor in England and America, except in the +field of roads, canals, and the postoffice. In both family +and territorial or community control of industry, we have +the economic function exercised as only one among several +others. The economic helped to strengthen the other bonds<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_498" id="Page_498">[Pg 498]</a></span> +of unity. On the other hand, the economic motive could +not disentangle itself and stand out in all its naked force. +Within either family or civic group the effects of the acquisitive +instincts were limited by the fact that individuals +in their industrial relations were also kin or neighbors.</p> + +<p><b>The Business Enterprise.</b>—In the business enterprise—partnership, +company, corporation, "trust,"—on the +other hand, men are organized solely for economic purposes. +No other interests or ends are regarded. Corporations +organized for this purpose "have no souls," because +they consist of merely the abstract economic interests. +While in domestic and territorial agencies the +acquisitive forces were to some degree beneficially controlled, +they were also injuriously hampered. With the +rise of business enterprise as a distinct sphere of human +action, the way was opened for a new force to manifest +itself. This brought with it both advantages and disadvantages +for the moral and social life as a whole. On +the one hand, it increased tremendously the possibilities +of economic and industrial efficiency. The size of the enterprise +could be as large or as small as was needed for +the most efficient production, and was not, as in family +or community agency, sometimes too small and sometimes +too large. The enterprise could group men according to +their capacity for a particular task, and not, as in the +other forms, be compelled to take a group already constituted +by other than economic or industrial causes. Further, +it could without difficulty dispense with the aged or those +otherwise unsuited to its purposes. When, moreover, +as is coming to be increasingly the case, great corporations, +each controlling scores or even hundreds of millions +of capital, are linked together in common control, we have +a tremendous force which may be wielded as a unit. It is +easy to assume—indeed it is difficult for managers not +to assume—that the interests of such colossal organizations +are of supreme importance, and that diplomacy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_499" id="Page_499">[Pg 499]</a></span> +tariffs, legislation, and courts should be subordinate. The +moral dangers attaching to such corporations formed +solely for economic purposes are obvious, and have found +frequent illustration in their actual workings. Knowing +few or none of the restraints which control an individual, +the corporation has treated competitors, employees, and +the public in a purely economic fashion. This insures +certain limited species of honesty, but does not include +motives of private sympathy or public duty.</p> + +<p><b>The Labor Union.</b>—Correlative to these corporate +combinations of capital are Labor Unions of various types. +They are usually when first organized more complex in motive, +including social and educational ends, and are more +emotional, or even passionate in conduct. With age they +tend to become more purely economic. In the United States +they have sought to secure better wages, to provide benefits +or insurance in case of sickness and death, and to gain +better conditions in respect of hours, of child-labor, and of +protection against dangerous machinery, explosions, and +occupational diseases. In Great Britain they have also +been successful in applying the coöperative plan to the purchase +of goods for consumption. The organizations have +been most successful among the skilled trades. For so far +as the aim is collective bargaining, it is evident that the +union will be effective in proportion as it controls the whole +supply of labor in the given trade. In the unskilled forms +of labor, especially with a constant flow of immigration, +it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain organizations +comparable with the organizations of capital. Hence in +conflicts it is natural to expect the moral situations which +frequently occur when grossly unequal combatants are opposed. +The stronger has contempt for the weaker and refuses +to "recognize" his existence. The weaker, rendered +desperate by the hopelessness of his case when he contends +under rules and with weapons prescribed by the stronger, +refuses to abide by the rules and resorts to violence—only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_500" id="Page_500">[Pg 500]</a></span> +to find that by this he has set himself in opposition to all +the forces of organized society.</p> + +<p><b>Group Morality Again.</b>—The striking feature of the +new conditions is that it means a <i>reversion to group morality</i>. +That is, it has meant this so far. Society is struggling +to reassert a general moral standard, but it has not +yet found a standard, and has wavered between a rigid insistence +upon outgrown laws on the one hand, and a more +or less emotional and unreasoned sympathy with new demands, +upon the other.<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> Group morality meant impersonal, +collective life. It meant loyalty to one's own group, +little regard for others, lack of responsibility, and lack of a +completely social standard. There is, of course, one important +difference. The present collective, impersonal agencies +are not so naïve as the old kinship group. They can +be used as effective agencies to secure definite ends, while +the manipulators secure all the advantages of the old +solidarity and irresponsibility.</p> + +<p><b>Members and Management.</b>—The corporation in its idea +is democratic. For it provides for the union of a number +of owners, some of them it may be small owners, under an +elected management. It would seem to be an admirable +device for maintaining concentration of power with distribution +of ownership. But the very size of modern enterprises +and unions prevents direct control by stockholders +or members. They may dislike a given policy, but they are +individually helpless. If they attempt to control, it is almost +impossible, except in an extraordinary crisis, to unite +a majority for common action.<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> The directors can carry +on a policy and at the same time claim to be only agents of +the stockholders, and therefore not ultimately responsible. +What influence can the small shareholders in a railway<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_501" id="Page_501">[Pg 501]</a></span> +company, or a great industrial corporation, or labor union, +have? They unite with ease upon one point only: they +want dividends or results. When an illegal policy is to +be pursued, or a legislature or jury is to be bribed, or a +non-union man is to be "dealt with," the head officials likewise +seek only "results." They turn over the responsibility +to the operating or "legal" department, or to the "educational +committee," and know nothing further. These departments +are "agents" for the stockholders or union, and +therefore, feel quite at ease. The stockholders are sure +they never authorized anything wrong. Some corporations +are managed for the interest of a large number of owners; +some, on the other hand, by ingenious contracts with side +corporations formed from an inner circle, are managed for +the benefit of this inner circle. The tendency, moreover, in +the great corporations is toward a situation in which +boards of directors of the great railroad, banking, insurance, +and industrial concerns are made up of the same +limited group of men. This aggregate property may then +be wielded as absolutely as though owned by these individuals. +If it is used to carry a political election the directors, +according to New York courts, are not culpable.</p> + +<p><b>Employer and Employed.</b>—The same impersonal relation +often prevails between employer and employed. The +ultimate employer is the stockholder, but he delegates +power to the director, and he to the president, and he to +the foreman. Each is expected to get results. The employed +may complain about conditions to the president, +and be told that he cannot interfere with the foreman, and +to the foreman and be told that such is the policy of the +company. The union may serve as a similar buffer. Often +any individual of the series would act humanely or generously, +if he were acting for himself. He cannot be humane +or generous with the property of others, and hence there +is no humanity or generosity in the whole system. This +system seems to have reached its extreme in the creation of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_502" id="Page_502">[Pg 502]</a></span> +corporations for the express purpose of relieving employers +of any personal responsibility. Companies organized +to insure employers against claims made by employees on +account of injuries may be regarded as a device for distributing +the burden. But as the company is organized, +not primarily to pay damages, as are life insurance companies, +but to avoid such payment, it has a powerful motive +in contesting every claim, however just, and in making +it so expensive to prosecute a claim that the victims may +prefer not to make the attempt. The "law's delay" can +nearly always be counted upon as a powerful defense when +a poor man is plaintiff and a rich corporation is defendant.</p> + +<p><b>Relations to the Public.</b>—The relations of corporations +to the public, and of the public to corporations, are similarly +impersonal and non-moral. A convenient way of approach +to this situation is offered by the ethical, or rather +non-ethical, status of the various mechanical devices which +have come into use in recent years for performing many +economic services. The weighing machines, candy machines, +telephones, are supposed to give a certain service +for a penny or a nickel. But if the machine is out of order, +the victim has no recourse. His own attitude is correspondingly +mechanical. He regards himself as dealing, not +with a person, but with a thing. If he can exploit it or +"beat" it, so much the better. Now a corporation, in the +attitude which it takes and evokes, is about half-way between +the pure mechanism of a machine and the completely +personal attitude of a moral individual. A man is overcharged, +or has some other difficulty with an official of a +railroad company. It is as hopeless to look for immediate +relief as it is in the case of a slot machine. The conductor +is just as much limited by his orders as the machine by its +mechanism. The man may later correspond with some +higher official, and if patience and life both persist long +enough, he will probably recover. But to prevent fraud, +the company is obliged to be more rigorous than a person<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_503" id="Page_503">[Pg 503]</a></span> +would be who was dealing with the case in a personal fashion. +Hence the individual with a just grievance is likely to +entertain toward the corporation the feeling that he is +dealing with a machine, not with an ethical being, even as +the company's servants are not permitted to exercise any +moral consideration in dealing with the public. They +merely obey orders. Public sentiment, which would hold +an individual teamster responsible for running over a child, +or an individual stage owner responsible for reckless or +careless conduct in carrying his passengers, feels only a +blind rage in the case of a railroad accident. It cannot +fix moral responsibility definitely upon either stockholder +or management or employee, and conversely neither stockholder, +nor manager, nor employee<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> feels the moral restraint +which the individual would feel. He is not wholly +responsible, and his share in the collective responsibility +is so small as often to seem entirely negligible.</p> + +<p><b>Relations to the Law.</b>—The collective business enterprises, +when incorporated, are regarded as "juristic persons," +and so gain the support of law as well as become +subject to its control. If the great corporation can thus +gain the right of an individual, it can enter the field of free +contract with great advantage. Labor unions have not +incorporated, fearing, perhaps, to give the law control +over their funds. They seek a higher standard of living, +but private law does not recognize this as a right. It +merely protects contracts, but leaves it to the individual +to make the best contract he can. As most wage-earners +have no contracts, but are liable to dismissal at any time, +the unions have seen little to be gained by incorporation. +They have thus missed contact with the institution in +which society seeks to embody, however tardily, its moral +ideas and have been, in a sense, outlaws. They were such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_504" id="Page_504">[Pg 504]</a></span> +at first by no fault of their own, for the law treated such +combinations as conspiracies. And they are still at two +decided disadvantages. First, the capitalistic or employing +corporation acting as a single juristic person may +refuse to buy the labor of a union; indeed, according to a +recent decision, it cannot be forbidden to discharge its employees +because of their membership in a union. As the +corporation may employ scores of thousands, and be practically +the only employer of a particular kind of labor, it +can thus enforce a virtual boycott and prevent the union +from selling its labor. It does not need to use a "blacklist" +because the employers are all combined in one "person." +On the other hand, the union is adjudged to act in +restraint of interstate commerce if it boycotts the employing +corporation. The union is here treated as a combination, +not as a single person. The second point in which the +employing body has greatly the legal advantage appears +in the case of a strike. Men are allowed to quit work, but +this is not an effective method of exerting pressure unless +the employer is anxious to keep his plant in operation and +can employ no one else. If he can take advantage of an +open labor market and hire other workmen, the only resource +of the strikers is to induce these to join their ranks. +But they have been enjoined by the courts, not only from +intimidating, but even from persuading<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> employees to quit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_505" id="Page_505">[Pg 505]</a></span> +work. The method of procedure in enforcing the injunction, +which enables the judge to fix the offense, eliminate +trial by jury, determine the guilt, and impose any penalty +he deems fit, has all the results of criminal process with +none of its limitations, and forms a most effective agency +against the unions. Where persuasion is enjoined it is +difficult to see how a union can exert any effective pressure +except in a highly skilled trade, where it can control all +the labor supply. In the field of private rights and free +contract, the labor unions are then at a disadvantage because +they have no rights which are of any value for their +purposes, except, under certain conditions, the right to +refuse to work. And since this is, in most cases, a weapon +that injures its wielder far more than his opponent, it is +not effective.</p> + +<p>Disappointed in the field of free contract, the labor +unions seek to enlist public agency in behalf of better sanitary +conditions and in prevention of child-labor, long hours +for women, unfair contracts, and the like. Capitalistic +corporations frequently resist this change of venue on the +ground that it interferes with free contract or takes away +property without "due process of law," and many laws +have been set aside as unconstitutional on these grounds,<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_506" id="Page_506">[Pg 506]</a></span> +several of them no doubt because so drawn as to appear to +be in the interest of a class, rather than in that of the +public. The trend in the direction of asserting larger public +control both under the police power and over corporations +in whose service the public has a direct interest, will +be noted later. Against other corporations the general +public or the unsuccessful competitor has sought legal aid +in legislation against "trusts," but this has mainly proved +to be futile. It has merely induced a change in form of +organization. Nor has it been easy as yet for the law to +exercise any effective control over the business corporation +on any of the three principles invoked—namely: to +prevent monopoly, to secure the public interest in the case +of public service corporations, and to assert police power. +For penalties by fine frequently fail to reach the guilty +persons, and it is difficult to fix any personal responsibility. +Juries are unwilling to convict subordinate officials of acts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_507" id="Page_507">[Pg 507]</a></span> +which they believe to have been required by the policy of the +higher officials, while, on the other hand, the higher officials +are seldom directly cognizant of criminal acts. Gradually, +however, we may believe that the law will find a way +to make both capital and labor organizations respect the +public welfare, and to give them support in their desirable +ends. The coöperative principle cannot be outlawed; it +must be more fully socialized.</p> + + +<h4>§ 4. THE METHODS OF PRODUCTION, EXCHANGE, AND +VALUATION</h4> + +<p><b>The Machine.</b>—The technique of production has shown +a similar progress from individual to collective method. +The earlier method was that of handicraft. The present +method in most occupations, aside from agriculture, is +that of the machine. But the great economic advantage +of the machine is not only in the substitution of mechanical +power for muscle; it is also in the substitution of collective +for individual work. It is the machine which makes possible +on a tremendously effective basis the division of labor +and its social organization. The extraordinary increase +in wealth during the past century depends upon these two +factors. The machine itself moreover, in its enormous expansion, +is not only a social tool, but a social product. The +invention and discovery which gave rise to the new processes +in industry of every sort were largely the outcome of +scientific researches carried on at public expense to a great +extent by men other than those who finally utilize their +results. They become in turn the instruments for the +production of wealth, which is thus doubly social in origin.</p> + +<p>This machine process has an important bearing upon +the factors of character mentioned in our analysis. It +standardizes efficiency; it calls for extraordinary increase +of speed; it requires great specialization of function and +often calls for no knowledge of the whole process. On the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_508" id="Page_508">[Pg 508]</a></span> +other hand, it gives a certain sense of power to control and +direct highly complicated machinery. In the more skilled +trades there is more time and resource for intellectual, æsthetic, +or social satisfactions. The association of workmen +favors discussion of common interests, sympathy, and +coöperation; this may evoke a readiness to sacrifice individual +to group welfare, which is quite analogous to +patriotic sentiment at its best, even if it is liable to such +violent expressions as characterize patriotic sentiment at +its worst. The association of workmen is one of the most +significant features of modern industry.</p> + +<p><b>Capital and Credit.</b>—The technique of exchange of services +and goods has undergone a transformation from an +individual and limited to a collective and almost unlimited +method. The earlier form of exchange and barter limited +the conduct of business to a small area, and the simpler +form of personal service involved either slavery or some +personal control which was almost as direct. With the use +of money it became possible to make available a far greater +area for exchange and to accumulate capital which represented +the past labors of vast numbers of individuals. +With the further discovery of the possibilities of a credit +system which business enterprise now employs, it is possible +to utilize in any enterprise not merely the results of the +labor of the past, but the anticipated income of the future. +A corporation, as organized at present, issues obligations +in the form of bonds and stock which represent no value as +yet produced, but only the values of labor or privilege anticipated. +The whole technique, therefore, of capital and +credit means a collective business enterprise. It masses the +work and the abilities of thousands and hundreds of thousands +in the past and the future, and wields the product as +an almost irresistible agency to achieve new enterprises or +to drive from the field rival enterprises.</p> + +<p><b>Basis of Valuation.</b>—The whole basis for value and +prices has also been changed. The old basis, employed for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_509" id="Page_509">[Pg 509]</a></span> +the most part through the Middle Ages in fixing the value +of labor or goods, was the amount of labor and material +which had been expended. The modern basis is that of supply +and demand. This proceeds on the theory that it is human +wants which after all give value to any product. I may +have expended time and labor upon a book or carving, or +in the cultivation of a new vegetable, or in the manufacture +of an article for apparel, but if no one cares to read the +book or look at the carving, if the vegetable is one that no +one can eat, or the garment is one that no one will wear, it +has no value. Starting then from this, we can see how +the two elements in valuation—namely, demand and supply—are +affected by social factors. The demand for an +article depends upon the market: i.e., upon how many +buyers there are, and what wants they have. Modern +methods of communication and transportation have made +the market for goods as large as the civilized world. Education +is constantly awakening new wants. The facilities +for communication, for travel, and for education are constantly +leading one part of the world to imitate the standards +or fashions set by other parts. We have, therefore, +a social standard for valuation which is constantly extending +in area and in intensity.</p> + +<p>The other factor in valuation, namely, the supply, is +likewise being affected in an increasing degree by social +forces. With many, if not with most, of the commodities +which are of greatest importance, it has been found that +there is less profit in an unrestricted supply than in a supply +regulated in the interest of the producers. The great +coal mines, the iron industries, the manufacturers of clothing, +find it more profitable to combine and produce a limited +amount. The great corporations and trusts have usually +signalized their acquisition of a monopoly or an approximate +control of any great field of production by shutting +down part of the factories formerly engaged. The supply +of labor is likewise limited by the policies of labor unions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_510" id="Page_510">[Pg 510]</a></span> +in limiting the number of apprentices allowed, or by other +means of keeping the union small. Tariffs, whether in the +interest of capital or of labor, are a social control of the +supply. Franchises, whether of steam railroads, street +transportation, gas, electric lighting, or other public +utilities so-called, are all of them in the nature of +monopolies granted to a certain group of individuals. +Their value is dependent upon the general need of +these utilities, coupled with the public limitation of +supply. In many cases the services are so indispensable +to the community that the servant does not need to give +special care or thought to the rendering of especially +efficient service. The increase in population makes the +franchises enormously profitable without any corresponding +increase of risk or effort on the part of the utility +company.</p> + +<p>But the most striking illustration of the creation of +values by society is seen in the case of land. That an acre +of land in one part of the country is worth fifty dollars, and +in another part two hundred thousand dollars,<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> is not due +to any difference in the soil, nor for the most part to any +labor or skill or other quality of the owner. It is due to +the fact that in the one case there is no social demand, +whereas, in the other, the land is in the heart of a city. In +certain cases, no doubt, the owner of city real estate may +help by his enterprise to build up the city, but even if so +this is incidental. The absentee owner profits as much by +the growth of the city as the foremost contributor to that +growth. The owner need not even improve the property +by a building. This enormous increase in land values has +been called the "unearned increment." In America it is due +very largely to features of natural location and transportation. +It has seemed to some writers, such as Henry<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_511" id="Page_511">[Pg 511]</a></span> +George, not only a conspicuous injustice, but the root of all +economic evil. It is, no doubt, in many cases, a conspicuous +form of "easy money," but the principle is not different +from that which is involved in nearly all departments of +modern industry. The wealth of modern society is really +a gigantic pool. No individual knows how much he creates; +it is a social product. To estimate what any one should +receive by an attempted estimate of what he has individually +contributed is absolutely impossible.</p> + + +<h4>§ 5. THE FACTORS WHICH AID ETHICAL RECONSTRUCTION</h4> + +<p>The two distinctive features of the modern economic situation, +its collective character and its impersonal character, +are themselves capable of supplying valuable aid toward +understanding the ethical problems and in making the +reconstruction required. For <i>the very magnitude of modern +operations and properties serves to bring out more +clearly the principles involved</i>. <i>The impersonal character +allows economic forces pure and simple to be seen in their +moral bearings.</i> Publicity becomes a necessity. Just as +the factories are compelled to have better light, air, and +sanitation than the sweat shops, so public attention is +aroused and the conscience stimulated by practices of great +corporations, although these practices may be in principle +precisely the same as those of private persons which escape +moral reprobation. In some cases, no doubt, the very magnitude +of the operation does actually change the principle. +A "lift" on the road from an oldtime stage-driver, or a +"special bargain" at a country store was not likely to disturb +the balance of competition as a system of free passes +or secret rebates may in modern business. But in other +cases what the modern organizations have done is simply +to exhibit the workings of competition or other economic +forces <i>on a larger scale</i>. An illustration of this is seen in +the familiar fact that a law passed to correct some corpo<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_512" id="Page_512">[Pg 512]</a></span>rate +practice is often found to apply to many practices +not contemplated by the makers of the law.</p> + +<p>The effect of getting a principle out into the open and +at work on a large scale is to make public judgment clear +and reprobation of bad practices more effective. The impersonal +factor likewise contributes powerfully to make +condemnation easy. Criticism is unhampered by the considerations +which complicate the situation when the conduct +of an individual is in question. The individual may be a +good neighbor, or a good fellow, or have had bad luck. +But no one hesitates to express his opinion of a corporation, +and the average jury is not biased in its favor, whatever +may be true of the bench. Even the plea that the corporation +includes widows and orphans among its shareholders, +which is occasionally put forth to avert interference +with corporate practices, usually falls on unsympathetic +ears. A higher standard will be demanded for business +conduct, a more rigid regard for public service will be +exacted, a more moderate return for invested capital in +public service, and a more liberal treatment of employees +will be insisted upon from corporations than from private +individuals. Nor does the organization of labor escape the +same law. When an agent of a union has been detected in +calling a strike for private gain, public sentiment has been +as severe in condemnation as in the case of corporate officials +who have profited at the expense of stockholders.</p> + +<p><b>Summary.</b>—We may summarize some of the chief points +brought out by our analysis. Modern technique has increased +enormously the productivity of labor, but has increased +its dangers to health and life, and to some extent +diminished its educating and moralizing values. The impersonal +agencies give vast power, but make responsibility +difficult to locate. The collective agencies and the social +contributions make the economic process a great social +pool. Men put in manual labor, skill, capital. Some +of it they have inherited from their kin; some they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_513" id="Page_513">[Pg 513]</a></span> +have inherited from the inventors and scientists who have +devised tools and processes; some they have wrought +themselves. This pooling of effort is possible because of +good government and institutions which were created by +statesmen, patriots, and reformers, and are maintained by +similar agencies. The pool is immensely productive. But +no one can say just how much his contribution earns. +Shall every one keep what he can get? Shall all share +alike? Or shall there be other rules for division—either +made and enforced by society or made by the individual +and enforced by his own conscience? Are our present rules +adequate to such a situation as that of the present? These +are some of the difficult questions that modern conditions +are pressing upon the man who thinks.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Besides the classic treatises of Adam Smith, J. S. Mill, and Karl +Marx, which are important for the relation of the economic to the +whole social order during the past century, the following recent works +in the general field give especial prominence to the ethical problems +involved: Marshall, <i>Principles of Economics</i>, 1898; Hadley, <i>Economics</i>, +1896; Clark, <i>Essentials of Economic Theory as Applied to Modern +Problems of Industry and Public Policy</i>, 1907; George, <i>Progress and +Poverty</i>, 1879; Schmoller, <i>Grundriss der allgemeinen Staatswirtschaftslehre</i>, +1900-04; Bonar, <i>Philosophy and Political Economy</i>, 1893; +Hobson, <i>The Social Problem</i>, 1901; Brooks, <i>The Social Unrest</i>, 1903.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On Modern Business and Industry</span>: Veblen, <i>The Theory of +Business Enterprise</i>, 1904; Taylor, <i>The Modern Factory System</i>, +1891; Hobson, <i>Evolution of Modern Capitalism</i>, 1894; Toynbee, <i>The +Industrial Revolution</i>, 1890; Adams and Sumner, <i>Labor Problems</i>, +1905; S. and B. Webb, <i>History of Trade Unionism</i>, 1894, <i>Problems +of Modern Industry</i>, 1898, and <i>Industrial Democracy</i>, 1902; Mitchell, +<i>Organized Labor</i>, 1903; Ely, <i>The Labor Movement in America</i>, 1886; +Hollander and Barnett, <i>Studies in American Trades Unionism</i>, 1907; +Henderson, <i>Social Elements</i>, 1898, chs. vii.-x.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_223_223" id="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> Veblen, <i>Theory of Business Enterprise</i>, p. 291.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_224_224" id="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> <i>Republic</i>, 550. Davies and Vaughan.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_225_225" id="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> E.g., in a strike there is sometimes a toleration by public sentiment +of a certain amount of violence where it is believed that there +is no legal remedy for unfair conditions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_226_226" id="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> Recent elections in the great insurance companies have shown +this.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_227_227" id="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> "J. O. Fagan," in the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> (1908), has called attention +to the influence of the union in shielding individuals from the +penalties of carelessness.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_228_228" id="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> Recent Illinois decisions (216 Ill., 358 f., and especially 232 Ill., +431-440) uphold sweeping injunctions against persuasion, no matter +how peaceable. "Lawful competition, which may injure the business +of a person, even though successfully directed to driving him out +of business, is not actionable." But for a union to hire laborers away +from an employer by money or transportation is not "lawful competition." +The object is assumed by the court to be malicious, i.e., the +injury of the employer. The court does not entertain the possibility +that to obtain an eight-hour day is as lawful an aim for the +labor union as to acquire property is for an employer. The decision +shows clearly the difference in legal attitude toward pressure exerted +by business corporations for the familiar end of acquisition, and that +exerted by the union for the novel end of a standard of living. +The court regards the injury to others as incidental in the former, but +as primary and therefore as malicious in the latter. It may be that +future generations will regard this judicial psychology somewhat +as we regard some of the cases cited above, ch. xxi. Other courts +have not always taken this view, and have permitted persuasion +unless it is employed in such a manner or under such circumstances +as to "operate on fears rather than upon their judgments or their +sympathies" (17., <i>N. Y. Supp.</i>, 264). For other cases, <i>Am. and Eng. +Decisions in Equity</i>, 1905, p. 565 f.; also <i>Eddy on Combinations</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_229_229" id="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> The list appended was bulletined at the Chicago Industrial Exhibit +of 1906, and reprinted in <i>Charities and The Commons</i>. +</p><p> +"What 'Freedom of Contract' has Meant to Labor: +</p><p> +1. Denial of eight-hour law for women in Illinois. +</p><p> +2. Denial of eight-hour law for city labor or for mechanics and +ordinary laborers. +</p><p> +3. Denial of ten-hour law for bakers. +</p><p> +4. Inability to prohibit tenement labor. +</p><p> +5. Inability to prevent by law employer from requiring employee +as condition of securing work, to assume all risk from injury +while at work. +</p><p> +6. Inability to prohibit employer selling goods to employees at +greater profit than to non-employees. +</p><p> +7. Inability to prohibit mine owners screening coal which is mined +by weight before crediting same to employees as basis of wages. +</p><p> +8. Inability to legislate against employer using coercion to prevent +employee becoming a member of a labor union. +</p><p> +9. Inability to restrict employer in making deductions from wages +of employees. +</p><p> +10. Inability to compel by law payment of wages at regular +intervals. +</p><p> +12. Inability to provide by law that laborers on public works +shall be paid prevailing rate of wages. +</p><p> +13. Inability to compel by law payment of extra compensation +for overtime. +</p><p> +14. Inability to prevent by law employer from holding back part +of wages. +</p><p> +15. Inability to compel payment of wages in cash; so that employer +may pay in truck or scrip not redeemable in lawful money. +</p><p> +16. Inability to forbid alien labor on municipal contracts. +</p><p> +17. Inability to secure by law union label on city printing." +</p><p> +Labor representatives speak of "the ironic manner in which the +courts guarantee to workers: The right to be maimed and killed without +liability to the employer; the right to be discharged for belonging +to a union; the right to work as many hours as employers please +and under any considerations which they may impose." The "irony" +is, of course, not intended by the courts. It is the irony inherent in a +situation when rules designed to secure justice become futile, if not +a positive cause of injustice, because of changed conditions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_230_230" id="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> In Greater New York. An acre on Manhattan Island is of course +worth much more. The Report of the New York Tax Department for +1907 is very suggestive.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_514" id="Page_514">[Pg 514]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XXIII</small> + +<br /><br /> + +SOME PRINCIPLES IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER</h2> + + +<p>Certain problems suggested by the foregoing analysis +are unsettled, for the issues are so involved, and in some +cases, both the facts and their interpretations are so much +in controversy, that we cannot yet formulate sure moral +judgments. On the other hand, certain principles emerge +with a good degree of clearness. We state some of the +more obvious.</p> + +<p><b>1. Wealth and Property are Subordinate in Importance +to Personality.</b>—The life is more than meat. Most +agree to this, stated abstractly, but many fail to make +the application. They may sacrifice their own health, +or human sympathy, or family life; or they may consent +to this actively or passively as employers, or consumers, +or citizens, in the case of others. A civilization which +loses life in providing the means to live is not highly +moral. A society which can afford luxuries for some cannot +easily justify unhealthful conditions of production, +or lack of general education. An individual who gratifies +a single appetite at the expense of vitality and efficiency +is immoral. A society which considers wealth or +property as ultimate, whether under a conception of "natural +rights" or otherwise, is setting the means above the +end, and is therefore unmoral or immoral.</p> + +<p><b>2. Wealth Should Depend on Activity.</b>—The highest +aspect of life on its individual side is found in active and +resolute achievement, in the embodying of purpose in action. +Thought, discovery, creation, mark a higher value +than the satisfaction of wants, or the amassing of goods.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_515" id="Page_515">[Pg 515]</a></span> +If the latter is to be a help it must stimulate activity, +not deaden it. Inherited wealth without any accompanying +incitement from education or class feeling or public +opinion would be a questionable institution from this point +of view. Veblen in his <i>Theory of the Leisure Class</i> +points out various forms of degeneration that may attend +upon leisure, when leisure means not merely release from +mechanical labor in the interest of more intellectual activity, +but a relinquishing of all serious labor. As the race +has made its ascent in the presence of an environment +which has constantly selected the more active persons, society +in its institutions and consciously directed processes +may well plan to keep this balance between activity and +reward. Modern charity has adopted this principle. We +fear to pauperize by giving aid to the poor unless we can +provide some form of self-help. But in its treatment of +the rich, society is not solicitous. Our provisions for inheritance +of property undoubtedly pauperize a certain +proportion of those who inherit. Whether this can be +prevented without interfering with motives to activity on +the part of those who acquire the property, or whether +the rich thus pauperized are not as well worth saving to +society as the poor, will undoubtedly become more pressing +problems as the number of inheritors increases, and society +recognizes that it may have a duty to its idle rich +as well as to its idle poor.</p> + +<p><b>3. Public Service Should Go Along with Wealth.</b>—Note +that we do not say, "wealth should be proportionate +to public service." This would take us at once into the +controversy between the individualist and the socialist +which we shall consider later among the unsettled problems. +The individualist, as represented, for example, by +Herbert Spencer, would say that except for the young, +the aged, or the sick, reward should be proportioned to +merit. The socialist, on the other hand, is more inclined +to say, "From each according to his ability, to each ac<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_516" id="Page_516">[Pg 516]</a></span>cording +to his needs." In either case, it is assumed that +there should be public service. Leaving for later consideration +the question whether we can fix any quantitative +rule, let us notice at this time why some service is a fundamental +moral principle.</p> + +<p>Such service in the form of some economically useful +contribution, whether to the production and distribution +of goods, to the public order, to education, to the satisfaction +of æsthetic and religious wants, might be demanded +as a matter of common honesty. This would be +to treat it as a just claim made by society upon each of +its members. There is, of course, no legal claim. The +law is far from adopting as a universal maxim, "If any +man will not work, neither let him eat." Vagrancy is not +a term applied to all idlers. It is sufficient for the law if +some of a man's ancestors obtained possession and title by +service, or force, or gift. Modern law, in its zeal to +strengthen the institution of property, releases all the +owner's posterity forever from the necessity of any useful +service. The old theology used to carry the conception +of inherited or imputed sin and merit to extremes +which modern individualism rejects. But the law—at +least in the United States—permits a perpetual descent +of inherited property; i.e., of inherited permission to receive +from society without rendering any personal return. +Theologically and morally, however, the man of to-day +repudiates any conception which would reduce him to a +shadow of another. He wishes to stand on his own feet, +to be rewarded or blamed according to his own acts, not +because of a deed of some one else. To follow out this +principle in the economic sphere would require that every +man who receives aught from others should feel in duty +bound to render some service. Merely "to have been +born" is hardly sufficient in a democratic society, however +munificent a contribution to the social weal the French +aristocrat may have felt this to be.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_517" id="Page_517">[Pg 517]</a></span></p> + +<p>But it is only one aspect of the case to say that society +may claim service as a just due. There is another aspect—what +this service means to the person himself. It +is his opportunity to fulfill his function in the social organism. +Now a person is as large as his purpose and +will. The person, therefore, who identifies his purposes +with the welfare of the public is thereby identifying himself +with the whole social body. He is no longer himself +alone; he is a social power. Not only the leader of society, +but every efficient servant makes himself an organ through +which society itself acts and moves forward. This is perhaps +most conspicuous in the case of the great inventors +or organizers of industry and society. By serving civilization +they have become its bearers and have thus shared +its highest pulses. But it is true of every laborer. As +he is an active contributor he becomes creative, not merely +receptive.</p> + +<p><b>4. The Change from Individual to Collective Methods, +of Industry and Business Demands a Change from Individual +to Collective Types of Morality.</b>—Moral action is +either to accomplish some positive good or to hinder +some wrong or evil. But under present conditions the +individual by himself is practically helpless and useless +for either purpose. It was formerly possible for a man +to set a high standard and live up to it, irrespective of +the practice or coöperation of others. When a seller's +market was limited to his acquaintance or a limited territory, +it might well be that honesty or even fair dealing +was the best policy. But with the changes that have come +in business conditions the worse practices, like a baser +coinage, tend to drive out the morally better. This may +not apply so thoroughly to the relations between seller +and buyer, but it applies to many aspects of trade. A +merchant may desire to pay his women clerks wages on +which they can support life without selling their souls. +But if his rival across the street pays only half the wage<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_518" id="Page_518">[Pg 518]</a></span> +necessary for subsistence, it is evident the former is in +so far at a disadvantage. Extend the same policy. Let +the former have his goods made under good conditions +and the latter have no scruple against "sweating"; let +the former pay taxes on an honest estimate and the latter +"see" the assessor, or threaten to move out of town if +he is assessed for more than a figure named by himself; +let the former ask only for a fair chance, while the latter +secures legislation that favors his own interests, or gets +specifications for bids worded so that they will exclude +his opponents, or in selling to public bodies "fixes" the +councils or school committees, or obtains illegal favors +in transportation. Let this continue, and how long +will the former stay in the field? Even as regards quality +of goods, where it would seem more plausible that honest +dealing might succeed, experience has shown that this +depends on whether the frauds can be easily detected. +In the case of drugs and goods where the adulterations +cannot be readily discovered, there is nothing to offset the +more economical procedure of the fraudulent dealer. The +fact that it is so difficult to procure pure drugs and +pure food would seem to be most plausibly due to the fatal +competition of the adulterated article.</p> + +<p>Or, suppose a person has a little property invested in +some one of the various corporations which offer the +most convenient method for placing small sums as +well as large. This railroad defies the government by +owning coal mines as well as transporting the product; +that public service corporation has obtained its franchise +by bribery; this corporation is an employer of child labor; +that finds it less expensive to pay a few damage suits—those +it cannot fight successfully—than to adopt devices +which will protect employees. Does a man, or even +an institution, act morally if he invests in such corporations +in which he finds himself helpless as an individual +stockholder? And if he sells his stock at the market<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_519" id="Page_519">[Pg 519]</a></span> +price to invest the money elsewhere, is it not still the price +of fraud or blood? If, finally, he buys insurance for his +family's support, recent investigation has shown that he +may have been contributing unawares to bribery of legislatures, +and to the support of political theories to which +he may be morally opposed. The individual cannot be +moral in independence. The modern business collectivism +forces a collective morality. Just as the individual cannot +resist the combination, so individual morality must +give place to a more robust or social type.</p> + +<p><b>5. To Meet the Change to Corporate Agency and +Ownership, Ways Must be Found to Restore Personal +Control and Responsibility.</b>—Freedom and responsibility +must go hand in hand. The "moral liability limited" +theory cannot be accepted in the simple form in which +it now obtains. If society holds stockholders responsible, +they will soon cease to elect managers merely on an economic +basis and will demand morality. If directors are +held personally responsible for their "legal department," +or union officials for their committees, directors and officials +will find means to know what their subordinates are +doing. "Crime is always personal," and it is not usual +for subordinates to commit crimes for the corporation +against the explicit wishes of the higher officials. In certain +lines the parties concerned have voluntarily sought +to restore a more personal relation.<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> It has been found +profitable to engage foremen who can get on smoothly +with workmen. It has proved to be good economy to treat +men, whether they sell labor or buy it, with respect +and fairness.</p> + +<p>The managers of some of the great public service corporations +have also recently shown a disposition to recognize +some public obligations, with the naïve admission that +this has been neglected. Labor unions are coming to see<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_520" id="Page_520">[Pg 520]</a></span> +the need of conciliating public opinion if they are to gain +their contests.</p> + +<p><b>6. To Meet the Impersonal Agencies Society Must +Require Greater Publicity and Express Its Moral Standards +More Fully in Law.</b>—Publicity is not a cure for +bad practices, but it is a powerful deterrent agency so +long as the offenders care for public opinion and not +solely for the approval of their own class. Professor +Ross<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> maintains that in the United States classes are +still so loosely formed that general approval is desired +by the leaders. Hence he urges that it is possible to +enforce moral standards by the "grilling of sinners." +But to make this "grilling" a moral process society needs +much more accurate information and a more impartial +basis for selecting its sinners than present agencies +afford. The public press is itself in many respects one +of the most conspicuous examples of the purely economic +motive. The newspaper or magazine must interest readers +and not displease advertisers. The news is selected, or +colored, or worked up to suit particular classes. If a +speaker says what the reporter does not regard as interesting +he is likely to find himself reported as saying +something more striking. Publicity bureaus are able to +point with pride to the amount of matter, favorable to +certain interests, which they place before the public as +news. The particular interests singled out for "exposure" +are likely to be determined more by the anticipated effects +on circulation or advertising than by the merits of the +case. It is scarcely more satisfactory to leave all the +education of public opinion to commercial control than +to leave all elementary education to private interests. +Publicity—scientific investigation and public discussion—is +indeed indispensable, and its greatest value is probably +not in the exhilarating discharge of righteous indignation, +but in the positive elevation of standards, by giv<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_521" id="Page_521">[Pg 521]</a></span>ing +completer knowledge and showing the fruits of certain +practices. A large proportion of the public will wish to +do the right thing if they can see it clearly, and can have +public support, so that right action will not mean suicide.</p> + +<p>But the logical way to meet the impersonal character +of modern economic agencies is by the moral consciousness +embodied in an impersonal agency, the law. The +law is not to be regarded chiefly as an agency for punishing +criminals. It, in the first place, defines a standard; +and, in the next place, <i>it helps the morally disposed to +maintain this standard by freeing him from unscrupulous +competition</i>. It is a general principle that to resort to +the law is an ethical gain only when the getting something +done is more important than to get it done from the +right motive. This evidently applies to acts of corporate +bodies. We do not care for their motives. We are not +concerned to save their souls. We are concerned only +for results—just the place where we have seen that the +personal responsibility breaks down. The value of good +motives and moral purpose is in this case located in those +who strive to secure and execute progressive legislation +for the public good, and in the personal spirit with which +this is accepted and carried out by officials.<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a></p> + +<p><b>7. Every Member of Society Should Share in Its +Wealth and in the Values Made Possible by It.</b>—The +quantitative basis of division and the method for giving +each a share belong to the unsettled problems. But the +worth and dignity of every human being of moral capacity +is fundamental in nearly every moral system of modern +times. It is implicit in the Christian doctrine of the +worth of the soul, in the Kantian doctrine of personality, +in the Benthamic dictum, "every man to count as one." +It is imbedded in our democratic theory and institutions. +With the leveling and equalizing of physical and mental +power brought about by modern inventions and the spread<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_522" id="Page_522">[Pg 522]</a></span> +of intelligence, no State is permanently safe except on a +foundation of justice. And justice cannot be fundamentally +in contradiction with the essence of democracy. +This means that wealth must be produced, distributed, +and owned justly: that is, so as to promote the individuality +of every member of society, while at the same +time he must always function as a member, not as an +individual. In defining justice some will place freedom +first; others, a standard of living. Some will seek fairness +by distributing to each an actual share of the +goods; others, by giving to each a fair chance to get +his share of goods. Others again have held that if no +moral purpose is proposed and each seeks to get what he +can for himself, the result will be a just distribution because +of the beneficent effects of competition. Still others +have considered that if the economic process has once been +established on the basis of contracts rather than status +or slavery, justice may be regarded as the maintenance +of these contracts, whatever the effect in actual benefits. +These views will be considered under the next topic as +unsettled problems.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>In addition to the works cited at the close of the last chapter, +Giddings, <i>The Costs of Progress</i>, in Democracy and Empire, 1901; +Bosanquet (Mrs. B.), <i>The Standard of Life</i>, 1898; Bosanquet, B., +<i>Aspects of the Social Problem</i>, 1895; Stephen, <i>Social Rights and +Duties</i>, 1896; Tufts, <i>Some Contributions of Psychology toward the +Conception of Justice</i>, Philosophical Review, xv., 1906, pp. 361-79; +Woods, <i>Democracy, a New Unfolding of Human Power</i>, in Studies +in Philosophy and Psychology (Garman Commemorative Volume), +1906.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_231_231" id="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> Hayes Robbins in the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for June, 1907, "The +Personal Factor in the Labor Problem."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_232_232" id="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> <i>Sin and Society.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_233_233" id="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> See Florence Kelley, <i>Some Ethical Gains through Legislation</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_523" id="Page_523">[Pg 523]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XXIV</small> + +<br /><br /> + +UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC +ORDER</h2> + + +<p>Under this head we propose to consider one general +and three special problems on which society is at present +at work, framing new moral standards to meet new conditions. +Many of the questions involved in the new order +marshal themselves under a single antithesis. Will the +moral values of wealth be most fully secured and justly +distributed by leaving to individuals the greatest possible +freedom and holding them morally responsible, or by social +agency and control? The first theory is known as <i>individualism</i>. +The most convenient term for the second +position would be <i>socialism</i>.</p> + +<p>Socialism, however, is, for many, an epithet rather than +a scientific conception. It is supposed to mean necessarily +the abolition of all private enterprise or private property. +In its extreme form it might mean this, as individualism +in its extreme form would mean anarchy. But as a practical +ethical proposition we have before us neither the +abolition of public agency and control—extreme individualism—nor +the abolition of private agency and control. +We have the problem of getting the proper amount +of each in order that the highest morality may prevail. +Each theory professes to desire the fullest development +and freedom of the individual. The individualist seeks +it through formal freedom and would limit public agency +to a minimum. The socialist is willing to permit limitations +on formal freedom in order to secure the "real" +freedom which he regards as more important and sub<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_524" id="Page_524">[Pg 524]</a></span>stantial. +Between the extremes, and borrowing from each, +is a somewhat indefinite programme known as the demand +for equal opportunity. Let us consider each in a brief +statement and then in a more thorough analysis.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM +AND OF PUBLIC AGENCY AND CONTROL</h4> + +<p><b>1. Individualism.</b>—Individualism<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> believes that each +man can secure his own welfare better than any one else +can secure it for him. It further holds that society is +made up of individuals, and hence, if each is provided for, +the welfare of the whole is secured. Such goods as are +social can be secured by voluntary association. Believing +that the course of civilization has been "from status to +contract," it makes free contract its central principle. +It should be the chief business of organized society to +maintain and safeguard this freedom. It locates the +important feature of freedom precisely in the act of +assent, rather than in any consideration of whether the +after consequences of the assent are good or bad; nor does +it ask what motives (force and fraud aside) brought about +the assent, or whether there was any other alternative. In +other words, it regards formal freedom as fundamental. If +not in itself all that can be desired, it is the first step, and +the only one which law need recognize. The individual may +be trusted to take other steps, if protected in this. The +only restriction upon individual freedom should be that it +must not interfere with the equal freedom of others. In +the economic sphere this restriction would mean, "must +not interfere by force." The theory does not regard economic +pressure by competition as interference. Hence +it favors free competition. Leaving out of account benevolence, +it holds that in business each should be allowed,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_525" id="Page_525">[Pg 525]</a></span> +or even recommended, to seek his own advantage. But +when the question as to the justice of the distribution +reached by this method is raised, a division appears between +the <i>democratic</i> individualists and the "<i>survival of +the fittest</i>" individualists. The democratic individualists—Adam +Smith, Bentham, Mill<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a>—believed that individualism +would promote the welfare of <i>all</i> members of +society. The "survival of the fittest" school maintains +that the welfare of the race or of civilization depends on +the sifting and selecting process known as the "struggle +for existence." If the "fittest" are thus selected and survive, +it matters not so much what is the lot of the rest. +We must choose between progress through aristocratic +selection and degeneration through democratic leveling.</p> + +<p><b>2. Theory of Public Agency and Control.</b>—Socialism +(using the word in a broad sense) holds that society should +secure to all its members the goods of life. It holds that +an unrestrained liberty of struggle for existence may +secure the survival of the strongest, but not necessarily +of the morally best. The individualist's theory emphasizes +formal freedom. "Seek first freedom and all other things +will be added." The socialist view emphasizes the content. +It would have all members of society share in education, +wealth, and all the goods of life. In this it agrees +with democratic individualism. But it considers this impossible +on the basis of individual effort. To hold that +society as a whole can do nothing for the individual either +ignores social goods or supposes the social will, so powerful +for democracy in the political sphere, to be helpless +and futile in the economic world. To assume that all +the control of economic distribution—the great field of +justice—may be left to individual freedom and agency, +is as archaic as to leave the collection of taxes, the administration +of provinces, and the education of citizens to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_526" id="Page_526">[Pg 526]</a></span> +private enterprise. It regards the unregulated struggle +for existence as economically wasteful and morally vicious, +both in its inequality of distribution and in the motives +of egoism on which it relies. Individualism, on the other +hand, so far as it is intelligent and does not lump socialism +with anarchy and all other criticisms on the established +order, regards socialism as ignoring the supreme importance +of active personal effort, and the value of freedom +as the keynote to progress.</p> + +<p><b>3. Equal Opportunity.</b>—An intermediate view has for +its maxim, "equal opportunity." It holds with individualism +that the active personality is to be stimulated and +made a prime end. But because it believes that not merely +a few but all persons should be treated as ends, it finds +individualism condemned. For it holds that an unregulated +struggle for existence does not secure the end individualism +professes to seek. When individuals start in +the race handicapped by differences in birth, education, +family, business, friends, and inherited wealth, <i>there is +no selection of ability</i>; there is <i>selection of the privileged</i>. +Hence it would borrow so much from socialism as to give +each individual a "fair start." This would include public +schools, and an undefined amount of provision for sanitation, +and for governmental regulation of the stronger.</p> + +<p>It is manifest, however, that this theory of the "square +deal" is a name for a general aim rather than for a +definite programme. For a "square deal," or equality of +opportunity, might be interpreted to call for a great +variety of concrete schemes, ranging all the way from an +elementary education up to public ownership of all the tools +for production, and to abolition of the right to bequeath or +inherit property. The peoples of America, Europe, and +Australasia are at present working out policies which combine +in various degrees the individualistic and the socialistic +views. Most have public schools. Some have provision +for old age and accident through either mutual or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_527" id="Page_527">[Pg 527]</a></span> +State systems of insurance and pensions. Let us analyze +the moral aspects of the two opposing theories more +thoroughly. It is obvious that the third view is only +one of a number of mediating positions.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. INDIVIDUALISM OR FREE CONTRACT ANALYZED: ITS +VALUES</h4> + +<p><b>Efficiency in Production.</b>—Individualism can make out +a strong case in respect to several of the ethical qualities +which are demanded: viz., efficiency in production of goods, +stimulation of active and forceful character, promotion +of freedom and responsibility, encouragement to wide +diversification of occupation and thus of services, and, +finally, the supply to society of the kinds of goods which +society wants. It would be absurd to credit the enormous +increase in production of wealth during the past century +to individualism alone, ignoring the contributions of +science and education which have been mainly made under +social auspices. It would be as absurd to credit all the +gains of the century in civilization and freedom to individualism +as it would be to charge all the wretchedness and +iniquity of the century to this same policy. But, setting +aside extravagant claims, it can scarcely be doubted +that Adam Smith's contentions for greater individual +freedom have been justified as regards the tests named. +Granting that the great increase in amount and variety +of production, and in means of communication and distribution, +has been primarily due to two agencies, the machine +and association, it remains true that individualism +has permitted and favored association and has stimulated +invention.</p> + +<p><b>Initiative and Responsibility.</b>—Moreover, the general +policy of turning over to individuals the power and responsibility +to regulate their own acts, is in accord with +one great feature of moral development. The evolution<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_528" id="Page_528">[Pg 528]</a></span> +of moral personality, as traced in our early chapters, +shows the individual at first living as a member of a kinship +group which determines his economic as well as his +religious and social life, and permits him neither to strike +out independently, nor, on the other hand, to suffer want +so long as the group has supplies. Individual initiative +and responsibility have steadily increased, and the economic +development has undoubtedly strengthened the +development of religious, political, and moral freedom. +It is the combination of these which gives the person of +to-day the worth and dignity belonging to autonomy, +self-government, and democracy.</p> + +<p><b>Regulation of Production.</b>—Further, it may be said +that supply and demand, individualism's method of regulating +prices and the kinds of goods produced, not only +accords with a principle of freedom, but also gets +those goods made which society most needs or wants. +If goods of a certain kind are scarce, the high price stimulates +production. While it permits crises, panics, and +hardship, it at least throws the burden of avoiding hardship +upon the foresight of a great many: namely, all +producers, rather than upon a few persons who might be +designated for the purpose. In thus providing a method +to find out what society wants and how much, it is performing +a social service, and, as we have pointed out, it +is none the less a service because the goods are to be +paid for; it is all the more so because they can be paid +for. So far, then, individualism has a strong case.</p> + + +<h4>§ 3. CRITICISMS UPON INDIVIDUALISM</h4> + +<p>There is undoubtedly great waste in some of its methods, +e.g., its advertising and its competitions, but the +most serious objections to individualism are not to be +found here; they arise in connection with the other ethical +criteria of economic morality. They fall chiefly under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_529" id="Page_529">[Pg 529]</a></span> +two heads. (1) Does individualism provide for real as +well as formal freedom? (2) Does it distribute the benefits +widely or to the few? Does it distribute them justly +or unjustly?</p> + +<p><b>It Does Not Secure Real Freedom.</b>—The distinction +between real and formal<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> freedom has been forced into +prominence by several causes. The division of labor +trains a man for a specific kind of work. If there is +no opening in this he is unable to find work. The continual +invention of improved machinery is constantly displacing +particular sets of workers and rendering their special +training worthless. A business panic causes immediate +discharge of thousands of laborers. A "trust" closes +several of its shops, and workmen who have purchased +homes must lose their jobs or their investments, or perhaps +both. The employer is no less limited in his conduct +by the methods of competing firms; but it is the +wage-workers who have felt this lack of real freedom +most keenly. Theoretically, no one is forced to labor. +Every one is free to choose whether he will work, and +what work he will do. But in effect, freedom of choice +depends for its value upon what the alternative is. If +the choice is, do this or—starve—the freedom is not worth +much. Formal freedom excludes constraint by the direct +control or will of others. It excludes violence or fear of +violence. But subjection to the stress or fear of want, +or to the limits imposed by ignorance, is just as fatal to +freedom. Hunger is as coercive as violence; ignorance fetters +as hopelessly as force. Whether a man has any choice +of occupation, employment, residence, or wage, depends +on his physical strength, education, family ties, and accumulated +resources, and on the pressure of present need. +To speak of free contract where there is gross inequality +between the parties, is to use a mere form of words. Free<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_530" id="Page_530">[Pg 530]</a></span> +contract in this case means simply the right of the +stronger to exploit the weaker.</p> + +<p><b>Individualism and Justice.</b>—Individualists, as stated, +belong to two very different schools, which we may call +the democratic and aristocratic, or perhaps more correctly, +if we may coin a word, "oligocratic." Democratic +individualism would have every man count as one. It +would distribute benefits widely. It holds that since society +is made up of individuals all social goods will be +secured if each individual seeks and finds his own. Aristocratic +individualism<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a> has been reënforced by the Darwinian +theory of the struggle for existence as a condition +for "survival of the fittest," by race prejudice, and +by imperialism. It holds that civilization is for the few +"best," not necessarily for the many. Progress lies +through the selection of the few efficient, masterful, aggressive +individuals, races, or nations. Individualism is +a policy which favors these few. It is Nature's method +of dealing. It is of course regrettable that there should +be weak, backward, ineffective individuals or races, but +their exploitation serves the advance of the rest, and +benevolence or charity may mitigate the most painful +results.</p> + +<p>The older economists of democratic individualism could +properly claim two respects in which economic justice was +furthered by economic processes under free management +and exchange. The social body is in truth made up of +members, and the old policy had been to tie up the members +to make the body grow. It did promote justice +to remove needless and excessive restrictions. In the second +place, it is true, as the economists insisted, that in +a free exchange each party profits if he gets what he +wants. There is mutual benefit, and so far as this goes +there is an element of justice. But while the benefit may +be mutual, the <i>amount</i> of advantage each gets is not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_531" id="Page_531">[Pg 531]</a></span> +necessarily the same, and if the party who has greater +shrewdness or resources takes advantage of a great need +on the part of the other, the result may be a very unequal +division. Exchanges of a birthright for a mess of pottage +will be common. Very well, says the individualist, +Esau will know better next time—or if he doesn't, he is +an object for charity. But the trouble is that even if +Esau does "know better" he is in even poorer condition +next time to make a bargain if his birthright is gone; +besides, if starvation or misery for himself or his family +is his only alternative, what good will it do him to "know +better"? Can the result, then, be just or fair? This +depends on how we define "just" and "fair." If we take +a purely formal view and make formal freedom of contract +the only criterion, then any price is fair which both +parties agree to. The law for the most part takes this +view, assuming absence of force or fraud. But this leaves +out of account everything except the bare formal act of +assent. It is too abstract a conception of personality on +which to base a definition of justice. To get the true +organic relation of mutual service and benefit by a system +of individualism we must have the two parties to the bargain +equal. <i>But in a large part of the exchange of business +and services the two parties are not equal.</i> One has +greater shrewdness, better education, more knowledge of +the market, more accumulated resources, and, therefore, +less pressing need than the other. The moral consciousness +will call prices or contracts unfair where the stronger +takes advantage of the weaker's necessities, even if the law +does not.</p> + +<p><b>Competition.</b>—The fact of competition is depended +upon by the individualist to obviate the disadvantages +of the weaker party. If A is ignorant of the market, B +may impose upon him; but if C and D are competing with +B for A's goods or services, A will soon find out what +they are "worth." That is, he will get for them a social<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_532" id="Page_532">[Pg 532]</a></span> +and not a purely individual valuation. There is doubtless +such a gain to A. But in considering competition +as removing the objections to the unfairness possible in bargaining, +we must bear in mind two things. First, competition +cuts both ways. It helps A when several compete +for his goods or labor; but, on the other hand, it may +ruin one of the competitors. If A is a laborer, it is a +good thing if X, Y, and Z, employers, compete for his +services. But if the boot is on the other foot, if B, C, +and D also are laborers and compete with A for a place, +we have the conditions which may lead to the sweat-shop. +Whether there is any better way to avoid unequal distribution +will be considered later. The second and seemingly +fatal objection to competition as a means to justice, +is that <i>free competition under an individualistic system +tends to destroy itself</i>. For the enormous powers which +the new forms of economic agency and technique give to +the individual who can wield them, enable him to crush +competitors. The process has been repeated over and +over within the past few years in various fields. The +only way in which a semblance of competition has been +maintained in railroad business has been by appeal to the +courts. This is an appeal to maintain individualism by +checking individualism, and as might be expected from +such a contradictory procedure, has accomplished little. +Nor can it be maintained that the evils may be obviated, +as Spencer holds, by private restraints on excessive competition. +As already pointed out, if one of a body of +competitors is unscrupulous, the rest are necessarily at a +disadvantage. Under present conditions individualism cannot +guarantee, and in many cases cannot permit, just distribution +and a true organic society.</p> + +<p>The other school of individualists is not disturbed by +inequality of goods. It frankly accedes to the logic of +unrestrained competition. It stakes its case upon the +importance for social welfare of the exceptionally gifted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_533" id="Page_533">[Pg 533]</a></span> +few. It is important to have their services. It can have +them only on terms which they set, as they will not work +unless there is sufficient motive. It is, on this view, perfectly +just that all the enormous increase of wealth due +to modern methods should go to the few leaders, for their +ability has produced it all. "The able minority of men +who direct the labor of the majority are the true producers +of that amount of wealth by which the annual +total output, in any given community, exceeds what would +have been produced by the laborers if left to their own +devices, whether working as isolated units or in small +self-organized groups, and controlled by no knowledge or +faculties but such as are possessed in common by any +one who can handle a spade or lay one brick upon +another."<a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> + +<p>Either from the standpoint of natural rights or from +that of utilitarianism it is proper, according to this +school, that all the increasing wealth of society, now and +in all future time, should go to the few. For, on the one +view, it belongs to the few since they have produced it; +and, on the other, it must be given them if society is to +have their services. It is possible they may not claim +it all for their exclusive possession. They may be pleased +to distribute some of it in gifts. But this is for them +to say. The logical method for carrying out this programme +would require an absolute abandonment by the +people as a whole, or by their representatives, or the +courts, of any attempt to control economic conditions. +The courts would be limited to enforcing contracts and +would cease to recognize considerations of public interest +except in so far as these were accepted by the able minority. +All such legislation as imposes any check upon the freedom +of the individual is mischievous. Under this head +would presumably come regulation of child labor, of +hours, of sanitary conditions, of charges by railroads,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_534" id="Page_534">[Pg 534]</a></span> +gas companies, and other public service corporations. +Graded income or inheritance taxes are also to be condemned +from this standpoint. It should in fairness be +added that while its upholders do not allege as their main +argument that individualism is for the interest of the +many, they hold, nevertheless, that the many are really +better off under individualism than under socialism. For +since all the increase in wealth is due to the able few whom +individualism produces, and since some of this increase, in +cases where the few compete for the custom or labor of +the many, may fall to the share of the many or else +be given them outright by the more generous, it appears +that the only hope for the many lies through the few.</p> + +<p>The general naturalistic theory has been discussed in +Chapter XVIII. Here it is only necessary to point out +that it is a misreading of evolution to suppose unregulated +competition to be its highest category of progress, +and that it is a misinterpretation of ethics to assume +that might is right. With the dawn of higher forms of +life, coöperation and sympathy prove stronger forces +for progress than ruthless competition. The "struggle" +for any existence that has a claim to moral recognition +must be a struggle for more than physical existence or +survival of force. It must be a struggle for a <i>moral</i> +existence, an existence of rational and social beings on +terms of mutual sympathy and service as well as of full +individuality. Any claim for an economic process, if it +is to be a moral claim, must make its appeal on moral +grounds and to moral beings. If it recognizes only a +few as having worth, then it can appeal only to these. +These few have no moral right to complain if the many, +whom they do not recognize, refuse to recognize them.</p> + +<p><b>Summary of the Ethics of Individualism.</b>—Individualism +provides well for production of quantity and kinds +required of goods and services; for activity and formal +freedom. Under present conditions of organization and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_535" id="Page_535">[Pg 535]</a></span> +modern methods it cannot be made to serve a democratic +conception of justice, but inevitably passes over into a +struggle for preëminence, in which the strong and less +scrupulous will have the advantage. It can be treated +as just only if justice is defined as what is according +to contract (formal freedom); or if the welfare of certain +classes or individual members of society is regarded +as of subordinate importance; or, finally, if it is held +that this welfare is to be obtained only incidentally, as +gift, not directly through social action. The criticism on +individualism is then that under a collective system like +that of the present, it does scant justice to most individuals. +It leaves the many out from all active participation +in progress or morality.<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a></p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>Individualism and Socialism are discussed in the works of Hadley, +Veblen, Hobson, Spencer, Marx, George, already cited; cf. also +Menger, <i>The Right to the Whole Produce of Labor</i>, 1899; Ely, <i>Socialism +and Social Reform</i>, 1894; Bosanquet, <i>Individualism and Socialism</i>, +in The Civilization of Christendom, 1893; Fite, <i>The Theory of Democracy</i>, +International Journal of Ethics, xxviii. (1907), pp. 1-18; Huxley, +<i>Administrative Nihilism</i>, in Essays; Godwin's <i>Political Justice</i>, +1793, raised many of the fundamental questions. Recent representative +Individualistic works are: Spencer, <i>Social Statics</i>, <i>The Man +versus the State</i>, various essays in Vol. III. of Essays; Sumner, +<i>What Social Classes Owe to Each Other</i>, 1883; Donisthorpe, <i>Individualism</i>, +1889; Harris, <i>Inequality and Progress</i>, 1897; Mallock, +<i>Socialism</i>, 1907. On Socialism: <i>Fabian Essays in Socialism</i>, edited +by Shaw, London, 1890, New York, 1891; Spargo, <i>Socialism</i>, 1906; +Marx and Engels, <i>The Communist Manifesto</i>, Eng. tr.; Reeve, <i>The +Cost of Competition</i>, 1906; Rae, <i>Contemporary Socialism</i>, 1891; +Hunter, <i>Socialists at Work</i>, 1908; Wells, <i>New Worlds for Old</i>, 1907.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_234_234" id="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> See above, pp. 428 f., 471-6, 483.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_235_235" id="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> In his later years Mill had much more confidence in the value +of social agency.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_236_236" id="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> See above, p. 437 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_237_237" id="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> See above, pp. 368 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_238_238" id="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> W. H. Mallock, <i>Socialism</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_239_239" id="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> Above, p. 472.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_536" id="Page_536">[Pg 536]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XXV</small> + +<br /><br /> + +UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC +ORDER (<span class="smcap">Continued</span>)</h2> + + +<h4>§ 4. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC AGENCY AND CONTROL</h4> + +<p>The various theories of public direction, including +socialism in the technical sense, are primarily interested +in the just distribution of goods. It is not so much "How +many goods can be produced?" as "Who is to get them?" +Individualism was chiefly concerned in increasing public +wealth, assuming (in the case of the democratic individualists) +that all would get the benefit. Socialism is more +concerned that the producing persons shall not be sacrificed, +and that each member shall benefit by the result. +Public agency and control might assert itself (1) as +a method of production, (2) as a method of distribution +of goods and returns, (3) as a method of property. It +is important to note at the outset that all civilized peoples +have some degree of social direction in each of these +fields. (1) Practically all peoples collect taxes, coin +money, carry mails, protect life and property, and supply +such elementary demands as those for water and drainage, +through State or municipal agency instead of leaving it +to private initiative. And in every one of the instances +the work was formerly done privately. (2) Under distribution, +all progressive peoples give education through the +State. Further, the benefits of the mail service are distributed +not in proportion to receipts, but on other principles +based on social welfare. (3) As a method of property-holding, +all civilized peoples hold certain goods for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_537" id="Page_537">[Pg 537]</a></span> +common use, and in the United States, after a period in +which it has been the policy to distribute for little or no +compensation public lands, public franchises, and public +goods of all kinds, the public policy is now not only to +retain large tracts for forest reserve, but to construct +irrigation plants, and to provide public parks, playgrounds, +and other forms of property to be used for +common advantage. Just as the individualist does not +necessarily carry his doctrine to the extreme of dispensing +with all social agency, at least in the matters of public +protection and public health, so the socialist does not +necessarily wish to abolish private property or private +enterprise. We have, then, to consider briefly the ethical +aspects of public agency for production, public control +over distribution, public holding of wealth.</p> + + +<h4>§ 5. SOCIETY AS AGENCY OF PRODUCTION</h4> + +<p>The advantage claimed for society as an agent of +production is not primarily greater efficiency, although +it is claimed that the present method is enormously wasteful +except where there already is private monopoly. Nor is +it in the social service rendered by providing great variety +of goods, and of the kinds most wanted. It is rather +(1) that in the case of public service enterprises, such +as transportation or lighting, fairness to the various +shippers, localities, and other users can be secured only +through public control or operation. These services are +as indispensable to modern life as air or navigation. Only +by public agency can discrimination be avoided. (2) +That the prizes to be gained are here so enormous that +bribery and corruption are inevitable under private management. +(3) That the profits arising from the growth +of the community belong to the community, and can only +be secured if the community owns and operates such +agencies of public service as transportation, communi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_538" id="Page_538">[Pg 538]</a></span>cation, +and in cities water supply and lighting. (4) +That the method of individualistic production is reckless +of child life and in general of the health of workmen. +Great Britain is already fearing a deterioration in +physical stature and capacity. (5) The motive of self-interest, +relied upon and fostered by individualism, is anti-social. +How can morality be expected to improve when +the fundamental agency and method of business and industry +is contradictory to morality? (6) More complete +socialism maintains that, under modern capitalism, a disproportionate +share is sure to fall to the capitalist, and, +more than this, to the great capitalist. Modern production +is complex and expensive. It requires an enormous +plant; the capitalist, not the workman, has the tools, +and can therefore charge what he pleases. The small +capitalist cannot undertake competition with the great +capitalist, for the latter can undersell him until he drives +him from business, and can then recoup himself by greater +gains. Hence the only way to secure fair distribution is +through social ownership of the tools and materials for +production.</p> + +<p><b>Private Interests and Public Welfare.</b>—Touching +these points it may be said that the public conscience is +rapidly coming to a decision upon the first five. (1) The +public has been exploited, the officials of government +have been bribed, and individual members of society discriminated +against. The process of competition always +involves <i>væ victis</i>, but the particular factor which makes +this not only hard but unjust, is that in all these cases +we have a quasi-public agency (monopoly, franchise, +State-aided corporation) used to give private advantage. +This must be remedied either by public ownership or +public control, unless the ethics of the struggle for existence +is accepted. The corruption which has prevailed +under (2) must be met either by public ownership or control, +or by so reducing the value of such franchises as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_539" id="Page_539">[Pg 539]</a></span> +to leave "nothing in it" for the "grafter" and his co-operators. +Vice—gambling, excessive use of drugs and +liquors, prostitution—is no doubt injurious to its victims, +and when leagued with public officials and yielding +enormous corruption funds to debauch politics, it is a +public evil as well. But its victims are limited, and its +appearance not attractive to the great majority. The +exploitation and corruption practiced by the more generally +successful and "respectable" members of society, +is far more insidious and wide-reaching. It demoralizes +not individuals only, but the standards of society. As +to (3) there is no doubt as to the rights of the matter. +Gains due to social growth should be socially shared, not +appropriated by a few. The only question is as to the +best method of securing these gains. European States +and cities have gone much farther than the United States +along the line of public agency, and, while there is still +dispute as to the balance of advantage in certain cases, +there is a growing sentiment that the more intelligent +and upright the community, the more it can wisely undertake. +The moral principle is that the public must +have its due. Whether it pays certain agents a salary +as its own officials, or a commission in the form of a moderate +dividend, is not so important.<a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> But to pay a man +or a small group of promoters a million dollars to supply +water or lighting or transportation, seems no more moral +than to pay such a salary to a mayor or counsel or superintendent +of schools. Taxpayers would probably denounce +such salaries as robbery. Such franchises as have +for the most part been given in American cities have been +licenses to collect high taxes from the citizens for the +benefit of a few, and do not differ in principle from paying +excessive salaries, except as the element of risk enters.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_540" id="Page_540">[Pg 540]</a></span> +What is needed at present in the United States is a larger +number of experiments in various methods of agency to +see which type results in least corruption, fairest distribution, +and best service.</p> + +<p><b>Conditions of Labor.</b>—On the fourth point, the necessity +of public control to regulate child labor, the labor +of women, sanitary conditions, and the use of dangerous +machinery, the public conscience is also awakening. Decisions +of the courts on the constitutionality of regulating +women's labor have been somewhat at variance. But the +recently announced decision<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a> of the United States Supreme +Court in the "Oregon case" seems likely to be decisive +of the principle that women may be treated as a class. +Freedom of contract cannot be regarded as interfering +with the right to establish reasonable precautions for +women's health. Woman may be protected "from the +greed as well as from the passion of man." The immorality +of child labor under modern conditions is also becoming +clear. For the public to see child life stunted +physically, mentally, and morally by premature labor +under the exhausting, deadening, and often demoralizing +conditions of modern industry and business, is for the +public to consent to wickedness. It cannot leave this +matter to the conscience of individual manufacturers and +parents, for the conscientious manufacturer is at a disadvantage, +and it might with as much morality consent to +a parent's starving or poisoning his child as to his injuring +it in less violent manner. For a society pretending to +be moral to permit little children to be used up or stunted +under any plea of cheap production or support of parents, +is not above the moral level of those peoples which practice +infanticide to prevent economic stress. Indeed, in +the case of a country which boasts of its wealth, there +is far less justification than for the savage. In the case +of provision against accident due to dangerous machinery,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_541" id="Page_541">[Pg 541]</a></span> +the ethical principle is also clear. To throw all the burden +of the accidents incident to modern production upon the +families of the laborers is entirely unjust. To impose +it upon the conscientious manufacturer is no better, for +it places him at a disadvantage. This is a necessary—except +so far as it can be minimized by safety devices—part +of the modern machine process. It ought to be paid +for either by all manufacturers, who would then shift +it to the consumers in the price of the goods, or by the +public as a whole in some form of insurance. European +countries have gone much farther than the United States +in this direction. The theory that the employer is exempt +if a fellow workman contributes in any way to the accident +has been applied in the United States in such a +way as to free employers, and thus the public, from any +share in the burden of a large part of accidents—except +as these entail poverty and bring the victim and his family +into the dependent class.</p> + +<p>Moreover, it is only by public action that fair conditions +of labor can be secured in many trades and under +many employers. For the single workman has not the +slightest chance to make conditions, and the union has +no effective means to support its position unless it represents +a highly skilled trade and controls completely the +supply of labor. It may go without saying that violence +is wrong. But it is often ignored that for a <i>prosperous +society to leave the laborer no remedy but violence for +an intolerable condition is just as wrong</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Motives.</b>—(5) On the question of motives the collectivist +theory is probably over-sanguine as to the gain to be +effected by external means. It is difficult to believe that +any change in methods would eliminate selfishness. There +is abundant exercise of selfishness in political democracy, +and even in families. Further, if it should be settled on +other grounds that competition in certain cases performs +a social service, it would then be possible for a man to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_542" id="Page_542">[Pg 542]</a></span> +compete with a desire to serve the public, just as truly +as it would be possible to compete for selfish motives. +That a process causes pain incidentally does not necessarily +pervert the motive of the surgeon or parent. It +does, of course, throw the burden of proof upon the advocate +of the process. Rivalry need not mean enmity if +the rivals are on an equal footing and play fair.</p> + +<p><b>Exploitation of Labor.</b>—(6) The question whether all +capitalistic production first exploits the laboring class, +and then tends to absorb or drive out of business the small +capitalist, is not so easy of decision. It seems to be easy +to make a plausible statement for each side by statistical +evidence. There seems little doubt that the general standard +of living for laborers is rising. On the other hand, +the number of enormous fortunes seems to rise much +faster, and there is an appalling amount of poverty in +the great cities. This is sometimes attributed to thriftlessness +or to excessively large families. A careful study +of an English agricultural community, where the conditions +seemed at least as good as the average, showed that +a family could not have over two children without sinking +below the line of adequate food, shelter, and clothing, to +say nothing of medical attendance or other comforts. In +the United States there has been such a supply of land +available that the stress has not been so intense. Just +what the situation will be if the country becomes thickly +settled cannot be foretold. Professor J. B. Clark shows +that the tendency in a static society would be to give +the laborer more and more nearly his share—provided +there is free competition for his services. The difficulty +is that society is not static and that a laborer cannot +shift at will from trade to trade and from place to +place.</p> + +<p>That sometimes capital exploits labor is merely to say +that the buyer sometimes gets the advantage. That capital +usually has the advantage in its greater resources may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_543" id="Page_543">[Pg 543]</a></span> +be admitted, but that it <i>invariably must</i> seems an unwarranted +deduction. The multiplication of wants widens +continually the number of occupations and thus increases +the competition for the service of the more skilled. In +such cases some, at least, of the sellers should be in a +position to make a fair bargain. Indeed, recent socialists +do not advocate any such complete assumption by society +of all production as is presented in some of the socialistic +Utopias. Their principle is "that the State must undertake +the production and distribution of social wealth wherever +private enterprise is dangerous or less efficient than +public enterprise."<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p> + +<p>It is for those who do not believe in public control to +prove that in the great enterprises for the production of +the necessaries of life, for transportation, banking, mining, +and the like, private enterprise is not dangerous. +The conduct of many—not all—of these enterprises in +recent years, not only in their economic aspects, but in +their recklessness of human life, health, and morality, is +what makes socialism a practical question. If it is +adopted, it will not be for any academic or <i>a priori</i> reasons. +It will be because private enterprise fails to serve +the public, and its injustice becomes intolerable. If business +enterprise, as sometimes threatens, seeks to subordinate +political and social institutions, including legislatures +and courts, to economic interests, the choice must be between +public control and public ownership. And if, +whether by the inherent nature of legal doctrine and +procedure, or by the superior shrewdness of capital +in evading regulation, control is made to appear ineffective, +the social conscience will demand ownership. To +subordinate the State to commercial interests is as immoral +as to make the economic interest supreme in the +individual.</p> + +<p>As regards the relations between capital and labor, it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_544" id="Page_544">[Pg 544]</a></span> +argues an undeveloped state of society that we have no +machinery for determining controversy as to what is a +fair wage. In the long run, and on the whole, supply +and demand may give an approximately fair adjustment, +but our present method of fighting it out in doubtful +cases is barbaric. The issue is decided often by violence +or the no less unmoral motive of pressing want, instead +of by the moral test of what is fair. And the great third +interest, the consumer, or the public at large, is not represented +at all. New Zealand, Canada, and some of the +states in the United States have made beginnings. The +President undoubtedly commanded general support in his +position during the coal strike, when he maintained that +the public was morally bound to take some part in the +struggle.</p> + +<p>Must not society be lacking in resources if its only +resource is to permit exploitation, on the one hand, +or carry on all industry and business itself, upon the +other? To lose the flexibility, variety, and keenness of +interest secured by individual or associated enterprise, +would certainly be an evil. Early business was conducted +largely by kinship organizations. The pendulum has +doubtless reached the other extreme in turning over to +groups, organized on a purely commercial basis, operations +that could be more equitably managed by city or +state agency. Most favor public agency in the case of +schools. Railroads, gas companies, and other monopolies +are still subject to controversy. But that an ideally +organized society should permit associations and grouping +of a great many kinds as agencies for carrying on its +work seems a platform not to be abandoned until proved +hopeless.</p> + +<p><b>Collective Agency is Not Necessarily Social.</b>—The +socialist is inclined to think that if the agency of production +were the government or the whole organized society +this would give a genuine social agency of control.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_545" id="Page_545">[Pg 545]</a></span> +This by no means follows. Party government and city +government in the United States have shown the fallacy +of this. But even apart from the possibility of a corrupt +boss there is still a wide gap between the collective +and the socialized agency. For until the members of +society have reached a sufficiently high level of intelligence +and character to exercise voluntary control, and +to coöperate wisely and efficiently, there must be some +central directing agency. And such an agency will be +morally external to a large number. It doesn't matter +so much what name this agent is called by—i.e., whether +he is "capitalist," or "government,"—so long as the control +is external. In general, individuals are still without +the mutual confidence and public intelligence which +would enable them really to socialize the mechanically +collective process.</p> + + +<h4>§ 6. THEORIES OF JUST DISTRIBUTION</h4> + +<p>Socialism as theory of distribution does not necessarily +imply public operation of production. By graded taxation +the proceeds of production might be taken by society +and either held, used, or distributed on some supposedly +more equitable basis. To give point to any inquiry as +to the justice of a proposed distribution, it would be desirable +to know what is the present distribution. Unfortunately, +no figures are accepted by all students. Spahr's +<i>Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States</i> +estimates that seven-eighths of the families in the United +States own only one-eighth of the wealth, and that one +per cent. own more than the remaining ninety-nine per +cent. This has been challenged, but any estimate made +by the economists shows such enormous disproportion as +to make it incredible that the present distribution can be +regarded as just on any definition of justice other than +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_546" id="Page_546">[Pg 546]</a></span>"according to the principles of contract and competition."<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Suppose, then, the question is raised, How can</span><br /> +we make a just distribution?</p> + +<p><b>Criteria Proposed.</b>—The simplest, and at the same time +most mechanical and abstract, method would be to divide +all goods equally. This would be to ignore all moral and +other differences, as indeed is practically done in the suffrage. +If all men are accounted equal in the State, why +not in wealth? It may be admitted that, if society were +to distribute, it would have to do it on some system which +could be objectively administered. To divide wealth according +to merit, or according to efforts, or according +to needs, would be a far more moral method. But it is +difficult to see how, in the case of material goods or their +money equivalent, such a division could be made by any +being not omniscient as well as absolutely just. If we are +to consider distribution as administered by society, we +seem reduced to the alternative of the present system or a +system of equality.</p> + +<p><b>1. The Individualistic Theory.</b>—It is indeed supposed +by some that the individualistic or competitive system distributes +on a moral basis: viz., according to merit. This +claim would have to meet the following criticisms:</p> + +<p>(1) The first abstraction which this individualistic +principle of reward usually makes it that it gives a man +credit for all he achieves, or charges him with all his +failures, without recognizing the threefold origin of +these achievements or failures. Heredity, society, personal +choice, have each had some share in the result. But, +in considering the ethics of competition upon this maxim, +there is evidently no attempt to discriminate between +these several sources. The man born with industrial genius, +presented by society with the knowledge of all that +has been done in the past, and equipped by society with +all the methods and tools society can devise, certainly has +an advantage over the man of moderate talents and no +education. To claim that the first should be justly re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_547" id="Page_547">[Pg 547]</a></span>warded +for his superiority would imply that the reception +of one gift constitutes a just claim for another.</p> + +<p>(2) Secondly, the theory as applied to our present system +is guilty of a further abstraction in assuming that +the chief, if not the only, way to deserve reward is by individualistic +shrewdness and energy.</p> + +<p>(3) It measures desert by service rendered without taking +any account of motive or even of intent. The captain +of industry performs an important service to society; +therefore, it is argued, he should be rewarded accordingly, +quite irrespective of the question whether he was aiming +at social welfare or at selfish gain. It may even be plausibly +argued that to reward men financially for good motives +would be bribing men to be honest. It is true that +financial rewards will not make good citizens, but this is +irrelevant. The point is that whatever other reasons,—expediency, +difficulty of estimating intent and motive,—may +be urged for abstracting from everything but the +result, the one reason which cannot be urged is, such abstraction +is just. A person has rights only because he is +a social person. But to call a man a social person because +he incidentally produces useful results, is to say that +purpose and will are negligible elements of personality.<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p> + +<p><b>2. Equal Division.</b>—The system of equal division is +liable to the following criticism. In their economic services +men are not equal. They are unequal not merely in talent +and ability; not merely in the value of their work; they +are unequal in their disposition. To treat idle and industrious, +useless and useful, slow and quick alike is not +equality, but inequality. It is to be guilty of as palpable +an abstraction as to say that all men are equally free +because they are not subject to physical constraint. Real +equality will try to treat like conditions alike, and unlike +character, efforts, or services differently.</p> + +<p>There is, moreover, a psychological objection which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_548" id="Page_548">[Pg 548]</a></span> +would weigh against an equal division even if such were +regarded as just. The average man perhaps prefers an +economic order in which there are prizes and blanks to an +order in which every man draws out the same. He prefers +an exciting game to a sure but tame return of his +investment. He may call for a "square deal," but we +must remember that a "square deal" in the great American +game from which the metaphor is taken is not designed to +make the game less one of chance. It is designed to give +full scope to luck and nerve. A game in which every +player was sure to win, but also sure to win just what he +had put in, would be equitable, but it would not be a game. +An equal distribution might rob life of its excitement and +its passion. Possibly the very strain of the process develops +some elements of character which it would be unfortunate +to lose.</p> + +<p>Is there no alternative possible for society except an +equality which is external only, and therefore unequal, +or an inequality which charges a man with all the accrued +benefits or evils of his ancestry? Must we either recognize +no moral differences in men, or else be more merciless than +the old orthodox doctrine of hereditary or imputed guilt? +The theological doctrine merely made a man suffer for +his ancestors' sins; the doctrine of unlimited individualism +would damn him not only for his ancestors' sins and +defects, but for the injustice suffered by his ancestors at +the hands of others. The analysis of the sources of a +man's ability may give a clue to a third possibility, and +it is along this line that the social conscience of to-day is +feeling its way.</p> + +<p><b>3. A Working Programme.</b>—A man's power is due (1) +to physical heredity; (2) to social heredity, including care, +education, and the stock of inventions, information, and +institutions which enables him to be more efficient than +the savage; and finally (3) to his own efforts. Individualism +may properly claim this third factor. It is just<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_549" id="Page_549">[Pg 549]</a></span> +to treat men unequally so far as their efforts are unequal. +It is socially desirable to give as much incentive +as possible to the full development of every one's powers. +But the <i>very same reason demands that in the first two +respects we treat men as equally as possible</i>. For it +is for the good of the social body to get the most +out of its members, and it can get the most out of +them only by giving them the best start possible. In +physical heredity the greater part is, as yet, wholly +outside control, but there is an important factor which +is in the sphere of moral action, namely, the physical +condition of the parents, particularly of the mother. Conditions +of food, labor, and housing should be such that +every child may be physically well born. In the various +elements included under social heredity society has a freer +hand. Not a <i>free</i> hand, for physical and mental incapacity +limit the amount of social accumulation which can +be communicated, but we are only beginning to appreciate +how much of the deficiency formerly acquiesced in as hopeless +may be prevented or remedied by proper food, hygiene, +and medical care. <i>Completely</i> equal education, likewise, +cannot be given; not in kind, for not all children have like +interests and society does not want to train all for the +same task; nor in quantity, for some will have neither the +ability nor the disposition to do the more advanced work. +But as, little by little, labor becomes in larger degree +scientific, the ratio of opportunities for better trained +men will increase, and as education becomes less exclusively +academic, and more an active preparation for all kinds +of work, the interests of larger and larger numbers of +children will be awakened. Such a programme as this is +one of the meanings of the phrase "<i>equal opportunity</i>," +which voices the demand widely felt for some larger conception +of economic and social justice than now obtains. +It would make formal freedom, formal "equality" before +the law, less an empty mockery by giving to every child<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_550" id="Page_550">[Pg 550]</a></span> +some of the power and knowledge which are the necessary +conditions of real freedom.</p> + +<p>Society has already gone a long way along the line of +giving an equal share in education. It is moving rapidly +toward broader conceptions of education for all occupations—farming, +mechanics, arts, trade, business—as well +as for the "learned professions." It is making a beginning +toward giving children (see the Report of the New +York Tenement House Commission) a chance to be born +and grow up with at least a living minimum of light and +air. Libraries and dispensaries and public health officials +are bringing the science and literature of the world in +increasing measure into the lives of all. When by the better +organization of the courts the poor man has real, and +not merely formal equality before the law, and thereby +justice itself is made more accessible to all, another long +step will be taken toward a juster order. How far society +can go is yet to be solved. But is it not at least a working +hypothesis for experiment, that society should try to +give to all its members the gains due to the social progress +of the past? How far the maxim of equal opportunity +will logically lead it is impossible to say. Fortunately, +the moral problem is to work out new ideals, not merely to +administer old ones. Other possibilities of larger justice +are noticed under § 8 below.</p> + + +<h4>§ 7. OWNERSHIP AND USE OF PROPERTY</h4> + +<p>The public wealth may be controlled and used in four +ways: It may be (1) Privately owned and used; (2) Privately +owned and publicly used; (3) Publicly held, but privately +used; (4) Publicly held and commonly used. The +individualist would have all wealth, or as much as possible, +under one of the first two forms. The tendency in the +United States until very recently has been to divest the +public of all ownership. The socialist, while favoring pri<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_551" id="Page_551">[Pg 551]</a></span>vate +ownership and use of the more strictly personal articles, +favors the public holding of much which is now privately +owned—notably the land, or the instruments of +production—as versus the holding of these by private or +corporate persons. Or, again, it may be maintained that +while individuals should be allowed to accumulate as much +property as they can, they should not be allowed to transmit +it entirely to their heirs.</p> + +<p><b>Value of Private Property.</b>—The individualist may +properly point to the psychological and historical significance +of private property, which has been stated in +a preceding chapter (p. 490). He may say that the +evils there mentioned as attendant upon private property +do not belong to the property in itself, but to the exaggerated +love of it. He may admit that the present emphasis +of attention upon the ownership of wealth, rather than +upon intellectual or æsthetic or social interests, is not the +highest type of human endeavor. But he urges that the +positive values of property are such that the present policy +of placing no check upon property should be maintained. +In addition to the indirect social value through +the power and freedom given to its owners, it may be +claimed that the countless educational, charitable, and +philanthropic agencies sustained by voluntary gifts from +private property, are both the best method of accomplishing +certain socially valuable work, and have an important +reflex value in promoting the active social interest of those +who carry them on. Nor is the force of this entirely +broken by the counter claim that this would justify keeping +half the population in poverty in order to give the +other half the satisfaction of charity. No system short of +absolute communism can abolish the need of friendly +help.</p> + +<p><b>Defects and Dangers in the Present System.</b>—The first +question which arises is: If property is so valuable morally, +how many are profiting by it under the present system,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_552" id="Page_552">[Pg 552]</a></span> +and how many are without its beneficent effects? Is the +number of property-owners increasing or diminishing? In +one of the morally most valuable forms of property, the +number of those who profit is certainly decreasing relatively: +<i>viz.</i>, in the owning of homes. The building of private +residences has practically ceased in New York and many +other cities except for the very rich. With the increasing +value of land the owning of homes is bound to become more +and more rare. Only the large capitalist can put up the +apartment house. In the ownership of shops and industries +the number of owners has relatively decreased, that +of clerks has increased. The wage-workers in cities +are largely propertyless. The management of industries +through corporations while theoretically affording opportunity +for property has yet, as Judge Grosscup has +pointed out forcibly, been such as to discourage the small +investor, and to prompt to the consumption of wages as +fast as received. The objection to individualism on this +ground would then be as before, that it is not individual +enough.</p> + +<p>An objection of contrary character is that the possession +of property releases its owner from any necessity of +active effort or service to the public. It may therefore +injure character on both its individual and its social side. +Probably the absolute number of those who refrain from +any social service because of their property is not very +large, and it may be questioned whether the particular +persons would be socially very valuable under any system +if they are now oblivious to all the moral arguments for +such activity and service.</p> + +<p>A more serious objection to the individualistic policy +is the enormous power allowed to the holders of great properties. +It has been estimated that a trust fund recently +created for two grandchildren will exceed five billion dollars +when handed over. It is easily possible that some of +the private fortunes now held may, if undisturbed, amount<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_553" id="Page_553">[Pg 553]</a></span> +to far more than the above within another generation. +Moreover, the power of such a fortune is not limited to its +own absolute purchasing value. By the presence of its +owners upon directorates of industrial, transportation, +banking, and insurance corporations the resources of +many other owners are controlled. A pressure may be +exerted upon political affairs compared with which actual +contributions to campaign funds are of slight importance. +The older theory in America was that the injury to the +private character of the owners of wealth would negative +the possible dangers to the public, since possession of large +wealth would lead to relaxation of energy, or even to dissipation. +It was assumed that the father acquired the fortune, +the son spent it, and thus scattered it among the +many, and the grandson began again at the bottom of the +ladder. Now that this theory is no longer tenable, society +will be obliged to ask how much power may safely be left +to any individual.</p> + +<p>It must be recognized that the present management of +such natural resources as forests under the régime of private +property has been extremely wasteful and threatens +serious injury to the United States. Individual owners +cannot be expected to consider the welfare of the country +at large, or of future generations; hence the water power +is impaired and the timber supply of the future threatened.</p> + +<p>Finally it must be remembered that many of the present +evils and inequities in ownership are not due necessarily +to a system of private property, but rather to special +privileges possessed by classes of individuals. These may +be survivals of past conquests of arms as in Europe, or +derived by special legislation, or due to a perfectly unconscious +attitude of public morals which carries over to a +new situation the customs of an early day. Mill's famous +indictment of present conditions is not in all respects so +applicable to America as to the older countries of Europe,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_554" id="Page_554">[Pg 554]</a></span> +but it has too much truth to be omitted in any ethical consideration.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the choice were to be made between communism with +all its chances, and the present state of society with all its +sufferings and injustices, if the institution of private property +necessarily carried with it, as a consequence, that the produce +of labor should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an +inverse ratio to the labor,—the largest portions to those +who have not worked at all, the next largest to those whose +work is almost nominal, and so in descending scale, the +remuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more +disagreeable, until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily +labor cannot count with certainty on being able to earn even +the necessaries of life,—if this, or communism, were the alternative, +all the difficulties, great or small, of communism +would be but as dust in the balance. But to make the comparison +applicable, we must compare communism at its best +with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it +might be made. The principle of private property has never +yet had a fair trial in any country." (<i>Polit. Econ.</i>, Book II., +ch. i.)</p></div> + + +<h4>§ 8. PRESENT TENDENCIES</h4> + +<p><b>Individualistic Foundations.</b>—The general tendency +up to very recent time in the United States has been decidedly +individualistic, both in the policy concerning the +method of holding property, and in the legal balance between +vested property rights and the social welfare. Public +lands were granted on easy terms to homesteaders; +mines as well as soil were practically free to the prospector; +school fund lands were in most cases sold for a song instead +of being kept for the public. So general has been +the attitude that all wealth ought to be in private hands +that it has been difficult to convict men who have fraudulently +obtained vast tracts of public land. The magnitude +of the operation has given "respectability" to the +beneficiaries. The taxing power has done little to maintain +adjustment. In this, as in many other respects, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_555" id="Page_555">[Pg 555]</a></span> +policy of the United States has been far more individualistic +than that of Great Britain. The latter has graded +income and inheritance taxes. In the United States, on +the other hand, the Federal taxation bears more heavily on +the poor as they are the large body of consumers,—not, +of course, in the sense that the individual poor man pays +more than the individual rich man, but in the sense that +a million of dollars owned by a thousand men pays more +than a million owned by one man. Legally, the Constitution +of the United States and certain of its amendments +gave private rights extraordinary protection, especially +when contracts were construed to mean charters, as well +as private contracts. The public welfare was conceived +to reside almost solely in private rights.<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></p> + +<p><b>Increased Recognition of Public Welfare.</b>—Recent policy +and legal decisions show a decided change. Reserves +of forest lands have been established. Water-supplies, +parks, and many other kinds of property have been +changed from private to public ownership. The question +as to mines has been raised. Graded inheritance taxes +have been established in some states, and the question of +graded income taxes is likely to be more generally considered +unless some other form of taxation based on the +social values given to land, or franchises, or other forms +of property seems more equitable. The Supreme Court in +recent decisions "has read into the constitution two sweeping +exceptions to the inviolability of property rights."<a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> +One is that of public use. "Whenever the owner of a +property devotes it to a use in which the public has an +interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in such +use, and must to the extent of that use submit to be controlled +by the public for the common good so long as he +maintains the use." The second exception is that of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_556" id="Page_556">[Pg 556]</a></span> +police power which in 1906 (204 U. S., 311, 318) was declared +to extend "to so dealing with the conditions which +exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare +of its people." The application of this broad principle +is still in an uncertain condition, but there can be no +question that it recognizes a changed situation. When people +are living in such interdependence as in the collective +life of to-day, it is no longer possible to locate public welfare +in any such preponderating degree in private rights +as was justified under the conditions of a new country a +century ago. Says Professor Smith:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"On the fundamental question of the relation of public +policy to private property rights the [Supreme] Court has +abandoned the individualist views with which the founders +of the constitution were imbued; and in its doctrines of the +public use and the police power it has distinctly accepted what +may be termed, in the literal and proper sense of the word, +the socialist view. In so doing, it has unquestionably expressed +the dominant opinion of the American people. The +American people does not accept the collectivist theory; it +believes in private property; but it recognizes that rights +of property must yield, in cases of conflict, to the superior +rights of society at large."</p></div> + +<p>If some of the means set forth above for securing juster +distribution were adopted, the first step toward Mill's demand<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> +would be met. If the community should reap the +return for its own growth, if taxation should be so arranged +as to fall most heavily on those best able to pay +rather than on those who are most honest or least able +to evade, it would seem rational to hold that society will +find a way to continue the four forms of control now existing, +making such shifts as changing conditions require.</p> + +<p>Some of these shiftings are already evident and give +promise of greater justice without loss of any of the benefits +accruing from private property.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_557" id="Page_557">[Pg 557]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Social Justice through Economic, Social, and Scientific +Progress.</b>—Not all moral advance comes "with observation," +or by political agency. The economic process is +providing in certain lines a substitute for property. +Science and invention, which are themselves a fine illustration +of the balance and interaction between individual and +social intelligence, individual effort and social coöperation, +are making possible in many ways a state of society in +which men have at once greater freedom and greater power +through association, greater individual development and +greater socialization of interests, less private property but +greater private use and enjoyment of what is common.</p> + +<p>The substitute for property provided by the economic +process itself is permanence or security of support. If +the person can count definitely upon a future, this is equivalent +to the security of property. And through the organization +of modern industry supplemented by insurance +and pensions, either state, institutional, or in corporations, +or in mutual benefit associations, there has been on the +whole, a great increase of security, although it is still unfortunately +true that the wage-worker may in most cases +be dismissed at any moment, and has virtually no contract, +or even any well-assured confidence of continued +employment.</p> + +<p>It is a mutual coöperation of economic, social, and scientific +factors which has brought about a great increase +of individual use and enjoyment through public ownership. +This <i>has placed many of the things which make life +worth living within the enjoyment of all</i>, and at the same +time given a far better service to the users than the old +method of private ownership. <i>In this change lies, perhaps, +the greatest advance of justice</i> in the economic sphere, and +a great promise for the future. There was a time when +if a man would sit down on a piece of ground and enjoy a +fine landscape, he must own it. If he would have a plot +where his children might play, he must own it. If he would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_558" id="Page_558">[Pg 558]</a></span> +travel, he must carry his own lantern, and furnish his +own protection from thieves. If he would have water, he +must sink his own well. If he would send a letter, he must +own or hire a messenger. If he would read a book, he must +not merely own the book, but own or hire the author or +copyist. If he would educate his children, he must own +or hire the tutor. We have learned that public parks, +public lighting and water works, public libraries, and +public schools, are better than private provision.</p> + +<p>The objection which comes from the individualist to this +programme is that it does too much for the individual. It +is better, urges individualism, to stimulate the individual's +activity and leave his wants largely unsatisfied than to +satisfy all his wants at the expense of his activity. But +this assumes that what is done through public agencies is +done for the people and not by the people. A democracy +may do for itself what an aristocracy may not do for a +dependent class. The greatest demoralization at the present +time is not to those who have not, but to those who +appropriate gains due to associated activity, complacently +supposing that they have themselves created all that they +enjoy.</p> + +<p><b>Another Great Advance is the Change in What Makes +Up the Chief Values of Life.</b>—In early times the values +of life were largely found in food, clothing, personal ornaments, +bodily comfort, sex gratifications. Enjoyment +of these involved exclusive possession and therefore property. +But with the advance of civilization an increasing +proportion of life's values falls in the mental realm of +sharable goods.</p> + +<p>Satisfaction in knowledge, in art, in association, in freedom, +is not diminished, but increased when it is shared. +The educated man may have no more property than the +illiterate. He has access to a whole system of social values. +He has freedom; he has a more genuinely independent type +of power than accrues from the mere possession of things.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_559" id="Page_559">[Pg 559]</a></span> +The society of the future will find a part of its justice in +so adjusting its economic system that all may enter as +fully as possible into this more social world.</p> + +<p><b>Methods of Social Selection.</b>—Finally, recognizing all +the value of the competitive process in the past as a +method of selecting ability, it must be regarded as crude +and wasteful. It is like the method of blind trial and +error which obtains in the animal world. The method +of ideas, of conscious use of means to secure ends, is the +more effective and the more rational. Society now is +gaining the scientific equipment which may allow the +substitution of the more effective and less wasteful method. +It should discover and educate capacity instead of giving +merely a precarious encouragement to certain special +types.</p> + + +<h4>§ 9. THREE SPECIAL PROBLEMS</h4> + +<p>Three special problems may be noticed about which +moral judgment is as yet uncertain: The open versus the +closed shop, the capitalization of corporations, and the +"unearned increment."</p> + +<p><b>1. The Open versus the Closed Shop.</b>—In certain industries +in which the workmen are well organized they +have made contracts with employers which provide that +only union men shall be employed. Such a shop is called +a closed shop, in distinction from an "open shop" in which +non-union men may be employed in part or altogether. +The psychological motive for the demand for the closed +shop is natural enough: the union has succeeded in gaining +certain advantages in hours or wages or both; this has +required some expense and perhaps some risk. It is natural +to feel that those who get the advantage should share +the expense and effort, and failing this, should not be admitted +to the shop. If the argument stopped here it would +be insufficient for a moral justification for two reasons. +First, joining a union involves much more than payment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_560" id="Page_560">[Pg 560]</a></span> +of dues. It means control by the union in ways which may +interfere with obligations to family, or even to the social +order. Hence, to exclude a fellow workman from the opportunity +to work because he—perhaps for conscientious +reasons—would not belong to the union, could not be justified +unless the union could make it appear that it was +maintaining a social and not merely a group interest. +Second, in some cases unions have sought to limit output. +In so far as this is done not for reasons of health but to +raise prices, the union is opposing the interest of consumers. +Here again the union must exhibit a social justification +if it is to gain social approval.</p> + +<p>On the other hand it may be noted that the individualist +of the second sort—who believes in the competitive +struggle as a moral process—has no ground on which to +declare for "open shop." Exactly the same principle +which would permit combination in capital and place no +limit on competitive pressure, provided it is all done +through free contracts, can raise no objection against +combinations of laborers making the best contracts possible. +When a syndicate of capitalists has made a highly +favorable contract or successfully underwritten a large +issue of stock, it is not customary under the principle of +"open shop" to give a share in the contract to all who +ask for it, or to let the whole public in "on the ground +floor." Nor are capitalists accustomed to leave a part +of the market to be supplied by some competitor for fear +such competitor may suffer if he does not have business. +When the capitalist argues for the open shop upon the +ground of freedom and democracy, it seems like the case +of the mote and the beam.</p> + +<p>An analogy with a political problem may aid: Has a +nation the right to exclude (or tax heavily) goods or persons +from other countries? May it maintain a "closed +shop"? The policy of the American colonists and of the +United States has varied. The Puritans maintained a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_561" id="Page_561">[Pg 561]</a></span> +"closed shop" on religious lines. They came to this country +to maintain a certain religion and polity. They expelled +several men who did not agree with them. The +United States excludes Chinese laborers, and imposes a +tariff which in many cases is intended to be prohibitive +against the products of other countries. This is done +avowedly to protect the laborer, and in so far as it is effective +it closes the shop. The maxim "This is a white man's +country" is a similar "closed shop" utterance. On moral +grounds the non-union man is in the same category as the +man of alien race or country. What, if anything, can +justify a nation or smaller group from excluding others +from its benefits? Clearly the only conditions are (1) +that the group or nation is existing for some morally +justifiable end, which (2) would be endangered by the admission +of the outsiders. A colony established to work +out religious or political liberty would be justified in +excluding a multitude who sought to enter it and then subvert +these principles. If a union is working for a morally +valuable end, e.g., a certain standard of living which is +morally desirable, and if this were threatened by the admission +of non-union men, the closed shop would seem to +be justified. If the purpose were merely to secure certain +advantages to a small group, and if the open shop would +not lower the standard but merely extend its range of +benefits, it is hard to see why the closed shop is not a +selfish principle—though no more selfish than the grounds +on which the tariff is usually advocated.</p> + +<p><b>2. The Capitalization of Corporations</b>, especially of +public service corporations, is a matter on which there +is a difference of policy in different states, owing probably +to uncertainty as to the morality of the principles involved. +The two theories held are: (a) Companies should +issue capital stock only on the basis of money paid in; +dividends then represent a return on actual investment. +(b) Companies may issue whatever stock they please, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_562" id="Page_562">[Pg 562]</a></span> +whatever they expect their income will enable them to pay +dividends upon; dividends will then represent return for +valuable privileges, or for some utility to be marketed. +In behalf of this latter view it may be claimed that if the +company pays dividends the investors have nothing to +complain of, and if it sells its products or transportation +at market rates, the consumer has nothing to complain of.</p> + +<p>So far as the relations between corporation and investor +are concerned, the issues are simple. If the stocks are +issued with no expectation that they will give any return, +merely to "sell," it is pure dishonesty, of the same type +which under cruder conditions sold spavined horses or made +counterfeit money, and now assumes the more vulgar type +of dealing in "green goods." The fact that fictitious +capital can be publicly advertised, gives it a financial +but not a moral advantage. This, however, would have +such decided limitations, credulous as human nature is, +that if fictitious capital paid no dividends it would soon +have no market. Hence, for the far-seeing promoter, +the pressure is toward making some at least of the fictitious +capital pay dividends. What is the principle in +this case? If we are dealing with a new and untried mode +of production or public service, the case is simply that +of any speculation. If a proposed product has a possible +utility, but at the same time involves so much risk +that in the long run only half of such enterprises will +succeed, society may consider it worth offering a profit +equal to fifty per cent. in order to pay for the risk. If, +on the other hand, the income is to derive from valuable +public franchises, or from the growth of the community +and its necessities, the case is different. Here there is +little, if any, risk for which it is fair for society to pay. +The excessive capital beyond the cost is designed to disguise +the rate of profit, and therefore conceal from the +community the cost of the goods or service. If the public +demands cheaper rates it is told that the company is now<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_563" id="Page_563">[Pg 563]</a></span> +paying only a fair dividend upon its stock.<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> The usual +method of capitalizing many enterprises of a quasi-public +sort is to issue bonds to cover the cost of construction +or plant, and then one or more series of stocks which +are known as "velvet." In part these stocks may represent +a work of organization which is a legitimate public +service, but in many cases they represent devices for +transferring public wealth to private property. Enormous +sums have been taken from the public in this +manner. The element which makes this method particularly +obnoxious is that the quasi-public corporations are +given a monopoly by the community and then take advantage +of this to capitalize indefinitely the necessities of +a growing community. In this case the conception of +public service is lost sight of in the "dazzling possibility +of public exploitation."<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a></p> + +<p>Few methods of extorting wealth have equaled this. +In some cases bribery of public officials has added an item +of expense to be collected later from the public. When +the various forms of public service or protected industry +were first projected there was risk involved. It was necessary +to offer inducements to capital to engage in them. +It was desirable to have railroads, gas, water, express +service. But as the factor of risk has been eliminated, the +public tires of paying double prices, and a "fair" return +must be estimated on the basis of actual rather than +fictitious capital. The public has come to have a clear +idea as to the morality of such practices as have been +employed in letting contracts for public buildings at +prices far above market value. The New York City courthouse +and Pennsylvania capitol offer familiar examples. +Does it differ materially from such practices when a com<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_564" id="Page_564">[Pg 564]</a></span>pany +charges the public an excessive price for transportation +or lighting, and when State or municipal authorities +authorize by franchise or monopoly such excessive +charges? Probably the conscience of the next century, +if not of the next generation, will fail to see the superior +moral quality of the latter procedure.</p> + +<p><b>3. The "Unearned Increment."</b>—This term is applied +most frequently to the increase in land value or franchise +value which is due, not to the owner, but to the growth +of the community. A tract of land is bought at a price +fixed by its value as farm land. A city grows up. The +owner of the land may have been active in the building +up of industry, but he may not. An increase of values +follows, which is due to the growth of the community. +Shall the owner have it all, or shall the community have +it all, or shall there be a division? The growth in value +of a franchise for gas, electric lighting, transportation, +presents the same problem. It is not usually recognized, +however, that the same principle is found in every increase +of value due to increasing demand. The logical +basis for distinction would seem to be that in some cases +increase of demand calls out competition, and the price is +lowered; the public thus receives its share in lower cost. +In other cases, notably those first mentioned, there can +be no competition, the price is therefore not often lowered +unless by legislative action, and the whole benefit goes +to the owner of land or franchise. As regards land, the +case is much stronger in Europe, for land titles were +originally gained there largely by seizure, whereas +in America private titles have been largely through +purchase.</p> + +<p>Individualism, according as it argues from the platform +of natural rights or from that of social welfare, would +claim either that individuals should have all the increase +because they have a right to all they can get under a +system of free contracts, or that it is for the social wel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_565" id="Page_565">[Pg 565]</a></span>fare +to allow them all they can get since private property +is public wealth. From the standpoint of natural rights +the reply would seem to be unanswerable: the community +gives the increased value; it belongs to the community. +From the standpoint of social welfare the answer is not +so simple. It might, for example, be socially desirable to +encourage the owners of farming land by leaving to them +the increase in value due to the growth of the country, +whereas city land-owners might need no such inducement. +Investors in a new form of public service corporation +might need greater inducements than would be fair to +those in enterprises well established. But, although details +are complex, the social conscience is working toward +this general principle: the community should share in +the values which it produces. If it cannot do this by +cheaper goods and better service, it must by graded taxation, +by ownership, or by some other means. The British +government has already considered a measure for ascertaining +the land values in Scotland as a preliminary step +toward adjustment of this question.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_566" id="Page_566">[Pg 566]</a></span></p> +<h3>APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV</h3> + + +<h4>PROFESSOR SEAGER'S PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION<br /> +WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WAGE-EARNERS</h4> + + +<p>In the conviction that in the field of social legislation +the United States is behind the more progressive countries +of Europe, Professor Henry R. Seager, of Columbia University, +presented the following <i>Outline</i> for discussion at +a meeting of the American Association for Labor Legislation, +December 30, 1907. It is reproduced with his +consent as giving concrete expression to several of the +principles advocated in the foregoing chapters.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The ends to be aimed at in any programme of social legislation +are:</p> + +<p>I. To protect wage-earners in the continued enjoyment of +standards of living to which they are already accustomed.</p> + +<p>II. To assist them to attain to higher standards of living.</p> + + +<p><i>I. Measures to protect prevailing standards of living.</i></p> + +<p>The principal contingencies which threaten standards of +living already acquired are: (1) industrial accidents; (2) illness; +(3) invalidity and old age; (4) premature death; (5) +unemployment. These contingencies are not in practice adequately +provided against by wage-earners themselves. In +consequence the losses they entail, in the absence of any social +provision against them, fall with crushing force on the families +which suffer from them, and only too often reduce such families +from a position of independence and self-respect to one of +humiliating and efficiency-destroying social dependency. The +following remedies for the evils resulting from this situation +are suggested.</p> + +<p>(1) Employers' liability laws fail to provide adequate indemnity +to the victims of industrial accidents because in a large +proportion of cases no legal blame attaches to the employer<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_567" id="Page_567">[Pg 567]</a></span> +and because litigation under them is costly and uncertain in +its outcome. Adequate indemnification must be sought along +the line of workmen's compensation for all industrial accidents +at the expense of the employer (the British system) or of +compulsory accident insurance (the German system). The +former seems to accord better with American ideas and +traditions.</p> + +<p>(2) The principle of workmen's compensation may be extended +to include indemnity for loss of wages due to trade +diseases. Provision against illness not directly traceable to +the employment must be sought either in compulsory illness +insurance or in subsidized and state-directed sick-insurance +clubs. Trade unions may assume the functions of such clubs +in organized trades. The latter plan seems better suited to +present American conditions than compulsory illness insurance.</p> + +<p>(3) Provision against invalidity and old age may be through +compulsory old age insurance, or through state old age pensions. +The latter, though more costly, are believed to be better +suited to American conditions, when hedged about by proper +restrictions, than compulsory old age insurance with the elaborate +administrative machinery which it entails.</p> + +<p>(4) Premature death may be provided against by an extension +of the machinery for caring for the victims of industrial +accident and of illness to provide for their families when accident +or illness results fatally.</p> + +<p>(5) Provision against losses due to unemployment is attended +with great difficulties because unemployment is so frequently +the consequence of incapacity or of disinclination for +continuous labor. The most promising plan for providing +against this evil appears to be through subsidizing and supervising +trade unions which pay out-of-work benefits to stimulate +this side of their activity. Public employment bureaus and +industrial colonies for the unemployed may also help to +alleviate the evil of unemployment.</p> + +<hr style='width: 15%;' /> + +<p>Adequate social provision against these five contingencies +along the lines suggested, would, it is believed, go a long way +towards solving the problem of social dependency. If these +concessions were made to the demands of social justice, a more +drastic policy towards social dependents than public opinion +will now sanction might be inaugurated with good prospect of +confining social dependency to the physically, mentally, and +morally defective.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_568" id="Page_568">[Pg 568]</a></span></p> + +<p><i>II. Measures to elevate standards of living.</i></p> + +<p>The primary conditions essential to rising standards of living +are energy and enterprise on the part of wage-earners and +opportunities to make energy and enterprise count in the form +of higher earnings. The principal contributions which social +legislation may make to advancing standards of living in the +United States are believed to be: (1) measures serving to encourage +saving for future needs on the part of wage-earners +by providing safe investments for savings; (2) measures protecting +wage-earners from the debilitating effects of an unregulated +competition; (3) measures serving to bring within +the reach of all opportunities for industrial training. Standards +of living will also be advanced, of course, by nearly all +measures calculated to promote the general well-being, such as +tax and tariff-reform legislation, laws safeguarding the national +domain, the public regulation of corporations, especially +those with monopolistic powers, etc., but these are not usually +classed under the head of social legislation.</p> + +<p>(1) The greatest present need under this head is for a postal +savings bank like those of European countries. The advantages +of a postal savings bank over privately managed banks +are the wider distribution of places of deposit, post-offices being +located in every section of the country, and the greater confidence +depositors would feel in such a bank. Once established +the postal savings bank might enter the insurance field, as has +the British postal savings bank, not as a rival of privately +managed insurance companies, but to bring to every wage-earner +the opportunity to secure safe insurance. Next to +providing itself opportunities for safe investment and insurance, +the government has an important duty to perform in +supervising the business of privately managed savings banks +and insurance companies. Notwithstanding the progress made +in recent years in the United States in this field, there is still +something left for social legislation to accomplish.</p> + +<p>(2) If energy and enterprise are to be kept at a maximum, +wage-earners must be protected from exhausting toil under +unhealthful conditions. Skilled wage-earners can usually protect +themselves through trade unions, but unskilled workers, +women and children, require legal protection. Under this head +belong, therefore, the familiar types of protective labor laws. +The following may be specified:</p> + +<p>(a) Laws prohibiting the employment of children below<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_569" id="Page_569">[Pg 569]</a></span> +fourteen in all gainful pursuits. Such laws should be uniform +throughout the United States and rigidly enforced by means of +employment certificates based on convincing evidence of age +and physical examination to determine fitness. As provision +for free public education is made more adequate to present +needs the minimum age may be advanced perhaps to sixteen.</p> + +<p>(b) Laws limiting the hours of labor of young persons over +fourteen. Protection here should extend to eighteen, at least +in factory employments, and employment certificates should +be required of all under that age.</p> + +<p>(c) Laws limiting the hours of labor of women. In the +regulation of women's work in the United States the principal +needs are uniformity and machinery for efficient enforcement. +The last is facilitated by the plan of specifying in the law the +working period for the protected classes, and American courts +must be brought to see the reasonableness (administratively) +of such prescriptions. The nine-hour day and prohibition of +night work set a high enough standard until greater uniformity +and more efficient enforcement shall have been secured.</p> + +<p>(d) Prescriptions in regard to sanitation and safety appliances. +General prescriptions in regard to ventilation, etc., +need to be made more exact, and much more attention needs to +be given to the special regulation of dangerous trades, the +existence of which has been largely ignored thus far in American +legislation.</p> + +<p>(3) The chief reason for restricting the labor of children +and young persons is to permit the physical and mental development +of childhood and youth to proceed unhampered and +to ripen into strong, vigorous, and efficient manhood and +womanhood. To attain this end, it is necessary to provide not +only for wholesome living conditions and general free public +education, but also for special industrial training for older +children superior to the training afforded in modern factories +and workshops. The apprenticeship system now fails as a +method of industrial training, even in those few trades which +retain the forms of apprenticeship. There is urgent social +need for comprehensive provision for industrial training as a +part of the public school system, not to take the place of the +training now given to children under fourteen, but to hold those +between fourteen and sixteen in school. As this need is +supplied the period of compulsory school attendance may +gradually be extended up to the sixteenth year. The guiding +principle of such industrial training should be that it is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_570" id="Page_570">[Pg 570]</a></span> +function of free public education in the United States not only +to prepare children to lead useful, well-rounded and happy +lives, but to command the earnings without which such lives are +impossible.</p> + +<p>The above programme of social legislation is urged as a step +towards realizing that canon of social justice which demands +for all equal industrial opportunities. It is believed that it will +also help to raise the standard of citizenship in the country by +making both wage-earners and employers more intelligent, +more efficient, and more truly democratic. Thus it will serve +to prepare the way for such further industrial reorganization +as may be found desirable.</p></div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_240_240" id="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> Boston has an ingenious method of dividing profits. The company +which supplies gas must lower the price of gas in proportion +as it increases its rate of dividends.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_241_241" id="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> February 24, 1908.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_242_242" id="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> Spargo, <i>Socialism</i>, 220-27.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_243_243" id="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> <i>Philosophical Review</i>, xiv., 370 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_244_244" id="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> Cf. J. A. Smith, <i>The Spirit of American Government</i>, 1907.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_245_245" id="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> I have followed in this paragraph the discussion of Professor +Munroe Smith, <i>Van Norden's Magazine</i>, February, 1908. For a full +history see E. Freund, <i>The Police Power</i>, 1905.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_246_246" id="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> Above, p. 554.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_247_247" id="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> As in the case of gas in New York City, where the court has +decided that the public cannot refuse to pay interest on the value of +the franchise—its own gift.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_248_248" id="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> Cf. Hadley, <i>Economics</i>, p. 159.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_571" id="Page_571">[Pg 571]</a></span></p> +<h2><small>CHAPTER XXVI</small> + +<br /><br /> + +THE FAMILY</h2> + + +<p>The family in its moral aspects has one end, the common +good of all its members, but this has three aspects. +(1) Marriage converts an attachment between man and +woman, either of passion or of friendship, into a deliberate, +intimate, permanent, responsible union for a common +end of mutual good. It is this common end, a good +of a higher, broader, fuller sort than either could attain +in isolation, which lifts passion from the impulsive or +selfish to the moral plane; it is the peculiar intimacy +and the peculiar demands for common sympathy and co-operation, +which give it greater depth and reach than +ordinary friendship. (2) The family is the great social +agency for the care and training of the race. (3) This +function reacts upon the character of the parents. Tenderness, +sympathy, self-sacrifice, steadiness of purpose, +responsibility, and activity, are all demanded and usually +evoked by the children. A brief sketch of the development +of the family and of its psychological basis, will prepare +the way for a consideration of its present problems.</p> + + +<h4>§ 1. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE MODERN FAMILY</h4> + +<p>The division of the sexes appeals to the biologist as +an agency for securing greater variability, and so greater +possibility of adaptation and progress. It has also to +the sociologist the value of giving greater variety in +function, and so a much richer society than could exist +without it. Morally, the realization of these values, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_572" id="Page_572">[Pg 572]</a></span> +the further effects upon character noted above, depend +greatly upon the terms under which the marriage union +is formed and maintained. The number of parties to +the union, the mode of forming it, its stability, and the relations +of husband and wife, parents and children, while in +the family relation, have shown in western civilization a +tendency toward certain lines of progress, although the +movement has been irregular and has been interrupted by +certain halts or even reversions.</p> + +<p><b>The Maternal Type.</b>—The early family, certainly in +many parts of the world, was formed when a man left +his father and mother to "cleave unto his wife," that is, +when the woman remained in her own group and the man +came from his group to live with her. This tended to +give the woman continued protection—and also continued +control—by her own relatives, and made the children +belong to the mother's clan. As recent ethnologists seem +inclined to agree, this does not mean a matriarchal family. +The woman's father and brothers, rather than the woman, +are in the last analysis the authority. At the same time, +at a stage when physical force is so large a factor, this +type of family undoubtedly favors the woman's condition +as compared with the next to be mentioned.</p> + +<p><b>The Paternal Type.</b>—When the woman leaves her own +group to live in the house of her husband, it means a possible +loss of backing and position for her. But it means +a great gain for the influence which insures the wife's +fidelity, the father's authority over the children and +interest in them, and finally the permanence of the family. +The power of the husband and father reached its extreme +among western peoples in the patriarchate at Rome, +which allowed him the right of life and death. At its +best the patriarchal type of family fostered the dignity +and power of a ruler and owner, the sense of honor which +watched jealously over self and wife and children to +keep the name unsullied; finally the respective attitudes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_573" id="Page_573">[Pg 573]</a></span> +of protector and protected enhanced the charm of each +for the other. At its worst it meant domineering brutality, +and either the weakness of abject submission or +the misery of hopeless injustice.</p> + +<p>Along with this building up of "father right" came +variations in the mode of gaining a wife. When the man +takes a wife instead of going to his wife, he may either +capture her, or purchase her, or serve for her. In any +of these cases she may become to a certain extent his property +as well as his wife. This does not necessarily imply a +feeling of humiliation. The Kafir women profess great +contempt for a system in which a woman is not worth +buying. But it evidently favors a commercial theory of +the whole relation. The bride's consent may sometimes +be a necessary part of the transaction, but it is not +always.</p> + +<p><b>Effects of Father Right.</b>—This family of "father +right" is also likely to encourage a theory that the man +should have greater freedom in marriage than the woman. +In the lowest types of civilization we often find the marital +relations very loose from our point of view, although, as +was noted in Chapter II., these peoples usually make up +for this in the rigidity of the rules as to who may marry +or have marriage relations. With some advance in +civilization and with the father right, we are very apt +to find polygamy permitted to chiefs or those who can +afford it, even though the average man may have but +one wife. In certain cases the wives may be an economic +advantage rather than a burden. It goes along +with a family in which father and children are of first +importance that a wife may even be glad to have her +servant bear the children if they may only be reckoned +as hers. The husband has thus greater freedom—for +polyandry seems to have been rare among civilized +peoples except under stress of poverty. The greater +freedom of the husband is likely to appear also in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_574" id="Page_574">[Pg 574]</a></span> +matter of divorce. Among many savage peoples divorce +is easy for both parties if there is mutual consent, but +with the families in which father right prevails it is +almost always easier for the man. The ancient Hebrew +might divorce his wife for any cause he pleased, but +there is no mention of a similar right on her part, and +it doubtless did not occur to the lawgiver. The code of +Hammurabi allows the man to put away the mother of +his children by giving her and her children suitable maintenance, +or a childless wife by returning the bride price, +but a wife who has acted foolishly or extravagantly may +be divorced without compensation or kept as a slave. The +woman may also claim a divorce "if she has been economical +and has no vice and her husband has gone out +and greatly belittled her." But if she fails to prove +her claim and appears to be a gadder-about, "they shall +throw that woman into the water." India and China +have the patriarchal family, and the Brahmans added the +obligation of the widow never to remarry. Greater freedom +of divorce on the part of the husband is also attended +by a very different standard for marital faithfulness. +For the unfaithful husband there is frequently no penalty +or a slight one; for the wife it is frequently death.</p> + +<p><b>The Roman Family.</b>—The modern family in western +civilization is the product of three main forces: the +Roman law, the Teutonic custom, and the Christian +Church. Early Roman law had recognized the extreme +power of the husband and father. Wife and children +were in his "hand." All women must be in the <i>tutela</i> of +some man. The woman, according to the three early +forms of marriage, passed completely from the power and +hand of her father into that of her husband. At the +same time she was the only wife, and divorce was rare. +But by the closing years of the Republic a new method +of marriage, permitting the woman to remain in the +<i>manus</i> of her father, had come into vogue, and with it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_575" id="Page_575">[Pg 575]</a></span> +an easy theory of divorce. Satirists have charged great +degeneracy in morals as a result, but Hobhouse thinks +that upon the whole the Roman matron would seem to have +retained the position of her husband's companion, counselor, +and friend, which she had held in those more austere +times when marriage brought her legally under his +dominion.<a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a></p> + +<p><b>The Germanic Family.</b>—The Germanic peoples recognized +an almost unlimited power of the husband. The +passion for liberty, which Cæsar remarked as prevalent +among them, did not seem to require any large measure +of freedom for their women. In fact, they, like other peoples, +might be said to have satisfied the two principles +of freedom and control by allotting all the freedom to +the men and all, or nearly all, the control to the women. +Hobhouse thus summarizes the conditions:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The power of the husband was strongly developed; he might +expose the infant children, chastise his wife, dispose of her +person. He could not put her to death, but if she was unfaithful, +he was, with the consent of the relations, judge and executioner. +The wife was acquired by purchase from her own relatives +without reference to her own desires, and by purchase +passed out of her family. She did not inherit in early times at +all, though at a later period she acquired that right in the +absence of male heirs. She was in perpetual ward, subject, in +short, to the Chinese rule of the three obediences, to which must +be added, as feudal powers developed, the rule of the king or +other feudal superior. And the guardianship or <i>mundium</i> was +frankly regarded in early law rather as a source of profit to +the guardian than as a means of defense to the ward, and for +this reason it fetched a price in the market, and was, in fact, +salable far down in the Middle Ages. Lastly, the German +wife, though respected, had not the certainty enjoyed by the +early Roman Matron of reigning alone in the household. It is +true that polygamy was rare in the early German tribes, but +this, as we have seen, is universally the case where the numbers<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_576" id="Page_576">[Pg 576]</a></span> +of the sexes are equal. Polygamy was allowed, and was +practiced by the chiefs."</p></div> + +<p><b>Two Lines of Church Influence.</b>—The influence of the +church on marriage and family life was in two conflicting +lines. On the one hand, the homage and adoration +given to Mary and to the saints, tended to exalt and +refine the conception of woman. Marriage was, moreover, +treated as a "sacrament," a holy mystery, symbolic +of the relation of Christ and the church. The priestly +benediction gave religious sacredness from the beginning; +gradually a marriage liturgy sprang up which added to +the solemnity of the event, and finally the whole ceremony +was made an ecclesiastical instead of a secular function.<a name="FNanchor_250_250" id="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> +The whole institution was undoubtedly raised to a more +serious and significant position. But, on the other hand, +an ascetic stream of influence had pursued a similar +course, deepening and widening as it flowed. Although +from the beginning those "forbidding to marry" had been +denounced, it had nearly always been held that the celibate +life was a higher privilege. If marriage was a sacrament, +it was nevertheless held that marriage made a man +unfit to perform the sacraments. Woman was regarded +as the cause of the original sin. Marriage was from this +standpoint a concession to human weakness. "The generality +of men and women must marry or they will do +worse; therefore, marriage must be made easy; but the +very pure hold aloof from it as from a defilement. The +law that springs from this source is not pleasant to +read."<a name="FNanchor_251_251" id="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> It must, however, be noted that, although celibacy +by a selective process tended to remove continually +the finer, more aspiring men and women, and prevent them +from leaving any descendants, it had one important value +for woman. The convent was at once a refuge, and a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_577" id="Page_577">[Pg 577]</a></span> +door to activity. "The career open to the inmates of +convents was greater than any other ever thrown open +to women in the course of modern European history."<a name="FNanchor_252_252" id="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a></p> + +<p>Two important contributions to the justice of the marriage +relation, and therefore to the better theory of the +family, are in any case to be set down to the credit +of the church. The first was that the consent of the +parties was the only thing necessary to constitute a valid +marriage. "Here the church had not only to combat +old tradition and the authority of the parents, but also +the seignorial power of the feudal lord, and it must be +accounted to it for righteousness that it emancipated the +woman of the servile as well as of the free classes in relation +to the most important event of her life."<a name="FNanchor_253_253" id="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> The other +was that in maintaining as it did the indissolubility of +the sacramental marriage, it held that its violation was +as bad for the husband as for the wife. The older +theories had looked at infidelity either as an injury to +the husband's property, or as introducing uncertainty +as to the parenthood of children, and this survives in Dr. +Johnson's dictum of a "boundless" difference. The feelings +of the wife, or even of the husband, aside from his +concern for his property and children, do not seem to +have been considered.</p> + +<p>The church thus modified the Germanic and Roman +traditions, but never entirely abolished them, because she +was divided within herself as to the real place of family +life. Protestantism, in its revolt from Rome, opposed +both its theories of marriage. On the one hand, the Reformers +held that marriage is not a sacrament, but a civil +contract, admitting of divorce. On the other hand, they +regarded marriage as the most desirable state, and abolished +the celibacy of the clergy. The "subjection of +women," especially of married women, has, however, re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_578" id="Page_578">[Pg 578]</a></span>mained +as the legal theory until very recently. In England +it was the theory in Blackstone's time that "The +very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended +during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated +into that of the husband, under whose wing, +protection, and cover, she performs everything." According +to the old law, he might give her "moderate +correction." "But with us in the politer reign of Charles +II., this power of correction began to be doubted." It +was not until 1882, however, that a married woman in +England gained control of her property. In the United +States the old injustice of the common law has been gradually +remedied by statutes until substantial equality in relation +to property and children has been secured.</p> + + +<h4>§ 2. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE FAMILY</h4> + +<p>The psychology of family life may be conveniently +considered under two heads: that of the husband and +wife, and that of parents and children, brothers and +sisters.</p> + +<p>1. The complex sentiment, love, which is found in the +most perfect family life, is on the one hand (1) a feeling +or emotion; on the other (2) a purpose, a will. Both +these are modified and strengthened by (3) parenthood +and (4) social and religious influences.</p> + +<p><b>(1) The Emotional and Instinctive Basis.</b>—As feeling +or emotion love may have two roots. A mental sympathy, +based on kindred tastes and interests, is sometimes present +at the outset, but in any case it is likely to develop +under the favoring conditions of a common life, particularly +if there are either children or a common work. But +it is well known that this is not all. A friend is one +thing; a lover another. The intimacy involved requires +not only the more easily described and superficial attraction +of mind for mind; it demands also a deeper con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_579" id="Page_579">[Pg 579]</a></span>geniality +of the whole person, incapable of precise formulation, +manifesting itself in the subtler emotional attitudes +of instinctive reaction. This instinctive, as contrasted +with the more reflective, attraction is frequently +described as one of opposites or contrasting dispositions +and physical characteristics. But this is nothing that +enters into the feeling as a conscious factor. The only +explanation which we can give in the present condition of +science is the biological one. From the biological point +of view it was a most successful venture when Nature, by +some happy variation, developed two sexes with slightly +different characters and made their union necessary to +the continuance of life in certain species. By uniting in +every new individual the qualities of two parents, the +chances of variation are greatly increased, and variation +is the method of progress. To keep the same variety of +fruit the horticulturist buds or grafts; to get new varieties +he plants seed. The extraordinary progress combined +with continuity of type, which has been exhibited +in the plant and animal world, has been effected, in part +at least, through the agency of sex. This long process +has developed certain principles of selection which are +instinctive. Whether they are the best possible or not, +they represent a certain adjustment which has secured such +progress as has been attained, and such adaptation to +environment as exists, and it would be unwise, if it were +not impossible, to disregard them. Marriages of convenience +are certainly questionable from the biological +standpoint.</p> + +<p>But the instinctive basis is not in and of itself sufficient +to guarantee a happy family life. If man were +living wholly a life of instinct, he might trust instinct +as a guide in establishing his family. But since he is +living an intellectual and social life as well, intellectual +and social factors must enter. The instinctive basis of +selection was fixed by conditions which contemplated only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_580" id="Page_580">[Pg 580]</a></span> +a more or less limited period of attachment, with care of +the young for a few years. Modern society requires the +husband and wife to contemplate life-long companionship, +and a care for children which implies capacity in the +father to provide for a great range of advantages, and in +the mother to be intellectual and moral guide and friend +until maturity. To trust the security of these increased +demands to instinct is to invite failure. Instinct must +be guided by reason if perfect friendship and mutual +supplementation in the whole range of interests are +to be added to the intenser, but less certain, attraction.</p> + +<p><b>(2) The Common Will.</b>—But whether based on instinct +or intellectual sympathy, no feeling or emotion by itself +is an adequate moral basis for the life together of a man +and a woman. What was said on p. 249, as to the moral +worthlessness of any <i>mere</i> feeling abstracted from will, +applies here. Love or affection, in the only sense in +which it makes a moral basis of the family, is not the +"affection" of psychological language—the pleasant or +unpleasant tone of consciousness; it is the resolute purpose +in each to seek the other's good, or rather to seek a +<i>common</i> good which can be attained only through a common +life involving mutual self-sacrifice. It is the good +will of Kant specifically directed toward creating a common +good. It is the formation of a small "kingdom of +ends" in which each treats the other "as end," never +as means only; in which each is "both sovereign and +subject"; in which the common will, thus created, enhances +the person of each and gives it higher moral dignity +and worth. And, as in the case of all purpose which has +moral value, there is such a common good as the actual +result. The disposition and character of both husband +and wife are developed and supplemented. The male +is biologically the more variable and motor. He has +usually greater initiative and strength. Economic and +industrial life accentuates these tendencies. But alone<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_581" id="Page_581">[Pg 581]</a></span> +he is apt to become rough or hard, to lack the feeling +in which the charm and value of life are experienced. On +the other hand, the woman, partly by instinct, it may be, +but certainly by vocation, is largely occupied with the +variety of cares on which human health, comfort, and +morality depend. She tends to become narrow, unless supplemented +by man. The value of emotion and feeling +in relation to this process of mutual aid and enlargement, +as in general, is, as Aristotle pointed out, to perfect the +will. It gives warmth and vitality to what would otherwise +be in any case partial and might easily become insincere. +There was a profound truth which underlay the +old psychology in which "the heart" meant at once character +and passion.</p> + +<p><b>(3) The Influence of Parenthood.</b>—Nature takes one step +at a time. If all the possible consequences of family life +had to be definitely forecasted, valued, and chosen at +the outset, many would shrink. But this would be because +there is as yet no capacity to appreciate new values +before the actual experience of them. "Every promise of +the soul has innumerable fulfillments; each of its joys +ripens into a new want." Parental affection is not usually +present until there are real children to evoke it. At the +outset the mutual love of husband and wife is enough. +But as the first, more instinctive and emotional factors +lose relatively, the deeper union of will and sympathy +needs community of interest if it is to become permanent +and complete. Such community of interest is often found +in sharing a business or a profession, but under present +industrial organization this is not possible as a general +rule. The most general and effective object of common +interest is the children of the family. As pointed out by +John Fiske, the mere keeping of the parents together by +the prolongation of infancy in the human species has had +great moral influence. Present civilization does not merely +demand that the parents coöperate eight or ten years<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_582" id="Page_582">[Pg 582]</a></span> +for the child's physical support. There has been a second +epoch in the prolongation. The parents now must +coöperate until the children are through school and +college, and in business or homes of their own. And the +superiority of children over the other common interests +is that in a different form the parents repeat the process +which first took them out of their individual lives to unite +for mutual helpfulness. If the parents treat the children +not merely as sources of gratification or pride, but +as persons, with lives of their own to live, with capacities +to develop, the personality of the parent is enlarged. The +affection between husband and wife is enriched by the +new relationship it has created.</p> + +<p><b>(4) Social and Religious Factors.</b>—The relations of +husband and wife, parent and child, are the most intimate +of personal relations, but they are none the less relations +of social interest. In fact, just because they are so intimate, +society is the more deeply concerned. Or, to put it +from the individual's standpoint, just because the parties +are undertaking a profoundly personal step, they must +take it as members of a moral order. The act of establishing +the family signifies, indeed, the entrance into fuller +participation in the social life; it is the assuming of ties +which make the parties in a new and deeper sense organic +parts of humanity. This social and cosmic meaning is +appropriately symbolized by the civil and religious ceremony. +In its control over the marriage contract, and in +its prescriptions as to the care and education of the children, +society continues to show its interest. All this lends +added value and strength to the emotional and intellectual +bases.</p> + +<p><b>2. Parent and Child.</b>—The other relationships in the +family, those of parents and children, brothers and sisters, +need no elaborate analysis. The love of parents for children, +like that of man and woman, has an instinctive basis. +Those species which have cared for their offspring have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_583" id="Page_583">[Pg 583]</a></span> +had a great advantage in the struggle for existence. +Nature has selected them, and is constantly dropping the +strains of any race or set which cares more for power, +or wealth, or learning than for children. Tenderness, +courage, responsibility, activity, patience, forethought, +personal virtue—these are constantly evoked not by the +needs of children in general, but by the needs of our +own children. The instinctive response, however, is soon +broadened in outlook and deepened in meaning. Intellectual +activity is stimulated by the needs of providing +for the physical welfare, and, still more, by the +necessity of planning for the unfolding mind. The interchange +of question and answer which forces the parent +to think his whole world anew, and which with the allied +interchange of imitation and suggestion produces a give +and take between all members of the family, is constantly +making for fluidity and flexibility, for tolerance and +catholicity. In the thoughtful parent these educative +influences are still further enriched by the problem of +moral training. For in each family, as in the race, the +need of eliciting and directing right conduct in the young +is one of the most important agencies in bringing home +to the elders the significance of custom and authority, of +right and wrong. It is natural enough, from one standpoint, +to think of childhood as an imperfect state, looking +forward for its completeness and getting its value because +of its rich promise. But the biologist tells us that +the child is nearer the line of progress than the more +developed, but also more rigidly set, man. And the lover +of children is confident that if any age of humanity +exists by its own right, and "pays as it goes," it is childhood. +It is not only meet, but a joy, that the fathers +labor for the children. Many, if not most, of the objects +for which men and women strive and drudge seem less satisfactory +when obtained; because we have meanwhile outgrown +the desire. Children afford an object of affection<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_584" id="Page_584">[Pg 584]</a></span> +which is constantly unfolding new powers, and opening +new reaches of personality.<a name="FNanchor_254_254" id="FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Conversely, an authority +which is also tender, patient, sympathetic, is the best +medium to develop in the child self-control. The necessity +of mutual forbearance where there are several children, +of sharing fairly, of learning to give and take, +is the best possible method of training for membership +in the larger society. In fact, from the point of view +of the social organism as a whole, the family has two +functions; as a smaller group, it affords an opportunity +for eliciting the qualities of affection and character +which cannot be displayed at all in the larger +group; and, in the second place, it is a training for +future members of the larger group in those qualities +of disposition and character which are essential to +citizenship.<a name="FNanchor_255_255" id="FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a></p> + + +<h4>§ 3. GENERAL ELEMENTS OF STRAIN IN FAMILY RELATIONS</h4> + +<p><b>Difference in Temperament.</b>—While there are intrinsic +qualities of men and women that bring them together for +family life, and, while there is in most cases a strong +reënforcement afforded by the presence of children, there +are certain characteristics which tend just as inevitably +to produce tension, and those forces of tension are +strengthened at the present time by certain economic, educational, +and cultural conditions. The differences between +men and women may be at the basis of their instinctive +attraction for each other; they certainly have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_585" id="Page_585">[Pg 585]</a></span> +possibilities of friction as well. A fundamental difference +already noted is that the male is more variable, the female +more true to the type. Biologically at least, the <i>varium et +mutabile</i> is applied by the poet to the wrong sex. Applied +to the mind and disposition, this means probably not +only a greater variation of capacity and temper as +a whole,—more geniuses and also more at the other extreme +than among women,—but also a greater average +mobility.</p> + +<p><b>Differences Accentuated by Occupation.</b>—From the +early occupations of hunting and fishing, to the modern +greater range of occupations, any native mobility in man +has found stimulation and scope, as compared with the +energies of women which have less distinct differentiation +and a more limited contact with the work of others. And +there is another industrial difference closely connected +with this, which has been pointed out by Ellis,<a name="FNanchor_256_256" id="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> and +Thomas.<a name="FNanchor_257_257" id="FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> Primitive man hunted and fought. Much of +primitive industry, the prototype, so far as it existed, of +the industrial activity of the modern world, was carried on +by woman. Industrial progress has been signalized by the +splitting off of one phase of woman's work after another, +and by the organization and expansion of this at the +hands of man. Man's work has thus become more specialized +and scientific; woman's has remained more detailed, +complex, and diffused. Her work in the family +of ordering the household, caring for the children, securing +the health and comfort of all its members, necessarily +involves personal adjustment; hence it resists system. +As a result of the differentiation man has gained +in greater and greater degree a scientific and objective +standard for his work; woman neither has nor can have—at +least in the sphere of personal relations—the advantage +of a standard. Business has its ratings in the quantity<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_586" id="Page_586">[Pg 586]</a></span> +of sales or the ratio of net profits. The professions and +skilled trades have their own tests of achievement. A +scientist makes his discovery, a lawyer wins his case, an +architect builds his bridge, the mechanic his machine; he +knows whether he has done a good piece of work, and +respects himself accordingly. He can appeal from the +man next to him to the judgment of his profession. Conversely, +the standard of the trade or profession helps to +lift the individual's work. It is a constant stimulus, as +well as support. A woman's work in the family has no +such professional stimulus, or professional vindication. +If the family is lenient, the work is not held up to a high +level. On the other hand, it must make its appeal to +the persons immediately concerned, and if they do not +respond, the woman feels that she has failed to do something +really worth while. If her work is not valued, +she feels that it is not valuable. For there is no demonstrative +proof of a successful home any more than there +is of a good work of art. It is easy enough to point +out reasons why the picture or the home should please and +satisfy, but if the work itself is not convincing, no +demonstration that similar works have satisfied is of any +avail.</p> + +<p>The way in which men and women come into contact +with others is another element in the case. Man comes +into contact with others for the most part in an abstract +way. He deals not with men, women, and children, but +with employers or employed, with customers or clients, or +patients. He doesn't have to stand them in all their +varied phases, or enter into those intimate relations which +involve strain of adjustment in its fullest extent. Moreover, +business or professional manner and etiquette come +in to relieve the necessity of personal effort. The "professional +manner" serves the same function in dealing +with others, which habit plays in the individual life; it +takes the place of continual readjustment of attention.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_587" id="Page_587">[Pg 587]</a></span> +When a man is forced to lay this aside and deal in any +serious situation as "a human being," he feels a far +greater strain. The woman's task is less in extension, +but great in intension. It obliges her to deal with the +children, at any rate, as wholes, and a "whole" child +is a good deal of a strain. If she does not see the whole +of the husband, it is quite likely that the part not brought +home—the professional or business part of him—is the +most alert, intelligent, and interesting phase. The constant +close-at-hand personal relations, unrelieved by the +abstract impersonal attitude and the generalizing activity +which it invites, constitute an element of strain +which few men understand, and which probably few +could endure and possess their souls. The present division +of labor seems, therefore, to make the man excessively +abstract, the woman excessively personal, instead +of supplementing to some extent the weak side of +each.</p> + +<p><b>Difference in Attitude toward the Family.</b>—As if +these differences in attitude based on disposition and occupation +were not enough, we have a thoroughgoing difference +in the attitude of men and women toward the very +institution which invites them. The man is ready enough +to assent to the importance of the family for the race, +but his family means not an interference with other ambitions, +but usually an aid to their fulfillment. His family +is one interest among several, and is very likely subordinate +in his thought to his profession or his business. +In early ages to rove or conquer, in modern life to master +nature and control her resources or his fellowmen—this has +been the insistent instinct which urges even the long-tossed +Ulysses from Ithaca and from Penelope again upon the +deep. Woman, on the other hand, if she enters a family, +usually abandons any other ambition and forgets any +acquired art or skill of her previous occupation. To be +the mistress of a home may be precisely what she would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_588" id="Page_588">[Pg 588]</a></span> +choose as a vocation. But there is usually no alternative +if she is to have a home at all. It is not a question of a +family in addition to a vocation, but of a family <i>as</i> a +vocation. Hence woman must regard family life not +merely as a good; it must be <i>the</i> good, and usually the +exclusive good.</p> + +<p>If, then, a woman has accepted the family as the +supreme good, it is naturally hard to be in perfect sympathy +with the man's standard of family life as secondary. +Of course a completer vision may find that a +division of labor, a difference of function, may carry with +it a difference in standards of value; the mastery of +nature and the maintenance of the family may be neither +an absolute good in itself, but each a necessity to life +and progress. But neither man nor woman is always +equal to this view, and to the full sympathy for the relative +value of the other's standpoint. Where it cuts closest +is in the attitude toward breach of faith in the family +tie. Men have severe codes for the man who cheats at +cards or forges a signature, but treat much more +leniently, or entirely ignore, the gravest offenses against +the family. These latter do not seem to form a barrier +to political, business, or social success (among men). +Women have a severe standard for family sanctity, especially +for their own sex. But it would probably be difficult +to convince most women that it is a more heinous +offense to secrete a card, or even with Nora in <i>The Doll's +House</i>, to forge a name, than to be unfaithful. It is +not meant that the average man or woman approves +either form of wrongdoing, but that there is a difference +of emphasis evidenced in the public attitude. In view of +all these differences in nature, occupation, and social +standard it may be said that however well husband and +wife may love each other, few understand each other +completely. Perhaps most men do not understand women +at all. Corresponding to the "psychologist's fallacy,"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_589" id="Page_589">[Pg 589]</a></span> +whose evils have been depicted by James, there is a "masculine +fallacy" and a "feminine fallacy."</p> + +<p><b>Difference in Age.</b>—The difference in age between +parents and children brings certain inevitable hindrances +to complete understanding. The most thoroughgoing +is that parent and children really stand concretely for +the two factors of continuity and individual variation +which confront each other in so many forms. The parent +has found his place in the social system, and is both +steadied and to some extent made rigid by the social tradition. +The child, though to some extent imitating and +adopting this tradition, has as yet little reasoned adherence +to it. The impulses and expanding life do not find +full expression in the set ways already open, and occasionally +break out new channels. The conservatism of +the parent may be a wiser and more social, or merely +a more hardened and narrow, mode of conduct; some of +the child's variations may be irrational and pernicious +to himself and society; others may promise a larger reasonableness, +a more generous social order—but meanwhile +certain features of the conflict between reason and impulse, +order and change, are constantly appearing. Differences +in valuation are also inevitable and can be bridged +only by an intelligent sympathy. It is easy to consider +this or that to be of slight importance to the child when +it is really his whole world for the time. Even if he does +"get over it," the effect on the disposition may remain, +and affect the temper or emotional life, even though not +consciously remembered. Probably, also, most parents do +not realize how early a crude but sometimes even passionate +sense for "fairness" develops, or how different the +relative setting of an act appears if judged from the +motives actually operative with the child, and not from +those which might produce such an act in a "grown-up." +Most parents and children love each other; few reach a +complete understanding.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_590" id="Page_590">[Pg 590]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>§ 4. SPECIAL CONDITIONS WHICH GIVE RISE TO PRESENT +PROBLEMS</h4> + +<p>In addition to the more general conditions of family +life, there are certain conditions at present operative +which give rise to special problems, or rather emphasize +certain aspects of the permanent problems. The family +is quite analogous to political society. There needs to +be constant readjustment between order and progress, +between the control of the society and the freedom of the +individual. The earlier bonds of custom or force have +to be exchanged in point after point for a more voluntary +and moral order. In the words of Kant, heteronomy must +steadily give place to autonomy, subordination of rank +or status to division of labor with equality in dignity. +The elements of strain in the family life at present may +fairly be expected to give rise ultimately to a better +constitution of its relations. The special conditions are +partly economic, partly educational and political, but the +general process is a part of the larger growth of modern +civilization with the increasing development of individuality +and desire for freedom. It is sometimes treated as +if it affected only the woman or the children; in reality +it affects the man as well, though in less degree, as his was +not the subordinate position.</p> + +<p><b>The Economic Factors.</b>—The "industrial revolution" +transferred production from home to factory. The household +is no longer as a rule an industrial unit. Spinning, +weaving, tailoring, shoemaking, soap-making, iron- and +wood-working, and other trades have gone to factories. +Men, young unmarried women, and to some extent married +women also, have gone with them. Children have lost +association with one parent, and in some cases with both. +The concentration of industry and business leads to cities. +Under present means of transportation this means apartments +instead of houses, it means less freedom, more<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_591" id="Page_591">[Pg 591]</a></span> +strain, for both mother and children, and possible deteriorating +effects upon the race which as yet are quite +outside any calculation. But leaving this uncertain field +of effects upon child life, we notice certain potent effects +upon men and women.</p> + +<p>It might be a difficult question to decide the exact gains +and losses for family life due to the absence of the man +from home during the day. On the one hand, too constant +association is a source of friction; on the other, +there is likely to result some loss of sympathy, and where +the working-day is long, an almost absolute loss of contact +with children. If children are the great natural agencies +for cultivating tenderness and affection, it is certainly unfortunate +that fathers should be deprived of this education. +The effect of the industrial revolution upon women +has been widely noted. First of all, the opening of an +increasing number of occupations to women has rendered +them economically more independent. They are not forced +to the alternative of marriage or dependence upon relatives. +If already married, even although they may have +lost touch to some extent with their former occupation, +they do not feel the same compulsion to endure intolerable +conditions in the home rather than again attempt self-support. +An incidental effect of the entrance of women +upon organized occupations, with definite hours and impersonal +standards, is to bring out more strongly by contrast +the "belated" condition of domestic work. It is +difficult to obtain skilled workers for an occupation requiring +nearly double the standard number of hours, isolation +instead of companionship during work, close +personal contact with an employer, a measure of control +over conduct outside of the hours on duty, and finally +the social inferiority implied by an occupation which has +in it survivals of the status of the old-time servant. Indeed, +the mistress of the house, if she "does her own work," +doesn't altogether like her situation. There is now no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_592" id="Page_592">[Pg 592]</a></span> +one general occupation which all men are expected to +master irrespective of native tastes and abilities. If every +male were obliged to make not only his own clothing, +including head- and foot-wear, but that of his whole +family, unassisted, or with practically unskilled labor, +there would probably be as much misfit clothing as there +is now unsatisfactory home-making, and possibly there +would be an increase of irritability and "nervousness" on +the one side and of criticism or desertion on the other, which +would increase the present strain upon the divorce courts. +To an increasing number of women, the position of being +"jack-at-all-trades and master-of-none" is irritating. +The conviction that there is a great waste of effort without +satisfactory results is more wearing than the actual +doing of the work.</p> + +<p>For the minority of women who do not "keep house," or +who can be relieved entirely of domestic work by experts, +the industrial revolution has a different series of possibilities. +If there is a decided talent which has received +adequate cultivation, there may be an opportunity for +its exercise without serious interference with family life, +but the chances are against it. If the woman cannot leave +her home for the entire day, or if her husband regards a +gainful occupation on her part as a reflection upon his +ability to "support the family," she is practically shut +out from any occupation. If she has children and has +an intelligent as well as an emotional interest in their +welfare, there is an unlimited field for scientific development. +But if she has no regular useful occupation, she +is not leading a normal life. Her husband very likely +cannot understand why she should not, in the words of +Veblen, perform "vicarious leisure" for him, and be satisfied +therewith. If she is satisfied, so much the worse. +Whether she is satisfied or not, she is certainly not likely +to grow mentally or morally in such an existence, and the +family life will not be helped by stagnation or frivolity.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_593" id="Page_593">[Pg 593]</a></span></p> + +<p>In certain classes of society there is one economic feature +which is probably responsible for many petty annoyances +and in some cases for real degradation of spirit. +When the family was an industrial unit, when exchange +was largely in barter, it was natural to think of +the woman as a joint agent in production. When the +production moved to factories and the wage or the wealth +was paid to the man and could be kept in his pocket or +his check-book, it became easy for him to think of himself +as "supporting" the family, to permit himself to be +"asked" for money for household expenses or even for +the wife's personal expenses, and to consider money used +in these ways as "gifts" to his wife or children. Women +have more or less resistingly acquiesced in this humiliating +conception, which is fatal to a real moral relation +as well as to happiness. It is as absurd a conception as +it would be to consider the receiving teller in a bank as +supporting the bank, or the manager of a factory as +supporting all the workmen. The end of the family is +not economic profit, but mutual aid, and the continuance +and progress of the race. A division of labor does not +give superiority and inferiority. When one considers +which party incurs the greater risks, and which works +with greater singleness and sincerity for the family, it +must pass as one of the extraordinary superstitions that +the theory of economic dependence should have gained +vogue.</p> + +<p><b>Cultural and Political Factors.</b>—Educational, cultural, +and political movements reënforce the growing sense +of individuality. Educational and cultural advance +strengthens the demand that woman's life shall have as +serious a purpose as man's, and that in carrying on her +work, whether in the family or without, she may have +some share in the grasp of mind, the discipline of character, +and the freedom of spirit which come from the +scientific spirit, and from the intelligent, efficient organ<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_594" id="Page_594">[Pg 594]</a></span>ization +of work by scientific methods. Political democracy +draws increasing attention to personal dignity, irrespective +of rank or wealth. Increasing legal rights have +been granted to women until in most points they are now +equal before the law, although the important exception +of suffrage still remains for the most part. Under these +conditions it is increasingly difficult to maintain a family +union on any other basis than that of equal freedom, +equal responsibilities, equal dignity and authority. It will +probably be found that most of the tension now especially +felt in family life—aside from those cases of maladaptation +liable to occur under any system—results either from +lack of recognition of this equality, or from the more +general economic conditions which society as a whole, +rather than any particular family, must meet and change.</p> + + +<h4>§ 5. UNSETTLED PROBLEMS: (1) ECONOMIC</h4> + +<p>The family as an economic unit includes the relation +of its members to society both as producers and as +consumers.</p> + +<p><b>The Family and Production.</b>—We have noted the industrial +changes which have seemed to draw the issue +sharply between the home and outside occupations. We +have seen that the present organization of industry, business, +and the professions has separated most of the occupations +from the family, so that woman must choose +between family and a specific occupation, but cannot +ordinarily combine the two. We have said that in requiring +all its women to do the same thing the family seems +to exclude them from individual pursuits adapted to their +talents, and to exclude them likewise from the whole scientific +and technical proficiency of modern life. Is this an +inevitable dilemma? Those who think it is divide into +two parties, which accept respectively the opposite horns. +The one party infers that the social division of labor must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_595" id="Page_595">[Pg 595]</a></span> +be: man to carry on all occupations outside the family, +woman to work always within the family. The other +party infers that the family life must give way to the +industrial tendency.</p> + +<p>(1) The "domestic theory," or as Mrs. Bosanquet +styles it, the "pseudo-domestic" theory, is held sincerely +by many earnest friends of the family in both sexes. +They feel strongly the fundamental necessity of family +life. They believe further that they are not seeking +to subordinate woman to the necessities of the race, but +rather to give her a unique position of dignity and affection. +In outside occupations she must usually be at a +disadvantage in competition with men, because of her +physical constitution which Nature has specialized for a +different function. In the family she "reigns supreme." +With most women life is not satisfied, experience is not +full, complete consciousness of sex and individuality is +not attained, until they have dared to enter upon the +full family relations. Let these be preserved not merely +for the race, but especially for woman's own sake. +Further, it is urged, when woman enters competitive +occupations outside the home, she lowers the scale of wages. +This makes it harder for men to support families, and +therefore more reluctant to establish them. Riehl urges +that not only should married women remain at home; unmarried +women should play the part of "aunt" in some +one's household—he says <i>alte Tante</i>, but it is not necessary +to load the theory too heavily with the adjective.</p> + +<p>(2) The other horn of the dilemma is accepted by many +writers, especially among socialists. These writers assume +that the family necessarily involves not only an exclusively +domestic life for all women, but also their economic +dependence. They believe this dependence to be not merely +a survival of barbarism, but an actual immorality in its +exchange of sex attraction for economic support. Hence +they would abandon the family or greatly modify it. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_596" id="Page_596">[Pg 596]</a></span> +must no longer be "coercive"; it will be coercive under +present conditions.</p> + +<p><b>Fallacies in the Dilemma.</b>—Each of these positions +involves a fallacy which releases us from the necessity of +choosing between them. The root of the fallacy in each +case is the conception that the economic status determines +the moral end, whereas the moral end ought to determine +the economic status.</p> + +<p>The fallacy of the pseudo-domestic theory lies in supposing +that the home must continue its old economic +form or be destroyed. What is essential to the family is +that man and wife, parents and children, should live in +such close and intimate relation that they may be mutually +helpful. But it is not essential that present methods of +house construction, domestic service, and the whole industrial +side of home life be maintained immutable. There is +one fundamental division of labor between men and +women. The woman who takes marriage at its full scope +accepts this. "The lines which it follows are drawn not +so much by the woman's inability to work for her family +in the outside world—she constantly does so when the +death or illness of her husband throws the double burden +upon her; but from the obvious fact that the man is +incapable of the more domestic duties incident upon the +rearing of children."<a name="FNanchor_258_258" id="FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> But this does not involve the total +life of a woman, nor does it imply that to be a good wife +and mother every woman must under all possible advances +of industry continue to be cook, seamstress, housemaid, +and the rest. True it is that if a woman steps out of her +profession or trade for five, ten, twenty years, it is in +many cases difficult to reënter. But there are some occupations +where total absence is not necessary. There are +others where her added experience ought to be an asset +instead of a handicap. A mother who has been well +trained ought to be a far more effective teacher in her +wholesome and intelligent influence. She ought to be a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_597" id="Page_597">[Pg 597]</a></span> +more efficient manager or worker in the great variety of +civic and social enterprises of both paid and unpaid character. +There is no doubt that the present educational +and social order is suffering because deprived of the competent +service which many married women might render, +just as women in their turn are suffering for want of congenial +occupation, suited to their capacities and individual +tastes. A growing freedom in economic pursuit would +improve the home, not injure it. For nothing that interferes +with normal development is likely to prove beneficial +to the family's highest interest.</p> + +<p>The fallacy of those who would abolish the family to +emancipate woman from economic dependence is in supposing +that because the woman is not engaged in a gainful +occupation she is therefore being supported by the +man for his own pleasure. This is to adopt the absurd +assumptions of the very condition they denounce. This +theory at most, applies to a marriage which is conceived +from an entirely selfish and commercial point of view. If +a man marries for his own pleasure and is willing to pay +a cash price; if a woman marries for cash or support and +is willing to pay the price, there is no doubt as to the +proper term for such a transaction. The result is not a +family in the moral sense, and no ceremonies or legal forms +can make it moral. A family in the moral sense exists for +a common good, not for selfish use of others. To secure +this common good each member contributes a part. If +both husband and wife carry on gainful occupations, well; +if one is occupied outside the home and the other within, +well also. If there are children, the woman is likely to have +the far more difficult and wearing half of the common +labor. Which plan is followed, i.e., whether the woman +works outside or within the home, ought to depend on which +plan is better on the whole for all concerned, and this will +depend largely on the woman's own ability and tastes, and +upon the number and age of the children. But the eco<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_598" id="Page_598">[Pg 598]</a></span>nomic +relation is not the essential thing. The essential +thing is that the economic be held entirely subordinate to +the moral conception, before marriage and after.</p> + +<p><b>The Family as Consumer.</b>—The relation of the family +as consumer to society and to the economic process at +large involves also an important moral problem. For +while production has been taken from the home, the selective +influence of the family over production through its +direction of consumption has proportionally increased. +And in this field the woman of the family is and should be +the controlling factor. As yet only the internal aspects +have been considered. Most women regard it as their duty +to buy economically, to secure healthful food, and make +their funds go as far as possible. But the moral responsibility +does not stop here. The consumer may have an +influence in helping to secure better conditions of production, +such as sanitary workshops, reasonable hours, decent +wages, by a "white label." But this is chiefly valuable +in forming public opinion to demand workrooms free from +disease and legal abolition of sweatshops and child labor. +The greater field for the consumers' control is in determining +the kind of goods that shall be produced. What +foods shall be produced, what books written, what plays +presented, what clothing made, what houses and what furnishing +shall be provided—all this may be largely determined +by the consumers. And the value of simplicity, utility, +and genuineness, is not limited to the effects upon the +family which consumes. The workman who makes fraudulent +goods can hardly help being injured. The economic +waste involved in the production of what satisfies no permanent +or real want is a serious indictment of our present +civilization. It was said, under the subject of the economic +process, that it was an ethically desirable end to have increase +of goods, and of the kind wanted. We may now +add a third end: it is important that society should learn +to want the kinds of goods which give happiness and not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_599" id="Page_599">[Pg 599]</a></span> +merely crude gratification. Men often need most what +they want least. Not only the happiness of life but its +progress, its unfolding of new capacities and interests, is +determined largely by the direction of the consumption. +Woman is here the influential factor.</p> + +<p>If there were no other reason for the better and wider +education of woman than the desirability of more intelligent +consumption, society would have ample ground to +demand it.</p> + + +<h4>§ 6. UNSETTLED PROBLEMS: (2) POLITICAL</h4> + +<p>The family may be regarded as a political unit, first +in its implication of some control of the members by the +common end, and in the second place in its relation to the +authority of the State.</p> + +<p><b>1. Authority within the Family.</b>—If the political character +of the family were kept clearly in mind, the internal +relations of the members of the family would be on a far +more moral basis and there would be less reason for friction +or personal clashes. If there is a group of persons +which is to act as a unity, there must be some leadership +and control. In many cases there will be a common conviction +as to the fittest person to lead or direct, but where +the group is a permanent one with frequent occasions for +divergent interests, unity has been maintained either by +force or by some agency regarded by the people as embodying +their common will. In the earliest forms of society +this, as we have seen, was not clearly distinguished from +personal and individual command. But as the conception +of the political worked free from that of the personal +agent, it could be recognized more and more that the ruler +was not the man—not Henry or William,—but the +King or the Parliament, as representing the nation. Then +government became a more consciously moral act. Obedience +was not humiliating, because the members were +sovereign as well as subject. It was not heteronomy but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_600" id="Page_600">[Pg 600]</a></span> +autonomy. In the family the personal relation is so close +that this easily overshadows the fact that there is also +a family relation of a political sort. The man in the +patriarchal family, and since, has exercised, or has had +the legal right to exercise authority. And with the legal +theory of inequality to support him it is not strange that +he should often have conceived that obedience was due to +him as a person, and not to him as, in certain cases, best +representing the joint purpose of the family, just as in +other cases the woman best represents this same purpose.</p> + +<p><b>Equality or Inequality.</b>—But even when there had been +recognition of a more than personal attitude the question +would at once arise, are the members of a family to be +considered as of equal or unequal importance? The answer +until recently has been unequivocal. In spite of such +apparent exceptions as chivalry, and the court paid to +beauty or wit, or the honor accorded to individual wives +and mothers, woman has seldom been taken seriously in the +laws and institutions of society. Opportunities for education +and full participation in the thought and life of +civilization are very recent. Public school education +for girls is scarcely a century old. College education +for women, in a general sense, is of the present generation. +But the conviction has steadily gained that democracy +cannot treat half the race as inferior in dignity, +or exclude it from the comradeship of life. Under primitive +society a man was primarily a member of a group +or caste, and only secondarily a person. A woman has +been in this situation as regards her sex. She is now +asserting a claim to be considered primarily as a person, +rather than as a woman. This general movement, like the +economic movement, has seemed to affect the attitude +of unmarried women, and to a less degree, of men, +toward marriage, and to involve an instability of the family +tie. The question is then this: does the family necessarily +involve inequality, or can it be maintained on a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_601" id="Page_601">[Pg 601]</a></span> +basis of equality? Or to put the same thing from another +angle: if the family and the modern movement toward +equality are at variance, which ought to give way?</p> + +<p>The "pseudo-domestic" theory on this point is suggested +by its general position on the economic relations of the +family as already stated. It believes that the family must +be maintained as a distinct sphere of life, coördinate in +importance for social welfare with the intellectual, artistic, +and economic spheres. It holds, further, that the family +can be maintained in this position only if it be kept as +a unique controlling influence in woman's life, isolated +from other spheres. This of course involves an exclusion +of woman from a portion of the intellectual and political +life, and therefore an inferiority of development, even if +there is not an inferiority of capacity. Some of this +school have maintained that in America the rapid advance +in education and intelligence among women has rendered +them so superior to the average man who has to leave +school for business at an early age that they are unwilling +to marry. A German alliterative definition of woman's +"sphere" has been found in "the four K's"—Kirche, Kinder, +Küche, und Kleider.</p> + +<p>If the permanence of the family rests on the maintenance +of a relation of inferiority, it is indeed in a perilous +state. All the social and political forces are making toward +equality, and from the moral standpoint it is impossible +successfully to deny Mill's classic statement, "The +only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between +equals." But some of the advocates of equality have accepted +the same fallacious separation between the family +and modern culture. They have assumed that the family +life must continue to be unscientific in its methods, and +meager in its interests. Some women—like some men—undoubtedly +place a higher value on book learning, musical +and dramatic entertainment, and other by-products of +modern civilization than on the elemental human sympathies<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_602" id="Page_602">[Pg 602]</a></span> +and powers which these should serve to enrich. It is too +easily granted that the opportunity and duty of woman +as wife and mother are limited to a purely unscientific provision +for physical wants to the exclusion of scientific +methods, intellectual comradeship, and effective grappling +with moral problems.</p> + +<p><b>Isolation Not the Solution.</b>—The solution for the present +unrest is therefore to be found not in forcing the separation +between the family on the one hand and the intellectual, +political, and other aspects of civilization on the +other, but in a mutual permeation. They think very +lightly of the elemental strength of sex and parental instincts +who suppose that these are to be overslaughed in +any great portion of the race by cultural interests. And +it is to ignore the history of political progress to suppose +that organic relations founded on equality and democracy +are less stable than those resting on superiority and subordination. +The fact is that there is no part of life so +much in need of all that modern science can give, and no +field for intellectual penetration and technological organization +so great as the family. Correlative with its control +over economic processes through its position as consumer, +is its influence over social, educational, and political life, +through its relation to the children who are constantly +renewing the structure. To fulfill the possibilities and even +the duties of family life under modern conditions requires +both scientific training and civic activity. Provisions for +health and instruction and proper social life in school, +provisions for parks and good municipal housekeeping, +for public health and public morals,—these demand the +intelligent interest of the parent and have in most cases +their natural motive in the family necessities. A theory +of the family which would limit the parent, especially the +mother, to "the home" needs first to define the limits of +"the home." To measure its responsibilities by the limit +of the street door is as absurd as to suppose that the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_603" id="Page_603">[Pg 603]</a></span> +sphere of justice is limited by the walls of the courtroom. +A broader education for women is certainly justified by +precisely this larger meaning of the care of children and +of the family interests. The things of greatest importance +to human life have scarcely been touched as yet by +science. We know more about astrophysics than about +health and disease; more about waste in steam power than +about waste in foods, or in education; more about classical +archæology than about the actual causes of poverty, alcoholism, +prostitution, and childlessness, the chief enemies +of home life. In the light of the actual possibilities and +needs of family life two positions seem equally absurd: the +one that family life can be preserved best by isolating it, +and particularly its women, from culture; the other, that +it does not afford an opportunity for a full life. Neither +of these errors can be corrected apart from the other. It +is in the mutual permeation and interaction of the respective +spheres of family and cultural life, not in their isolation, +that the family is to be strengthened. Here, as in the +economic field, no one family can succeed entirely by itself. +The problem is largely a social one. But every family +which is free and yet united, which shows comradeship as +well as mutual devotion, is forcing the issue and preparing +the way for the more perfect family of the future.</p> + +<p><b>2. Authority over the Family: Divorce.</b>—The strains +which have been noticed in the foregoing paragraphs have +centered public attention on the outward symptoms of unrest +and maladaptation. Current discussions of family +problems are likely to turn largely upon the increase of divorce. +For the reasons which have been given there has +doubtless been increasing tendency to seek divorce, and +this may continue until more stable conditions are reached. +Now that the authority of the church is less implicitly accepted, +individuals are thrown back upon their own voluntary +controls, and whether marriages are arranged by parents +as in France, or formed almost solely on the initia<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_604" id="Page_604">[Pg 604]</a></span>tive +and unguided will of the parties as in America, the +result is much the same. Two classes of persons seek divorce. +Those of individualistic temperament, who have +formed the marriage for selfish ends or in frivolous moments, +are likely to find its constraints irksome when the +expected happiness fails to be realized and the charm of +novelty is past. This is simply one type of immoral conduct +which may be somewhat checked by public opinion +or legal restraint, but can be overcome only by a more +serious and social attitude toward all life. The other class +finds in the bond itself, under certain conditions, a seemingly +fatal obstacle to the very purpose which it was designed +to promote: unfaithfulness, cruelty, habitual intoxication, +and other less coarse, but equally effective modes +of behavior may be destructive of the common life and +morally injurious to the children. Or alienation of spirit +may leave external companionship empty of moral unity +and value, if not positively opposed to self-respect. This +class is evidently actuated by sincere motives. How far +society may be justified in permitting dissolution of the +family under these conditions, and how far it may properly +insist on some personal sacrifice for the sake of larger +social ends is simply another form of the problem which +we considered in the economic field—the antithesis between +individual rights and public welfare. The solution in each +case cannot be reached by any external rule. It will be +found only in the gradual socializing of the individual on +the one hand, and in the correlative development of society +to the point where it respects all its members and makes +greater freedom possible for them on the other. Meanwhile +it must not be overlooked that the very conception +of permanence in the union, upheld by the state, is itself +effective toward thoughtful and well-considered action +after as well as before marriage. Some causes of friction +may be removed, some tendencies to alienation may be suppressed, +if the situation is resolutely faced from the stand<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_605" id="Page_605">[Pg 605]</a></span>point +of a larger social interest rather than from that of +momentary or private concern.</p> + +<p><b>General Law of Social Health.</b>—Divorce is a symptom +rather than a disease. The main reliance in cases of family +pathology, as for the diseases of the industrial and +economic system, is along the lines which modern science +is pursuing in the field of medicine. It is isolating certain +specific organisms which invade the system under favorable +circumstances and disturb its equilibrium. But it finds +that the best, and in fact the only ultimate protection +against disease is in the general "resisting power" of the +living process. This power may be temporarily aided by +stimulation or surgery, but the ultimate source of its renewal +is found in the steady rebuilding of new structures +to replace the old stagnation; the retention of broken-down +tissues means weakness and danger. The social organism +does not escape this law. Science will succeed in +pointing out the specific causes for many of the moral +evils from which we suffer. Poverty, crime, social injustice, +breaking down of the family, political corruption, +are not all to be accepted simply as "evils" or "wickedness" +in general. In many cases their amount may be +greatly reduced when we understand their specific causes +and apply a specific remedy. But the great reliance is +upon the primal forces which have brought mankind so far +along the line of advance. The constant remaking of +values in the search for the genuinely satisfying, the constant +forming, criticizing, and reshaping of ideals, the +reverence for a larger law of life and a more than individual +moral order, the outgoing of sympathy and love, +the demand for justice—all these are the forces which +have built our present social system, and these must continually +reshape it into more adequate expressions of genuine +moral life if it is to continue unimpaired or in greater +vigor.</p> + +<p>We do not know in any full sense whence the life<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_606" id="Page_606">[Pg 606]</a></span> +of the spirit comes, and we cannot, while standing upon +the platform of ethics, predict its future. But if our +study has shown anything, it is that the moral <i>is</i> a life, not +a something ready made and complete once for all. It is +instinct with movement and struggle, and it is precisely +the new and serious situations which call out new vigor +and lift it to higher levels. Ethical science tracing this +process of growth, has as its aim not to create life—for +the life is present already,—but to discover its laws and +principles. And this should aid in making its further +advance stronger, freer, and more assured because more +intelligent.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<h3>LITERATURE</h3> + +<p>On the early history of the Family, see the works cited at close +of ch. ii.; also Starcke, <i>The Primitive Family</i>, 1889; Westermarck, +<i>The History of Human Marriage</i>, 1901; Howard, <i>A History of Matrimonial +Institutions</i>, 3 vols., 1904. On present problems: H. Bosanquet, +<i>The Family</i>, 1906; Parsons, <i>The Family</i>, 1906; Bryce, <i>Marriage and +Divorce in Roman and in English Law</i>, in Studies in History and +Jurisprudence, 1901; Ellis, <i>Man and Woman</i>; Thomas, <i>Sex and Society</i>, +1906; Bebel, <i>Woman and Socialism</i>; Riehl, <i>Die Familie</i>.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_249_249" id="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> <i>Morals in Evolution</i>, Part I., p. 216.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_250_250" id="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> Howard, <i>History of Matrimonial Institutions</i>, I., ch. vii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251_251" id="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> Pollock and Maitland, <i>Hist. Eng. Law</i>, II., 383, quoted in Howard, +I., 325-26.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_252_252" id="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> Eckstein, <i>Woman under Monasticism</i>, p. 478.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_253_253" id="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> Hobhouse, <i>op. cit.</i>, I., 218.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_254_254" id="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> Helen Bosanquet, <i>The Family</i>, p. 313: "'They must hinder your +work very much,' I said to a mother busy about the kitchen, with +a two-year-old clinging to her skirt. 'I'd never get through my work +without them,' was the instant rejoinder, and in it lay the answer to +much of our sentimental commiseration of hard-worked mothers. It +may be hard to carry on the drudgery of daily life with the little +ones clamoring around; it is ten times harder without, for sheer +lack of something to make it worth while."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_255_255" id="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> Bosanquet, Part II., ch. x.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256_256" id="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> <i>Man and Woman.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_257_257" id="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> <i>Sex and Society.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_258_258" id="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> Helen Bosanquet, <i>The Family</i>, p. 272.</p></div> +</div> + + + + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_607" id="Page_607">[Pg 607]</a></span></p> +<h2>INDEX</h2> + +<div class="iquot"> +<p><br /> +Abelard, <a href="#Page_150">150 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Achan, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> +<br /> +Addams, Jane, <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br /> +<br /> +Æschylus, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /> +<br /> +Æsthetic, in Greek valuation of conduct, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133 f.</a>, <a href="#Footnote_79_79">135 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a><br /> +<br /> +Agency, public, see Public Agency;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rationalizing, <a href="#Page_40">40-2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">socializing, <a href="#Page_42">42-8</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Altruism, discussion of theories concerning, <a href="#Page_384">384-91</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">altruistic springs, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">true and false, <a href="#Page_387">387-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrasted with social justice, <a href="#Page_389">389</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Amos, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> +<br /> +Approbation, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a><br /> +<br /> +Angell, <a href="#Page_9">9</a><br /> +<br /> +Aquinas, Thomas, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> +<br /> +Aristophanes, <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> +<br /> +Aristotle, on the criterion of a moral act, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on nature and the natural, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the State, <a href="#Page_127">127 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Eudæmonism, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the "mean," <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on "highmindedness," <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the reflective life, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the good man, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the right, <a href="#Footnote_158_158">306 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on justice, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">referred to, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Arnold, M., <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a><br /> +<br /> +Art and arts, as a rationalizing agency, <a href="#Page_41">41 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a socializing agency, <a href="#Page_45">45 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">create new interests, <a href="#Page_79">79 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hebrew, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mediæval, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Church and modern, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a good that is sharable, <a href="#Page_559">559</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Asceticism, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_576">576</a><br /> +<br /> +Attitude, defined, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">emphasized by one type of theory, <a href="#Page_236">236-7</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to will, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Motive and "How"</span><br /> +<br /> +Augustine, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> +<br /> +Aurelius, Marcus, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> +<br /> +Authority, of group, <a href="#Page_26">26 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">behind customs, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Israel's religion, <a href="#Page_96">96 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of custom challenged in Greece, <a href="#Page_111">111 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the church, <a href="#Page_145">145-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conflict of reason with, <a href="#Page_165">165 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of duty, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the family, <a href="#Page_599">599 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Duty, Control, Standard</span><br /> +<br /> +Autonomy, as essence of moral duty, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kant's conception of, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in later utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in State and the family, <a href="#Page_599">599 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Control, Duty, Law, State</span><br /> +<br /> +Australian customs, marriage, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">initiatory, <a href="#Page_58">58 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regulated duel, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Bacon, Francis, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br /> +<br /> +Bacon, Roger, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> +<br /> +Bagehot, <a href="#Page_53">53</a><br /> +<br /> +Bain, on happiness, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his account of duty, <a href="#Page_356">356-8</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Balzac, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> +<br /> +Bayard, Chevalier, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> +<br /> +Benevolence, <a href="#Page_160">160 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375-91</a><br /> +<br /> +Bentham, on motive, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247-8</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on moral science, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on disposition, <a href="#Page_254">254-5</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pleasure and happiness, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on utilitarian calculus, <a href="#Page_275">275-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">denial of quality of pleasure, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pleasure of sympathy, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">democratic individualism of, <a href="#Page_525">525</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Blackstone, <a href="#Page_578">578</a><br /> +<br /> +Blood feud, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a><br /> +<br /> +Boniface VIII., Bull of, <a href="#Page_147">147</a><br /> +<br /> +Bosanquet, Helen, <a href="#Page_584">584</a>, <a href="#Page_595">595 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Bryce, James, <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Cæsar, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_608" id="Page_608">[Pg 608]</a></span><br /> +Capital and labor, <a href="#Page_499">499</a>, <a href="#Page_501">501 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_505">505 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_532">532</a>, <a href="#Page_542">542 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Capitalism, as method of industry, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158-60</a>, <a href="#Page_498">498 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>, <a href="#Page_538">538</a>, <a href="#Page_545">545</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Capital, Corporation</span><br /> +<br /> +Carelessness, <a href="#Page_462">462-4</a><br /> +<br /> +Carlyle, criticism of individualism, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Footnote_143_143">289 n.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Casuistry, <a href="#Page_325">325-8</a><br /> +<br /> +Categorical Imperative, <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br /> +<br /> +Celts, clan system of, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also Ireland, Welsh</span><br /> +<br /> +Character, formation of, <a href="#Page_9">9 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organization of, in group morality, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Hebrews, <a href="#Page_104">104-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Greeks, <a href="#Page_138">138-41</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to desire and deliberation, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral importance of, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to will, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to conduct, Chapter <a href="#Page_240">XIII.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and disposition, <a href="#Page_254">254-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">measures the pleasant and unpleasant, <a href="#Page_277">277-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">unification of, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its reconstruction, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">recognized by law, <a href="#Page_460">460 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Charity, in Middle Ages, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and right to life, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Benevolence</span><br /> +<br /> +Chastity, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> +<br /> +Chief, authority of, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> +<br /> +Child-labor, <a href="#Page_193">193 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_538">538</a>, <a href="#Page_540">540 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Chinese customs, <a href="#Page_17">17 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> +<br /> +Chivalry, <a href="#Page_149">149 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Christian conceptions, love, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sacrifice, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">faith, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">freedom, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social order, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">asceticism and authority, <a href="#Page_145">145 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">unity of members, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral value of labor, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to social order, <a href="#Page_184">184 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Church, Hebrew</span><br /> +<br /> +Church, its contribution to modern morality, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its ideals, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and jural theory of morals, <a href="#Page_218">218 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its influence on history of the family, <a href="#Page_576">576-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also Religion</span><br /> +<br /> +Cicero, <a href="#Page_152">152</a><br /> +<br /> +Civil Society, Chapter <a href="#Page_451">XXI.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform of its administration, <a href="#Page_471">471-3</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Clark, J. B., <a href="#Page_542">542</a><br /> +<br /> +Class ideals, of Greeks, <a href="#Page_116">116 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Germans and Celts, <a href="#Page_144">144 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">honor and, <a href="#Page_86">86 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as source of moral terms, <a href="#Page_175">175 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Class interests, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119-24</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a><br /> +<br /> +Closed shop, <a href="#Page_559">559-61</a><br /> +<br /> +Collective Agencies, see Corporations, Labor Union, Public Agency, Socialism<br /> +<br /> +Collectivism, its formula, <a href="#Page_484">484</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrasted with socialism, <a href="#Page_556">556</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Colonna, Ægidius, <a href="#Page_147">147</a><br /> +<br /> +Communism, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> +<br /> +Competition, modern theory of, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>, <a href="#Page_542">542</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">tends to destroy itself, <a href="#Page_532">532</a>, <a href="#Page_538">538</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">crude method of selecting ability, <a href="#Page_559">559</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Carlyle on, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Conduct, as subject of ethics, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">two aspects of, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">three stages of, <a href="#Page_8">8-10</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">three levels of, <a href="#Page_37">37-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">first level, Chapter <a href="#Page_37">III.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">second level, Chapter <a href="#Page_51">IV.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">third level, Chapters <a href="#Page_73">V.-VIII.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nature of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to character, Chapter <a href="#Page_240">XIII.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">place of happiness in, Chapter <a href="#Page_263">XIV.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">place of reason in, Chapter <a href="#Page_306">XVI.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Conflicting services, problem of, <a href="#Page_493">493</a><br /> +<br /> +Conscience, transition from custom to, <a href="#Page_73">73 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek symbols of, <a href="#Page_139">139 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stoic suggestion of, <a href="#Page_140">140 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">with Abelard, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">meaning of, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">analysis of, see Intuitionalism, Knowledge, Reason</span><br /> +<br /> +Conscientiousness, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a><br /> +<br /> +Consequences, Chapter <a href="#Page_240">XIII.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">importance of, <a href="#Page_234">234-5</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">denied by Kant, <a href="#Page_242">242-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">when foreseen form intention, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practical importance, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as moral sanctions, <a href="#Page_358">358-60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as self-realization, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">accidental, <a href="#Page_459">459-60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">careless, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Content, see Consequences, and "What"<br /> +<br /> +Contracts, <i>versus</i> status, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory and value of, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of little benefit to wage-earner, <a href="#Page_503">503-5</a>, <a href="#Page_529">529 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_609" id="Page_609">[Pg 609]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">as obstacle to legislation, <a href="#Page_505">505 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">analyzed, <a href="#Page_527">527 ff.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Control, the right as, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in primitive group, <a href="#Page_26">26-9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">primitive means of enforcing, <a href="#Page_54">54 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">challenged in Greece, <a href="#Page_118">118 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">problem of, <a href="#Page_217">217-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theories concerning, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">external and internal, <a href="#Page_353">353-61</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">self-control, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Jural, Law, Standard, Right</span><br /> +<br /> +Convention, in Greek morals and ethics, <a href="#Page_111">111 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Coöperation, and mutual aid, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in industry, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in war, <a href="#Page_44">44 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in art, <a href="#Page_45">45 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as organized in corporations and unions, <a href="#Page_495">495-507</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Corporations, moral difficulties of, <a href="#Page_498">498</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">management of, <a href="#Page_500">500 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relations to employés and public, <a href="#Page_501">501 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">require new types of morality, <a href="#Page_517">517-22</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">capitalization of, <a href="#Page_561">561 ff.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Corruption, political, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_537">537-9</a><br /> +<br /> +Coulanges, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br /> +<br /> +Courage, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410-13</a><br /> +<br /> +Courts, primitive, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as school of morality, <a href="#Page_182">182 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as instruments of oppression, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">civil, ethical value of, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in labor disputes, <a href="#Page_504">504 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on police power, <a href="#Page_505">505 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_555">555 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">recognition of public welfare by, <a href="#Page_555">555 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Covenant, in Hebrew moral development, <a href="#Page_94">94 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Criminal Procedure, reform of, <a href="#Page_468">468-9</a><br /> +<br /> +Criterion of the moral, <a href="#Page_5">5-13</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202 ff.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the good and right, typical theories of, <a href="#Page_224">224 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Good, Right, Kant, Utilitarianism, Plato, Aristotle</span><br /> +<br /> +Crusades, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> +<br /> +Cunningham, W., <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br /> +<br /> +Custom, and the term ethics, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in early group life, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as "second level" of conduct, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general discussion of, <a href="#Page_51">51 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">educational, <a href="#Page_57">57 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">jural, <a href="#Page_59">59 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">birth, marriage, death, <a href="#Page_64">64 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">festal, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hospitality, <a href="#Page_67">67 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">values and defects of, <a href="#Page_68">68 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">transition to conscience from, <a href="#Page_73">73 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">transition among Hebrews, <a href="#Page_95">95 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Greeks, <a href="#Page_110">110 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">opposed to "nature," <a href="#Page_120">120 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Grote on, <a href="#Page_172">172 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with reflective morality, <a href="#Page_172">172 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and moral rules, <a href="#Page_330">330-2</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Cultus, of Hebrew priesthood, <a href="#Page_97">97 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Cynics, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Cyrenaics, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Dante, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> +<br /> +Darwinism, and morals, <a href="#Page_371">371 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Naturalism</span><br /> +<br /> +Deliberation, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and intuition, <a href="#Page_322">322-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and conscience, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of crucial importance, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Democracy, in Greece, <a href="#Page_119">119 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development of, <a href="#Page_151">151 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and moral problems, <a href="#Page_474">474-81</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the corporation in relation to, <a href="#Page_500">500</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and economic problems, <a href="#Page_521">521 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and individualism, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>, <a href="#Page_535">535</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as agency, <a href="#Page_558">558</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the family, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>, <a href="#Page_600">600 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Descartes, <a href="#Page_164">164 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Desire, hedonistic theory of, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to pleasure, <a href="#Page_270">270-1</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to happiness, <a href="#Page_272">272-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and reason, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their organization, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conflict with duty, <a href="#Page_339">339-46</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and temperance, <a href="#Page_406">406-8</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Dharna, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> +<br /> +Distribution, theories of, <a href="#Page_545">545-50</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">present inequalities in, <a href="#Page_545">545</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">individualism and, <a href="#Page_546">546</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">equal division, <a href="#Page_547">547</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a working programme, <a href="#Page_548">548-50</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Divorce, <a href="#Page_574">574 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_577">577</a>, <a href="#Page_603">603-5</a><br /> +<br /> +Dominicans, <a href="#Page_149">149 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Duty, Chapter <a href="#Page_337">XVII.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stoic conception, <a href="#Page_140">140 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origin of the term, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">standpoint of, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">double meaning of, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conflict with desire, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">explanation of, <a href="#Page_342">342-4</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">authority of, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social character of, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kant's view, <a href="#Page_346">346-52</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">utilitarian view of, <a href="#Page_353">353-62</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Eastman, Charles, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> +<br /> +Eckstein, <a href="#Page_577">577</a><br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_610" id="Page_610">[Pg 610]</a></span>Economic conditions and forces, in kinship and family groups, <a href="#Page_24">24 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">help to effect transition from group morality to conscience, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Hebrews, <a href="#Page_93">93 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Greeks, <a href="#Page_119">119 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern, <a href="#Page_155">155-63</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in reflective morality, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">restrict physical freedom, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and freedom of thought, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">legislative reform of, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in relation to happiness and character, <a href="#Page_487">487 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social aspects of, <a href="#Page_491">491 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">require ethical readjustment, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>, <a href="#Page_517">517-22</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">impersonal character, <a href="#Page_511">511 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical principles, <a href="#Page_514">514 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">unsettled problems, <a href="#Page_523">523-65</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Education, moral significance of, <a href="#Page_168">168 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">right to, <a href="#Page_446">446 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">restrictions upon, <a href="#Page_448">448 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a means of justice, <a href="#Page_548">548 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_557">557 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Egoism, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hedonistic, <a href="#Page_288">288-9</a> (see Chapter <a href="#Page_286">XV.</a>);</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">naturalistic theory of, <a href="#Page_368">368-74</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrasted with altruism, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">explanation of, <a href="#Page_377">377-81</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reasonable self-love, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Self, Individualism</span><br /> +<br /> +Ellis, H., <a href="#Page_584">584</a><br /> +<br /> +Eliot, George, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /> +<br /> +Emerson, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Footnote_201_201">446 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_581">581</a><br /> +<br /> +Empiricism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">discussion of, <a href="#Page_329">329-32</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Ends, and Means, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation of happiness to, <a href="#Page_273">273-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">utilitarian, conflicts with its hedonistic motive, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social and rational, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">kingdom of, <a href="#Page_315">315</a> and <a href="#Page_433">433</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Enlightenment, period of, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Epictetus, <a href="#Page_140">140</a><br /> +<br /> +Epicureans, theory of life, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on friendship, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Ethics, definition, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">derivation of term, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">specific problem of, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">method of, <a href="#Page_3">3-13</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<i>Ethos</i>, meaning, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chapter <a href="#Page_51">IV.</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Eudæmonism, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Happiness, Self-realization</span><br /> +<br /> +Euripides, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /> +<br /> +Evil, problem of, in Israel, <a href="#Page_100">100 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Excitement, and pleasure, <a href="#Page_408">408</a><br /> +<br /> +Ezekiel, on personal responsibility, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +"Fagan, J. O.," <a href="#Page_503">503</a><br /> +<br /> +Family, or Household Group, <a href="#Page_23">23-31</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as an agency in early society, <a href="#Page_47">47-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as affected by reflective morality, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and contract, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history of, <a href="#Page_571">571-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychological basis of, <a href="#Page_578">578-84</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">strain in, <a href="#Page_584">584-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">present factors of strain in, <a href="#Page_590">590-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the economic order, <a href="#Page_594">594-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">authority in, <a href="#Page_599">599-603</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and divorce, <a href="#Page_603">603-5</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Feelings, the hedonistic ultimate, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">an ambiguous term, <a href="#Page_249">249-51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mill on importance of, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Feud, see Blood Feud<br /> +<br /> +Fichte, <a href="#Page_490">490</a><br /> +<br /> +Fisher, G. P., <a href="#Page_143">143</a><br /> +<br /> +Fiske, John, <a href="#Page_581">581</a><br /> +<br /> +Franchises, abuses of, <a href="#Page_539">539</a><br /> +<br /> +Franciscans, <a href="#Page_149">149 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Francke, Kuno, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> +<br /> +Freedom, Pauline conception, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formal and real, <a href="#Page_158">158 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437-9</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_525">525 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_529">529</a>, <a href="#Page_549">549</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Rights</span><br /> +<br /> +Freund, E., <a href="#Page_555">555</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Galileo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> +<br /> +Genetic Method in Ethics, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> +<br /> +Gentleman, in Greece, <a href="#Page_116">116 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mediæval and class ideal of, <a href="#Page_144">144 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155-7</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Genung, J. F., <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> +<br /> +George, Henry, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_510">510 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Germans, customs of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">character and ideals, <a href="#Page_143">143 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">family among, <a href="#Page_575">575 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Golden Rule, <a href="#Page_334">334</a><br /> +<br /> +Good, the, as subject of ethics, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203-5</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origin of the conception of moral, <a href="#Page_183">183 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in group morality, <a href="#Page_69">69-72</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hebrew ideals of, <a href="#Page_107">107-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">significance in Greek thought, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek individualistic and hedonistic theories of, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_611" id="Page_611">[Pg 611]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plato on, <a href="#Page_131">131-4</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Aristotle on, <a href="#Page_134">134 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and modern civilization, <a href="#Page_154">154 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_557">557 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as happiness, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, Chapter <a href="#Page_263">XIV.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">private and general, <a href="#Page_289">289-300</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the true, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">good men as standard, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rational and sensuous, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">wealth as, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Happiness, Value</span><br /> +<br /> +Goodness, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formal and material, <a href="#Footnote_133_133">259 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of character, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and happiness, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and social interest, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">intrinsic, <a href="#Page_318">318-20</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and progress, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Virtue</span><br /> +<br /> +Government, distrust of, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform of, <a href="#Page_479">479-80</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also State</span><br /> +<br /> +Gray, J. H., <a href="#Page_17">17</a><br /> +<br /> +Greeks, early customs, <a href="#Page_18">18 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with Hebrews, <a href="#Page_91">91 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral development of, <a href="#Page_111">111-41</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Green, on duty, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on hedonism, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on practical value of utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_287">287-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on moral progress, <a href="#Page_429">429</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Grosscup, Judge, <a href="#Page_552">552</a><br /> +<br /> +Grote, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> +<br /> +Group ideal, mediæval, <a href="#Page_144">144 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Class Ideal</span><br /> +<br /> +Group Life, early, Chapter <a href="#Page_17">II.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">necessary to understand moral life, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">typical facts of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">kinship, <a href="#Page_21">21 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">family, <a href="#Page_23">23 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ownership of land in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">other economic aspects of, <a href="#Page_25">25 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">political aspects of, <a href="#Page_26">26-30</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rights and responsibilities of individual in, <a href="#Page_27">27-30</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">religious aspects of, <a href="#Page_30">30-2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">age and sex groups in, <a href="#Page_32">32-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral significance of, <a href="#Page_34">34 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Group Morality, <a href="#Page_34">34 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51 ff.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">values and defects of, <a href="#Page_68">68-73</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in early Hebrew life, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Middle Ages, <a href="#Page_144">144 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">persistence of, <a href="#Page_173">173-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in legal progress, <a href="#Page_456">456</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and international relations, <a href="#Page_481">481 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in industrial conflicts, <a href="#Page_500">500</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Habit, and character, <a href="#Page_9">9 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effect on knowledge, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effect upon desire, <a href="#Page_342">342-3</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Hadley, A. T., <a href="#Footnote_222_222">475 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_563">563</a><br /> +<br /> +Hammurabi, Code of, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_574">574</a><br /> +<br /> +Happiness, and pleasure, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ambiguity in conception of, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to desire, <a href="#Page_272">272-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as standard, <a href="#Page_275">275-80</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">elements in its constitution, <a href="#Page_281">281-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">final or moral, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and sympathy, <a href="#Page_300">300-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and efficiency, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">private and public, <a href="#Page_395">395-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Eudæmonism, Good</span><br /> +<br /> +Hazlitt, on Bentham, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on excitement, <a href="#Footnote_188_188">409 n.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Hearn, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br /> +<br /> +Hebrews, early morality, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral development, <a href="#Page_91">91-110</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with Greek, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Hedonism, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hebrew, <a href="#Page_106">106 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticism of, <a href="#Page_269">269-75</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">universalistic, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">egoistic character of, <a href="#Page_289">289-94</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kant's, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">paradox of, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its theory of duty, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Hegel, on institutional character of morals, <a href="#Page_225">225-6</a><br /> +<br /> +High-mindedness, Aristotle's description of, <a href="#Footnote_79_79">135 n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Hobhouse, L. T., on formation of custom, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on social order and individuality, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the family, <a href="#Page_575">575 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_577">577</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Höffding, <a href="#Footnote_125_125">253 n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Honesty, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a><br /> +<br /> +Honor, <a href="#Page_85">85-8</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> +<br /> +Hosea, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> +<br /> +Hospitality, in group morality, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> +<br /> +"How," the, in conduct, <a href="#Page_5">5-8</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in group morality, <a href="#Page_69">69 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Hebrew morality, <a href="#Page_102">102 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greek ethics, <a href="#Page_136">136 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Attitude</span><br /> +<br /> +Howard, <a href="#Page_576">576</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Ibsen, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_588">588</a><br /> +<br /> +Ideal, <i>vs.</i> actual in Greek thought, <a href="#Page_136">136-8</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">meaning of, <a href="#Page_421">421 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +India, customs of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_524">524</a><br /> +<br /> +Indians (American), <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_612" id="Page_612">[Pg 612]</a></span><br /> +Indifferent Acts, <a href="#Page_205">205-6</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210-11</a><br /> +<br /> +Individual, the, in early group life, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27-30</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">collision of with group, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184-7</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Hebrews, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development of, in modern civilization, <a href="#Page_148">148-69</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as affected by reflective morality, <a href="#Page_187">187-92</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and society, <a href="#Page_427">427-36</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to corporations</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and unions, <a href="#Page_500">500-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Individualism, Self</span><br /> +<br /> +Individualism, as factor in transition from custom to conscience, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">forces producing, <a href="#Page_76">76-87</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Israel, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greece, <a href="#Page_114">114-24</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greek ethical theory, <a href="#Page_124">124-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in modern world, <a href="#Page_149">149-63</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184-6</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220-3</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in ethical theory, <a href="#Page_225">225 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Carlyle's criticism of, <a href="#Page_265">265 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hedonistic, <a href="#Page_289">289 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as self-assertion, <a href="#Page_368">368-75</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">true and false, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">political formula of, <a href="#Page_483">483 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in economic theory, <a href="#Page_523">523-35</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">democratic, <a href="#Page_525">525</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"survival of the fittest," <a href="#Page_525">525</a>, <a href="#Page_532">532-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">values, <a href="#Page_527">527 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_548">548 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">does not secure real freedom, <a href="#Page_529">529</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nor justice, <a href="#Page_530">530 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_535">535</a>, <a href="#Page_546">546 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">other defects of, <a href="#Page_551">551 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in U. S. Constitution, <a href="#Page_534">534</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on "unearned increment," <a href="#Page_564">564 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in family, <a href="#Page_604">604</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Individual, Self</span><br /> +<br /> +Industry, as a rationalizing agency, <a href="#Page_39">39-42</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differentiation in, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a socializing agency, <a href="#Page_42">42 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">factor in effecting transition from custom to conscience, <a href="#Page_76">76-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern development of, <a href="#Page_155">155-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agencies of, <a href="#Page_497">497</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Initiation, in primitive tribes, <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br /> +<br /> +Institutions, <a href="#Page_192">192-5</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225-6</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Chapter <a href="#Page_427">XX.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Intention, and Motive, <a href="#Page_246">246-54</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257-8</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and accident, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459-60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Deliberation</span><br /> +<br /> +Intuitionalism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">discussion of, <a href="#Page_317">317-25</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and casuistry, <a href="#Page_325">325-8</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Ireland, ancient law of, <a href="#Page_24">24 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> +<br /> +Israel, moral development of, <a href="#Page_91">91-110</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +James, William, on the social self, <a href="#Page_85">85-7</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on animal activity, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on effect of emotion on ideas, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Japanese morality, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> +<br /> +Jesus, <a href="#Page_106">106 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> +<br /> +Job, moral theory in, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> +<br /> +Judgments, moral; see Moral<br /> +<br /> +Jural influence, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218-9</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353-6</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454-5</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467-8</a><br /> +<br /> +Justice, in primitive society, <a href="#Page_27">27 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as Hebrew ideal, <a href="#Page_94">94 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greek theory, <a href="#Page_113">113 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">natural and conventional, <a href="#Page_120">120 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as interest of the stronger, <a href="#Page_122">122-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern demand for, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and charity, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">virtue of, <a href="#Page_414">414-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development of civil, <a href="#Page_456">456-63</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formal and substantial, <a href="#Page_465">465 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_521">521</a>, <a href="#Page_556">556-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the new, <a href="#Page_496">496 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and individualism, <a href="#Page_530">530-5</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in distribution, theories of, <a href="#Page_545">545-50</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Kafirs, clanship among, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a><br /> +<br /> +Kant, on unsocial sociableness of man, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">forces of progress, <a href="#Page_87">87 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on dignity of man, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general standpoint, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">individualism of, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the "law of nature," <a href="#Footnote_109_109">222 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on moral law, <a href="#Page_228">228-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the Good Will, <a href="#Page_241">241-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his theory of will discussed, <a href="#Page_241">241-46</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on egoistic hedonism, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of practical reason, <a href="#Page_309">309-17</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of duty, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346-52</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on legality and morality, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">cf. also <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a>, <a href="#Page_580">580</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Kidd, Dudley, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a><br /> +<br /> +Kinship, <a href="#Page_21">21 ff.</a>; see Group Life<br /> +<br /> +Knowledge, place in morals, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theories of, <a href="#Page_231">231-2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">close connection with emotion, <a href="#Footnote_131_131">256 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">with character, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Chapter <a href="#Page_306">XVI.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kant's theory of, <a href="#Page_309">309-16</a>;</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_613" id="Page_613">[Pg 613]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">intuitional theory of, <a href="#Page_317">317-24</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">casuistical view, <a href="#Page_325">325-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">principles in, <a href="#Page_333">333-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and sympathy, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and conscience, <a href="#Page_418">418-23</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Labor, differentiation of, in early society, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the gentleman and, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">church and, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the law, <a href="#Page_504">504-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions of, <a href="#Page_540">540 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of women and children, <a href="#Page_540">540 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">exploitation of, <a href="#Page_542">542-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Prof. Seager's programme for benefit of, <a href="#Page_566">566 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Industry, Labor Union, Capital</span><br /> +<br /> +Labor Union, moral aspects of, <a href="#Page_499">499 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">revives group morality, <a href="#Page_500">500</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relations to the law, <a href="#Page_503">503 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">disadvantages of, <a href="#Page_503">503-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">violence of, <a href="#Page_541">541</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">open and closed shop, <a href="#Page_559">559 ff.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Laissez-faire, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a><br /> +<br /> +Land, "unearned increment," <a href="#Page_510">510 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_564">564 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Lankester, Ray, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> +<br /> +Law, as control in group life, <a href="#Page_59">59-63</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Hebrew moral development, <a href="#Page_95">95-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">righteousness of the, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek conceptions of, <a href="#Page_118">118-23</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of nature, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Roman, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and government, <a href="#Page_194">194 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as defining rights, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development of, <a href="#Page_456">456 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formal in, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">needed reforms in, <a href="#Page_468">468 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to corporations and unions, <a href="#Page_503">503-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">needed to embody and enforce moral standards, <a href="#Page_520">520 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral, see Jural;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Right; see Civil Society, Courts, Justice, Legal, State</span><br /> +<br /> +Legal and Moral, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454-5</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467-8</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also Jural, Law, Right</span><br /> +<br /> +Leibniz, <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br /> +<br /> +Levels of conduct, <a href="#Page_37">37-9</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> +<br /> +Liability, equals external responsibility, <a href="#Page_436">436</a><br /> +<br /> +Liberty, struggle for, <a href="#Page_84">84 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Freedom, Rights</span><br /> +<br /> +"Life," Hebrew and Christian moral ideal, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the moral as, <a href="#Page_606">606</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Locke, on natural rights, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the "natural light," <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his <i>Essay</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on danger of fixed rules, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Love, between the sexes, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychological analysis of, <a href="#Page_578">578 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as moral ideal, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Lubbock, <a href="#Page_428">428</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Machine, in production, <a href="#Page_507">507 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +MacLennan, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br /> +<br /> +Magic, contrasted with religion, <a href="#Footnote_15_15">30 n.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">influence on morals, <a href="#Page_457">457 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Taboos</span><br /> +<br /> +Maine, status and contract, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Slav families, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Mallock, W. H., <a href="#Page_533">533</a><br /> +<br /> +Marriage, regulations for, in group morality, <a href="#Page_64">64 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">violation of, provokes moral reflection, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in reflective morality, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and contract, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Roman, <a href="#Page_574">574 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">church views of, <a href="#Page_576">576 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Divorce, Family, Sex</span><br /> +<br /> +Marti, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> +<br /> +Mead, G. H., <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> +<br /> +Mean, Aristotle's conception of, <a href="#Page_134">134 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Measure, among Greeks, <a href="#Page_112">112 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Men's clubs and houses, <a href="#Page_32">32 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Micah, <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> +<br /> +Mill, John Stuart, on Bentham's method, <a href="#Footnote_119_119">235 n.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on motive and intention, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on disposition, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on partial and complete intent, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the desirable, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the quality of pleasure, <a href="#Page_279">279-80</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on utilitarian standard, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on general happiness, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticism of Bentham, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on desire for social unity, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on personal affections, <a href="#Footnote_154_154">299 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on general rules, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as democratic individualist, <a href="#Page_525">525</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on private property, <a href="#Page_553">553 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_556">556</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on equality in the family, <a href="#Page_601">601</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Monasticism, <a href="#Page_149">149 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">women under, <a href="#Page_576">576 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Moral, derivation of term, <a href="#Page_1">1 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">characteristics of, <a href="#Page_5">5-13</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201-11</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conceptions, derivation of, <a href="#Page_175">175-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differentiation of, <a href="#Page_177">177-92</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Morality</span><br /> +<br /> +Morality, customary or group, <a href="#Page_51">51 ff.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hebrew, <a href="#Page_91">91 ff.</a> (Chapter <a href="#Page_91">VI.</a>);</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_614" id="Page_614">[Pg 614]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek, <a href="#Page_111">111 ff.</a> (Chapter <a href="#Page_111">VII.</a>);</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Modern, <a href="#Page_142">142 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">customary and reflective, compared, <a href="#Page_171">171 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subjective and objective, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kant's view of, <a href="#Page_309">309-10</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social nature of, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and legality, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">changes in, necessitated by present economic conditions, <a href="#Page_496">496 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_517">517 ff.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Mores, or customs, Chapter <a href="#Page_51">IV.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">definition, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">authority and origin of, <a href="#Page_52">52-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">means of enforcing, <a href="#Page_54">54-7</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Moses, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> +<br /> +Motives, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in customary morality, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">purity of, insisted on by Hebrews, <a href="#Page_105">105 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to effort and achievement, <a href="#Page_243">243-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to intention, <a href="#Page_246">246-54</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257-8</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hedonistic theory of, criticized, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288-92</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sympathy as, <a href="#Page_298">298-300</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kantian view of, <a href="#Page_346">346-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">egoistic, <a href="#Page_379">379-80</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">altruistic, <a href="#Page_385">385-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in business, <a href="#Page_538">538</a>, <a href="#Page_541">541 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Naturalism, ethical, <a href="#Page_369">369-75</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and individualism, in the economic, <a href="#Page_525">525</a>, <a href="#Page_532">532-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Nature</span><br /> +<br /> +Nature, opposed to convention among Greeks, <a href="#Page_111">111 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124-31</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in modern development of rights, <a href="#Page_152">152 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">versus artificiality of society, <a href="#Page_221">221 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Naturalism</span><br /> +<br /> +Nemesis, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /> +<br /> +Newton, <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br /> +<br /> +Nietzsche, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Footnote_172_172">370 n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Nineteenth Century, development of intelligence in, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Obligations, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and responsibility, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and rights, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Duty</span><br /> +<br /> +Opportunity, equal, <a href="#Page_526">526 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_549">549</a><br /> +<br /> +Optimism and courage, <a href="#Page_412">412-3</a><br /> +<br /> +"Oregon case," decision of U. S. Supreme Court in, <a href="#Page_540">540</a><br /> +<br /> +Ought, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Duty</span><br /> +<br /> +Owen, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Paley, <a href="#Footnote_167_167">354 n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Parsifal, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> +<br /> +Parties, political, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> +<br /> +Paul, his ethics, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Peace, as moral ideal, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br /> +<br /> +Perfectionism, <a href="#Page_231">231</a><br /> +<br /> +Pessimism, and courage, <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br /> +<br /> +Pindar, <a href="#Page_122">122</a><br /> +<br /> +Plato, on the necessity of the moral sense, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral influence of art, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">duty to strangers, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on measure, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">religious critic, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the "gentleman," <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">presents arguments of individualists, <a href="#Page_120">120 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the State, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the good, <a href="#Page_131">131 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pleasure, <a href="#Page_132">132 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the ideal, <a href="#Page_136">136 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the self, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on rule of wealthy, <a href="#Page_491">491</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on private property, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Pleasure, good measured by, among early Hebrews, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek doctrines of, <a href="#Page_125">125 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not the object of desire, <a href="#Page_269">269-71</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">quality, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to happiness, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and sympathy, <a href="#Page_291">291-2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">control of, <a href="#Page_407">407-8</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Police Power, <a href="#Page_505">505-7</a>, <a href="#Page_540">540 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_555">555 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Pollock and Maitland, <a href="#Page_460">460</a>, <a href="#Page_576">576</a><br /> +<br /> +Post, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> +<br /> +Principles, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nature of, <a href="#Page_333">333-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as motives, <a href="#Page_350">350-2</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Problems of Moral Theory, Chapter <a href="#Page_212">XI.</a> (<a href="#Page_211">211-23</a>);<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classified, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214-5</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Production, moral cost of, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">efficiency of, in individualistic systems, <a href="#Page_527">527</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regulation of, <a href="#Page_528">528 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Property, in primitive groups, <a href="#Page_24">24-6</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">taboo as substitute for, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as factor in growth of individualism, <a href="#Page_79">79 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plato on, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the Church on, <a href="#Page_146">146 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and wealth, <a href="#Page_487">487 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and character, <a href="#Page_490">490</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social aspects of, <a href="#Page_491">491 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">private, and social welfare, <a href="#Page_493">493-5</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">implies public service, <a href="#Page_515">515-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">value of private, <a href="#Page_551">551</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defects in present system, <a href="#Page_551">551 ff.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Prophets, Hebrew, <a href="#Page_99">99 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Protagoras, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br /> +<br /> +Protestantism, conception of marriage, <a href="#Page_577">577</a><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_615" id="Page_615">[Pg 615]</a></span><br /> +Public Agency, theory of, <a href="#Page_525">525</a>, Chapter <a href="#Page_536">XXV.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">advantages claimed by, <a href="#Page_537">537 ff.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Public ownership, <a href="#Page_494">494 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Publicity, necessity of, <a href="#Page_511">511 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_520">520 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Punishment, as necessitating moral judgment, <a href="#Page_96">96 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">evil viewed as by Hebrews, <a href="#Page_96">96 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and duty, <a href="#Page_353">353-5</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and justice, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and social welfare, <a href="#Page_442">442-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and intent, <a href="#Page_461">461</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform of, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Puritans, conception of God-given rights, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of art, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">emphasized value of work, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Reason, as element in the moral, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40-2</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as standard among Greeks, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">age of, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Chapter <a href="#Page_306">XVI.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to desire, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>a priori</i> of Kant, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is social, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">value of principles, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and sympathy, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">opposition to desire, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and virtue, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and conscientiousness, <a href="#Page_418">418-23</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Religion, in early group life, <a href="#Page_30">30-2</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">socializing force, <a href="#Page_81">81 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral agency among Hebrews, <a href="#Page_94">94-102</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek, <a href="#Page_115">115 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139-41</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ideals of mediæval, <a href="#Page_145">145-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern development of, <a href="#Page_148">148-50</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and customary morality, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in reflective morality, <a href="#Page_195">195 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as sanction of the family, <a href="#Page_582">582</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Church.</span><br /> +<br /> +Renaissance, <a href="#Page_163">163 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Responsibility, collective, in group life, <a href="#Page_17">17-20</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development of personal, <a href="#Page_104">104 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">meaning of, <a href="#Page_436">436-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for accidents, <a href="#Page_458">458-60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for carelessness and negligence, <a href="#Page_463">463-5</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as affected by modern economic conditions, <a href="#Page_500">500-3</a>, <a href="#Page_519">519 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Reverence, <a href="#Footnote_15_15">30 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a><br /> +<br /> +Revolution, American, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">English, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">French, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Industrial, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_591">591</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Riehl, W., <a href="#Page_595">595</a><br /> +<br /> +Right, as subject of ethics and moral judgments, <a href="#Page_1">1-3</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201-3</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307 ff.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">meaning of, <a href="#Page_7">7 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as standard, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Hebrews as righteousness, <a href="#Page_102">102-4</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">among Greeks as justice, <a href="#Page_113">113 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also Jural, Justice, Law, Reason, Standard</span><br /> +<br /> +Righteousness, typical theme in Hebrew morality, <a href="#Page_91">91 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as justice, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Right, Justice</span><br /> +<br /> +Rights, development of, <a href="#Page_83">83 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151 ff.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">natural, <a href="#Page_152">152 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern assertion of, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and freedom, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and obligations, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">physical, <a href="#Page_442">442-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mental, <a href="#Page_445">445-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">civil, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contract, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of association, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to use of courts, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development of civil, <a href="#Page_456">456-66</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">political, <a href="#Page_473">473-4</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Ritual, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> +<br /> +Romanticists, on art and morality, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br /> +<br /> +Rome, government and law, contribution to modern morality of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">patriarchal family, <a href="#Page_572">572</a>, <a href="#Page_574">574 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Ross, E. A., <a href="#Page_520">520</a><br /> +<br /> +Rousseau, <a href="#Page_152">152 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> +<br /> +Rules, general, <a href="#Page_325">325-35</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and casuistry, <a href="#Page_326">326-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and legalism, <a href="#Page_328">328-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">utilitarian view of, <a href="#Page_329">329-32</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinguished from principles, <a href="#Page_333">333-4</a></span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Sanctions, Bentham's theory of, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">internal, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Sceptics, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> +<br /> +Schiller, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Kant, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> +<br /> +Schurtz, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> +<br /> +Science, as agency in effecting the transition from custom to conscience, <a href="#Page_78">78-80</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greek development, <a href="#Page_114">114-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in modern period, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">influence on morals, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as promoting justice, <a href="#Page_557">557-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and family problems, <a href="#Page_593">593 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_601">601-3</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Seager, Henry R., programme of social legislation, <a href="#Page_566">566 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Secret societies, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_616" id="Page_616">[Pg 616]</a></span><br /> +Seebohm, F., <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> +<br /> +Self, higher and lower, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social, how built up, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">individual and tribal or clan, <a href="#Page_23">23 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek conception of, <a href="#Page_138">138-41</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the twofold, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Arnold on, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kant on, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as social, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">fictitious theory of, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theories regarding its nature, see Chapter <a href="#Page_364">XVIII.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">self-denial, <a href="#Page_364">364-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">self-assertion, <a href="#Page_368">368-74</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">self-love and benevolence, <a href="#Page_375">375-91</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">self-realization, <a href="#Page_391">391-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Individual, Self-sacrifice</span><br /> +<br /> +Self-sacrifice, <a href="#Page_366">366-8</a>; cf. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298-304</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380-2</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388-91</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393-5</a><br /> +<br /> +Seneca, <a href="#Page_140">140</a><br /> +<br /> +Sense, moral, <a href="#Page_317">317-22</a><br /> +<br /> +Sex, groups on the basis of, <a href="#Page_32">32 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a socializing agency, <a href="#Page_47">47 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as prompting to self-assertion, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">taboos, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Hebrew conceptions, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in different standards for men and women, <a href="#Page_142">142 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">vices, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychology of, <a href="#Page_578">578-81</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differences between the sexes, <a href="#Page_584">584-8</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Shakspere, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a><br /> +<br /> +Shop, open <i>vs.</i> closed, <a href="#Page_559">559</a><br /> +<br /> +Simmons and Wigmore, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> +<br /> +Sidgwick, H., <a href="#Footnote_137_137">265 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> +<br /> +Sin, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br /> +<br /> +Slav groups, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> +<br /> +Slavery, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br /> +<br /> +Smith, Adam, on the formation of conscience, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sympathy, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Theory of Moral Sentiments</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as individualist, <a href="#Page_525">525</a>, <a href="#Page_527">527</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Smith, Arthur, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> +<br /> +Smith, H. P., <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> +<br /> +Smith, J. A., <a href="#Page_555">555</a><br /> +<br /> +Smith, Munroe, <a href="#Page_555">555 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Smith, W. Robertson, <a href="#Page_29">29 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Social Ends, of utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_287">287</a> (see Chapter <a href="#Page_286">XV.</a>), <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and happiness, <a href="#Page_302">302-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and rationality, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and duties, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and altruism, <a href="#Page_389">389-90</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and individuality, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Socialism, doctrine of, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_523">523</a>, <a href="#Page_525">525 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_535">535</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on production, <a href="#Page_537">537 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in decision of U. S. Supreme Court, <a href="#Page_556">556</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Public Agency, Collectivism, Individualism</span><br /> +<br /> +Socializing Process and Agencies, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a><br /> +<br /> +Socrates, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a><br /> +<br /> +Sophocles, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Spahr, C. B., <a href="#Page_545">545</a><br /> +<br /> +Spargo, John, <a href="#Page_543">543</a><br /> +<br /> +Speech, freedom of, <a href="#Page_446">446</a><br /> +<br /> +Spencer (Baldwin), and Gillen (F. B.), <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +Spencer, Herbert, on primitive morality, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on nature and morality, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conduct as indifferent and as ethical, <a href="#Page_205">205-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling as ultimate end, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on consequences, <a href="#Footnote_118_118">234 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on happiness <a href="#Footnote_137_137">265 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on duty, <a href="#Page_358">358-60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on æsthetic ingredients of happiness, <a href="#Footnote_174_174">374 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reward and merit, <a href="#Page_515">515</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on voluntary limitation of competition, <a href="#Page_532">532</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Spinoza, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Footnote_125_125">253 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Footnote_190_190">410 n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Standard, right as, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in group morality, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">custom as, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law of deity as, <a href="#Page_95">95-7</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">measure as, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">popular, in Greece, <a href="#Page_116">116 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">felt necessity of in Greece, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for pleasure, <a href="#Page_132">132 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the "mean" as, <a href="#Page_135">135 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">importance of, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">utilitarians confuse with object of desire, <a href="#Page_266">266-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">why necessary, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">happiness as, <a href="#Page_275">275-80</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general happiness as, Chapter <a href="#Page_286">XV.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the rational, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">revision of, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of political action, <a href="#Page_482">482-5</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Standard of living, <a href="#Page_503">503</a>, <a href="#Footnote_228_228">504 n.</a>, <a href="#Page_522">522</a>, <a href="#Page_540">540-2</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Professor Seager's programme for, <a href="#Page_566">566-70</a></span><br /> +<br /> +State, the, early group as germ of, <a href="#Page_26">26-30</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as bearer of moral ideals in Israel, <a href="#Page_92">92 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greece, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">authority challenged, <a href="#Page_118">118-24</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plato and Aristotle on, <a href="#Page_127">127-30</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Church, <a href="#Page_146">146 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral effect of organization of, <a href="#Page_194">194 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral value of, <a href="#Page_434">434-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Chapter <a href="#Page_451">XXI.</a></span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_617" id="Page_617">[Pg 617]</a></span><br /> +Stephen, on love of happiness, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on egoism, <a href="#Footnote_177_177">378 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">also <a href="#Footnote_137_137">265 n.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Stevenson, Mrs. M. C., <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> +<br /> +Stoics, the "wise man" of, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on following nature, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on inner self, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">natural law, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conflict between the moral and the actual order, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">cosmopolitanism, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on control of passions, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Sumner, on "mores," <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on luck, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on taboo, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Ethos, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">gladiatorial shows, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on relation between goodness and happiness, <a href="#Footnote_183_183">396 n.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Sutherland, <a href="#Page_48">48</a><br /> +<br /> +Sympathetic Resentment, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Sympathy</span><br /> +<br /> +Sympathy, as factor in socialization, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">fostered by art, <a href="#Page_45">45 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and family life, <a href="#Page_47">47 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and hospitality, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">when moral, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the moral judgment, <a href="#Footnote_83_83">141 n.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern development of, <a href="#Page_160">160 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bentham's view of, <a href="#Page_291">291-2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mill's view of, <a href="#Page_293">293-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">importance of, <a href="#Page_298">298-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">principle of knowledge, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and duty, <a href="#Page_348">348-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and efficiency, <a href="#Page_370">370-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and thoughtfulness, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Sympathetic Resentment</span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Taboos, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hebrew, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">survival of, in modern life, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Tariff, protective, <a href="#Page_560">560</a><br /> +<br /> +Taxation, <a href="#Page_555">555</a><br /> +<br /> +Teleological, types of moral theory, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Good, Value</span><br /> +<br /> +Temperance, <a href="#Page_405">405-10</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Greek view of, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Roman, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Christian, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Theodorus, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> +<br /> +Theory, relation to practice, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_606">606</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">types of, classified and discussed, <a href="#Page_224">224-39</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also Problems</span><br /> +<br /> +Thomas, W., <a href="#Page_584">584</a><br /> +<br /> +Thoreau, <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> +<br /> +Totem groups, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> +<br /> +Torts, <a href="#Page_455">455</a><br /> +<br /> +Toynbee, A., <a href="#Page_492">492</a><br /> +<br /> +Trades Unions, see Labor Union<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Unearned Increment, <a href="#Page_510">510 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_564">564 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +United States, individualism in, <a href="#Page_554">554</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Supreme Court decisions, <a href="#Page_555">555 f.</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Utilitarianism, relation of, to modern civilization, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of intention, <a href="#Page_246">246-52</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of the good, Chapters <a href="#Page_263">XIV.</a> and <a href="#Page_286">XV.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">method of, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">introduction of the idea of quality, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its social standard, Chapter <a href="#Page_286">XV.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of general rules, <a href="#Page_329">329-31</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of duty, <a href="#Page_353">353-61</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see also Bentham, Mill</span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Valuation, changed basis of, <a href="#Page_508">508-11</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Value</span><br /> +<br /> +Value, as "higher and lower," <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the good as, <a href="#Page_7">7 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">measure of, among Hebrews, <a href="#Page_107">107 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">question and standard of, among the Greeks, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in modern civilization, <a href="#Page_153">153-7</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">transformation of, <a href="#Page_186">186 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_558">558</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moral, and incompatible ends, <a href="#Page_207">207-9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and teleological theories, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Good Will, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Veblen, T. B., <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_515">515</a>, <a href="#Page_592">592</a><br /> +<br /> +Vices, of reflective stage of morality, <a href="#Page_189">189 ff.</a><br /> +<br /> +Virtue, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, Chapter <a href="#Page_399">XIX.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origin of term, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general meaning, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greek popular usage, <a href="#Page_117">117 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as "mean," <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as wisdom, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">highmindedness as, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">meaning in group morality, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"old-fashioned," <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, <a href="#Page_399">399-402</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classified, <a href="#Page_402">402-3</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">aspects of, <a href="#Page_403">403-4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">cardinal, <a href="#Page_405">405</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Voltaire, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> +<br /> +Voluntary Action, its nature, <a href="#Page_9">9 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essential to morality, <a href="#Page_12">12 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agencies tending to evoke, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">covenant as implying, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">fundamental, in Hebrew morality, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to moral theories, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_618" id="Page_618">[Pg 618]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">divided into "inner" and "outer," <a href="#Page_227">227-30</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237-9</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">place of motive and endeavor, <a href="#Page_243">243-6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">place of disposition, <a href="#Page_254">254-8</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and accident, <a href="#Page_459">459-60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Conduct</span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +War, as agency in development, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and right to life, <a href="#Page_442">442 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and organized humanity, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Wealth, in Israel, <a href="#Page_93">93 f.</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greece, <a href="#Page_119">119 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and property, <a href="#Page_487">487 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subordinate to personality, <a href="#Page_514">514</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">should depend on activity, <a href="#Page_514">514 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">implies public service, <a href="#Page_515">515-7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distribution of, <a href="#Page_521">521 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_545">545 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Property</span><br /> +<br /> +Welsh, kin group, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> +<br /> +Wergild, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> +<br /> +Westermarck, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a><br /> +<br /> +"What," the, meaning of, <a href="#Page_5">5-8</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in group morality, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Hebrew morality, <a href="#Page_102">102 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Greek theory, <a href="#Page_125">125 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to the "how" as outer to inner, <a href="#Page_228">228-39</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Attitude, Consequences, "How"</span><br /> +<br /> +Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> +<br /> +Windelband, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> +<br /> +Wisdom, as chief excellence or virtue with Plato, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Aristotle, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sceptics, Epicureans, and Stoics, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as standard for pleasure, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nurse of all the virtues, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as conscientiousness, <a href="#Page_418">418-23</a></span><br /> +<br /> +Woman, as "leisure class," <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as laborer, protection for, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_540">540</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the family, <a href="#Page_572">572 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subordination of, <a href="#Page_574">574 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">her temperamental and occupational distinction from man, <a href="#Page_584">584 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effect of industrial revolution upon, <a href="#Page_591">591 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and occupations, <a href="#Page_594">594 ff.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">determines consumption, <a href="#Page_598">598 f.</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">use of higher training for, <a href="#Page_599">599</a>, <a href="#Page_602">602</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see Family, Marriage, Sex</span><br /> +<br /> +Work, see Industry, Labor<br /> +<br /> +Worth, see Value<br /> +<br /> +Wyclif, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Xenophon, <a href="#Page_115">115 f.</a><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Zuñi ceremonies, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> +</p> +</div> + + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> + +<h2>American Science Series</h2> + + +<div class="iquot"> +<p class="caption">Physics.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">A. L. Kimball</span>, Professor in Amherst College.</p> + +<p class="caption">Physics.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">George F. Barker</span>.</p> + +<p class="caption">Chemistry.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">Ira Remsen</span>, President of the Johns Hopkins University.</p> + +<p class="caption">Astronomy.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">Simon Newcomb</span> and <span class="smcap">Edward S. Holden</span>.</p> + +<p class="caption">Geology.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">Thomas C. Chamberlin</span> and <span class="smcap">Rollin D. Salisbury</span>, Professors +in the University of Chicago.</p> + +<p class="caption">Physiography.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">Rollin D. Salisbury</span>, Professor in the University of Chicago.</p> + +<p class="caption">General Biology.</p> + +<p>By <span class="smcap">William T. Sedgwick</span>, Professor in the Mass. Institute, +and <span class="smcap">Edmund B. 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