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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: My Mission to London 1912-1914 + +Author: Prince Lichnowsky + +Release Date: April 15, 2012 [EBook #39457] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY MISSION TO LONDON 1912-1914 *** + + + + +Produced by James Wright and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Canada Team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + + + + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>————————————————————————————————————————<br /> +REVELATIONS OF THE LAST GERMAN<br /> +AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND<br /> +————————————————————————————————————————</h4> + + +<h1>MY MISSION TO<br /> +LONDON<br /> + +<small>1912-1914</small></h1> + +<h3>—————————————————————————————————<br /> +<small><small><i>By</i></small></small><br /> +PRINCE LICHNOWSKY<br /> +—————————————————————————————————</h3> + +<h5><i>With a Preface by</i><br /> +PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY</h5> + +<p><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /></p> + + +<h4>————————————————————————————————————————<br /> +NEW YORK: GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY<br /> +————————————————————————————————————————</h4> + +<p><small><small>PRICE TEN CENTS</small></small></p> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + +<div class="ads"> +<h1>MY MISSION TO<br /> +LONDON<br /> +<small>1912-1914</small></h1> + +<h4>————————————————————————————————————————</h4> + +<h3><small>BY</small><br /> +PRINCE LICHNOWSKY<br /> +<small><i>Late German Ambassador in England</i></small></h3> + +<h4>————————————————————————————————————————</h4> + +<h4><small>WITH A PREFACE BY</small><br /> +PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY<br /> +<small><i>Author of "The Policy of Sir Edward Grey," etc.</i></small></h4> + +<h4>————————————————————————————————————————</h4> + +<p><br /><br /><br /><br /></p> + +<h3>NEW YORK<br /> +GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY</h3> +<p><br /></p> +</div> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<p><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /></p> + +<p>==========================================================================</p> + +<h5>WITH THE COMPLIMENTS<br /> +OF<br /> +<big><big><span class="smcap">Professor W. Macneile Dixon</span></big></big><br /> +(UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW)</h5> + +<p><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /></p> + +<p class="address"><b><span class="smcap">Address:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em">8, BUCKINGHAM GATE,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 4em">LONDON, S. W., ONE,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 8.5em">ENGLAND.</span></b></p> + +<p>==========================================================================</p> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<p class="toc"> +<a href="#BIOGRAPHICAL_NOTE"><b>Biographical Note</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PREFACE"><b>Preface</b></a><br /> +<a href="#CONTENTS"><b>Contents</b></a></p> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="BIOGRAPHICAL_NOTE" id="BIOGRAPHICAL_NOTE"></a>BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE</h2> +<p><br /></p> + +<p>The author of the following pages, Karl Max, Prince +Lichnowsky, is a member of a family which holds estates +both in German and Austrian Silesia, and has an +hereditary seat in the Upper House of the Prussian +Diet. The father of the present Prince and his predecessor +in the title was a Prussian cavalry general, who, +at the end of his life, sat for some years in the Reichstag +as a member of the Free Conservative Party.</p> + +<p>His uncle, Prince Felix, was elected in 1848 to represent +Ratibor in the German National Assembly at +Frankfort-on-Main; he was an active member of the +Conservative wing, and during the September rising, +while riding with General Auerswald in the neighbourhood +of the city, was attacked and murdered by the +mob.</p> + +<p>The present Prince, after serving in the Prussian +army, in which he holds the rank of Major, entered the +diplomatic service. He was in 1885 for a short time attached +to the German Embassy in London, and afterwards +became Councillor of Embassy in Vienna. From +1899 to 1904 he was employed in the German Foreign +Office, and received the rank and title of Minister Plenipotentiary.</p> + +<p>In 1904 he retired to his Silesian estates, and, as he +states, lived for eight years the life of a country gentleman, +but read industriously and published occasional +political articles. He himself recounts the circumstances +in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on +the death of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein.</p> + +<p>Baron Marschall, who had been Secretary for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span> +Foreign Affairs under the Chancellorships of Count Caprivi +and for a time under Prince Hohenlohe, had achieved +great success as Ambassador at Constantinople, and also, +from the German point of view, as chief German Plenipotentiary +at the Second Hague Conference in 1907. +Baron Marschall was, to use an expression of Bismarck's, +"the best horse in Germany's diplomatic stable." And +great things were expected of him in London. But he +lived only a few months after his appointment.</p> + +<p>Prince Lichnowsky's high social rank, his agreeable +manners, and the generous hospitality which he showed +in Carlton House Terrace gave him a position in English +society which facilitated the negotiations between England +and Germany, and did much to diminish the friction +that had arisen during the time that Prince Bülow +held the post of German Chancellor.</p> + +<p>The pamphlet which is here translated gives an account +of his London mission; after his return to Germany +he has lived in retirement in the country, but has contributed +occasional articles to the Press. The pamphlet, +which was written in August, 1916, was not intended +for publication, but was distributed confidentially to a +few friends. The existence of it had long been known, +but it was only in March of this year that for the first +time extracts from it were published in the Swedish +paper <i>Politiken</i>. Longer extracts have since appeared +in the London Press; for the first time a complete +translation made from the German original is now placed +before the public.</p> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p>Never perhaps in history has the world seen so great +an exhibition, as at the outbreak of this war, of the +murderous and corrupting power of the organised lie. +All Germany outside the governmental circles was induced +to believe that the war was a treacherous attack, +plotted in the dark by "revengeful France, barbaric +Russia, and envious England," against the innocent +and peace-loving Fatherland. And the centre of the +plot was the Machiavellian Grey, who for long years +had been encircling and strangling Germany in order +at the chosen moment to deal her a death-blow from +behind. The Emperor, the princes, the ministers, the +bishops and chaplains, the historians and theologians, +in part consciously and in part innocently, vied with +one another in solemn attestations and ingenious forgeries +of evidence; and the people, docile by training and long +indoctrinated to the hatred of England, inevitably believed +and passionately exaggerated what they were told. +From this belief, in large part, came the strange brutalities +and ferocities of the common people of Germany +at the opening of the war, whether towards persons +who had a right to courtesy, like the Ambassadors, +or a claim on common human sympathy, like the +wounded and the prisoners. The German masses could +show no mercy towards people guilty of so hideous a +world-crime.</p> + +<p>And now comes evidence, which in normal times would +convince even the German nation, that the whole basis +of their belief was a structure of deliberate falsehood; +which shows that it was the Kaiser and his Ministers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> +who plotted the war; while it was England, and especially +Sir Edward Grey, who strove hardest for the +preservation of peace.</p> + +<p>It is the evidence of the German Ambassador in London +during the years 1912-1914, Prince Lichnowsky, +corroborated rather than confuted by the comments of +Herr von Jagow, who was Foreign Minister at the +time, and carried further by the recently published Memoranda +of Herr Mühlon, one of the directors of the +Krupp armament factory at Essen. One could hardly +imagine more convincing testimony. Will the German +people believe it? Would they believe now if one +rose from the dead?</p> + +<p>We cannot yet guess at the answer. Indeed, there is +another question which must be answered first: For +what motive, and with what possible change of policy +in view, has the German Government permitted the +publication of these papers and the circulation of Lichnowsky's +Memorandum as a pamphlet at 30 pfennig? +Do the militarists think their triumph is safe, and the +time come for them to throw off the mask? Or have +the opponents of militarism, who seemed so crushed, +succeeded in asserting their power? Is it a plan to +induce the ever docile German populace to hate England +less?</p> + +<p>It must be a startling story for the Germans, but for +us it contains little that is new. It is an absolute confirmation, +in spirit and in letter, of the British Blue Book +and of English books such as Mr. Headlam's "History +of Twelve Days" and Mr. Archer's "Thirteen Days." +Prince Lichnowsky's summing-up agrees exactly with +the British conclusions: The Germans encouraged Count +Berchtold to attack Serbia, well knowing the consequences +to expect; between the 23rd and 30th July they +rejected all forms of mediation; and on the 30th July, +when Austria wished to withdraw, they hastily sent an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> +ultimatum to Russia so as to make withdrawal impossible +(pp. 39-40). A ghastly story of blindness and +crime; but we knew it all before.</p> + +<p>Equally interesting is Prince Lichnowsky's account +of the policy of Germany and England before the war. +He confirms our knowledge of the "sinister vagueness" +of German policy in Morocco, the steady desire of +England to come to an understanding and of Germany +to elude an understanding. As for our alleged envy of +German trade, it was in English commercial circles that +the desire for an understanding with Germany was +strongest. As for our "policy of encirclement," it was +the deliberate aim of our policy, continuing the line of +Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, to facilitate rather +than hinder the legitimate and peaceful expansion of a +great force, which would become dangerous if suppressed +and confined.</p> + +<p>The test cases were the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese +Colonies. We agreed to make no objection to +Germany's buying them when Portugal was willing to +sell; we agreed in the meantime to treat them as a +German sphere of interest and not to compete for influence +there. We agreed, subject to the conservation +of existing British rights and to certain other safeguards, +to the completion of the great railway from the +Bosphorus to Basra, and to the recognition of the whole +district tapped by the railway as a German sphere of +interest. The two treaties, though completed, were never +signed; why? Because Grey would sign no secret treaty. +He insisted that they must be published. And the German +Government would not allow them to be published! +To Lichnowsky this seemed like mere spite on the part +of rivals who grudged his success, but we see now that +it was a deliberate policy. The war-makers could not +afford to let their people know the proof of England's +goodwill.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> + +<p>Lichnowsky was a friend of England, but he was no +pacifist or "little German." His policy was to favour +the peaceful expansion of Germany, in good understanding +with England and France, on the seas and in the +colonies. He aimed at "imperial development" on British +lines; he abhorred the "Triple Alliance policy" of +espousing Austria's quarrels, backing Turkey against the +Balkan States, intriguing against Russia, and seeing all +politics in the terms of European rivalries with a background +of war. His own policy was one which, if followed +loyally by the German Government, would have +avoided the war and saved Europe.</p> + +<p>There are one or two traits in Lichnowsky's language +which show that, with all his liberality of thought, he is +still a German. He accepts at once, on the report of a +German secret agent, the false statement that Grey had +concluded a secret treaty with France. He mentions, +as if it were a natural thing, the strange opinion that +the <i>Standard</i> was "apparently bought by Austria." He +describes Mr. Asquith as a pacifist and Sir Edward Grey +as both a pacifist and, ideally and practically, a Socialist. +One must remember the sort of views he was accustomed +to at Potsdam.</p> + +<p>There can be no doubt that Lichnowsky was deliberately +deceived by his Government, and not much that +he was chosen for his post in London with a view to +deceiving us. These things are all in gospel according +to Bernhardi. Lichnowsky himself was both an honest +and an able diplomatist, and there is the ring of sincerity +in his words of self-reproach: "I had to support in +London a policy the heresy of which I recognised. That +brought down vengeance on me, for it was a sin against +the Holy Ghost."</p> + +<p>If Grey, in the tangle of terrific problems that surrounded +him, ever erred, his sin was not against the +Holy Ghost. The attack made on him at the <a name="outset" id="outset">outset</a> of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> +the war by Radical idealists was easy to confute. If +ever a statesman strove, with due prudence, for peace, +for friendship between nations, for a transformation of +armed rivalries into cordial and democratic understandings, +our great English Minister was that man. He +was accused as a maker of secret treaties; and we find +him all through the times of peace, and through all times +when choice was still possible, a steady refuser of +secret treaties. He was accused as a seeker for territory; +and we find him, both in war and peace, steadily +opposing all territorial aggrandisement. Such was the +policy approved by the leaders of both English parties +before the war.</p> + +<p>It is an attack from the other side that now reaches +him. If the war had been short and successful, this +would not have occurred. But a long and bitter and +dangerous war of necessity creates its own atmosphere, +and the policy that was wisdom in 1913, when the world +was at peace and our relations with Germany were improving, +strikes us now perhaps as strangely trustful +and generous. Yet, if we try to recover that mental +calm without which the nations will never till the end +of time be able to restore their wasted wealth and rebuild +the shattered hopes of civilisation, I think most +Englishmen will agree that Grey's policy was, as we +all thought it at the time, the right and the wise policy. +To let all the world know that we would never join in +any attack on Germany, but would never permit any +attack on France; to seek to remove all causes of friction +between England and Germany, as they had been +removed between England and France and between England +and Russia; to extend the "Entente Cordiale" by +gradual steps to all nations who would come into it, and +to "bring the two groups of Europe nearer." This +was the right policy, whether it succeeded or failed;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> +and it will, in spirit at least, some day be the right +policy again.</p> + +<p>No Englishman, I think, will regret the generous courtesy +which sent off the German Ambassador with a guard +of honour, "like a departing sovereign." No one will regret +our Prime Minister's silent tears when the war became +inevitable, or Grey's conviction that it would be +"the greatest catastrophe in history"—not even if mad +German militarists drew the conclusion that the only +motive for such grief must be the fear of defeat. For +my own part I am glad that, at the last interview with +Lichnowsky, Grey assured him that, if ever a chance +came of mediation between the combatants, he would +take it, and that "we have never wished to crush Germany."</p> + +<p>Surely, even now in the crisis of the war, it is well +to remember these things. The cleaner our national conscience +the keener surely will be our will to victory. The +slower we were to give up the traditions of generosity +and trustfulness that came from our long security the +firmer will be our resolution to hold out, through whatever +martyrdom may be yet in store for us, until we or +our children can afford once more to live generously and +to trust our neighbours. In the long run no other life +is worth living.</p> + +<p class="author">G. M.</p> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> + +<p><br /></p> + +<table summary="Table of Contents" width="70%" border="0"> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td class="tdr"><small>PAGE</small></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">My Appointment</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#My_Appointment">1</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Morocco Policy</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Morocco_Policy">2</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Sir Edward Grey's Programme</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Sir_Edward_Greys_Programme">4</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Albanian Question</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Albanian_Question">5</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Near_East">7</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Conference of Ambassadors</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Conference_of_Ambassadors">10</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Balkan Conference</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Balkan_Conference">12</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Second Balkan War</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Second_Balkan_War">13</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Liman Von Sanders</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Liman_Von_Sanders">14</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Colonial Treaty</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Colonial_Treaty">15</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Bagdad Treaty</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Bagdad_Treaty">20</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Question of the Navy</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Question_of_the_Navy">21</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Commercial Jealousy</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Commercial_Jealousy">23</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Court and Society</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Court_and_Society">24</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Sir Edward Grey</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Sir_Edward_Grey">26</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Mr. Asquith</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Mr_Asquith">28</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap"><a name="Nicholson" id="Nicholson">Nicolson</a></span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Nicolson">29</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Tyrrell</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Tyrrell">30</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Attitude of the German Foreign Office</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Attitude_of_the_German_Foreign_Office">30</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">In Case of War</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#In_Case_of_War">31</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Serbian Crisis</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Serbian_Crisis">31</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The English Declaration of War</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_English_Declaration_of_War">37</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Retrospect</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Retrospect">38</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">My Return</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#My_Return">40</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Question of Responsibility</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Question_of_Responsibility">41</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">The Enemy Point of View</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#The_Enemy_Point_of_View">41</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Bismarck</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Bismarck">42</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><span class="smcap">Our Future</span></td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#Our_Future">43</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h1>MY MISSION TO LONDON<br /> + +<small>1912-14</small></h1> + +<h4><a name="My_Appointment" id="My_Appointment"></a><span class="smcap">My Appointment</span></h4> + +<p>In September, 1912, Baron Marschall died after he had +only been at his post in London for a few months. His +appointment, which no doubt was principally due to his +age and the desire of his junior officer to go to London, +was one of the many mistakes of our policy.</p> + +<p>In spite of his striking personality and great reputation, +he was too old and too tired to adjust himself to +the Anglo-Saxon world, which was completely alien to +him; he was rather an official and a lawyer than a +diplomat and statesman. From the very beginning he +was at great pains to convince the English of the harmlessness +of our fleet, and naturally this only produced +the contrary effect.</p> + +<p>Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in October. +I had retired to the country as a "Personalreferent" +after many years of activity, there being then no suitable +post available for me. I passed my time between flax +and turnips, among horses and meadows, read extensively, +and occasionally published political essays.</p> + +<p>Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen +since I had left the Embassy at Vienna with the rank +of Envoy. That had been my last real sphere of political +activity, as in those days such activity was impossible +unless one was prepared to help a half-crazy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +chief in drafting his crotchety orders with their crabbed +instructions.</p> + +<p>I do not know who was responsible for my being +appointed to London. It was certainly not due to H.M. +alone—I was not one of his intimates, though he was +at all times gracious to me. I also know by experience +that his nominees generally met with successful +opposition. Herr von Kiderlen had really wanted to +send Herr von Stumm to London! He immediately +manifested unmistakable ill-will towards me, and endeavoured +to intimidate me by his incivility. Herr von +Bethmann Hollweg was at that time kindly disposed +towards me, and had paid me a visit at Grätz only a +short time before. I am therefore inclined to think +that they all agreed on me because no other candidate +was available at the moment. But for Baron Marschall's +unexpected death, I should no more have been called +out of retirement then than at any other time during +all those previous years.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Morocco_Policy" id="Morocco_Policy"></a><span class="smcap">Morocco Policy</span></h4> + +<p>It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to +establish better relations with England. Our enigmatic +Morocco policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our +pacific intentions. At the very least, it had given rise +to the suspicion that we did not quite know what we +wanted, or that it was our object to keep Europe on +the <i>qui vive</i>, and, when opportunity offered, to humiliate +France. An Austrian colleague, who had been in Paris +for a long time, said to me: "Whenever the French +begin to forget about <i>revanche</i>, you always remind them +of it with a jack-boot."</p> + +<p>After we had repulsed M. Delcassé's efforts to arrive +at an understanding with us about Morocco, and prior +to that had formally declared that we had no political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +interests there—which conformed to the traditions of +the Bismarckian policy—we suddenly discovered a second +Krüger in Abdul Aziz. We assured him also, like +the Boers, of the protection of the mighty German +Empire, with the same display and the same result; +both demonstrations terminated with our retreat, as +they were bound to do, if we had not already made up +our minds to embark on the world-war. The distressing +congress at Algeçiras could not change this in any way, +still less the fall of M. Delcassé.</p> + +<p>Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later +the Anglo-Japanese <i>rapprochement</i>. In face of "the German +Peril" all other differences faded into the background. +The possibility of a new Franco-German war +had become apparent, and such a war could not, as in +1870, leave either Russia or England unaffected.</p> + +<p>The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown +at Algeçiras, while that of the agreements arrived at +there was demonstrated shortly afterwards by the collapse +of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not be +prevented. Among the German people, however, the belief +gained ground that our foreign policy was feeble +and was giving way before the "Encirclement"—that +high-sounding phrases were succeeded by pusillanimous +surrender.</p> + +<p>It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is +otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he wound up +our Moroccan inheritance and accepted as they were +the facts that could no longer be altered. Whether, +indeed, it was necessary to alarm the world by the +Agadir incident I will leave others to say. It was jubilantly +acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused all the +more disquiet in England because the Government were +kept waiting for three weeks for an explanation of +our intentions. Lloyd George's speech, which was meant +as a warning to us, was the consequence. Before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +Delcassé's fall, and before Algeçiras, we might have had a +harbour and territory on the West Coast, but after +those events it was impossible.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Sir_Edward_Greys_Programme" id="Sir_Edward_Greys_Programme"></a><span class="smcap">Sir Edward Grey's Programme</span></h4> + +<p>When I came to London in November, 1912, the excitement +over Morocco had subsided, as an agreement +with France had been reached in Berlin. It is true +that Haldane's mission had failed, as we had required +the assurance of neutrality, instead of being content +with a treaty securing us against British attacks and +attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward Grey +had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an agreement +with us, and in the first place tried to do this in +colonial and economic questions. Conversations were +in progress with the capable and business-like Envoy +von Kühlmann concerning the renewal of the Portuguese +colonial agreement and Mesopotamia (<a name="Bagdad_Railway" id="Bagdad_Railway">Bagdad Railway</a>), +the unavowed object of which was to divide both the +colonies and Asia Minor into spheres of influence.</p> + +<p>The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding +points of difference with France and Russia, +wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not +his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power +to make us partners in the existing association. As +he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian +differences, so he also wished to do his +best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a network +of treaties, which would in the end no doubt have led +to an agreement about the troublesome question of naval +armaments, to ensure the peace of the world, after our +previous policy had led to an association—the Entente—which +represented a mutual insurance against the risk +of war.</p> + +<p>This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words: Without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +interfering with our existing friendship with France +and Russia, which has no aggressive aims and does not +entail any binding obligations on England, to arrive at +a friendly <i>rapprochement</i> and understanding with Germany, +"to bring the two groups nearer."</p> + +<p>As with us, there were two parties in England at that +time—the Optimists, who believed in an understanding, +and the Pessimists, who thought that sooner or later war +was inevitable.</p> + +<p>The former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord +Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet; +also the leading Liberal papers, such as the <i>Westminster +Gazette</i>, <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, <i>Daily Chronicle</i>. +The Pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like +Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made this clear to me; +also leading Army men, like Lord Roberts, who pointed +out the necessity of universal military service ("The +Writing on the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe Press +and the eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin, of <i>The +Observer</i>. During my period of office, however, they +abstained from all attacks, and maintained both personally +and politically a friendly attitude. But our naval +policy and our attitude in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had +aroused in them the conviction that after all it would +some day come to war. Just as it is with us, the former +are now being accused in England of short-sightedness +and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as the +true prophets.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Albanian_Question" id="The_Albanian_Question"></a><span class="smcap">The Albanian Question</span></h4> + +<p>The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey +and thus to a defeat for our policy, which had been +identified with Turkey for a number of years. Since +Turkey in Europe could no longer be saved, there were +two ways in which we could deal with the inheritance:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +either we could declare our complete disinterestedness +with regard to the frontier delimitations and leave the +Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could support our +"Allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the +Near East, thus giving up the rôle of mediator.</p> + +<p>From the very beginning I advocated the former +course, but the Foreign Office emphatically favoured the +latter.</p> + +<p>The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies +desired the establishment of an independent Albanian +state, as the Austrians did not want the Serbs to obtain +access to the Adriatic, and the Italians did not want the +Greeks to get to Valona or even to the north of Corfu. +As opposed to this, Russia, as is known, was backing +Serbia's wishes and France those of Greece.</p> + +<p>My advice was to treat this question as outside the +scope of the Alliance, and to support neither the Austrian +nor the Italian claims. Without our aid it would have +been impossible to set up an independent Albania, which, +as anyone could foresee, had no prospect of surviving; +Serbia would have extended to the sea, and the present +world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy +would have quarrelled over Greece, and if the Italians +had not wanted to fight France unaided they would have +been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to +the north of Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is +Hellenic. The towns in the south are entirely so; and +during the Conference of Ambassadors delegations from +principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation +to Greece. Even in present-day Greece there are Albanian +elements and the so-called Greek national dress +is of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the Albanians, +who are principally Orthodox and Moslem, in the body +of the Greek state was therefore the best and most +natural solution, if you left Scutari and the north to +the Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons H.M.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +was also in favour of this solution. When I supported +this view in a letter to the monarch I received agitated +reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the +reputation of being "an opponent of Austria," and I was +to abstain from such interference and direct correspondence.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Near_East" id="The_Near_East"></a><span class="smcap">The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance</span></h4> + +<p>We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition +of pursuing a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East +also, and have recognised our mistake, which lay in identifying +ourselves in the south with the Turks and in the +north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of +this policy, upon which we had entered at the Berlin +Congress, and which we had actively pursued ever since, +was bound to lead in time to a conflict with Russia and +to the world-war, more especially if the requisite cleverness +were lacking in high places. Instead of coming +to terms with Russia on a basis of the independence of +the Sultan, whom even Petrograd did not wish to eject +from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to our +economic interests in the Near East and to the partitioning +of Asia Minor into spheres of influence while renouncing +any intention of military or political interference, +it was our political ambition to dominate on the +Bosphorus. In Russia they began to think that the road +to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay <i>via</i> Berlin. +Instead of supporting the active development of the Balkan +States—which, once liberated, are anything rather +than Russian, and with which our experiences had been +very satisfactory—we took sides with the Turkish and +Magyar oppressors.</p> + +<p>The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near +East policy—which had forced Russia, our natural best<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> +friend and neighbour, into the arms of France and England +and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion—was +the more apparent, as a Franco-Russian attack, +which was the <i>sole</i> hypothesis that justified a Triple +Alliance policy, could be left out of our calculations.</p> + +<p>The value of the Italian alliance needs no further reference. +Italy will want our money and our tourists even +after the war, with or without an alliance. That this +latter would fail us in case of war was patent beforehand. +Hence the alliance had <i>no value</i>. Austria needs +our protection in war, as in peace, and has no other support. +Her dependence on us is based on political, national, +and economic considerations, and is the greater +the more intimate our relations with Russia are. The +Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since the days of Count +Beust no Vienna Minister has adopted such a self-confident +attitude towards us as Count Aehrenthal during +the later years of his life. If German policy is conducted +on right lines, cultivating relations with Russia, +Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, +even without an alliance or recompense; if it is wrongly +conducted, then we are dependent on Austria. Hence +there was <i>no reason</i> for the alliance.</p> + +<p>I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return +to the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count +Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable there. Little as the +Slavs there love us, just as little do they wish to return +into a German Empire even with a Habsburg-Lorraine +emperor at its head. They are striving for a federation +in Austria on national lines, a state of things which +would have even less chance of being realised within the +German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Germans +of Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as the +centre of German Might and Culture, and are well aware +that Austria can never again be the leading Power. +They wish for as intimate a connection with the German<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> +Empire as possible, not for an anti-German policy.</p> + +<p>Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally +changed in Austria, as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a +return to Great German separatism and old Bavarian +policy is not to be feared, so with the former a resuscitation +of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg +was not to be expected. By a federation with Austria, +however, which resembles a big Belgium, since its +population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only +about half Germanic, our interests would suffer as +much as if we subordinated our policy to the views of +Vienna or Budapest—thus espousing Austria's quarrels +("<i>d'épouser les querelles d'Autriche</i>").</p> + +<p>Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the +desires of our ally; they were not only unnecessary but +also dangerous, as they would lead to a conflict with +Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through Austrian +spectacles.</p> + +<p>The development of the alliance, from a union formed +on a single hypothesis for a single specific purpose, into +a general and unlimited association, a pooling of interests +in all spheres, was the best way of producing that +which diplomacy was designed to prevent—war. Such +an "alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from +us the sympathies of the strong, young, rising communities +in the Balkans, who were prepared to turn to us +and to open their markets to us.</p> + +<p>The difference between the power of a Ruling House +and a National State, between dynastic and democratic +ideas of government, had to be decided, and as usual +we were on the wrong side.</p> + +<p>King Carol told one of our representatives that he had +entered into the alliance with us on the assumption that +we retained the leadership; but if this passed to Austria, +that would alter the foundations of the relationship, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +under such circumstances he would not be able to go on +with it.</p> + +<p>Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our +own economic interests, we were supporting the Austrian +policy of strangulation.</p> + +<p>Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose +breakdown could have been foreseen: Krüger, Abdul +Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, ending—the most +fatal of all mistakes—with the great plunge on the Berchtold +stable.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Conference_of_Ambassadors" id="The_Conference_of_Ambassadors"></a><span class="smcap">The Conference of Ambassadors</span></h4> + +<p>Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, +Sir E. Grey proposed an informal conversation to prevent +the Balkan War developing into a European one, +after we had unfortunately refused, on the outbreak +of the war, to agree to the French proposal of a declaration +of disinterestedness. The British statesman +from the very beginning took up the position that England +had no interest in Albania, and had no intention +of going to war over this question. He merely wished +to mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker" +and smooth over difficulties. He therefore by no means +took sides with the Entente, and during the eight months +or so of the negotiations his goodwill and his authoritative +influence contributed in no small degree to the +attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting +an attitude similar to the English one, invariably took +up the position which was prescribed for us by Vienna. +Count Mensdorff was the leader of the Triple Alliance +in London; I was his "second." It was my duty to +support his proposals. That clever and experienced man +Count Szögyenyi was conducting affairs in Berlin. His +refrain was "Then the <i>casus fœderis</i> will arise," and +when I once ventured to doubt the truth of this conclusion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> +I was severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." +It was also said that I had an "hereditary weakness"—the +allusion being to my father.</p> + +<p>On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy—about +Albania, a Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, +and also about the delimitation of the frontiers of +Albania—while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the +French or Russian claims. He mostly supported our +group in order not to give a pretext like the one a dead +Archduke was to furnish later on. Thus with his assistance +it was possible to coax King Nikita out of +Scutari again. Otherwise this question would already +have led to a world-war, as we should certainly not have +ventured to induce "our ally" to give way.</p> + +<p>Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, +calm, and tact. When a question threatened to +become involved, he sketched a formula for agreement +which was to the point and was always accepted. His +personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged +from one of those trials of strength which characterise +our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us +on all points, as she was never in a position to procure +success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established +as a vassal state of Austria and Serbia was pressed +back from the sea. Hence this conference resulted in a +fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878 +and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although +no <i>German</i> interests were involved. Bismarck was clever +enough to mitigate the mistake of the Congress by the +secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg question; +but we continued to pursue in London the dangerous +path, upon which we had once more entered in the +Bosnian question, nor did we leave it in time when it led +to the precipice.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> + +<p>The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time +was shown during the conference by attacks in the Russian +Press against my Russian colleague and Russian +diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital of his +German descent and Roman Catholicism, his reputation +as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was +related both to Count Mensdorff and to me. Without +possessing a very distinguished personality, Count Benckendorff +is endowed with a number of qualifications that +distinguish a good diplomat—tact, polished manners, experience, +courtesy, and a natural eye for men and matters. +He was always at pains to avoid a brusque attitude, +and was supported in this by England and France.</p> + +<p>Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Russian +feeling is very anti-German." He replied: "There +are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, +but in general people are anti-Austrian."</p> + +<p>It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie à +outrance" (friendship for Austria through thick and +thin) was hardly calculated to loosen the Entente and to +direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests!</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Balkan_Conference" id="The_Balkan_Conference"></a><span class="smcap">The Balkan Conference</span></h4> + +<p>At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting +in London and I had occasion to come into contact with +the leaders of the Balkan States. M. Venizelos was certainly +the most distinguished personality. At that time +he was anything rather than anti-German, and visited +me several times; he was especially fond of wearing the +ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle—he even wore it +at the French Embassy. His prepossessing charm and +ways of a man of the world secured him much sympathy. +Next to him M. Daneff, at that time Bulgarian Premier +and confidant of Count Berchtold, played a great part. +He gave the impression of a subtle and energetic man,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> +and it is probably only due to the influence of his Vienna +and Budapest friends, of whose homage he often made +fun, that he was induced to commit the folly of entering +upon the second Balkan War and of refusing Russian +arbitration.</p> + +<p>M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London and +then visited me regularly. I knew him from the time +when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one +of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was +endeavouring to obtain concessions to Rumania from +M. Daneff by means of negotiations, in which he was +assisted by the very able Rumanian Ambassador Misu. +It is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about +the failure of these negotiations. Count Berchtold (and +we of course with him) was entirely on Bulgaria's side, +otherwise by putting pressure on M. Daneff we might +have secured the desired satisfaction for Rumania and +placed her under an obligation to us; she was finally +estranged from the Central Powers by Austria's attitude +during and after the second Balkan War.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Second_Balkan_War" id="The_Second_Balkan_War"></a><span class="smcap">The Second Balkan War</span></h4> + +<p>The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War +and the victory of Serbia, with the Rumanian invasion, +naturally constituted a humiliation for Austria. The +plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia +seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon after. The +Italian revelations prove this, and it may be assumed +that Marquis San Giuliano, who described the plan—most +aptly—as a <i>pericolosissima aventura</i>, saved us from being +involved in a world-war as early as the summer of 1913.</p> + +<p>Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the +Vienna plan was doubtless known in Petrograd. In +any case, M. Sazonow openly declared at Constanza, +as M. Take Jonescu told me, that an Austrian attack on +Serbia would be a <i>casus belli</i> for Russia.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span></p> + +<p>When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna +in the spring of 1914 he said that Herr von Tschirschky +had declared that there would soon be war. As I, however, +was always left in ignorance about important events +I considered this pessimism to be unfounded.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since +the peace of Bucharest, Vienna was bent on securing +a revision of the treaty by her own effort and was +apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext. Vienna +statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. +They were aware of that, as they had been repeatedly +accused of lack of firmness. In fact, Berlin was pressing +for a "rehabilitation of Austria."</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Liman_Von_Sanders" id="Liman_Von_Sanders"></a><span class="smcap">Liman Von Sanders</span></h4> + +<p>When I returned to London in December, 1913, from +a lengthy leave, the Liman von Sanders question had +led to a fresh crisis in our relations with Russia. Sir +E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the +excitement there was in Petrograd over it: "I have never +seen them so excited."</p> + +<p>I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister +to exert a restraining influence in Petrograd, and +to assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward gladly +did this, and his intervention contributed in no small +degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations +with Sir Edward and his great influence in Petrograd +were repeatedly made use of in similar manner when we +wished to attain anything there, as our representative +proved himself quite useless for such a purpose.</p> + +<p>During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward +said to me: "When you want to obtain anything in +Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I appeal to you +for your influence in Vienna you fail me."</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Colonial_Treaty" id="The_Colonial_Treaty"></a><span class="smcap">The Colonial Treaty</span></h4> + +<p>The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded +in establishing, not only with society and the +most influential people like Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, +but also with the great public at public dinners, produced +a marked improvement in the relations of the two +countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm this +<i>rapprochement</i>, and his intentions were most apparent on +two questions—the Colonial and the Bagdad Railway +Treaties.</p> + +<p>In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a +secret agreement dividing the Portuguese colonies into +economic spheres of influence between us and England. +As the Government of Portugal had neither the power +nor the means to open up her extended possessions or to +administer them properly, she had already thought of +selling them before and thus relieving her financial burdens. +An agreement had been come to between us and +England which defined the interests of both parties, and +which was of the greater value because Portugal is entirely +dependent on England, as is generally known.</p> + +<p>On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard +the integrity and independence of the Portuguese State, +and merely declared the intention of being of financial +and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Literally, +therefore, it did not contravene the ancient Anglo-Portuguese +Alliance of the fifteenth century, which was last +renewed under Charles II. and gave a reciprocal territorial +guarantee.</p> + +<p>In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis +Soveral, who was presumably aware of the Anglo-German +agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Treaty of +Windsor—was concluded between England and Portugal +in 1899, confirming the old agreements, which had always +remained in force.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span></p> + +<p>The object of negotiations between us and England, +which had commenced before my arrival, was to amend +and improve our agreement of 1898, as it had proved +unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical +delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of +the British Government I succeeded in making the new +agreement fully accord with our wishes and interests. +The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude +was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo +State from the south; we also acquired the valuable +islands of San Thomé and Principe, which are north of +the Equator and therefore really in the French sphere of +influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to +enter strong but unavailing protests.</p> + +<p>Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; +the Licango formed the border.</p> + +<p>The British Government showed the greatest consideration +for our interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended +to demonstrate his goodwill towards us, but he +also wished to assist our colonial development as a +whole, as England hoped to divert the German development +of strength from the North Sea and Western +Europe to the Ocean and to Africa. "We don't want +to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member +of the Cabinet said to me.</p> + +<p>The British Government originally intended to include +the Congo State in the agreement, which would have +given us the right of pre-emption and enabled us to +penetrate it economically. We refused this offer nominally +in view of Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps we +wished to be economical of successes? With regard also +to the practical realisation of its real though unexpressed +intention—the later actual partition of the Portuguese +colonies—the treaty in its new form showed marked improvements +and advantages as compared with the old +one. Cases had been specified which empowered us to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> +take steps to guard our interests in the districts assigned +to us. These were couched in such a manner +that it was really left to us to decide when "vital" interests +arose, so that, with Portugal entirely dependent on +England, it was only necessary to cultivate further good +relations with England in order to carry out our joint +intentions at a later date with English assent.</p> + +<p>Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's +desire to respect our rights by referring to us +Englishmen who wished to invest capital and asked for +the support of the British Government in the districts +assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this +was completed and signed, and by informing them that +their enterprise belonged to our sphere of influence.</p> + +<p>The agreement was practically completed at the time +of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At that +time a conference took place in Berlin under the presidency +of the Imperial Chancellor; in this conference I +also took part, and certain further wishes of ours were +defined. On my return to London I succeeded, with the +assistance of Councillor of Legation von Kühlmann, who +was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker, in having +our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole agreement +could be paragraphed by Sir E. Grey and by me +in August, 1913, before I went on leave.</p> + +<p>But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented its +being signed, and I did not obtain the authorisation to +conclude it till a year later—that is, shortly before the +outbreak of the war. It was, however, never signed.</p> + +<p>Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign <i>if the agreement +were published together with those of 1898 and 1899</i>. +England had, as he said, no other secret treaties besides +these, and it was contrary to established principles to +keep binding agreements secret. Therefore he could not +make any agreement without publishing it. He was, +however, willing to accede to our wishes with regard to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +the time and manner of publication, provided that such +publication took place within one year from the date of +signature.</p> + +<p>At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had +caused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential +personage, who acted the part of Herr von Holstein, +wanted the London post for himself, I was informed that +the publication would endanger our interests in the colonies, +as the Portuguese would then not give us any more +concessions.</p> + +<p>The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration +that the Portuguese, in view of the closeness +of Anglo-Portuguese relations, were most probably just +as well aware of the old agreement as of our new arrangements, +and that the influence which England possesses +at Lisbon renders their Government completely impotent +in face of an Anglo-German agreement.</p> + +<p>Another pretext had therefore to be found for wrecking +the treaty. It was suggested that the publication of +the Treaty of Windsor, which had been concluded during +the time of Prince Hohenlohe—though it was only a +renewal of the Treaty of Charles II., which had always +remained in force—might endanger the position of Herr +von Bethmann Hollweg, as a proof of British hypocrisy +and perfidy!</p> + +<p>I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed +the same thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as +other similar treaties, namely, that we would protect the +sovereign rights of Portugal and the inviolability of its +possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated discussions +with Sir E. Grey, at which he made many fresh suggestions +for the publication, the Foreign Office persisted +in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir E. Goschen +that matters should be left as they were!</p> + +<p>The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> +the result of more than a year's work, was thus dropped +because it would have been a public success for me.</p> + +<p>When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a +dinner at the Embassy in the spring of 1914, the Minister +for the Colonies told me that he was placed in a difficult +position, and did not know how to act. The present +position was intolerable—he wished to safeguard our interests, +but was in doubt whether he should proceed on +the terms of the old or the new treaty. It was therefore +urgently desirable to clear up the situation and to settle +the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time.</p> + +<p>In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instructions +couched in terms which showed more emotion than +civility, telling me to abstain from any further interference +in the matter.</p> + +<p>I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin +and place my post at the disposal of the monarch, and +that I had not lost faith in the possibility of arriving at +an understanding with those in authority, a sinister mistake +which was to take its revenge a few months later +in such a tragical way.</p> + +<p>However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the +highest official of the Empire, as he feared that I was +aspiring to his post, yet I must in justice to him say +that during our last interview before the outbreak of +war, at the end of June, 1914, to which I will refer later, +he gave me his assent for the signature and publication +of the treaty. In spite of this it required repeated applications +on my part, which were supported by Herr +Dr. Solf in Berlin, before sanction was finally obtained +at the end of July, 1914. As the Serbian crisis at that +time already imperilled the peace of Europe, the completion +of the treaty had to be postponed. It also is one +of the sacrifices of this war.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Bagdad_Treaty" id="The_Bagdad_Treaty"></a><span class="smcap">The Bagdad Treaty</span></h4> + +<p>At the same time I was negotiating in London, with +the able support of Herr von Kühlmann, about the so-called +Bagdad Treaty. The real object of this was to +divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although +this term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights +of the Sultan. Sir E. Grey also repeatedly stated that +there were in existence no agreements with France and +Russia about the partition of Asia Minor.</p> + +<p>In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki +Pasha, all economic questions concerning German undertakings +were settled in the main according to the wishes +of the Deutsche Bank. The most important concession +Sir E. Grey made to me personally was the continuation +of the railway as far as Basra. We had dropped this +point in favour of the connection to Alexandretta; up to +that time Bagdad had been the terminal point of the +railway. An international commission was to regulate +navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have +a share in the harbour works at Basra, and received +rights for the navigation of the Tigris, which hitherto +had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.</p> + +<p>By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as +Basra was included within our sphere of influence (without +prejudice to already existing British navigation rights +on the Tigris and the rights of the Wilcox irrigation +works), as well as the whole district of the Bagdad and +Anatolian railway.</p> + +<p>The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin +railway were recognised as the British economic sphere, +Syria as the French, and Armenia as the Russian. If +both treaties were executed and published, an agreement +with England would be reached which would preclude +all doubts about the possibility of an "Anglo-German +co-operation."</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Question_of_the_Navy" id="The_Question_of_the_Navy"></a><span class="smcap">The Question of the Navy</span></h4> + +<p>The Naval question was and is the most delicate of +all. It is not always regarded rightly.</p> + +<p>The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of +the North Sea—the development of the greatest military +power of the Continent into the greatest naval power as +well—was bound to be felt in England as at least "inconvenient." +There can be no doubt about this in any +reasonable view. In order to maintain her advantage +and not to become dependent, in order to secure the +rule over the seas which is necessary for her if she +is not to starve, she was compelled to undertake armaments +and expenditure which weighed heavily on the tax-payer. +England's international position would be threatened, +however, if our policy created the belief that warlike +developments might ensue—a state of affairs which +had almost been reached during the time of the Morocco +crises and the Bosnian problem.</p> + +<p>Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet <i>within +its then appointed limits</i>, but it was certainly not welcome, +and was one of the causes—though not the only +cause and perhaps not the most important—of her adhesion +to France and Russia; but on account of the fleet +<i>alone</i> England would not have drawn the sword any +more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged +to have produced jealousy and finally war.</p> + +<p>From the very beginning I maintained that, <i>notwithstanding</i> +the fleet, it would be possible to arrive at a +friendly understanding and <i>rapprochement</i> if we did not +introduce a new Navy Bill and <i>our policy were indubitably +pacific</i>. I also avoided mention of the fleet and the +word never passed between Sir E. Grey and me. On +one occasion Sir E. Grey said at a meeting of the Cabinet, +"The present German Ambassador has never mentioned +the fleet to me."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span></p> + +<p>During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, then First +Lord of the Admiralty, proposed, as is known, the so-called +"Naval holiday" and suggested for financial reasons, +and probably also to meet the pacific wishes of his +party, a year's pause in armaments. Officially Sir E. +Grey did not support the proposal; he never mentioned +it to me, but Mr. Churchill repeatedly spoke to +me about it.</p> + +<p>I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as prevarication +is altogether foreign to English nature. It +would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill if +he could have come before the country with reductions +of expenditure and freed it from the nightmare of armaments +that weighed on the people.</p> + +<p>I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult +to agree to his plan. What was to become of the +workmen who were engaged for this purpose, and what +of the technical staff? Our Naval programme had been +decided on, and it would be difficult to alter it in any +way. On the other hand we had no intention of exceeding +it. But he reverted to it again and pointed out that +the sums used for enormous armaments might better +be employed for other and useful purposes. I replied +that this expenditure too benefited our home industries.</p> + +<p>Through interviews with Sit W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's +principal private secretary, I managed to have the question +removed from the agenda without causing any ill-feeling, +although it was again referred to in Parliament, +and to prevent any official proposal being made. It was, +however, a pet idea of Mr. Churchill's and the Government's, +and I think that by entering upon his plan and +the formula 16:10 for battleships we might have given +tangible proof of our goodwill, and strengthened and +encouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the +Government) to enter into closer relations with us.</p> + +<p>But, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> +understanding <i>in spite of the fleet</i> and without a "Naval +holiday." I had always regarded my mission from this +point of view, and I had also succeeded in realising my +plans when the outbreak of war destroyed everything I +had achieved.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Commercial_Jealousy" id="Commercial_Jealousy"></a><span class="smcap">Commercial Jealousy</span></h4> + +<p>The "commercial jealousy," about which we hear so +much, is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. +Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power +after the war of 1870 and during the following decades +was a menace to British commercial circles which, with +their industries and export-houses, had held a virtual +monopoly of trade. The increasing commerce with Germany, +which was the leading country in Europe as regards +British exports—a fact to which I invariably referred +in my public speeches—had, however, given rise +to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their +best customer and business friend, and had driven all +other considerations into the background.</p> + +<p>The Briton is matter-of-fact—he takes things as they +are and does not tilt against windmills. Notably in commercial +circles I encountered the most friendly spirit +and the endeavour to further our common economic interests. +As a matter of fact nobody in them took any +interest in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even in the +French representative, in spite of his striking personality +and his political successes. Only the German and American +Ambassadors attracted public attention.</p> + +<p>In order to get into touch with important commercial +circles, I accepted invitations from the United Chambers +of Commerce, and from the London and Bradford Chamber, +and was the guest of the cities of Newcastle and +Liverpool. I was well received everywhere; Manchester,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> +Glasgow, and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I intended +to go there later.</p> + +<p>People who did not understand British conditions and +did not realise the importance of "public dinners," also +people to whom my successes were unwelcome, reproached +me with having done harm with my speeches. +I believe on the contrary that by appearing in public and +emphasising common commercial interests I contributed +in no small measure to the improvement of relations, +quite apart from the fact that it would have been clumsy +and churlish to refuse all invitations.</p> + +<p>In all other circles I also met with the most friendly +reception and hearty co-operation—at Court, in society, +and from the Government.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Court_and_Society" id="The_Court_and_Society"></a><span class="smcap">The Court and Society</span></h4> + +<p>The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well-meaning +man with sound common sense; he demonstrated +his goodwill towards me and was frankly desirous of +furthering my task. Although the British Constitution +leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the +monarch, in virtue of his position, can exercise a considerable +influence on opinion both in society and in the +Government. The Crown is the apex of the social pyramid; +it sets the fashion. Society, which is principally +Unionist (Conservative), has always taken an active +interest in politics a habit which the ladies share. It is +represented in the House of Lords, the House of Commons, +and hence also in the Cabinet. An Englishman +either is a member of society, or he would like to be +one. It is his constant endeavour to be a "Gentleman," +and even people of undistinguished origin, like Mr. Asquith, +delight to mingle in society and the company of +beautiful and fashionable women.</p> + +<p>The British gentlemen of both parties have the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> +education, go to the same colleges and universities, have +the same recreations—golf, cricket, lawn-tennis, or polo. +All have played cricket and football in their youth; they +have the same habits of life, and spend the week-end in +the country. There is no social cleavage between the +parties, but only a political one; in recent years it has +so far developed into a social cleavage that the politicians +of the two camps avoid social intercourse with one +another. Even on the neutral territory of an Embassy +one did not venture to mingle the two parties, as since +the Veto and Home Rule Bills the Unionists have ostracised +the Radicals. When the King and Queen dined +with us a few months after my arrival, Lord Londonderry +left the house after dinner, as he did not wish to +remain together with Sir E. Grey. But it is not a difference +of caste or education as in France; they are not +two separate worlds, but the same world, and the opinion +about a foreigner is a common one, and not without +influence on his political position, whether Mr. Asquith +be governing or Lord Lansdowne.</p> + +<p>There has been no difference of caste in England since +the time of the Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and Whig +oligarchy, in contrast to the Tory landed gentry encouraged +the rise of an urban middle-class. It is rather +a difference of political opinions about questions of constitutional +law and taxation. Especially aristocrats like +Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, who joined the people's +party—the Radicals—were most hated by the Unionist +aristocracy; one never met any of these gentlemen +at any of the great aristocratic houses, except at +those of a few party friends.</p> + +<p>We were received in London with open arms and +both parties rivalled one another in courtesy towards us. +In view of the close relationship between politics and +society in England, it would be wrong to undervalue<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> +social relations, even when the majority of the upper ten +thousand are in opposition to the Government.</p> + +<p>There is not the same <a name="unbridgeable" id="unbridgeable">unbridgeable</a> gulf between Mr. +Asquith and the Duke of Devonshire that there is between, +say, M. Briand and the Due de Doudeauville. +Certainly they do not consort together in times of great +tension; they belong to two separate social groups, but +these are parts of the <i>same</i> society, though of different +grades, the centre of which is the Court. They have +common friends and habits of life; mostly they have +known each other from their youth up and also are +frequently related to one another either by blood or +marriage.</p> + +<p>Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George—the man of the +people, petty attorney, and self-made man—are the exception. +Even Mr. Burns, the Socialist Labour leader, +and self-educated man, sought contact with society. In +view of the prevailing attempt to rank as a gentleman, +whose unattained prototype is still the great aristocrat, +the value of the verdict of society and its attitude must +not be underestimated.</p> + +<p>Hence the social adaptability of a representative nowhere +plays a greater rôle than in England. A hospitable +house with pleasant hosts is worth more than the most +profound scientific knowledge; a savant with provincial +manners and small means would gain no influence, in +spite of all his learning.</p> + +<p>The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; +he likes a good fellow.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Sir_Edward_Grey" id="Sir_Edward_Grey"></a><span class="smcap">Sir Edward Grey</span></h4> + +<p>Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign +policy was almost unlimited. On important occasions he +used indeed to say, "I must first bring it before the Cabinet"; +but this always agreed to his views. His authority<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> +was undisputed. Although he does not know foreign +countries at all, and had never left England except for +a short visit to Paris, he was fully conversant with all +the important questions owing to his long parliamentary +experience and his natural insight. He understands +French, but does not speak it. He was returned to +Parliament as a young man, and soon began to interest +himself in foreign affairs. Under Lord Rosebery he +was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and +became Secretary of State in 1906, under Mr. Campbell-Bannerman; +he has now held the post for some ten +years.</p> + +<p>The scion of an old north country family, which had +already furnished Grey, the well-known statesman, he +joined the left wing of his party and sympathised with +Socialists and pacifists. You may call him a Socialist +in the ideal sense, as he carries the theory into his +private life and lives very simply and unpretentiously, +although he has extensive means. Ostentation is foreign +to him. In London he only had a small house, and +never gave dinners, except the one official dinner at the +Foreign Office on the King's Birthday. On the few occasions +when he entertained guests it was at a simple +dinner or lunch with maidservants to wait. Also he +avoided large functions and banquets.</p> + +<p>Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends +in the country, but not with large or fashionable parties. +He is mostly by himself in his cottage in the New Forest, +where he takes long walks to study birds and their +ways, as he is a passionate lover of nature and an +ornithologist. Or sometimes he goes to his estate in +the north, where he feeds the squirrels that come in +at the windows, and breeds different species of waterfowl.</p> + +<p>He was very fond of going to the Norfolk marshes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +to watch in their breeding season the rare kinds of +herons, which nest only there.</p> + +<p>In his youth he was a well-known cricket and racquet +player; now his favourite pastime is salmon and trout-fishing +in Scottish rivers in company with his friend +Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. "All the +rest of the year I am looking forward to it." He has +published a book on fishing.</p> + +<p>On one occasion, when we spent a week-end with him +alone at Lord Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived +on a bicycle and returned to his cottage about thirty +miles distant in the same way.</p> + +<p>The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him +the esteem even of his opponents, who were to be found +rather in the sphere of home affairs than of foreign +policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him.</p> + +<p>His wife, to whom he was devotedly attached and +from whom he was inseparable, died in consequence of +being thrown from a trap she was driving. As is generally +known, one of his brothers was killed by a lion.</p> + +<p>Wordsworth is his favourite poet, and he could quote +much of his poetry.</p> + +<p>The calm quiet of his British nature is not lacking in a +sense of humour. Once when he was lunching with us +and the children, and heard them talking German, he +said, "I can't help thinking how clever these children +are to talk German so well," and was pleased with his +joke.</p> + +<p>This is a true picture of the man who is decried as +"Liar-Grey" and instigator of the world-war.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Mr_Asquith" id="Mr_Asquith"></a><span class="smcap">Mr. Asquith</span></h4> + +<p>Mr. Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. +A jovial <i>bon-vivant</i>, fond of the ladies, especially the +young and pretty ones, he is partial to cheerful society<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +and good cooking; and his zest for enjoyment is shared +by his wife. Formerly a well-known barrister with a +large income, and for a number of years in Parliament, +then a Minister under Mr. Gladstone, a pacifist like his +friend Grey, and favouring an understanding with Germany, +he treated all questions with the cheery calm +and assurance of an experienced man of business, whose +good health and excellent nerves were steeled by devotion +to the game of golf.</p> + +<p>His daughters were at school in Germany and spoke +German fluently. In a short time we got on friendly +terms with him and his family, and were his guests in +his small country house on the Thames.</p> + +<p>Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with +foreign politics, when important questions arose; then of +course his decision was final. During the critical days +of July Mrs. Asquith repeatedly came to us to warn +us, and in the end she was quite distraught at the +tragic turn of events. Mr. Asquith also, when I called +on him on the 2nd August to make a last effort in the +direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, +though absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his +cheeks.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Nicolson" id="Nicolson"></a><span class="smcap">Nicolson</span></h4> + +<p>Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell were the two +most influential men at the Foreign Office after the Minister. +The former was no friend of ours, but his attitude +towards me was absolutely correct and courteous. +Our personal relations were excellent. He too did not +want war; but when we advanced against France, he +no doubt worked in the direction of an immediate intervention. +He was the confidant of my French colleague, +with whom he was in constant touch; also he +wished to relieve Lord Bertie in Paris.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span></p> + +<p>Sir Arthur, who had been Ambassador at Petrograd, +had concluded the treaty of 1907, which had enabled +Russia again to turn her attention to the West and to +the Near East.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Tyrrell" id="Tyrrell"></a><span class="smcap">Tyrrell</span></h4> + +<p>Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, possessed +far greater influence than the Permanent Under-Secretary. +This highly intelligent man had been at school +in Germany, and had then turned to diplomacy, but +had only been abroad for a short time. At first he +favoured the anti-German policy, which was then in +fashion amongst the younger British diplomatists, but +later he became a convinced advocate of an understanding. +He influenced Sir E. Grey, with whom he +was very intimate, in this direction. Since the outbreak +of war he has left the Office and found a place in the +Home Office, probably because of the criticisms passed +on him for his Germanophil tendency.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Attitude_of_the_German_Foreign_Office" id="Attitude_of_the_German_Foreign_Office"></a><span class="smcap">Attitude of the German Foreign Office</span></h4> + +<p>Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at +my London successes and the position which I had managed +to make for myself in a short time. They devised +vexatious instructions to render my office more difficult. +I was left in complete ignorance of the most important +matters, and was restricted to the communication +of dull and unimportant reports. Secret agents' reports, +on matters about which I could not learn without espionage +and the necessary funds, were never available to +me; and it was not till the last days of July, 1914, that +I learnt, quite by chance, from the Naval Attaché of the +secret Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation +of the two fleets in case of war. The knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +of other important events which had been known to the +Office for a long time, like the correspondence between +Grey and Cambon, was kept from me.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="In_Case_of_War" id="In_Case_of_War"></a><span class="smcap">In Case of War</span></h4> + +<p>Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that +under <i>no</i> circumstances had we to fear a British attack +or British support for any foreign attack, but that +<i>under any circumstances England would protect the +French</i>. I expressed this view in repeated dispatches, +with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain +any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to assent +to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during +the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications. +In addition there were the secret agreements which I have +referred to, and which were known to the Office.</p> + +<p>I always pointed out that in the event of a war between +European Powers, England as a commercial state +would suffer enormously, and would therefore do her +best to prevent a conflict; but, on the other hand, she +would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of +France; because of the necessity of maintaining the European +balance of power and of preventing a German +superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this +shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people had +expressed themselves in the same sense.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Serbian_Crisis" id="The_Serbian_Crisis"></a><span class="smcap">The Serbian Crisis</span></h4> + +<p>At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of +the Emperor. A few weeks prior to this I had been +made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an honour which +had not been conferred on any German Ambassador +since Herr von Bunsen. On board the <i>Meteor</i> we learned +of the death of the Archduke. H.M. regretted that his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had thus +been rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan +of an active policy against Serbia had already been decided +on at Konopischt.</p> + +<p>As I was not instructed about views and events in +Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this +occurrence. Later on I could only remark that amongst +Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other +sentiments. On board the <i>Meteor</i> there was also an Austrian +guest of the Emperor's, Count Felix Thun. He +had remained in his cabin all the time suffering from sea-sickness, +in spite of the splendid weather; but on receiving +the news he was well. The fright or joy had cured +him.</p> + +<p>On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told +him that I considered the state of our foreign relations +very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England +than we had been for a long time, whilst in +France also the government was in the hands of a pacifist +Ministry.</p> + +<p>Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share +my optimism, and complained about Russian armaments. +I sought to reassure him, emphasising the fact that Russia +had no interest in attacking us, and that such an +attack would never receive Anglo-French support, as +both countries wanted peace. Thereupon I went to Dr. +Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von Jagow, and +he told me that Russia was about to raise 900,000 additional +troops. His language betrayed unmistakable annoyance +with Russia, which was "everywhere in our +way." There were also difficulties in economic policy. +Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was +pressing for war; but I learned that Herr von Tschirschky +had been reprimanded because he reported that he +had counselled moderation towards Serbia in Vienna.</p> + +<p>On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> +a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended +to take steps against Serbia in order to put an +end to an impossible situation.</p> + +<p>I regret that at the moment I underestimated the importance +of the news. I thought that nothing would +come of it this time either, and that matters could easily +be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I now +regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare +that I would not co-operate in a policy of this kind.</p> + +<p>Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive conference +at Potsdam on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry +received the unqualified assent of all the leading people, +and with the rider that no harm would be done if a +war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, +at any rate, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff +received in London. Soon afterwards Herr von +Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about +all these matters.</p> + +<p>At that time I received instructions to induce the British +Press to adopt a friendly attitude should Austria +administer the <i>coup de grâce</i> to the "Great Serbia" movement, +and to exert my personal influence to prevent public +opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. If one +remembered England's attitude during the annexation +crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the +Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent furtherance +of national movements in the days of Lord +Byron and Garibaldi, the probability that she would +support the intended punitive expedition against the murderers +of the prince happened so remote, that I found +myself obliged to give an urgent warning. But I also +warned them against the whole plan, which I characterised +as adventurous and dangerous, and advised them to +counsel the Austrians to <i>moderation</i>, as I did not believe +that the conflict could be localised.</p> + +<p>Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> +ready; there would probably be some fuss, but the more +firmly we took sides with Austria the more would Russia +give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of weakness +and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. +Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming +more and more anti-German, so we must just +risk it.</p> + +<p>In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was +based on reports from Count Pourtalès that Russia would +not move under any circumstances, and which caused us +to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I +hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew +that Sir E. Grey's great influence in Petrograd could +be used in the direction of peace. I therefore availed +myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to request +him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia +in case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction +from Serbia.</p> + +<p>At first the English Press preserved calm and was +friendly to Austria, because the murder was generally +condemned. But gradually more and more voices were +heard insisting emphatically that, however much the +crime merited punishment, its exploitation for political +purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly +exhorted to use moderation.</p> + +<p>When the ultimatum was published, all the papers +with the exception of the <i>Standard</i>—the ever-necessitous, +which had apparently been bought by Austria—were +unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting +Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war—indeed, +"the world-war." The British Fleet, which happened +to have assembled for a naval review, was not +demobilised.</p> + +<p>My efforts were in the first place directed towards +obtaining as conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was +possible, since the attitude of the Russian Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> +left room for no doubts about the gravity of the situation.</p> + +<p>Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as +M. Pasitch had really agreed to everything, excepting +two points, about which, however, he declared his willingness +to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted +the war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would +have been enough, and the unprecedented Note would +not have been answered.</p> + +<p>Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, +and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Government +of Belgrade. Thereupon we discussed his proposal +of mediation, which was to include a formula acceptable +to both parties for clearing up the two points. +His proposal was that a committee, consisting of M. +Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself, should assemble +under his presidency, and it would have been an +easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the +points at issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration +of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in +Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been +settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance +of the British proposal would have brought about a +relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved +our relations with England. I therefore strongly +backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise there +was danger of the world-war, through which we stood +to gain nothing and lose all; but in vain. It was derogatory +to the dignity of Austria—we did not intend to +interfere in Serbian matters—we left these to our ally. +I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict."</p> + +<p>Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have +decided Count Berchtold to content himself with a +diplomatic success, and to accept the Serbian reply. This +hint was not given; on the contrary they urged in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> +direction of war. It would have been such a splendid +success.</p> + +<p>After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit +a proposal. We insisted on war. I could not obtain any +reply but that Austria had shown an exceedingly "accommodating +spirit" by not demanding an extension of +territory.</p> + +<p>Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an +extension of territory it is possible to reduce a state to +a condition of vassalage, and that Russia would see a +humiliation in this, and would not suffer it.</p> + +<p>The impression grew stronger and stronger that we +wanted war under any circumstances. It was impossible +to interpret our attitude, on a question which did not +directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent requests +and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed +by the Czar's positively humble telegrams, the repeated +proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings of the Marquis +San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all +were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be massacred.</p> + +<p>The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come +round, if only that I might not have the success of +averting war in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey.</p> + +<p>Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous +warning. I replied that I had invariably reported that +we should have to reckon with English opposition if it +came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister +said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest +catastrophe the world has ever seen."</p> + +<p>After that, events followed each other rapidly. When +at last Count Berchtold, who up till then had, at the +behest of Berlin, played the strong man, decided to come +round, we replied to the Russian mobilisation, after +Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in +vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> + +<h4><a name="The_English_Declaration_of_War" id="The_English_Declaration_of_War"></a><span class="smcap">The English Declaration of War</span></h4> + +<p>Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding +the catastrophe. Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the +morning of the 1st August to tell me that his chief still +hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if +France did? I understood that we should then agree to +spare France, but he had meant that we should remain +altogether neutral—towards Russia also. That was the +well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked +me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of +the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, Sir W. +Tyrrell having hurried to him at once. In the afternoon, +however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality and +the possibility that we and France might face one another +in arms without attacking.</p> + +<p>Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question +without any guarantee, as our interview, which I have +mentioned before, was to take place soon afterwards. +Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview, made +this report the foundation for far-reaching measures. +Then there came M. Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, +King Albert's telegram. The waverers in the Cabinet—excepting +three members who resigned—were converted.</p> + +<p>Till the very last moment I had hoped that England +would adopt a waiting attitude. Nor did my French colleague +feel at all confident, as I heard from a private +source. Even on the 1st August the King had given +the President an evasive reply. But England was already +mentioned as an opponent in the telegram from Berlin +announcing the imminent danger of war. Berlin was +therefore already reckoning on war with England.</p> + +<p>Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the +5th, at his house. I had called at his request. He was +deeply moved. He told me he would always be prepared<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> +to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately +this confidential interview was made public, +and Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed the last +chance of gaining peace through England.</p> + +<p>The arrangements for our departure were perfectly +dignified and calm. The King had previously sent his +equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express his regrets at my +departure and that he could not see me himself. Princess +Louise wrote to me that the whole family were sorry we +were leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to +the Embassy to take leave.</p> + +<p>A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of +honour was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing +Sovereign. Such was the end of my London mission. +It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, +but by the wiles of our policy.</p> + +<p>Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station +in London. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand +that perhaps he would remain there, but he told the +English that we, and not Austria, had wanted the war.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Retrospect" id="Retrospect"></a><span class="smcap">Retrospect</span></h4> + +<p>Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion +that I realised too late that there was no room for me in +a system that for years had lived on routine and traditions +alone, and that only tolerated representatives who +reported what their superiors wished to read. Absence +of prejudice and an independent judgment are resented. +Lack of ability and want of character are praised and +esteemed, while successes meet with disfavour and excite +alarm.</p> + +<p>I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance +policy, as I realised that it was useless, and that +my warnings were attributed to "Austrophobia," to my +<i>idée fixe</i>. In politics, which are neither acrobatics nor a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> +game, but the main business of the firm, there is no "phil" +or "phobe," but only the interest of the community. A +policy, however, that is based only on Austrians, Magyars, +and Turks must come into conflict with Russia, and +finally lead to a catastrophe.</p> + +<p>In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been +put right in July, 1914. An agreement with England +had been arrived at. We ought to have sent a representative +to Petrograd who was at least of average political +capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we +wished neither to control the straits nor to strangle Serbia. +"<i>Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français</i>" +("Drop Austria and we will drop the French"), M. +Sazonow said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von +Jagow, "<i>Vous n'avez pas besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout</i>" +("You need not follow Austria everywhere").</p> + +<p>We wanted <i>neither wars nor alliances</i>; we wanted only +treaties that would safeguard us and others, and secure +our economic development, which was without its like in +history. If Russia had been freed in the West, she could +again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry +would have been re-established automatically and without +our intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese.</p> + +<p>We could also have considered the question of the +reduction of armaments, and need no longer have troubled +ourselves about Austrian complications. Then Austria +would have become the vassal of the German Empire, +without any alliance—and especially without our seeking +her good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war +for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, +although German interest demanded the exact contrary.</p> + +<p>I had to support in London a policy the heresy of +which I recognised. That brought down vengeance on +me, because it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p> + +<h4><a name="My_Return" id="My_Return"></a><span class="smcap">My Return</span></h4> + +<p>As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be +made the scapegoat for the catastrophe for which our +Government had made itself responsible against my advice +and warnings.</p> + +<p>The report was deliberately circulated in official quarters +that I had allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. +Grey, because, if he had not wanted war, Russia would +not have mobilised. Count Pourtalès, whose reports +could be relied on, was to be protected, not least on account +of his relationship. He had conducted himself +"magnificently," he was praised enthusiastically, and I +was blamed the more severely.</p> + +<p>"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman +said to me after eight years in office at Petrograd. The +whole thing was a British trick that I had not noticed. +At the Foreign Office they told me that war would in +any case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have +been ready; therefore it was better now.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Question_of_Responsibility" id="The_Question_of_Responsibility"></a><span class="smcap">The Question of Responsibility</span></h4> + +<p>As is evident from all official publications—and this is +not refuted by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty +of its contents and to its omissions, is a gravely self-accusing +document—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, +although German interests were not involved and the +danger of a world-war must have been known to us. +Whether we were aware of the wording of the Ultimatum +is completely immaterial.</p> + +<p>2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, +1914, when M. Sazonow emphatically declared that he +would not tolerate any attack on Serbia, we rejected the +British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under<span class="pagenumbq"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> +Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the +whole of the Ultimatum, and although an agreement +about the two points at issue could easily have been +reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to +content himself with the Serbian reply.</p> + +<p>3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted +to come to terms, we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd +merely because of the Russian mobilisation, although +Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st July +we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged +his word that he would not order a man to march as +long as negotiations were proceeding—thus deliberately +destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement.</p></div> + +<p>In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder +that the whole of the civilised world outside Germany +places the entire responsibility for the world-war upon +our shoulders.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="The_Enemy_Point_of_View" id="The_Enemy_Point_of_View"></a><span class="smcap">The Enemy Point of View</span></h4> + +<p>Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare +that they will not rest before a system is destroyed which +is a constant menace to our neighbours? Must they not +otherwise fear that in a few years' time they will again +have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun +and their towns and villages destroyed? Have not +they proved to be right who declared that the spirit of +Treitschke and Bernhardi governed the German people, +that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not loathe +it as an evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, +the warrior caste, still rule and form ideals and values, +not the civilian gentleman; that the love of the duel which +animates our academic youth still persists in those who +control the destinies of the people? Did not the Zabern +incident and the parliamentary discussions about it clearly +demonstrate to foreign countries the value we place<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> +on the rights and liberties of the citizen if these collide +with questions of military power?</p> + +<p>That intelligent historian Cramb, who has since died, +an admirer of Germany, clothed the German conception +in the words of Euphorion:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Dream ye of peace?<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a><br /></span> +<span class="i0">Dream he that will—<br /></span> +<span class="i0">War is the rallying cry!<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Victory is the refrain.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Militarism, which by rights is an education for the +people and an instrument of policy, turns policy into the +instrument of military power when the patriarchal absolutism +of the soldier-kingdom makes possible an attitude +which a democracy, remote from military Junker +influence, would never have permitted.</p> + +<p>So think our enemies, and so they must think when +they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialisation and +in spite of socialist organisation, "the living are still +ruled by the dead," as Friedrich Nietzsche says. The +principal war aim of our enemies, the democratisation +of Germany, will be realised!</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Bismarck" id="Bismarck"></a><span class="smcap">Bismarck</span></h4> + +<p>Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As +a statesman he avoided fresh wars, the folly of which +he recognised. He was content with bloodless battles. +After he had, in rapid succession, vanquished Christian, +Francis Joseph, and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, +Pius, and Augusta. That did not suffice him. Gortschakow, +who thought himself the greater, had repeatedly +annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost to the +point of war—even by depriving him of his railway +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>saloon. This gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. +At last came the conflict with William, in which the +mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was vanquished +by Alexander.</p> + +<p>Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded +on a constitutional basis and not on an international +one. They are all the more questionable if the partner +is feeble. Bismarck never meant the Alliance to take +this form.</p> + +<p>He always treated the English with forbearance; he +knew that this was wiser. He always paid marked respect +to the old Queen Victoria, despite his hatred of +her daughter and of political Anglomania; the learned +Beaconsfield and the worldly-wise Salisbury he courted; +and even that strange Gladstone, whom he did not like, +really had nothing to complain about.</p> + +<p>The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point +of the policy of the Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, +the Conference of London: but there was yet time to +turn back.</p> + +<p>We were completely successful in achieving that which +above all other things should have been avoided—the +breach with Russia and England.</p> + +<p><br /></p> + +<h4><a name="Our_Future" id="Our_Future"></a><span class="smcap">Our Future</span></h4> + +<p>After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not +hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, +English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, or +reckon on being able to wear our enemies down. But +we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating +the occupied territory, the retention of which would +in any event be a burden and cause of weakness to us, +and would involve the menace of further wars. Therefore +everything should be avoided which would make +it more difficult for those enemy groups who might<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> +possibly still be won over to the idea of a peace by compromise +to come to terms, viz., the British Radicals and +the Russian Reactionaries. From this point of view +alone the Polish scheme is to be condemned, as is also +any infringement of Belgian rights, or the execution of +British citizens—to say nothing of the insane U-boat +plan.</p> + +<p>"Our future lies on the water." Quite right; therefore +it is not in Poland and Belgium, in France and +Serbia. This is a return to the days of the Holy Roman +Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and +Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that +of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy +of the Triple Alliance is a return to the past, a turning +aside from the future, from imperialism and a world-policy. +"Middle Europe" belongs to the Middle Ages, +Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into the +open country, to unlimited possibilities, to the world-mission +of the German nation.</p> + +<p>I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or +Serbia, or any other state, but only of the Triple Alliance +policy, which was bound to divert us from our +aims and bring us onto the inclined plane of a Continental +policy. It was not the German policy, but that +of the Austrian Imperial House. The Austrians had +come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella under the +shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near +East when they thought fit.</p> + +<p>And what must we expect as the result of this war of +nations? The United States of Africa will be British, +like those of America, Australia and Oceania. And the +Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will +enter into the same relations with the United Kingdom +that their Latin sisters in America maintain with the +United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate them. +France, exhausted by the war, will only attach herself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +still more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain +continue to resist for long.</p> + +<p>And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread +and will carry their customs with their frontiers, and +the South will remain to the British.</p> + +<p>The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russians, +and Japanese, and the German will remain alone with +Austria and Hungary. His rule will be that of thought +and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the +soldier. He made his appearance too late, and his +last chance of making good the past, that of founding +a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by the world-war.</p> + +<p>For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then +will be realised the plan of the great Rhodes, who saw +the salvation of humanity in the expansion of Britondom—in +British Imperialism.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p><br /></p> +<div class="footnotes"> +<h4>FOOTNOTE</h4> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> +The original has "war," presumably owing to a misprint.—<span class="smcap">Translator.</span></p></div></div> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<h3>——————————————————————————————————<br /> +<i>Important Books of the Day</i><br /> +——————————————————————————————————</h3> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>THE CRIME</u> <span class="ex"><i>By a German. Author of "I Accuse!"</i></span></b></p> + +<p>An arraignment in even more cogent form than "I Accuse!" of the +rulers and governments of Germany and Austria. <span class="ex">Two vols. 8vo. Vol. I. Net, $2.50</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>THE GREAT CRIME AND ITS MORAL</u> <span class="ex"><i>By J. Selden Willmore</i></span></b></p> + +<p>A volume which is an invaluable library. An illuminating summary of +the immense documentary literature of the war.<span class="ex">8vo. Net, $2.00</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>BELGIUM IN WAR TIME</u> <span class="ex"><i>By Commandant De Gerlache De Gomery</i></span></b></p> + +<p><small>Translated from the French Edition by Bernard Miall</small><br /> +The authoritative book essential to an understanding of the history, the +position and the sufferings of the country that will not die, the title of +the Norwegian and Swedish editions of this famous work set up under +fire. <span class="ex">Illustrations, maps and facsimiles. 8vo. Net, $2.00</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME</u> <span class="ex"><i>By John Buchan</i></span></b></p> + +<p>"Mr. Buchan's account is a clear and brilliant presentation of the whole +vast manoeuver and its tactical and strategic development through all +four stages."—Springfield <i>Republican</i>. <span class="ex">Illustrated. 12mo. Net, $1.50</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>THE LAND OF DEEPENING SHADOW</u> <span class="ex"><i>By D. Thomas Curtin</i></span></b></p> + +<p>Revealing the Germany of <i>fact</i> in place of the Germany of <i>tradition</i>; +telling the truth about Germany-in-the-third-year-of-the-war. <span class="ex">12mo. Net, $1.50</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>I ACCUSE! <small>(<span class="smcap">J'ACCUSE!</span>)</small></u> <span class="ex"><i>By a German</i></span></b></p> + +<p>An arraignment of Germany by a German of the German War Party. +Facts every neutral should know. <span class="ex">12mo. Net, $1.50</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>THE GERMAN TERROR IN FRANCE</u> <span class="ex"><i>By Arnold J. Toynbee</i></span><br /> +<u>THE GERMAN TERROR IN BELGIUM</u> <span class="ex"><i>By Arnold J. Toynbee</i></span></b></p> + +<p>"From the facts he places before his readers, it appears conclusive that +the horrors were perpetrated systematically, deliberately, under orders, +upon a people whose country was invaded without just cause."—Philadelphia +<i>Public Ledger</i>. <span class="ex">Each 8vo. Net, $1.00</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>TRENCH PICTURES FROM FRANCE</u> <span class="ex"><i>By Major William Redmond, M.P.</i></span></b></p> + +<p><small>Biographical Introduction by Miss E. M. Smith-Dampier</small><br /> +A glowing book, filled with a deep love of Ireland, by one of the most +attractive British figures of the war. <span class="ex">12mo. Net, $1.25</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>WOUNDED AND A PRISONER OF WAR</u> <span class="ex"><i>By an Exchanged Officer</i></span></b></p> + +<p>The high literary merit, studious moderation and charming personality +of the author make this thrilling book "the most damning indictment of +Germany's inhumanity that has yet appeared." <span class="ex">12mo. Net, $1.25</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<p><b><u>MY HOME IN THE FIELD OF MERCY</u> <span class="ex"><i>By Frances Wilson Huard</i></span><br /> +<u>MY HOME IN THE FIELD OF HONOUR</u> <span class="ex"><i>By Frances Wilson Huard</i></span></b></p> + +<p>The simple, intimate, classic narrative which has taken rank as one of +the few distinguished books produced since the outbreak of the war. <span class="ex">Illustrated. Each 12mo. Net, $1.35</span></p> + +<p><br /></p> +<h3>——————————————————————————————————<br /> +GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY <small><i>Publishers</i></small> New York<br /> +<small>PUBLISHERS IN AMERICA FOR HODDER & STOUGHTON</small><br /> +——————————————————————————————————</h3> + +<p><br /><br /></p> + +<p class="center"><b>Transcriber's Notes</b></p> + +<p>Original spelling and grammar retained with the following exceptions.</p> + +<p class="tn"> +Contents <a href="#Nicholson">"Nicholson"</a> changed to "Nicolson"<br /> + +Page <a href="#outset">xi</a> "The attack made on him at the ouset of the war" changed to "The attack made + on him at the outset of the war"<br /> + +Page <a href="#Bagdad_Railway">4</a> "(Badgad Railway)" changed to "(Bagdad Railway)"<br /> + +Page <a href="#unbridgeable">26</a> "There is not the same unbridgable gulf" changed to "There is not the same + unbridgeable gulf"</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of My Mission to London 1912-1914, by +Prince Lichnowsky + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY MISSION TO LONDON 1912-1914 *** + +***** This file should be named 39457-h.htm or 39457-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/9/4/5/39457/ + +Produced by James Wright and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Canada Team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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