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+Project Gutenberg's My Mission to London 1912-1914, by Prince Lichnowsky
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: My Mission to London 1912-1914
+
+Author: Prince Lichnowsky
+
+Release Date: April 15, 2012 [EBook #39457]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY MISSION TO LONDON 1912-1914 ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by James Wright and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Canada Team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
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+
+
+                  REVELATIONS OF THE LAST GERMAN
+                       AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND
+
+                           MY MISSION TO
+                               LONDON
+
+                             1912-1914
+
+                                _By_
+                         PRINCE LICHNOWSKY
+
+                        _With a Preface by_
+                     PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY
+
+
+                NEW YORK: GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+
+PRICE TEN CENTS
+
+
+
+
+                           MY MISSION TO
+                               LONDON
+
+                             1912-1914
+
+                                 BY
+
+                         PRINCE LICHNOWSKY
+
+                _Late German Ambassador in England_
+
+                         WITH A PREFACE BY
+                     PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY
+
+         _Author of "The Policy of Sir Edward Grey," etc._
+
+
+                              NEW YORK
+                      GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+
+
+
+
+                       WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
+                                OF
+
+                   PROFESSOR W. MACNEILE DIXON
+
+                     (UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW)
+
+
+Address:
+  8, BUCKINGHAM GATE,
+      LONDON, S. W., ONE,
+            ENGLAND.
+
+
+
+
+BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
+
+
+The author of the following pages, Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky, is a
+member of a family which holds estates both in German and Austrian
+Silesia, and has an hereditary seat in the Upper House of the Prussian
+Diet. The father of the present Prince and his predecessor in the title
+was a Prussian cavalry general, who, at the end of his life, sat for
+some years in the Reichstag as a member of the Free Conservative Party.
+
+His uncle, Prince Felix, was elected in 1848 to represent Ratibor in the
+German National Assembly at Frankfort-on-Main; he was an active member
+of the Conservative wing, and during the September rising, while riding
+with General Auerswald in the neighbourhood of the city, was attacked
+and murdered by the mob.
+
+The present Prince, after serving in the Prussian army, in which he
+holds the rank of Major, entered the diplomatic service. He was in 1885
+for a short time attached to the German Embassy in London, and
+afterwards became Councillor of Embassy in Vienna. From 1899 to 1904 he
+was employed in the German Foreign Office, and received the rank and
+title of Minister Plenipotentiary.
+
+In 1904 he retired to his Silesian estates, and, as he states, lived for
+eight years the life of a country gentleman, but read industriously and
+published occasional political articles. He himself recounts the
+circumstances in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on the
+death of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein.
+
+Baron Marschall, who had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the
+Chancellorships of Count Caprivi and for a time under Prince Hohenlohe,
+had achieved great success as Ambassador at Constantinople, and also,
+from the German point of view, as chief German Plenipotentiary at the
+Second Hague Conference in 1907. Baron Marschall was, to use an
+expression of Bismarck's, "the best horse in Germany's diplomatic
+stable." And great things were expected of him in London. But he lived
+only a few months after his appointment.
+
+Prince Lichnowsky's high social rank, his agreeable manners, and the
+generous hospitality which he showed in Carlton House Terrace gave him a
+position in English society which facilitated the negotiations between
+England and Germany, and did much to diminish the friction that had
+arisen during the time that Prince Buelow held the post of German
+Chancellor.
+
+The pamphlet which is here translated gives an account of his London
+mission; after his return to Germany he has lived in retirement in the
+country, but has contributed occasional articles to the Press. The
+pamphlet, which was written in August, 1916, was not intended for
+publication, but was distributed confidentially to a few friends. The
+existence of it had long been known, but it was only in March of this
+year that for the first time extracts from it were published in the
+Swedish paper _Politiken_. Longer extracts have since appeared in the
+London Press; for the first time a complete translation made from the
+German original is now placed before the public.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+Never perhaps in history has the world seen so great an exhibition, as
+at the outbreak of this war, of the murderous and corrupting power of
+the organised lie. All Germany outside the governmental circles was
+induced to believe that the war was a treacherous attack, plotted in the
+dark by "revengeful France, barbaric Russia, and envious England,"
+against the innocent and peace-loving Fatherland. And the centre of the
+plot was the Machiavellian Grey, who for long years had been encircling
+and strangling Germany in order at the chosen moment to deal her a
+death-blow from behind. The Emperor, the princes, the ministers, the
+bishops and chaplains, the historians and theologians, in part
+consciously and in part innocently, vied with one another in solemn
+attestations and ingenious forgeries of evidence; and the people, docile
+by training and long indoctrinated to the hatred of England, inevitably
+believed and passionately exaggerated what they were told. From this
+belief, in large part, came the strange brutalities and ferocities of
+the common people of Germany at the opening of the war, whether towards
+persons who had a right to courtesy, like the Ambassadors, or a claim on
+common human sympathy, like the wounded and the prisoners. The German
+masses could show no mercy towards people guilty of so hideous a
+world-crime.
+
+And now comes evidence, which in normal times would convince even the
+German nation, that the whole basis of their belief was a structure of
+deliberate falsehood; which shows that it was the Kaiser and his
+Ministers who plotted the war; while it was England, and especially Sir
+Edward Grey, who strove hardest for the preservation of peace.
+
+It is the evidence of the German Ambassador in London during the years
+1912-1914, Prince Lichnowsky, corroborated rather than confuted by the
+comments of Herr von Jagow, who was Foreign Minister at the time, and
+carried further by the recently published Memoranda of Herr Muehlon, one
+of the directors of the Krupp armament factory at Essen. One could
+hardly imagine more convincing testimony. Will the German people believe
+it? Would they believe now if one rose from the dead?
+
+We cannot yet guess at the answer. Indeed, there is another question
+which must be answered first: For what motive, and with what possible
+change of policy in view, has the German Government permitted the
+publication of these papers and the circulation of Lichnowsky's
+Memorandum as a pamphlet at 30 pfennig? Do the militarists think their
+triumph is safe, and the time come for them to throw off the mask? Or
+have the opponents of militarism, who seemed so crushed, succeeded in
+asserting their power? Is it a plan to induce the ever docile German
+populace to hate England less?
+
+It must be a startling story for the Germans, but for us it contains
+little that is new. It is an absolute confirmation, in spirit and in
+letter, of the British Blue Book and of English books such as Mr.
+Headlam's "History of Twelve Days" and Mr. Archer's "Thirteen Days."
+Prince Lichnowsky's summing-up agrees exactly with the British
+conclusions: The Germans encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia,
+well knowing the consequences to expect; between the 23rd and 30th July
+they rejected all forms of mediation; and on the 30th July, when Austria
+wished to withdraw, they hastily sent an ultimatum to Russia so as to
+make withdrawal impossible (pp. 39-40). A ghastly story of blindness and
+crime; but we knew it all before.
+
+Equally interesting is Prince Lichnowsky's account of the policy of
+Germany and England before the war. He confirms our knowledge of the
+"sinister vagueness" of German policy in Morocco, the steady desire of
+England to come to an understanding and of Germany to elude an
+understanding. As for our alleged envy of German trade, it was in
+English commercial circles that the desire for an understanding with
+Germany was strongest. As for our "policy of encirclement," it was the
+deliberate aim of our policy, continuing the line of Lord Salisbury and
+Mr. Chamberlain, to facilitate rather than hinder the legitimate and
+peaceful expansion of a great force, which would become dangerous if
+suppressed and confined.
+
+The test cases were the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese Colonies. We
+agreed to make no objection to Germany's buying them when Portugal was
+willing to sell; we agreed in the meantime to treat them as a German
+sphere of interest and not to compete for influence there. We agreed,
+subject to the conservation of existing British rights and to certain
+other safeguards, to the completion of the great railway from the
+Bosphorus to Basra, and to the recognition of the whole district tapped
+by the railway as a German sphere of interest. The two treaties, though
+completed, were never signed; why? Because Grey would sign no secret
+treaty. He insisted that they must be published. And the German
+Government would not allow them to be published! To Lichnowsky this
+seemed like mere spite on the part of rivals who grudged his success,
+but we see now that it was a deliberate policy. The war-makers could not
+afford to let their people know the proof of England's goodwill.
+
+Lichnowsky was a friend of England, but he was no pacifist or "little
+German." His policy was to favour the peaceful expansion of Germany, in
+good understanding with England and France, on the seas and in the
+colonies. He aimed at "imperial development" on British lines; he
+abhorred the "Triple Alliance policy" of espousing Austria's quarrels,
+backing Turkey against the Balkan States, intriguing against Russia, and
+seeing all politics in the terms of European rivalries with a background
+of war. His own policy was one which, if followed loyally by the German
+Government, would have avoided the war and saved Europe.
+
+There are one or two traits in Lichnowsky's language which show that,
+with all his liberality of thought, he is still a German. He accepts at
+once, on the report of a German secret agent, the false statement that
+Grey had concluded a secret treaty with France. He mentions, as if it
+were a natural thing, the strange opinion that the _Standard_ was
+"apparently bought by Austria." He describes Mr. Asquith as a pacifist
+and Sir Edward Grey as both a pacifist and, ideally and practically, a
+Socialist. One must remember the sort of views he was accustomed to at
+Potsdam.
+
+There can be no doubt that Lichnowsky was deliberately deceived by his
+Government, and not much that he was chosen for his post in London with
+a view to deceiving us. These things are all in gospel according to
+Bernhardi. Lichnowsky himself was both an honest and an able
+diplomatist, and there is the ring of sincerity in his words of
+self-reproach: "I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which
+I recognised. That brought down vengeance on me, for it was a sin
+against the Holy Ghost."
+
+If Grey, in the tangle of terrific problems that surrounded him, ever
+erred, his sin was not against the Holy Ghost. The attack made on him at
+the outset of the war by Radical idealists was easy to confute. If ever
+a statesman strove, with due prudence, for peace, for friendship between
+nations, for a transformation of armed rivalries into cordial and
+democratic understandings, our great English Minister was that man. He
+was accused as a maker of secret treaties; and we find him all through
+the times of peace, and through all times when choice was still
+possible, a steady refuser of secret treaties. He was accused as a
+seeker for territory; and we find him, both in war and peace, steadily
+opposing all territorial aggrandisement. Such was the policy approved by
+the leaders of both English parties before the war.
+
+It is an attack from the other side that now reaches him. If the war had
+been short and successful, this would not have occurred. But a long and
+bitter and dangerous war of necessity creates its own atmosphere, and
+the policy that was wisdom in 1913, when the world was at peace and our
+relations with Germany were improving, strikes us now perhaps as
+strangely trustful and generous. Yet, if we try to recover that mental
+calm without which the nations will never till the end of time be able
+to restore their wasted wealth and rebuild the shattered hopes of
+civilisation, I think most Englishmen will agree that Grey's policy was,
+as we all thought it at the time, the right and the wise policy. To let
+all the world know that we would never join in any attack on Germany,
+but would never permit any attack on France; to seek to remove all
+causes of friction between England and Germany, as they had been removed
+between England and France and between England and Russia; to extend the
+"Entente Cordiale" by gradual steps to all nations who would come into
+it, and to "bring the two groups of Europe nearer." This was the right
+policy, whether it succeeded or failed; and it will, in spirit at
+least, some day be the right policy again.
+
+No Englishman, I think, will regret the generous courtesy which sent off
+the German Ambassador with a guard of honour, "like a departing
+sovereign." No one will regret our Prime Minister's silent tears when
+the war became inevitable, or Grey's conviction that it would be "the
+greatest catastrophe in history"--not even if mad German militarists
+drew the conclusion that the only motive for such grief must be the fear
+of defeat. For my own part I am glad that, at the last interview with
+Lichnowsky, Grey assured him that, if ever a chance came of mediation
+between the combatants, he would take it, and that "we have never wished
+to crush Germany."
+
+Surely, even now in the crisis of the war, it is well to remember these
+things. The cleaner our national conscience the keener surely will be
+our will to victory. The slower we were to give up the traditions of
+generosity and trustfulness that came from our long security the firmer
+will be our resolution to hold out, through whatever martyrdom may be
+yet in store for us, until we or our children can afford once more to
+live generously and to trust our neighbours. In the long run no other
+life is worth living.
+
+G. M.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                                 PAGE
+
+MY APPOINTMENT                                                      1
+
+MOROCCO POLICY                                                      2
+
+SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROGRAMME                                         4
+
+THE ALBANIAN QUESTION                                               5
+
+THE NEAR EAST AND THE POLICY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE                 7
+
+THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS                                      10
+
+THE BALKAN CONFERENCE                                              12
+
+THE SECOND BALKAN WAR                                              13
+
+LIMAN VON SANDERS                                                  14
+
+THE COLONIAL TREATY                                                15
+
+THE BAGDAD TREATY                                                  20
+
+THE QUESTION OF THE NAVY                                           21
+
+COMMERCIAL JEALOUSY                                                23
+
+THE COURT AND SOCIETY                                              24
+
+SIR EDWARD GREY                                                    26
+
+MR. ASQUITH                                                        28
+
+NICOLSON                                                           29
+
+TYRRELL                                                            30
+
+ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE                              30
+
+IN CASE OF WAR                                                     31
+
+THE SERBIAN CRISIS                                                 31
+
+THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR                                     37
+
+RETROSPECT                                                         38
+
+MY RETURN                                                          40
+
+THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY                                     40
+
+THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW                                            41
+
+BISMARCK                                                           42
+
+OUR FUTURE                                                         43
+
+
+
+
+MY MISSION TO LONDON
+
+1912-14
+
+
+
+
+MY APPOINTMENT
+
+
+In September, 1912, Baron Marschall died after he had only been at his
+post in London for a few months. His appointment, which no doubt was
+principally due to his age and the desire of his junior officer to go to
+London, was one of the many mistakes of our policy.
+
+In spite of his striking personality and great reputation, he was too
+old and too tired to adjust himself to the Anglo-Saxon world, which was
+completely alien to him; he was rather an official and a lawyer than a
+diplomat and statesman. From the very beginning he was at great pains to
+convince the English of the harmlessness of our fleet, and naturally
+this only produced the contrary effect.
+
+Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in October. I had retired to
+the country as a "Personalreferent" after many years of activity, there
+being then no suitable post available for me. I passed my time between
+flax and turnips, among horses and meadows, read extensively, and
+occasionally published political essays.
+
+Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen since I had left the
+Embassy at Vienna with the rank of Envoy. That had been my last real
+sphere of political activity, as in those days such activity was
+impossible unless one was prepared to help a half-crazy chief in
+drafting his crotchety orders with their crabbed instructions.
+
+I do not know who was responsible for my being appointed to London. It
+was certainly not due to H.M. alone--I was not one of his intimates,
+though he was at all times gracious to me. I also know by experience
+that his nominees generally met with successful opposition. Herr von
+Kiderlen had really wanted to send Herr von Stumm to London! He
+immediately manifested unmistakable ill-will towards me, and endeavoured
+to intimidate me by his incivility. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was at
+that time kindly disposed towards me, and had paid me a visit at Graetz
+only a short time before. I am therefore inclined to think that they all
+agreed on me because no other candidate was available at the moment. But
+for Baron Marschall's unexpected death, I should no more have been
+called out of retirement then than at any other time during all those
+previous years.
+
+
+
+
+MOROCCO POLICY
+
+
+It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to establish better
+relations with England. Our enigmatic Morocco policy had repeatedly
+shaken confidence in our pacific intentions. At the very least, it had
+given rise to the suspicion that we did not quite know what we wanted,
+or that it was our object to keep Europe on the _qui vive_, and, when
+opportunity offered, to humiliate France. An Austrian colleague, who had
+been in Paris for a long time, said to me: "Whenever the French begin to
+forget about _revanche_, you always remind them of it with a jack-boot."
+
+After we had repulsed M. Delcasse's efforts to arrive at an
+understanding with us about Morocco, and prior to that had formally
+declared that we had no political interests there--which conformed to
+the traditions of the Bismarckian policy--we suddenly discovered a
+second Krueger in Abdul Aziz. We assured him also, like the Boers, of the
+protection of the mighty German Empire, with the same display and the
+same result; both demonstrations terminated with our retreat, as they
+were bound to do, if we had not already made up our minds to embark on
+the world-war. The distressing congress at Algeciras could not change
+this in any way, still less the fall of M. Delcasse.
+
+Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later the Anglo-Japanese
+_rapprochement_. In face of "the German Peril" all other differences
+faded into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war
+had become apparent, and such a war could not, as in 1870, leave either
+Russia or England unaffected.
+
+The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown at Algeciras,
+while that of the agreements arrived at there was demonstrated shortly
+afterwards by the collapse of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not
+be prevented. Among the German people, however, the belief gained ground
+that our foreign policy was feeble and was giving way before the
+"Encirclement"--that high-sounding phrases were succeeded by
+pusillanimous surrender.
+
+It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is otherwise overrated as
+a statesman, that he wound up our Moroccan inheritance and accepted as
+they were the facts that could no longer be altered. Whether, indeed, it
+was necessary to alarm the world by the Agadir incident I will leave
+others to say. It was jubilantly acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused
+all the more disquiet in England because the Government were kept
+waiting for three weeks for an explanation of our intentions. Lloyd
+George's speech, which was meant as a warning to us, was the
+consequence. Before Delcasse's fall, and before Algeciras, we might
+have had a harbour and territory on the West Coast, but after those
+events it was impossible.
+
+
+
+
+SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROGRAMME
+
+
+When I came to London in November, 1912, the excitement over Morocco had
+subsided, as an agreement with France had been reached in Berlin. It is
+true that Haldane's mission had failed, as we had required the assurance
+of neutrality, instead of being content with a treaty securing us
+against British attacks and attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward
+Grey had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an agreement with us,
+and in the first place tried to do this in colonial and economic
+questions. Conversations were in progress with the capable and
+business-like Envoy von Kuehlmann concerning the renewal of the
+Portuguese colonial agreement and Mesopotamia (Bagdad Railway), the
+unavowed object of which was to divide both the colonies and Asia Minor
+into spheres of influence.
+
+The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding points of
+difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements
+with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his
+power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had
+succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so
+he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a
+network of treaties, which would in the end no doubt have led to an
+agreement about the troublesome question of naval armaments, to ensure
+the peace of the world, after our previous policy had led to an
+association--the Entente--which represented a mutual insurance against
+the risk of war.
+
+This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words: Without interfering with
+our existing friendship with France and Russia, which has no aggressive
+aims and does not entail any binding obligations on England, to arrive
+at a friendly _rapprochement_ and understanding with Germany, "to bring
+the two groups nearer."
+
+As with us, there were two parties in England at that time--the
+Optimists, who believed in an understanding, and the Pessimists, who
+thought that sooner or later war was inevitable.
+
+The former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the
+Ministers in the Radical Cabinet; also the leading Liberal papers, such
+as the _Westminster Gazette_, _Manchester Guardian_, _Daily Chronicle_.
+The Pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour,
+who repeatedly made this clear to me; also leading Army men, like Lord
+Roberts, who pointed out the necessity of universal military service
+("The Writing on the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe Press and the
+eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin, of _The Observer_. During my
+period of office, however, they abstained from all attacks, and
+maintained both personally and politically a friendly attitude. But our
+naval policy and our attitude in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had aroused in
+them the conviction that after all it would some day come to war. Just
+as it is with us, the former are now being accused in England of
+short-sightedness and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as
+the true prophets.
+
+
+
+
+THE ALBANIAN QUESTION
+
+
+The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey and thus to a
+defeat for our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for a
+number of years. Since Turkey in Europe could no longer be saved, there
+were two ways in which we could deal with the inheritance: either we
+could declare our complete disinterestedness with regard to the frontier
+delimitations and leave the Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could
+support our "Allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the Near
+East, thus giving up the role of mediator.
+
+From the very beginning I advocated the former course, but the Foreign
+Office emphatically favoured the latter.
+
+The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies desired the
+establishment of an independent Albanian state, as the Austrians did not
+want the Serbs to obtain access to the Adriatic, and the Italians did
+not want the Greeks to get to Valona or even to the north of Corfu. As
+opposed to this, Russia, as is known, was backing Serbia's wishes and
+France those of Greece.
+
+My advice was to treat this question as outside the scope of the
+Alliance, and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian claims.
+Without our aid it would have been impossible to set up an independent
+Albania, which, as anyone could foresee, had no prospect of surviving;
+Serbia would have extended to the sea, and the present world-war would
+have been avoided. France and Italy would have quarrelled over Greece,
+and if the Italians had not wanted to fight France unaided they would
+have been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to the north of
+Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is Hellenic. The towns in the south
+are entirely so; and during the Conference of Ambassadors delegations
+from principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation to Greece.
+Even in present-day Greece there are Albanian elements and the so-called
+Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the
+Albanians, who are principally Orthodox and Moslem, in the body of the
+Greek state was therefore the best and most natural solution, if you
+left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic
+reasons H.M. was also in favour of this solution. When I supported this
+view in a letter to the monarch I received agitated reproaches from the
+Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of being "an opponent of
+Austria," and I was to abstain from such interference and direct
+correspondence.
+
+
+
+
+THE NEAR EAST AND THE POLICY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE
+
+
+We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition of pursuing a
+Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and have recognised our
+mistake, which lay in identifying ourselves in the south with the Turks
+and in the north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of this
+policy, upon which we had entered at the Berlin Congress, and which we
+had actively pursued ever since, was bound to lead in time to a conflict
+with Russia and to the world-war, more especially if the requisite
+cleverness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming to terms with
+Russia on a basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom even Petrograd
+did not wish to eject from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to
+our economic interests in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia
+Minor into spheres of influence while renouncing any intention of
+military or political interference, it was our political ambition to
+dominate on the Bosphorus. In Russia they began to think that the road
+to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay _via_ Berlin. Instead of
+supporting the active development of the Balkan States--which, once
+liberated, are anything rather than Russian, and with which our
+experiences had been very satisfactory--we took sides with the Turkish
+and Magyar oppressors.
+
+The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy--which had
+forced Russia, our natural best friend and neighbour, into the arms of
+France and England and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion--was
+the more apparent, as a Franco-Russian attack, which was the _sole_
+hypothesis that justified a Triple Alliance policy, could be left out of
+our calculations.
+
+The value of the Italian alliance needs no further reference. Italy will
+want our money and our tourists even after the war, with or without an
+alliance. That this latter would fail us in case of war was patent
+beforehand. Hence the alliance had _no value_. Austria needs our
+protection in war, as in peace, and has no other support. Her dependence
+on us is based on political, national, and economic considerations, and
+is the greater the more intimate our relations with Russia are. The
+Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since the days of Count Beust no Vienna
+Minister has adopted such a self-confident attitude towards us as Count
+Aehrenthal during the later years of his life. If German policy is
+conducted on right lines, cultivating relations with Russia,
+Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, even without an
+alliance or recompense; if it is wrongly conducted, then we are
+dependent on Austria. Hence there was _no reason_ for the alliance.
+
+I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return to the policy of
+Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable
+there. Little as the Slavs there love us, just as little do they wish to
+return into a German Empire even with a Habsburg-Lorraine emperor at its
+head. They are striving for a federation in Austria on national lines, a
+state of things which would have even less chance of being realised
+within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Germans of
+Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as the centre of German Might and
+Culture, and are well aware that Austria can never again be the leading
+Power. They wish for as intimate a connection with the German Empire as
+possible, not for an anti-German policy.
+
+Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally changed in Austria,
+as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a return to Great German separatism
+and old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so with the former a
+resuscitation of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not
+to be expected. By a federation with Austria, however, which resembles a
+big Belgium, since its population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is
+only about half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if we
+subordinated our policy to the views of Vienna or Budapest--thus
+espousing Austria's quarrels ("_d'epouser les querelles d'Autriche_").
+
+Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the desires of our ally;
+they were not only unnecessary but also dangerous, as they would lead to
+a conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through
+Austrian spectacles.
+
+The development of the alliance, from a union formed on a single
+hypothesis for a single specific purpose, into a general and unlimited
+association, a pooling of interests in all spheres, was the best way of
+producing that which diplomacy was designed to prevent--war. Such an
+"alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from us the sympathies
+of the strong, young, rising communities in the Balkans, who were
+prepared to turn to us and to open their markets to us.
+
+The difference between the power of a Ruling House and a National State,
+between dynastic and democratic ideas of government, had to be decided,
+and as usual we were on the wrong side.
+
+King Carol told one of our representatives that he had entered into the
+alliance with us on the assumption that we retained the leadership; but
+if this passed to Austria, that would alter the foundations of the
+relationship, and under such circumstances he would not be able to go
+on with it.
+
+Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our own economic
+interests, we were supporting the Austrian policy of strangulation.
+
+Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose breakdown could have
+been foreseen: Krueger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied,
+ending--the most fatal of all mistakes--with the great plunge on the
+Berchtold stable.
+
+
+
+
+THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS
+
+
+Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir E. Grey
+proposed an informal conversation to prevent the Balkan War developing
+into a European one, after we had unfortunately refused, on the outbreak
+of the war, to agree to the French proposal of a declaration of
+disinterestedness. The British statesman from the very beginning took up
+the position that England had no interest in Albania, and had no
+intention of going to war over this question. He merely wished to
+mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker" and smooth over
+difficulties. He therefore by no means took sides with the Entente, and
+during the eight months or so of the negotiations his goodwill and his
+authoritative influence contributed in no small degree to the attainment
+of an agreement. We, instead of adopting an attitude similar to the
+English one, invariably took up the position which was prescribed for us
+by Vienna. Count Mensdorff was the leader of the Triple Alliance in
+London; I was his "second." It was my duty to support his proposals.
+That clever and experienced man Count Szoegyenyi was conducting affairs
+in Berlin. His refrain was "Then the _casus foederis_ will arise," and
+when I once ventured to doubt the truth of this conclusion I was
+severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." It was also said that I had an
+"hereditary weakness"--the allusion being to my father.
+
+On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy--about Albania, a
+Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and also about the delimitation
+of the frontiers of Albania--while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the
+French or Russian claims. He mostly supported our group in order not to
+give a pretext like the one a dead Archduke was to furnish later on.
+Thus with his assistance it was possible to coax King Nikita out of
+Scutari again. Otherwise this question would already have led to a
+world-war, as we should certainly not have ventured to induce "our ally"
+to give way.
+
+Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and
+tact. When a question threatened to become involved, he sketched a
+formula for agreement which was to the point and was always accepted.
+His personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants.
+
+As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged from one of those
+trials of strength which characterise our policy. Russia had been
+obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was never in a position
+to procure success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established as a
+vassal state of Austria and Serbia was pressed back from the sea. Hence
+this conference resulted in a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem.
+As in 1878 and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although no
+_German_ interests were involved. Bismarck was clever enough to mitigate
+the mistake of the Congress by the secret treaty and by his attitude in
+the Battenberg question; but we continued to pursue in London the
+dangerous path, upon which we had once more entered in the Bosnian
+question, nor did we leave it in time when it led to the precipice.
+
+The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown during
+the conference by attacks in the Russian Press against my Russian
+colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital
+of his German descent and Roman Catholicism, his reputation as a friend
+of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff
+and to me. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count
+Benckendorff is endowed with a number of qualifications that distinguish
+a good diplomat--tact, polished manners, experience, courtesy, and a
+natural eye for men and matters. He was always at pains to avoid a
+brusque attitude, and was supported in this by England and France.
+
+Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Russian feeling is very
+anti-German." He replied: "There are also very strong and influential
+pro-German circles, but in general people are anti-Austrian."
+
+It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie a outrance"
+(friendship for Austria through thick and thin) was hardly calculated to
+loosen the Entente and to direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests!
+
+
+
+
+THE BALKAN CONFERENCE
+
+
+At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting in London and I had
+occasion to come into contact with the leaders of the Balkan States. M.
+Venizelos was certainly the most distinguished personality. At that time
+he was anything rather than anti-German, and visited me several times;
+he was especially fond of wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red
+Eagle--he even wore it at the French Embassy. His prepossessing charm
+and ways of a man of the world secured him much sympathy. Next to him M.
+Daneff, at that time Bulgarian Premier and confidant of Count Berchtold,
+played a great part. He gave the impression of a subtle and energetic
+man, and it is probably only due to the influence of his Vienna and
+Budapest friends, of whose homage he often made fun, that he was induced
+to commit the folly of entering upon the second Balkan War and of
+refusing Russian arbitration.
+
+M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London and then visited me
+regularly. I knew him from the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest.
+He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was
+endeavouring to obtain concessions to Rumania from M. Daneff by means of
+negotiations, in which he was assisted by the very able Rumanian
+Ambassador Misu. It is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about the
+failure of these negotiations. Count Berchtold (and we of course with
+him) was entirely on Bulgaria's side, otherwise by putting pressure on
+M. Daneff we might have secured the desired satisfaction for Rumania and
+placed her under an obligation to us; she was finally estranged from the
+Central Powers by Austria's attitude during and after the second Balkan
+War.
+
+
+
+
+THE SECOND BALKAN WAR
+
+
+The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War and the victory of
+Serbia, with the Rumanian invasion, naturally constituted a humiliation
+for Austria. The plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia
+seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon after. The Italian revelations
+prove this, and it may be assumed that Marquis San Giuliano, who
+described the plan--most aptly--as a _pericolosissima aventura_, saved
+us from being involved in a world-war as early as the summer of 1913.
+
+Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the Vienna plan was
+doubtless known in Petrograd. In any case, M. Sazonow openly declared at
+Constanza, as M. Take Jonescu told me, that an Austrian attack on Serbia
+would be a _casus belli_ for Russia.
+
+When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna in the spring of 1914
+he said that Herr von Tschirschky had declared that there would soon be
+war. As I, however, was always left in ignorance about important events
+I considered this pessimism to be unfounded.
+
+As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since the peace of
+Bucharest, Vienna was bent on securing a revision of the treaty by her
+own effort and was apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext.
+Vienna statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. They were
+aware of that, as they had been repeatedly accused of lack of firmness.
+In fact, Berlin was pressing for a "rehabilitation of Austria."
+
+
+
+
+LIMAN VON SANDERS
+
+
+When I returned to London in December, 1913, from a lengthy leave, the
+Liman von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis in our relations
+with Russia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the
+excitement there was in Petrograd over it: "I have never seen them so
+excited."
+
+I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exert a
+restraining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in settling the
+dispute. Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in
+no small degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations with Sir
+Edward and his great influence in Petrograd were repeatedly made use of
+in similar manner when we wished to attain anything there, as our
+representative proved himself quite useless for such a purpose.
+
+During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "When you
+want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I
+appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you fail me."
+
+
+
+
+THE COLONIAL TREATY
+
+
+The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in
+establishing, not only with society and the most influential people like
+Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with the great public at public
+dinners, produced a marked improvement in the relations of the two
+countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm this _rapprochement_,
+and his intentions were most apparent on two questions--the Colonial and
+the Bagdad Railway Treaties.
+
+In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a secret agreement
+dividing the Portuguese colonies into economic spheres of influence
+between us and England. As the Government of Portugal had neither the
+power nor the means to open up her extended possessions or to administer
+them properly, she had already thought of selling them before and thus
+relieving her financial burdens. An agreement had been come to between
+us and England which defined the interests of both parties, and which
+was of the greater value because Portugal is entirely dependent on
+England, as is generally known.
+
+On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard the integrity and
+independence of the Portuguese State, and merely declared the intention
+of being of financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese.
+Literally, therefore, it did not contravene the ancient Anglo-Portuguese
+Alliance of the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles
+II. and gave a reciprocal territorial guarantee.
+
+In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis Soveral, who was
+presumably aware of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty--the
+so-called Treaty of Windsor--was concluded between England and Portugal
+in 1899, confirming the old agreements, which had always remained in
+force.
+
+The object of negotiations between us and England, which had commenced
+before my arrival, was to amend and improve our agreement of 1898, as it
+had proved unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical
+delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of the British
+Government I succeeded in making the new agreement fully accord with our
+wishes and interests. The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of
+longitude was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo State
+from the south; we also acquired the valuable islands of San Thome and
+Principe, which are north of the Equator and therefore really in the
+French sphere of influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to
+enter strong but unavailing protests.
+
+Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed
+the border.
+
+The British Government showed the greatest consideration for our
+interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill
+towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a
+whole, as England hoped to divert the German development of strength
+from the North Sea and Western Europe to the Ocean and to Africa. "We
+don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the
+Cabinet said to me.
+
+The British Government originally intended to include the Congo State in
+the agreement, which would have given us the right of pre-emption and
+enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused this offer nominally
+in view of Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps we wished to be economical
+of successes? With regard also to the practical realisation of its real
+though unexpressed intention--the later actual partition of the
+Portuguese colonies--the treaty in its new form showed marked
+improvements and advantages as compared with the old one. Cases had been
+specified which empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in
+the districts assigned to us. These were couched in such a manner that
+it was really left to us to decide when "vital" interests arose, so
+that, with Portugal entirely dependent on England, it was only necessary
+to cultivate further good relations with England in order to carry out
+our joint intentions at a later date with English assent.
+
+Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's desire to
+respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who wished to invest
+capital and asked for the support of the British Government in the
+districts assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this was
+completed and signed, and by informing them that their enterprise
+belonged to our sphere of influence.
+
+The agreement was practically completed at the time of the King's visit
+to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time a conference took place in Berlin
+under the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor; in this conference I
+also took part, and certain further wishes of ours were defined. On my
+return to London I succeeded, with the assistance of Councillor of
+Legation von Kuehlmann, who was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker,
+in having our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole agreement
+could be paragraphed by Sir E. Grey and by me in August, 1913, before I
+went on leave.
+
+But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented its being signed, and I
+did not obtain the authorisation to conclude it till a year later--that
+is, shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was, however, never
+signed.
+
+Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign _if the agreement were published
+together with those of 1898 and 1899_. England had, as he said, no other
+secret treaties besides these, and it was contrary to established
+principles to keep binding agreements secret. Therefore he could not
+make any agreement without publishing it. He was, however, willing to
+accede to our wishes with regard to the time and manner of publication,
+provided that such publication took place within one year from the date
+of signature.
+
+At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had caused increasing
+dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, who acted the part
+of Herr von Holstein, wanted the London post for himself, I was informed
+that the publication would endanger our interests in the colonies, as
+the Portuguese would then not give us any more concessions.
+
+The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration that
+the Portuguese, in view of the closeness of Anglo-Portuguese relations,
+were most probably just as well aware of the old agreement as of our new
+arrangements, and that the influence which England possesses at Lisbon
+renders their Government completely impotent in face of an Anglo-German
+agreement.
+
+Another pretext had therefore to be found for wrecking the treaty. It
+was suggested that the publication of the Treaty of Windsor, which had
+been concluded during the time of Prince Hohenlohe--though it was only a
+renewal of the Treaty of Charles II., which had always remained in
+force--might endanger the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as a
+proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy!
+
+I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed the same
+thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as other similar treaties, namely,
+that we would protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the
+inviolability of its possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated
+discussions with Sir E. Grey, at which he made many fresh suggestions
+for the publication, the Foreign Office persisted in its attitude, and
+finally arranged with Sir E. Goschen that matters should be left as they
+were!
+
+The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages, the result of
+more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a
+public success for me.
+
+When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a dinner at the Embassy
+in the spring of 1914, the Minister for the Colonies told me that he was
+placed in a difficult position, and did not know how to act. The present
+position was intolerable--he wished to safeguard our interests, but was
+in doubt whether he should proceed on the terms of the old or the new
+treaty. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear up the situation
+and to settle the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time.
+
+In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instructions couched in
+terms which showed more emotion than civility, telling me to abstain
+from any further interference in the matter.
+
+I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin and place my
+post at the disposal of the monarch, and that I had not lost faith in
+the possibility of arriving at an understanding with those in authority,
+a sinister mistake which was to take its revenge a few months later in
+such a tragical way.
+
+However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the highest official
+of the Empire, as he feared that I was aspiring to his post, yet I must
+in justice to him say that during our last interview before the outbreak
+of war, at the end of June, 1914, to which I will refer later, he gave
+me his assent for the signature and publication of the treaty. In spite
+of this it required repeated applications on my part, which were
+supported by Herr Dr. Solf in Berlin, before sanction was finally
+obtained at the end of July, 1914. As the Serbian crisis at that time
+already imperilled the peace of Europe, the completion of the treaty had
+to be postponed. It also is one of the sacrifices of this war.
+
+
+
+
+THE BAGDAD TREATY
+
+
+At the same time I was negotiating in London, with the able support of
+Herr von Kuehlmann, about the so-called Bagdad Treaty. The real object of
+this was to divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although
+this term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights of the Sultan. Sir
+E. Grey also repeatedly stated that there were in existence no
+agreements with France and Russia about the partition of Asia Minor.
+
+In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic
+questions concerning German undertakings were settled in the main
+according to the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important
+concession Sir E. Grey made to me personally was the continuation of the
+railway as far as Basra. We had dropped this point in favour of the
+connection to Alexandretta; up to that time Bagdad had been the terminal
+point of the railway. An international commission was to regulate
+navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have a share in the
+harbour works at Basra, and received rights for the navigation of the
+Tigris, which hitherto had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.
+
+By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra was included
+within our sphere of influence (without prejudice to already existing
+British navigation rights on the Tigris and the rights of the Wilcox
+irrigation works), as well as the whole district of the Bagdad and
+Anatolian railway.
+
+The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway were
+recognised as the British economic sphere, Syria as the French, and
+Armenia as the Russian. If both treaties were executed and published, an
+agreement with England would be reached which would preclude all doubts
+about the possibility of an "Anglo-German co-operation."
+
+
+
+
+THE QUESTION OF THE NAVY
+
+
+The Naval question was and is the most delicate of all. It is not always
+regarded rightly.
+
+The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of the North Sea--the
+development of the greatest military power of the Continent into the
+greatest naval power as well--was bound to be felt in England as at
+least "inconvenient." There can be no doubt about this in any reasonable
+view. In order to maintain her advantage and not to become dependent, in
+order to secure the rule over the seas which is necessary for her if she
+is not to starve, she was compelled to undertake armaments and
+expenditure which weighed heavily on the tax-payer. England's
+international position would be threatened, however, if our policy
+created the belief that warlike developments might ensue--a state of
+affairs which had almost been reached during the time of the Morocco
+crises and the Bosnian problem.
+
+Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet _within its then
+appointed limits_, but it was certainly not welcome, and was one of the
+causes--though not the only cause and perhaps not the most important--of
+her adhesion to France and Russia; but on account of the fleet _alone_
+England would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our
+trade, which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war.
+
+From the very beginning I maintained that, _notwithstanding_ the fleet,
+it would be possible to arrive at a friendly understanding and
+_rapprochement_ if we did not introduce a new Navy Bill and _our policy
+were indubitably pacific_. I also avoided mention of the fleet and the
+word never passed between Sir E. Grey and me. On one occasion Sir E.
+Grey said at a meeting of the Cabinet, "The present German Ambassador
+has never mentioned the fleet to me."
+
+During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the
+Admiralty, proposed, as is known, the so-called "Naval holiday" and
+suggested for financial reasons, and probably also to meet the pacific
+wishes of his party, a year's pause in armaments. Officially Sir E. Grey
+did not support the proposal; he never mentioned it to me, but Mr.
+Churchill repeatedly spoke to me about it.
+
+I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as prevarication is
+altogether foreign to English nature. It would have been a great success
+for Mr. Churchill if he could have come before the country with
+reductions of expenditure and freed it from the nightmare of armaments
+that weighed on the people.
+
+I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult to agree to
+his plan. What was to become of the workmen who were engaged for this
+purpose, and what of the technical staff? Our Naval programme had been
+decided on, and it would be difficult to alter it in any way. On the
+other hand we had no intention of exceeding it. But he reverted to it
+again and pointed out that the sums used for enormous armaments might
+better be employed for other and useful purposes. I replied that this
+expenditure too benefited our home industries.
+
+Through interviews with Sit W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's principal private
+secretary, I managed to have the question removed from the agenda
+without causing any ill-feeling, although it was again referred to in
+Parliament, and to prevent any official proposal being made. It was,
+however, a pet idea of Mr. Churchill's and the Government's, and I think
+that by entering upon his plan and the formula 16:10 for battleships we
+might have given tangible proof of our goodwill, and strengthened and
+encouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the Government) to
+enter into closer relations with us.
+
+But, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an understanding _in
+spite of the fleet_ and without a "Naval holiday." I had always regarded
+my mission from this point of view, and I had also succeeded in
+realising my plans when the outbreak of war destroyed everything I had
+achieved.
+
+
+
+
+COMMERCIAL JEALOUSY
+
+
+The "commercial jealousy," about which we hear so much, is based on a
+wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a
+commercial power after the war of 1870 and during the following decades
+was a menace to British commercial circles which, with their industries
+and export-houses, had held a virtual monopoly of trade. The increasing
+commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as
+regards British exports--a fact to which I invariably referred in my
+public speeches--had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain
+friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and had
+driven all other considerations into the background.
+
+The Briton is matter-of-fact--he takes things as they are and does not
+tilt against windmills. Notably in commercial circles I encountered the
+most friendly spirit and the endeavour to further our common economic
+interests. As a matter of fact nobody in them took any interest in the
+Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even in the French representative, in
+spite of his striking personality and his political successes. Only the
+German and American Ambassadors attracted public attention.
+
+In order to get into touch with important commercial circles, I accepted
+invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, and from the London
+and Bradford Chamber, and was the guest of the cities of Newcastle and
+Liverpool. I was well received everywhere; Manchester, Glasgow, and
+Edinburgh had also invited me, and I intended to go there later.
+
+People who did not understand British conditions and did not realise the
+importance of "public dinners," also people to whom my successes were
+unwelcome, reproached me with having done harm with my speeches. I
+believe on the contrary that by appearing in public and emphasising
+common commercial interests I contributed in no small measure to the
+improvement of relations, quite apart from the fact that it would have
+been clumsy and churlish to refuse all invitations.
+
+In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and
+hearty co-operation--at Court, in society, and from the Government.
+
+
+
+
+THE COURT AND SOCIETY
+
+
+The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well-meaning man with
+sound common sense; he demonstrated his goodwill towards me and was
+frankly desirous of furthering my task. Although the British
+Constitution leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the
+monarch, in virtue of his position, can exercise a considerable
+influence on opinion both in society and in the Government. The Crown is
+the apex of the social pyramid; it sets the fashion. Society, which is
+principally Unionist (Conservative), has always taken an active interest
+in politics a habit which the ladies share. It is represented in the
+House of Lords, the House of Commons, and hence also in the Cabinet. An
+Englishman either is a member of society, or he would like to be one. It
+is his constant endeavour to be a "Gentleman," and even people of
+undistinguished origin, like Mr. Asquith, delight to mingle in society
+and the company of beautiful and fashionable women.
+
+The British gentlemen of both parties have the same education, go to
+the same colleges and universities, have the same recreations--golf,
+cricket, lawn-tennis, or polo. All have played cricket and football in
+their youth; they have the same habits of life, and spend the week-end
+in the country. There is no social cleavage between the parties, but
+only a political one; in recent years it has so far developed into a
+social cleavage that the politicians of the two camps avoid social
+intercourse with one another. Even on the neutral territory of an
+Embassy one did not venture to mingle the two parties, as since the Veto
+and Home Rule Bills the Unionists have ostracised the Radicals. When the
+King and Queen dined with us a few months after my arrival, Lord
+Londonderry left the house after dinner, as he did not wish to remain
+together with Sir E. Grey. But it is not a difference of caste or
+education as in France; they are not two separate worlds, but the same
+world, and the opinion about a foreigner is a common one, and not
+without influence on his political position, whether Mr. Asquith be
+governing or Lord Lansdowne.
+
+There has been no difference of caste in England since the time of the
+Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and Whig oligarchy, in contrast to the
+Tory landed gentry encouraged the rise of an urban middle-class. It is
+rather a difference of political opinions about questions of
+constitutional law and taxation. Especially aristocrats like Grey,
+Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, who joined the people's party--the
+Radicals--were most hated by the Unionist aristocracy; one never met any
+of these gentlemen at any of the great aristocratic houses, except at
+those of a few party friends.
+
+We were received in London with open arms and both parties rivalled one
+another in courtesy towards us. In view of the close relationship
+between politics and society in England, it would be wrong to
+undervalue social relations, even when the majority of the upper ten
+thousand are in opposition to the Government.
+
+There is not the same unbridgeable gulf between Mr. Asquith and the Duke
+of Devonshire that there is between, say, M. Briand and the Due de
+Doudeauville. Certainly they do not consort together in times of great
+tension; they belong to two separate social groups, but these are parts
+of the _same_ society, though of different grades, the centre of which
+is the Court. They have common friends and habits of life; mostly they
+have known each other from their youth up and also are frequently
+related to one another either by blood or marriage.
+
+Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George--the man of the people, petty attorney,
+and self-made man--are the exception. Even Mr. Burns, the Socialist
+Labour leader, and self-educated man, sought contact with society. In
+view of the prevailing attempt to rank as a gentleman, whose unattained
+prototype is still the great aristocrat, the value of the verdict of
+society and its attitude must not be underestimated.
+
+Hence the social adaptability of a representative nowhere plays a
+greater role than in England. A hospitable house with pleasant hosts is
+worth more than the most profound scientific knowledge; a savant with
+provincial manners and small means would gain no influence, in spite of
+all his learning.
+
+The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; he likes a good
+fellow.
+
+
+
+
+SIR EDWARD GREY
+
+
+Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign policy was almost
+unlimited. On important occasions he used indeed to say, "I must first
+bring it before the Cabinet"; but this always agreed to his views. His
+authority was undisputed. Although he does not know foreign countries
+at all, and had never left England except for a short visit to Paris, he
+was fully conversant with all the important questions owing to his long
+parliamentary experience and his natural insight. He understands French,
+but does not speak it. He was returned to Parliament as a young man, and
+soon began to interest himself in foreign affairs. Under Lord Rosebery
+he was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and became
+Secretary of State in 1906, under Mr. Campbell-Bannerman; he has now
+held the post for some ten years.
+
+The scion of an old north country family, which had already furnished
+Grey, the well-known statesman, he joined the left wing of his party and
+sympathised with Socialists and pacifists. You may call him a Socialist
+in the ideal sense, as he carries the theory into his private life and
+lives very simply and unpretentiously, although he has extensive means.
+Ostentation is foreign to him. In London he only had a small house, and
+never gave dinners, except the one official dinner at the Foreign Office
+on the King's Birthday. On the few occasions when he entertained guests
+it was at a simple dinner or lunch with maidservants to wait. Also he
+avoided large functions and banquets.
+
+Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends in the country,
+but not with large or fashionable parties. He is mostly by himself in
+his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long walks to study birds
+and their ways, as he is a passionate lover of nature and an
+ornithologist. Or sometimes he goes to his estate in the north, where he
+feeds the squirrels that come in at the windows, and breeds different
+species of waterfowl.
+
+He was very fond of going to the Norfolk marshes to watch in their
+breeding season the rare kinds of herons, which nest only there.
+
+In his youth he was a well-known cricket and racquet player; now his
+favourite pastime is salmon and trout-fishing in Scottish rivers in
+company with his friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law.
+"All the rest of the year I am looking forward to it." He has published
+a book on fishing.
+
+On one occasion, when we spent a week-end with him alone at Lord
+Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived on a bicycle and returned to
+his cottage about thirty miles distant in the same way.
+
+The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the esteem even of
+his opponents, who were to be found rather in the sphere of home affairs
+than of foreign policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him.
+
+His wife, to whom he was devotedly attached and from whom he was
+inseparable, died in consequence of being thrown from a trap she was
+driving. As is generally known, one of his brothers was killed by a
+lion.
+
+Wordsworth is his favourite poet, and he could quote much of his poetry.
+
+The calm quiet of his British nature is not lacking in a sense of
+humour. Once when he was lunching with us and the children, and heard
+them talking German, he said, "I can't help thinking how clever these
+children are to talk German so well," and was pleased with his joke.
+
+This is a true picture of the man who is decried as "Liar-Grey" and
+instigator of the world-war.
+
+
+
+
+MR. ASQUITH
+
+
+Mr. Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. A jovial
+_bon-vivant_, fond of the ladies, especially the young and pretty ones,
+he is partial to cheerful society and good cooking; and his zest for
+enjoyment is shared by his wife. Formerly a well-known barrister with a
+large income, and for a number of years in Parliament, then a Minister
+under Mr. Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and favouring an
+understanding with Germany, he treated all questions with the cheery
+calm and assurance of an experienced man of business, whose good health
+and excellent nerves were steeled by devotion to the game of golf.
+
+His daughters were at school in Germany and spoke German fluently. In a
+short time we got on friendly terms with him and his family, and were
+his guests in his small country house on the Thames.
+
+Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with foreign politics,
+when important questions arose; then of course his decision was final.
+During the critical days of July Mrs. Asquith repeatedly came to us to
+warn us, and in the end she was quite distraught at the tragic turn of
+events. Mr. Asquith also, when I called on him on the 2nd August to make
+a last effort in the direction of expectant neutrality, was quite
+broken, though absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his cheeks.
+
+
+
+
+NICOLSON
+
+
+Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell were the two most influential men at
+the Foreign Office after the Minister. The former was no friend of ours,
+but his attitude towards me was absolutely correct and courteous. Our
+personal relations were excellent. He too did not want war; but when we
+advanced against France, he no doubt worked in the direction of an
+immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague,
+with whom he was in constant touch; also he wished to relieve Lord
+Bertie in Paris.
+
+Sir Arthur, who had been Ambassador at Petrograd, had concluded the
+treaty of 1907, which had enabled Russia again to turn her attention to
+the West and to the Near East.
+
+
+
+
+TYRRELL
+
+
+Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, possessed far greater
+influence than the Permanent Under-Secretary. This highly intelligent
+man had been at school in Germany, and had then turned to diplomacy, but
+had only been abroad for a short time. At first he favoured the
+anti-German policy, which was then in fashion amongst the younger
+British diplomatists, but later he became a convinced advocate of an
+understanding. He influenced Sir E. Grey, with whom he was very
+intimate, in this direction. Since the outbreak of war he has left the
+Office and found a place in the Home Office, probably because of the
+criticisms passed on him for his Germanophil tendency.
+
+
+
+
+ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE
+
+
+Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London
+successes and the position which I had managed to make for myself in a
+short time. They devised vexatious instructions to render my office more
+difficult. I was left in complete ignorance of the most important
+matters, and was restricted to the communication of dull and unimportant
+reports. Secret agents' reports, on matters about which I could not
+learn without espionage and the necessary funds, were never available to
+me; and it was not till the last days of July, 1914, that I learnt,
+quite by chance, from the Naval Attache of the secret Anglo-French
+agreement concerning the co-operation of the two fleets in case of war.
+The knowledge of other important events which had been known to the
+Office for a long time, like the correspondence between Grey and Cambon,
+was kept from me.
+
+
+
+
+IN CASE OF WAR
+
+
+Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that under _no_
+circumstances had we to fear a British attack or British support for any
+foreign attack, but that _under any circumstances England would protect
+the French_. I expressed this view in repeated dispatches, with minute
+proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain any credence, although Lord
+Haldane's refusal to assent to the neutrality formula and England's
+attitude during the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications.
+In addition there were the secret agreements which I have referred to,
+and which were known to the Office.
+
+I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European Powers,
+England as a commercial state would suffer enormously, and would
+therefore do her best to prevent a conflict; but, on the other hand, she
+would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of France; because of
+the necessity of maintaining the European balance of power and of
+preventing a German superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this
+shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people had expressed
+themselves in the same sense.
+
+
+
+
+THE SERBIAN CRISIS
+
+
+At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of the Emperor. A few weeks
+prior to this I had been made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an honour
+which had not been conferred on any German Ambassador since Herr von
+Bunsen. On board the _Meteor_ we learned of the death of the Archduke.
+H.M. regretted that his efforts to win him over to his way of thinking
+had thus been rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan of an active
+policy against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt.
+
+As I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not
+attach very great importance to this occurrence. Later on I could only
+remark that amongst Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed
+other sentiments. On board the _Meteor_ there was also an Austrian guest
+of the Emperor's, Count Felix Thun. He had remained in his cabin all the
+time suffering from sea-sickness, in spite of the splendid weather; but
+on receiving the news he was well. The fright or joy had cured him.
+
+On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told him that I
+considered the state of our foreign relations very satisfactory, as we
+were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time,
+whilst in France also the government was in the hands of a pacifist
+Ministry.
+
+Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share my optimism, and
+complained about Russian armaments. I sought to reassure him,
+emphasising the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and
+that such an attack would never receive Anglo-French support, as both
+countries wanted peace. Thereupon I went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was
+acting for Herr von Jagow, and he told me that Russia was about to raise
+900,000 additional troops. His language betrayed unmistakable annoyance
+with Russia, which was "everywhere in our way." There were also
+difficulties in economic policy. Of course, I was not told that General
+von Moltke was pressing for war; but I learned that Herr von Tschirschky
+had been reprimanded because he reported that he had counselled
+moderation towards Serbia in Vienna.
+
+On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only a few hours in
+Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia
+in order to put an end to an impossible situation.
+
+I regret that at the moment I underestimated the importance of the news.
+I thought that nothing would come of it this time either, and that
+matters could easily be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I
+now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare that I
+would not co-operate in a policy of this kind.
+
+Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive conference at Potsdam
+on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry received the unqualified assent of
+all the leading people, and with the rider that no harm would be done if
+a war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in
+the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Soon
+afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about
+all these matters.
+
+At that time I received instructions to induce the British Press to
+adopt a friendly attitude should Austria administer the _coup de grace_
+to the "Great Serbia" movement, and to exert my personal influence to
+prevent public opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. If one
+remembered England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public
+opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her
+benevolent furtherance of national movements in the days of Lord Byron
+and Garibaldi, the probability that she would support the intended
+punitive expedition against the murderers of the prince happened so
+remote, that I found myself obliged to give an urgent warning. But I
+also warned them against the whole plan, which I characterised as
+adventurous and dangerous, and advised them to counsel the Austrians to
+_moderation_, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localised.
+
+Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready; there would
+probably be some fuss, but the more firmly we took sides with Austria
+the more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of
+weakness and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. Public
+opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more
+anti-German, so we must just risk it.
+
+In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was based on reports
+from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move under any circumstances,
+and which caused us to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I
+hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew that Sir E.
+Grey's great influence in Petrograd could be used in the direction of
+peace. I therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the
+Minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in
+case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia.
+
+At first the English Press preserved calm and was friendly to Austria,
+because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more
+voices were heard insisting emphatically that, however much the crime
+merited punishment, its exploitation for political purposes could not be
+justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation.
+
+When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with the exception of
+the _Standard_--the ever-necessitous, which had apparently been bought
+by Austria--were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting
+Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war--indeed, "the world-war."
+The British Fleet, which happened to have assembled for a naval review,
+was not demobilised.
+
+My efforts were in the first place directed towards obtaining as
+conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the attitude of
+the Russian Government left room for no doubts about the gravity of the
+situation.
+
+Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as M. Pasitch had
+really agreed to everything, excepting two points, about which, however,
+he declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had
+wanted the war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have
+been enough, and the unprecedented Note would not have been answered.
+
+Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed out the
+conciliatory attitude of the Government of Belgrade. Thereupon we
+discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula
+acceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal
+was that a committee, consisting of M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali,
+and myself, should assemble under his presidency, and it would have been
+an easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the points at
+issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial
+officials at the investigations in Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything
+could have been settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance
+of the British proposal would have brought about a relaxation of the
+tension, and would have further improved our relations with England. I
+therefore strongly backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise
+there was danger of the world-war, through which we stood to gain
+nothing and lose all; but in vain. It was derogatory to the dignity of
+Austria--we did not intend to interfere in Serbian matters--we left
+these to our ally. I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict."
+
+Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count
+Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success, and to accept
+the Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the contrary they urged
+in the direction of war. It would have been such a splendid success.
+
+After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit a proposal. We
+insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply but that Austria had shown
+an exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of
+territory.
+
+Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an extension of
+territory it is possible to reduce a state to a condition of vassalage,
+and that Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would not suffer
+it.
+
+The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any
+circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude, on a
+question which did not directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent
+requests and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed by the Czar's
+positively humble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the
+warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent
+counsels, all were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be
+massacred.
+
+The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, if only
+that I might not have the success of averting war in conjunction with
+Sir Edward Grey.
+
+Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I
+replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon
+with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the
+Minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest
+catastrophe the world has ever seen."
+
+After that, events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count
+Berchtold, who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin, played the
+strong man, decided to come round, we replied to the Russian
+mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in
+vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.
+
+
+
+
+THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR
+
+
+Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding the catastrophe.
+Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the morning of the 1st August to tell me
+that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if
+France did? I understood that we should then agree to spare France, but
+he had meant that we should remain altogether neutral--towards Russia
+also. That was the well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked
+me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, he
+called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to him at
+once. In the afternoon, however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality
+and the possibility that we and France might face one another in arms
+without attacking.
+
+Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any
+guarantee, as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take
+place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the
+interview, made this report the foundation for far-reaching measures.
+Then there came M. Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's
+telegram. The waverers in the Cabinet--excepting three members who
+resigned--were converted.
+
+Till the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting
+attitude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I heard
+from a private source. Even on the 1st August the King had given the
+President an evasive reply. But England was already mentioned as an
+opponent in the telegram from Berlin announcing the imminent danger of
+war. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England.
+
+Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 5th, at his house. I
+had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He told me he would
+always be prepared to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany."
+Unfortunately this confidential interview was made public, and Herr von
+Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed the last chance of gaining peace through
+England.
+
+The arrangements for our departure were perfectly dignified and calm.
+The King had previously sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express
+his regrets at my departure and that he could not see me himself.
+Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family were sorry we were
+leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the Embassy to take
+leave.
+
+A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was drawn up
+for me. I was treated like a departing Sovereign. Such was the end of my
+London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, but by
+the wiles of our policy.
+
+Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station in London. He was
+cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain there,
+but he told the English that we, and not Austria, had wanted the war.
+
+
+
+
+RETROSPECT
+
+
+Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion that I realised
+too late that there was no room for me in a system that for years had
+lived on routine and traditions alone, and that only tolerated
+representatives who reported what their superiors wished to read.
+Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are resented. Lack of
+ability and want of character are praised and esteemed, while successes
+meet with disfavour and excite alarm.
+
+I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance policy, as I
+realised that it was useless, and that my warnings were attributed to
+"Austrophobia," to my _idee fixe_. In politics, which are neither
+acrobatics nor a game, but the main business of the firm, there is no
+"phil" or "phobe," but only the interest of the community. A policy,
+however, that is based only on Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must come
+into conflict with Russia, and finally lead to a catastrophe.
+
+In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been put right in
+July, 1914. An agreement with England had been arrived at. We ought to
+have sent a representative to Petrograd who was at least of average
+political capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we wished neither
+to control the straits nor to strangle Serbia. "_Lachez l'Autriche et
+nous lacherons les Francais_" ("Drop Austria and we will drop the
+French"), M. Sazonow said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow,
+"_Vous n'avez pas besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout_" ("You need not
+follow Austria everywhere").
+
+We wanted _neither wars nor alliances_; we wanted only treaties that
+would safeguard us and others, and secure our economic development,
+which was without its like in history. If Russia had been freed in the
+West, she could again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry
+would have been re-established automatically and without our
+intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese.
+
+We could also have considered the question of the reduction of
+armaments, and need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian
+complications. Then Austria would have become the vassal of the German
+Empire, without any alliance--and especially without our seeking her
+good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war for the liberation
+of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interest
+demanded the exact contrary.
+
+I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised.
+That brought down vengeance on me, because it was a sin against the Holy
+Ghost.
+
+
+
+
+MY RETURN
+
+
+As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be made the scapegoat
+for the catastrophe for which our Government had made itself responsible
+against my advice and warnings.
+
+The report was deliberately circulated in official quarters that I had
+allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. Grey, because, if he had not
+wanted war, Russia would not have mobilised. Count Pourtales, whose
+reports could be relied on, was to be protected, not least on account of
+his relationship. He had conducted himself "magnificently," he was
+praised enthusiastically, and I was blamed the more severely.
+
+"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me after
+eight years in office at Petrograd. The whole thing was a British trick
+that I had not noticed. At the Foreign Office they told me that war
+would in any case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have been ready;
+therefore it was better now.
+
+
+
+
+THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
+
+
+As is evident from all official publications--and this is not refuted by
+our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its
+omissions, is a gravely self-accusing document--
+
+     1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German
+     interests were not involved and the danger of a world-war must have
+     been known to us. Whether we were aware of the wording of the
+     Ultimatum is completely immaterial.
+
+     2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, 1914, when M.
+     Sazonow emphatically declared that he would not tolerate any attack
+     on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although
+     Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost
+     the whole of the Ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two
+     points at issue could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold
+     was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.
+
+     3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms,
+     we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the Russian
+     mobilisation, although Austria had not been attacked; and on the
+     31st July we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged his
+     word that he would not order a man to march as long as negotiations
+     were proceeding--thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a
+     peaceful settlement.
+
+In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that the whole of
+the civilised world outside Germany places the entire responsibility for
+the world-war upon our shoulders.
+
+
+
+
+THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW
+
+
+Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare that they will
+not rest before a system is destroyed which is a constant menace to our
+neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years' time they
+will again have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun
+and their towns and villages destroyed? Have not they proved to be right
+who declared that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi governed the
+German people, that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not
+loathe it as an evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, the
+warrior caste, still rule and form ideals and values, not the civilian
+gentleman; that the love of the duel which animates our academic youth
+still persists in those who control the destinies of the people? Did not
+the Zabern incident and the parliamentary discussions about it clearly
+demonstrate to foreign countries the value we place on the rights and
+liberties of the citizen if these collide with questions of military
+power?
+
+That intelligent historian Cramb, who has since died, an admirer of
+Germany, clothed the German conception in the words of Euphorion:
+
+    Dream ye of peace?[1]
+    Dream he that will--
+    War is the rallying cry!
+    Victory is the refrain.
+
+[Footnote 1: The original has "war," presumably owing to a
+misprint.--TRANSLATOR.]
+
+Militarism, which by rights is an education for the people and an
+instrument of policy, turns policy into the instrument of military power
+when the patriarchal absolutism of the soldier-kingdom makes possible an
+attitude which a democracy, remote from military Junker influence, would
+never have permitted.
+
+So think our enemies, and so they must think when they see that, in
+spite of capitalistic industrialisation and in spite of socialist
+organisation, "the living are still ruled by the dead," as Friedrich
+Nietzsche says. The principal war aim of our enemies, the
+democratisation of Germany, will be realised!
+
+
+
+
+BISMARCK
+
+
+Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman he
+avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognised. He was content
+with bloodless battles. After he had, in rapid succession, vanquished
+Christian, Francis Joseph, and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius,
+and Augusta. That did not suffice him. Gortschakow, who thought himself
+the greater, had repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost
+to the point of war--even by depriving him of his railway saloon. This
+gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. At last came the conflict
+with William, in which the mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was
+vanquished by Alexander.
+
+Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded on a
+constitutional basis and not on an international one. They are all the
+more questionable if the partner is feeble. Bismarck never meant the
+Alliance to take this form.
+
+He always treated the English with forbearance; he knew that this was
+wiser. He always paid marked respect to the old Queen Victoria, despite
+his hatred of her daughter and of political Anglomania; the learned
+Beaconsfield and the worldly-wise Salisbury he courted; and even that
+strange Gladstone, whom he did not like, really had nothing to complain
+about.
+
+The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the
+Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, the Conference of London: but there
+was yet time to turn back.
+
+We were completely successful in achieving that which above all other
+things should have been avoided--the breach with Russia and England.
+
+
+
+
+OUR FUTURE
+
+
+After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an
+unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians,
+Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on being able to wear our enemies
+down. But we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating the
+occupied territory, the retention of which would in any event be a
+burden and cause of weakness to us, and would involve the menace of
+further wars. Therefore everything should be avoided which would make it
+more difficult for those enemy groups who might possibly still be won
+over to the idea of a peace by compromise to come to terms, viz., the
+British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. From this point of view
+alone the Polish scheme is to be condemned, as is also any infringement
+of Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens--to say nothing
+of the insane U-boat plan.
+
+"Our future lies on the water." Quite right; therefore it is not in
+Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. This is a return to the days
+of the Holy Roman Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and
+Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that of Drake and
+Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy of the Triple Alliance is a
+return to the past, a turning aside from the future, from imperialism
+and a world-policy. "Middle Europe" belongs to the Middle Ages,
+Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into the open country, to
+unlimited possibilities, to the world-mission of the German nation.
+
+I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other
+state, but only of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert
+us from our aims and bring us onto the inclined plane of a Continental
+policy. It was not the German policy, but that of the Austrian Imperial
+House. The Austrians had come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella
+under the shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near East
+when they thought fit.
+
+And what must we expect as the result of this war of nations? The United
+States of Africa will be British, like those of America, Australia and
+Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will
+enter into the same relations with the United Kingdom that their Latin
+sisters in America maintain with the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will
+dominate them. France, exhausted by the war, will only attach herself
+still more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain continue to resist
+for long.
+
+And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread and will carry
+their customs with their frontiers, and the South will remain to the
+British.
+
+The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russians, and Japanese, and
+the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His rule will be
+that of thought and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the
+soldier. He made his appearance too late, and his last chance of making
+good the past, that of founding a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by
+the world-war.
+
+For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then will be realised the
+plan of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of humanity in the
+expansion of Britondom--in British Imperialism.
+
+    Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
+    Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
+    Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.
+
+
+
+
+_Important Books of the Day_
+
+
+THE CRIME                         _By a German. Author of "I Accuse!"_
+
+An arraignment in even more cogent form than "I Accuse!" of the
+rulers and governments of Germany and Austria.
+                                     Two vols. 8vo. Vol. I. Net, $2.50
+
+
+THE GREAT CRIME AND ITS MORAL                  _By J. Selden Willmore_
+
+A volume which is an invaluable library. An illuminating summary of the
+immense documentary literature of the war.             8vo. Net, $2.00
+
+
+BELGIUM IN WAR TIME              _By Commandant De Gerlache De Gomery_
+Translated from the French Edition by Bernard Miall
+
+The authoritative book essential to an understanding of the history, the
+position and the sufferings of the country that will not die, the title
+of the Norwegian and Swedish editions of this famous work set up under
+fire.              Illustrations, maps and facsimiles. 8vo. Net, $2.00
+
+
+THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME                               _By John Buchan_
+
+"Mr. Buchan's account is a clear and brilliant presentation of the whole
+vast manoeuver and its tactical and strategic development through all
+four stages."--Springfield _Republican_. Illustrated. 12mo. Net, $1.50
+
+
+THE LAND OF DEEPENING SHADOW                     _By D. Thomas Curtin_
+
+Revealing the Germany of _fact_ in place of the Germany of _tradition_;
+telling the truth about Germany-in-the-third-year-of-the-war.
+                                                      12mo. Net, $1.50
+
+
+I ACCUSE! (J'ACCUSE!)                                    _By a German_
+
+An arraignment of Germany by a German of the German War Party.
+Facts every neutral should know.                      12mo. Net, $1.50
+
+
+THE GERMAN TERROR IN FRANCE                     _By Arnold J. Toynbee_
+THE GERMAN TERROR IN BELGIUM                    _By Arnold J. Toynbee_
+
+"From the facts he places before his readers, it appears conclusive that
+the horrors were perpetrated systematically, deliberately, under orders,
+upon a people whose country was invaded without just cause."--Philadelphia
+_Public Ledger_.                                  Each 8vo. Net, $1.00
+
+
+TRENCH PICTURES FROM FRANCE           _By Major William Redmond, M.P._
+Biographical Introduction by Miss E. M. Smith-Dampier
+
+A glowing book, filled with a deep love of Ireland, by one of the most
+attractive British figures of the war.                12mo. Net, $1.25
+
+
+WOUNDED AND A PRISONER OF WAR                _By an Exchanged Officer_
+
+The high literary merit, studious moderation and charming personality
+of the author make this thrilling book "the most damning indictment of
+Germany's inhumanity that has yet appeared."          12mo. Net, $1.25
+
+
+MY HOME IN THE FIELD OF MERCY                _By Frances Wilson Huard_
+MY HOME IN THE FIELD OF HONOUR               _By Frances Wilson Huard_
+
+The simple, intimate, classic narrative which has taken rank as one of
+the few distinguished books produced since the outbreak of the war.
+                                    Illustrated. Each 12mo. Net, $1.35
+
+
+GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY _Publishers_ New York
+PUBLISHERS IN AMERICA FOR HODDER & STOUGHTON
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes
+
+Original spelling and grammar retained with the following exceptions:-
+
+Contents NICHOLSON ==> NICOLSON
+
+Page xi The attack made on him at the ouset of the war ==> The attack made
+        on him at the outset of the war
+
+Page  4 (Badgad Railway) ==> (Bagdad Railway)
+
+Page 26 There is not the same unbridgable gulf ==> There is not the same
+        unbridgeable gulf
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of My Mission to London 1912-1914, by
+Prince Lichnowsky
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY MISSION TO LONDON 1912-1914 ***
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