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diff --git a/39356-8.txt b/39356-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fbdd429 --- /dev/null +++ b/39356-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11253 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An +Exposition of the San Min Chu I by Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger + + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no +restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under +the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or +online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license + + + +Title: The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min + Chu I + +Author: Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger + +Release Date: April 2, 2012 [Ebook #39356] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO 8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF SUN YAT-SEN: AN EXPOSITION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I*** + + + + + + The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen + + An Exposition of the _Sun Min Chu I_ + + By + + Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Ph.D. + + The Department of Government, Harvard University + + Greenwood Press, Publishers + + Westport, Connecticut + + Copyright 1937, The Johns Hopkins Press + + First Greenwood Reprinting 1973 + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +Foreword. +Preface. +Introduction. + The Problem of the _San Min Chu I_. + The Materials. + The Necessity of an Exposition. +Chapter I. The Ideological, Social, and Political Background. + The Rationale of the Readjustment. + Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity. + The Theory of the Confucian World-Society. + The Chinese World-Society of Eastern Asia. + The Impact of the West. + The Continuing Significance of the Background. +Chapter II The Theory of Nationalism. + The Emergence of the Chinese Race-Nation. + The Necessity of Nationalism. + The Return to the Old Morality. + The Return to the Ancient Knowledge. + Western Physical Science in the New Ideology. + The Consequences of the Nationalist Ideology. +Chapter III. The Theory of Democracy. + Democracy in the Old World-Society. + Five Justifications of a Democratic Ideology. + The Three Natural Classes of Men. + Ch'üan and Nêng. + The Democratic Machine State. + Democratic-Political Versus Ideological Control. +Chapter IV. The Theory of _Min Shêng_. + _Min Shêng_ in the Ideology. + The Economic Background of _Min Shêng_. + The Three Meanings of _Min Shêng_. + Western Influences: Henry George, Marxism and Maurice William. + _Min Shêng_ as a Socio-Economic Doctrine. + _Min Shêng_ as an Ethical Doctrine. +Chapter V. The Programs of Nationalism. + Kuomintang. + The Dragon Throne and State Allegiance. + Economic Nationalism. + Political Nationalism for National Autonomy. + The Class War of the Nations. + Racial Nationalism and Pan-Asia. + The General Program of Nationalism. +Chapter VI. The Programs of Democracy. + The Three Stages of Revolution. + The Adjustment of Democracy to China. + The Four Powers. + The Five Rights. + Confederacy Versus Centralism. + The _Hsien_ in a Democracy. + The Family System. +Chapter VII. The Programs of _Min Shêng_. + The Three Programs of _Min Shêng_. + The National Economic Revolution. + The Industrial Revolution. + The Social Revolution. + The Utopia of _Min Shêng_. +Bibliography. +Chinese-English Glossary. +Index. +Footnotes + + + + + + +FOREWORD. + + +The importance of introducing Western political thought to the Far East +has long been emphasized in the West. The Chinese conception of a rational +world order was manifestly incompatible with the Western system of +independent sovereign states and the Chinese code of political ethics was +difficult to reconcile with the Western preference for a reign of law. No +argument has been necessary to persuade Westerners that Chinese political +philosophy would be improved by the influence of Western political +science. + +The superior qualifications of Sun Yat-sen for the interpretation of +Western political science to the Chinese have also been widely recognized +in the West, particularly in the United States. Dr. Sun received a modern +education in medicine and surgery and presumably grasped the spirit of +Western science. He read widely, more widely perhaps than any contemporary +political leader of the first rank except Woodrow Wilson, in the +literature of Western political science. He was thoroughly familiar with +the development of American political thought and full of sympathy for +American political ideals. His aspiration to build a modern democratic +republic amidst the ruins of the medieval Manchu Empire, Americans at +least can readily understand. + +What is only beginning to be understood, however, in the West is, that it +is equally important to interpret Chinese political philosophy to the rest +of the world. Western political science has contributed a great deal to +the development of political power. But it has failed lamentably to +illuminate the ends for which such power should be used. Political ethics +is by no means superfluous in lands where a government of law is supposed +to be established in lieu of a government of men. The limitation of the +authority of sovereign states in the interest of a better world order is +an enterprise to which at last, it may be hoped not too late, Westerners +are beginning to dedicate themselves. + +As an interpreter of Chinese political philosophy to the West Dr. Sun has +no peer. Better than any other Chinese revolutionary leader he appreciated +the durable values in the classical political philosophy of the Far East. +He understood the necessity for preserving those values, while introducing +the Western political ideas deemed most proper for adapting the Chinese +political system to its new place in the modern world. His system of +political thought, therefore, forms a blend of Far Eastern political +philosophy and Western political science. It suggests at the same time +both what is suitable in Western political science for the use of the Far +East and what is desirable in Far Eastern political philosophy for the +improvement of the West. + +Dr. Linebarger has analyzed Dr. Sun's political ideas, and also his plans +for the political rehabilitation of China, with a view to the interests of +Western students of politics. For this task his training and experience +have given him exceptional competence. The result is a book, which not +only renders obsolete all previous volumes in Western languages on modern +Chinese political philosophy, but also makes available for the political +scientists and politicians of the West the best political thought of the +Far East on the fundamental problems of Western politics. + +ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE +_Harvard University_ + + + + + +PREFACE. + + +This book represents an exploration into a field of political thought +which is still more or less unknown. The Chinese revolution has received +much attention from publicists and historians, and a vast number of works +dealing with almost every phase of Chinese life and events appears every +year in the West. The extraordinary difficulty of the language, the +obscurity--to Westerners--of the Chinese cultural background, and the +greater vividness of events as compared with theories have led Western +scholars to devote their attention, for the most part, to descriptions of +Chinese politics rather than to venture into the more difficult field of +Chinese political thought, without which, however, the political events +are scarcely intelligible. + +The author has sought to examine one small part of modern Chinese +political thought, partly as a sample of the whole body of thought, and +partly because the selection, although small, is an important one. Sun +Yat-sen is by far the most conspicuous figure in recent Chinese history, +and his doctrines, irrespective of the effectiveness or permanence of the +consequences of their propagation, have a certain distinct position in +history. The _San Min Chu I_, his chief work, not only represents an +important phase in the revolution of Chinese social and political thought, +but solely and simply as doctrine, may be regarded as a Chinese expression +of tendencies of political thought current in the Western world. + +The personal motives, arising out of an early and rather intimate family +relationship with the Chinese nationalist movement centering around the +person of Sun Yat-sen, that led the author to undertake this subject, have +their advantages and disadvantages. The chief disadvantage lies in the +fact that the thesis must of necessity treat of many matters which are the +objects of hot controversy, and that the author, friendly to the movement +as a whole but neutral as between its factions, may seem at times to deal +unjustly or over-generously with certain persons and groups. The younger +widow of Sun Yat-sen (née Soong Ching-ling) may regard the mention of her +husband and the Nanking government in the same breath as an act of +treachery. Devoted to the memory of her husband, she has turned, +nevertheless, to the Left, and works on cordial terms with the Communists. +She said: "... the Nanking Government has crushed every open liberal, +democratic, or humanitarian movement in our country. It has destroyed all +trade unions, smashed every strike of the workers for the right to +existence, has thrown hordes of criminal gangsters who are simultaneously +Fascist 'Blue Shirts' against every labor, cultural, or national +revolutionary movement in the country."(1) The author, from what he +himself has seen of the National Government, is positive that it is not +merely dictatorial, ruthless, cruel, treacherous, or historically +unnecessary; nor would he, contrarily, assert that the National Government +lives up to or surpasses the brilliant ideals of Sun Yat-sen. He seeks to +deal charitably with all factions, to follow a middle course whenever he +can, and in any case to state fairly the positions of both sides. + +The advantages may serve to offset the disadvantages. In the first place, +the author's acquaintance with the Nationalist movement has given him +something of a background from which to present his exposition. This +background cannot, of course, be documented, but it may serve to make the +presentation more assured and more vivid. In the second place, the author +has had access to certain private manuscripts and papers, and has had the +benefit of his father's counsel on several points in this work.(2) The +author believes that on the basis of this material and background he is +justified in venturing into this comparatively unknown field. + +The primary sources for this work have been Sun Yat-sen's own works. A +considerable number of these were written originally in the English +language. Translations of his major Chinese works are more or less fully +available in English, German, French, or Spanish. The author's highly +inadequate knowledge of the Chinese written language has led him to depend +almost altogether upon translations, but he has sought--in some cases, +perhaps, unsuccessfully--to minimize the possibility of misunderstanding or +error by checking the translations against one another. Through the +assistance of his Chinese friends, he has been able to refer to Sun's +complete works in Chinese and to Chinese books on Sun wherever such +reference was imperatively necessary. A list of the Chinese titles thus +made available is included in the bibliography. The language difficulty, +while an annoyance and a handicap, has not been so considerable as to give +the author reason to suppose that his conclusions would have been +different in any significant respect had he been able to make free and +continuous use of Chinese and Russian sources. + +The author has thought of the present work as a contribution to political +theory rather than to sinology, and has tried to keep the discussion of +sinological questions at a minimum. In the transliteration of Chinese +words and names he has adhered more or less closely to the Wade system, +and has rendered most terms in the _kuo yü_, or national language. Despite +this rule, he gives the name of President Sun in its more commonly known +Cantonese form, Sun Yat-sen, rather than in the _kuo yü_, Sun I-hsien. + +In acknowledging assistance and encouragement received, the author must +first of all turn to his father, Judge Paul Myron Wentworth Linebarger, +Legal Advisor to The National Government of China, counsellor to and +biographer of Sun Yat-sen during the latter's lifetime. Without his +patient encouragement and his concrete assistance, this book could neither +have been begun nor brought to a conclusion after it was started. The +author desires, however, to make it perfectly clear that this work has no +relation to the connections of Judge Linebarger with the Chinese +Government or with the Nationalist Party. No information coming to the +knowledge of Judge Linebarger in the course of his official duties has +been here incorporated. Anxiously scrupulous to maintain a completely +detached point of view, the author has refrained from communicating with +or submitting the book to Chinese Government or Party officials, and +writes purely as an American student of China. + +Professor James Hart, formerly at The Johns Hopkins University and now at +The University of Virginia, Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Johns Hopkins +University, Professor Harley Farnsworth MacNair and Dr. Ernest Price, both +of The University of Chicago, have rendered inestimable assistance by +reading the manuscript and giving the author the benefit of their advice. +Professor Hart has criticized the work as an enterprise in political +science. Professor Lovejoy assisted the author by reading the first third +of the work, and selections of the later parts, and applying his thorough +and stimulating criticism; the author regrets that he was unable to adopt +all of Professor Lovejoy's suggestions in full, and is deeply grateful for +the help. Professor MacNair read the book as a referee for a dissertation, +and made a great number of comments which have made the book clearer and +more accurate; the author would not have ventured to present this work to +the public had it not been for the reassurances and encouragement given +him by Professor MacNair. Dr. Ernest Price, while at The Hopkins, +supervised the composition of the first drafts; his judicious and balanced +criticism, based upon sixteen years' intimacy with the public and private +life of the Chinese, and a sensitive appreciation of Chinese values, were +of great value to the author in establishing his perspective and lines of +study. The author takes this opportunity to thank these four gentlemen for +their great kindness and invaluable assistance. + +It is with deep regret that the author abbreviates his acknowledgments and +thanks for the inspiration and the favors he received in his study of +Chinese politics from Dr. C. Walter Young; Professor Frederic Ogg, of The +University of Wisconsin; Professors Kenneth Colegrove, William McGovern, +and Ikuo Oyama, of The Northwestern University; Dr. Arthur Hummel, of The +Library of Congress; Professor Frederick Dunn, of Yale University; +Professor Arthur Holcombe, of Harvard University; Professor Quincy Wright, +of The University of Chicago; and Dr. Wallace McClure, of The Department +of State. Many of the author's Chinese friends assisted by reading the +manuscript and criticizing it from their more intimate knowledge of their +own country, among them being Messrs. Miao Chung-yi and Djang Chu, at The +Johns Hopkins University; Professor Jên T'ai, of Nankai University; and +Messrs. Wang Kung-shou, Ch'ing Ju-chi, and Lin Mou-sheng, of The +University of Chicago, made many helpful suggestions. The author must +thank his teachers at The Johns Hopkins University, to whom he is indebted +for three years of the most patient assistance and stimulating +instruction, in respect of both the present work and other fields in the +study of government: Dr. Johannes Mattern; Dr. Albert Weinberg; Mr. Leon +Sachs; and Professor W. W. Willoughby. Finally, he must acknowledge his +indebtedness to his wife, Margaret Snow Linebarger, for her patient +assistance in preparing this volume for the press. + +PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER. + +December, 1936. + + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + + + +The Problem of the _San Min Chu I_. + + + +The Materials. + + +Sun Yat-sen played many rôles in the history of his times. He was one of +those dramatic and somewhat formidable figures who engage the world's +attention at the very outset of their careers. In the late years of the +nineteenth century, he was already winning some renown in the West; it was +picturesque that a Cantonese, a Christian physician, should engage in +desperate conspiracies against the Manchu throne. Sun became known as a +political adventurer, a forerunner, as it were, of such mutually +dissimilar personages as Trotsky, Lawrence, and Major-General Doihara. +With the illusory success of the revolution of 1911, and his Presidency of +the first Republic, Sun ceased being a conspirator in the eyes of the +world's press, and became the George Washington of China. It is in this +rôle that he is most commonly known, and his name most generally recalled. +After the world war, in the atmosphere of extreme tension developed, +perhaps, by the Bolshevik revolution, Sun was regarded as an enigmatic +leader, especially significant in the struggle between Asiatic +nationalisms allied with the Soviets against the traditional capitalist +state-system. It was through him that the Red anti-imperialist policy was +pushed to its greatest success, and he was hated and admired, ridiculed +and feared, down to the last moments of his life. When he died, American +reporters in Latvia cabled New York their reports of Russian comments on +the event.(3) More, perhaps, than any other Chinese of modern times, Sun +symbolized the entrance of China into world affairs, and the inevitable +confluence of Western and Far Eastern history. + +It is characteristic of Sun that he should have appeared in another and +final rôle after his death. He had been thought of as conspirator, +statesman, and mass leader; but with the advent of his party to power it +became publicly apparent that he had also been a political philosopher. +The tremendous prestige enjoyed by him as state-founder and party leader +was enhanced by his importance as prophet and law-giver. His doctrines +became the state philosophy of China, and for a while his most zealous +followers sought to have him canonized in a quite literal fashion, and at +one stroke to make him replace Confucius and the Sons of Heaven. After the +extreme enthusiasms of the Sun Yat-sen cult subsided, Sun remained the +great national hero-sage of modern China. Even in those territories where +the authority of his political heirs was not completely effective, his +flag was flown and his doctrines taught. + +His doctrines have provided the theories upon which the Nationalist +revolution was based; they form the extra-juridical constitution of the +National Government of China. When the forces hostile to Sun Yat-sen and +his followers are considered, it is amazing that his ideas and ideals +should have survived. An empire established with the aid of Japanese arms, +and still under Japanese hegemony, controls Manchuria; parts of north +China are ruled by a bastard government, born of a compromise between +enemies; a largely unrecognized but powerful Soviet Republic exists in +outer Mongolia; the lamaist oligarchy goes on in Tibet; and somewhere, in +central and western China, a Soviet group, not quite a government but more +than a conspiracy, is fighting for existence. It is quite probable that +nowhere else in the world can there be found a greater variety of +principles, each scheme of principles fostered by an armed organization +struggling with its rivals. In this chaos the National Government has made +the most effective bid for authority and the greatest effort for the +reëstablishment of order; through it the principles of Sun Yat-sen rule +the political life of a population greater than that of the United States +or of the Soviet Union. + +It is difficult to evaluate the importance of political doctrines. Even if +_The Three Principles_ is judged by the extent of the population which its +followers control, it has achieved greater results in practical politics +in fifteen years than has Marxism in ninety. Such a criterion may well be +disputed, but, whatever the test, it cannot be denied that the thought of +Sun Yat-sen has played a major part in the political development of his +native land. It may continue into the indefinitely remote future, or may +succumb to the perils that surround its advocates; in any case, these +doctrines have been taught long enough and broadly enough to make an +impress on the age, and have been so significant in political and cultural +history that they can never sink into complete obscurity. + +What are these doctrines? Sun Yat-sen was so voluminous a writer that it +would be impossible for his followers to digest and codify all his +writings into one neat and coherent handbook; he himself did not provide +one. Before printing became common, there was a certain automatic process +of condensation which preserved the important utterances of great men, and +let their trivial sayings perish. Sun, however, must have realized that he +was leaving a vast legacy of materials which are not altogether coherent +or consistent with one another. Certain of his works were naturally more +important than others, but, to make the choice definitive, he himself +indicated four sources which his followers might draw upon for a +definitive statement of his views.(4) + +His _Political Testament_ cites the _Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (_The Program of +National Reconstruction_), the _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (_The Outline of +National Reconstruction_), the _San Min Chu I_ (_The Triple Demism_, also +translated as _The Three Principles of the People_), and the _Manifesto_ +issued by the first national congress of the Party.(5) These four items +differ quite sharply from one another in form. No one of them can be +relied upon to give the whole of Sun's doctrines. + +The _Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (_The Program of National Reconstruction_) is in +reality three works, only remotely related to one another. The first item +in the trilogy is the _Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_ (_The Philosophy of Sun Wên_); +it is a series of familiar essays on the Chinese way of thought.(6) The +second is the _Min Ch'üan Ts'u Pu_, _The Primer of Democracy_, which is +little more than a text on parliamentary law.(7) The third is the _Shih +Yeh Chi Hua_, known in English as _The International Development __ of +China_, which Sun wrote in both English and Chinese.(8) These three works, +under the alternate titles of "The Program of Psychological +Reconstruction," "The Program of Social Reconstruction," and "The Program +of Material Reconstruction" form _The Program of National Reconstruction_. + +The _Chien Kuo Ta Kang, The Outline of National Reconstruction_, is an +outline of twenty-five points, giving the necessary steps towards the +national reconstruction in their most concise form.(9) + +The _San Min Chu I_ is Sun's most important work. It comprises sixteen +lectures setting forth his socio-political theories and his programs. The +title most commonly used in Western versions is _The Three Principles of +the People_.(10) + +The last document mentioned in Sun Yat-sen's will was the _Manifesto_ of +the first national congress of the Kuomintang. This was not written by +himself, but was drafted by Wang Ch'ing-wei, one of his closest followers, +and embodies essentially the same ideas as do the other three items, even +though Borodin--the emissary of the Third International--had been consulted +in its preparation.(11) + +Sun undoubtedly regretted leaving such a heterogeneous and ill-assembled +group of works as his literary bequest. Throughout the latter years of his +life he was studying political science in the hope that he might be able +to complete a great treatise which he had projected, an analysis and +statement of the programs of the Chinese nationalists. One attempt toward +actualization of this work was frustrated when Sun's manuscripts and a +great part of his library were burned in the attack launched against him +by Ch'en Ch'iung-ming in 1922. His apology for the makeshift volume on the +_San Min Chu I_ is pathetic: "As I had neither time to prepare nor books +to use as references, I could do nothing else in these lectures but +improvise after I ascended the platform. Thus I have omitted and forgotten +many things which were in my original manuscript. Although before having +them printed, I revised them, added (passages) and eliminated (others), +yet, those lectures are far from coming up to my original manuscripts, +either in the subject matter itself, or in the concatenations of the +discussion, or in the facts adduced as proofs."(12) Sun was in all +probability a more assiduous and widely read student of political science +than any other world leader of his day except Wilson; he studied +innumerable treatises on government, and was surprisingly familiar with +the general background of Western politics, in theory and practice. He was +aware of the shabby appearance that these undigested occasional pieces +would present when put forth as the bible of a new China, and earnestly +enjoined his followers to carry on his labors and bring them to +fruition.(13) + +The various works included in the _Chien Kuo Fang Lo_, while satisfactory +for the purposes Sun had in mind when he wrote them, are not enough to +outline the fundamentals both of political theory and a governmental plan. +The familiar essays have an important bearing on the formation of the +ideology of a new China; the primer of democracy, less; the industrial +plan is one of those magnificent dreams which, in the turn of a decade, +may inspire an equally great reality. The outline and the manifesto are no +more suited to the rôle of classics; they are decalogues rather than +bibles.(14) There remains the _San Min Chu I_. + +The _San Min Chu I_ is a collection of sixteen lectures delivered in +Canton in 1924. There were to have been eighteen, but Sun was unable to +give the last two. Legend has it that Borodin persuaded Sun to give the +series.(15) Whatever the cause of their being offered, they attracted +immediate attention. Interest in Sun and in his ideas was at a fever heat; +his friends turned to the printed lectures for guidance; his enemies, for +statements which could be turned against him. Both friends and enemies +found what they wanted. To the friends, the _San Min Chu I_ presented a +fairly complete outline of Sun's political and social thought in such a +form that it could be preserved and broadcast readily. There was danger, +before the book appeared, that the intrinsic unity in Sun's thinking would +be lost sight of by posterity, that his ideas would appear as a +disconnected jumble of brilliant inspirations. The sixteen lectures +incorporated a great part of the doctrines which he had been preaching for +more than a generation. To the enemies of Sun, the work was welcome. They +pointed out the numerous simplifications and inconsistencies, the frequent +contradictions in matters of detail, the then outrageous denunciations of +the economic and political system predominant in the Far East. They +ridiculed Sun because he was Chinese, and because he was not Chinese +enough, and backed up their criticisms with passages from the book.(16) + +When Sun gave the lectures, he was a sick man. He carried an ivory-headed +sword cane with him on the platform; occasionally, holding it behind him +and locking his arms through it, he would press it against his back to +relieve the intolerable pain.(17) The business awaiting him after each +lecture was vitally important; the revolution was proceeding by leaps and +bounds. The lectures are the lectures of a sick man, given to a popular +audience in the uproar of revolution, without adequate preparation, +improvised in large part, and offered as one side of a crucial and +bitterly disputed question. The secretaries who took down the lectures may +not have succeeded in following them completely; Sun had no leisure to do +more than skim through the book before releasing it to the press. + +These improvised lectures have had to serve as the fundamental document of +Nationalist China. Sun Yat-sen died without writing the treatise he had +planned. The materials he left behind were a challenge to scholars and to +his followers. Many persons set to work interpreting them, each with a +conscious or unconscious end in view. A German Marxian showed Sun to be a +forerunner of bolshevism; an American liberal showed Sun to be a bulwark +against bolshevism. A Chinese classicist demonstrated Sun's reverence for +the past; a Jesuit father explained much by Sun's modern and Christian +background. His works have been translated into Western languages without +notes; the improvised lectures, torn from their context of a revolutionary +crisis, have served poorly to explain the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, and his +long range political, social, and economic plans. + + + +The Necessity of an Exposition. + + +Followers of Sun who knew him personally, or were members of that circle +in which his ideas and opinions were well known, have found the _San Min +Chu I_ and other literary remains helpful; they have been able to turn to +the documents to refresh their memories of Sun on some particular point, +or to experience the encouraging force of his faith and enthusiasm again. +They need not be reminded of the main tenets of his thought, or of the +fundamental values upon which he based his life and his political +activities. His sense of leadership, which strangers have at times thought +fantastic, is one which they admire in him, since they, too, have felt the +power of his personality and have experienced that leadership in the +course of their own lives. His voice is ringing in their consciences; they +feel no need of a guide to his mind. At the present day many members of +Sun's own family, and a considerable number of his veteran disciples are +still living; the control of the National Government is in their hands. +They are people who need no commentary on Sun Yat-sen; to them, he died +only yesterday. + +Others, who met Sun only casually, or who could know him only through his +writings, have a quite different impression of his thought. They perforce +assume that he thought as he wrote, and fail to realize that virtually all +his writings and speeches were occasional pieces, improvisations designed +as propaganda. One of the most respected American authorities on China +says that in the _San Min Chu I_ "... there is a combination of sound +social analysis, keen comment on comparative political science, and +bombast, journalistic inaccuracy, jejune philosophizing and sophomoric +economics."(18) This view is one which can scarcely be attacked, if one +considers only the printed lectures, and overlooks the other utterances +and the personality of Sun. To apply this, or any similar estimate (and +there are many of them), to all of Sun Yat-sen's thought would be woefully +inaccurate. It is not the critic's fault that Sun never found time to +write a sober, definitive political treatise expressing his ideas; it is, +nevertheless, the critic's responsibility to weigh the value of the _San +Min Chu I_, and consider the importance which Sun himself attached to it, +before judging Sun's whole philosophy by a hastily-composed and poorly +written book. + +Yet, if the Western student of modern Chinese history were to look +elsewhere for some general exposition of Sun Yat-sen's political ideas, he +would find none. He could discover several excellent translations of the +sixteen lectures, and parts of the other work of Sun. He would be helped +by the prefatory notes to some of these translations.(19) A few treatises +would be available to him on special phases of Sun's thought: the +influence of Maurice William, and the influence of the Russian +Communists.(20) In addition, there would be the biographies, of which +there are more than a dozen, and a few other useful although not general +works. None of these sifts Sun's thought, seeking to separate the +transitory from the permanent in his ideas. For this the searcher would +have to rely on brief outlines of Sun's ideas, to be found in works +dealing with modern China or the Chinese revolution.(21) + +This relative scarcity of exegetic material concerning the ideology and +programs of Sun is not the result of any inadequacy on the part of those +persons, both Chinese and Western, who have devoted thought and time to +his life or to the translation of his works. It is one thing to point out +a task that has yet to be done; and quite another, actually to perform it. +An interpretation or exposition of Sun's thought, to be worthy of the +great significance of the original, must be very thorough; but scarcely +enough time has elapsed to allow a perspective of all the materials, let +alone an orientation of Sun in the Far Eastern scene. Yet the importance +of Sun demands that something be done to bring his thought to the +attention of the world, so that the usual distortion of his +personality--arising from the lack of commentaries--may be avoided in +present day works. In a sense, the time is not ripe for a definitive +treatment of Sun, either as a figure in history or as a contributor to the +significant and enduring political thought of modern times; any work now +done will, as time passes, fall grotesquely far short of adequacy. On the +other hand, there is so much material of a perishable nature--anecdotes and +legends not yet committed to print, and the memories of living men--now +available, that a present-day work on Sun may gain in color and intimacy +what it loses in judgment and objectivity, may gain in proximity what it +has to forgo in detachment. And, lastly, the complete absence of any +systematic presentation of Sun's ideas in any Western language is so great +a deficiency in the fields of Far Eastern history and world political +thought, that even a relatively inadequate exposition of the thought of +Sun Yat-sen may prove to be not without value. Sun himself never explained +his philosophy, whether theoretical or applied, in any broad, systematic +fashion; nor has anyone else done so. + +If the permissibility of an exposition of Sun Yat-sen's thought be +conceded, there still remains the vexing problem of a choice of method. +While the far-flung peripheries of Sun's thought touch almost every field +of knowledge and opinion, a systematic condensation of his views cannot +hope to survey the same broad ranges. The problem of proportion, of just +emphasis, involves the nice appraisal of the degree of importance which +each of Sun's minor rôles had in his intellectual career as a whole. Nor +do the difficulties concerning method end with the consideration of +proportion; they merely begin, for there remains the far more important +and perplexing problem of a technique of interpretation. + +Interpretation obviously relates to the problem of language. The +translation of theoretical terms from Chinese into English constitutes a +formidable difficulty which proves, in several instances, to be +insuperable. No satisfactory equivalent for _min shêng_ (usually rendered +"livelihood") can be found in English; even simpler and less specialized +terms are extremely difficult to render. Sometimes it would be convenient +to employ four or five alternative translations for one Chinese term. Sun +uses the word "nationalism" in the sense that a Westerner would, in +advocating national consciousness in a China hitherto unfamiliar with the +conception of nation-states; but, in a different context, he uses it in +the sense of "patriotism."(22) These difficulties must be faced and, +somehow or other, overcome. When the Western reader encounters a familiar +term in an unexpected place, he must be prepared to meet a shift of +meaning. No amount of definition can make a Chinese term, which has no +exact Western equivalent, completely clear. It is simpler to grow +accustomed to the term, to gather together its connotations, to understand +something of the frame of reference wherein it is set, and thereby to +learn it as a child learns a word. A dictionary is no help to a baby; in a +realm of unfamiliar ideas even scholars must learn terms step by step. + +Less obviously than language, the translation of ideas and of values is +also involved in interpretation. In dealing with the intellectual content +of a civilization as alien as that of China, the Westerner must be wary of +the easy analogy. The full, forceful application of Western ideas and +values in a world to which they are completely irrelevant produced strange +results during the nineteenth century. Western notions of goodness and +reasonableness did not fit the Chinese scheme of things. Under such a test +a wildly distorted image of China was obtained. China seemed peculiar, +topsy-turvy, fantastic. To themselves the Chinese still seemed quite +matter-of-fact, and the Westerners thought even this odd and ridiculous: +not only was China upside-down, but the Chinese did not know it! In any +case, the present-day scholar, to whom so much material concerning the +Chinese is available and China so near, has little justification for +applying Western tests of virtue and rationality to things Chinese. + +If the application of Western values to China is avoided, there is still +the danger that the Chinese scheme of things may not be interpreted at +all. The literal translation of Chinese terms strips them of their +contexts. The result may be unintelligibility. The Chinese term _jên_ is +frequently rendered "benevolence," a Western word which, while at times an +approximate equivalent, fails to carry the full burden of meaning. Sun +speaks of an interpretation of history antagonistic to dialectical +materialism--the interpretation of history by _jên_. A "benevolent" +interpretation of history means nothing whatever to a Westerner. If _jên_ +is translated into a different configuration of words, and given as +"group-consciousness" or "social fellow-feeling," the result, while still +not an exact equivalent of the Chinese, is distinctly more intelligible. + +To effect this translation of ideas and values, several methods are +available. The issue cannot be dodged by a denial of its existence; the +mere act of explanation involves some process, whether deliberate or +unconscious, of translation and transvaluation. If the interpreter refuses +to deal with the problem consciously, he will nevertheless be guided by +his unrevealed assumptions. To give an accounting for what he has done, he +must, first, admit that he is interpreting, and second, seek to make plain +what he is doing, so that his readers may allow for the process. The +demonstration of the consequences of interpretation minimizes their +possible adverse effects. The simplest way to allow for the alterations +(beyond mere reproduction) arising from interpretation would be to adopt a +technique so widely known that others could, in their own minds, try to +re-trace the steps of the process and negate the changes. Among such +widely known techniques are the Marxian and the sociological. + +Both these scarcely seem adapted to the problems presented by an +interpretation of Sun Yat-sen. The Marxian terminology is so peculiarly +suited to the ulterior purposes the Marxians keep in mind, and is so +esoteric when applied to matters not related to the general fields in +which the Marxians are interested, that it could scarcely be applied in +the present instance. A non-Marxian would find it a hazardous task. The +interpreter of Sun Yat-sen must interpret _into_ something; what, depends +on the audience. Dialectical materialism, in the abstract excellent as a +technique, would scarcely make Sun understandable to most Americans of the +present day. Sun himself rejected the Marxian method of interpretation; an +American audience would also reject it; these two factors outweigh all the +conceivable advantages. + +The sociological technique of interpretation is quite another question. +The various methods of analysis developed by each of the schools of +sociologists are still the objects rather than the tools of study. Such +men as Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto have made contributions to Western +social thought which enrich the scope and method of the social studies. +Their methods of analysis are not weighted down by a body of extraneous +considerations, as is the Marxian, and they promise an objectivity not +otherwise attainable. On the other hand, they are still at that stage of +development where the technique obtrudes itself; it has not, as has the +inductive method in general, become so much taken for granted as to be +invisible. + +The sociological approach need not, however, be carried to the full extent +thought necessary by its advocates. In the study of law, the consideration +of extra-juridical materials is called sociological in contrast to the +strictly juristic. If the legal scholar goes beyond the strict framework +of the law, and considers other elements in man's behavior and knowledge +while dealing with legal problems, he is apt to be called a sociological +jurist. In doing so he is not committed, however, to belief in or use of +any particular form of what is known as the science of society or +sociology. He may adopt almost any sort of social outlook, or may be +committed to any one of many doctrines of social value and to any one of +widely varying methods of social study. + +This negative, broad sense of the sociological, when applied to the study +of politics, has commonly meant that the scholars employing it began with +the notion of the political, but, finding it too narrow, touched upon +related fields. An interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's politics might be based +on this method. It would still be a political work, in that it sought to +associate his ideas with the ideas concerning government to be found in +the West, but would be free, nevertheless, to touch upon non-political +materials relevant to Sun's politics. The Chinese have had notions of +authority and control radically different from those developed in the +West; a purely juristic interpretation of the various Chinese politics +would simply scrape the lacquer off the screen. + +The Chinese have not had the sharp distinction of disciplines which runs +through all Western learning. Since one of the most conspicuous +ingredients in their thought--conspicuous, that is, to Westerners looking +in from outside--has been the ethical, many Westerners have dismissed +Chinese historical, political and more strictly philosophical thought as +being loosely and amiably ethical but never getting anywhere. The Chinese +did not departmentalize their learning to any considerable degree. +Politics was not the special activity of a definite group of men, or the +study of a select body of scholars. Politics ran through and across most +of the activities in society, and was largely the interest of that +intellectual élite by which China has been so distinguished on the roster +of civilizations. In becoming everything, politics ceased being politics; +that is, those elements in man's thought and behavior which Westerners +have termed political were not separated and labelled. The Westerner must +say that politics was everything in China, or that it was nothing. + +An interpretation of Sun Yat-sen must keep in mind these differences +between Chinese and Western categories. In doing so it will pass beyond +the limits of what is commonly known as politics, since no sharp +boundaries of "politics" are to be found in China. Yet, as an +interpretation designed to serve Western readers, it must return again and +again to Western politics, making comparisons when they are justified, +pointing out differences between China and the West as they become +relevant and clear. The interpretation will thus weave back and forth +between conventional Western political science, with its state-mindedness, +and the wholly different material of traditions and customs out of which +Sun sought to construct an ideology and a system of working politics for +China in the modern world. + +How can this interpretation seek to avoid the misfortunes and errors into +which so many similar attempts have fallen? It must proceed without the +aid of such specialized techniques as dialectical-materialistic or +Paretian analysis, and yet aim at the scientific, the rationally +defensible, the objective. In seeking to apply a method in the +interpretation of Sun Yat-sen, the work must face criticism of its method, +must make the method explicit and simple enough to allow criticism. If the +thought of Sun really is to emerge from the exposition, the exposition +must allow itself to be judged, so that it can be appraised, and so that, +one way or another, it may not interfere with the just evaluation of the +materials which it seeks to present. Sun Yat-sen should not be judged poor +because of a poor interpretation; nor, on the other hand, should his +thought be adjudged more excellent or more exact than it seems to the +Chinese, merely because the expositor has suggested an interpretation +possibly more precise. + +The technique adopted in the present work is a relatively simple one. It +is an attempt to start _de novo_ with certain concepts of society and +government. Several simple although novel terms are introduced, to provide +a foundation upon which the procedure may rest. One of these, for +instance, is "ideology," which in the present work refers to the whole +psychological conditioning of a group of persons.(23) No attempt is made, +at the beginning or at any later phase of the exposition, to distinguish +between the ideology as belief and the ideology as truth. Whether the +Chinese were and are right, or the Westerners, are questions, not for the +student of comparative political science, but for the philosopher and the +psychologist. The interpretation seeks, as far as possible, to transpose +certain parts of the traditional Chinese ideology, as they were, and as +Sun Yat-sen re-shaped them, into one frame of reference provided by the +ideology of twentieth-century America. What the "real truth" is, does not +matter; the Marxians would say that both ideologies were inexact; so might +the Roman Catholics. If the ideology of old China, and the ideology that +Sun wished to see developed in the minds of the Chinese people of the +future, can be made comprehensible in terms of contemporary American +beliefs, of fact or of value, this venture will have been successful. + +The Chinese ideology cannot be explained in its own terms; these exist +only in the Chinese language. If Sun Yat-sen's own arrangement of his +works is inadequate for the Chinese, rearrangement is a task for the +Chinese and not for the Western scholars to perform. The Westerners who +deal with Sun can contribute substantially only if they give what the +Chinese cannot--enough of a reference to their own ideology to permit a +broader scale for the analysis and the appreciation of Sun's thought. +Their knowledge of their own world of ideas is the special tool which +justifies their intervention in this Chinese field of knowledge. + +In avoiding the unjustifiable imposition of Western ideas and values upon +the Chinese, and yet orienting Sun's thought with respect to the West, the +interpretation will have to resort to several fairly evident means. In the +first place, it will have to transpose Chinese ideas into the Western +ideology, and yet avoid distortions of meaning. This can be partly done by +the use of neutral terms, of terms which are simple and clear enough to +reproduce the Chinese, and nevertheless not so heavily burdened with +connotations that they will cause a reading-in of Western ideas not +relevant to the point in question. More simply, the Chinese ideas must be +represented by terms which approximate the same set of values in the West +that their originals have in China. This will sometimes require the use of +unfamiliar periphrases: the words "music" and "rites" may be given as "the +rhythm of life" and "conformity to the ideology." Secondly, the Chinese +ideology need not be given as a whole; it is improbable that it could, +without a terrific expansion of the Western ideology to accommodate it; +but enough of the Chinese ideology must be given to explain the +significant differences between the Chinese system of controlling the +behavior of men, and the Western. This latter involves the choice of +material, and is therefore by its nature challengeable. + +Again, in demonstrating significant differences instead of merely seeking +analogous (and probably misleading) examples, the interpretation might +turn to certain aspects of Chinese philosophy which appear as strikingly +illustrative of the point of view of the Chinese. Confucius the political +thinker is only a small part of Confucius the man and the philosopher; +Chinese political thought, although a vast field, is only a small part of +the social thought of the Chinese. Only an infinitesimal part of this +comparatively minor area of Chinese study will suffice to make clear some, +at least, of the sharp differences of outlook between China and the West. + +A recapitulation of this declaration of technique may be found helpful, +for an understanding of Sun Yat-sen by Westerners is necessary because of +the vastly different background of his thought. Even apart from the +strangeness of his thought to the West, it is scattered in the original, +and must be pieced together. An exposition of his ideas which would, at +one and the same time, present a systematic outline of his ideas, and +transpose them into a frame of reference where Western scholars might +grasp them, might be a labor meriting performance. His terms would have to +be rendered by neutral words (not overladen with particular Western +contexts) or by neologisms, or simply left in the original, to develop +meaning as a configuration of related ideas is built up about them. The +problem of interpretation cannot, however, be solved by settling the +difficulty of language: there still remains the question of a technique +which can pretend to the scientific, the exact, the rationally defensible. +Despite their great merits, the Marxian and Paretian techniques are not +suited to the present task. The point of view and means of study of +political science may be kept, if a few necessary borrowings from +sociological thought (not necessarily sociology) are introduced. Such +borrowing includes the use of notions such as non-political society, +patterns of authority, and ideology, none of which are to be found in the +more law-minded part of political science. By seeking to point out the +Chinese, then the Western, ideas involved, without confusing the two, the +presentation may succeed in transposing the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as +well as his beliefs concerning working politics, into the English language +and into an explanatory but not distorting background. To do this, a small +sampling of certain aspects of old Chinese social thought and behavior +will be a required preliminary. + + + + + +CHAPTER I. THE IDEOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND. + + + + +The Rationale of the Readjustment. + + +The _San Min Chu I_ and related works of Sun Yat-sen represent in their +entirety one of the most ambitious bodies of doctrine ever set forth by a +political leader. They differ from such a document as the Communist +Manifesto in that they comprehend a much greater range of subject matter +and deal with it in much greater detail. They pertain not merely to the +reconstitution of an economic or political system; they propose a plan for +the reconstruction of a whole civilization, the reformation of a way of +thought customary among a great part of the human race, and a consequent +transformation of men's behavior. Conceived in the bold flights of a +penetrating, pioneering mind, avowedly experimental at the time of their +first utterance, these works of Sun have already played a most significant +rôle in the Far East and may continue to affect history for a long time to +come. They may quite legitimately be called the bible of new China. + +Social change is a consequence of maladjustment. The thought of Sun +Yat-sen is a program of change--change which, if it is to be understood, +must be seen at its beginning and its end. The background from which Sun +emerged and which was an implicit condition of all his utterances must be +mentioned, so that the problems he faced may be understood. Only then will +it be possible to turn to the plans he devised for the rethinking of +Chinese tradition and the reorganization of Chinese polity. A vast +maladjustment between the Chinese and the world outside led to the +downfall of the Manchu Empire in China and has threatened the stability of +every government erected since that time; Chinese society is in a state of +profound unrest and recurrent turmoil. Sun Yat-sen contributed to the +change, and sought a new order, to be developed from the disorder which, +voluntarily or not, he helped in part to bring about. + +The old order that failed, the _interregnum_ (in the etymological sense of +the word), and the new order proposed by Sun must be taken all together in +order to obtain a just understanding of Sun's thought. No vast history +need be written, no _Decline and Fall of the Chinese Empire_ is necessary, +but some indication of the age-old foundations and proximate conditions of +Sun's thought must be obtained. + +These may, perhaps, be found in a sampling of certain data from the +thought and behavior of the Chinese as a group under the old system, and +the selection of a few important facts from the history of China since the +first stages of the maladjustment. An exposition of Sun's thought must not +slur the great importance of the past, yet it dare not linger too long on +this theme lest the present--in which, after all, uncounted millions of +Chinese are desperately struggling for life--come to seem insignificant. + +Confucianism is a philosophy so broad and so highly developed that any +selection does violence to its balance and proportion, which are among its +chief merits.(24) Yet only those few facts can be taken from the history +and thought of the Chinese which may assist the Westerner in becoming +familiar with a few terms which recur again and again in the works of Sun +Yat-sen. If the present work purported to be a study of Chinese history, +or a complete analysis of the Chinese social system, such an extreme +selectivity could not be condoned; since it, however, tries only to +outline Sun's thought, the selection of a few Confucian doctrines and the +complete ignoring of others, may be forgiven. All the schools of the past, +and the literary traditions which developed from them, and social +tendencies that were bound up with these have to be omitted, and those few +ideas and customs described which bear directly on one single point--the +most significant ideological differences between the Chinese and the West +with respect to the political order, i. e. the control of men in society +in the name of all society.(25) + + + + +Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity. + + +The Confucian system, against which Sun Yat-sen reacted in part and in +part sought to preserve, was a set of ideas and institutions developed as +a reaction against certain conditions in ancient China. These conditions +may be roughly described as having arisen from a system of +proto-nationalisms, at a time when the old--perhaps prehistorically +ancient--Chinese feudal system was rapidly declining and an early form of +capitalism and of states was taking its place. The Chou dynasty (ca. +1150-221 B.C.) was in power at the time of this transition; under its rule +the golden age of Chinese philosophy appeared--Confucius (552-479 B.C.) and +Lao Tzu (ca. 570-ca. 490 B.C.) lived and taught. + +Their philosophies, contrary to the popular Western beliefs concerning +Chinese philosophies, were protests against a world which seemed to them +well-nigh intolerable. The old Chinese system, which may seem to +Westerners a highly mystical feudal organization, was in its century-long +death-agonies; the virtues it had taught were not the virtues of the hour; +the loyalties it had set up were loyalties which could scarcely be +maintained in a time when rising states, acting more and more as states +have acted in the West, were disrupting the earlier organization of +society, waging struggles--in the manner that, centuries later, Machiavelli +was to portray--of intrigue and warfare for the eventual hegemony over that +whole area of eastern Asia which the Chinese of that time regarded as the +civilized world. + +The political aspects of the transition from the feudal to the +proto-national system is described by one of the most eminent of the +Western authorities on China in the following terms: "The aim of all the +Leaders was to control western Ho-nan. There is the heart of ancient +China.... All around about, in vaster regions occupied no doubt by less +dense and more shifting populations, great States formed, increasing first +towards the exterior, seeking (as we have seen in the case of China) to +cut the communication of their rivals with the Barbarians, mutually +forcing each other to change the directions of the expansion, exercising +on each other a pressure from behind, and a converging pressure on the +central overlordships. All schemed to conquer them. Thus an amalgamation +was achieved. Whilst in the centre the Chinese nation was coming into +being, on the outer borders States were being formed which, aiming at +annexing the centre of China, ended by themselves also becoming +Chinese."(26) Not only did the newer, political organization of society +begin to make itself distinct from the family, feudal, and religious +organization; it began to engage in activities which increased its +resemblance to the Western system of nations. Tributes of textiles, +horses, and compulsory labor were demanded. A non-feudal economy was +encouraged; the state of Ch'i encouraged artisans and merchants, and +favored the trade in fish and salt. Mining, metallurgy and currency were +studied. State monopolies were created out of the products of forests, +lakes, marshes, shell-fish beds, and salt pans. Mines also became +"treasures of the state."(27) + +The history of these states reads like a page torn out of the history of +early modern Europe. The struggle was half diplomatic and half military. +From the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.) to the +end of the Age of Warring States (491-221 B.C.), China was subject to +frequent war and unstable peace. The character of war itself changed, from +a chivalrous exercise almost ritualistic in nature, to a struggle of +unrestricted force. The units of government which were to develop into +states, and almost into nations, began as feudal overlordships; +traditional hatreds and sentiments were developed; diplomatic and military +policies crystallized and became consistent; and activities of a state +nature became increasingly prominent. + +Concurrently, other factors operated to prevent an indefinite continuance +of these struggles of proto-national states and to avoid the appearance of +a permanent system of armed nations such as that which has appeared in +modern Europe. The feudal system of China left a strong ethnical, +linguistic and intellectual heritage of unity, which was stronger than the +cultural disunities and particularities appearing in certain of the +states. (The state of Chêng was particularly conspicuous in developing a +peculiar state culture.)(28) As the states became larger and larger with +the passing of time, they tended not only to develop certain large +differences between themselves, but to eradicate the minute local +peculiarities of the old system, and in so doing to increase the general +homogeneity which was also a heritage of the past ages. This general +homogeneity found a living symbol in the persons of the Chou Emperors who, +possessed of no more power than the Tennos under the Shogunate, acted, as +did their Japanese analogues two thousand years later, as the +quasi-religious personifications of the whole general community. It thus +occurred that the old feudal system was destroyed by the growth of a +general non-feudal economy and political order, which, in its turn, led to +the development of the great imperial system under which China continued +for many centuries. The period of the transition, during which the +traditional feudal unity had been shaken and the new imperial unity not +yet established, was a tumultuous and bloody one. The presence of a +confederation under the hegemony of some one state--the so-called +Presidency--provided a suitable framework for rivalries toward power, +without particularly increasing the general peace. + +The transition, as it took place, was neither apparent nor agreeable. The +political turmoil was but slightly less than the intellectual unrest and +disturbance. Everywhere faith and acceptance seemed to have been lost to +humanity; licentiousness and impiety fed discord. The lack of harmony, +made doubly vivid by the presence of a strong tradition of primeval +Arcadian peace and unity under the mythological Emperors, was bitter to +the scholars and men of virtue of the time. It was quite inevitable that +protests should be raised which would hasten the advent, or return, of +unity and peace. These protests form the subject of the work of Confucius +and the other great philosophers, and schools of thinkers, of the Chou +dynasty. It was, in later ages, upon these philosophies that the great +structure of Chinese society developed and continued down until modern +times. + + + + +The Theory of the Confucian World-Society. + + +The various types of protest against the development of states and the +consequent anarchy of the Chinese society considered as a whole cannot be +considered in this work; many were primarily religious; Taoism, while +ranking as one of the most conspicuous religions of the world, has little +bearing on politics. Even Confucianism, which merits careful study, must +be summarized and re-stated as briefly as possible. Confucianism has +suffered from an ambiguity and exoticism of terms, when presented to the +West; its full significance as a political philosophy can become fully +apparent only when it is rendered in the words of the hour. + +What was it that Confucius did in protest against the established discord +of the world he knew? He struck directly at the foundations of politics. +His criticisms and remedies can be fully appreciated only by reference to +a theory of ideology. + +Confucius perceived that the underlying problem of society was that of +ideology; he seems to have realized that the character of a society itself +essentially depends upon the character of the moral ideas generally +prevalent among the individuals composing it, and that where there is no +common body of ideas a society can scarcely be said to exist.(29) He did +not consider, as did Han Fei-tzu and the legalist school of philosophers, +questions of law the preëminent social problem. He realized that state and +law were remedies, and that the prime questions of organization were those +anterior to the political, and that the state existed for the purpose of +filling out the shortcomings of social harmony.(30) + +In a society--such as Confucius dreamed of--where there was no disagreement +in outlook, policy would not be a governmental question; if there were no +disharmony of thought and of behavior, there would be no necessity of +enforcing conformance to the generally accepted criteria of conduct. From +this standpoint, government itself is socially pathological, a remedy for +a poorly ordered society. Men are controlled indirectly by the examples of +virtue; they do good because they have learned to do good and do it +unquestioningly and simply. Whatever control is exercised over men is +exercised by their ideology, and if other men desire control they must +seek it through shaping the ideas of others. At its full expression, such +a doctrine would not lead to mere anarchy; but it would eliminate the +political altogether from the culture of man, replacing it with an +educational process. Ideological control would need to be supplemented by +political only if it failed to cover the total range of social behavior, +and left loopholes for conflict and dispute. + +This doctrine is framed in quite different terms by Confucius, who spoke +and wrote in an age when the mystical elements of the old feudal ideology +still exercised powerful and persuasive influence, and when there was no +other society than his own which he might make the object of his study. +The central point of his teachings is the doctrine of _jên_. Liang +Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the most brilliant modern exponents of ancient Chinese +philosophy, wrote of this: + + + In the simplest terms, "Jen" means fellow-feeling for one's kind. + Once Fan Chih, one of his disciples, asked Confucius what "Jen" + meant. Confucius replied, "To love fellow-men"; in other words + this means to have a feeling of sympathy toward mankind.... + + Intellectually the relationship becomes common purpose; + emotionally it takes the form of fellow-feeling.(31) + + +This doctrine appears more specific in its application when it is realized +that Confucius regarded his own society and mankind as coterminous. +Barbarians, haunting the fringes of the world, were unconscious of _jên_; +not being in sympathy with mankind, they were not as yet fully human. + +_Jên_ is a word which cannot be exactly translated into English. It is +laden with a burden of connotations which it has acquired through the +centuries; its variability of translation may be shown by the fact that, +in the standard translations of the Chinese classics, it is written +"Benevolence." It might equally well be given as "consciousness of one's +place and function in society." The man who followed _jên_ was one who was +aware of his place in society, and of his participation in the common +endeavors of mankind. + +_Jên_, or society-mindedness, leads to an awareness of virtue and +propriety (_têh_ and _yi_). When virtue and propriety exist, it is +obligatory that men follow them. Behavior in accordance with virtue and +propriety is _li_. Commonly translated "ethics," this is seen as the +fruition of the force of _jên_ in human society. _Jên_ underlies and +establishes society, from the existence of which spring virtue and +propriety; these prescribe principles for human conduct, the formulation +of which rules is _li_.(32) Auxiliary to _li_ is _chêng ming_. _Chêng +ming_ is the rightness of names: _li_, the appropriateness of +relationships. _Li_, it may be noted, is also translated "rites" or +"ceremonies"; a rendering which, while not inexact, fails to convey the +full import of the term. + +_Chêng ming_, the rectification of names, may be regarded as a protest +against the discords in language that had developed during the +transitional period from feudalism to eventual unity. Confucius, of +course, did not have as sharp an issue confronting him as do the modern +Western innovators in social and political ideology. Nevertheless, the +linguistic difficulty was clear to him. The expansion of the Chinese +written language was so great at that time that it led to the +indiscriminate coining of neologisms, and there was a tendency towards a +sophisticated hypocrisy in the use of words.(33) + +Confucius saw that, in obtaining harmony, language needed to be exact; +otherwise long and fruitless disputes over empty words might be engaged in +or, what was even worse, words might not conform to the realities of +social life, and might be used as instruments of ill-doing. Confucius did +not, however, present a scheme of word-worship. He wanted communication to +cement society, to be an instrument of concord. He wanted, in modern +terms, a terminology which by its exactness and suitability would of +itself lead to harmony.(34) In advocating the rectification of names, +Confucius differed from many other founders of philosophies and religions; +they, too, wanted names rectified--terminology reorganized--to suit their +particular doctrines; but there they stopped short. Confucius regarded the +rectification of names as a continuous process, one which had to be +carried on unceasingly if communication, for the sake of social harmony, +was to remain just and exact. + +_Chêng ming_ is highly significant in Confucian thought, and exhibits the +striking difference between the Chinese and the older Western political +study. If the terms by means of which the communication within a society +is effected, and in which the group beliefs of fact or of value are to be +found, can be the subject of control, there is opened up a great field of +social engineering. _Chêng ming_ states, in recognizable although archaic +terms, the existence of ideology, and proposes the strengthening of +ideology. In recognizing the group (in his case, mankind) as dependent +upon ideology for group existence, Confucius delivered Chinese political +thought from any search for an ontology of the _real state_. It became +possible to continue, in the traditional pragmatic manner,(35) thinking of +men in simple terms referring only to individual men, avoiding the +hypostatizations common in the West. In pointing out the necessity for the +control of ideology by men, Confucius anticipated theories of the +"pedagogical state" by some twenty centuries. + +_Li_, in the terminology of the present work, is the conformity of the +individual to the moral ideology, or, stated in another manner, the +control of men by the ideology.(36) + +_Li_, conformity to the ideology, implies, of course, conformity to those +parts of it which determine value. _Li_ prescribes the do-able, the +thinkable. In so far as the ideology consists of valuations, so far do +those valuations determine _li_. Hsü lists the operations of _li_ in six +specific categories: + + + (1) it furnishes the principles of political organization; (2) it + furnishes details for the application of the doctrine of + ratification; (3) it discusses the functions of government; (4) it + prescribes the limitations of governmental authority; (5) it + advances principles of social administration; and (6) it provides + a foundation for crime and lawsuits. These are only the political + functions of _li_. Its force is to be regarded as equally + effective in every other type of human behavior.(37) + + +The approach to society contained in the doctrines of _jên_, _chêng ming_, +and _li_ is, therefore, one which largely eliminates the necessity for +politics. Its influence may be estimated from three points of view: (1) to +what degree was government different from what it might have been had it +followed the line of development that government did in the West? (2) what +was the range of governmental action in such a system? and (3) what was +the relation of government to the other institutions of a Confucian +society? + +In regard to the first point, it will be seen immediately that government, +once _chêng ming_ has been set in motion, is not a policy-making body. +There is no question of policy, no room for disagreement, no alternative. +What is right is apparent. Politics, in the narrow sense of the word, +ceases to be a function of government; only administration remains. + +Secondly, government needs to administer only for two purposes. The chief +of these is the maintenance of the ideology. Once right views are +established, no individual is entitled to think otherwise. Government must +treat the heterodox as malefactors. Their crime is greater than ordinary +crime, which is a mere violation of right behavior; they pollute right +thought, set in motion the forces of discord, and initiate evils which may +work on and on through the society, even after the evil-thinkers +themselves are dead. To protect the society actively against discord, the +government must encourage the utterance of the accepted truth. The scholar +is thus the highest of all the social classes; it is he who maintains +agreement and order. The government becomes, in maintaining the ideology, +the educational system. The whole political life is education, formal or +informal. Every act of the leader is a precept and an example. The ruler +does not compel virtue by law; he spreads it by his conspicuous example. + +The other function of the government in maintaining the ideology lies in +the necessity of dealing with persons not affected by the ideology. +Barbarians are especially formidable, since both heretics and criminals +may be restored to the use of their reason, while barbarians may not, so +long as they remain barbarians. Accordingly, the government is also a +defense system. It is a defense against open and physical disruption from +within--as in the case of insurrectionaries or bandits--and a defense +against forces from without which, as veritable powers of darkness, cannot +be taught and are amenable only to brute force. + +In connection with the third point, government itself appears as subject +to _li_. It has no right to do wrong. The truth is apparent to everyone, +and especially to the scholars. In this wise the Chinese governments were +at the mercy of their subjects. No divine right shielded them when public +opinion condemned them; ill-doing governments were twice guilty and +contemptible, because of the great force of their examples. An evil +emperor was not only a criminal; he was a heresiarch, leading many astray, +and corrupting the virtue upon which society rested--virtue being the +maintenance of a true and moral ideology, and conformity to it. + +The consequence of these teachings was such that we may say, without +sacrificing truth to paradox, that the aim of Chinese government was +anarchy--not in the sense of disorder, but in the sense of an order so just +and so complete that it needed no governing. The _laissez-faire_ of the +Chinese was not only economic; it was political. The Great Harmony of +Confucius, which was his Utopia, was conceived of as a society where the +excellence of ideology and the thoroughness of conformity to ideology had +brought perfect virtue, perfect happiness. + +The other doctrines of Confucius, his practical teachings on +statesmanship, his discourses on the family--these cannot be entered into +here. Enough has, perhaps, been shown to demonstrate the thoroughness of +Confucius' reaction against state and nation.(38) This reaction was to +continue, and to become so typical that the whole Chinese system of +subsequent centuries was called Confucian,(39) until the exigencies of a +newer, larger, and more perilous world led to Sun Yat-sen's teaching of +modern Chinese nationalism. Before taking up the doctrine of _min tsu_, it +may be worthwhile to summarize the manner in which Chinese society, +deliberately and accidentally, each in part, followed out the doctrines of +Confucius in its practical organization. + + + + +The Chinese World-Society of Eastern Asia. + + +It would be, of course, absurd to pretend to analyze the social system of +China in a few paragraphs; and yet it is necessary to the study of Sun +Yat-sen that certain characteristics be at least mentioned. Several +problems appear which are quite outstanding. What was the social position +and function of each individual? How were refractory individuals to be +disciplined in accordance with the requirements that the general opinion +of society imposed? What were the ultimate ends which the organization of +Chinese society was to realize? How were the educational system and the +frontier defenses to be maintained? What was to be the position and power +of the political organization? + +At the outset it is necessary that a working demarcation of the political +be established. Accepting, by definition, those coercive controls as +political which are operated for the preservation of society as a whole, +and are recognized within the society as so doing, we see immediately that +the range of the political must have been much less in old China than it +has been in the West. Western societies tend, at least in law, to +emphasize the relationship between the individual and the society as a +whole; free and unassociated individuals tend to become extraordinarily +unstable. In the old Chinese society the control of the individual was so +much an ideological one, that political control was infinitely narrower +than in the West. But, in order to effectuate ideological control, there +must be an organization which will permit pressure to be exercised on the +individual in such a compelling manner that the exercise of external +coercion becomes unnecessary. In a society in which the state has withered +away, after an enormous expansion in the subject-matter of its +control,(40) the totalitarian state is succeeded by the totalitarian +tradition, if--and the qualification is an important one--the indoctrination +has been so effective that the ideology can maintain itself in the minds +of men without the continuing coercive power of the state to uphold it. If +the ideology is secure, then control of the individual will devolve upon +those persons making up his immediate social environment, who--in view of +the uniform and secure notions of right and justice prevailing--can be +relied upon to attend to him in a manner which will be approved by the +society in general. + +In China the groups most conspicuous within the society were the family +system, the village and district, and the _hui_ (association; league; +society, in the everyday sense of the word). + +The family was an intricate structure. A fairly typical instance of family +organization within a specific village has been described in the following +terms: "The village is occupied by one sib, a uni-lateral kinship group, +exogamous, monogamous but polygynous, composed of a plurality of kin +alignments into four families: the natural family, the economic-family, +the religious-family, and the sib."(41) The natural family corresponded to +the family of the West. The economic family may have had a natural family +as its core, but commonly extended through several degrees of kinship, and +may have included from thirty to one hundred persons, who formed a single +economic unit, living and consuming collectively. The religious family was +an aggregate of economic families, of which it would be very difficult to +give any specified number as an average. It was religious in that it +provided the organization for the proper commemoration and reverence of +ancestors, and maintained an ancestral shrine where the proper +genealogical records could be kept; the cult feature has largely +disappeared in modern times. The sib corresponded roughly to the clan, +found in some Western communities; its rôle was determined by the +immediate environment. In some cases--as especially in the south--the sib +was powerful enough to engage in feuds; at times one or more sibs +dominated whole communities; in the greater part of China it was a loose +organization, holding meetings from time to time to unite the various +local religious families which constituted it. + +Family consciousness played its part in sustaining certain elements of the +Confucian ideology. It stressed the idea of the carnal immortality of the +human race; it oriented the individual, not only philosophically, but +socially as well. The size of each family determined his position +spatially, and family continuity fixed a definite location in time for +him. With its many-handed grasp upon the individual, the family system +held him securely in place and prevented his aspiring to the arrogant +heights of nobility or falling to the degradation of a slavery in which he +might become a mere commodity. A Chinese surrounded by his kinsmen was +shielded against humiliations inflicted upon him by outsiders or the +menace of his own potential follies. It was largely through the family +system, with its religious as well as economic and social foundation, that +the Chinese solved the problem of adequate mobility of individuals in a +society stable as a whole, and gave to that stability a clear and +undeniable purpose--the continued generation of the human race through the +continuity of a multitude of families, each determined upon survival. + +The family was the most obviously significant of the groupings within the +society, but it was equalled if not excelled in importance by the +village.(42) + +Had the family been the only important social grouping, it might have been +impossible for any democracy to develop in China. It so occurred that the +family pattern provided, indeed, the model for the government, but the +importance of villages in Chinese life negated the too sharp influence of +a familistic government. It would have been the most awful heresy, as it +is in Japan today, to revolt against and depose an unrighteous father; +there was nothing to prevent the deposition or destruction of an evil +village elder. In times of concord, the Emperor was the father of the +society; at other times, when his rule was less successful, he was a +fellow-villager subject to the criticism of the people. + +The village was the largest working unit of non-political administration; +that is to say, groups within and up to the village were almost completely +autonomous and not subject to interference, except in very rare cases, +from outside. The village was the smallest unit of the political. The +District Magistrate, as the lowest officer in the political-educational +system, was in control of a district containing from one to twenty +villages, and negotiated, in performing the duties imposed upon him, with +the village leaders. The villages acted as self-ruling communes, at times +very democratic.(43) + +Next in importance, among Chinese social groups, after the family and the +village was the _hui_. It was in all probability the last to appear. +Neither ordained, as the family seemed to be, by the eternal physical and +biological order of things, nor made to seem natural, as was the village, +by the geographic and economic environment, the association found its +justification in the deeply ingrained propensities of the Chinese to +coöperate. Paralleling and supplementing the former two, the _hui_ won for +itself a definite and unchallenged place in the Chinese social structure. +The kinds of _hui_ may be classified into six categories:(44) 1) the +fraternal societies; 2) insurance groups; 3) economic guilds; 4) religious +societies; 5) political societies; and 6) organizations of militia and +vigilantes. The _hui_ made up, in their economic form, the greater part of +the economic organization of old China, and provided the system of +vocational education for persons not destined to literature and +administration. Politically, it was the _hui_--under such names as the +Triad and the Lotus--that provided the party organizations of old China and +challenged the dynasties whenever objectionable social or economic +conditions developed. + +The old Chinese society, made up of innumerable families, villages, and +_hui_, comprised a whole "known world." Its strength was like that of a +dinosaur in modern fable; having no one nerve-centre, the world-society +could not be destroyed by inroads of barbarians, or the ravages of famine, +pestilence, and insurrection. The ideology which has been called Confucian +continued. At no one time were conditions so bad as to break the many +threads of Chinese culture and to release a new generation of persons +emancipated from the tradition. Throughout the centuries education and +government went forward, even though dynasties fell and the whole country +was occasionally over-run by conquerors. The absence of any juristically +rigid organization permitted the Chinese to maintain a certain minimum of +order, even in the absence of an emperor, or, as more commonly occurred, +in the presence of several. + +The governmental superstructure cemented the whole Chinese world together +in a formal manner; it did not create it. The family, the village, and the +_hui_ were fit subjects for imperial comment, but there was nothing in +their organization to persuade the student that the Emperor--by virtue of +some Western-type _Kompetenz Kompetenz_--could remove his sanction from +their existence and thereby annihilate them. There was no precarious legal +personality behind the family, the village, and the _hui_, which could be +destroyed by a stroke of law. It was possible for the English kings to +destroy the Highland clan of the MacGregor--"the proscribed name"--without +liquidating the members of the clan _in toto_. In China the Emperor beheld +a family as a quasi-individual, and when enraged at them was prone to wipe +them out with massacre. Only in a very few cases was it possible for him +to destroy an organization without destroying the persons composing it; he +could, for example, remove the privilege of a scholarship system from a +district, prefecture, or province without necessarily disposing of all the +scholars involved in the move. The government of China--which, in the +normal run of affairs, had no questions of policy, because policy was +traditional and inviolable--continued to be an administration dedicated to +three main ends--the maintenance of the ideology (education), the defense +of the society as a whole against barbarians (military affairs) and +against the adverse forces of nature (public works on the most +extensive--and not intensive--scale), and the collection of funds for the +fulfillment of the first two ends (revenue). The Emperor was also the +titular family head of the Chinese world. + +The educational system was identical with the administrative, except in +the case of the foreign dynasties. (Under the Manchus, for example, a +certain quota of Manchu officials were assigned throughout the government, +irrespective of their scholastic rank in contrast to the Chinese.) It was +a civil service, an educational structure, and a ritualist organization. +Selected from the people at large, scholars could--at least in +theory--proceed on the basis of sheer merit to any office in the Empire +excepting the Throne. Their advancement was graduated on a very elaborate +scale of degrees, which could be attained only by the passing of +examinations involving an almost perfect knowledge of the literature of +antiquity and the ability to think in harmony with and reproduce that +literature. The Chinese scholar-official had to learn to do his own +thinking by means of the clichés which he could learn from the classics; +he had to make every thought and act of his life conform to the pattern of +the ideology. Resourceful men may have found in this a proper +fortification for their originality, as soon as they were able to cloak it +with the expressions of respect; mediocre persons were helpless beyond the +bounds of what they had learned. + +The combination of education and administration had one particular very +stabilizing effect upon Chinese society. It made literacy and rulership +identical. Every educated man was either a government official or expected +to become one. There was no hostile scholar class, no break with the +tradition. Struggle between scholars generally took the form of conflicts +between cliques and were not founded--except in rare instances--on any +cleavage of ideas. The Throne secured its own position and the continuity +of the ideology through establishing intellectuality as a government +monopoly. The consequences of the educational-administrative system +fostered democratic tendencies quite as much as they tended to maintain +the status quo. The scholars were all men, and Chinese, owing allegiance +to families and to native districts. In this manner a form of +representation was assured the government which kept it from losing touch +with the people, and which permitted the people to exercise influence upon +the government in the advancement of any special interests that could +profit by government assistance. The educational system also served as the +substitute for a nobility. Hereditary class distinctions existed in China +on so small a scale that they amounted to nothing. The way to power was +through the educational hierarchy.(45) In a society which offered no +financial or military short cuts to power, and which had no powerful +nobility to block the way upward, the educational system provided an +upward channel of social mobility which was highly important in the +organization of the Chinese world order. + +The scholars, once they had passed the examinations, were given either +subsistence allowances or posts, according to the rank which they had +secured in the tests. (This was, of course, the theory; in actuality +bribery and nepotism played rôles varying with the time and the locality.) +They made up the administration of the civilized world. They were not only +the officials but the literati. + +It would be impossible even to enumerate the many posts and types of +organization in the administration of imperial China.(46) Its most +conspicuous features may be enumerated as follows: China consisted of half +a million cities, towns, villages, and hamlets, each to a large extent +autonomous.(47) These were divided among, roughly, two thousand _hsien_, +in each of which an over-burdened District Magistrate sought to carry out +all the recognized functions of government in so far as they applied to +his locality. He did this largely by negotiation with the leaders of the +social groups in his bailiwick, the heads of families, the elders of +villages, the functionaries of _hui_. He was supervised by a variety of +travelling prefects and superintendents, but the next officer above him +who possessed a high degree of independence was the viceroy or +governor--whichever type happened to rule the province or group of +provinces. Except for their non-hereditability, these last offices were to +all intents and purposes satrapies. The enormous extent of the Chinese +civilized world, the difficulty of communicating with the capital, the +cumbersomeness of the administrative organization, the rivalry and +unfriendliness between the inhabitants of various provinces--all these +encouraged independence of a high degree. If Chinese society was divided +into largely autonomous communes, the Chinese political system was made up +of largely autonomous provinces. Everywhere there was elasticity. + +At the top of the whole structure stood the Emperor. In the mystical +doctrines which Confucianism transmitted from the animism of the feudal +ages of China, the Emperor was the intermediary between the forces of +nature and mankind. The Son of Heaven became the chief ritualist; in more +sophisticated times he was the patron of civilization to the scholars, and +the object of supernatural veneration to the uneducated. His function was +to provide a constant pattern of propriety. He was to act as chief of the +scholars. To the scholars the ideology was recognized as an ideology, +albeit the most exact one; to the common people it was an objective +reality of thought and value. As the dictates of reason were not subject +to change, the power and the functions of the Emperor were delimited; he +was not, therefore, responsible to himself alone. He was responsible to +reason, which the people could enforce when the Emperor failed. Popular +intervention was regarded as _de jure_ in proportion to its effectiveness +_de facto_. The Imperial structure might be called, in Western terms, the +constitutionalism of common sense.(48) The Dragon Throne did not enjoy the +mysterious and awful prestige which surrounds the modern Tenno of Nippon; +although sublime in the Confucian theory, it was, even in the theory, at +the mercy of its subjects, who were themselves the arbiters of reason. +There was no authority higher than reason; and no reason beyond the reason +discovered and made manifest in the ages of antiquity. + + + + +The Impact of the West. + + +Mere physical shock could not derange the old Chinese society as easily as +it might some other, dependent for its stability upon complex, fragile +political mechanisms. China was over-run many times by barbarians; the +continuity of its civilization was undisturbed. Each group of conquerors +added to the racial composition of the Chinese, but contributed little to +the culture. The Ch'in, the Mongols, the Manchus--all ruled China as +Chinese rulers. + +This strength of the Chinese society--in contrast to the Roman--must not, +however, lead us to suppose that there were any extraordinary virtues in +the Chinese social organization that made Chinese civilization +indestructible. On the contrary, the continued life of the Chinese society +may be ascribed, among others, to four conditions acting definitely and +overwhelmingly in its favor: China's greater physical extent, homogeneity, +wealth, and culture. + +No barbarian conqueror, with the possible exception of the Mongol, would +have been a match for an orderly and united China. Without exception, the +barbarian incursions occurred in times of social and political disorder +and weakness. That this is no freakish coincidence, may be shown by the +contrast between China and any of the peripheral realms. None approached +China in extent, in heaviness of population. Conquest of China was always +conquest by sufferance of the Chinese. + +Second, China's neighbors were divided among themselves. There was never +any coalition extensive enough to present a genuine threat to a thriving +China. The Chinese, in spite of diversities of spoken language, were +united--so far as they were literate--by a common writing and literature; +the common ideology had, moreover, fostered an extreme sympathy of thought +and behavior among the Chinese. Persons speaking mutually unintelligible +dialects, of different racial composition, and in completely different +economic and geographical environments displayed--and, for all that, still +display in modern times--an uncanny uniformity of social conditioning. +China faced barbarians on many fronts; China was coördinated, homogeneous; +the barbarians of North and South did not, in all probability, know +anything of each other's existence, except what they heard from the +Chinese. + +Third, China's wealth was a socially fortifying factor. In all Eastern +Asia, no other society or form of social organization appeared which could +produce a higher scale of living. The Chinese were always materially +better off than their neighbors, with the possible exception of the +Koreans and Japanese. + +Fourth, Eastern Asia was Chinese just as Europe was Graeco-Roman. The +peripheral societies all owed a great part, if not all, of their culture +to the Chinese. China's conquerors were already under the spell of Chinese +civilization when they swept down upon it. None of them were anxious to +destroy the heritage of science, arts, and invention which the Chinese had +developed. + +With these advantages in mind, it is easy to understand the peculiarity of +the Westerners, as contrasted with the other peoples whom the Chinese met +and fought. The formidable physical power of the Chinese was, after the +first few decades of intercourse, seen to be quite unequal to the superior +military technique of the West. The Westerners, although different from +one another at home, tended to appear as united in the Far East. In any +case, Chinese unity availed little in the face of greater military power. +The economic factor, while a great attraction to the Westerners, was no +inducement to them to become Chinese; they were willing to gain Chinese +wealth, and dreamed of conquering it, but not of making wealth in the +Chinese manner. And lastly, and most importantly, the Westerners presented +a culture of their own which--after the first beginnings of regular +intercourse--was quite well able to hold its own against the Chinese.(49) + +To the utter certainty of the Chinese way of life, the Westerners +presented the equally unshakable dogma of Christianity. They regarded the +Chinese--as did the Chinese them--as outlanders on the edge of the known +world. They exhibited, in short, almost the same attitude toward the +Chinese that the Chinese had toward barbarians. Consequently, each group +regarded the other as perverse. The chief distinction between the Chinese +and the Westerners lay in the fact that the Chinese would in all +probability have been satisfied if the West had minded its own business, +while the West, feverish with expansionism, cajoled and fought for the +right to come, trade, and teach.(50) + +At times, the two races met on agreeable and equal terms. The Jesuit +missionaries ingratiated themselves with the Chinese and, by respecting +Chinese culture, won a certain admiration for their own. The eighteenth +century in Europe was the century of _chinoiserie_, when Chinese models +exercised a profound influence on the fine and domestic arts of +Europe.(51) The great upsurge of economic power in the period of the +European industrial revolution led to increased self-assurance on the part +of the Europeans. The new standards of value alienated them from those +features of Chinese culture which the eighteenth century had begun to +appreciate, and placed them in a position to sell to the Chinese as well +as buy. More and more the economic position of the two societies changed +about; the Westerners had come to purchase the superior artizan-made goods +of China, giving in exchange metals or raw materials. A tendency now +developed for them to sell their own more cheaply, and, in some cases, +better manufactured products to the Chinese. The era of good feeling and +mutual appreciation, which had never been very strong, now drew to a +close. + +The vassal states of China were conquered. The British fought the Chinese +on several occasions, and conquered each time. The full extent of Western +military superiority was revealed in the capture of Peking in 1860, and in +the effectiveness--entirely disproportionate to their numbers--that +Western-trained Imperial troops had in suppressing the Chinese T'ai-p'ing +rebels. + +When Sun Yat-sen was a boy, the country was afire with fear and +uncertainty. Barbarians who could neither be absorbed nor defeated had +appeared. Instead of adopting Chinese thought and manners, they were +vigorously teaching their own to the Chinese. The traditional Chinese +mechanisms of defense against barbarians were not working.(52) Something +was vitally wrong. The Chinese could not be persuaded, as some other +non-European peoples conquered in the age of Western world-dominion seem +to have been, that all error lay with themselves, and that their own +ideology was not worth the saving; nor could they, in face of the +unfortunate facts, still believe that they themselves were completely +right, or, at least, that their own notions of rightness were completely +expedient. In view of the pragmatic foundations of the whole Chinese +ideology and way of life, the seriousness of these consequences cannot be +over-estimated. Little wonder that China was disturbed! The pragmatic, +realistic method of organization that the Chinese had had, no longer +worked in a new environment rising, as it were, from the sea. + +The Western impact, consequently, affected China in two ways. In the first +place, the amorphous Chinese society was threatened and dictated to by the +strong, clearly organized states of the West. In the second place, the +introduction of disharmonious values from the West destroyed, in large +part, that appearance of universality, upon which the effectiveness of the +Chinese ideology depended, and shocked Chinese thought and action until +even their first premises seemed doubtful. + +This, in short, was the dilemma of the Chinese at the advent of Sun +Yat-sen. His life was to be dedicated to its solution; it is his analyses +that are to be studied in the explanation of the Chinese society in the +modern world. + + + + +The Continuing Significance of the Background. + + +Before proceeding to the exposition of Sun Yat-sen's theories and +programs, it is necessary that a superlatively important consideration be +emphasized: namely, that Sun Yat-sen was a Chinese, that the nation he +worked for was China, and that the intellectual and social background of +his labors was one completely different from that of the Euramerican +world. A great part of the vaporous disputation which has hidden Chinese +politics in a cloud of words has been the consequence of the ignoring, by +Westernized Chinese as well as by Westerners, of the monumental fact that +China is in only a few respects comparable to the West, and that the ideas +and methods of the West lose the greater part of their relevance when +applied to the Chinese milieu. Political dialecticians in China split +Marxian hairs as passionately and sincerely as though they were in +nineteenth-century Germany.(53) Sun Yat-sen, though accused of this +fantastic fault by some of his adversaries, was--as his theories show upon +close examination--much less influenced by Western thought than is commonly +supposed to be the case, and in applying Western doctrines to Chinese +affairs was apt to look upon this as a fortunate coincidence, instead of +assuming the universal exactness of recent Western social and political +thought. + +What are the features of the Chinese background that must be remembered in +order to throw a just light upon the beliefs of Sun Yat-sen? Primarily, it +must have become apparent, from the foregoing discussion of Confucianism +and the old social order, that China, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, +was beginning to draw away from an order of things which the West--or at +least a part of the West--aspires to achieve: a world-society in which the +state had withered away. This ideal, while never completely realized in +China, was perhaps more closely attained than it has ever been in any +other society. Modern actualities led away from this ideal. The West, +dreaming of world unity, was divided and armed; China too had to abandon +the old notions of universal peace, and arm. The West, seeking social +stability, was mobile; China too had to move. + +The old society was in its controls totalitarian. Diffuse and extensive +controls operated fairly evenly throughout the system. The West possessed +a state system which was fundamentally different. By limiting the range of +law to the reinforcement of certain particular _mores_, the Westerners +were able to obtain a terrific concentration of political power within the +sphere of what they conceived to be legitimate state control. On the other +hand the presence of a large number of activities not subject to state +control led individuals to cherish their freedom--a freedom which in most +cases did not impair the military and political effectiveness of the state +in external action. + +Since Fascism seeks to reëstablish order and certainty, as does Communism +(although an order and certainty of a different kind), by the extension of +state activities; and since Sun Yat-sen proposed to improve the political +position of China by developing a modern state (of narrow, but intense +activities in contrast to the loose general controls of the old society), +the drift in China may be regarded, in this respect, as Fascism in +reverse. Beginning with the same premises--the regeneration of the +nation--Mussolini was led to a course of policy diametrically opposite to +that plotted by Sun Yat-sen. + +Even, however, with his plans for developing a "machine state" in a +society where states had long since perished, Sun Yat-sen did not propose +to destroy Chinese morality and non-political discipline for the sake of +instituting a sharp juristic law-and-order organization. He was anxious +that the old Chinese morality and social knowledge be applied. In this, he +differed from most of the other modern leaders of China, who were for +veneering China with a Parliament and police without delay. Sun Yat-sen +realized that a state was necessary in China, and hoped to establish one; +he also hoped that, beyond the limits of the new state activity, +individualism and disorder would not come to prevail, but that the old +controls would continue to operate. + +Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen's thought cannot be studied as a mere offshoot of +recent Western thought. It must be realized that he proposed two ends +which, of all the countries of the world, would be mutually compatible +only in China: the development of a state, and the full continuation of +non-political controls.(54) + +In fostering the continuation of ideological control, Sun Yat-sen hoped to +modify the old ideology so that it would become applicable to the new +situations. As will be made clear later, he was redefining the old +world-view so that, without disturbing the consequences to which it would +lead, it might apply in a novel and unprecedentedly disturbed world. He +was, in short, switching the premises and trying to preserve the +conclusions, modifying the actual behavior of the Chinese only in so far +as it was necessary for the purpose of strengthening and invigorating the +whole body politic of China. + +Another strain of the ancient thought penetrates Sun Yat-sen's theories. +Ideological control was not to the Confucians, as some Marxian critics +aver,(55) a rather naïve duplicity by which the gentry of China could +maintain themselves in power indefinitely. Confucius can not be accused, +save on the basis of unwarrantable reading-in, of insincerity in his +teaching of order. He was conservative, and knew what he was doing, in +seeking for the general self-discipline of men, and the rule of precept +and virtue; but to believe that he desired one public philosophy and +another private one goes beyond the realm of historically justifiable +interpretation. An ideology may, of course, be deceptive to its +promulgators, but the absence of any genuine class-society--as known in the +West--must serve as a testimonial to the sincerity of Confucian teachings. +The Confucian ideology was to the ancients not only an instrument for +good; it was common sense. + +Sun Yat-sen did not, as a Western leader in his position might have done, +seek to befuddle the masses for their own good. Since he proposed to +entrust China's destinies to the votes of the masses, he could scarcely +have believed them liable to fall victims to deceit over a great length of +time. In teaching of the race-nation, and of the nature of Chinese +society, Sun Yat-sen was telling the people what it would be good for them +to believe; it was good for them because it was the truth--that is, most in +accord with the actual situation of China in the general society of the +world. + +Few today would dare say what is really in the minds of European leaders +such as Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler. These men may themselves believe +what they say; or, not believing it, say it nevertheless because they +think it the right thing for the masses, in the masses' own interests, to +believe. Their respective enemies accuse them of saying what they do in +order to mislead the masses and to dominate the masses for hidden purposes +of their own. No such accusation has been levelled against Sun Yat-sen. +Apart from his personal sincerity, his belief in the qualities of the +common people was such that he did not consider it necessary to deceive +them, even for their own good. + +Consequently, in dealing with the various doctrines that Sun preached, it +must be remembered that he himself believed what he was saying. He did not +merely think that the people should regard the Chinese society as a +race-nation; he thought that China _was_ a race-nation. The modifications +of the Confucian philosophy were to be contemplated, as was the original +philosophy, as pragmatically true.(56) + +These two factors must be reckoned with--that Sun Yat-sen was teaching and +working in the Chinese milieu, and that his ideology was an ideology not +in the older pejorative sense of the word, which connoted duplicity, but +an ideology in the sense of a scheme of exact knowledge which, by its very +truthfulness, was a political and social instrument. + + + + + +CHAPTER II THE THEORY OF NATIONALISM. + + + + +The Emergence of the Chinese Race-Nation. + + +It could, at first thought, be supposed that the reconstruction of Chinese +society might have been necessitated by internal weakness just as much as +by a changed environment. The process of organizing and developing a +tight, clear scheme of political control organizations within the society +(stateification), and delimiting the extent and aims of the society +(nationalism) were the chief characteristics of this reconstruction. + +It is only by means of a disregard of actual conditions that the +supposition of an internal weakness so great as to require radical change +can be maintained. While the latter days of the Manchu Empire represented +a decline, it was a decline no more serious than others through which +Chinese culture had passed and resurged many times in its history. It is +still a debatable matter as to whether China had actually become +intellectually and artistically sterile during this period. In any event, +it is questionable whether the completely revolutionary reorganization of +Chinese society--of the type that Sun Yat-sen found it necessary to +support--would have been either worth-while or probable in the absence of +Euramerican aggression, and the appearance, all about China, of a new, +hostile, and unstable environment. If it had not been for the impact of +the West it is conceivable--although all comment on this must remain mere +speculation--that a social revolution such as those which occurred under +Wang Mang (usurper-founder of the unrecognized Hsin Dynasty, 9-25 A.D.), +Wang An-shih (prime minister, 1069-1076 A.D., under the Sung dynasty), or +Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (founder of the rebel T'ai P'ing dynasty, 1849-1865), +might have adjusted matters by a general redistribution of wealth and +administrative reorganization. + +In his earliest agitations Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the Manchus.(57) In +this connection he developed a peculiar and interesting theory concerning +nationalism. He held, briefly, that the Chinese had, at the noon-day glory +of their Empire, fallen under the lure of a cosmopolitanism which was not +in accord with the realities of political existence. It was this lack of +distinction between themselves and outsiders which had permitted hundreds +of millions of Chinese to fall prey to one hundred thousand Manchus in the +early seventeenth century,(58) with the consequence that the Manchus, once +on the throne of China, made every effort to erase their barbarian origin +from the minds of the Chinese, and, with this end in view, did everything +possible, as modern Japan is doing in Korea, to destroy the national +consciousness of the Chinese.(59) China, to Sun Yat-sen, had always been a +nation, but its inhabitants did not believe it a nation. They had lost the +precious treasure of nationalism. Without contradicting Sun Yat-sen, but +differing from him only in the use of words, Westerners might say that the +Chinese had once known nationalism as members of the antique Chinese +states, but had later formed--in the place of a nation--a cosmopolitan +society which comprehended the civilized world of Eastern Asia.(60) + +Sun Yat-sen did not blame Confucius for cosmopolitanism. There is, indeed, +nowhere in his works the implication that Confucianism was an evil in +itself, deserving destruction; why then did Sun Yat-sen believe that, even +though the old ideology was not invalid for the organization of China +internally, the old world-view had broken down as an effective instrument +for the preservation of China? + +First of all, Sun stated, in terms more general than did the ancients, the +necessity of establishing the ideology on the basis of pragmatism. He +stated: + + + We cannot say in general that ideas, as ideas, are good or bad. We + must judge whether, when put into practice, they prove useful to + us or not. If they are of practical value to us, they are good; if + they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful to the + world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they + are not good.(61) + + +He states, also, that if the Chinese race is to survive, it must adopt +nationalism. "... if we now want to save China, if we wish to see the +Chinese race survive forever, we must preach Nationalism."(62) Hitherto +they had been no more conscious of race than were the Europeans of the +middle ages. To be sure, they were barbarians, whose features were +strange; but the Chinese were not conscious of themselves as a racial +unity in competition and conflict with other equal or superior racial +unities. The self-consciousness of the Chinese was a cultural rather than +a racial one, and the juxtaposition that presented itself to the Chinese +mind was between "Ourselves of the Central Realm" and "You the +Outsiders."(63) Sun Yat-sen became intensely conscious of being a Chinese +by race,(64) and so did many other of his compatriots, by the +extraordinary race-pride of the _White Men_ in China. In common with many +others of his generation, Sun Yat-sen turned to race-consciousness as the +name for Chinese solidarity. + +There is nowhere in his works, so far as the writer knows, any attempt to +find a value higher than the necessity of perpetuating the Chinese race. +Sun Yat-sen was a Chinese; his followers were Chinese; whatever benefits +they contemplated bestowing upon the world as a whole were incidental to +their work for a powerful and continued China. At various times Sun +Yat-sen and his followers expressed sympathy with the whole world, with +the oppressed of the earth, or with all Asia, but the paramount drive +behind the new movement has been the defense and reconstruction of China, +no longer conceived of as a core-society maintaining the flower of human +civilization, but regarded as a race abruptly plunged into the chaos of +hostile and greedy nations. + +Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen called China a nation. We may suppose +that he never thought that Chinese society need not necessarily be called +a nation, even in the modern world. What he did do, though, was to +conceive of China as a unique type of nation: a race-nation. He stated +that races could be distinguished by a study of physical characteristics, +occupation, language, religion and folkways or customs.(65) Dividing the +world first into the usual old-style five primary races (white, black, +yellow, brown, and red), he divides these races into sub-races in the +narrow sense of the term. The Chinese race, in the narrow sense of the +term, is both a race and a nation. The Anglo-Saxons are divided between +England and America, the Germans between Germany and Austria, the Latins +among the Mediterranean nations, and so forth; but China is at the same +time both the Chinese race and the Chinese nation. If the Chinese wish +their race to perpetuate itself forever, they must adopt and follow the +doctrine of Nationalism.(66) Otherwise China faces the tragedy of being +"despoiled as a nation and extinct as a race."(67) + +Sun Yat-sen felt that China was menaced and oppressed ethnically, +politically and economically. Ethnically, he believed that the +extraordinary population increase of the white race within the past few +centuries represented a trend which, if not counterbalanced, would simply +result in the Chinese race being crowded off the earth. Politically he +observed that the Chinese dependencies had been alienated by the Western +powers and Japan; that China was at the mercy of any military nation that +chose to attack; that it was a temporary deadlock between the conquering +powers rather than any strength of China that prevented, at least for the +time being, the partition of China and that a diplomatic attack, which +could break the deadlock of the covetous states, would be even more deadly +and drastic than simple military attack.(68) + +It must be remembered that Sun Yat-sen saw a nation while the majority of +his compatriots still envisioned the serene, indestructible society of the +Confucians. Others may have realized that the Western impact was more than +a frontier squabble on a grand scale; they may have thought it to have +assumed epic proportions. But Sun Yat-sen, oppressed by his superior +knowledge of the Western nations, obtained at the cost of considerable +sympathy with them, struggled desperately to make his countrymen aware of +the fact, irrefutable to him, that China was engaged in a conflict +different not only in degree but in kind from any other in Chinese +history. The Great Central Realm had become simply China. Endangered and +yet supine, it faced the imperative necessity of complete reconstitution, +with the bitter alternative of decay and extinction--a race tragedy to be +compounded of millions of individual tragedies. And yet reconstitution +could not be of a kind that would itself be a surrender and treason to the +past; China must fit itself for the modern world, and nevertheless be +China. This was the dilemma of the Chinese world-society, suddenly become +a nation. Sun Yat-sen's life and thought were devoted to solving it. + + + + +The Necessity of Nationalism. + + +An abstract theorist might observe that the Chinese, finding their +loose-knit but stable society surrounded by compact and aggressive +nations, might have solved the question of the perpetuation of Chinese +society in the new environment by one of two expedients: first, by +nationalizing, as it were, their non-national civilization; or second, by +launching themselves into a campaign against the system of nations as +such. The second alternative does not seem to have occurred to Sun +Yat-sen. Though he never ventured upon any complete race-war theory, he +was nevertheless anxious to maintain the self-sufficient power of China as +it had been until the advent of the West. In his negotiations with the +Communists, for example, neither he nor they suggested--as might have been +done in harmony with communist theory--the fusion of China and the Soviet +Union under a nuclear world government. We may assume with a fair degree +of certainty that, had a suggestion been made, Sun Yat-sen would have +rejected it with mistrust if not indignation. He had spent a great part of +his life in the West. He knew, therefore, the incalculable gulf between +the civilizations, and was unwilling to entrust the destinies of China to +persons other than Chinese.(69) + +Once the possibility of a successful counter-attack upon the system of +nations is discounted, nationalism is seen as the sole solution to China's +difficulties. It must, however, be understood that, whereas nationalism in +the West implies an intensification of the already definite national +consciousness of the peoples, nationalism in China might mean only as +little as the introduction of such an awareness of nationality. +Nationalism in China might, as a matter of logic, include the possibility +of improved personal relations between the Chinese and the nationals of +other states since, on the one hand, the Chinese would be relieved of an +intolerable sense of humiliation in the face of Western power, and, on the +other, be disabused of any archaic notions they might retain concerning +themselves as the sole civilized people of the earth.(70) + +A brief historical reference may explain the apparent necessity of +nationalism in China. In the nineteenth century foreigners in China +generally suffered reverses when they came into conflict with a village, a +family, or a guild. But when they met the government, they were almost +always in a position to bully it. It was commonly of little or no concern +to the people what their government did to the barbarians; the whole +affair was too remote to be much thought about. We find, for example, that +the British had no trouble in obtaining labor auxiliaries in Canton to +fight with the British troops against the Imperial government at Peking in +1860; it is quite probable that these Cantonese, who certainly did not +think that they were renegades, had no anti-dynastic intentions. Chinese +served the foreign enemies of China at various times as quasi-military +constabulary, and served faithfully. Before the rise of Chinese +nationalism it was not beyond possibility that China would be partitioned +into four or five colonies appurtenant to the various great powers and +that the Chinese in each separate colony, if considerately and tactfully +treated, would have become quite loyal to their respective foreign +masters. The menace of such possibilities made the need of Chinese +nationalism very real to Sun Yat-sen; the passing of time may serve +further to vindicate his judgment. + +Sun Yat-sen's nationalism, though most vividly clear when considered as a +practical expedient of social engineering, may also be regarded more +philosophically as a derivation of, or at least having an affinity with, +certain older ideas of the Chinese. Confucian thinking, as re-expressed in +Western terms, implants in the individual a sense of his responsibility to +all humanity, united in space and time. Confucianism stressed the +solidarity of humanity, continuous, immortal, bound together by the +closest conceivable ties--blood relationships. Sun Yat-sen's nationalism +may represent a narrowing of this conception, and the substitution of the +modern Chinese race for Confucian humanity. In fairness to Sun Yat-sen it +must, however, be admitted that he liked to think, in Christian and +Confucian terms, of the brotherhood of man; one of his favorite +expressions was "under heaven all men shall work for the common good."(71) + +Nationalism was to Sun Yat-sen the prime condition of his movement and of +his other principles. The Communists of the West regard every aspect of +their lives significant only in so far as it is instrumental in the class +struggle. Sun Yat-sen, meeting them, was willing to use the term "class +struggle" as an instrument for Chinese nationalism. He thought of China, +of the vital and immediate necessity of defending and strengthening China, +and sacrificed everything to the effectuation of a genuine nationalism. To +him only nationalism could tighten, organize, and clarify the Chinese +social system so that China, whatever it was to be, might not be lost. + +The early philosophers of China, looking upon a unicultural world, saw +social organization as the supreme criterion of civilization and humanity. +Sun Yat-sen, in a world of many mutually incomprehensible and hostile +cultures saw nationalism (in the sense of race solidarity) as the supreme +condition for the survival of the race-nation China. Democracy and social +welfare were necessary to the stability and effectiveness of this +nationalism, but the preservation and continuation of the race-nation was +always to remain the prime desideratum. + + + + +The Return to the Old Morality. + + +Sun Yat-sen quite unequivocally stated the necessity for establishing a +new Nationalist ideology in order to effectuate the purposes of China's +regeneration. He spoke of the two steps of ideological reconstitution and +political reconstitution as follows: "In order today to restore our +national standing we must, first of all, revive the national spirit. But +in order to revive the national spirit, we must fulfill two conditions. +First, we must realize that we are at present in a very critical +situation. Second ... we must unite ... and form a large national +association."(72) He evidently regarded the ideological reconstitution as +anterior to the political, although he adjusted the common development of +the two quite detailedly in his doctrine of tutelage. + +He proposed three ideological methods for the regeneration of China, which +might again make the Chinese the leading society (nation) of the world. +There were: first, the return to the ancient Chinese morality; second, the +return to the ancient Chinese learning; and third, the adoption of Western +science.(73) + +Sun Yat-sen's never-shaken belief in the applicability of the ancient +Chinese ethical system, and in the wisdom of old China in social +organization, is such that of itself it prevents his being regarded as a +mere imitator of the West, a barbarized Chinese returning to barbarize his +countrymen. His devotion to Confucianism was so great that Richard +Wilhelm, the greatest of German sinologues, wrote of him: "The greatness +of Sun Yat-sen rests, therefore, upon the fact that he has found a living +synthesis between the fundamental principles of Confucianism and the +demands of modern times, a synthesis which, beyond the borders of China, +can again become significant to all humanity. Sun Yat-sen combined in +himself the brazen consistency of a revolutionary and the great love of +humanity of a renewer. Sun Yat-sen has been the kindest of all the +revolutionaries of mankind. And this kindness was taken by him from the +heritage of Confucius. Hence his intellectual work stands as a connecting +bridge between the old and the modern ages. And it will be the salvation +of China, if it determinedly treads that bridge."(74) And Tai Chi-tao, one +of Sun Yat-sen's most respected followers, had said: "Sun Yat-sen was the +only one among all the revolutionaries who was not an enemy to Confucius; +Sun Yat-sen himself said that his ideas embodied China, and that they were +derived from the ideas of Confucius."(75) The invocation of authorities +need not be relied upon to demonstrate the importance of Sun Yat-sen's +demand for ideological reconstruction upon the basis of a return to the +traditional morality; he himself stated his position in his sixth lecture +on nationalism: "If we now wish to restore to our nation its former +position, besides uniting all of us into a national body, we must also +first revive our own ancient morality; when we have achieved that, we can +hope to give back to our nation the position which she once held."(76) + +What are the chief elements of the old morality? These are: 1) loyalty and +filial piety, 2) humanity and charity, 3) faithfulness and justice, and 4) +peace. These four, however, are all expressions of _humanity_, to which +_knowledge_ and _valor_ must be joined, and _sincerity_ employed in +expressing them. + +The problem of loyalty was one very difficult to solve. Under the Empire +it was easy enough to consider the Emperor as the father of the great +society, and to teach loyalty to him. This was easy to grasp, even for the +simplest mind. Sun Yat-sen urged loyalty to the people, and loyalty to +duty, as successors to the loyalty once owed to the sovereign. He deplored +the tendency, which appeared in Republican times, for the masses to assume +that since there was no more Emperor, there was no more loyalty; and it +has, since the passing of Sun Yat-sen, been one of the efforts of the +Nationalists to build up a tradition of loyalty to the spirit of Sun +Yat-sen as the timeless and undying leader of modern China. + +Sun Yat-sen was also deeply devoted to filial piety in China, which was--in +the old philosophy--simply a manifestation, in another direction, of the +same virtue as loyalty. He called filial piety indispensable, and was +proud that none of the Western nations had ever approached the excellence +of the Chinese in this virtue.(77) At the time that he said this, Sun +Yat-sen was accused of being a virtual Communist, and of having succumbed +to the lure of Soviet doctrines. It is at least a little strange that a +man supposedly infatuated with Marxism should praise that most +conservative of all virtues: filial piety! + +Sun Yat-sen then commented on each of the other virtues, pointing out +their excellence in old China, and their necessity to modern China. In the +case of faithfulness, for example, he cited the traditional reliability of +the Chinese in commercial honor. Concerning justice, he pointed out that +the Chinese political technique was one fundamentally just; an instance of +the application of this was Korea, which was-allowed to enjoy peace and +autonomy as a Chinese vassal state for centuries, and then was destroyed +shortly after becoming a Japanese protectorate. Chinese faithfulness and +justice were obviously superior to that of the Japanese. + +In politics the two most important contributions of the old morality to +the Nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen were (1) the doctrine of _wang +tao_, and (2) the social interpretation of history. + +_Wang tao_ is the way of kings--the way of right as opposed to _pa tao_, +the way of might. It consisted, in the old ideology, of the course of +action of the kingly man, who ruled in harmony with nature and did not +violate the established proprieties of mankind. Sun Yat-sen's teachings +afford us several applications of _wang tao_. In the first place, a group +which has been formed by the forces of nature is a race; it has been +formed according to _wang tao_. A group which has been organized by brute +force is a state, and is formed by _pa tao_. The Chinese Empire was built +according to _wang tao_; the British Empire by _pa tao_. The former was a +natural organization of a homogeneous race; the latter, a military outrage +against the natural order of mankind.(78) + +_Wang tao_ is also seen in the relation between China and her vassal +states, a benevolent relationship which stood in sharp contrast, at times, +though not always, to the methods later to be used by the Europeans in +Asia.(79) Again, economic development on a basis of the free play of +economic forces was regarded as _wang tao_ by Sun Yat-sen, even though its +consequences might be adverse. _Pa tao_ appeared only when the political +was employed to do violence to the economic.(80) This doctrine of good and +bad aspects of economic relationships stands in distinct contrast to the +Communist theory. He believed that the political was frequently employed +to bring about unjust international economic relationships, and extenuated +adverse economic conditions simply because they were the free result of +the operations of a _laissez-faire_ economy. + +Economically, the interpretation of history was, according to Sun Yat-sen, +to be performed through the study of consumption, and not of the means of +production. In this he was indebted to Maurice William--at least in +part.(81) The social interpretation of history is, however, associated not +only with economic matters, but with the ancient Chinese moral system as +well. Tai Chi-tao, whose work has most clearly demonstrated the +relationship between Confucianism and Sunyatsenism, points out in his +diagram of Sun Yat-sen's ethical system that _humanity_ (_jên_) was to Sun +Yat-sen the key to the interpretation of history. We have already seen +that _jên_ is the doctrine of social consciousness, of awareness of +membership in society.(82) Sun Yat-sen, according to Tai Chi-tao, regarded +man's development as a social animal, the development of his humanity, as +the key to history. This would include, of course, among other things, his +methods of production and of consumption. The distinction between Sun +Yat-sen and the Western Marxian thinkers lies in the fact that the latter +trace their philosophical genealogy back through the main currents of +Western philosophy, while Sun Yat-sen derives his from Confucius. Nothing +could be further from dialectical materialism than the socio-ethical +interpretation that Sun Yat-sen developed from the Confucian theories. + +The rôle played by the old Chinese morality in the ideology of Sun Yat-sen +is, it is apparent, an important one. First, Sun Yat-sen believed that +Chinese nationalism and the regeneration of the Chinese people had to be +based on the old morality of China, which was superior to any other +morality that the world had known, and which was among the treasures of +the Chinese people. Second, he believed that, in practical politics as +well as national ideology, the application of the old virtues would be +fruitful in bringing about the development of a strong China. Third, he +derived the idea of _wang tao_, the right, the royal, the natural way, +from antiquity. He pointed out that violence to the established order--of +race, as in the case of the British Empire, of economics, as in the case +of the political methods of imperialism--was directly antithetical to the +natural, peaceful way of doing things that had led to the supreme +greatness of China in past ages. Fourth, he employed the doctrine of +_jên_, of social-consciousness, which had already been used, by the +Confucians, and formed the cornerstone of their teaching, as the key to +his interpretation. In regard to the individual, this was, as we have +seen, consciousness of social orientation; with regard to the group, it +was the development of strength and harmony. It has also been translated +_humanity_, which broadly and ethically, carries the value scheme with +which _jên_ is connected. + +Even this heavy indebtedness to Chinese antiquity in adopting and adapting +the morality of the ancients for the salvation of their children in the +modern world, was not the total of Sun Yat-sen's political traditionalism. +He also wished to renew the ancient Chinese knowledge, especially in the +fields of social and political science. Only after these did he desire +that Western technics be introduced. + + + + +The Return to the Ancient Knowledge. + + +Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the return to the ancient Chinese knowledge may +be divided into three parts. First, he praised the ancient Chinese +superiority in the field of social science, but distinctly stressed the +necessity of Western knowledge in the field of the physical and applied +sciences alone.(83) Second, he pointed out the many practical +accomplishments of the ancient Chinese knowledge, and the excellence and +versatility of Chinese invention.(84) Third, his emphasis upon the +development of talents in the material sciences hints at, although it does +not state, a theory of national wealth based upon labor capacity. + +Sun Yat-sen said, "Besides reviving our ancient Chinese morality, we must +also revive our wisdom and ability.... If today we want to revive our +national spirit, we must revive not only the morality which is proper to +us, but we must revive also our own knowledge."(85) He goes on to say that +the peculiar excellence of the ancient Chinese knowledge lay in the field +of political philosophy, and states that the Chinese political philosophy +surpassed the Western, at least in clearness. + +He quotes _The Great Learning_ for the summation, in a few words, of the +highlights of this ancient Chinese social knowledge: "Investigate into +things, attain the utmost knowledge, make the thoughts sincere, rectify +the heart, cultivate the person, regulate the family, govern the country +rightly, pacify the world."(86) This is, as we have seen, what may be +called the Confucian doctrine of ideological control. Sun Yat-sen lavished +praise upon it. "Such a theory, so detailed, minute, and progressive, was +neither discovered nor spoken of by any foreign political philosopher. It +is a peculiar intellectual treasure pertaining to our political +philosophy, which we must preserve."(87) The endorsement is doubly +significant. In the first place, it demonstrates the fact that Sun Yat-sen +thought of himself as a rebuilder and not as a destroyer of the ancient +Chinese culture, and the traditional methods of organization and control. +In the second place, it points out that his Chinese background was most +clear to him, and that he was in his own mind the transmitter of the +Chinese heritage. + +In speaking of Chinese excellence in the field of the social science, Sun +Yat-sen did not confine his discussion to any one time. Whenever he +referred to a political theory, he mentioned its Chinese origin if it were +one of those known to Chinese antiquity: anarchism, communism, democracy. +He never attacked Chinese intellectual knowledge for being what it was, +but only for what it omitted: physical science.(88) He was undoubtedly +more conservative than many of his contemporaries, who were actually +hostile to the inheritance. + +The summary of Sun Yat-sen's beliefs and position in respect to the +ancient intellectual knowledge is so well given by Tai Chi-tao that any +other statement would almost have to verge on paraphrase. Tai Chi-tao +wrote: + + + Sun Yat-sen (in his teachings) completely includes the true ideas + of China as they recur again and again from Yao and Shun, + Confucius and Mencius. It will be clear to us, therefore, that Sun + Yat-sen is the renewal of Chinese moral culture, unbroken for two + thousand years ... we can see that Sun Yat-sen was convinced of + the truth of his own words, and at the same time we can also + recognize that his national revolution was based upon the + re-awakening of Chinese culture. He wanted to call the creative + power of China to life again, and to make the value of Chinese + culture useful to the whole world, and in that way to realize + cosmopolitanism.(89) + + +Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen's doctrines may not only be regarded as having +been based upon the tacit premises of the Chinese intellectual milieu, but +as having been incorporated in them as supports. Sun Yat-sen's theories +were, therefore, consciously as well as unconsciously Chinese. + +Sun Yat-sen was proud of the accomplishment of the Chinese in physical and +applied knowledge. He praised Chinese craftsmanship and skill, and +extolled the talents of the people which had invented the mariner's +compass, printing, porcelain, gunpowder, tea, silks, arches, and +suspension bridges.(90) He urged the revival of the talents of the +Chinese, and the return of material development. This teaching, in +conjunction with his advocacy of Western knowledge, leads to another +suggestive point. + +Sun Yat-sen pointed out that _wealth_ was to the modern Chinese what +_liberty_ was to the Europeans of the eighteenth century--the supreme +condition of further progress.(91) The way to progress and wealth was +through social reorganization, and through the use of the capacities of +the people. It may be inferred, although it cannot be stated positively, +that Sun Yat-sen measured wealth not merely in metals or commodities, but +in the productive capacities of the country, which, as they depend upon +the labor skill of the workers, are in the last analysis cultural and +psychological rather than exclusively physical in nature.(92) + +China, following the ancient morality, conscious of its intellectual and +social heritage, and of its latent practical talents, needed only one more +lesson to learn: the need of Western science. + + + + +Western Physical Science in the New Ideology. + + +The third element of the nationalist ideology proposed by Sun Yat-sen was +the introduction of Western science. It is upon this that his break with +the past arose; it is this that gives his ideology its partially +revolutionary character, for the ideology was, as we have seen, strongly +reconstitutional in two of its elements. Sun Yat-sen was, however, willing +to tear down if he could rebuild, and rebuild with the addition of Western +science. These questions immediately arise: why did he wish to add Western +science to the intellectual background of modern China? what, in Western +science, did he wish to add? to what degree did he wish Western science to +play its rôle in the development of a new ideology for China? + +Sun Yat-sen did not have to teach the addition of Western science to the +Chinese ideology. In his own lifetime the terrific swing from arrogant +self-assurance to abject imitativeness had taken place. Sun Yat-sen said +that the Boxer Rebellion was the last surge of the old Chinese +nationalism, "But the war of 1900 was the last manifestation of +self-confidence thoughts and self-confidence power on the part of the +Chinese to oppose the new civilization of Europe and of America.... They +understood that the civilization of Europe and of America was really much +superior to the ancient civilization of China."(93) He added that this +superiority was naturally evident in the matter of armaments. This +illustrates both consequences of the impact of the West--the endangered +position of the Chinese society, and the consequent instability of the +Chinese ideology. + +Sun Yat-sen did not regard the introduction of Western science into +Chinese life as merely remedial in nature, but, on the contrary, saw much +benefit in it. This was especially clear to him as a physician; his +training led him to see the abominable practices of many of the Chinese in +matters of diet and hygiene.(94) He made a sweeping claim of Western +superiority, which is at the same time a sharp limitation of it in fields +which the conservative European would be likely to think of as +foremost--politics, ethics, religion. "Besides the matter of armaments, the +means of communication ... are far superior.... Moreover, in everything +else that relates to machinery or daily human labor, in methods of +agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, all (foreign) methods by far +surpass those of China."(95) + +Sun Yat-sen pointed out the fact that while manuals of warfare become +obsolete in a very few years in the West, political ideas and institutions +do not. He cited the continuance of the same pattern of government in the +United States, and the lasting authority of the _Republic_ of Plato, as +examples of the stagnation of the Western social sciences as contrasted +with physical sciences. Already prepossessed in favor of the Chinese +knowledge and morality in non-technical matters, he did not demand the +introduction of Western social methods as well. He had lived long enough +in the West to lose some of the West-worship that characterized so many +Chinese and Japanese of his generation. He was willing, even anxious, that +the experimental method, by itself, be introduced into Chinese thought in +all fields,(96) but not particularly impressed with the general +superiority of Western social thought. + +Sun Yat-sen's own exposition of the reasons for his desiring to limit the +rôle played by Western science in China is quite clear.(97) In the first +place, Sun Yat-sen was vigorously in favor of adopting the experimental +method in attaining knowledge. He stood firmly for the pragmatic +foundation of knowledge, and for the exercise of the greatest care and +most strenuous effort in discovering it. Secondly, he believed in taking +over the physical knowledge of the Westerners, although--in his emphasis on +Chinese talent--he by no means believed that Western physical knowledge +would displace that of the Chinese altogether. "We can safely imitate the +material civilization of Europe and of America; we may follow it blindly, +and if we introduce it in China, it will make good headway."(98) Thirdly, +he believed that the social science of the West, and especially its +political philosophy, might lead the Chinese into gross error, since it +was derived from a quite different ideology, and not relevant to Chinese +conditions. "It would be a gross error on our part, if, disregarding our +own Chinese customs and human sentiments, we were to try to force upon +(our people) a foreign type of social government just as we copy a foreign +make of machinery."(99) Fourthly, even apart from the difference between +China and the West which invalidated Western social science in China, he +did not believe that the West had attained to anything like the same +certainty in social science that it had in physical science.(100) Fifthly, +Sun Yat-sen believed that the Chinese should profit by observing the +experiments and theories of the West in regard to social organization, +without necessarily following them. + +The great break between Sun Yat-sen's acceptance of Western physical +science and his rejection of Western social science is demonstrated by his +belief that government is psychological in its foundations. "Laws of human +government also constitute an abstract piece of machinery--for that reason +we speak of the machinery of an organized government--but a material piece +of machinery is based on nature, whereas the immaterial machinery of +government is based on psychology."(101) Sun Yat-sen pointed out, although +in different words, that government was based upon the ideology and that +the ideology of a society was an element in the last analysis +psychological, however much it might be conditioned by the material +environment. + +Of these three elements--Chinese morality, Chinese social and political +knowledge, and Western physical science--the new ideology for the modern +Chinese society was to be formed. What the immediate and the ultimate +forms of that society were to be, remains to be studied. + + + + +The Consequences of the Nationalist Ideology. + + +What are the consequences of this Nationalistic ideology? What sort of +society did Sun Yat-sen envision? How much of it was to be Chinese, and +how much Western? Were the Chinese, like some modern Japanese, to take +pride in being simultaneously the most Eastern of Eastern nations and the +most Western of Western or were they to seek to remain fundamentally what +their ancestors had been for uncounted centuries? + +In the first place, Sun Yat-sen's proposed ideology was, as we have seen, +to be composed of four elements. First, the essential core of the old +ideology, to which the three necessary revivifying elements were to be +added. This vast unmentioned foundation is highly significant to the +assessment of the nature of the new Chinese ideology. (It is quite +apparent that Sun Yat-sen never dreamed, as did the Russians, of +overthrowing the _entire_ traditional order of things. His three +modifications were to be added to the existing Chinese civilization.) +Second, he wished to revive the old morality. Third, he desired to restore +the ancient knowledge and skill of the Chinese to their full creative +energy. Fourth, he desired to add Western science. The full significance +of this must be realized in a consideration of Chinese nationalism. Sun +Yat-sen did not, like the Meiji Emperor, desire to add the whole front of +Western culture; he was even further from emulating the Russians in a +destruction of the existing order and the development of an entirely new +system. His energies were directed to the purification and reconstitution +of the Chinese ideology by the strengthening of its own latent moral and +intellectual values, and by the innovation of Western physical science and +the experimental method. Of the range of the ideology, of the +indescribably complex intellectual conditionings in which the many +activities of the Chinese in their own civilization were carried on, Sun +Yat-sen proposed to modify only those which could be improved by a +reaction to the excellencies of Chinese antiquity, or benefited by the +influence of Western science. Sun Yat-sen was, as Wilhelm states, both a +revolutionary and a reconstitutionary. He was reconstitutionary in the +ideology which he proposed, and a revolutionary by virtue of the political +methods which he was willing to sanction and employ in carrying the +ideology into the minds of the Chinese populace. + +In the second place, Sun Yat-sen proposed to modify the old ideology not +only with respect to content but also with regard to method of +development. The Confucians had, as we have seen, provided for the +continual modification and rectification of the ideology by means of the +doctrine of _chêng ming_. It is a matter of dispute as to what degree that +doctrine constituted a scientific method for propagating knowledge.(102) +Whatever the method of the ancients, Sun Yat-sen proposed to modify it in +three steps: the acknowledgment of the pragmatic foundations of social +ideas, the recognition of the necessity for knowledge before action, and +the introduction of the experimental method. His pragmatic position shows +no particular indication of having been derived from any specific source; +it was a common enough tendency in old Chinese thought, from the +beginning; in advocating it, Sun Yat-sen may have been revolutionary only +in his championing of an idea which he may well have had since early +childhood. His stress upon the necessity of ideological clarity as +antecedent to revolutionary or any other kind of action is negatively +derived from Wang Yang-ming, whose statement of the converse Sun Yat-sen +was wont to attack. The belief in the experimental method is clearly +enough the result of his Western scientific training--possibly in so direct +a fashion as the personal influence of one of his instructors, Dr. James +Cantlie, later Sir James Cantlie, of Queen's College, Hongkong. Sun +Yat-sen was a physician; his degree _Dr._ was a medical and not an +academic one; and there is no reason to overlook the influence of his +vocation, a Western one, in estimating the influence of the Western +experimental method.(103) + +The overwhelming preponderance of Chinese elements in the new ideology +proposed by Sun Yat-sen must not hide the fact that, in so stable an +ideology as that of old China, the modifications which Sun advocated were +highly significant. In method, experimentalism;(104) in background, the +whole present body of Western science--these were to move China deeply, +albeit a China that remained Chinese. There is a fundamental difference +between Sun's doctrine of ideological extension ("the need for knowledge") +and Confucius' doctrine of ideological rectification (_chêng ming_). +Confucius advocated the establishment of a powerful ideology for the +purpose of extending ideological control and thereby of minimizing the +then pernicious effects of the politically active proto-nations of his +time. Sun Yat-sen, reared in a world subject to ideological control, saw +no real necessity for strengthening it; what he desired was to prepare +China psychologically for the development of a clear-cut conscious nation +and a powerful government as the political instrument of that nation. In +spite of the great Chinese emphasis which Sun pronounced in his ideology, +and in spite of his many close associations with old Chinese thought, his +governmental principles are in a sense diametrically opposed to +Confucianism. Confucius sought to establish a totalitarian system of +traditional controls which would perpetuate society and civilization +regardless of the misadventures or inadequacies of government. Sun Yat-sen +was seeking to build a strong liberal protective state within the +framework of an immemorial society which was largely non-political; his +doctrine, which we may call totalitarianism in reverse, tended to +encourage intellectual freedom rather than any rigid ideological +coördination. The mere fact that Sun Yat-sen trusted the old Chinese +ideology to the ordeal of free criticism is, of course, further testimony +to his belief in the fundamental soundness of the old intellectual +order--an order which needed revision and supplementation to guide modern +China through the perils of its destiny. + +Before passing to a brief consideration of the nature of the society to be +developed through this nationalist ideology, it may be interesting to note +the value-scheme in the ideology. There was but one value--the survival of +the Chinese people with their own civilization. All other considerations +were secondary; all other reforms were means and not ends. Nationalism, +democracy, and _min shêng_ were each indispensable, but none was superior +to the supreme desideratum, Chinese survival. That this survival was a +vivid problem to Sun, almost any of his lectures will testify. Tai +Chi-tao, one of the inner circle of Sun Yat-sen's disciples, summarized +the spirit of this nationalism when he wrote; "We are Chinese, and those +things that we have to change first lie in China. But if all things in +China have become worthless, if Chinese culture no longer has any +significance in the cultural history of the world, if the Chinese people +has lost its power of holding its culture high, we might as well wait for +death with bound hands--what would be the use of going on with +revolution?"(105) Sun Yat-sen made concessions to cosmopolitanism, which +he saw as ideal to be realized in the remote future. First and last, +however, he was concerned with his own people, the Chinese. + +What was to be the nature of the society which would arise from the +knowledge and application of the new ideology? Sun planned to introduce +the idea of a race-nation into the Chinese ideology, to replace the +definite but formless we-you outlook which the Chinese of old China had +had toward outsiders almost indiscriminately.(106) The old anti-barbarian +sentiment had from time to time in the past been very powerful; Sun +Yat-sen called this nationalism also, not distinguishing it from the new +kind of nationalism which he advocated--a modern nationalism necessarily +connoting a plurality of equal nations. The self-consciousness of the +Chinese he wished to restore, although on a basis of justice and the +mutual recognition by the nations of each other's right to exist. But this +nationalism was not to be a complete break with the past, for the new +China was to continue the traditional function of old China--of being the +teacher and protectress of Eastern Asia. It was the duty of China to +defend the oppressed among the nations, and to smite down the Great Powers +in their oppressiveness. We may suppose that this benevolence of the +Chinese race-nation would benefit the neighbors of China only so long as +those neighbors, quickened themselves by nationalist resurgences, did not +see something sinister in the benevolent manifest destiny of the Chinese. + +It was a matter of policy, rather than of ideology, as to what the Chinese +nation was to include. There were possibilities of a conflict with the +Communists over the question of Outer Mongolia. Physically, Sun saw the +Mongols as one of the five component peoples of the Great Chung-hua +Republic. At another time he suggested that they might become assimilated. +He never urged the Mongols to separate from China and join the Soviet +Union, or even continue as a completely independent state.(107) There was +always the possibility of uncertainty in the case of persons who were--by +the five principle elements of race (according to Sun Yat-sen, blood, +livelihood, language, religion, and mores)(108)--members of the Chinese +race-nation but did not consider themselves such. + +Chinese nationalism was to lead to cosmopolitanism. Any attempt to foster +cosmopolitanism before solving the national problem was not only Utopian +but perverse. The weakness of the Chinese had in great part been derived +from their delusions of world-order in a world that was greater than they +imagined, and the true solution to the Chinese question was to be found, +not in any vain theory for the immediate salvation of the world as a +whole, but in the diligent and patriotic activities of the Chinese in +their own country. China was to help the oppressed nations of the earth, +not the oppressed classes. China was to help all Asia, and especially the +countries which had depended upon China for protection, and had been +failed in their hour of need by the impotent Manchu Dynasty. China was, +indeed, to seek the coöperation of the whole world, and the promotion of +universal peace. But China was to do all this only when she was in a +position to be able to do so, and not in the meantime venture forth on any +splendid fantasies which would profit no people. + +The survival of China was the supreme aim of Sun Yat-sen. How did he +propose that China, once conscious of itself, should control itself to +survive and go onwards to the liberation and enrichment of mankind? These +are questions that he answered in his ideology of democracy and of _min +shêng_. + + + + + +CHAPTER III. THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY. + + + + +Democracy in the Old World-Society. + + +In describing a few of the characteristics of the old ideology and the old +society which may assist the clarification of the principle of democracy, +it may prove useful to enter into a brief examination of what the word may +mean in the West, to refer to some of the ideas and institutions of old +China that were or were not in accord with the Western notion of +democracy, and, finally, to see what connection Sun Yat-sen's theory of +democracy may have either with the Western term or with elements in the +Chinese background. Did Sun Yat-sen propound an entirely new theory as the +foundation of his theory of democracy for the Chinese race-nation, or did +he associate several hitherto unrelated ideas and systems to make a new +whole? + +The European word _democracy_ may, for the purposes of this examination, +be taken to have two parts to its meaning; first, with regard to the +status of individuals in society; second, with respect to the allocation +of political power in society. In the former sense, democracy may refer to +an equalitarianism of status, or to a social mobility so easy and so +general as to encourage the impression that position is a consequence of +the behavior of the individual, and a fair gauge to his merit. In the +latter part of the meaning, democracy may refer to the identification of +the governed and the governors, or to the coincidence of the actions of +the governors with the wishes of the governed. Each of these +ideas--equalitarianism, free mobility, popular government, and +representative government--has been referred to as the essence of +democracy. One of them may lead to the discovery of a significance for +democracy relevant to the scheme of things in the old Chinese society. + +Egalitarianism and mobility were both present in old Chinese society. The +Chinese have had neither an hereditary aristocracy equivalent to the +Western, nor a caste-system resembling that of India or Japan, since the +breakdown of the feudal system twenty-three centuries ago.(109) The +extra-legal egalitarianism of the Chinese has been so generally remarked +upon by persons familiar with that nation, that further discussion of it +here is superfluous. Birth has probably counted less in China than it has +in any other country in the world. + +The egalitarianism of intercourse was a powerful aid to social mobility. +The Chinese never pretended to economic, political, or intellectual +equality; the mere statement of such a doctrine would have been sufficient +refutation of it to the members of the old society. Yet there were no +gradations of weight beyond educational, political, and economic +distinctions, and the organization of the old society was such that +mobility in these was relatively free. Movement of an individual either +upwards or downwards in the economic, political, or academic scale was +retarded by the influence of the family, which acted as a drag either way. +Movement was nevertheless continuous and conspicuous; a proof of this +movement is to be found in the fact that there are really no supremely +great families in China, comparable to the great names of Japan or of the +Euramerican nations. (The closest approximation to this is the _K'ung_ +family, the family of Confucius; since the family is large, its eminence +is scarcely more than nominal and it has no political power.). + +Mobility in China was fostered by the political arrangements. The +educational-administrative system provided a channel upwards and +downwards. The government tended, for the most part, to be the way up, +while the economic system was the way down for prominent official +families. Few families managed to remain eminent for more than a few +generations, and--with the great size of families--there was always room at +the top. If a man were not advancing himself, there was always the +possibility that a kinsman might win preferment, to the economic and +political advantage of the whole family group. + +Social relations--in the narrowest sense of the word--were characterized by +an extreme attention to form as such, and great contempt for it otherwise. +Ritualism never became a chivalry or a cult of honor. There was always the +emphasis upon propriety and courtesy but, once the formalities were done +with, there was little social distinction between members of different +economic, political, or academic classes.(110) + +In connection with control and representation, a great deal more can be +said. In the first place, the relations between the governing ideologue in +the Confucian teachings,(111) and the governed accepters of the ideology +in the Confucian system were to be discovered through _yüeh_. + +_Yüeh_, commonly translated "music" or "harmony," plays a peculiar rôle in +the Confucian teachings. It is the mass and individual emotional pattern, +as _li_ is the behavior pattern. If the people follow the proper behavior +pattern, their emotional pattern must also be good. Consequently, the +function of a truly excellent ruler was the scrutiny of _yüeh_. If he were +a man of superior penetration, he should be able to feel the _yüeh_ about +him, and thus discover the temper of the populace, without reference to +electoral machinery or any other government instrumentality. _Yüeh_ is to +be seen in the tone of voices, in the rhythm of behavior. If it is good, +it will act with increasing effect upon itself. If bad, it serves as a +warning to the authorities. As Prof. Hsü says, "For rulers and +administrators _yüeh_ has two uses; first, it enables them to ascertain +the general sentiment of the people toward the government and political +life; and second, it cultivates a type of individual attitude that is most +harmonious with the environment. The joint work of _li_ and _yüeh_ would +produce social harmony and social happiness--which is the ultimate aim of +the State."(112) + +_Yüeh_ is, however, a peculiar phenomenon, which can scarcely be called +either representation or control. It is an idea rooted in the curiously +pragmatic-mystical world-view of the Confucians, that same world-view +which elevated virtue almost to the level of a physical substance, subject +to the same sort of laws of disruption or transmission. Nothing like +_yüeh_ can be found in Western political thought; however significant it +may have been in China, any attempt to deal with it in a Western language +would have more than a touch of futility, because of the great chasm of +strangeness that separates the two intellectual worlds at so many places. + +A more concrete illustration of the old Chinese ideas of popular control +may be found in the implications of political Confucianism, as Hsü renders +them: + + + From the Confucian doctrine of stewardship, namely, that the king + is an ordinary person selected by God upon his merit to serve as + the steward of God in the control of the affairs of the people for + the welfare of the people, there are deduced five theories of + political democracy. In the first place, the government must + respect public opinion. The will of the people is the will of God, + and thus the king should obey both the will of the people and the + will of God.... + + In the second place, government should be based upon the consent + of the governed.... + + In the third place, the people have a duty as well as a right to + carry on revolution as the last resort in stopping tyranny.... + Revolution is regarded as a natural blessing; it guards against + tyranny and promotes the vitality of the people. It is in complete + harmony with natural law. + + In the fourth place, the government exists for the welfare of the + people. + + In the fifth place, liberty, equality and equity should be + preserved. The State belong equally to all; and so hereditary + nobility, hereditary monarchy, and despotism are deplored. + Confucius and his disciples seem to advocate a democracy under the + form of an elective monarchy or a constitutional monarchy.... + + Local self-government is recognized in the Confucian system of + government.... The Confucian theory of educational election + suggests the distinctly new idea of representation.(113) + + +This summary could scarcely be improved upon although it represents a +considerable latitude of interpretation in the subject-matter of the +classics. The voice of the people was the voice of God. From other +political writers of antiquity--Mêng Tzu, Mo Ti, Han Fei Tzu and the +Legalists, and others--the Chinese received a variety of political +interpretations, none of which fostered the development of autocracy as it +developed in Europe. + +The reason for this is simple. In addition to the eventual popular control +of government, and the necessity for the close attention of the government +to the wishes of the people, the classical writers, for the most part, did +not emphasize the position of government. With the increasing ideological +solidarity of the Chinese world, the increasing antiquity and authority of +tradition, and the stability of the social system, the Chinese states +withered away--never completely, but definitely more so than their +analogues in the West. There appeared, consequently, in China a form of +laissez-faire that surpassed that of Europe completely in thoroughness. +Not only were the economic functions of the state reduced to a minimum--so +was its police activity. Old China operated with a government in reserve, +as it were; a government which was nowhere nearly so important to its +subjects as Western governments commonly are. The government system was +one democratic in that it was rooted in a society without intransigeant +class lines, with a considerable degree of social mobility for the +individual, with the total number of individuals exercising a terrific and +occasionally overwhelming pressure against the political system. And yet +it was not the governmental system upon which old China might have based +its claim to be a democracy. It could have, had it so wished, claimed that +name because of the weakness or the absence of government, and the +presence of other social organizations permitting the individual a +considerable amount of latent pressure to exercise upon his social +environment. + +This arose from the nature of the large non-political organizations which +sustained Chinese civilization even more than did the +educational-administrative authorities. It is obvious that, in theory, a +free and unassociated individual in a laissez-faire polity would be +defenseless against extra-politically organized persons. The equities of +modern democracy lie largely in the development of a check and balance +system of pressure groups, affording each individual adequate means of +exercising pressure on behalf of his various interests. It was this +function--the development of a just statement of pressure-groups--which the +old Chinese world-society developed for the sufficient representation of +the individual. + +There was no illusion of complete personal liberty. Such a notion was +scarcely thinkable. Every individual had his family, his village, +and--although this was by no means universally true--his _hui_, whether one +or, less commonly, several. He was never left solitary and defenseless +against powerfully organized interests. No more intimate community of +interests could be discovered than that of a family, since the community +of interests there would verge on the total. Ancient Chinese society +provided the individual with mechanisms to make his interests felt and +effective, through the family, the village, and the association. + +In the West the line of influence runs from the individual, who feels a +want, to the group which assists him in expressing it, to the government, +upon which the group exercises pressure, in order that the government may +use its power to secure what the first group wants from some other group. +The line runs, as it were, in the following manner: +individual-group-government-group. In China the group exercised its +pressure for the most part directly. The individual need not incorporate +himself in a group to secure the recognition and fulfillment of his +interests; he was by birth a member of the group, and with the group was +mobile. In a sense old Chinese society was thoroughly democratic. + +On the basis of such a background, Sun Yat-sen did not believe that the +Chinese had too much government, but, rather, too little. He did not cry +for liberty; he denounced its excess instead. On the basis of the old +social organization, which was fluid and yet stable, he sought to create a +democracy which would pertain to the interests of the nation as a whole, +not to the interests of individuals or groups. These could go on in the +traditional manner. The qualifications implicit in Sun Yat-sen's +championship of democracy must be kept in mind, and his acquaintance with +the democratic techniques of the old society be allowed for. Otherwise his +advocacy of the recognition of nationalist rights and his neglect or +denunciation of individual liberties might be taken for the dogma of a +lover of tyranny or dictatorship. + +Old China possessed a considerable degree of egalitarianism, of social +mobility, of popular control, and of popular participation, through the +civil service, in what little government there was. In addition, +ideological control ensured a minimum of conflicts of interests and +consequently a maximum facility for self-expression without conflict with +other individuals, groups, or society as a whole. Finally, the protection +and advancement of individuals' rights and interests were fostered by a +system of group relationships which bound virtually every individual into +a group and left none to fall, solitary, at the mercy of others who were +organized. + +Why then did Sun Yat-sen advocate democracy? What were his justifications +for it, in a society already so democratic? + + + + +Five Justifications of a Democratic Ideology. + + +Sun Yat-sen, realizing the inescapable necessity of nationalism, did not +immediately turn to democracy as a necessary instrument for its promotion. +He hated the Manchus on the Dragon Throne--human symbols of China's +subjugation--but at first considered replacing them with a new Chinese +dynasty. It was only after he had found the heirs of the Ming dynasty and +the descendants of Confucius to be unworthy that he turned to +republicanism and found democracy, with its many virtues.(114) He early +became enamored of the elective system, as found in the United States, as +the only means of obtaining the best governors.(115) In the final stage he +had departed so far from his earlier way of thinking that he criticized +Dr. Goodnow severely for recommending the re-introduction of a monarchy in +China. + +Sun Yat-sen, as a good nationalist, made earnest efforts to associate his +doctrines with those of the sages and to avoid appearing as a proponent of +Western civilization. It is, consequently, not unusual to discover him +citing Confucius and Mencius on _vox populi vox dei_, and saying, + +"The government of Yao and Shun was monarchical in name but democratic in +practice, and for that reason Confucius honored these men."(116) + +He considered that democracy was to the sages an "ideal that could not be +immediately realized,"(117) and therefore implied that modern China, in +realizing democracy, was attaining an ideal cherished by the past. +Democracy, other things apart, was a filial duty. This argument, while +persuasive in Chinese, can scarcely be considered Sun Yat-sen's most +important one in favor of democracy. + +His most cogent and perhaps most necessary argument was based on his +conception of national liberty as opposed to the liberty of the +individual. He delivered a spirited denunciation of those foreigners who +criticized the Chinese for being without liberty, and in the next breath +complained that the Chinese had no government, that they were "loose +sand." (Another fashionable way of expressing this idea is by saying that +"China is a geographical expression.") He said: "If, for instance, the +foreigners say that China is 'loose sand,' what do they finally mean by +that expression? They mean to say that each individual is free, that +everybody is free, that each one takes the maximum of liberty, and that, +as a result, they are 'loose sand'."(118) He pointed out that the Chinese +had not suffered from the loose autocracy in the Empire, and that they had +no historical justification for parroting the cry "Liberty!" simply +because the Westerners, who had really lacked it, had cried and fought for +it. He cited John Millar's definition of liberty, given in _The Progress +of Science Relative to Law and Government_, 1787: "True liberty consists +in this: that the liberty of each individual is limited by the +non-infringement on the liberty of others; when it invades the liberty of +others, it is no longer liberty."(119) Sun Yat-sen had himself defined +liberty as follows: "Liberty consists in being able to move, in having +freedom of action within an organized group."(120) China, disorganized, +had no problem of individual liberty. There was, as a matter of fact, too +much liberty.(121) What the Chinese had to do was to sacrifice some of +their individual liberty for the sake of the organized nation. Here we +find a curious turn of thought of which several other examples may be +found in the _San Min Chu I_: Sun Yat-sen has taken a doctrine which in +the West applies to the individual, and has applied it to the nation. He +believes in liberty; but it is not the liberty of the individual which is +endangered in China. It is the liberty of the nation--which has been lost +before foreign oppression and exploitation. Consequently he preaches +national and not individual liberty. Individual liberty must be sacrificed +for the sake of a free nation.(122) Without discipline there is no order; +without order the nation is weak and oppressed. The first step to China's +redemption is _min tsu_, the union (nationalism) of the people. Then comes +_min ch'üan_, the power of the people. The liberty of the nation is +expressed through the power of the people. + +How is the power of the people to be exercised? It is to be exercised by +democratic means. To Sun Yat-sen, the liberty of the nation and the power +of the people were virtually identical. If the Chinese race gained its +freedom, that freedom, exercised in an orderly manner, could mean only +democracy. It is this close association of nationalism (_min tsu_) and +democracy (_min ch'üan_), this consideration of democracy as the +expression of nationalism, that forms, within the framework of the _San +Min Chu I_, what is probably the best nationalist argument for +democracy--best, that is, in being most coherent with the Three Principles +as a whole. + +If the view of democracy just expressed be considered an exposition of the +fundamental necessity of democracy, the third argument may be termed the +dialectical or historical championship of democracy. Sun Yat-sen believed +in the existence of progress, and considered that there was an inevitable +tendency toward democracy: the overthrow of the Manchus was a result of +the "... world tide. That world current can be compared to the course of +the Yangtze or the Yellow River. The flow of the stream turns perhaps in +many directions, now toward the north, now toward the south, but in the +end flows toward the east in spite of all obstacles; nothing can stem it. +In the same way the world-tide passes ...; now it has arrived at +democracy, and there is no way to stem it."(123) This belief in the +inevitability as well as the justice of his cause encouraged Sun, and has +lent to his movement--as his followers see it--something of the impressive +sweep that the Communists see in their movement. + +Sun Yat-sen did not devise any elaborate scheme of dialectical materialism +or economic determinism to bolster his belief in the irreversibility of +the flow to democracy. With infinite simplicity, he presented an +exposition of democracy in space and time. In time, he saw a change from +the rule of force to theocracy, then to monarchy, and then to democracy; +this change was a part of the progress of mankind, which to him was +self-evident and inevitable.(124) In space he perceived that increasingly +great numbers of people threw off monarchical rule and turned to +democracy. He hailed the breakdown of the great empires, Germany and +Russia, as evidence of the power of democracy. "... if we observe (things) +from all angles, we see that the world progresses daily, and we realize +that the present tide has already swept into the age of democracy; and +that no matter how great drawbacks and failures may be, _democracy will +maintain itself in the world for a long time_ (_to come_). For that +reason, thirty years ago, we promoters of the revolution, _resolved that +it was impossible to speak of the greatness of China or to carry out the +revolution without advocating democracy_."(125) + +A fourth argument in favor of democracy, and one which cannot be expanded +here, since it involves reference to Sun Yat-sen's practical plans for the +political regeneration of China, was his assertion that democracy was an +adjunct to appropriate and effective public administration. Sun Yat-sen's +plans concerning the selection of officials in a democratic state showed +that he believed the merging of the Chinese academic-civil service +technique with Western democracy would produce a paragon among practicable +governments. + +Fifthly and finally, Sun regarded democracy as an essential modernizing +force.(126) In the introduction of Western material civilization, which +was always an important consideration to his mind, he felt that a certain +ideological and political change had to accompany the economic and +technological revolution that--in part natural and in part to be stimulated +by nationalist political interference--was to revolutionize the _min shêng_ +of China, the economic and social welfare of the Chinese people. While +this argument in favor of democracy is similar to the historical argument, +it differs from the latter in that Sun Yat-sen saw the technique of +democracy influencing not only the political, but the economic and social, +life of the people as well. The growth of corporate responsibility, the +development of a more rigid ethical system in matters of finance, the +disappearance of too strict an emphasis upon the personal element in +politics (which has clouded Chinese politics with a fog of conspiracy and +intrigue for centuries), a trust in mathematics (as shown in reliance upon +the voting technique for ascertaining public opinion), and the development +of a new kind of individual aggressiveness and uprightness were among the +changes which, necessary if China was to compete in the modern world, +democracy might assist in effecting. While these desiderata do not seem +large when set down in the vast field of political philosophy, they are of +irritating importance in the inevitable trivalities upon which so much of +day-to-day life depends, and would undoubtedly improve the personal tone +of Sino-Western relations. Sun never divorced the theoretical aspects of +his thought from the practical, as has been done here for purposes of +exposition, and even the tiniest details of everyday existence were the +objects of his consideration and criticism. In itself, therefore, the +modernizing force of democracy, as seen in Sun's theory, may not amount to +much; nevertheless, it must not be forgotten.(127) + +Democracy, although secondary in point of time to his theory, is of great +importance in Sun's plans for the political nature of the new China. He +justified democracy because it was (1) an obligation laid upon modern +China by the sages of antiquity; (2) a necessary consequence of +nationalism, since nationalism was the self-rule of a free people, and +democracy the effectuation of that self-rule, and democracy the +effectuation of that self-rule; (3) the government of the modern age; +China, along with the rest of the world, was drawn by the tide of progress +into the age of democratic achievement; (4) the political form best +calculated for the obtaining of good administration; and (5) a modernizing +force that would stir and change the Chinese people so as to equip them +for the competitions of the modern world. + +In the lecture in which he criticized the inadequacies of democracy as +applied in the West, Sun Yat-sen made an interesting comment on the +proletarian dictatorship which had recently been established in Russia. +"Recently Russia invented another form of government. That government is +not representative; it is _absolute popular government_. In what does that +absolute popular government really consist? As we know very little about +it, we cannot judge it aright, but we believe that this (absolute popular +government) is _evidently much better than a representative +government_."(128) He went on immediately to say that the Three Principles +were what China needed, and that the Chinese should not imitate the +political systems advocated in Europe and America, but should adapt +democracy in their own way. In view of his objection to a permanent class +dictatorship, as opposed to a provisional party dictatorship, and the very +enthusiastic advocacy of democracy represented by the arguments described +above, it appears unlikely in the extreme that Sun Yat-sen, had he lived +beyond 1925, would have abandoned his own plan of democracy for China in +favor of "absolute popular government." The phrase was, at the time, since +Sun Yat-sen was seeking Russian assistance, expedient for a popular +lecture. Its importance might easily be exaggerated. + + + + +The Three Natural Classes of Men. + + +Having in mind the extreme peril in which the Chinese race-nation stood, +its importance in a world of Western or Western-type states, and seeing +nationalism as the sole means of defending and preserving China, Sun +Yat-sen demanded that the Chinese ideology be extended by the acquisition +of knowledge. If this modernizing and, if a neologism be permitted, +stateizing process were to succeed, it must needs be fostered by a +well-prepared group of persons within the society. + +In the case of the Confucian social theory, it was the scholars who took +the ideology from the beliefs and traditions of the agrarian masses or +whole people, rectified it, and gave it back to them. This continuous +process of ideological maintenance by means of conformity (_li_) and, when +found necessary, rectification (_chêng ming_) was carried on by an +educational-political system based upon a non-hereditary caste of +academician-officials called _Mandarins_ by the early Western travellers. +In the case of those modern Western states which base their power upon +peculiar ideologies, the philosophy-imposing caste has been a more or less +permanent party- or class-dictatorship. Superficially, the +party-dictatorship planned by Sun Yat-sen would seem to resemble these. +His theory, however, presents two bases for a class of ideologues: one +theoretical, and presumably based upon the Chinese; and one applied, which +is either of his own invention or derived from Western sources. The class +of ideological reformers proposed in what may be called the applied aspect +of his theory was to be organized by means of the party-dictatorship of +the Kuomintang. His other basis for finding a class of persons whose +influence over the ideology was to be paramount was more theoretical, and +deserves consideration among the more abstract aspects of his doctrines. + +He hypothecated a tripartite division of men: + + + Men may be divided into three classes according to their innate + ability or intelligence. The first class of men may be called + _hsien chih hsien cho_ or the "geniuses." The geniuses are endowed + with unusual intelligence and ability. They are the creators of + new ideas, fathers of invention, and originators of new + achievements. They think in terms of group welfare and so they are + the promoters of progress. Next are the _hou chih hou cho_ or the + "followers." Being less intelligent and capable than the _hsien + chih hsien cho_, they do not create or invent or originate, but + they are good imitators and followers of the first class of men. + The last are the _pu chih pu cho_, or the "unthinking," whose + intelligence is inferior to that of the other two classes of men. + These people do what the others instruct them to do, but they do + not think about it. In every sphere of activity all three classes + of men are present. In politics, for example, there are the + creators or inventors of new ideas and movements, then the + propagators of these ideas and movements, and lastly the mass of + men who are taught to practice these ideas.(129) + + +The harmony of this conception with the views of Confucius is evident. +Presbyter is Priest writ large; genius is another name for scholar. Sun, +although bitterly opposed to the mandarinate of the Empire and the +pseudo-Republic, could not rid himself of the age-old Chinese idea of a +class organization on a basis of intellect rather than of property. He +could not champion a revolutionary creed based upon an economic class-war +which he did not think existed, and which he did not wish to foster, in +his own country. He continued instead the consistent theory of an +aristocracy of intellect, such as had controlled China before his coming. + +The aristocracy of intellect is not to be judged, however, by the old +criteria. Under the old regime, a scholar-ruler was one who deferred to +the wisdom of the ancients, who was fit to perpetuate the mysteries of the +written language and culture for the benefit of future ages, and who was +meanwhile qualified by his training to assume the rôle of counsellor and +authority in society. In the theory of Sun Yat-sen, the genius leader is +not the perpetuator but the discoverer. He is the social engineer. His +work is similar to that of the architect who devises plans for a building +which is to be built by workers (the unthinking) under the guidance of +foremen (the followers).(130) In this guise, the new intellectual +aristocrat is a figure more akin to the romantic Western pioneers and +inventors than to the serene, conservative scholars of China in the past. + +The break with Western thought comes in Sun's distinguishing three +permanent, natural classes of men. Though in their aptitudes the _hsien +chih hsien cho_ are more like modern engineers than like archaic literary +historians, they form a class that is inevitably the ruling class. To +Marxism this is anathema; it would imply that the Communist party is +merely the successor of the bourgeoisie in leading the unthinking masses +about--a more benevolent successor, to be sure, but still a class distinct +from the led proletariat of the intellect. To Western democratic thought, +this distinction would seem at first glance to invalidate any future +advocacy of democracy. To the student interested in contrasting +ideological control and political government, the tripartite division of +Sun Yat-sen is significant of the redefinition in modern terms, and in an +even more clear-cut manner, of the Confucian theory of scholarly +leadership. + +How were the geniuses of the Chinese resurgence to make their knowledge +useful to the race-nation? How could democracy be recognized with the +leadership and ideological control of an intellectual class? To what +degree would such a reconciliation, if effected, represent a continuation, +in different terms, of the traditions and institutions of the old Chinese +world? Questions such as these arise from the fusion of the old traditions +and new necessities. + + + + +Ch'üan and Nêng. + + +The contrast between _ch'üan_ and _nêng_ is one of the few aspects of Sun +Yat-sen's theory of democracy which persons not interested in China may, +conceivably, regard as a contribution to political science. There is an +extraordinarily large number of possible translations for each of these +words.(131) A version which may prove convenient and not inaccurate, can +be obtained by translating each Chinese term according to its context. +Thus, a fairly clear idea of _ch'üan_ may be obtained if one says that, +applied to the individual, it means "power," or "right," and when applied +to the exercise of political functions, it means "sovereignty" or +"political proprietorship." _Nêng_, applied to the individual, may mean +"competency" (in the everyday sense of the word), "capacity" or "ability +to administer." Applied to the individual, the contrast is between the +ability to have political rights in a democracy, and the ability to +administer public affairs. Applied to the nation, the contrast is between +sovereignty and administration.(132) + +Without this contrast, the doctrine of the tripartite classification of +men might destroy all possibilities of a practical democracy. If the +Unthinking are the majority, how can democracy be trusted? This contrast, +furthermore, serves to illuminate a further problem: the paradoxical +necessity of an all-powerful government which the people are able to +control. + +If this distinction is accepted in the establishment of a democracy, what +will the consequences be?(133) + +In the first place, the masses who rule will not necessarily govern. +Within the framework of a democratic constitution, they will be able to +express their wishes, and make those wishes effective; but it will be +impossible for them to interfere in the personnel of government, whether +merely administrative or in the highest positions. It will be forever +impossible that a "swine-representative" should be elected, or that one of +those transient epochs of carpet-baggery, which appear from time to time +in most Western democracies, should corrupt the government. By means of +the popular rights of initiative, referendum, election and recall, the +people will be able to control their government in the broad sweep of +policy. The government will be beyond their reach insofar as petty +political interference, leading to inferiority or corruption, is +concerned. + +In the second place, the benefits of aristocracy will be obtained without +its cost. The government will be made up of men especially fit and trained +to govern. There will, hence, be no difficulty in permitting the +government to become extraordinarily powerful in contrast with Western +governments. Since the masses will be able to choose between a wide +selection of able leaders, the democracy will be safeguarded. + +Sun Yat-sen regarded this as one of the cardinal points in his doctrines. +In retaining the old Chinese idea of a scholar class and simultaneously +admitting Western elective and other democratic techniques, he believed +that he had found a scheme which surpassed all others. He saw the people +as stockholders in a company, and the administrators as directors; he saw +the people as the owner of an automobile, and the administrators as the +chauffeur. + +A further consequence of this difference between the right of voting and +the right of being voted for, but one to which Sun Yat-sen did not refer, +necessarily arises from his postulation of a class of geniuses leading +their followers, who control the unthinking masses. That is the continuity +which such a group of ideological controllers would impart to a democracy. +Sun Yat-sen, addressing Chinese, took the Chinese world for granted. A +Westerner, unmindful of the background, might well overlook some +comparatively simple points. The old system, under which the Empire was a +sort of educational system, was a familiar feature in the politics which +Sun Yat-sen criticized. In arguing for the political acceptance of +inequality and the guarantee of government by a select group, Sun was +continuing the old idea of leadership, modifying it only so far as to make +it consistent with democracy. Under the system he proposed, the two great +defects of democracy, untrustworthiness and lack of continuity of policy, +would be largely eliminated. + + + + +The Democratic Machine State. + + +Throughout pre-modern Chinese thought there runs the idea of personal +behavior and personal controls. The Chinese could not hypostatize in the +manner of the West. Looking at men they saw men and nothing more. +Considering the problems and difficulties which men encountered, they +sought solutions in terms of men and the conditioning intimacies of each +individual's life. The Confucian Prince was not so much an administrator +as a moral leader; his influence, extending itself through imitation on +the part of others, was personal and social rather than political.(134) In +succeeding ages, the scholars thought of themselves as the leaven of +virtue in society. They stressed deportment and sought, only too +frequently by means of petty formalities, to impress their own excellence +and pre-eminence upon the people. Rarely, if ever, did the +scholar-official appeal to formal political law. He was more likely to +invoke propriety and proceed to exercise his authority theoretically in +accordance with it. + +Sun Yat-sen did not feel that further appeal to the intellectual leaders +was necessary. In an environment still dominated by the past, an +exhortation for the traditional personal aspect of leadership would +probably have appeared as a centuries-old triteness. The far-seeing men, +the geniuses that Sun saw in all society, owed their superiority not to +artificial inequality but to natural inequality;(135) by their ability +they were outstanding. Laws and customs could outrage this natural +inequality, or conceal it behind a legal facade of artificial inequality +or equally artificial equality. Laws and customs do not change the facts. +The superior man was innately the superior man. + +Nevertheless, the geniuses of the Chinese revolution could not rely upon +the loose and personal system of influence hitherto trusted. To organize +Chinese nationalism, to give it direction as well as force, the power of +the people must be run through a machine--the State. + +A distinction must be made here. The term "machine," applied to +government, was itself a neologism introduced from the Japanese.(136) Not +only was the word but the thing itself was alien to the Chinese, since the +same term (_ch'i_) meant machinery, tool, or instrument. The introduction +of the view of the state as a machine does not imply that Sun Yat-sen +wished to introduce a specific form of Western state-machine into China--as +will be later explained (in the pages which concern themselves with the +applied political science of Sun Yat-sen). + +Sun was careful, moreover, to explain that his analogy between industrial +machinery and political machinery was merely an analogy. He said, "The +machinery of the government is entirely composed of human beings. All its +motions are brought about by men and not by material objects. Therefore, +there is a very great difference between the machinery of the government +and the manufacturing machine ... the machinery of the government is moved +by human agency whereas the manufacturing machine is set in motion by +material forces."(137) + +Even after allowance has been made for the fact that Sun Yat-sen did not +desire to import Western governmental machinery, nor even to stress the +machine and state analogy too far, it still remains extraordinarily +significant that he should have impressed upon his followers the necessity +of what may be called a mechanical rather than an organic type of +government. The administrative machine of the Ch'ing dynasty, insofar as +it was a machine at all, was a chaotic mass of political authorities +melting vaguely into the social system. Sun's desire to have a clear-cut +machine of government, while not of supreme importance in his ideological +projects, was of great significance in his practical proposal. In his +theory the state machine bears the same resemblance to the old government +that the Chinese race-nation bears to the now somewhat ambiguous civilized +humanity of the Confucians. In both instances he was seeking sharper and +more distinct lines of demarcation. + +In putting forth his proposals for the reconstitution of the Chinese +government he was thinking, in speaking of a state-machine, of the more or +less clearly understood juristic states of the West.(138) His concrete +proposals dealing with the minutiae of administrative organization, his +emphasis on constitution and law, and his interest in the exact allocation +of control all testify to his complete acceptance of a sharply delimited +state. On the other hand, he was extraordinary for his time in demanding +an unusual extent, both qualitative and quantitative, of power for the +state which he wished to hammer out on the forges of the nationalist +social and political revolution. + +In summarizing this description of the instrument with which Sun Yat-sen +hoped to organize the intellectual leaders of China so as to implement the +force of the revolution, it may be said that it was to be a state-machine, +as opposed to a totalitarian state, based upon Western juristic theory in +general but organized out of the materials of old Chinese political +philosophy and the Imperial experience in government.(139) The state +machine was to be built along lines which Sun Yat-sen laid out in some +detail. Yet, even with his elaborate plans already prepared, and in the +midst of a revolution, he pointed out the difficulty of political +experimentation, in the following words: + + + ... the progress of human machinery, as government organizations + and the like, has been very slow. What is the reason? It is that + once a manufacturing machine has been constructed, it can easily + be tested, and after it has been tried out, it can easily be put + aside if it is not good, and if it is not perfect, it can easily + be perfected. But it is very difficult to try out a human machine + and more difficult still to perfect it after it has been tried + out. It is impossible to perfect it without bringing about a + revolution. The only other way would be to regard it as a useless + material machine which can easily be turned into scrap iron. But + this is not workable.(140) + + + + +Democratic-Political Versus Ideological Control. + + +Sun Yat-sen accepted an organization of society based upon intellectual +differences, despite his belief in the justifiability and necessity of +formal democracy, and his reconciliation of the two at first contradictory +theses in a plan for a machine state to be based upon a distinction +between _ch'üan_ and _nêng_. It may now be asked, why did Sun Yat-sen, +familiar with the old method of ideological control, and himself proposing +a new ideology which would not only restore internal harmony but also put +China into harmony with the actual political condition of the world, +desire to add formal popular control to ideological control? + +The answer is not difficult, although it must be based for the most part +on inference rather than on direct citation of Sun Yat-sen's own words. In +the consideration of the system of ideological control fostered by the +Confucians, ideological control presented two distinct aspects: the +formation of the ideology by men, and control of men by the ideology. The +ideology controlled men; some men sought to control the ideology; the +whole ideological control system was based upon the continuous interaction +of cause and effect, wherein tradition influenced the men who sought to +use the system as a means of mastery, while the same men succeeded in a +greater or less degree in directing the development of the ideology. + +In the old Chinese world-society the control of the ideology was normally +vested in the _literati_ who were either government officials or hoped to +become such. The populace, however, acting in conformity with the +ideology, could overthrow the government, and, to that extent, consciously +control the content and the development of the ideology. Moreover, as the +efficacy of an ideology depends upon its greater acceptance, the populace +had the last word in control of the ideology both consciously and +unconsciously. Politics, however, rarely comes to the last word. In the +normal and ordinary conduct of social affairs, the populace was willing to +let the _literati_ uphold the classics and modify their teachings in +accordance with the development of the ideology--in the name of _chêng +ming_. The old ideology was so skilfully put together out of traditional +elements that are indissociable from the main traits of Chinese culture, +together with the revisions made by Confucius and his successors, that it +was well-nigh unchallengeable. The whole Confucian method of government +was based, as previously stated, on the control of men through the control +of their ideas by men--and these latter men, the ideologues, were the +scholar administrators of successive dynasties. The identification of the +_literati_ and officials, the respect in which learning was held, the +general distribution of a leaven of scholars through all the families of +the Empire, and the completeness--almost incredible to a Westerner--of +traditional orthodoxy, permitted the interpreters of the tradition also to +mould and transform it to a considerable degree. As a means of adjusting +the mores through the course of centuries, interpretation succeeded in +gradually changing popular ideas, where open and revolutionary heterodoxy +would have failed. + +Now, in modern times, even though men might still remain largely under the +control of the ideology (learn to behave rightly instead of being +governed), the ideology was necessarily weakened in two ways: by the +appearance of men who were recalcitrant to the ideology, and by the +emergence of conceptions and ideas which could not find a place in the +ideology, and which consequently opened up extra-ideological fields of +individual behavior. In other words, _li_ was no longer all-inclusive, +either as to men or as to realms of thought. Its control had never, of +course, been complete, for in that case all institutions of government +would have become superfluous in China and would have vanished; but its +deficiencies in past ages had never been so great; either with reference +to insubordinate individuals or in regard to unassimilable ideas, as they +were in modern times. + +Hence the province of government had to be greatly extended. The control +of men by the ideology was incomplete wherever the foreign culture had +really struck the Chinese--as, for instance, in the case of the +newly-developed Chinese proletariat, which could not follow the Confucian +precepts in the slums of twentieth-century industry. The family system, +the village, and the guild were to the Chinese proletarians mere shadows +of a past; they were faced individually with the problems of a foreign +social life suddenly interjected into that of the Chinese. True instances +of the interpenetration of opposites, they were Chinese from the still +existing old society of China suddenly transposed into an industrial world +in which the old ideology was of little relevance. If they were to remain +Chinese they had to be brought again into the fold of the Chinese +ideology; and, meanwhile, instead of being controlled ideologically, they +must be controlled by the sharp, clear action of government possessing a +monopoly of the power of coercion. The proletarians were not, indeed, the +only group of Chinese over whom the old ideology had lost control. There +were the overseas Chinese, the new Chinese finance-capitalists, and others +who had adjusted their personal lives to the Western world. These had done +so incompletely, and needed the action of government to shield them not +only from themselves and from one another, but from their precarious +position in their relations with the Westerners. + +Other groups had not completely fallen away from the ideology, but had +found major sections of it to be unsuitable to the regulation of their own +lives. Virtue could not be found in a family system which was slowly +losing its polygynous character and also slowly giving place to a sort of +social atomism; the intervention of the machine state was required to +serve as a substitute for ideological regulation until such a time as the +new ideology should have developed sufficiently to restore relevance to +traditions. + +Indeed, throughout all China, there were few people who were not touched +to a greater or less degree by the consequences of the collision of the +two intellectual worlds, the nationalistic West and the old Chinese +world-society. However much Chinese might desire to continue in their +traditional modes of behavior, it was impossible for them to live happy +and progressive lives by virtue of having memorized the classics and paid +respect to the precepts of tradition, as had their forefathers. In all +cases where the old ideas failed, state and law suddenly acquired a new +importance--almost overwhelming to some Chinese--as the establishers of the +new order of life. Even etiquette was established by decree, in the days +of the parliamentary Republic at Peking; the age-old assurance of Chinese +dress and manners was suddenly swept away, and the government found itself +forced to decree frock-coats. + +Successive governments in the new China had fallen, not because they did +too much, but because they did too little. The sphere of state activity +had become enormous in contrast to what it had been under more than a +score of dynasties, and the state had perforce to intervene in almost +every walk of life, and every detail of behavior. Yet this intervention, +although imperative, was met by the age-old Chinese contempt for +government, by the determined adherence to traditional methods of control +in the face of situations to which now they were no longer relevant. It +was this paradox, the ever-broadening necessity of state activity in the +face of traditional and unrealistic opposition to state activity, which +caused a great part of the turmoil in the new China. Officials made +concessions to the necessity for state action by drafting elaborate codes +on almost every subject, and then, turning about, also made concessions to +the traditional non-political habits of their countrymen by failing to +enforce the codes which they had just promulgated. The leaders of the +Republic, and their followers in the provinces, found themselves with laws +which could not possibly be introduced in a nation unaccustomed to law and +especially unaccustomed to law dealing with life in a Western way; thus +baffled, but perhaps not disappointed, the pseudo-republican government +officials were content with developing a shadow state, a shadow body of +law, and then ignoring it except as a tool in the vast pandemonium of the +tuchunates--where state and law were valued only in so far as they served +to aggrandize or enrich military rulers and their hangers-on. + +This tragic dilemma led Sun Yat-sen to call for a new kind of state, a +state which was to be democratic and yet to lead back to ideological +control. The emergency of imperialism and internal impotence made it +imperative that the state limit its activities to those provinces of human +behavior in which it could actually effectuate its decrees, and that, +after having so limited the field of its action, it be well-nigh +authoritarian within that field. Yet throughout the whole scheme, Sun +Yat-sen's deep faith in the common people required him to demand that the +state be democratic in principle and practice. + +It may begin to be apparent that, at least for Sun Yat-sen, the control of +the race-nation by the ideology was not inconsistent with the political +control of the race-nation by itself. In the interval between the old +certainty and the new, political authority had to prevail. This authority +was to be directed by the people but actually wielded by the geniuses of +the revolution. The new ideology was to emerge from the progress of +knowledge not, as before, among a special class of literary persons, but +through all the people. It was to be an ideology based on practical +experience and on the experimental method, and consequently, perhaps, less +certain then the old Confucian ideology, which was in its foundations +religious. To fill in the gaps where uniformity of thought and behavior, +on the basis of truth, had not been established, the state was to act, and +the state had to be responsible to the people. + +At this point it may be remembered that Sun Yat-sen was among the very few +Chinese leaders of his day who could give the historians of the future any +valid reasons for supposing that they believed in republican principles. +Too many of the militarists and scholar-politicians of the North and South +paid a half-contemptuous lip-service to the republic, primarily because +they could not agree as to which one of them should have the Dragon +Throne, or, at the least, the honor of restoring the Manchu Emperor--who +stayed on in the Forbidden City until 1924.(141) Sun Yat-sen had a deep +faith in the judgment and trustworthiness of the uncounted swarms of +coolies and farmers whom most Chinese leaders ignored. He was perhaps the +only man of his day really loved by the illiterate classes that knew of +him, and was always faithful to their love. Other leaders, both Chinese +and Western, have praised the masses but refused to trust them for their +own good. Sun's implicit belief in the political abilities of the common +people in all matters which their knowledge equipped them to judge, was +little short of ludicrous to many of his contemporaries, and positively +irritating to some persons who wished him well personally but did not--at +least privately--follow all of his ideas. + +To return to the consideration of the parts played by ideology and popular +government in social control: there was another point of great difference +between the old ideology and the new. The old was the creation, largely, +of a special class of scholars, who for that purpose ranked highest in the +social hierarchy of old China. Now even though the three natural classes +might continue to be recognized in China, the higher standard of living +and the increased literacy of the populace was to enlarge the number of +persons participating in the life of ideas. The people were to form the +ideology in part, and in part control the government under whose control +the revolutionary geniuses were to form the rest of the ideology, and +propagate it through a national educational program. In all respects the +eventual control was to rest with the people of the Chinese race-nation, +united, self-ruling, and determined to survive. + +How, then, does the pattern of _min ch'üan_ fit into the larger scheme of +the continuation of Confucian civilization and ideological control? First, +the old was to continue undisturbed where it might. Second, those persons +completely lost to the discipline of the old ideology must be controlled +by the state. Third, those areas of behavior which were disturbed by the +Western impact required state guidance. Fourth, the machine state was to +control both these fields, of men, and of ideas, and within this limited +field was to be authoritarian ("an all-powerful state") and yet democratic +("nevertheless subject to the control of the people"). Fifth, the ideology +was to arise in part from the general body of the people. Sixth, the other +parts of it were to be developed by the intellectuals, assisted by the +government, which was to be also under the control of the people. Seventh, +since the world was generally in an unstable condition, and since many +wrongs remained to be righted, it was not immediately probable that the +Chinese would settle down to ideological serenity and certainty, and +consequently State policy would still remain as a governmental question, +to be decided by the will of the whole race-nation. + +To recapitulate, then the people was to rule itself until the reappearance +of perfect tranquility--_ta t'ung_--or its nearest mundane equivalent. The +government was to serve as a canalization of the power of the Chinese +race-nation in fighting against the oppressor-nations of the world for +survival. + +The last principle of the nationalist ideology remains to be studied. _Min +tsu_, nationalism, was to provide an instrumentality for self-control and +for external defense in a world of armed states. But these two would +remain ineffectual in a starved and backward country, if they were not +supplemented by a third principle designed to relieve the physical +impotence of the nation, to promote the material happiness of its +individual members and to guarantee the continued survival of the Chinese +society as a whole. Union and self-rule could be frustrated by starvation. +China needed not only to become united and free as a nation; it had also +to become physically healthy and wealthy. This was to be effected through +_min shêng_, the third of the three principles. + + + + + +CHAPTER IV. THE THEORY OF _MIN SHÊNG_. + + + + +_Min Shêng_ in the Ideology. + + +The principle of _min shêng_ has been the one most disputed. Sun Yat-sen +made his greatest break with the old ideology in promulgating this last +element in his triune doctrine; the original Chinese term carried little +meaning that could be used in an approach to the new meaning that Sun +Yat-sen gave it. He himself stated that the two words had become rather +meaningless in their old usage, and that he intended to use them with +reference to special conditions in the modern world.(142) He then went on +to state the principle in terms so broad, so seemingly contradictory, that +at times it appears possible for each man to read in it what he will, as +he may in the Bible. The Communists and the Catholics each approve of the +third principle, but translate it differently; the liberals render it by a +term which is not only innocuous but colorless.(143) Had Sun Yat-sen lived +to finish the lectures on _min shêng_, he might have succeeded in rounding +off his discussion of the principle. + +There are two methods by means of which the principle of _min shêng_ may +be examined. It might be described on the basis of the various definitions +which Sun Yat-sen gave it in his four lectures and in other speeches and +papers, and outlined, point by point, by means of the various functions +and limits that he set for it. This would also permit some consideration +of the relation of _min shêng_ to various other theories of political +economy. The other approach may be a less academic one, but perhaps not +altogether unprofitable. By means of a reconsideration of the first two +principles, and of the structure and meaning of the three principles as a +whole, it is possible to surmise, if not to establish, the meaning of _min +shêng_, that is, to discover it through a sort of political triangulation: +the first two principles being given, to what third principle do they +lead? + +This latter method may be taken first, since it will afford a general view +of the three principles which will permit the orientation of _min shêng_ +with reference to the nationalist ideology as a whole, and prepare the +student for a solution of some of the apparent contradictions which are to +be found in the various specific definitions of _min shêng_. + +Accepting the elementary thesis of the necessary awakening of the +race-nation, and its equally necessary self-rule, both as a nation +_vis-à-vis_ other nations, and as a world by itself, one may see that +these are each social problems of organization which do not necessarily +involve the physical conditions of the country, although, as a matter of +application, they would be ineffectual in a country which did not have the +adequate means of self-support. Sun Yat-sen was interested in seeing the +Chinese people and Chinese civilization survive, and by survival he meant +not only the continuation of social organization and moral and +intellectual excellence, but, more than these, the actual continued +existence of the great bulk of the population. The most vital problem was +that of the continued existence of the Chinese as a people, which was +threatened by the constant expansion of the West and might conceivably +share the fate of the American Indians--a remnant of a once great race +living on the charity of their conquerors. Sun Yat-sen expressly +recognized this problem as the supreme one, requiring immediate +attention.(144) Nationalism and democracy would have no effect if the race +did not survive to practise them. + +The old Chinese society may be conceived as a vast system of living men, +who survived by eating and breeding, and who were connected with one +another in time by the proper attention to the ancestral cults, and in +space by a common consciousness of themselves as the standard-bearers of +the civilization of the world. Sun Yat-sen, although a Christian, was not +unmindful of this outlook; he too was sensible of the meaning of the +living race through the centuries. He dutifully informed the Emperor T'ai +Tsung of Ming that the Manchus had been driven from the throne, and some +years later he expressed the deepest reverence for the ancestral +cult.(145) But in facing the emergency with which his race was confronted, +Sun Yat-sen could not overlook the practical question of physical +survival. + +He was, therefore, materialistic in so far as his recognition of the +importance of the material well-being of the race-nation made him so. At +this point he may be found sympathetic with the Marxians, though his +ideology as a whole is profoundly Chinese. The destitution, the economic +weakness, the slow progress of his native land were a torture to his +conscience. In a world of the most grinding poverty, where war, +pestilence, and famine made even mere existence uncertain, he could not +possibly overlook the problem of the adequate material care of the vast +populace that constituted the race-nation. + +_Min shêng_, accordingly, meant primarily the survival of the race-nation, +as nationalism was its awakening, and democracy its self-control. No one +of these could be effective without the two others. In the fundamentals of +Sun Yat-sen's ideology, the necessity for survival and prosperity is +superlative and self-evident. All other features of the doctrine are, as +it were, optional. The first two principles definitely required a third +that would give them a body of persons upon which to operate; they did not +necessarily require that the third principle advance any specific +doctrine. If this be the case, it is evident that the question of the +content of _min shêng_, while important, is secondary to the first +premises of the _San Min Chu I_. The need for a third principle--one of +popular subsistence--in the ideology is vital; the _San Min Chu I_ would be +crippled without it. + + + + +The Economic Background of _Min Shêng_. + + +What was the nature of the background which decided Sun Yat-sen to draw an +economic program into the total of his nationalist ideology for the +regeneration of China through a nationalist revolution? Was Sun Yat-sen +dissatisfied with the economic order of the old society? Was he interested +in a reconstitution of the economic system for the sake of defense against +Western powers? + +He was unquestionably dissatisfied with the economic order of things in +the old society, but it was a dissatisfaction with what the old order had +failed to achieve rather than a feeling of the injustice of the Chinese +distributive system. He was bitter against a taxation system which worked +out unevenly,(146) and against the extortions of the internal-transit +revenue officials under the Empire.(147) He was deeply impressed by his +first encounter with Western mechanical achievement--the S. S. _Grannoch_, +which took him from Kwangtung to Honolulu.(148) But he had served in the +shop of his brother as a young boy,(149) and knew the small farm life of +South China intimately. On the basis of this first-hand knowledge, and his +many years of association with the working people of China, he was not +likely to attack the old economic system for its injustice so much as for +its inadequacy.(150) + +That there were injustices in the old system of Chinese economy, no one +can deny, but these injustices were scarcely sufficient to provoke, of +themselves alone, the complete alteration of economic outlook that Sun +Yat-sen proposed. Chinese capitalism had not reached the state of +industrial capitalism until after its contact with the West; at the most +it was a primitive sort of usury-capitalism practised by the three +economically dominant groups of old China--landholders, officials, and +merchant-usurers.(151) The disturbances which hurt the economic condition +of the country, and thereby led to greater disturbances, had involved +China in a vicious cycle of decline which could scarcely be blamed on any +one feature or any one group in the old economy. The essential fault lay +with the condition of the country as a whole, directly affected by the +economic consequences of Western trade and partial industrialization.(152) + +Sun Yat-sen's positive dissatisfaction with the economy of his time arose +from the position which he felt China had in the modern business world. He +believed that, by virtue of the economic oppression of the Chinese by the +Western powers, China had been degraded to the position of the lowest +nation on earth--that the Chinese were even more unfortunate than "slaves +without a country," such as the Koreans and the Annamites.(153) The +particular forms of this oppression, and Sun Yat-sen's plans for meeting +it, may be more aptly described in the consideration of his program of +economic national regeneration.(154) The Chinese nation occupied the +ignominious position of a sub-colony or--as Sun himself termed it--"a +hypo-colony"; "Our people are realizing that to be a semi-colony is a +national disgrace; but our case is worse than that; our country is in the +position of a sub-colony (since it is the colony of all the Great Powers +and not merely subject to one of them), a position which is inferior to an +ordinary colony such as Korea and Annam."(155) + +What, then, were the positive implications of the principle of _min shêng_ +in the nationalist ideology? + + + + +The Three Meanings of _Min Shêng_. + + +First, _min shêng_ is the doctrine leading the nationalist democracy on +its road to a high position among the nations of the earth; only through +the material strength to be found in _min shêng_ can the Chinese attain a +position by which they can exert the full force of their new-formed state +against the invaders and oppressors, and be able to lift up the populace +so that democracy will possess some actual operative meaning. _Min shêng_ +is "... the center of politics, of economics, of all kinds of historical +movements; it is similar to the center of gravity in space."(156) It +provides the implementation of nationalism and democracy. + +Secondly, _min shêng_ means national enrichment. The problem of China is +primarily one of poverty. Sun wanted consideration of the problem of the +livelihood of the people to begin with the supreme economic reality in +China. What was this reality? "It is the poverty from which we all suffer. +The Chinese in general are poor; among them there is no privileged wealthy +class, but only a generality of ordinary poor people."(157) However this +enrichment was to be brought about, it was imperative. + +Thirdly, _min shêng_, as the doctrine of enrichment, was also the doctrine +of economic justice. If the nation was to become economically healthy, it +could only do so on the basis of the proper distribution of property among +its citizens. Its wealth would not bring about well-being unless it were +properly distributed. + +More briefly, _min shêng_ may be said to be the thesis of the +indispensability of: 1) a national economic revolution against imperialism +and for democracy; 2) an industrial revolution for the enrichment of +China; and 3) a prophylactic against social revolution. + +The significance of _min shêng_ as the economic implementation of +nationalism and democracy is clear enough to require no further +discussion. Its significance as a doctrine for the promotion of the +industrial revolution is considerable, and worth attention. + +Western science was to sow the seed. _Min shêng_ economy was to reap the +harvest. By means of the details in Sun Yat-sen's programs which he +believed sufficient for the purposes, the modernization of China, which +was to be a consequence of Western science in the ideology, was to lead at +the same time to the actual physical enrichment of the economic goods and +services of the country. The advocacy of industrial development is, of +course, a commonplace in the Western world, but in China it was strikingly +novel. Sun Yat-sen did not regard industrialism as a necessary evil; he +considered it a positive blessing, as the means of increasing the material +welfare of the Chinese people. + +Time and time again, Sun Yat-sen emphasized the necessity of +modernization. His theory of nationalism led him to urge the introduction +of Western physical science into the ideology. His theory of democracy was +justified in part by the fact that democracy was to be regarded as a +modernizing force. Now his principle of _min shêng_ was also to lead to +that great end--the modernization of China to a degree to permit the +race-nation to regain in the modern world, which encompassed the whole +planet, the position it had once had in the smaller world of Eastern Asia. + +The wealth of old China had been one of the factors enabling it to resist +destruction at the spear-points of its barbarian conquerors. Sun Yat-sen +knew this, and knew also that the position of the United States--which had +probably the greatest concentration of social and physical wealth and +power under one political system that the world had ever known--made that +nation impregnable in the modern world. Seeing that wealth was not only a +blessing to individuals, but to nations as well, he was anxious that his +beloved China should be guarded and assisted by the strength that the +ideology of _min shêng_, once accepted and effectuated, could give it. + +_Min shêng_ is more than a vague aspiration for national welfare. The +general theory of nationalism and democracy required an additional point +to make them effective in the realities of international politics, and +_min shêng_ was to supply the hygienic and economic strength that the +Chinese race-nation needed for competition and survival; but it was to do +more. + +_Min shêng_ is at the same time the last step of Chinese resistance and +the first of Chinese submission to Western culture. In seeking an economic +policy and an ideology which would lead to increased wealth of the nation, +the Chinese were preparing to resist the West with its own weapons. _Min +shêng_ is a submission in that it is a deliberate declaration of +industrial revolution. + +It is beside the point to consider the ideological bases of the Western +industrial revolution. It was perhaps neither a voluntary nor a deliberate +process at all; no man in the first few decades of the nineteenth century +could have foretold what the end of a process of mechanization would +bring, or was likely to advocate the intentional following of a policy +which would transform the orientation and organization of man more +thoroughly than had any previous religious, political, and economic +transition. The industrial revolution of Euramerica, when viewed from the +outside, presents the appearance of a colossal accident, whether for good +or for bad, which was but half-perceived by the participants in it. Even +today, when the ideology and the institutional outline of the +agrarian-handicraft past is fading swiftly away in the new brilliance of +Western machine-culture, the new certainty, the new order have not yet +appeared. The great transition works its way beyond the knowledge or the +intervention of individual men. + +This was decidedly not the case in China. Industrialism was something +which could be studied from the outside, which could be appraised, and +then acclaimed or resisted. Emperor Meiji and his Genro, with a flash of +intuition or an intellectual penetration almost unparalleled in the +political history of the world, guided Japan into the swift current of +mechanical progress; the island empire swept ahead of Asia, abreast of the +most powerful states of the world. The Chinese court, under the resolute, +but blind, guidance of the Empress Dowager, made a few feeble gestures in +favor of modernization, but vigorously opposed any change which might +seriously modify the order of Chinese society or the position of the +Manchus. In the shadow of the foreign guns, industrialism crept into +China, along the coasts and up the banks of the navigable rivers. One +might suppose that the Chinese were in a position to choose, deliberately, +for or against industrialism. They were not; in China, as in the West, the +machine age first appeared largely as an accident. + +It is here that the significance of Sun Yat-sen's _min shêng_ becomes +apparent. Above all other subsidiary meanings, it is a deliberate +declaration of the industrial revolution. Modernism had been an accident; +Sun Yat-sen wished to transform it into a program. What would be the +ideological consequences of such an attitude? + +In the first place, a plan was indicated for almost every type of human +behavior. Sun Yat-sen himself drafted a preliminary scheme for a modern +manufacturing and communications system.(158) The road that China was to +take would not be the miserable, halting progress of industrialism, +complicated by delays and wars, which the West had known in the painful +centuries of readjustment from the medieval to modern civilization; China +would not stumble forward, but would deliberately select the swiftest and +easiest way to a sound industrialism, and then take it. + +_Min shêng_ thus not only provides the Chinese with a way to make their +nationalism, their democracy, and their stateification felt in the hour of +their ultimate triumph; it gives them something to do to bring about that +triumph. + +On the basis of the outlines of the ideology and the social system that +Sun Yat-sen proposed, viewed from the perspective of the old Confucian +world-society, the reader will realize that this declaration of the +industrial revolution is the boldest of Sun Yat-sen's acts, and that the +meaning of _min shêng_ as a program of complete modernization and +reconstruction is superior to other possible meanings it may have, in +regard to theoretical national or social revolution. There is nothing +remote or philosophical about the significance of _min shêng_ when so +viewed; it is a plan to which a Lenin or a Henry Ford might subscribe with +equal fervor--although a Tagore would deplore it. It is here that Sun +Yat-sen appears as the champion of the West against the traditional +technological stagnation of China. Yet just there, at the supreme point of +his Westernism, we must remember what he was fighting for: the life of a +race-nation and a civilization that was contradictory to the West. The +stability of Confucianism could not serve as a cloak for reaction and +stagnant thought. For its own good, nay, its own life, Chinese +civilization had to modernize (i. e., Westernize economically) in order to +compete in a West-ruled world. But what, more specifically, was the +socio-economic position of Sun Yat-sen? Was he a Marxian? Was he a +liberal? Was he neither? + + + + +Western Influences: Henry George, Marxism and Maurice William. + + +As previously stated there are three parts which may be distinguished in +the ideology of the principle of _min shêng_. _Min shêng_ is, first, the +economic aspect of the national revolution--the creation of an active +race-nation of China implementing its power by, second, technological +revolution. Third, it connotes also the necessity of a social revolution +of some kind. Western commentators have been prone to ignore the +significance of _min shêng_ in the first two of these meanings, and have +concentrated on disputation concerning the third part. The question of the +right system of distribution has become so prominent in much Western +revolutionary thought that, to many, it sums up the whole moral issue +concerning what is good and bad in society.(159) They are uninterested in +or ignorant of the great importance that the first two aspects of _min +shêng_ possess for the Chinese mind. The third part, the application of +_min shêng_ to the problems that are in the West the cause of social +revolution, and to the possible application of social revolution to China, +is important, but is by no means the complete picture. + +In attempting to state the definitive position of Sun Yat-sen on this +question several points must be kept in mind. The first is that Sun +Yat-sen, born a Chinese of the nineteenth century, had the intellectual +orientation of a member of the world-society, and an accepter of the +Confucian ideology. Enough has been shown of the background of his +theories to demonstrate their harmony with and relevance to society which +had endured in China for centuries before the coming of the West. The +second point to be remembered is that Westerners are prone to overlook +this background and see only the Western influences which they are in such +a good position to detect. Sun Yat-sen's mind grew and changed. His +preferences in Western beliefs changed frequently. A few Westerners, +seeing only this, are apt to call Sun unstable and devoid of reason.(160) + +It would, indeed, be strange to find any Western political or ideological +leader who thought in precisely the same terms after the world war and the +Russian revolution as before. Sun Yat-sen was, like many other +receptive-minded leaders, sensitive to the new doctrines of Wilson and +Lenin as they were shouted through the world. He was, perhaps, less +affected by them than Western leaders, because his ideology was so largely +rooted in the ideology of old China. + +Apart from the winds of doctrine that blew through the world during Sun's +life-period, and the generally known Western influences to which he was +exposed,(161) there were three writers whose influence has been supposed +to have been critical in the development of his thinking. These three were +Henry George, Karl Marx, and Maurice William of New York. A much greater +amount of material is needed for a detailed study of the influences of +various individual theories on Sun Yat-sen than for a general exposition +of his political doctrines as a whole. At the present time scarcely enough +has been written to permit any really authoritative description of the +relations between the ideology of Sun Yat-sen and the thought of these +three men. It is possible, nevertheless, to trace certain general outlines +which may serve to clarify the possible influence that was exercised on +Sun, and to correct some current misapprehensions as to the nature and +extent of that influence. + +Sun Yat-sen's opposition to the "unearned increment" shows the influence +of the thought of Henry George. Sun proposed an ingenious scheme for the +government confiscation of unearned increment in an economy which would +nevertheless permit private ownership of land. (Incidentally, he terms +this, in his second lecture on _min shêng_, "communism," which indicates a +use of the word different, in this respect at least, from the conventional +Western use.)(162) The land problem was of course a very old one in China, +although accentuated in the disorders resulting from the impact of the +West. There can be little question that Sun's particular method of solving +the problem was influenced by the idea of unearned increment. + +He knew of Henry George in 1897, the year the latter died,(163) and +advocated redistribution of the land in the party oath, the platform, and +the slogans of the _Tung Meng Hui_ of 1905.(164) Since, even at the time +of the Canton-Moscow Entente, his land policy never approached the +Marxist-Leninist program of nationalization or collectivization of land, +but remained one of redistribution and confiscation of unearned increment, +it is safe to say that Sun kept the theory of George in mind, although he +by no means followed George to the latter's ultimate conclusions.(165) It +may thus be inferred that the influence of Henry George upon the +nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen was slight, but permanent. An idea was +borrowed; the scheme of things was not. + +Sun Yat-sen encountered Marxism for the first recorded time in London in +1897, when he met a group of Russian revolutionaries and also read in the +subject. The fact that Sun was exposed to Marxism proves little except +that he had had the opportunity of taking up Marxism and did not do +so.(166) Again, the _Tung Meng Hui_ manifesto of 1905 may have been +influenced by Marxism. It was not, however, until the development of his +_Three Principles_ that the question of Marxian influence was raised. Sun +Yat-sen made his first speech on the _Principles_ in Brussels in the +spring of 1905.(167) By 1907 the three principles had taken on a clear +form: nationalism, democracy, and _min shêng_, which the Chinese of that +time seem to have translated _socialism_ when referring to it in Western +languages.(168) + +The most careful Marxian critic of Sun Yat-sen, writing of the principle +of _min shêng_ and its two main planks, land reform and state capitalism, +says: "This very vague program, which does not refer to class interests +nor to the class struggle as the means of breaking privileged class +interests, was objectively not socialism at all, but something else +altogether: Lenin coined the formula, 'subjective socialism,' for +it."(169) He adds, later: "Hence Sun's socialism meant, on the lips of the +Chinese bourgeoisie, nothing but a sort of declaration for a 'social' +economic policy, that is, a policy friendly to the masses."(170) T'ang +Liang-li declares that the third principle at this time adopted "a frankly +socialistic attitude,"(171) but implies elsewhere that its inadequacy was +seen by a Chinese Marxist, Chu Chih-hsin.(172) This evidence, as far as it +goes, shows that Sun Yat-sen had had the opportunity to become acquainted +with Marxism, and that even on the occasion of the first formulation of +the principle of _min shêng_ he used none of its tenets. The revolutionary +critic, T'ang Liang-li, who, a devoted and brilliant Nationalist in +action, writes with a sort of European left-liberal orientation, suggests +that the Third Principle grew with the growth of capitalist industrialism +in China.(173) This is true: economic maladjustment would emphasize the +need for ideological reconstruction with reference to the economy. There +is no need to resort to Marxian analysis. + +That the third principle meant something to Sun Yat-sen is shown by the +fact that when Sung Chiao-jen, who a few years later was to become one of +the most celebrated martyrs of the revolution, suggested in the period of +the first provisional Republic at Nanking that the Third Principle had +better be omitted altogether, Sun was enraged, and declared that if _min +shêng_ were to be given up, the whole revolution might as well be +abandoned.(174) + +Since _min shêng_, in its third significance, that of the development of a +socially just distributive system, was not Marxian nor yet unimportant, it +may be contrasted once again with the communist doctrines, and then +studied for its actual content. In contrasting it with Marxism, it might +be of value to observe, first, the criticism that the Marxians levy +against it, and second, the distinctions that nationalist and European +critics make between _min shêng_ and communism. + +Dr. Karl Wittfogel, the German Marxist whose work on Sun Yat-sen is the +most satisfactory of its kind, points out the apparent contradictions in +the _San Min Chu I_: on the one hand, statements which are not only +objectively but subjectively friendly to capitalism (on the excellence of +the Ford plant; on the necessity for the coöperation of capital and +labor)--on the other, the unmerciful condemnation of capitalism; on the one +hand, the declaration that there is no capitalism in China--on the other, +that capitalism must be destroyed as it appears; on the right, the +statement that communism and _min shêng_ are opposed--on the left, that the +communist doctrines are a subsidiary part of the ideology of _min +shêng_.(175) How, asks Wittfogel, does this all fit together? He answers +by pointing out the significance of Sun's theses when considered in +relation to the dialectical-materialist interpretation of recent Far +Eastern history: + + + His three principles incorporate + + in their _development_ the objective change in the socio-economic + situation of China, + in their _contradictions_ the real contradictions of the Chinese + revolution, + in their _latest tendencies_ the transposition of the social + center of gravity of the revolution, which sets the + classes in action, and whose aim is no longer a + bourgeois capitalist one, but proletarian-socialist + and peasant agrarian-revolutionary. + + Sun Yat-sen is according to this not only the hitherto most + powerful representative of the bourgeois-national, + anti-imperialist revolutions of awakening Asia; he points at the + same time outwards over the bourgeois class limitations of the + first step of the Asiatic movement for liberation. To deny this + were portentuous, even for the proletarian communist movement of + Eastern Asia.(176) + + +The modifications which the Marxians have introduced into their programs +with respect to the class struggle in colonial countries do not imply a +corresponding modification of their ideology. The determinism adopted from +Hegel, the economic interpretation of history--these and other dogmas are +held by the Marxians to be universally valid despite their Western origin. + +We have seen what Sun's chief Marxian exegete thinks of him. Now it may be +worth while to consider the actual relations of Sun's doctrines with some +of those in Marxism. In the first place, Sun Yat-sen, during his stay in +Shanghai, 1919-1922 (with interruptions), was very much interested in +Communism and friendly to the Russian people, but not at all inclined to +adopt its ideology.(177) + +In reference to specific points of the Communist ideology, Sun Yat-sen was +indebted to the Communists for the application of the principle of +nationalism, as a means of propaganda, as anti-imperialism, although, as +we have seen, it was fundamentally a thesis for the readjustment of the +Chinese society from the ideological basis of a world-society over to a +national state among national states.(178) Second, his habit of taking +Western doctrines and applying them to the Chinese nation instead of to +Chinese individuals, led him to apply nationalism to the class war of the +oppressed nations against the oppressing nations. There was no +justification of intra-national class war in the nationalist ideology of +Sun Yat-sen.(179) In his doctrine of democracy, his application of a +class-system based on intellect was a flat denial of the superior +significance of the Marxian economic-class ideology, as was his favoring +of the development of a five-power liberal government through _ch'üan_ and +_nêng_ in place of a dictatorship of the proletariat operating through +soviets. Finally, in relation to _min shêng_, his use of the Confucian +philosophy--the interpretation of history through _jên_--was a contradiction +of the materialist interpretation of history by the Marxians. It also +contradicted the class struggle; the loyalty of the Chinese to the +race-nation was to be the supreme loyalty; it was to develop from the _ta +chia_, the great family of all Chinese; and class lines within it could +not transcend its significance. Furthermore, purely as a matter of +economic development, Sun Yat-sen regarded the class struggle as +_pathological_ in society. He said, "Out of his studies of the social +question, Marx gained no other advantage than a knowledge of the diseases +of social evolution; he failed to see the principle of social evolution. +Hence we can say that Marx was a pathologist rather than a physiologist of +society."(180) Finally, he did not accept the Marxian theory of surplus +value or of the inevitable collapse of capitalism. He even spoke of +capitalism and socialism as "two economic forces of human civilization" +which might "work side by side in future civilization."(181) + +All in all, it may safely be said that Sun Yat-sen's ideology, as an +adjustment of the old Chinese ideology to the modern world, was not +inspired by the Marxist; that through the greater part of his life, he was +acquainted with Marxism, and did not avail himself of the opportunities he +had for adopting it, but consistently rejected it; and that while the +Communists were of great use to him in the formulation and implementation +of his program, they affected his ideology, either generally or with +reference to _min shêng_, imperceptibly if at all. + +This conclusion is of significance in the estimation of the influence of +Maurice William upon the thought of Sun Yat-sen. It is, briefly, the +thesis of Dr. William that it was his own book which saved China from +Bolshevism by making an anti-Marxian out of Sun after he had fallen prey +to the Bolshevist philosophy. Dr. William writes of the lectures on +Nationalism and Democracy; "In these lectures Dr. Sun makes clear that his +position is strongly pro-Russian and pro-Marxian, that he endorses the +class struggle, repudiates Western democracy, and advocates China's +coöperation with Bolshevist Russia against capitalist nations."(182) Dr. +William then goes on to show, quite convincingly, that Sun Yat-sen, with +very slight acknowledgments, quoted William's _The Social Interpretation +of History_ almost verbatim for paragraph after paragraph in the lectures +on _min shêng_. + +It would be unjust and untruthful to deny the great value that William's +book had for Sun Yat-sen, who did quote it and use its arguments.(183) On +the other hand, it is a manifest absurdity to assume that Sun Yat-sen, +having once been a communist, suddenly reversed his position after reading +one book by an American of whom he knew nothing. Even Dr. William writes +with a tone of mild surprise when he speaks of the terrific _volte-face_ +which he thinks Sun Yat-sen performed. + +There are two necessary comments to be made on the question of the +influence of Maurice William. In the first place, Sun Yat-sen had never +swerved from the interpretation of history by _jên_, which may be +interpreted as the humane or social interpretation of history. Enough of +the old Chinese ideology has been outlined above to make clear what this +outlook was.(184) Sun Yat-sen, in short, never having been a Marxian, was +not converted to the social interpretation of history as put forth by Dr. +William. He found in the latter's book, perhaps more clearly than in any +other Western work an analysis of society that coincided with his own, +which he had developed from the old Chinese philosophy and morality as +rendered by Confucius. Consequently he said of William's rejection of the +materialistic interpretation of history, "That sounds perfectly reasonable +... the greatest discovery of the American scholar _fits in perfectly_ +with the (third) principle of our Party."(185) The accomplishment of +Maurice William, therefore, was a great one, but one which has been +misunderstood. He formulated a doctrine of social evolution which tallied +perfectly with Chinese ideology, and did this without being informed on +Chinese thought. He did not change the main currents of Sun's thought, +which were consistent through the years. He did present Sun with several +telling supplementary arguments in Western economic terms, by means of +which he could reconcile his interpretation of social history not only +with Confucian _jên_ but also with modern Western economics. + +The other point to be considered in relation to Maurice William is a +matter of dates. The thesis of Maurice William, that Sun Yat-sen, after +having turned Marxian or near-Marxian, was returned to democratic liberal +thought by William's book, is based on contrast of the first twelve +lectures in the _San Min Chu I_ and the last four on _min shêng_. Dr. +William believes that Sun read his book in the meantime and changed his +mind. A Chinese commentator points out that Sun Yat-sen referred to _The +Social Interpretation of History_ in a speech on January 21, 1924; his +first lecture on the _San Min Chu I_ was given January 24, 1924.(186) +Hence, in the twelve lectures that Dr. William interprets as Marxian, Sun +Yat-sen was speaking from a background which included not only Marxism, +but _The Social Interpretation of History_, as well. + +Only on the third part does the influence of the Western thinkers appear +unmistakably. Henry George gave Sun Yat-sen the idea of the unearned +increment, but Sun Yat-sen, instead of accepting the whole body of +doctrine that George put forth, simply kept this one idea, and built a +novel land-policy of his own on it. Marxism may have influenced the verbal +tone of Sun Yat-sen's lectures, but it did not affect his ideology, +although it shows a definite imprint upon his programs. Maurice William +gave Sun Yat-sen a set of arguments in modern economic terms which he +attached to his ideological thesis of the _jên_ interpretation of history, +which he based upon Confucianism. There is no evidence to show that at any +time in his life Sun Yat-sen abandoned his Chinese ideological orientation +and fell under the sway of any Western thinker. The strong consistency in +the ideology of Sun Yat-sen is a consistency rooted in the old Chinese +ideology. On minor points of doctrine he showed the influence of the West; +this influence cannot be considered solely by itself. The present +discussion of Western influences may, by its length, imply a +disproportionate emphasis of Western thought in the political doctrines of +Sun Yat-sen, but in a work written primarily for Westerners, this may be +found excusable. + + + + +_Min Shêng_ as a Socio-Economic Doctrine. + + +If one were to attempt to define the relations of the _min shêng_ ideology +to the various types of Western economic doctrines at present current, +certain misapprehensions may be eliminated at the outset. First: +Capitalism in its Western form was opposed by Sun Yat-sen; _min shêng_ was +to put through the national economic revolution of enrichment through a +deliberately-planned industrialization, but in doing so was to prevent +China from going through all the painful stages which attended the growth +of capitalism in the West. "We want," said Sun Yat-sen, "a preventive +remedy; a remedy which will thwart the accumulation of large private +capitals and so preserve future society from the great inconvenience of +the inequality between rich and poor."(187) And yet he looked forward to a +society which would ultimately be communistic, although never in its +strict Marxian sense. "We may say that communism is the ideal of +livelihood, and that the doctrine of livelihood is the practical +application of communism; such is the difference between the doctrine of +Marx and the doctrine of the Kuomintang. In the last analysis, there is no +real difference in the principles of the two; where they differ is in +method."(188) This is sufficient to show that Sun Yat-sen was not an +orthodox Western apologist for capitalism; as a Chinese, it would have +been hard for him to be one, for the logically consistent capitalist +ideology is one which minimizes all human relationships excepting those +individual-contractual ones based on money bargains. The marketing of +goods and services in such a way as to disturb the traditional forms of +Chinese society would have been repugnant to Sun Yat-sen. + +Second: if Sun Yat-sen's _min shêng_ ideology cannot be associated with +capitalism, it can as little be affiliated with Marxism or the single-tax. +What, then, in relation to Western socio-economic thought, is it? We have +seen that the state it proposed was liberal-protective, and that the +society from which it was derived and to which it was to lead back was one +of extreme laissez-faire, bordering almost on anarchism. These political +features are enough to distinguish it from the Western varieties of +socialism, anarchism and syndicalism, since the ingredients of these +ideologies of the West and that of Sun Yat-sen, while coincident on some +points, cannot be fitted together. + +Superficially, there is a certain resemblance between the ideology of the +_San Min Chu I_ and that of Fascism. The resemblances may be found in the +emphasis on the nation, the rejection of the class war and of Marxism, the +upholding of tradition, and the inclusion of a doctrine of intellectual +inequality. But Sun Yat-sen seeks to reconcile all this with democracy in +a form even more republican than that of the United States. The scheme of +_min ch'üan_, with its election, recall, initiative and referendum, and +with its definite demands of intellectual freedom, is in contradiction to +the teachings of Fascism. His condemnation of Caesarism is unequivocal: +"Therefore, if the Chinese Revolution has not until now been crowned with +success, it is because the ambitions for the throne have not been +completely rooted out nor suppressed altogether."(189) With these +fundamental and irreconcilable distinctions, it is hard to find any +possibility of agreement between the _San Min Chu I_ and the Fascist +ideologies, although the transitional program of the _San Min Chu I_--in +its advocacy of provisional party dictatorship, etc.--has something in +common with Fascism as well as with Communism as applied in the Soviet +Union. + +A recent well-received work on modern political thought describes a +category of Western thinkers whose ideas are much in accord with those +contained in the _min shêng_ ideology.(190) Professor Francis W. Coker of +Yale, after reviewing the leading types of socialist and liberal thought, +describes a group who might be called "empirical collectivists." The men +to whom he applies this term reject socialist doctrines of economic +determinism, labor-created value, and class war. They oppose, on the other +hand, the making of a fetish of private ownership, and recognize that the +vast mass of ordinary men in modern society do not always receive their +just share of the produce of industry. They offer no single panacea for +all economic troubles, and lay down no absolute and unchallengeable dogma +concerning the rightness or wrongness of public or private ownership.(191) +Professor Coker outlines their general point of view by examining their +ideas with reference to several conspicuous economic problems of the +present day: public ownership; labor legislation; regulation of prices; +taxation; and land policies.(192) + +According to Coker, the empirical collectivist is not willing to forgo the +profit motive except where necessary. He is anxious to see a great part of +the ruthlessness of private competition eliminated, and capital generally +subjected to a regulation which will prevent its use as an instrument of +harm to the community as a whole. While not committed to public ownership +of large enterprises as a matter of theory, he has little objection to the +governmental operation of those which could, as a matter of practical +expediency, be managed by the state on a nonprofit basis. + +Sun Yat-sen's position greatly resembles this, with respect to his more +immediate objectives. Speaking of public utilities, he said to Judge +Linebarger: "There are so many public utilities needed in China at the +present time, that the government can't monopolize all of them for the +advantage of the masses. Moreover, public utilities involve risks which a +government cannot afford to take. Although the risks are comparatively +small in single cases, the entire aggregate of such risks, if assumed by +the government, would be of crushing proportions. Private initiative and +capital can best perform the public utility development of China. We +should, however, be very careful to limit the control of these public +utilities enterprises, while at the same time encouraging private +development as much as possible."(193) Sun had, however, already spoken of +nationalization: "I think that when I hold power again, we should +institute a nationalization program through a cautious and experimental +evolution of (1) public utilities; (2) public domains; (3) industrial +combines, syndicates, and cartels; (4) coöperative department stores and +other merchandising agencies."(194) It must be remembered that there were +two considerations back of anything that Sun Yat-sen said concerning +national ownership: first, China had already ventured into broad national +ownership of communications and transport, even though these were in bad +condition and heavily indebted; second, there was no question of +expropriation of capital, but rather the free alternative of public and +private industry. An incidental problem that arises in connection with the +joint development of the country by public and by private capital is the +use of foreign capital. Sun Yat-sen was opposed to imperialism, but he did +not believe that the use of foreign capital at fair rates of interest +constituted submission to imperialism. He said, in Canton, " ... we shall +certainly have to borrow foreign capital in order to develop means of +communication and transportation, and we cannot do otherwise than have +recourse to those foreigners who are men of knowledge and of experience to +manage these industries."(195) It may thus be said that Sun Yat-sen had no +fixed prejudice against private capital or against foreign capital, when +properly and justly regulated, although in general he favored the +ownership of large enterprises by the state. + +Second--to follow again Professor Coker--the Western empirical collectivists +favor labor legislation, and government intervention for the protection of +the living standards of the working classes. This, while it did not figure +conspicuously in the theories of Sun Yat-sen,(196) was a striking feature +of all his practical programs.(197) In his address to Chinese labor, on +the international Labor Day, 1924, he urged that Chinese labor organize in +order to fight for its own cause and that of national liberation. It had +nothing to fear from Chinese capitalism, but everything from foreign +imperialistic capitalism.(198) Sun did not make a special hero class out +of the workers; he did, however, advocate their organization for the +purpose of getting their just share of the national wealth, and for +resistance to the West and Japan. + +Third, the empirical collectivist tends to advocate price-control by the +state, if not over the whole range of commodities, at least in certain +designated fields. Sun was, has been stated, in favor of the regulation of +capital at all points, and of public ownership in some. This naturally +implies an approval of price-control. He more specifically objected to +undue profits by middlemen, when, in discussing salesmen, he said: "Under +ideal conditions, society does not need salesmen or any inducement to buy. +If a thing is good, and the price reasonable, it should sell itself on its +own merits without any salesmanship. This vast army of middlemen should +hence be made to remember that they should expect no more from the +nonproductive calling in which they are engaged than any other citizen +obtains through harder labor."(199) In this, too, _min shêng_ coincides +with empirical collectivism; the coincidence is made easy by the relative +vagueness of the latter. + +Fourth, in the words of Mr. Coker, "many collectivists look upon taxation +as a rational and practical means for reducing extreme differences in +wealth and for achieving other desired economic changes."(200) Sun Yat-sen +agrees with this definitely; his land policy is one based upon taxation +and confiscation of the amount of the unearned increment (which, not +involving the confiscation of the land itself, is perhaps also taxation), +and proposes to apply taxes extensively. Quite apart from the question of +distributive justice, a heavy tax burden would be necessary in a country +which was being rigorously developed. + +Fifth, empirical collectivists believe in land control, not only in the +cities, but in the open country as well, as a matter of agrarian reform. +We have seen that the land figured extensively in the ideology of _min +shêng_, and shall observe that Sun Yat-sen, in his plans for _min shêng_, +stressed the importance of proper control of land. + +In summing up the theory of distributive justice which forms a third part +of the principle of _min shêng_, one may say that, as far as any +comparison between a Chinese and a Western idea is valid, the positive +social-revolutionary content of _min shêng_ coincides with the doctrines +of that group of Western politico-economic writers whom Coker calls +empirical collectivists. The correspondence between the two may not be a +mere coincidence of names, for in considering Sun Yat-sen's _min shêng_, +one is struck by the empirical, almost opportunistic, nature of the +theory. A great part of the activity of the Chinese, whether material or +intellectual, has been characterized by a sort of opportunism; not +necessarily an opportunism of insincerity, it may be more aptly described +as a tendency to seek the golden mean, the reasonable in any situation. It +is this habit of compromise with circumstance, this bland and happy +disregard of absolutes in theory, which has preserved--with rare +exceptions--the Chinese social mind from the torment of any really bitter +and profound religious conflict, and which may, in these troubled times, +keep even the most irreconcilable enemies from becoming insane with +intolerance. This fashion of muddling through, of adhering to certain +traditional general rules of reasonableness, while rendering lip-service +to the doctrines of the moment, has been the despair of many Western +students of China, who, embittered at the end, accuse the Chinese of +complete insincerity. They do not realize that it is the moderateness of +the Confucian ideology, the humane and conciliatory outlook that centuries +of cramped civilized life have given the Chinese, that is the basis of +this, and that this indisposition to adopt hard and fast systems has been +one of the ameliorating influences in the present period of serious +intellectual antagonisms. Generalizations concerning China are rarely +worth much. It may be, however, that the doctrine of _min shêng_, with +respect to its positive socio-economic content, may appear vague to the +Western student, and that he may surmise it to be a mere cloak for +demagogues. It could easily do that in the West, or in the hands of +insincere and unscrupulous leaders. In China, however, it need not +necessarily have been formulated more positively than it was, because, as +we have seen, the intellectual temper of the Chinese makes any strict +adherence to a schedule or a plan impossible. It is easy, always, to +render the courtesies; it is hard to follow the specific content. Sun +Yat-sen apparently realized this, and wished to leave a general body of +doctrine which could be followed and which would not be likely to be +violated. In any case, the theses of _min shêng_, both ideologically and +programmatically, can scarcely be contrasted with the detailed schedules +of social revolution to be found in the West. + +Sun Yat-sen's frequent expressions of sympathy with communism and +socialism, and his occasional identification of the large principles of +_min shêng_ with them, are an indication of his desire for ultimate +collectivism. (It may be remarked, in passing, that Sun Yat-sen used the +word _collectivist_ in a much more rigid sense than that employed by +Coker.) His concessions to the economic situation of his time, the +pragmatic, practical method in which he conceived and advocated his plans, +are a manifestation of the empirical element in his collectivism. + +_Ming shêng_ cannot, however, be thought of as another Western doctrine +for national economic strength, national economic reconstitution, and +national distributive justice; it is also a program for the improvement of +the morale of the people. + +How is the _min shêng_ doctrine to fit in with the essentially +conservative spirit of the nationalist ideology? If, as Sun proposed, the +new ideology is to be compounded of the old morality, the old knowledge, +and modern physical science, how is _min shêng_, referring to social as +well as material programs, to be developed in harmony with the old +knowledge? In the terminology of ultramodern Western political science, +the ethical, the moral, and the emotional are likely to appear as words of +derision. In a milieu characterized by the curiously warmblooded social +outlook of the Confucians, such terms are still relevant to reality, still +significant in the lives of men. The sentimental is intangible in +politics; for that reason it is hard to fit into contemporary thought, but +though it cannot be measured and fully understood, its potency cannot be +disregarded; and for Sun Yat-sen it was of the utmost importance. + + + + +_Min Shêng_ as an Ethical Doctrine. + + +Reference has been made to the Confucian doctrine of _jên_, the +fellow-feeling of all mankind--each man's consciousness of membership in +society. This doctrine was formulated in a society unacquainted with Greek +logic, nor did it have the strange European emphasis upon sheer +intellectuality which has played its way through Western thought. Not, of +course, as profoundly introspective as Christianity, nor appealing so +distinctly to the mystical in man's nature, it was nevertheless concerned +with man's inner life, as well as with the ethics of his outward behavior. +The Confucian was suffused throughout with the idea of virtue; the moral +and the physical were inextricably intertwined. Its non-logical content +scarcely approached the form of a religion; commentators on the old +ideology have not called it religious, despite the prominence of beliefs +in the supernatural.(201) The religion of the Chinese has been +this-worldly,(202) but it has not on that account been indifferent to the +subjective aspects of the moral life.(203) + +The nationalist ideology was designed as the inheritor of and successor +to, the old ideology of China. The doctrine of nationalism narrowed the +field of the application of Confucianism from the whole civilized world to +the state-ized society of the Chinese race-nation. The doctrine of +democracy implemented the old teachings of popular power and intellectual +leadership with a political mechanism designed to bring forth the full +strength of both. And the doctrine of _min shêng_ was the economic +application of the old social ethos. + +It is in this last significance, rather than in any of its practical +meanings of recovery, development, and reform, that Sun Yat-sen spoke most +of it to one of his followers.(204) He was concerned with it as a moral +force. His work was, among other things, a work of moral transformation of +individual motives.(205) _Min shêng_ must, in addition to its other +meanings be regarded as an attempt to extend the Chinese ideology to +economic matters, to lead the Chinese to follow their old ethics. Sun +Yat-sen had ample time in his visits to the West to observe the ravages +that modern civilization had inflicted upon the older Western moral life, +and did not desire that China should also follow the same course. The +humanity of the old tradition must be kept by the Chinese in their venture +into the elaborate and dangerous economy of modern life; the machine +civilization was needed, and was itself desirable,(206) but it could not +overthrow the humane civilization that preceded it and was to continue on +beneath and throughout it. + +In this manner a follower of Sun Yat-sen seeks to recall his words: "I +should say that _min shêng_ focuses our ethical tradition even more than +the other two principles; after a Chinese has become nationalistic and +democratic, he will become socialized through the idea of his own +personality as an instrument of good for human welfare. In this proud +feeling of importance to and for the world, egotism gives way to +altruism.... So, I say again that _min shêng_ is an ethical endeavor ... +this, the final principle (and yet, the first principle which I +discovered, in the bitterness and poverty of my boyhood days), will come +imperceptibly into our lives."(207) + +In a philosophy for intellectuals such attitudes need not, perhaps, be +reckoned with; in an ideology for revolution and reconstitution, perhaps +they should. Sun Yat-sen conceived of his own work and his ideology not +only as political acts but as moral forces; _min shêng_ was at once to +invigorate the national economy, to industrialize the material +civilization, and to institute distributive justice, and in addition to +this, it was to open a new, humane epoch in economic relations. That is +why the term, instead of being translated, is left in the Chinese: _min +shêng_. + + + + + +CHAPTER V. THE PROGRAMS OF NATIONALISM. + + + + +Kuomintang. + + +Sun Yat-sen was a political leader as well as a political philosopher. His +growth as a thinker was intimately associated with the development of his +political activities. It would be difficult to say which came first, +either in time or in importance, in his life--his teachings or his work. At +times the line between the two becomes vague. Sun made vital commitments +concerning his ideology in furthering his revolutionary work. These have +to be sifted out from other utterances bearing only upon the immediate +situation. This is not easy, but neither is it impossible. Lyon Sharman +wrote, "It might be cogently argued that, in dealing with an easily +absorbent, propagandist mind like Sun Yat-sen's one should not look to the +shifting ideas for his real opinions, but to those formulations which he +clung to tenaciously all his life."(208) + +The ideology of the _San Min Chu I_ provides a broad scheme of terms and +values by means of which the Chinese of the twentieth century could orient +themselves simultaneously in the modern world and in the continuing world +of Confucian civilization. Between this philosophy and the necessity of +immediate practical action there stands an intermediate step--that of the +plans. The plans provide a theory of means leading to the establishment of +the ends set up in the ideology. The ideology, left on paper by itself, +could not bring about China's salvation; it had to be spread and +implemented with political action. Sun Yat-sen planned the programs and +activities of the Chinese revolutionaries in some detail; he proposed +policies reaching far out into the future. While, since his death, these +plans have been modified to a greater or less degree,(209) they have not +lost all relevance to the course of affairs in China, and, in any case, +possess an interest of their own in the history of political thought, as +illustrating the political doctrines to which Sun Yat-sen's ideology led +him. The first problem the plans had to include was that of providing a +tool by which they could be set in motion. + +What instrument could preach nationalism to the Chinese people and awaken +them, and, having awakened them, lead them on to a victorious defense of +their race and civilization? Sun's answer was: "The Kuomintang." The +nationalist revolutionary party was the designated heir to the leadership +of the people, and even in his life-time Sun Yat-sen worked through the +party that was almost entirely his own creation. + +This party had begun as a small group of the personal followers of Sun +Yat-sen in the days when he was struggling against the Manchu monarchy +almost singlehanded. Gradually this group increased and became a +federation of the great secret orders which had resisted the Manchus for +centuries. It developed into a modern parliamentary party under the name +_Kuomintang_--literally _nation people party_--with the inauguration of the +first republic, but was soon driven underground by the would-be emperor +Yüan Shih-k'ai. It emerged again in South China at the end of the World +War, was reorganized after the Communist model (so far as intra-party +organization was concerned) before the death of Sun Yat-sen, led the +revolution to the North, and, now, though somewhat less united than +before, rules the greater part of China in the name of the Three +Principles.(210) + +Confucius preached the slow transformation of society by means of an +intellectual leaven, scholar class, which, by re-forming and clarifying +the ideology, could gradually minimize conflict among men and bring about +an epoch of concord in which all men would live by reason as found in +tradition. The function of the Kuomintang was, in Sun's mind, only +remotely similar. The Kuomintang was designed to intervene in a chaos of +wars and corrupt politics, to propagate the nationalist ideology, and +avert a tragic fate which would otherwise be inevitable--the disappearance +of China from the map of the world, and the extinction not only of Chinese +civilization but--as Sun Yat-sen thought--of the Chinese race as well. + +In the days before the downfall of the monarchy, and for the few years of +defeat under the first republic, the Kuomintang was not highly organized. +Sun Yat-sen's genius for leadership, and the fervor of his adherents--which +can be understood only at first-hand, and cannot be explained in rational +terms--were sufficient to hold the party together. But there was far too +much discord as to final principles as well as to points of immediate +action, and party activities were not so specialized as to permit maximum +efficiency.(211) Furthermore, there was the question of the relations of +the party and the state. It was somewhat absurd for the partizans of Sun +Yat-sen, having brought about the revolution, to stand back and let +whomever would walk away with it. The party's power had ebbed with its +success in 1911. There had to be some way of keeping the party in power +after it had achieved the overthrow of its enemies, and won the +revolutionary control of the country. Reorganization was definitely +necessary if party effectiveness were to be raised to the point of +guaranteeing the success of the next revolution--which Sun did not live to +see--and party supremacy to the point of assuring the Nationalists control +of the government after the revolution had been accomplished. + +Reorganization was effected through the assistance of the Communists +during the period of the Canton-Moscow entente (1923-1927).(212) Under the +leadership of the extraordinarily able Michael Borodin, the Soviet +advisers sent from Russia completely re-shaped the internal structure of +the Kuomintang and won for themselves positions of considerable confidence +and influence, which they lost only when they attempted to transform the +principles and objectives of the Party as thoroughly as they had the +organization. + +The Kuomintang of today, which is irreconcilably opposed to Marxism, still +bears the imprint of Communist design.(213) Though the working details of +the Party organization do not, for the most part, appear directly relevant +to the principle of _min ch'üan_ of Sun Yat-sen, the arrangements for +Party control illustrate the curious compromise between Chinese and +Western democratic patterns, on the one hand, and the revolutionary +requirements of absolutism, on the other, which have made Chinese +republicanism seem a sham, if not a farce, to Western scholars who expect +to find in China the same openness and freedom in democratic government to +which they are accustomed at home. + +During the life-time of Sun there was no question of an elective headship +for the Party. In spite of the fact that the party stood for democracy, it +seemed impossible that any alternative to Sun Yat-sen himself should be +considered. Sun Yat-sen's complete willingness to continue as head of the +Party without troubling to have himself elected from time to time has been +variously interpreted: his friends term it the humble and natural +recognition of a celebrated fact; his enemies regard it as the +hallucination of an egotism as distorted as it was colossal. The truth +would appear to be that Sun regarded the initiation and the guidance of +the Nationalist revolution as his particular mission in life. He was, in a +sense, the intellectual proprietor of the Three Principles. Unselfish in +all personal matters, he had few doubts of his own capacity when he had +discovered what he believed to be his duty, and unquestioningly set out to +perform it. In the lawlessness and tumult of the revolution, it would have +seemed absurd for Sun Yat-sen to submit to the periodical formula of +reëlection for the sake of any merely theoretical harmony of action and +theory. + +Not only was Sun Yat-sen the leader of the Party; he was not even to have +a successor. The first revised constitution of the Kuomintang provided for +his life-time headship; the second stipulated that the post of _Tsung Li_ +should never be filled by any other person. As _Tsung Li_--the Party +Leader, it is still customary to refer to Sun Yat-sen in China today. +This, again, was not the display of a superhuman vanity so much as a +practical requirement designed to offset the possibility of conflict and +intrigue among the most conspicuous party chiefs, which would quite +probably arise should the question of a succession to Sun Yat-sen ever be +mentioned. There was, of course, the element of respect in this +gesture--the implication that the magistral chair of Sun Yat-sen was too +high a place for any common man to sit. + +So far as leadership was concerned the Kuomintang was an autocracy until +the death of Sun Yat-sen. In all other party matters attempts were made to +cultivate democratic form and instil democratic morale. The prudence of +this choice may seem to have been borne out by the course of history, +since the Communists did not become ambitious, nor the Nationalists +jealous, to the point of open conflict until after the death of Sun +Yat-sen. Western thought will have to make extensive allowances before it +can comprehend a democratic Party which operated under the unquestioned +authority of a single man, without recourse to the formula of a plebiscite +or election to a boss-ship in the form of a nominal post made significant +only by the personal conspicuousness of the incumbent. + +Had Karl Marx lived to work in the Russian Revolution, he might have +occupied a position analogous to that which Sun Yat-sen did in the +Chinese. In other respects the new Kuomintang organization was remarkably +like the Communist. There was the extraordinarily complex, but somehow +effective, mechanism of a Party Congress, a Central Executive Committee, +and a Standing Committee. There was a Political Bureau and an agency for +overseas agitation. There were also the wide ramifications of an extensive +net work of auxiliary organizations designed to draw strength from every +popular enthusiasm, and deflect it to the cause of the Nationalist +revolution. In due time these agencies were turned about and swung into +action against the Communists who had attempted to master them. + +The precise details of Kuomintang organization need not be described. In +general the pattern of authority proceeded from the whole membership, by a +sequence of indirect elections, to the inner group of the Central +Executive Committee, a body which possesses as much power in China as does +its Soviet prototype.(214) An instance of its power may be given: +representatives are sent by the _tang pu_ (Party Branches) to the Party +Congress; in the event that delegates do not or cannot come, the C. E. C. +has the power of appointing persons to serve _pro tempore_ as the +representatives of the otherwise unrepresented branches. Since the same +committee examines delegates' credentials, it is apparent that the +trustworthiness of the Party Congress can be assured in the same manner +that, to the understanding of the present author, the earlier All-Union +Congresses of Soviets and the C. P. were assured in the Russian +Revolution. The pattern given the Kuomintang by the Russians gave the +Party a strong central control able to assure orthodoxy within the Party; +for some years, as a matter of history, differences of opinion within the +Party could only be expressed by schism (as in the case of the +"Kuomintang" of Wang Ch'ing-wei). While the aim of the Party was +democracy, it cannot be said truthfully that democracy worked in a +militant Party engaged in turning an anarchy into a revolution. The +requirements of revolutionary endeavor, among other things, seem to +include an iron-handed leadership of the right sort. Such leadership +could, in the Sun Yat-sen ideology, be justified by reference to the three +stages of the revolution. + +The Kuomintang remained, so far as leadership was concerned, the creature +of Sun Yat-sen. In structure it was extensively reorganized to resemble +the Communist hierarchy found in Russia, with the administrative and +legislative systems united into grades of conferences and committees. The +Kuomintang also took over the Communist system of a registered and +disciplined membership. To the time of the reorganization in 1923-1924, +the Party had apparently admitted and expelled members in the informal, +but effective, manner employed by the old Chinese _hui_--associations; +guilds; or "tongs"--for centuries.(215) Without a complete system of +personnel book-keeping, it was impossible to keep adequate records of the +performance of each member and comb through the membership for the purpose +of eliminating undesirables and inactives. At the time of the +reorganization the membership was required to be reënrolled; in many cases +certificates of membership were granted (in physical appearance resembling +a European passport) which, in view of the Party power, entailed a +considerable grant of privileges with the more or less corresponding +burden of duties. Party finances notably improved. In time this systematic +method of recording membership was applied for the purposes of ousting +persons with Communist or pro-Communist views, or eliminating individuals +too friendly with foreign interests believed antagonistic to the Party or +its purposes. "Party purges" have been frequent and drastic since the +organization of a complete membership record. + +The Kuomintang, as it was re-formed just before its swift rise to power +and as it has essentially remained since, was a well-organized body of +persons, subject to varying degrees of Party discipline, and trained in +the methods of propaganda. The leadership was in the hands of Sun Yat-sen +and, after his death, in the hands of his most trusted military and +political aides. The membership, drawn from all parts of China and the +world, was made up of persons from almost every class in society; +representation was on the Russian plan, tending to centralize power in the +C. E. C.(216) Intra-party democracy was not, for the most part, put into +practice because of the disturbed political and economic conditions. The +Party and its predecessors have, in the forty-odd years of their combined +existence, been facing what amounted to a state of perpetual emergency. +Sometimes badly, but more often effectively, they have struggled to +establish a state which in turn can found the democratic ideology of Sun +upon which the democracy of the future must, they believe, be based. + +Sun did not state definitely that the Party was to be dissolved after the +task of its dictatorship was completed, and China had won a stable +democratic government. That decision, of perpetuating the Party as one of +many competing parties in the new democracy, or of abolishing it +altogether, was presumably to be left to the Party leaders of the time. A +precedent may be found in the behavior of Sun himself after the +establishment of the Republic in 1912; he continued the Nationalist Party +as one of the chief parties in the parliamentary republic. Yüan Shih-k'ai +soon drove it underground again. From this it might be possible to +conclude that the Party having done with its trusteeship, need not commit +suicide as a party, but could continue in some form or another. + +The Kuomintang forms the link between the theories of Sun and the +realities of the revolutionary struggle; it ties together his plans for a +new democracy in China and his strategies in the conflicts of the moment. +First instrument of the ideology, it bears the burden of bringing about +the revolution, and bringing the country to the stage of testing the +administrative and political theories of the founder, and simultaneously +inculcating the democratic principle in the minds of those who are to bear +the heritage of Chinese organization and culture on to the future. + +The genius of Sun Yat-sen, the Communist gift of organization, and the +fervor of the membership brought about the defeat or submission--however +nominal the latter may have been--of the warlords. By what stages, +according to the theory of Sun Yat-sen, could national unity be realized? +What, given power, should the Kuomintang do to guarantee the success of +the revolution? + + + + +The Dragon Throne and State Allegiance. + + +The first task which the Kuomintang, once established, had to perform was +a necessary preliminary to the other portions of its work--such as the +leading of the first steps against the Western inroads, the opening up of +the democratic technique of government, and the initiation of the first +phases of _min shêng_. That task was to awaken the Chinese to the fact +that they were a nation, and not only a nation, but an abused and +endangered one as well. + +We have seen that Sun Yat-sen regarded nationalism as a precious treasure +which the Chinese had lost.(217) He had said, many years before, in his +_Kidnapped in London_, that the Manchus had followed a deliberate policy +of intellectual suppression designed to extinguish or divert Chinese +nationalism, and to make the great masses of Chinese on whom the Manchu +power depended oblivious to the fact that they were the humiliated slaves +of alien conquerors.(218) Again, in the third lecture on nationalism, he +said that while the Emperors Kang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung were at least honest +in acknowledging themselves to be Manchus, extenuating their presence on +the Dragon Throne by claiming the imperial hero-sages, Shun and Wen Wang, +of antiquity as fellow-barbarians, the Manchu Emperors after Ch'ien Lung +did everything they could to suppress Chinese nationalist ideas. They even +did not hesitate to revise the classics of history in order to obliterate +whatever historical consciousness the Chinese may have had of +themselves.(219) Sun Yat-sen pointed out that the strong +group-consciousness of the Jews has kept Judea living through the +centuries, even though the Jewish state was obliterated and the Jews +themselves scattered to the four winds. He also praised the Poles,(220) +who were subjugated by aliens as were the Chinese, but kept their +nationalist ideas and were consequently restored as an honored nation +after the world war. Hence, the first step in the program of Chinese +nationalism was to be the creation of a consciousness of that nationalism. +If the Chinese did not regain their nationalism, "that precious treasure +which makes possible the subsistence of humanity,"(221) they might meet +the fate of the Miao tribes whom the Chinese had pushed back into desolate +lands and who faced an ignominious extinction. + +This consciousness of themselves as a race-national unity was not of +itself enough. The Chinese had lost the favored position that they had +held since before the beginning of recorded history, and were no longer in +a position to view the frailties of outside nations with the charity to +which their once impregnable position had entitled them. It was no longer +a mere question of pushing through a recognition that China, hitherto +regarded by the Chinese as the ecumene of civilization, was a nation, and +not even an equal to the other nations. This idea had to be developed into +a force. + +Sun Yat-sen wrote, of the significance of philosophy in action: "What is a +principle? A principle is an idea, a belief, a force. As a rule, when men +search for the truth of a thesis, they first reflect upon it, then their +reflections grow into a belief, and that belief becomes a force. Hence in +order to be firmly established, a principle must pass through the +different stages of idea, belief, and force."(222) No more definite +statement of the ideological consequences of thought could be found. Sun +Yat-sen appreciated this, and realized that, in the carrying out of his +ideology, the first necessity was the adoption of the ideology itself. All +other steps must be secondary. The grouping of the important steps in the +fulfillment of the program of nationalism may have differed from time to +time,(223) but the actual work of Sun Yat-sen was based upon the method +indicated: the establishment of at least the preliminary notions of the +ideology as a prerequisite to effective social action. (In this +connection, and in anticipation of further discussion, it might be pointed +out that the advantage of the Moscow-Canton entente was not one gained +from the superior appeal of the Communist ideology, but from the superior +agitation techniques which the Nationalists learned from the Communists, +and which enabled them to bring into play the full latent social force in +Sun Yat-sen's ideas.) But if mere national-consciousness were insufficient +of itself, what else was needed? + +Loyalty was necessary. Being aware of themselves as Chinese would not help +them, unless they united and were loyal to that union. "To say that what +the ancients understood by loyalty was loyalty toward the emperor, and +that, since we no longer have an emperor, we (need no longer) speak of +loyalty, and to believe that we can act as we please--that is a grave +error."(224) Sun Yat-sen thus points out one of the most tragically +perplexing of the problems of the new China. + +He was urging return to the ancient morality. The ancient code of loyalty +was one built up to the emperor. Although the emperor did not have much +power, in comparison with some despots who have changed history, he was +nevertheless the man at the apex of society. The Confucian society was one +built in general upon the grand design of an enormous family; a design +which was, nevertheless, flexible enough to permit the deposition of a +wicked or mad emperor--something which the Japanese order of things could +not in theory, although it did in fact, tolerate. Filial piety was piety +toward one's own family head; loyalty was piety toward the family head of +all civilized society. + +Many writers have pointed out the discord and unhappiness which the +abolition of the Empire brought to many Chinese. Their code of honor was +outraged; the embodiment of their social stability was gone.(225) The +critics who made the comment could not, of course, deny the general trend +away of political organization throughout the world from monarchy. They +did question the competence of the Chinese to make the readjustment at the +present stage of their history, or believed that the Chinese could not +preserve their traditional civilization under a governmental system which +was alien to the form if not to the spirit of the Chinese tradition. +Although their criticisms may be influenced too heavily by an antiquarian +appreciation of the excellencies of the Chinese Imperial system, or a +desire to preserve China as a sort of vast museum with all its +quaintnesses of yesteryear, there is some point to what they say, since +the transition to national-state allegiance was not an easy one. There +were two factors involved in it, besides the tremendousness of the +educational task of convincing almost half a billion people that they were +no longer ruled by a properly deputized agent of the universe, but were +quite free to manage their world as they collectively saw fit. These +factors were, first, the necessity of preventing any possible resurrection +of the Dragon Throne, and second, the inculcation of allegiance to an +intangible state. + +Sun Yat-sen pointed out the enormous waste of blood and wealth involved in +the change from one dynasty to another, when the highest post in the whole +world was suddenly left open for the strongest man to seize. Republicanism +would consequently tend to prevent civil wars in the future;(226) the +cumbersome, murderous old method of expressing the popular will, as the +Confucian ideology provided, was to be done away with, and peaceful +changes of political personnel developed. He asserted that the T'ai P'ing +rebels, of whose memory he was fond, had failed in their fierce attempt to +establish a fantastic pseudo-Christian, proletarian, collectivistic +dynasty in the sixth and seventh decade of the nineteenth century because +of the dispute that arose within their ranks as to leadership.(227) He +also pointed out that many of the militarists under the Republic knew well +that the Dragon Throne was empty, but did not know that it was gone. + +The story of the eradication of monarchy from Chinese society is an +interesting one, relevant to the question of the old and the new loyalty. +Sun Yat-sen's full force was thrown at first against the Manchus. He +taught the other two principles of democracy and _min shêng_, but in his +earlier years he attracted most attention by his anti-Manchu activities. +Now, in allowing the principle of nationalism to do the work of the +principle of democracy, Sun Yat-sen was using the anti-dynastic +revolutionary potentialities of the situation to push along an +anti-monarchical movement. The Chinese constitutional arrangement was +such, under the Manchus, that a foreign monarch, who was a sovereign in +his own right, quite apart from China, sat on the Chinese throne. The +Manchu Emperor occupied the Dragon Throne. Many were willing to rebel +against a Manchu; they might have hesitated had an indigenous prince +occupied that position. + +On the occasion of the establishment of the first Republic, in 1912, the +Manchu Emperor was allowed to continue residence in Peking. Retaining his +dynastic title and the use of the Forbidden City, he was to receive a +stipend from the Chinese Republic and to be entitled to all the privileges +normally accorded a foreign emperor by international law. There is a +remote possibility, although the truth of this surmise cannot be +substantiated, that he was left there as a sort of scarecrow, to prevent +anyone from seizing the throne. Constitutional difficulties would have +arisen if a pensioned Manchu Emperor and a native caesarian Emperor were +to attempt to occupy the same throne. + +This peculiar arrangement does not seem to have helped matters much. There +was not enough pro-Manchu sentiment to support any restoration movement on +a large scale, such as a reactionary insurrection, and the personal +unpopularity of the one man, Yüan Shih-k'ai, who, as dictator of the first +Republic (1912-1916), sought the throne, was enough to keep any active +monarchical movement from succeeding. The one attempt of the Manchu +partizans, in 1917, failed utterly. + +That is not to say that the Dragon Throne was not missed. A general +relaxation of political ethics was observable. The old tradition could not +easily be reconciled to a juristic notion from outside. Sun Yat-sen sought +most eagerly to impress upon the Chinese the necessity for state +allegiance in place of monarchical devotion: "At present everybody says +that morality was overthrown with the advent of the republic. The main +reason is right here. Reasonably speaking we must practice loyalty even +under a republican regime, not loyalty to a sovereign, but loyalty toward +the nation, loyalty toward the people, loyalty toward our four hundred +million men. Of course, loyalty toward four hundred million men is +something much more exalted than loyalty toward one single man. Hence we +must preserve the excellent virtue of loyalty."(228) A curious emphasis on +the physical object of loyalty is present here. The Chinese, having no +background of Western juristic hypostatizations, were unable to be +faithful to a legal fiction; expressing state allegiance, Sun Yat-sen had +to put it in its most tangible form, that of a concord of human beings. + +Nevertheless, under the republic, the old virtue of personal loyalty +should not interfere with state allegiance. Sun Yat-sen was willing and +anxious that the Chinese should consider their loyalty as being directed +to the nation; he did not wish that the officials of the nation, as men, +should get it. In that case the very purpose of democracy would be +defeated, and a monarchy or an oligarchy set up with the formulae of a +democracy. Sun Yat-sen was as radically republican as any early American. +"In regard to the government of the nation, fundamentally, it is the +people who have the power, but the administration of the government must +be entrusted to experts who have the capacity. We need not regard those +experts as stately and honorable presidents and ministers, but merely as +chauffeurs of automobiles, as sentinels who guard the gate, as cooks who +prepare the food, as doctors who attend to sicknesses, as carpenters who +build houses, as tailors who make clothes."(229) State allegiance had to +be directed between the Scylla of a monarchical restoration and the +Charybdis of nominally republican personal government. The old form had to +be discarded, and the old habits turned in a new direction, but not in the +easiest direction that they might take. + +The problem of the supplanting of the Dragon Throne by a state was not an +easy one. In the preparation of the Chinese people for the initiation of +an active program of nationalism, the first elements of the nationalist +ideology had to be inculcated. This involved race-consciousness. But the +idea of race-consciousness and national-consciousness could not be exerted +as a force unless the conscious union of the Chinese race-nation was +accompanied by the erection of a powerful democratic state, and unless +this state fell heir to the loyalty which had once been shown the Throne, +or even a higher loyalty. This loyalty had to be based on the two +suppositions that the Empire was gone forever, and that personal loyalty, +even under the forms of a republic, should not be allowed to take its +place. Only with a genuine state-allegiance could the Chinese advance to +their national salvation. + + + + +Economic Nationalism. + + +The ideological establishment of a race-national outlook would have +far-reaching consequences that might well continue working themselves out +for centuries. The immediate exercise of this sense of unity was to be +developed through a loyalty to state allegiance, which would also of +itself be significant. These two new patterns--the one ideological, and the +other institutional--running through the Chinese society and social mind +were vitally necessary. But after the institutional habit of +state-allegiance had been developed, what was the new democratic state, +the instrument of the awakened race-nation, to do in the way of practical +policies to give effect to the new consciousness and strength of Chinese +nationalism? + +Sun Yat-sen, whose principles tended to develop themselves in terms of +threes,(230) cited three perils constituting a threat to the Chinese +society. The first was the peril to the Chinese race, which was faced with +the possibility of decline in an expanding Western World and might even +become vestigial or extinct. This peril was to be fought with +race-nationalism. The second was the peril to the Chinese polity, the +danger that China might become politically appurtenant to some foreign +power of group of powers. This was to be fought with democratic +race-nationalism. And the last, and most insidious, was the peril to the +Chinese economy, the looting of China by the unfair economic measures of +the great powers, to be met by a nationalist economic program. Sun Yat-sen +was most apprehensive of the combined strength of these three pressures: +"... I fear that our people are in a very difficult position; and I fear +that we may perish in the near future. We are threatened by the three +forces I have mentioned: namely, the increase of foreign population, the +political force, and the economic force of the foreigners."(231) + +Of the three forms of the foreign oppression of China, the economic, +because it did not show itself so readily, and was already working full +force, was the most dangerous. It was from this oppression that China had +sunk to the degraded position of a sub-colony. "This economic oppression, +this immense tribute is a thing which we did not dream of; it is something +which cannot be easily detected, and hence we do not feel the awful shame +of it."(232) + +Sun Yat-sen, as stated above, was not hostile to the development of that +portion of foreign capital which he regarded as fairly employed in China, +and spent a great part of his life in seeking to introduce capital from +outside. He did, however, make a distinction between the just operation of +economic forces, and the unjust combination of the economic with the +politically oppressive. Foreign capital in China was not oppressive +because it was capital; it was oppressive because it held a privileged +position, and because it was reinforced by political and military +sanctions. There is no implication in Sun Yat-sen's works that the +operations of finance, when not unjustly interfered with by political +action, could, even when adverse to China, be regarded as wrong of +themselves. + +In what ways, then, did foreign capital so invest its position with unjust +non-economic advantages that it constituted a burden and an oppression? +There were, according to Sun Yat-sen, six headings under which the various +types of economic incursion could be classified, with the consequence that +a total of one billion two hundred million Chinese dollars were unjustly +exacted from the Chinese economy every year by the foreigners. + +First, the control of the Customs services having, by treaty, been +surrendered by China, and a standard _ad valorem_ tariff having also been +set by treaty, the Chinese had to leave their markets open to whatever +foreign commerce might choose to come. They were not in a position to +foster their new modern industries by erecting a protective tariff, as had +the United States in the days of its great industrial development.(233) +China's adverse balance in trade constituted a heavy loss to the already +inadequate capital of the impoverished nation. Furthermore, the amount of +the possible revenue which could be collected under an autonomous tariff +system was lost. Again, foreign goods were not required, by treaty +stipulation, to pay the internal transit taxes which Chinese goods had to +pay. As a result, the customs situation really amounted to the development +of a protective system for foreign goods in China, to the direct financial +loss of the Chinese, and to the detriment of their industrial development. +He estimated that half a billion dollars, Chinese, was lost yearly, +through this politically established economic oppression.(234) Obviously, +one of the first steps of Chinese economic nationalism had to be tariff +autonomy. + +Second, the foreign banks occupied an unfair position in China. They had +won a virtual monopoly of banking, with the consequence that the Chinese +banks had to appear as marginal competitors, weak and unsound because the +people were "poisoned by economic oppression."(235) The foreign banks +issued paper money, which gave them cost-free capital; they discounted +Chinese paper too heavily; and they paid either no or very little interest +on deposits. In some cases they actually charged interest on deposits. A +second step of economic nationalism had to be the elimination of the +privileged position of the foreign banks, which were not subject to +Chinese jurisdiction, and were thus able to compete unfairly with the +native banks. + +Third, economic oppression manifested itself in transportation, chiefly by +water. The economic impotence of the Chinese made them use foreign bottoms +almost altogether; the possible revenue which could be saved or perhaps +actually gained from the use of native shipping was lost. + +Fourth, the Western territorial concessions constituted an economic +disadvantage to the Chinese. Wrested from the old Manchu government, they +gave the foreigners a strangle-hold on the Chinese economy. Besides, they +represented a direct loss to the Chinese by means of the following items: +taxes paid to the foreign authorities in the conceded ports, which was +paid by the Chinese and lost to China; land rents paid by Chinese to +foreign individuals, who adopted this means of supplementing the tribute +levied from the Chinese in the form of taxes; finally, the unearned +increment paid out by Chinese to foreign land speculators, which amounted +to an actual loss to China. Under a nationalist economic program, not only +would the favorable position of the foreign banks be reduced to one +comparable with that of the Chinese banks, but the concessions would be +abolished. Taxes would go to the Chinese state, the land rent system would +be corrected, and unearned increment would be confiscated under a somewhat +novel tax scheme proposed by Sun Yat-sen. + +Fifth, the Chinese lost by reason of various foreign monopolies or special +concessions. Such enterprises as the Kailan Mining Administration and the +South Manchuria Railway were wholly foreign, and were, by privileges +politically obtained, in a position to prevent Chinese competition. This +too had to be corrected under a system of economic nationalism. The new +state, initiated by the Kuomintang and carried on by the people, had to be +able to assure the Chinese an equality of economic privilege in their own +country. + +Sixth, the foreigners introduced "speculation and various other sorts of +swindle" into China.(236) They had exchanges and lotteries by which the +Chinese lost tens of millions of dollars yearly. + +Under these six headings Sun Yat-sen estimated the Chinese tribute to +Western imperialism to be not less than one billion two hundred millions a +year, silver. There were, of course, other forms of exaction which the +Westerners practised on the Chinese, such as the requirement of war +indemnities for the various wars which they had fought with China. +Furthermore, the possible wealth which China might have gained from +continued relations with her lost vassal states was diverted to the +Western powers and Japan. Sun Yat-sen also referred to the possible losses +of Chinese overseas, which they suffered because China was not powerful +enough to watch their rights and to assure them equality of opportunity. + +Sun Yat-sen did not expect that forces other than those which political +nationalism exerted upon the economic situation could save the Chinese. +"If we do not find remedies to that big leakage of $1,200,000,000.00 per +year, that sum will increase every year; there is no reason why it should +naturally decrease of its own accord."(237) The danger was great, and the +Chinese had to use their nationalism to offset the imperialist economic +oppression which was not only impoverishing the nation from year to year, +but which was actually preventing the development of a new, strong, modern +national economy. + +What is the relation of the sub-principle of economic nationalism to the +principle of _min shêng_?(238) Economic nationalism was the preliminary +remedy. The program of _min shêng_ was positive. It was the means of +creating a wealthy state, a modern, just economic society. But the old +oppressions of imperialism, lingering on, had to be cleared away before +China could really initiate such a program. Not only was it the duty of +the Chinese national and nationalist state to fight the political methods +of Western imperialism; the Chinese people could help by using that old +Asiatic weapon--the boycott. + +Sun Yat-sen was pleased and impressed with the consequences of Gandhi's +policy of non-coöperation. He pointed out that even India, which was a +subject country, could practise non-coöperation to the extreme discomfort +of the British. The creation of race-nationalism, and of allegiance to a +strong Chinese state, might take time. Non-coöperation did not. It was a +tool at hand. "The reason why India gained results from the +non-coöperation policy was that it could be practised by all the +citizens."(239) The Chinese could begin their economic nationalist program +immediately. + +Sun Yat-sen pointed out that the basis for the weakness of China, and its +exploitation by the foreigners, was the inadequacy of the Chinese +ideology. "The reason why we suffer from foreign oppression is our +ignorance; we 'are born in a stupor and die in a dream'."(240) Conscious +of the peril of the foreign economic oppression, the Chinese had to exert +economic nationalism to clear the way for the positive initiation of a +program of _min shêng_. In practising economic nationalism, there were two +ways that the Chinese could make the force of their national union and +national spirit felt: first, through the actual advancement of the +programs of the whole of nationalism and the progress of the political and +economic condition of the country; second, through non-coöperation, "... a +negative boycott which weakens the action of imperialism, protects +national standing, and preserves from destruction."(241) + + + + +Political Nationalism for National Autonomy. + + +After the first steps of resistance to economic oppression, the Chinese +nationalists would have to launch a counter-attack on the political +oppression practised upon China by the Western powers. In his discussion +of this, Sun Yat-sen described, though briefly, the past, the +contemporary, and the future of that oppression, and referred to its +methods. His theory also contained three answers to this oppression which +need to be examined in a consideration of his theoretical program of +Chinese nationalism: first, the question of China's nationalist program of +political anti-imperialism; second, the nature of the ultimate development +of nationalism and a national state; and third, the theory of the class +war of the nations. In view of the fact that this last is a theory in +itself, and one quite significant in the distinction between the doctrines +of Sun Yat-sen and those of Marxism-Leninism, it will be considered +separately. The first two questions of the program of nationalism are, +then: what is to be the negative action for the advancement of China's +national political strength, in opposing the political power of the West? +and what is to be the positive, internal program of Chinese nationalism? + +As has been stated Sun Yat-sen used the anti-dynastic sentiment current in +the last years of the Manchus as an instrument by means of which he could +foster an anti-monarchical movement. The great significance of his +nationalism as a nationalism of Chinese _vis-à-vis_ their +Oriental-barbarian rulers quite overshadowed its importance as a teaching +designed to protect China against its Western-barbarian exploiters. The +triumph of the Republicans was so startling that, for a time, Sun Yat-sen +seems to have believed that nationalism could develop of itself, that the +Chinese, free from their Manchu overlords, would develop a strong +race-national consciousness without the necessity of any political or +party fostering of such an element in their ideology. Afire with all the +idealism of the false dawn of the first Republic, Sun Yat-sen dropped the +principle of nationalism from his program, and converted his fierce +conspiratorial league into a parliamentary party designed to enter into +amicable competition with the other parties of the new era.(242) This +pleasant possibility did not develop. The work of nationalism was by no +means done. The concept of state-allegiance had not entered into the +Chinese ideology as yet, and the usurper-President Yüan Shih-k'ai was able +to gather his henchmen about him and plan for a powerful modern Empire of +which he should be forced by apparently popular acclamation to assume +control. + +The further necessity for nationalism appeared in several ways. First, the +Chinese had not become nationalistic enough in their attitude toward the +powers. Sun Yat-sen, with his reluctance to enter into violent +disagreement with the old ideology, was most unwilling that chauvinism +should be allowed in China.(243) He hoped that the Western powers, seeing +a fair bargain, would be willing to invest in China sufficient capital to +advance Chinese industrial conditions. Instead, he saw Japanese capital +pouring into Peking for illegitimate purposes, and accepted by a +prostituted government of politicians. With the continuation of the +unfavorable financial policy of the powers, and the continuing remoteness +of any really helpful loans, he began to think that the Chinese had to +rely on their own strength for their salvation.(244) Second, he realized +that the foreigners in China were not generally interested in a strong, +modern Chinese state if that state were to be developed by Chinese and not +by themselves. Sun had understood from the beginning that the great aim of +nationalism was to readjust the old world-society to nationhood in the +modern world; he had not, perhaps, realized that the appearance of this +nationhood was going to be opposed by foreigners.(245) When he came to +power in 1912, he thought that the immediate end of nationalism--liberation +of China from Manchu overlordship--had been achieved. He was preoccupied +with the domestic problems of democracy and _min shêng_. When, however, +the foreign powers refused to let his government at Canton exercise even +the limited authority permitted the Chinese by the treaties over their own +customs service, and did not let Sun take the surplus funds allowed the +Chinese (after payment of interest due on the money they had lent various +Chinese governments), his appreciation of the active propagation of +nationalism was heightened. He realized that the Chinese had to fight +their own battles, and that, while they might find individual friends +among the Westerners, they could scarcely hope for a policy of the great +powers which would actually foster the growth of the new national +China.(246) Simultaneously, he found his advocacy of a nationalist program +receiving unexpected support from the Soviet Union. His early contacts +with the Russians, who were the only foreigners actually willing to +intervene in his behalf with shipments of arms and money, made him +interested in the doctrines lying behind their actions, so inconsistent +with those of the other Western powers. In the Communist support of his +nationalism as a stage in the struggle against imperialism, he found his +third justification of a return, with full emphasis, to the program of +nationalism. + +Hence, at the time that he delivered his sixteen lectures, which represent +the final and most authoritative stage of his principles, and the one with +which the present work is most concerned, he had returned to an advocacy +of nationalism after a temporary hope that enough work had been done along +that line. In expelling the alien Manchu rulers of China, he had hoped +that the old Chinese nationalism might revive, as soon as it was free of +the police restrictions had placed on race-national propaganda by the +Empire. He had found that this suspension of a nationalist campaign was +premature because nationalism had not firmly entrenched itself in the +Chinese social mind. In the first place, state allegiance was weak; +usurpers, dictators and military commandants strode about the Chinese +countryside with personal armies at their heels. Secondly, the foreign +powers, out of respect to whom, perhaps, a vigorous patriotic campaign had +not been carried out, did not show themselves anxious to assist China--at +least, not as anxious as Sun Yat-sen expected them to be. Third, the +inspiration offered by a power which, although temporarily submerged, had +recently been counted among the great powers of the world, and which had +rejected the aggressive policy which the rest of the Western nations, to a +greater or less degree, pursued in the Far East, was sufficient to +convince Sun Yat-sen of the justice of the doctrines of that power. Soviet +Russia did not stop with words; it offered to associate with China as an +equal, and the Soviet representative in Peking was the first diplomat to +be given the title of ambassador to China. + +The sharpening of the nationalist policy into a program of +anti-imperialism seems to have been the direct result of the Communist +teachings, one of the conspicuous contributions of the Marxians to the +programmatic part of the theories of Sun Yat-sen. As earlier stated, their +ideology influenced his almost not all. Their programs, on the other hand, +were such an inspiration to the Chinese nationalists that the latter had +no hesitation in accepting them. Hu Han-min, one of the moderate +Kuomintang leaders, who would certainly not go out of his way to give the +Communists credit which they did not deserve, stated unequivocally that +the Chinese did not have the slogan, "Down with Imperialism!" in the 1911 +revolution, and gave much credit to the Bolsheviks for their +anti-imperialist lesson to the Chinese.(247) + +In describing the political aggression of the Western states upon the +Chinese society, Sun Yat-sen began by contrasting the nature of the +inter-state vassalage which the peripheral Far Eastern states had once +owed to the Chinese core-society. He stated that the Chinese did not +practise aggression on their neighbors, and that the submission of the +neighboring realms was a submission based on respect and not on +compulsion. "If at that time all small states of Malaysia wanted to pay +tribute and adopt Chinese customs, it was because they admired Chinese +civilization and spontaneously wished to submit themselves; it was not +because China oppressed them through military force."(248) Even the +position of the Philippines, which Sun Yat-sen thought a very profitable +and pleasant one under American rule, was not satisfactory to the +Filipinos of modern times, who, unlike the citizens of the vassal states +of old China, were dissatisfied with their subordinate positions.(249) + +He pointed out that this benevolent Chinese position was destroyed as the +West appeared and annexed these various states, with the exception of +Siam. He then emphasized that this may have been done in the past with a +view to the division of China between the various great powers.(250) + +This partitioning had been retarded, but the danger was still present. The +Chinese revolution of 1911 may have shown the powers that there was some +nationalism still left in China.(251) + +The military danger was tremendous. "Political power can exterminate a +nation in a morning's time. China who is now suffering through the +political oppression of the powers is in danger of perishing at any +moment. She is not safe from one day to the other."(252) Japan could +conquer China in ten days. The United States could do it in one month. +England would take two months at the most, as would France. The reason why +the powers did not settle the Chinese question by taking the country was +because of their mutual distrust; it was not due to any fear of China. No +one country would start forth on such an adventure, lest it become +involved with the others and start a new world war.(253) + +If this were the case, the danger from diplomacy would be greater even +than that of war. A nation could be extinguished by the stroke of a pen. +The Chinese had no reason to pride themselves on their possible military +power, their diplomacy, or their present independence. Their military +power was practically nil. Their diplomacy amounted to nothing. It was not +the Chinese but the aggressors themselves that had brought about the +long-enduring stalemate with respect to the Chinese question. The +Washington Conference was an attempt on the part of the foreigners to +apportion their rights and interests in China without fighting. This made +possible the reduction of armaments.(254) The present position of China +was not one in which the Chinese could take pride. It was humiliating. +China, because it was not the colony of one great power, was the +sub-colony of all. The Chinese were not even on a par with the colonial +subjects of other countries. + +The shameful and dangerous position thus outlined by Sun could be remedied +only by the development of nationalism and the carrying-on of the struggle +against imperialism. + +Anti-imperialism was the fruit of his contact with the Bolsheviks. His +nationalism had approached their programs of national liberation, but the +precise verbal formulation had not been adopted until he came in contact +with the Marxian dialecticians of the Third International. His +anti-imperialism differed from theirs in several important respects. He +was opposed to political intervention for economic purposes; this was +imperialism, and unjust. The economic consequences of political +intervention were no better than the intervention itself. Nevertheless, at +no time did he offer an unqualified rejection of capitalism. He sought +loans for China, and distinguished between capital which came to China in +such a manner as to profit the Chinese as well as its owners, and that +which came solely to profit the capitalists advancing it, to the economic +disadvantage of the Chinese. In his ideology, Sun Yat-sen never appears to +have accepted the Marxian thesis of the inevitable fall of capitalism, nor +does he seem to have thought that imperialism was a necessary and final +stage in the history of capitalism. + +In short, his program of anti-imperialism and the foreign policy of +Chinese political nationalism, seem to be quite comparable to the policy +held by the Soviets, apart from those attitudes and activities which their +peculiar ideology imposed. In practical matters, in affairs and actions +which he could observe with his own eyes, Sun Yat-sen was in accord with +the anti-imperialism of Soviet Russia and of his Communist advisers. In +the deeper implications of anti-imperialism and in the pattern of the +Marxian-Leninist ideology underlying it in the U.S.S.R., he showed little +interest. Ideologically he remained Chinese; programmatically he was +willing to learn from the Russians. + +The internal program of his nationalism was one which seems to have been +influenced by the outlook developed by himself. His vigorous denunciation +of Utopian cosmopolitanism prevents his being considered an +internationalist. He had, on the occasion of the institution of the first +Republic, been in favor of the freedom of nations even when that freedom +might be exercised at the expense of the Chinese. The Republic might +conceivably have taken the attitude that it had fallen heir to the +overlordship enjoyed by the Manchu Empire, and consequently refused +representation to the Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and Mohammedans. It was, +however, called the Republic of Chung Hua (instead of the Republic of +Han), and a five-striped flag, representing its five constituent "races," +was adopted. Sun Yat-sen later gave a graphic description of the +world-wide appeal of Woodrow Wilson's principle of national +self-determination. He did not think that the principle, once enunciated, +could be recalled; and stated that the defeat of the minor and colonial +nations at the Versailles Conference, which drafted a very unjust treaty, +was an instance of the deceitfulness of the great powers. + +His nationalism did not go so far as to permit his endorsing the entrance +of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia into the Soviet Union. This +doctrine of nationalism as a correlative of democratic national autonomy +was his second principle, that of democracy; his first principle, that of +race-nationalism, had other implications for the destiny of Mongolia. His +positive program of nationalism was dedicated, in its "political" +exercise, to the throwing-off of the imperialist bondage and the exercise +of the self-rule of the Chinese people. + +It is only if one realizes that these three sub-principles of nationalism +were re-emphases of the three principles that their position in the theory +of the nationalist program becomes clear. Nationalism was to clear the way +for _min shêng_ by resisting the Western economic oppression of the +Chinese, and thus allowing the Chinese to enrich themselves. Nationalism +was to strike down the political oppression of imperialism by eradicating +the political holds of the West upon China, and thus allowing the Chinese +people to rule itself. So long as China was at the mercy of Western power, +any self-government that the Chinese might attempt would have to be +essayed at the sufferance of the aggressors. Finally, nationalism was to +reinforce itself by the application of race-nationalism to race-kinship; +China was not only to be self-ruling--it was to help the other nations of +Asia restore their autonomy and shield them with its tutelary benevolence. + +When one considers that to Sun Yat-sen democracy and autonomy are +inextricably associated, the full significance of his stressing +nationalism as a means to democracy appears. The Chinese people could not +rule themselves if they were to be intimidated by the Western powers and +Japan. They could not rule themselves completely if large portions of them +were under alien jurisdiction in the treaty ports. These forms of +political oppression were wounds in the body of Chinese society. Chinese +nationalism, associated with democracy, required that the whole Chinese +people be associated in one race-nation and that this race-nation rule +itself through the mechanism of a democratic state. + +Here the code of values imposed by Sun Yat-sen's thinking in terms of the +old ideology becomes apparent. The development of nationalism in China, +while it threatened no one outside and sought only for the justification +of China's interests at home, was an accentuation of the existence of the +race-nation. The race-nation, freeing itself (political nationalism) and +ruling itself (democracy), was to become more conscious of itself. Sun +implicitly denied the immediate necessity for a general world-authority; +perhaps he did so because he realized that in the present world, any +supreme authority would be predominantly Western. The Chinese race-nation, +once politically free, had a definite duty to perform on behalf of its +peripheral states and on behalf of the suppressed states of the whole +world. The first demand, however, was for the freedom of China; others +could not be helped by China until China herself was free. + +The political application of nationalism envisaged (1) the elimination of +existing foreign political control (imperialism) in China; (2) the +strengthening of the country to such a degree that it would no longer be a +hypo-colony or sub-colony, and would not have to live under the constant +threat of invasion or partition; and (3) the resulting free exercise of +self-rule by the Chinese people, through a nationalist democracy, so +arranged that self-rule of China did not conflict with the equal right of +self-rule of other peoples but, on the contrary, helped them. + + + + +The Class War of the Nations. + + +Now come to a consideration of the second part of the sub-principle of +political nationalism. This is the theory held by Sun concerning the class +war of the nations. It serves to illustrate three points in Sun Yat-sen's +thought: first, that Sun never permitted a Western theory to disturb the +fundamentals of Chinese ideology as he wished to re-orient it; second, +that Sun frequently took Western political theories which had been +developed in connection with the relations of individuals and applied them +to the relations of nations; and third, that Sun was so much impressed +with the cordiality and friendship proffered him by the Communists that he +sought to coöperate with them so far as his Chinese ideology permitted +him.(255) + +One notes that the question of distributive justice is not as pressing in +China as it is in the modern West. One also observes that the old Chinese +ideology was an ideology of the totalitarian society, which rejected any +higher allegiance of states or of classes. And one sees that Sun Yat-sen, +in proposing a democracy, suggested an ideology which would continue the +old Chinese thesis of eventual popular sovereignty as reconciled with +administration by an intellectually disciplined elite. Each of these three +points prevented Sun from endorsing the intra-national class struggle. + +He regarded the class struggle, not--as do the Marxians--as a feature of +every kind of economically unequal social organization, but as a +pathological development to be found in disordered societies. He +considered the Marxian teachings in this respect to be as different from +really adequate social doctrines as pathology is from physiology in +medical science. The mobility of the old Chinese society, combined with +the drags imposed by family, village, and _hui_, had resulted in a social +order which by and large was remarkably just. By presenting the principle +of _min shêng_ as a cardinal point in an ideology to be made up of old +Chinese morality, old Chinese knowledge, and Western science, he hoped to +avoid the evils of capitalism in the course of ethically sound enrichment, +development and arrangement of China's economy. + +At the same time Sun was faced with the spectre of imperialism, and had to +recognize that this unjust but effective alliance of economic exploitation +and political subjection was an irreconcilable enemy to Chinese national +freedom. He saw in Russia an ally, and did not see it figuratively. Years +of disappointment had taught him that altruism is rare in the +international financial relations of the modern world. After seeking +everywhere else, he found the Russians, as it were, on his door-step +offering him help. This convinced him as no theory could have. He regarded +Russia as a new kind of power, and ascribed the general hatred for the +Soviet to their stand against capitalism and imperialism: "Then all the +countries of the world grew afraid of Russia. This fear of Russia, which +the different countries entertain at present, is more terrible than the +fear they formerly held, because this policy of peace not only overthrew +the Russian imperialism, but (purposed) to overthrow also imperialism in +the (whole world)."(256) This fight against imperialism was a good work in +the mind of Sun Yat-sen. + +In considering the principles of Sun more than a decade after they were +pronounced, one cannot permit one's own knowledge of the events of the +last eleven years to make one demand of Sun Yat-sen a similar background. +That would amount to requiring that he be a prophet. At the time when he +spoke of the excellence of Russia he had no reason to question the good +faith of the Communists who were helping him. It is conceivable that even +the Bolsheviks who were aiding and advising the Nationalists did not +realize how soon the parting of the ways would come, how much the two +ideologies differed from one another, how much each of the two parties +endangered the other's position. At the time Sun spoke, the Communists +were his allies in the struggle against imperialism; they had agreed from +the beginning that China was a country not suited to communism; and Sun +Yat-sen, relying on them not to use him in some wider policy of theirs, +had no cause to mistrust or fear them. What has happened since is history. +Sun Yat-sen can scarcely be required to have predicted it. His comments on +imperialism, therefore, must be accepted at face value in a consideration +of the nationalist program in his theories. + +The method by means of which Sun reconciled his denial of the superiority +of class to nation is an interesting one, profoundly significant as a clue +to the understanding of his thought. He estimates the population of the +world at 1500 million. Now, of this total 400 million are members of the +white race, who constitute the most powerful and prosperous people in the +modern world. "This white race regards (its 400,000,000 representatives) +as the unit which must swallow up the other, colored races. Thus the Red +tribes of America have already been exterminated.... The Yellow Asiatic +race is now oppressed by the Whites, and it is possible that it will be +exterminated before long."(257) Thus, as Sun viewed it, imperialism before +the war was racial as well as economic. The White Peril was a reality. +This emphasis on the doctrine of race shows the emphasis that Sun put upon +race once he had narrowed down the old world-society to the Chinese +race-nation. The most vigorous _Rassenpolitiker_, such as Homer Lea or +Lothrop Stoddard,(258) would approve heartily of such a system of +calculation in politics. Sun Yat-sen differed with them, as he differed +with the Marxians, and with the race-theorists in general, by not +following any one Western absolute to the bitter end, whether it was the +class war or the race struggle. + +Russia fitted into this picture of race struggle. One hundred and fifty +million Russians left the camp of the 400 million white oppressors, and +came over to the just side of the 1100 million members of oppressed +nations. Consequently the figures came out somewhat more favorably for the +oppressed, in spite of the fact that the imperialist powers were still +economically and militarily supreme. Sun Yat-sen quoted an apocryphal +remark of Lenin's: "There are in the world two categories of people; one +is composed of 1,250,000,000 men and the other of 250,000,000 men. These +1,250,000,000 men are oppressed by the 250,000,000 men. The oppressors act +against nature, and in defiance of her. We who oppose _might_ are +following her."(259) Sun regarded the Russian Revolution as a shift in the +race-struggle, in which Russia had come over to the side of the oppressed +nations. (He did, of course, refer to Germany as an oppressed nation at +another time, but did not include, so far as we can tell, the German +population in the thesis under consideration.) + +On this basis China was to join Russia in the class struggle of the +nations. The struggle was to be between the oppressed and the oppressors +among the nations, and not between the races, as it might have been had +not Russia come over to the cause of international equality.(260) After +the class struggle of the nations had been done with, the time for the +consideration of cosmopolitanism would have arrived. + +In taking class lines in a scheme of nations, Sun was reconciling the +requirements of the old ideology and the international struggle against +imperialism. It is characteristic of his deep adherence to what he +believed to be the scheme of realities in political affairs that he did +not violate his own well-knit ideology in adopting the Marxian ideology +for the anti-imperialist struggle, but sought to preserve the marvellous +unity of his own society--a society which he believed to have been the most +nearly perfect of its time. The race-interpretation of the international +class struggle is at one and the same time an assertion of the natural and +indestructible unity of Chinese society, and the recognition of the fact +that China and Russia, together with the smaller nations, had a common +cause against the great advances of modern imperialism. + + + + +Racial Nationalism and Pan-Asia. + + +The dual orientation of Sun Yat-sen's anti-imperialist programs has +already been made partly evident in the examination of this belief in a +class war of the nations. A much more nearly complete exposition of this +doctrine, although with the emphasis on its racial rather than on its +economic aspects, is to be found in the third sub-principle of the +nationalist program: the race-national aspect of the national revolution. +Each of the three principles was to contribute to this implementation of +nationalism. _Min shêng_ was to provide the foundation for economic +nationalism. Democracy was to follow and reinforce political nationalism, +which would clear away the political imperialism and let the Chinese, +inculcated with state-allegiance, really rule themselves. + +At the end of his life, even after he had delivered the sixteen lectures +on the three principles, Sun Yat-sen issued another call for the +fulfillment in action of his principle of nationalism. This, too, praised +Russia and stressed the significance of the defection of Russia from the +band of the white oppressing powers; but it is important as showing the +wider implications of Sun Yat-sen's race-national doctrines. During the +greater part of his life, Sun spoke of the Chinese race-nation alone. His +racial theory led him into no wider implications, such as the political +reality of race kinship. In this last pronouncement, he recognized the +wide sweep of consequences to which his premises of race-reality had led +him. This call was issued in his celebrated Pan-Asiatic Speech of November +28, 1924, given in Kobe, Japan.(261) + +The content of the speech is narrower than the configuration of auxiliary +doctrines which may be discussed in connection with it. These are: the +race orientation of the Chinese race-nation; the possibility of Pan-Asia; +and the necessary function of the future Chinese society as the protector +and teacher of Asia, and of the whole world. These points in his +theoretical program were still far in the future when he spoke of them, +and consequently did not receive much attention. In the light of the +developments of the last several years, and the continued references to +Sun's Pan-Asia which Japanese officials and propagandists have been +making, this part of his program requires new attention. + +The speech itself is a re-statement of the race-class war of the nations. +He points out that "It is contrary to justice and humanity that a minority +of four hundred million should oppress a majority of nine hundred +million...."(262) "The Europeans hold us Asiatics down through the power +of their material accomplishments."(263) He then goes on to stress the +necessity of emulating the material development of the West not in order +to copy the West in politics and imperialism as well, but solely for the +purpose of national defense. He praises Japan, Turkey, and the Soviet +Union as leaders of the oppressed class of nations and predicts that the +time will come when China will resume the position she once had of a great +and benevolent power. He distinguishes, however, between the position of +China in the past and Great Britain and the United States in the present. +"If we look back two thousand five hundred years, we see that China was +the most powerful people of the world. It then occupied the position which +Great Britain and the United States do today. But while Great Britain and +the United States today are only two of a series of world powers, China +was then the only world power."(264) Sun also refers to the significant +position of Turkey and Japan as the two bulwarks of Asia, and emphasizes +the strangely just position of Russia. + +In his earlier days Sun Yat-sen had been preoccupied with Chinese +problems, but not so much so as to prevent his taking a friendly interest +in the nationalist revolutions of the Koreans against the Japanese, and +the Filipinos against the Americans. This interest seems to have been a +personally political one, rather than a preliminary to a definition of +policy. He said to the Filipinos: "Let us know one another and we shall +love each other more."(265) The transformation of the ideology in China +did not necessarily lead to the development of outside affiliations. The +Confucian world-society, becoming the Chinese race-nation, was to be +independent. + +In the development of his emphasis upon race kinship on the achievement of +race-nationalism, Sun Yat-sen initiated a program which may not be without +great meaning in the furthering of the nationalist program. He showed that +the Chinese race-nation, having racial affinities with the other Asiatic +nations, was bound to them nationally in policy in two ways: racially, +and--as noted--anti-imperialistically. This theory would permit the Chinese +to be drawn into a Pan-Asiatic movement as well as into an +anti-imperialist struggle. This theory may now be used as a justification +for either alternative in the event of China's having to choose aides in +Russo-Japanese conflict. China is bound to Russia by the theory of the +class war of the nations, but could declare that Russia had merely devised +a new form for imperialism. China is bound to Japan by the common heritage +of Asiatic blood and civilization, but could declare that Japan had gone +over to the _pa tao_ side of Western imperialism, and prostituted herself +to the status of another Westernized-imperialized aggressive power. +Whatever the interpretations of this doctrine may be, it will afford the +Chinese a basis for their foreign policy based on the _San Min Chu I_. + +When Sun Yat-sen spoke, Russia and China had not fought over the Chinese +Eastern Railway and the Chinese Communist problem, nor had Japan and China +entered into the Manchurian conflict. He was therefore in no position to +see that his expressions of approval for Pan-Asianism and for pro-Soviet +foreign policy might conflict. In one breath he praised Japan as the +leader and inspirer of modern Asia, and lauded Russia as the pioneer in a +new, just policy on the part of the Western powers. He saw little hope +that the example of the Soviet Union would be followed by any other +Western power, although he did state that there was " ... in England and +America a small number of people, who defend these our ideals in harmony +with a general world movement. As far as the other barbarian nations are +concerned, there might be among them people who are inspired by the same +convictions."(266) The possibility of finding allies in the West did not +appear to be a great one to Sun Yat-sen. + +Sun did something in this speech which he had rarely hitherto done. He +generalized about the whole character of the East, and included in that +everything which the Westerners regarded as Eastern, from Turkey to Japan. +We have seen that the Chinese world of Eastern Asia had little in common +with the middle or near East. In this speech Sun accepted the Western idea +of a related Orient and speaks of Asiatic ideals of kindliness and +justice. This is most strange. "If we Asiatics struggle for the creation +of a pan-Asiatic united front, we must consider ... on what fundamental +constitution we wish to erect this united front. We must lay at the +foundations whatever has been the special peculiarity of our Eastern +culture; we must place our emphasis on moral value, on kindliness and +justice."(267) This Pan-Asian doctrine had been the topic of frequent +discussion by Japanese and Russians. The former naturally saw it as a +great resurgency of Asia under the glorious leadership of the Japanese +Throne. The Russians found pan-Asianism to be a convenient instrument in +the national and colonial struggle against imperialism for communism. + +Sun Yat-sen joined neither of these particular pan-Asiatic outlooks. The +foreign policy of the Chinese race-nation was to fight oppressors, and to +join the rest of Asia in a struggle against white imperialist domination. +But--here is the distinction--how was China to do these things? Sun Yat-sen +never urged the Chinese to accept the leadership of the Western or +Japanese states, however friendly they might be. China was to follow a +policy of friendship and coöperation with those powers which were friendly +to her and to the cause of justice throughout the world. Sun praised the +old system of Eastern Asia, by which the peripheral states stood in +vassalage to China, a vassalage which he regarded as mutually voluntary +and not imperialistic in the unpleasant sense of the word. + +In the end, he believed Chinese society should resume the duty which it +had held for so many centuries in relation to its barbarian neighbors. +China should be rightly governed and should set a constant instance of +political propriety. Sun even advocated ultimate intervention by the +Chinese, a policy of helping the weak and lifting up the fallen. He +concluded his sixth lecture on nationalism by saying: "If we want to +'govern the country rightly and pacify the world,' we must, first of all, +restore our nationalism together with our national standing, and unify the +world on the basis of the morality and peach which are proper (to us), in +order to achieve an ideal government."(268) + +We may conclude that his racial sub-principle in a program of nationalism +involved: 1) orientation of Chinese foreign policy on the basis of blood +kinship as well as on the basis of class war of the nations; 2) advocacy +of a pan-Asiatic movement; and 3) use of China's resurgence of national +power to restore the benevolent hegemony which the Chinese had exercised +over Eastern Asia, and possibly to extend it over the whole world. + + + + +The General Program of Nationalism. + + +It may be worthwhile to attempt a view of the nationalist program of Sun +Yat-sen as a whole. The variety of materials covered, and the intricate +system of cross-reference employed by Sun, make it difficult to summarize +this part of his doctrines on a simple temporal basis. The plans for the +advancement of the Chinese race-nation do not succeed each other in an +orderly pattern of future years, one stage following another. They mirror, +rather, the deep conflict of forces in the mind of Sun, and bring to the +surface of his teachings some of the almost irreconcilable attitudes and +projects which he had to put together. In the ideological part of his +doctrines we do not find such contrasts; his ideology, a readjustment of +the ideology of old China, before the impact of the new world, to +conditions developing after that impact, is fairly homogeneous and +consistent. It does not possess the rigid and iron-bound consistency +required to meet the logic of the West; but, in a country not given to the +following of absolutes, it was as stable as it needed to be. His programs +do not display the same high level of consistency. They were derived from +his ideology, but, in being derived from it, they had to conform with the +realities of the revolutionary situation in words addressed to men in that +situation. As Wittfogel has said, the contradictions of the actual +situation in China were reflected in the words of Sun Yat-sen; Marxians, +however, would suppose that these contradictions ran through the whole of +the ideology and plans. It may be found that in the old security +transmitted by Sun from the Confucian ideology to his own, there is little +contradiction; in his programs we shall find much more. + +This does not mean, of course, that Sun Yat-sen planned things which were +inherently incompatible with one another. What he did do was to advocate +courses of action which might possibly have all been carried out at the +same time, but which might much more probably present themselves as +alternatives. His ardor in the cause of revolution, and his profound +sincerity, frequently led him to over-assess the genuineness of the +cordial protestations of others; he found it possible to praise Japan, +Turkey, and the Soviet Union in the same speech, and to predict the +harmonious combination, not only of the various Asiatic nationalisms with +each other, but of all the nations of Asia with Western international +communism. The advantage, therefore, of the present treatment, which seeks +to dissever the ideology of Sun Yat-sen from his plans, may rest in large +part upon the fact that the ideology, based in the almost timeless scheme +of things in China, depended little upon the political situations of the +moment, while his plans, inextricably associated with the main currents of +the contemporary political situation, may have been invalidated as plans +by the great political changes that occurred after his death. That is not +to say, however, that his plans are no longer of importance. The Chinese +nationalists may still refer to them for suggestions as to their general +course of action, should they wish to remain orthodox to the teachings of +Sun. The plans also show how the ideology may be developed with reference +to prevailing conditions. + +Clearly, some changes in the plans will have to be made; some of the +changes which have been made are undoubtedly justified. Now that war +between the Soviet Union and Japan has ceased to be improbable, it is +difficult to think of the coördination of a pan-Asiatic crusade with a +world struggle against imperialism. Chinese nationalists, no longer on +good terms with the Japanese--and on worse terms with the Communists--must +depend upon themselves and upon their own nation much more than Sun +expected. At the time of his death in 1925 the Japanese hostility to the +Kuomintang, which became so strikingly evident at Tsinanfu in 1928-9, and +the fundamental incompatibility of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party +of China, had not manifested themselves. On the other hand, he could not +have foreseen that the imperialist nations, by no means cordial to the +Chinese Nationalists, would become as friendly to the Chinese nationalism +as they have. The United States, for instance, while not acting positively +against the political restrictions of Western imperialism (including its +own) in China, has been friendly to the Nanking government, and as far as +a rigid policy of neutrality permitted it, took the side of China against +Japan in the Manchurian conflict in and after 1931. Such developments +cannot easily be reconciled to the letter of the plans of Sun Yat-sen, +and, unless infallibility is expected of him, there is no reason why they +should. + +His plans possess an interest far more than academic. It is not the +province of this work to judge the degree to which the Nationalists +carried out the doctrines of Sun, nor to assess the relative positions of +such leaders as Chiang Chieh-shih and Wang Ching-wei with respect to +orthodoxy. The plans may be presented simply as a part of the theory of +Sun Yat-sen, and where there is possibility of disagreement, of his theory +in its final and most authoritative stage: the sixteen lectures of 1924, +and the other significant writings of the last years of his life. + +The first part of his plans for China--those dealing with the applications +of nationalism--may be more easily digested in outline form: + + + 1. The Kuomintang was to be the instrument of the revolution. + Re-formed under the influence of the Communist advisers, it had + become a powerful weapon of agitation. It was, as will be seen in + the discussion of the plans for democracy, to become a governing + system as well. Its primary purpose was to carry out the + advancement of nationalism by the elimination of the _tuchuns_ and + other anti-national groups in China, and by an application of the + three principles, one by one, of the nationalist program. + + 2. The Kuomintang should foster the ideology of nationalism and + arouse the Chinese people to the precarious position of their + country. In order to make nationalism politically effective, state + allegiance had to supplant the old personal allegiance to the + Dragon Throne, or the personal allegiance to the neo-feudal + militarists. + + 3. Nationalism should be exerted economically, to develop the + country in accord with the ideology of _min shêng_ and to clear + away imperialist economic oppression which interfered with both + nationalism and _min shêng_. + + 4. Nationalism had to be exerted politically, for two ends: + Chinese democracy, and Chinese autonomy, which Sun often spoke of + as one. This had to be done by active political resistance to + aggression and by the advancement of a China state-ized and + democratic. + + 5. Nationalism had also to be exercised politically, in another + manner: in the class war of the nations. China should fight the + racial and economic oppression of the ruling white powers, in + common with the other oppressed nations and the one benevolent + white nation (Soviet Russia). + + 6. Nationalism had to reinforce itself through its racial + kinships. China had to help her fellow Asiatic nations, in a + pan-Asia movement, and restore justice to Asia and to the world. + + +This recapitulation serves to show the curious developments of Sun +Yat-sen's nationalist program. Originally based upon his ideology, then +influenced by the race-orientation of a good deal of his political +thought, and finally reconciled to the programmatic necessities of his +Communist allies, it is surprising not in its diversity but in its +homogeneity under the circumstances. This mixture of elements, which +appears much more distinctly in Sun's own words than it does in a +rephrasing, led some Western students who dealt with Sun to believe that +his mind was a cauldron filled with a political witch-brew. If it is +remembered that the points discussed were programmatic points, which +changed with the various political developments encountered by Sun and his +followers, and not the fundamental premises of his thought and action +(which remained surprisingly constant, as far as one can judge, throughout +his life), the inner consistency of Sun Yat-sen will appear. These plans +could not have endured under any circumstances, since they were set in a +particular time. The ideology may. + +In turning from the nationalist to the democratic plans of Sun Yat-sen, we +encounter a distinct change in the type of material. Orderly and precise +instead of chaotic and near-contradictory, the democratic plans of Sun +Yat-sen present a detailed scheme of government based squarely on his +democratic ideology, and make no concessions to the politics of the +moment. Here his nationalism finds its clearest expression. The respective +autonomies of the individual, the clan, the _hsien_ and the nation are +accounted for; the nature of the democratic nationalist state becomes +clear. Programmatically, it is the clearest, and, perhaps, the soundest, +part of Sun's work. + + + + + +CHAPTER VI. THE PROGRAMS OF DEMOCRACY. + + + + +The Three Stages of Revolution. + + +Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the three stages of revolution attracted a +considerable degree of attention. By the three stages of the revolution he +meant (1) the acquisition of political power by the teachers of the new +ideology (the revolution), (2) the teaching of the new ideology +(tutelage), and (3) the practice of government by the people in accord +with the new ideology (constitutional democracy). Enough of Sun Yat-sen's +teaching concerning the new ideology has been shown to make clear that +this proposal is merely a logical extension of his doctrine of the three +classes of men. + +Western writers who have acquainted themselves with the theory seem, in +some instances, inclined to identify it with the Marxist theory of the +dictatorship of the proletariat, into which the proletarian revolution is +to be divided into three stages--the conquest of political power by the +masses; the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the inauguration (in the +remote future) of the non-governmental class-less society.(269) It +scarcely seems necessary to go so far afield to discover the origin of the +theory. As a matter of record, Sun Yat-sen made his earliest recorded +announcement of this theory in 1905, when he was not at all under the +influence of Marxism, although he was acquainted with it.(270) Finally, +the theory forms so necessary a link between his theory of Kuomintang +control of the revolution, and his equally insistent demand for ultimate +democracy, that it may be regarded as a logically necessary part of his +complete plan. The coincidence between his and the Marxian theories would +consequently appear as a tribute to his acumen; this was the view that the +Communists took when they discovered that Sun Yat-sen was afraid of the +weaknesses of immediate democracy in a country not fit for it. + +One might also observe that, once the premise of revolution for a purpose +is accepted, the three stages fit well into the scheme of age-old +traditional political thought advocated by the Confucians. Confucius did +not see the value of revolution, although he condoned it in specific +instances. He did, however, believe in tutelage and looked forward to an +age when the ideology would have so impregnated the minds of men that _ta +t'ung_ (the Confucian Utopia) would be reached, and, presumably, +government would become superfluous. That which Sun sought to achieve by +revolution--the placing of political power in the hands of the ideological +reformers (or, in the case of the Marxist theory, the proletariat, +actually the Communist party, its trustee)--Confucius sought, not by +advocating a general conspiracy of scholars for an oligarchy of the +intellectuals, but the more peaceful method of urging princes to take the +advice of scholars in government, so that the ideology could be +established (by the introduction of "correct names," _chêng ming_) and +ideological control introduced. + +The three stages of revolution may resemble Communist doctrine; they may +have been influenced by Confucian teaching; whatever their origin, they +play an extremely important part in the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, and in +the politics springing from his principles. If the Kuomintang is the +instrument of the revolution, the three stages are its process. The +clearest exposition of this theory of the three stages is found in _The +Fundamentals of National Reconstruction_, a manifesto which Sun Yat-sen +issued in 1924: + + + 3. The next element of reconstruction is democracy. To enable the + people to be competent in their knowledge of politics, the + government should undertake to train and guide them so that they + may know how to exercise their rights of election, recall, + initiative, and referendum.... + + 5. The order of reconstruction is divided into three periods, viz. + + (_a_) Period of Military Operations; + (_b_) Period of Political Tutelage; + (_c_) Period of Constitutional Government. + + 6. During the period of military operations the entire country + should be subject to military rule. To hasten the unification of + the country, the Government to be controlled by the Kuomintang + should employ military force to conquer all opposition in the + country and propagate the principles of the Party so that the + people may be enlightened. + + 7. The period of political tutelage in a province should begin and + military rule should cease as soon as order within the province is + completely restored.... + + +He then goes on to describe the method by which tutelage shall be applied, +and when it should end. It should end, Sun declares, in each _hsien_ +(district; township) as the people of the _hsien_ become self-governing, +through learning and practice in the democratic techniques. As soon as all +the _hsien_ within a province are self-governing, the provincial +government shall be released to democratic control. + + + 23. When more than one half of the provinces in the country have + reached the constitutional government stage, _i. e._ more than one + half of the provinces have local self-government full established + in all their districts, there shall be a National Congress to + decide on the adoption and promulgation of the Constitution.... + + (_Signed_) SUN WEN + + 12th day, 4th month, 13th year of the Republic (April 12, + 1924).(271) + + +Sun Yat-sen was emphatic about the necessity of a period of tutelage. The +dismal farce of the first Republic in 1912, when the inexperience and +apathy of the people, coupled with the venality of the militarists and +politicians, very nearly discredited Chinese democracy, convinced Sun +Yat-sen that effective self-government could be built up only as the +citizens became ready for it. A considerable number of the disputes +concerning the theory of self-government to be employed by the +policy-making groups of the National (Kuomintang-controlled) Government +have centered on the point of criteria for self-government. Even with the +insertion of a transition stage, and with a certain amount of tutelage, +difficulties are being encountered in the application of this theory of +the introduction of constitutional government as soon as the people in a +_hsien_ are prepared for it. Other considerations, military or political, +may make any venture beyond the secure confines of a benevolent Party +despotism dangerous; and the efficacy of tutelage can always be +questioned. The period of tutelage was set for 1930-1935; it is possible, +however, that the three stages cannot be gone through as quickly as +possible, since the Japanese invasions and the world economic depression +exercised a thoroughly disturbing influence throughout the country. + +A final point may be made with regard to the three stages of the +revolution as Sun Yat-sen planned them. Always impetuous and optimistic in +revolutionary endeavor, Sun Yat-sen expected that the military conquest +would be rapid, the period of tutelage continue a few years, and +constitutional democracy endure for ages, until in the end _ta t'ung_ +should reign upon earth. The transition period was not, as in the theory +of the Confucians and the Marxians, an indefinite period beginning with +the present and leading on down to the age of the near-perfection of +humanity. It was to Sun Yat-sen, in his more concrete plans, an interval +between the anarchy and tyranny of the warlord dictatorships and the +coming of Nationalist democracy. It was not a scheme of government in +itself. + +To recapitulate: Sun Yat-sen believed that revolution proceeded or should +proceed by three stages--the (military) revolution proper; the period of +tutelage; and the period of constitutional democracy. His theory resembles +the Communist, although it provides for a dictatorship of the patriotic +elite (Kuomintang) and not of any one class such as the proletariat; it +also resembles the Confucian with respect to the concepts of tutelage and +eventual harmony. Military conquest was to yield swiftly to tutelage; +tutelage was to lead, _hsien_ by _hsien_, into democracy. With the +establishment of democracy in more than one-half of the provinces, +constitutional government was to be inaugurated and the expedient of Party +dictatorship dispensed with. + +This theory, announced as early as 1905, Sun did not insist upon when the +first Republic was proclaimed in 1912, with the tragic results which the +history of that unfortunate experiment shows. In the experience derived +from that great enthusiasm, Sun appreciated the necessity of knowledge +before action. He was willing to defer the enjoyment of democracy until +the stability of the democratic idea in the minds of the people was such +that they could be entrusted with the familiar devices of Western +self-government. + +What kind of a democratic organization did Sun Yat-sen propose to develop +in China on the basis of his Nationalist and democratic ideology? Having +established the fundamental ideas of national unity, and the national +self-control, and having allowed for the necessity of an instrument of +revolution--the Kuomintang--and a process of revolution--the three stages, +what mechanisms of government did Sun advocate to permit the people of +China to govern themselves in accord with the Three Principles? + + + + +The Adjustment of Democracy to China. + + +It is apparent that, even with tutelage, the democratic techniques of the +West could impair the attainment of democracy in China were they applied +in an unmodified form, and without concession to the ideological and +institutional backgrounds of the Chinese. The Westerner need only +contemplate the political structure of the Roman Republic to realize how +much this modern democracy is the peculiar institution of his race, bred +in his bone and running, sacred and ancient, deep within his mind. The +particular methods of democracy, so peculiarly European, which the +modern--that is, Western or Westernized--world employs, is no less alien to +the imperial anarchy of traditional China than is the Papacy. Sun Yat-sen, +beholding the accomplishments of the West in practical matters, had few +illusions about the excellence of democratic shibboleths, such as +parliamentarism or liberty, and was profoundly concerned with effecting +the self-rule of the Chinese people without leading them into the +labyrinth of a strange and uncongenial political system. + +In advocating democracy he did not necessarily advocate the adoption of +strange devices from the West. While believing, as we have seen, in the +necessity of the self-rule of the Chinese race-nation, he by no means +desired to take over the particular parliamentary forms which the West had +developed.(272) He criticised the weakness of Western political and social +science as contrasted with the strength of Western technology: "It would +be a gross error to believe that just as we imitate the material sciences +of the foreigners, so we ought likewise to copy their politics. The +material civilization of the foreigners changes from day to day; we +attempt to imitate it, and we find it difficult to keep step with it. But +there is a vast difference between the progress of foreign politics and +the progress of material civilization; the speed of (the first) is very +slow."(273) And he said later, in speaking of the democracy of the first +Republic: "China wanted to be in line with foreign countries and to +practice democracy; accordingly she set up her representative government. +But China has not learned anything about the good sides of representative +governments in Europe and in America, and as to the bad sides of these +governments, they have increased tenfold, a hundredfold in China, even to +the point of making swine, filthy and corrupt, out of government +representatives, a thing which has not been witnessed in other countries +since the days of antiquity. This is truly a peculiar phenomenon of +representative government. Hence, China not only failed to learn well +anything from the democratic governments of other countries, but she +learned evil practices from them."(274) This farce-democracy was as bad as +no government at all. Sun Yat-sen had to reject any suggestion that China +imitate the example of some of the South American nations in borrowing the +American Constitution and proclaiming a "United States of China." The +problem was not to be solved so easily. + +In approaching Sun Yat-sen's solution the Western student must again +remember two quite important distinctions between the democracy of Sun +Yat-sen and the democracy of the West. Sun Yat-sen's principle of _min +ch'üan_ was the self-control of the whole people first, and a government +by the mass of individuals making up the people secondarily. The Chinese +social system was well enough organized to permit the question of +democracy to be a question of the nation as a whole, rather than a +question of the reconciliation of particular interests within the nation. +Special interests already found their outlet in the recognized social +patterns--so reminiscent of the institutions envisaged by the pluralists--of +the ancient order. In the second place, China was already a society which +was highly organized socially, although politically in ruins; the +democratic government that Sun Yat-sen planned had infinitely less +governing to do than did Western governments. The new Nationalist +government had to fit into rather than supplant the old order. As a +consequence of these distinctions, one may expect to find much less +emphasis on the exact methods of popular control of the government than +one would in a similar Western plan; and one must anticipate meeting the +ancient devices and offices which the usage of centuries had hallowed and +made true to the Chinese. + +One may find that democracy in China is not so radical a novelty as it +might at first thought be esteemed. A figure of speech, which somewhat +anticipates the exposition, may serve to prepare one for some of the +seeming omissions of Sun Yat-sen's plan for a democracy. The suggestion is +this: that the democracy of Sun Yat-sen is, roughly, a modernization of +the old Imperial system, with the Emperor (as the head of the academic +civil service) removed, and the majority placed in his stead. Neither in +the old system nor in the new were the minorities the object of profound +concern, for, to the Chinese, the notion of a minority (as against the +greater mass of the tradition-following people) is an odd one. The rule of +the Son of Heaven (so far as it was government at all) was to be replaced +by the rule of the whole people (_min_, which is more similar to the +German _Volk_ than the English _people_). The first Sun Yat-sen called +monarchy; the second, democracy. + +The old ideology was to yield to the new, but even the new as a review of +it has shown, was not broad enough completely to supplant the old. The +essential continuity of Chinese civilization was not to be broken. +Democracy as a Western institution could be nothing more than a sham, as +the parliaments at Peking had showed; democracy in China had to be not +only democracy, but Chinese as well. + +It is not, therefore, extraordinarily strange to find the ancient +institutions of the Empire surviving by the side of the most extreme +methods of popular government. The censorate and the referendum, the +examination system and the recall, all could work together in the +democracy planned by Sun Yat-sen. Even with the idea of popular rule +adopted in the formal Western manner, Sun Yat-sen proposed to continue the +idea of natural and ineradicable class differences between men. The +Chinese democracy was not to be any mere imitation of the West; it was to +be the fundamentally new fusion of Chinese and Western methods, and +offered as the solution for the political readjustment of the Chinese +society in a world no longer safe for it. + + + + +The Four Powers. + + +Sun Yat-sen divided all men into three categories: the geniuses, the +followers, and the unthinking. To reconcile this theory of natural +inequality with democracy, he distinguished between _ch'üan_, the right to +rule as sovereign, and _nêng_, the right to administer as an official. He +furthermore considered the state similar to a machine. How should the +unthinking, who would possess _ch'üan_, the right to rule, be granted that +right without attempting to usurp _nêng_? + +This was to be accomplished by two means. The Four Powers were to be given +to the people, in order to assure their possession of _ch'üan_. The Five +Rights were to assure that the government might be protected in its right +to _nêng_, in its right to have only the most competent officials. +Together the Four Powers and the Five Rights implement a scheme of +government so novel that Sun Yat-sen himself believed it to be a definite +contribution to political method. The learned Jesuit translator of the +_San Min Chin I_ does not even term it democracy, but neo-democracy +instead.(275) + +The Four Powers represent an almost extreme limit of popular control. Sun +Yat-sen divided the four into two groups: the first two are powers of the +people over the administrators--the power of election and the power of +recall; the second two are powers of the people over the laws--the power of +initiative and the power of referendum. Having secured the government from +undue interference, Sun Yat-sen had no reluctance in giving these powers +to the people. He said: "As for our China, since she had no old democratic +system, she ought to be able to make very good use of this most recent and +excellent invention."(276) + +These four powers are perhaps the most Western element in the whole theory +of Sun. History does not record the technique by which the Chinese chose +Yao to be their Emperor, and even where actions comparable to elections +were performed, it was not by use of the ballot-box or the voting machine, +or drilling on an appointed field. The Chinese way of getting things done +never tended that much to formality. A man who wanted to be a village head +might be quietly chosen head by a cabal of the most influential persons, +or at a meeting of many of the villagers. He might even decide to be head, +and act as head, in the hope that people would pay attention to him and +think that he was head. The Four Powers represent a distinct innovation in +Chinese politics for, apart from a few ridiculous comic-opera performances +under the first Republic, and the spurious plebiscite on the attempted +usurpation of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the voting method has been a technique +unknown in China. It is distinctly Western. + +Another distinction may be made with a certain degree of reservation and +hesitancy. It is this: the Chinese, without the elaborate system of +expedient fictions which the West terms juristic law, were and are unable +to conceive of corporate action. A law passed by the Peking parliament was +not passed by the dictator in parliament, or the people in parliament; it +was simply passed by parliament, and was parliament's responsibility. The +only kind of law that the people could pass would be one upon which they +themselves had voted. + +Seen in this light, the Four Powers assume a further significance greater +than the Western political scientist might attribute to them. In America +there is little difference between a law which the people of Oregon pass +in the legislature, and one which they pass in a referendum. To the +Chinese there is all the difference in the world. The one is an act of the +government, and not of the people; the other, the act of the people, and +not of the government. The people may have powers over the government, but +never, by the wildest swing of imagination, can they discover themselves +personified in it. A Chinese democracy is almost a dyarchy of majority and +officialdom, the one revising and checking the other. + +Sun Yat-sen did not comment on the frequency with which he expected these +powers to be exercised, nor has the political development of democratic +China gone far enough to afford any test of experience; it is consequently +impossible to state whether these powers were to be, or shall be, +exercised constantly as a matter of course, or whether they shall be +employed by the people only as courses for emergency action, when the +government arouses their displeasure. The latter seems the more probable, +in view of the background of Chinese tradition, and the strong +propensities of the Chinese to avoid getting involved in anything which +does not concern them immediately and personally. This probability is made +the more plausible by the self-corrective devices in the governmental +system, which may seem to imply that an extensive use of the popular +corrective power was not contemplated by Sun Yat-sen. + +Sun Yat-sen said: + + + Now we separate power from capacity and we say _that the people + are the engineers and the government is the machine_. On the one + hand, we want the machinery of the government to be all-powerful, + able to do anything, and on the other hand we want the engineer, + the people, to have great power so as to be able to control that + all-powerful machine. + + But what must be the mutual rights of the people and of the + government in order that they might balance? We have just + explained that. On the people's side there should be the four + rights of _election_, _recall_, _initiative_, and _referendum_. On + the government's side there must be five powers.... If the four + governing powers of the people control the five administrative + powers of the government, then we shall have _a perfect + political-democratic machine_....(277) + + + + +The Five Rights. + + +Sun Yat-sen implemented his theory of democracy by assigning Four Powers +to the people and Five Rights to the government. This latter doctrine is +one of the most disputed points in his proposal. Some writers see in it +nothing more than a crass conjunction of the theory of Montesquieu and the +practices of the Chinese Imperial system.(278) His followers are disposed +to regard the doctrine of the Five Rights as the product of intrepid +imagination, which succeeded in reconciling the traditional scheme of +Chinese things with the requirements of modern self-government. + +Sun made the point that both Chinese and Western governments had in the +past had tripartite governments. He illustrated this by a diagram:(279) + + + CONSTITUTION OF CHINA + + The Examining Power (_Kao Shih ch'üan_) + The Imperial Power (_Chun ch'üan_) + The Legislative Power + The Executive Power + The Judicial Power + The Power to Impeach (_Tan k'ê ch'üan_) + + FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONS + + The Legislative Power combined with the Power to Impeach + The Executive Power combined with the Examining Power + The Judicial Power + + +Sun Yat-sen believed that in separating the Five Rights from one another +he would make clear certain differentiations of function which had led to +numberless disputes in the past, and would present to the world a model +government. + +Thus far, the Five Rights seem the complement of the Four Powers. The two +sets of controls, of people over the government, and of the government +over the people, assure China that a neo-democratic administration will +have no less continuity and power than did its Imperial predecessor, and +nevertheless be subject to the will of the majority of the four hundred +odd million sovereigns. Contemplated in this manner, the Five Rights are +an amalgamation of the Western theory upon the Chinese, and significant as +a novelty in democratic administrative theory rather than as institutions +altering the fundamental premises and methods of democracy. + +If, however, a further step is taken, and the Five Powers are associated +with Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the three naturally unequal classes of men, +they assume a somewhat less superficial significance. If the rule of the +people is placed over the administration by the geniuses, the geniuses +must be assured a method of entering the government service. The oligarchy +of the intellectuals is to be reconciled with the dictatorship of the +majority. The old Chinese system of a trained class of scholars, entrance +to which was open on a competitive system to members of almost all classes +of society, had to be preserved in the new China, and at the same time +disciplined and purified of unworthy or unsuitable elements, while +simultaneously subject to the policy-making authority of the majority. + +The preservation of a leader class was to be assured by an examination +division in the new democratic government, and its purification and +discipline continued by a supervisory or censoring division. The +administrative setup of the nationalist democracy would appear as follows, +when the present official translations of the Chinese names for the +divisions (_Yuan_) are adopted: + + 1. The division of the executive (Executive Yuan). + 2. The division of the legislative (Legislative Yuan). + 3. The division of the judicial (Judicial Yuan). + 4. The division of censorship, impeachment and accounting (Control + Yuan). + 5. And the division of the examination system (Examination Yuan). + +It is an illustration of the further difference between the democracy of +Sun Yat-sen and Western democracy, that each of the divisions, even the +legislative, was to have a single head. The whole government was to be +departmentally, not camerally, organized. + +The system of Five Powers emphasizes the implied dyarchy of government and +people in the _San Min Chu I_ by assigning to the government itself +functions which, in the usual course of events, are supposed to be +exercised by the people themselves in Western democracies. The people are +supposed to eliminate unfit officials and decide on the merits and +trustworthiness of incumbents. By the expedient of non-reëlection, the +people are supposed to remove officials, who are incapable or unsuitable +for public office. The two functions have been taken over by the +Examination and Control Yuans, respectively; the Four Powers of the people +are not, in all probability, instruments for continual popular intrigue +and meddling in government, but almost revolutionary implements for +shifting the course or composition of the government. + +The Five Rights are instruments for the self-government of the official +class (Examination and Control), and for the government of the people by +the official class (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). The Four Powers +are the instruments for the government of the official class by the +people. Out of the checks and balances of government and people the +integrity, efficacy, and stability of Sun Yat-sen's democracy was to be +assured. + +The exercise of the Four Rights of the people could, in the theory of Sun +Yat-sen, be used to check the development of an arrogant, inefficient or +irresponsible bureaucracy, in that the people would assist in the +selection of officials and would be able to remove incompetents at any +time. The civil service mechanism of the government would, on the other +hand, resist the too free play of popular caprice. No incompetent person +would be elected to office, since the civil service would extend even to +elective offices. The voters could remove a bad official but they could +not replace him with an untrained person; they would have to select their +candidate from the roster of scholar-officials eligible for the rank of +the office in question. The people were to supervise the operations of the +age-old Chinese civil service, as revivified by the nationalists; they +were to appoint and remove officers, to repeal and enact laws; but in no +case were they to tear down the structure of the civil service and +inaugurate a spoils democracy such as that found in the United States. +This blending of extreme democracy and traditional administrative +hierarchy would result, said Sun Yat-sen, in perfect government. + +The democratic nationalist government was to supersede the Empire. In +between there was no central government, since the various military +leaders paid scant respect to the unfortunate clique of diplomats and +officials who carried on the few functions left to the powerless Peking +government.(280) The new government was not, therefore, so much a new +political order to be set up in place of the old as a political order to +be built up out of military chaos. The social system, although shaken and +affected by Western ideas, continued much as usual, and was to be woven +into the new socio-political patterns that Sun Yat-sen projected. + +The Nationalist government was to be the nation's answer to the foreign +aggression. The White Peril, which had flooded Asia, could only be held +back by the dykes of a militant nationalist movement, expressing itself in +a formal state such as the Westerners themselves had developed, and which +fitted them to undertake the conquest of the world. This government was to +be the agent of the whole Chinese people who, casting off the oppression +of the militarists and the imperialists, was to rise again with its +ancient power, formidable and ready to fight if necessary, more ready to +bring about world-coöperation and peace if possible. It was to be a +government made up of a trained officialdom such as ancient China had +possessed for centuries, which had led to the integration of control and +culture (in the narrowest sense of the word), and of a people ruling by +checking that officialdom: an all-powerful state-machine ruled by an +all-powerful people.(281) A state was to appear in the world of states and +enclose the Chinese people, by political power, more effectively than +could the Great Wall. + +This aspect of democracy, the self-rule of the Chinese society _vis-à-vis_ +the linked despotism of militarists, renegades and imperialists, was, +although the most important facet of democracy, not the whole story. In +order to systematize the loose democracy of old China, in order to lead +all force to the top, where it could be exerted outwards, the democratic +plan had to plan links with the traditional system. The government could +not be democratic if it were not tied to the people. The people could not +govern themselves, as apart from governing the officialdom making up the +National government, unless they had mechanisms with which to do so. +Although the family, the _hui_ and the _hsien_ provided self-government, +this self-government had to be associated with the scheme of nationalist +and national self-government in order to guarantee the latter's +effectiveness. Beyond or beneath the national democracy of China there was +to be a system of democracy (the politicalization, as it were, of the old +social organs) running through society. What these separate or subordinate +organs were to be, what relations they were to have with the national +government, and what other intermediate institutions were to facilitate +those relations must be studied to gain a complete picture of the +democracy of Sun Yat-sen. + + + + +Confederacy Versus Centralism. + + +One of the most involved questions in the political thought of the Chinese +revolution has been the problem of provincial autonomy. The Chinese +provinces differ considerably more from one another in economic +conditions, language and race than do the American states; it has been +said that one of the causes of the overthrow of the Manchu monarchy was +the encroachment of the Imperial central power, in its last desperate +attempts to modernize itself and cope with the last crisis, upon the old +autonomy of the provinces.(282) Institutionally, the provinces were +relatively independent; this degree of independence was, however, +minimized by the general unimportance of government in Chinese society. +The Chinese, toward each other, feel conscious of family, village and +provincial ties; face to face with the foreigners, they are beginning to +know themselves as Chinese. Until the wave of nationalism swept the +country, provincial rivalry was a live issue; even today, it cannot be +called forgotten. + +Sun Yat-sen's opinions on many points of government remained stable +through his life. The fundamental ideas and ideals seem to have been +expanded, rather than changed, as his theory met the test of his growing +experience and the lessons of the revolution; but even with expansion, +they remain, for the most part, consistent. Sun Yat-sen was steadfast in +his beliefs. + +This cannot be said of his and his successors' opinions on the problem of +province versus nation. There is no one doctrine dealing with the question +of provincial autonomy. There may be a trend, however, which can be +described as a swing from definite emphasis upon the province toward +neglect of that unit of administration. This trend may be illustrated by +several points. + +At the time of the first Republic the provinces were treated much as are +states in the United States. The members of the Senate of the Republic +(_Ts'an Yi Yuan_) were to be elected by the Assemblies of the provinces, +and, when representing persons not under the jurisdiction of a provincial +Assembly, by Electoral Colleges. The House of Representatives was to be +elected directly by the people, in the proportion of one member to each +eight hundred thousand of population, with the reservation--again in +propitiation of provincial vanity--that no province should have less than +ten representatives.(283) The first Republic was distinctly federal +although by no means confederate. + +Sun Yat-sen did not immediately shift from this position. As late as +1919-1922, when he was preparing his official biography, he spoke +enthusiastically to his biographer of the potentialities of democratic +provincial home rule.(284) He still believed in the importance of the +provinces as units of a future democracy in China. + +From the time that Sun went South, and the Kuomintang was reorganized, to +the present, the tendency in the Sun-Kuomintang theory seems to have been +toward minimization of the importance of the provinces in the democracy to +be set up. The Party Declaration of the Kuomintang at its First National +Convention in 1924 in Canton criticised several political viewpoints +prevalent; among these was that of the Confederalists, so called. The +Declaration states, in part: "Undoubtedly regional self-government is in +entire accord with the spirit of democracy and is a great need of our +nation. But a true regional self-government can be realized only when our +national independence is won, for without national freedom, local freedom +is impossible.... Many social, economic and political problems facing the +individual provinces can be solved only by the nation as a whole. So the +success of the peoples' revolution is a prerequisite to the realization of +provincial autonomy."(285) + +Sun Yat-sen himself stated, a few months earlier, a point of view which +may seem inconsistent with the Party Declaration: + + + 18. The _Hsien_ is the unit of self-government. The province links + up and provides means of co-operation between the Central + Government and the local governments of the districts.(286) + + +Whatever the occasion for the slight difference of opinion, it has been +the policy of the Kuomintang to emphasize _hsien_ rather than provinces as +units of self-government. The Party itself is quite centralized. The +Resumé of the Kuomintang Third National Congress Resolutions Concerning +Political Matters, adopted March 27, 1929, states unequivocally: "The +traditional policy of attaching greater importance to provincial +government than to _Hsien_ or district government must be corrected or +even reversed." It adds, "The provincial government, on the other hand, +shall act only as a supervisor of local self-government, standing in +between the _Hsien_ or district government on the one hand, and the +Central Government on the other."(287) + +The province is thus reduced to the lowest possible level. It is not +probable that this tendency was influenced by Marxism, but it certainly +resembled the Marxian idea of a vast confederation of self-governing +communes, acting, by some proletarian metempsychosis, as a highly +centralized instrument of revolution.(288) The doctrine of the +_hsien_-province-nation relationship which places emphasis upon the first +and the last is the authoritative one, and is quite harmonious with the +earlier picture of Imperial China which, apart from the strictly +governmental, was a vast confederacy of largely autonomous communities. In +the picture of the new democratic national government which emerges from +this doctrine, the central government may be regarded as a centralism +versus the provinces, and a super-government in relation to the _hsien_; +that is, while the people govern themselves as groups in the _hsien_, they +will govern themselves as one people in the National Government. The +province will remain as a convenient intermediary between the two. + +This is one of the few doctrines of Sun Yat-sen upon which no one +definitive and final pronouncement is to be found and concerning which, +consequently, recourse must be had to the history of the development of +the Sun Yat-sen political philosophy. + + + + +The _Hsien_ in a Democracy. + + +The _hsien_, or district, was one of the most important social +institutions in old China. The lowest official, the _hsien_ Magistrate, +represented the Empire to the people of the _hsien_, while within the +villages or the _hsien_ the people enjoyed a very high degree of autonomy. +The _hsien_ was the meeting point of the political system and the +extra-legal government, generally of a very vaguely organized nature, by +which the Chinese managed their own affairs in accord with tradition. An +estimate of the position of the _hsien_ may be gleaned from the fact that +China has approximately four hundred eighty million inhabitants; apart +from the cities and towns, there are about half a million villages; and +the whole country, with the exception of certain Special Municipalities, +such as Shanghai, is divided into nineteen hundred and forty-three +_hsien_.(289) + +The _hsien_, however significant they may be in the social system of +China, both past and present, cannot be described in a work such as this. +It is not inappropriate, however, to reiterate that they form what is +perhaps the most important grouping within China, and that much of Chinese +life is centred in _hsien_ affairs. It is by reason of _hsien_ autonomy +that the Chinese social system has been so elastic as to permit the shocks +of invasion, insurrection, conquest, famine and flood to pass through and +over China without disrupting Chinese social organization. + +Sun once quoted the old Chinese proverb about the Lu Shan (mountains): "We +cannot find the real shape of the Lu Shan--for we ourselves are on it." +From the viewpoint of the Western reader this proverb could be turned +against Sun in his treatment of the _hsien_. He was passionately emphatic +in discussing the importance of the _hsien_ with his foreign friends;(290) +in his writings, addressed to his countrymen, he, as they, simply assumed +the importance of the _hsien_ without troubling to make any cardinal point +of it. + +The _hsien_ is in the unit of the most direct self-government of the +people, without the interference of any elaborate set-up from officialdom. +Apart from its age-old importance, it will gain further significance in +the democracy of Sun Yat-sen. + +Some of the functions to be assigned to the people in a _hsien_ are +assessment, registration, taxation, and/or purchase of all lands in the +_hsien_; the collection of all unearned increment on lands within the +_hsien_; land profits to be subjected to collection by the _hsien_, and +disbursement for public improvements, charitable work, or other public +service. Add this to the fact that the _hsien_ have been the chief +agencies for police, health, charity, religious activity and the +regulative control of custom--sometimes with the assistance of +persons--through the centuries, and the great importance of the _hsien_ in +the nationalist democracy becomes more clear. + + + + +The Family System. + + +Sun Yat-sen's democracy differs further from the parliamentary, mechanical +democracy of the West in that it incorporates the family system.(291) Of +course Sun understood the extraordinary part that the family plays in +China--a part more conspicuous, perhaps, than in any other country. He +pointed out that the family required in China much of the loyalty which in +the West is given to the state. "Among the Chinese people the family and +kinship ties are very strong. Not infrequently the people sacrifice their +lives and homes for some affair of kinship; for instance, in Kuangtung, +two clans may fight regardless of life and property. On the other hand, +our people hesitate to sacrifice themselves for a national cause. The +spirit of unity has not extended beyond the family and clan +relationships."(292) + +Speaking of the early Emperors and the revolution, he said: "You see, +gentlemen, the methodology of Yao, like that of ours, was to begin his +moral and political teachings with the family, then the nation-group, then +the world."(293) How did Sun Yat-sen propose to join the strength of the +family spirit and of nationalism, to the common advantage? + +He planned to reorganize the already existing clan organizations in each +district. These organizations have existed from time immemorial for the +purposes of preserving clan unity, commemorating clan ancestry, performing +charitable functions, and acting as a focus--although this last was not an +avowed purpose--for clan defense. The reorganization which Sun proposed +would probably have involved some systematizing of the organization for +the purposes of uniformity and official record, as well as effectiveness. + +Once the district headquarters were reorganized, they could be combined +throughout a province into a provincial clan organization. Such +organizations already exist, but they are neither systematic nor general. +After the clan was organized on a provincial basis throughout the +provinces, the various provincial organizations could be gathered together +in a national clan organization. + +It is only when one contemplates the strength of the family system in +China that the boldness of this plan becomes apparent. A series of vast +national clan organizations would include practically every Chinese. Not +content with this, Sun proposed inter-clan organizations, certain clans +being more related to one another. A further series of national inter-clan +organizations would draw together the allegiance of numberless +individuals. There was always the possibility that a convention of all the +clans might be called--although Sun was not sanguine about this last.(294) + +This methodology, according to Sun Yat-sen, would automatically bring +about nationalism. The Chinese people were already vigorously attached to +their families and clans. A union of all the families and clans would lead +the Chinese to realize that they were one people--one enormous family, as +it were--and cause them to join together as a nation. Since there are only +about four hundred surnames in China, the alliance of the clans was not so +far-fetched a suggestion as it might seem. Some clans have a membership +running into the millions, and clan spirit is so great that, in spite of +the absence of legislation, the Chinese marriage system is still largely +exogamic on this clan basis. + +The suggestion of clan organization is relevant to Sun Yat-sen's +democracy, in that the clan was one of the democratizing influences in old +China. An individual who failed to exert appreciable pressure on the +government, or on some other group, might appeal to his clan for +assistance. The Chinese record of relationships was kept so extensively +that there were few men of wealth or power who did not have their kinsmen +commanding their assistance. The non-political authority of the family +system controlled many things which have been within the scope of the +police power in the West, and the adjustments of society and the +individual were frequently mitigated in their harshness by the entrance of +the clan upon the scene. A stable Chinese democracy with a clan system +would be remarkably like the traditional system. The recourse of political +democracy would have been added, but the familiar methods of political +pressure upwards through the clan to the government might, not +inconceivably, prove the more efficacious. + + + + + +CHAPTER VII. THE PROGRAMS OF _MIN SHÊNG_. + + + + +The Three Programs of _Min Shêng_. + + +The new ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as has been shown, demanded three +fulfilments of the doctrine of _min shêng_: a nationalistic economic +revolution, a deliberate industrial revolution, and a social revolution. +The last was to be accomplished negatively rather than positively. It was +to aim at the reconstruction of the Chinese economy in such a manner as to +avoid the necessity of class war. Since Chinese society was to be +revolutionized by the development of a nation and a state, with all that +that implied, and was to be changed by a transition from a handicraft +economy to an industrial one, Sun Yat-sen hoped that these changes would +permit the social revolution to develop at the same time as the others, +and did not plan for it separately and distinctly. The three revolutions, +all of them economic, were to develop simultaneously, and all together +were to form a third of the process of readjustment. + +In considering the actual plans for carrying out the _min shêng_ +principle, the student encounters difficulties. The general philosophical +position of the _min shêng_ ideology in relation to the ideologies of +nationalism and democracy, and in connection with such foreign +philosophies as capitalism and Marxism, has already been set forth. The +direct plans that Sun Yat-sen had for the industrial revolution in China +are also clear, since he outlined them, laboriously although tentatively, +in _The International Development of China_;(295) but whereas the ideology +and the actual physical blueprints can be understood clearly enough, the +general lines of practical governmental policy with regard to economic +matters have not been formulated in such a way as to make them +indisputable. + +Sun Yat-sen was averse to tying the hands of his followers and successors +with respect to economic policy. He said: "While there are many +undertakings which can be conducted by the State with advantage, others +cannot be conducted effectively except under competition. I have no +hard-and-fast dogma. Much must be left to the lessons of experience."(296) + +It would be inexpedient to go into details about railway lines and other +modern industrial enterprises by means of which Sun sought to modernize +China. On the other hand, it would be a waste of time merely to repeat the +main economic theses of the new ideology. Accordingly, the examination of +the program of _min shêng_ will be restricted to the consideration of +those features that affected the state, either directly or indirectly, or +which had an important bearing upon the proposed future social +organization of the Chinese. Among the topics to be discussed are the +political nature of the national economic revolution, the political effect +of the industrial revolution upon the Chinese, and the expediency of Sun's +plans for that revolution; the nature of the social revolution which was +to accompany these two first, especially with reference to the problem of +land, the problem of capital, and the problem of the class struggle; the +sphere of state action in the new economy; and the nature of that ideal +economy which would be realized when the Chinese should have carried to +completion the programs of _min shêng_. Railway maps and other designs of +Sun, which have proved such an inspiration in the modernization of China +and which represent a pioneer attempt in state planning, will have to be +left to the consideration of the economists and the geographers.(297) + +The program of _min shêng_ was vitally important to the realization of the +Nationalist revolution as a whole, so important, indeed, that Sun Yat-sen +put it first in one of his plans: + + + The first step in reconstruction is to promote the economic + well-being of the people by providing for their four necessities + of life, namely, food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. For + this purpose, the Government will, with the people's co-operation, + develop agriculture to give the people an adequate food supply, + promote textile industries to solve their clothing problem, + institute gigantic housing schemes to provide for them decent + living quarters, and build roads and canals so that they may have + convenient means of travel. + + Next is the promotion of democracy.... + + The third step is the development of nationalism....(298) + + +The plans for realizing _min shêng_ were to be the most necessary and the +most difficult. In the change from a world-society to a race-nation, the +Chinese had their own social solidarity and the experience of the Western +nations to guide them. There was little in the development of a nation +that had not already been tried elsewhere. The only real obstacles were +the ignorance of the people, in relation to the new social environment in +which their whole society was involved, and the possibility of opposition +from the politically oppressing powers. + +In the development of democracy the Chinese could rely in part upon the +experience of the West. The Kuomintang could observe the machinery of +democratic states in regular operation abroad. Although the new democracy +of the five powers and the four rights was differed from the democratic +methods of the West, still, as in mechanics, certain fundamental rules of +political organization in its technical details could be relied upon. The +Chinese people had a democratic background in the autonomy of the various +extra-political units. + +In _min shêng_ neither the experience of the West nor the old Chinese +background would be of much value. More than the other two principles and +programs, _min shêng_ sought to alter the constitution and nature of +Chinese society. Yet in _min shêng_ the Chinese were to be guided only +negatively by Western experience. Into their society, passing through a +great economic upheaval, they must introduce, by a trial-and-error method, +the requirements for economic unity, efficiency, and justice. + + + + +The National Economic Revolution. + + +After the pitiable failure of the 1912 Republic, Sun Yat-sen began to +place an especially heavy emphasis on the necessity of a national economic +revolution which would carry on the achievements of the national political +revolution. He placed an even greater stress upon the necessity of _min +shêng_ in the revolutionary ideology, and became more and more clearly +conscious of the danger imperialism constituted to the Chinese +race-nation. He believed that, as the 1912 revolution had been created by +the sword, the new economic revolution might be furthered by the pen, and +with this in mind he wrote _The International Development of China_. At +the time that he wrote this work, he seems to have been convinced of the +fruitlessness of purely military effort, and the superior value of pacific +economic organization.(299) + +This organization was to be effected through capital brought in from the +outside. As it developed that capital would not come in, that instead of +continuing the terrific pace of production which the World War had +demanded, the nations returned to comparative laissez faire, and let their +economies slump, Sun was persuaded that the whole revolution would have to +be carried on by the Chinese themselves, with the possible help of the +Communist Russians, and of Japan. He found the reorganized Kuomintang to +be the instrument of this last revolution, both politically and +democratically, and began to emphasize Chinese resistance to the outside, +rather than appeal for help from the barbarian nations. + +It is this last attitude which one finds expressed in the acts of the last +years of his life. The national revolution was to be made a reality by +being intimately associated with the economic life and development of the +country. The plans made for economic development should be pushed as far +as possible without waiting for foreign help. The Chinese should use the +instrument of the boycott as a sanction with which to give weight to their +national policy.(300) They had to practise economic nationalism in order +to rid themselves of the incubus of imperialism which was sucking the +life-blood of their country. In this connection between nationalism and +_min shêng_, the economic aspect of the nationalist program was to be the +means, and the national aspect of the _min shêng_ program the consequence. +Unless Chinese, both as members of a state and as individuals stirred by +national sentiment, were moved to action against Western economic +aggression, they might consider themselves already doomed. + +How did Sun propose to promote the national economic revolution,(301) as +distinguished from the industrial revolution and the social revolution? He +gave, in the first place, as earlier stated, the economic part of his +theories a greater weight than they had hitherto enjoyed, and placed them +first in his practical program. Secondly, he tended to associate the +national political revolution more and more with the real seat of economic +power: the working class. In this introduction of the working class into +the labors for the fulfilment of _min shêng_ as a national economic +revolution, he was doing two things. He was hoping to bring the standards +of Chinese labor up to those of the West, and he was making use of the +political power of labor in China as an added instrument of the national +economic revolution. + +The Chinese nation could and should not continue, as a nation, on a scale +of living lower than that of the Western nations. He urged the Chinese +workers, as the class most affected, to fight for the economic advancement +of themselves and of their nation. "Comrades, the people meeting here are +all workers and represent a part of the nation. A great responsibility +rests on Chinese labor, and if you are equal to the task, China will +become a great nation and you a mighty working class."(302) The Chinese +workers were performing not only a duty that they owed to themselves--they +were also acting patriotically. + +In advancing the national economic revolution by advancing themselves, +they could not afford to lose sight of the political part of the +revolution. "Beyond the economic struggle for the shortening of the +working day and the increase of wages, there are before you other much +more important questions of a political character. For our political +objectives you must follow the three principles and support the +revolution."(303) The two parts of the revolution could not be separated +from one another. + +Besides the economic part of the national revolution, there was another +readjustment of which Sun did not often speak, because it was not an open +problem which could be served by immediate political action. This was the +problem of the transition of China from an autarchic to a trading economy. +The old Chinese world had been self-sustaining, so self-sustaining that +the Emperor Tao Kuang wrote to George III of England that he did not +desire anything that the barbarians might have, but, out of the mercy and +the bounty of his heart, would permit them to come to China in order to +purchase the excellent things that the Chinese possessed in such +abundance.(304) The impact of the West had had serious economic +consequences,(305) and the Chinese were in the unpleasant position of +having their old economic system disrupted without gaining the advantages +of a nationally organized economy in return. They had the actual privilege +of consuming a greater variety of goods than before, but this was offset +by the fact that the presence of these goods threw their domestic markets +and old native commercial system out of balance, without offering a +correspondingly large potentiality of foreign export. Furthermore, the +political position of the Western powers in China was such, as Sun Yat-sen +complained, that trade was conducted on a somewhat inequitable basis. + +The consequences of a national economic revolution could not but be +far-reaching. The political changes in the economic situation demanded by +Sun Yat-sen in his program of economic nationalism--the return of tariff +autonomy, the retrocession of the occupied concessions, etc.--would have a +great positive and immediate effect; but there would be a long system of +development, not to be so easily predicted or foreseen, which would +inevitably appear as a result of Chinese nationhood. If China were to have +a state strong enough to perform the economic functions which Sun wished +to have imposed upon it, and were to take her place as one of the great +importing and exporting nations of the world, it is obvious that a real +economic revolution would have to be gone through. + +Here again the liberal-national character of Sun's ideology and programs +with respect to relations with the West appears. The Fascist states of the +present time exhibit a definite drift from free trade to autarchy. In +China the change from an autarchic world-society to a trading nation +constituted the reverse. Sun Yat-sen did not leave a large legacy of +programs in this connection, but he foresaw the development and was much +concerned about it. + + + + +The Industrial Revolution. + + +The program of industrial revolution was planned by Sun Yat-sen with great +care. The same belief which led him to urge the social revolution also +guided him in his plans for the industrial revolutionizing of the Chinese +economy, namely, his belief that China could profit by the example of the +West, that what the West had done wastefully and circuitously could be +done by the Chinese deliberately and straightforwardly. He proposed that +the change from the old economy to the new be according to a well thought +out plan. "However, China must develop her industries by all means. Shall +we follow the old path of western civilization? This old path resembles +the sea route of Columbus' first trip to America. He set out from Europe +by a southwesterly direction through the Canary Islands to San Salvador, +in the Bahama group. But nowadays navigators take a different direction to +America and find that the destination can be reached by a distance many +times shorter. The path of Western civilization was an unknown one and +those who went before groped in the dark as Columbus did on his first +voyage to America. As a late comer, China can greatly profit in covering +the space by following the direction already charted by western +pioneers."(306) By calling in the help of friends who were familiar with +engineering and by using his own very extensive knowledge of Chinese +economic potentialities, Sun Yat-sen drafted a broad long-range plan by +means of which China would be able to set forth on such a charted course +in her industrial revolution. This plan, offered tentatively, was called +_The International Development of China_ in the English and _The Outline +of Material Reconstruction_ in the Chinese version, both of which Sun +himself wrote. + +This outline was originally prepared as a vast plan which could be +financed by the great powers, who would thereby find markets for their +glut of goods left over by the war. The loan was to be made on terms not +unprofitable to the financial powers, but nevertheless equitable to the +Chinese. Sun Yat-sen hoped that with these funds the Chinese state could +make a venture into state socialism. It was possible, in his opinion, to +launch a coöperative modern economy in China with the assistance of +international capitalism, if the capital employed were to be remunerated +with attractive rates of interest, and if the plan were so designed as to +allow for its being financially worthwhile. He stated: + + + Before entering into the details of this International development + scheme four principles have to be considered: + + 1. The most remunerative field must be selected in order to + attract foreign capital. + 2. The most urgent needs of the nation must be met. + 3. The lines of least resistance must be followed. + 4. The most suitable positions must be chosen.(307) + + +He was not oblivious to the necessity of making each detail of his plan +one which would not involve the tying-up of unproductive capital, and did +not propose to use capital advanced for the purposes of the industrial +revolution for the sake of military or political advantage. + +This may be shown in a concrete instance. He spoke of his Great +Northeastern railway system as a scheme which might not seem economically +attractive, and then pointed out that, as between a railway system running +between densely-populated areas, the latter would be infinitely the more +preferable. But, said he, "... a railway between a densely populated +country and a sparsely settled country will pay far better than one that +runs end to end in a densely populated land."(308) + +Even though he came to despair of having this scheme for the development +of China carried out by international financial action, the expediency of +his plans remained. He sought the fulfillment of this outline throughout +his life; it has remained as a part of his legacy, challenging the Chinese +people by the grandeur of its conception and the precision of its details. + +It is a work which cannot easily be summarized in a discussion of +political doctrines. Fully comparable in grandeur to the Russian +_Piatiletka_, it provides for a complete communication system including +all types of transport, the development of great ports, colonization and +reclamation projects, and the growth of vast industrial areas comparable +to the Donbas or the Kuzbas. The plan, while sound as a whole and not +inexpedient in detail, is not marked by that irregularity of proportion +which marks planning under capitalism; although not as fully worked out as +the later Russian projects, Sun's plan, in 1922, was considerably more +advanced than any Russian plan of that time. Sun shared with Lenin a +passionate conviction of the inevitable necessity of industrialization; +but while Lenin saw in industrialism the strengthening of that +revolutionary bulwark, the proletariat, Sun believed in industrialism as a +benefit to the whole nation. + +This plan is the obvious fruit of Sun's advocacy of the adoption of the +Western physical sciences. Here there is little trace of his ideological +consistency with the old premises of Chinese society. He does not +challenge them, but he does present a concrete plan which refers only +incidentally to the political or the ideological. It is heavy with the +details of industrial revolution. Sun Yat-sen's enthusiasm shows clearly +through the pages of this work; he wrote it at a time when his health was +still comparatively good, and when he was not harassed by the almost +explosive dynamics of the situation such as that in which he delivered the +sixteen lectures on the _San Min Chu I_. Here the practical aspects of his +thinking show forth, his willingness to consider and debate, the profound +and quiet enthusiasm for concrete projects which animated him and which +was so infectious among his followers. + +It were, of course, unfeasable to attempt any detailed description and +assessment of the plan.(309) The great amount of point by point +elaboration worked over by Sun Yat-sen in order to make his plan appealing +precludes the consideration of any one project in detail as a sample. +Failing this, the magnitude of the plan may be gauged by a recapitulation +of the chief points in each of his programs. It must be remembered, +however, that each one of these subheads might necessitate hundreds of +millions of dollars for execution, involving the building of several +industrial cities or the reconstruction of a whole industry throughout the +country. The printing industry, for example, not even mentioned in the +general outline given below, was discussed as follows: + + + This industry provides man with intellectual food. It is a + necessity of modern society, without which mankind cannot + progress. All human activities are recorded, and all human + knowledge is stored in printing. It is a great factor of + civilization. The progress and civilization of different nations + of the world are measured largely by the quantity of printed + matter they turned out annually. China, though the nation that + invented printing, is very backward in the development of its + printing industry. In our international Development Scheme, the + printing industry must also be given a place. If China is + developed industrially according to the lines which I suggested, + the demand for printed matter will be exceedingly great. In order + to meet this demand efficiently, a system of large printing houses + must be established in all large cities in the country, to + undertake printing of all kinds, from newspapers to encyclopedia + [sic!]. The best modern books on various subjects in different + countries should be translated into Chinese and published in cheap + edition form for the general public in China. All the publishing + houses should be organized under one common management, so as to + secure the best economic results. + + In order to make printed matter cheap, other subsidiary industries + must be developed at the same time. The most important of these is + the paper industry. At present all the paper used by newspapers in + China is imported. And the demand for paper is increasing every + day. China has plenty of raw materials for making paper, such as + the vast virgin forests of the northwestern part of the country, + and the wild reeds of the Yangtze and its neighboring swamps which + would furnish the best pulps. So, large plants for manufacturing + paper should be put up in suitable locations. Besides the paper + factories, ink factories, type foundries, printing machine + factories, etc., should be established under a central management + to produce everything that is needed in the printing + industry.(310) + + +With this comment on printing as a small sample of the extent of each +minor project in the plans, let us observe Sun's own summary: + +I. + The Development of a Communications System. + + (a) + 100,000 miles of Railways. + (b) + 1,000,000 miles of Macadam Roads. + (c) + Improvement of Existing Canals. + + (1) + Hangchow-Tientsin Canals. + (2) + Sikiang-Yangtze Canals. + + (d) + Construction of New Canals. + + (1) + Liaoho-Sunghwakiang Canal. + (2) + Others to be projected. + + (e) + River Conservancy. + + (1) + To regulate the Embankments and Channel of the Yangtze + River from Hankow to the Sea thus facilitating + Ocean-going ships to reach that Port at all seasons. + (2) + To regulate the Hoangho Embankments and Channel to + prevent floods. + (3) + To regulate the Sikiang. + (4) + To regulate the Hwaiho. + (5) + To regulate various other rivers. + + (f) + The Construction of more Telegraph Lines and Telephones and + Wireless Systems all over the Country. + +II. + The Development of Commercial Harbors. + + (a) + Three largest Ocean Ports with future capacity equalling New + York Harbor to be constructed in North, Central and South + China. + (b) + Various small Commercial and Fishing Harbors to be constructed + along the Coast. + (c) + Commercial Docks to be constructed along all navigable rivers. + +III. + Modern Cities with public utilities to be constructed in all Railway + Centers, Termini, and alongside Harbors. +IV. + Water Power Development. +V. + Iron and Steel Works and Cement Works on the largest scale in order + to supply the above needs. +VI. + Mineral Development. +VII. + Agricultural Development. +VIII. + Irrigational Work on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang. +IX. + Reforestation in Central and North China. +X. + Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and + Thibet.(311) + +The industrial revolution is to _min shêng_ what the present program of +socialist construction is to the Marxians of the Soviet Union, what +prosperity is to American democracy. Without industrialization _min shêng_ +must remain an academic theory. Sun's program gives a definite physical +gauge by means of which the success of his followers can be told, and the +extent of China's progress estimated. It provides a material foundation to +the social and political changes in China. + +The theory of Sun Yat-sen in connection with the continuation of the old +system is a significant one. His political doctrines, both ideological and +programmatic, are original and not without great meaning in the +development of an adequate and just state system in modern China. But this +work might have been done, although perhaps not as well, by other leaders. +The significance of Sun in his own lifetime lay in his deliberate +championing of the cause of industrial revolution as the _sine qua non_ of +development in China. In the epoch of the first Republic he relinquished +the Presidency in favor of Yüan Shih-k'ai in order to be able to devote +his whole time to the advancement of the railway program of the Republic. +In the years that he had to spend in exile, he constantly studied and +preached the necessity of modernizing China. Of his slogan, "Modernization +without Westernization!" modernization is the industrial revolution, and +non-Westernization the rest of his programs and ideology. The unity of Sun +Yat-sen's doctrines is apparent; they are inseparable; but if one part +were to be plucked forth as his greatest contribution to the working +politics of his own time, it might conceivably be his activities and plans +for the industrial revolution. + +He spoke feelingly and bitterly of the miserable lives which the vast +majority of his countrymen had to lead, of the expensiveness and +insecurity of their material existences, of the vast, tragic waste of +human effort in the form of man-power in a world where machine-power had +rendered muscular work unnecessary. "This miserable condition among the +Chinese proletariat [he apparently means the whole working class] is due +to the non-development of the country, the crude methods of production, +and the wastefulness of labor. The radical cure for all this is industrial +development by foreign capital and experts for the benefit of the whole +nation.... If foreign capital cannot be gotten, we will have to get at +least their experts and inventors to make for us our own +machinery...."(312) Howsoever the work was to be done, it had to be done. +In bringing China into the modern world, in modernizing her economy, in +assuring the justice of the new economy which was to emerge, Sun found the +key in the physical advancement of China, in the building of vast railway +systems, in creating ports "with future capacity equalling New York +harbor," in re-making the whole face of Eastern Asia as a better home for +his beloved race-nation. + + + + +The Social Revolution. + + +In considering the social revolution which was to form the third part of +the program of _min shêng_, four questions appear, each requiring +examination. It is in this field of Sun's programs that the terms of the +Western ideology are most relevant, since the ideological distinctions to +be found in old China as contrasted with the West do not apply so +positively in problems that are to appear in a society which is to be +industrially modern. Even in this, however, some of the old Chinese ideas +may continue in use and give relevance to the terms with which Sun +discusses the social revolution. Private property, that mysterious +relation between an individual and certain goods and services, has been +almost a fetish in the West; the Chinese, already subject to the +collectivisms of the family, the village and the _hui_, does not have the +deep attachment to this notion that Westerners--especially those who do +have property--are apt to develop. Consequently, even though the discussion +of Sun's programs with regard to distributive justice are remarkably like +the discussions of the same problem to be found in the West, the +possibility, at least, of certain minor though thoroughgoing differences +must be allowed for, and not overlooked altogether. The four aspects to +this problem which one may distinguish in Sun's program for _min shêng_ +are: what is to be the sphere of state action? what is to be the treatment +accorded private ownership of land? what is to be the position of private +capital? and, what of the class struggle? + +Sun Yat-sen said: "In modern civilization, the material essentials of life +are five, namely: food, clothing, shelter, means of locomotion, and the +printed page."(313) At other times he may have made slightly different +arrangements of these fundamental necessities, but the essential content +of the demands remained the same. + +Behind his demand for a program to carry out _min shêng_ there was the +fundamental belief that a government which does not assure and promote the +material welfare of the masses of its citizens does not deserve to exist. +To him the problem of livelihood, the concrete aspect of _min shêng_, was +one which had to be faced by every government, and was a means of judging +the righteousness of a government. He could not tolerate a state which did +not assure the people a fair subsistence. There was no political or +ethical value higher than life itself. A government which did not see that +its subjects were fed, sheltered, clothed, transported, and lettered to +the degree which the economic level of its time permitted, was a +government deserving of destruction. Sun Yat-sen was not a doctrinaire on +the subject of classes; he would tolerate inequality, so long as it could +be shown not to militate against the welfare of the people. He was +completely intolerant of any government, Eastern or Western, which +permitted its subjects to starve or to be degraded into a nightmare +existence of semi-starvation. Whatever the means, this end of popular +livelihood, of a reasonable minimum on the scale of living for each and +every citizen, had to prevail above all others.(314) + +Within the limits of this supreme criterion, Sun Yat-sen left the +government to its own choice in the matter of the sphere of state action. +If the system of private initiative could develop more efficiently than +could the government in certain fields, then leave those fields to private +effort. If and when private initiative failed to meet rigid requirements +to be established by the government it was not merely the privilege, it +was the obligation of the government to intervene. Sun Yat-sen seems to +have believed that government action would in the long run be desirable +anyhow, but to have been enough of a political realist at the same time to +be willing to allow the government a considerable length of time in +expanding its activities. In a developing country like China it seemed to +him probable that the ends of _ming shêng_ could best be served in many +fields by private enterprise. "All matters that can be and are better +carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which +should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws...."(315) + +From the outset, Sun Yat-sen's plan of empirical collectivism demanded a +fairly broad range of state action. "All matters that cannot be taken up +by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should +be taken up as national undertakings."(316) This view of his may be +traced, among others, to three suppositions he entertained concerning +Bismarck, concerning "war socialism," and concerning the industrial +revolution in China. Sun shows a certain grudging admiration for Bismarck, +whom he believed to have offset the rising tide of democratic socialism in +Germany by introducing state socialism, in government control of +railroads, etc. "By this preventive method he imperceptibly did away with +the controversial issues, and since the people had no reason to fight, a +social revolution was naturally averted. This was the very great +anti-democratic move of Bismarck."(317) Secondly, he believed that the +"... unification and nationalization of all the industries, which I might +call the Second Industrial Revolution ..." on account of the world war +would be even more significant than the first.(318) It intensified the +four elements of recent economic progress, which tended to prove the +falsity of the Marxian predictions of the future of capitalism, namely: +"a. Social and industrial improvements (i. e. labor and welfare +legislation); b. State ownership of the means of transportation and of +communication; c. Direct taxes; d. Socialized distribution (the +coöperative movement)."(319) Finally, Sun believed that the magnitude of +the Chinese industrial revolution was such that no private capital could +establish its foundations, and that the state had perforce to initiate the +great undertakings of industrialism. + +Concerning Sun's beliefs regarding the sphere of state action in economic +matters, one may say that his ideology of empirical collectivism required +a program calling for: 1) the protection of private enterprise and the +simultaneous launching of great state enterprises at the beginning; 2) the +intermediate pursuance of a policy by means of which the state would be +the guarantor of the livelihood of the people, and establish the sphere of +its own action according to whether or not private enterprise was +sufficient to meet the needs of the people; and 3) a long range trend +toward complete collectivism. + +With respect to the question of land, Sun Yat-sen believed in his own +version of the "single tax," which was not, in his programs, the single +tax, since he foresaw other sources of revenue for the state (tariffs, +revenue from state enterprises, etc.). According to the land-control +system of Sun Yat-sen the land-owner would himself assess the value of his +land. He would be prevented from over-assessing it by his own desire to +avoid paying too high a tax; and under-assessment would be avoided by a +provision that the state could at any time purchase the land at the price +set by the owner. If the land were to go up in value the owner would have +to pay the difference between the amount which he formerly assessed and +the amount which he believed it to be worth at the later time. The money +so paid would become "... a public fund as a reward, to all those who had +improved the community and who had advanced industry and commerce around +the land. The proposal that all future increment shall be given to the +community is the 'equalization of land ownership' advocated by the +Kuomintang; it is the _Min-sheng_ Principle. This form of the _Min-sheng_ +Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang support +the _San Min_ Principles they should not oppose communism." Continuing +directly, Sun makes clear the nature of the empirical collectivism of his +_min shêng_ program, which he calls communism. "The great aim of the +Principle of Livelihood in our Three Principles is communism--a share in +property by all. But the communism which we propose is a communism of the +future, not of the present. This communism of the future is a very just +proposal, and those who have had property in the past will not suffer at +all by it. It is a very different thing from what is called in the West +'nationalization of property,' confiscation for the government's use of +private property which the people already possess."(320) Sun Yat-sen +declared that the solution to the land problem would be half of the +solution of the problem of _min shêng_.(321) + +Sun Yat-sen believed in the restriction of private capital in such a way +as to assure its not becoming a socially disruptive force. That is a part +of his ideology which we have already examined. In the matter of an actual +program, he believed in the use of "harnessed capital."(322) He had no +real fear of capital; imperialist foreign capital was one thing--the small +native capital another. The former was a political enemy. The latter was +not formidable. In a speech on Red Labor Day, 1924, when his sympathies +were about as far Left as they ever were, in consideration for the +kindliness of the Communist assistance to Canton, he said: "Chinese +capitalists are not so strong that they could oppress the Chinese +workers,"(323) and added that, the struggle being one with imperialism, +the destruction of the Chinese capitalists would not solve the question. + +The restriction of private capital to the point of keeping it harmless, +and thus avoiding the evils which would lead to the class war and a +violent social revolution, was only half the story of capitalism in China +which Sun Yat-sen wanted told in history. The other half was the +advancement of the industrial revolution by the state, which was the only +instrumentality capable of doing this great work. "China cannot be +compared to foreign countries. It is not sufficient (for her) to impose +restrictions upon capital. Foreign countries are rich, while China is +poor.... For that reason China must not only restrict private capital, but +she must also develop the capital of the State."(324) The restrictions to +be placed upon private capital and upon private land speculation were +negative; the development of state-owned capital and of capital which the +state could trust politically were positive, as was the revenue which +should be gained from the governmental seizure of unearned increment. In +some cases the state would not even have to trouble itself to confiscate +the unearned increment; it could itself develop the land and profit by its +rise in value, applying the funds thus derived to the paying-off of +foreign loans or some socially constructive enterprise.(325) + +Ideologically, Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the intra-national class war. +Class war could, nevertheless, be justified in the programs of Sun in two +ways: 1) if it were international class war, of the oppressed against the +oppressing nations; and 2) if it were the class war of the nationalist +Chinese workers against foreign imperialism. In these two cases Sun +Yat-sen thought class-war a good idea. He did not think class war +necessary in contemporary China, and hoped, by means of _min shêng_, to +develop an economy so healthy that the pathological phenomena of the class +struggle would never appear. On the other hand, in justice to Sun, and to +those Marxians who would apologize for him to their fellow-Marxians, there +can be little doubt that Sun Yat-sen would have approved of the class war, +even in China, if he had thought that Chinese capitalism had risen to such +power that it obstructed the way of the Chinese nation to freedom and +economic health. Even in this he might not have set any particular virtue +upon the proletariat as such; the capitalists would be the enemies of the +nation, and it would be the whole nation which would have to dispose of +them. + +A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun Yat-sen's programs +for _min shêng_ is intellectually unremunerative, since it has been +established that _min shêng_ may be called empirical collectivism; +collectivism which is empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it +loses its empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of +historical materialism, and following the traditionally Chinese pragmatic +way of thinking, could not orient his revolution in a world of economic +predestinations. With the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather +than on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China were ruled by +the right sort of men, his programs would be carried through in accordance +with the expediency of the moment. He does not appear to have considered, +as do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary +movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy persons. Even had he +foreseen such a possible state of affairs, he would not, in all +probability, have settled his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the +most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it is in China to +pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. The first Republic had +taught him that. + +One must consequently regard the programs of national economic revolution, +of industrial revolution, and of social revolution as tentative and +general outlines of the course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang +and state to follow in carrying out _min shêng_. Of these programs, the +one least likely to be affected by political or personal changes was that +of the industrial revolution, and it is this which is most detailed.(326) +His great desire was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to +subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so that it could +restore the ancient morality and wisdom of China, as well as become +proficient in the Western sciences. + +A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs of Sun Yat-sen, +before consideration of the Utopia which lay at the end of the road of +_min shêng_. His plans may continue to go on in _min shêng_ because they +are so empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by the new +situation in world politics. His optimism concerning the rapidity of +democratic developments may not be justified by actual developments. The +programs of _min shêng_ are so general that they can be followed to some +degree by governments of almost any orientation along the Right-Left +scale. The really important criterion in the programs of _min shêng_ is +this: the people must live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a +great force in the continued development of his programs, to the last +stage of _min shêng_. + + + + +The Utopia of _Min Shêng_. + + +Sun Yat-sen differs from the empirical collectivists of the West in that +he has an end to his program, which is to be achieved over a considerable +period of time. The means are such that he can be classified with those +Western thinkers; his goal is one which he took from the ideals in the old +ideology and which he identified with those of the communists, although +not necessarily with the Marxists. He said, at the end of his second +lecture on _min shêng_: + + + Our way is community of industrial and social profits. We cannot + say, then, that the doctrine of _min shêng_ is different from + communism. The _San Min Chu I_ means a government "of the people, + by the people, and for the people"--that is, the state is the + common property of all the people, its politics are participated + in by all, and its profits are shared by all. Then there will be + not only communism in property, but communism in everything else. + Such will be the ultimate end of _min shêng_, a state which + Confucius calls _ta t'ung_ or the age of "great similarity."(327) + + +Perhaps no other passage from the works of Sun Yat-sen in relation to _min +shêng_ could illustrate his position so aptly. He describes his doctrine. +He labels it "communism," although, as we have seen, it is quite another +thing than Marxism. He cites Lincoln. In the end he calls upon the +authority of Confucius. + +To a Westerner, the ideal commonwealth of Sun Yat-sen bears a remarkable +resemblance to the world projected in the ideals of the ancient Chinese. +Here again there is "great similarity," complete ideological harmony, and +the presumable disappearance of state and law. Property, the fount of war, +has been set aside, and men--animated by a profound and sincere +appreciation of _jên_--work together, all for the common good. The Chinese +will, in this Utopia, have struck down _might_ from the high places of the +world, and inaugurated an era of _the kingly way_ throughout the earth. +Their ancient doctrines of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in +bringing about cosmospolitanism. + +There are, however, differences from the old order of ideals. According to +the Marxists, nationality, after it has served its purpose as an +instrument in the long class struggle, may be set aside. Speculation of +this sort is rare among them, however, and it is difficult to envision +their final system. To Sun Yat-sen, however, there was the definite ideal +that the Chinese live on forever. This was an obligation imposed upon him +and his ideology by the teleological element in the old ideology which +required that humanity be immortal in the flesh and that it be immortal +through clearly traceable lines of descent. The individual was settled in +a genealogical web, reaching through time and space, which gave him a +sense of certainty that otherwise he might lack. This is inconsistent with +the Marxian ideal, where the family system, a relic of brutal days, shall +have vanished. + +The physical immortality of the Chinese race was not the only sort of +immortality Sun Yat-sen wished China to have. His stress on the peculiar +virtues of the Chinese intellectual culture has been noted. The Chinese +literati had sought an immortality of integrity and intellect, a +continuity of civilization without which mere physical survival might seem +brutish. In the teleology of Sun's ideal society, there would no doubt be +these two factors: filial piety, emphasizing the survival of the flesh; +and _jên_, emphasizing the continuity of wisdom and honor. Neither could +aptly continue unless China remained Chinese, unless the particular +virtues of the Chinese were brought once again to their full potency.(328) + +The family system was to continue to the _min shêng_ Utopia. So too were +the three natural orders of men. Sun Yat-sen never advocated that the +false inequality of the present world be thrown down for the purpose of +putting in its place a false equality which made no distinction between +the geniuses, the apostles, and the unthinking. The Chinese world was to +be Chinese to the end of time. In this the narrowness of Sun Yat-sen's +ideals is apparent; it is, perhaps, a narrowness which limits his +aspirations and gives them strength. + +The Chinese Utopia which was to be at the end of _min shêng_ was to be +established in a world, moreover, which might not have made a complete +return to ideological control, in which the state might still survive. The +requirements of an industrial economy certainly presupposes an enormous +length of time before the ideology and the society shall have been +completely adjusted to the peculiarities of life in a world not only of +working men but of working machines. The state must continue until all men +are disciplined to labor: "When all these vagrants will be done away with +and when all will contribute to production, then clothing will be abundant +and food sufficient; families will enjoy prosperity, and individuals will +be satisfied. + +"Then the question of the 'people's life' will be solved."(329) + +Thus Sun Yat-sen concluded his last lecture on _min shêng_. + + + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY. + + +The bibliography of works in Western languages dealing with Sun Yat-sen is +short. The author has made no attempt to gather various fugitive pieces, +such as newspaper clippings. He believes, however, that the following +bibliography of Western works on Sun is the most nearly complete which has +yet appeared, and has listed, for the sake of completeness, two Russian +items as yet unavailable in the United States. + +The first half of the bibliography presents these Western materials, +arranged according to their subject. Within each category, the individual +items are presented in chronological order; this has been done in order to +make clear the position of the works in point of time of publication--a +factor occasionally of some importance in the study of these materials. + +The second half of the bibliography lists further works which have been +referred to or cited. The first group of these consists of a small +collection of some of the more important Chinese editions of, and Chinese +and Japanese treatises upon, Sun Yat-sen's writings. The second group +represents various Western works on China or on political science which +have been of assistance to the author in this study. + +Chinese names have been left in their natural order, with the patronymic +first. Where Chinese names have been Westernized and inverted, they have +been returned to their original Chinese order, but with a comma inserted +to indicate the change. + + + + +A. Major Sources on Sun Yat-sen Which are Available in Western Languages. + + + +I. Biographies of Sun Yat-sen. + + + Ponce, Mariano, _Sun Yat-sen, El fundador de la Republica de + China_, Manila, 1912. + + +A popular biography. Valuable for the period just before 1912. + + + Cantlie, James and Sheridan-Jones, C., _Sun Yat-sen and the + Awakening of China_, New York, 1912. + + +Also a popular work. Valuable for the description of Sun Yat-sen's +education. + + + Linebarger, Paul (and Sun Yat-sen), _Sun Yat-sen and The Chinese + Republic_, New York, 1925. + + +The only biography authorized by Sun Yat-sen, who wrote parts of it +himself. A propaganda work, it presents the most complete record of Sun's +early life. Does not go beyond 1922. + + + Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., _Sun' Iat-Sen--otets kitaiskoe + revoliutsii_, Moscow, 1925. The same, Moscow, 1926. + + +Not available. + + + Lee, Edward Bing-shuey, _Dr. Sun Yat-sen, His Life and + Achievements_ (English and French), Nanking, n. d. + + +A synopsis, by a spokesman for the Nationalist Party. + + + Wou, Saofong, _Sun Yat-sen, Sa Vie et Sa Doctrine_, Paris, 1929. + + +An excellent outline, largely from Chinese sources. + + + Restarick, Henry Bond, _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China_, New + Haven, 1931. + + +Useful for a description of Sun Yat-sen's life in Honolulu, and of some of +his overseas connections. + + + ---- (R.-Ch. Duval, translator), _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator de la + Chine_, Paris, 1932. + + de Morant, George Soulie, _Soun Iat-sènn_, Paris, 1932. + + +A romantic work based upon Chinese sources, and the Chinese translation of +Linebarger's work. + + + Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor), _The Gospel of + Sun Chung-shan_, Paris, 1932. + + Sharman, (Mrs.) Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning, A + Criticall Biography_, New York, 1934. + + +The most complete biography of Sun Yat-sen. Well documented and prepared. +Mrs. Sharman's work will remain authoritative for many years to come. Its +main fault is its somewhat hyper-sensitive criticism of Sun Yat-sen's +personality, with which the author never comes in contact. + + + Linebarger, Paul, _The Life of Sun Chung-san_, Shanghai, 1932. + Fragmentary proofsheets. See note in Preface. + + Reissig, Paul, _Sun Yat Sen und die Kuomintang_, Berlin, n. d. A + Lutheran missionary tract. + + + +II. Translations of the Sixteen Lectures on the _San Min Chu I_. + + + Anonymous, _The Three Principles_, Shanghai 1927. + + +Of no value. + + + Tsan Wan, _Die Drei Nationalen Grundlehren, Die Grundlehren von + dem Volkstum_, Berlin, 1927. + + +A translation of the lectures on Nationalism; excellent as far as it goes. + + + d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J. (translator and editor); _Le Triple + Demisme de Suen Wen_, Shanghai, 1929. + + +The only annotated translation. The style is simple and direct, and the +notes accurate, for the most part, and informative. The uninitiated reader +must make allowances for Father d'Elia's religious viewpoints. This is +probably the most useful translation. + + + Price, Frank W. (translator), Chen, L. T. (editor); _San Min Chu + I, The Three Principles of the People_, Shanghai, 1930. + + +The translation most widely known and quoted. + + + d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, + Wuchang, 1931. + + +A translation of the French version. + + + Hsü, Leonard Shihlien; _Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social + Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933. + + +The most complete selection of the documents of Sun Yat-senism available +in English. Dr. Hsü has assembled his materials remarkably well. His +chapter "The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism" is the best of its kind in +English. + + + +III. Other Translations of the Chinese Works of Sun Yat-sen. + + + Anonymous; _Zapiski kitaiskogo revoliutsionera_, Moscow, 1926. + + +Not available. + + + ---- _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d. + + +Not documented and apparently unreliable. English version of the above. + + + Wittfogel, Karl; _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen + Revolutionärs_, Vienna and Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927). + + +The most complete Marxist critique, containing also an excellent short +biography. + + + Tsan Wan; _30 Jahre Chinesische Revolution_, Berlin, 1927. + + +An excellent translation of one of the short autobiographies of Sun +Yat-sen. + + + Wei Yung (translator); _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_, + Shanghai, 1931. + + +Also referred to as _The Outline of Psychological Reconstruction_. It +comprises a series of popular essays discussing the problems involved in +modernization of the Chinese outlook, and presenting Sun Yat-sen's theory +of knowledge versus action. + + + +IV. Works in English by Sun Yat-sen. + + + Sun Yat-sen; _Kidnapped in London_, Bristol, 1897. + + +Sun Yat-sen's first book in English. Expresses his Christian, modernist, +anti-Manchu attitude of the time. + + + ---- _How China was Made a Republic_, Shanghai, 1919. + + +A short autobiography of Sun Yat-sen; see note in Preface. + + + ---- _The International Development of China_, New York and London, + 1929. + + +Sun Yat-sen's bold project for the industrialization of China. First +proposed in 1919, the work calls for a coördinated effort of world +capitalism and Chinese nationalism for the modernization of China. Also +called the _Outline of Material Reconstruction_. + + + +V. Commentaries on the Principles of Sun Yat-sen. + + + Li Ti tsun; _The Politico-Economic Theories of Sun Yat-sen_. + + +This work has not been published, but portions of it appeared in the +_Chinese Students' Monthly_, XXIV, New York, 1928-1929, as follows: "The +Life of Sun Yat-sen," no. 1, p. 14, November, 1928; "The Theoretical +System of Dr. Sun Yat-sen," no. 2, p. 92, December 1928, and no. 3, p. +130, January 1929; and "The Sunyatsenian Principle of Livelihood," no. 5, +p. 219, March 1929. It is most regrettable that the whole work could not +be published as a unit, for Li's work is extensive in scope and uses the +major Chinese and foreign sources quite skilfully. + + + Tai Chi-tao (Richard Wilhelm, translator); _Die Geistigen + Grundlagen des Sunyatsenismus_, Berlin, 1931. + + +An informative commentary on the ethical system of Sun Yat-sen. Tai +Chi-tao is an eminent Party leader. + + + Antonov, K.: _Sun'iatsenizm i kitaiskaia revoliutsiia_, Moscow, + 1931. + + +Not available to the author. + + + William, Maurice; _Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism_, Baltimore, 1932. + + +A presentation, by the author of _The Social Interpretation of History_, +of the influence which that work had on Sun; useful only in this +connection. + + + Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor); _Conversations + With Sun Yat-sen_, 1919-1922. + + +For comment on this and the following manuscript, see Preface. + + + Linebarger, Paul; _A Commentary on the San Min Chu I_. Four + volumes, unpublished, 1933. + + Tsui, Shu-Chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon + Sun Yat-sen's political Philosophy_, in _The Chinese Social and + Political Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934. + + +A dissertation presented to Harvard University. Dr. Tsui covers the ground +very thoroughly; his conclusions challenge the general belief that the +Communists influenced Sun Yat-sen's philosophy. Ranks with the works of +Tai Chi-tao, Hsü Shih-lien, and Father d'Elia as an aid to the +understanding of the Three Principles. + + + Jair Hung: _Les Idées Économiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934. + + +A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Toulouse, treating, +chiefly, the programmatic parts of the principle of _min shêng_. + + + Tsiang Kuen; _Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme + de Sun Yat Sen_, Paris, 1933. + + +A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Paris, which deals with +the institutional and historical background of min sheng. + + + Li Chao-wei; _La souveraineté nationale d'après la doctrine + politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934. + + +A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Dijon, concerning the +four popular powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum. + + + + +B. Chinese Sources and Further Western Works Used as Auxiliary Sources. + + + +I. Chinese and Japanese Works by or Concerning Sun Yat-sen. + + + Anonymous; _Tsung-li Fêng An Shih Lu (A True Record of the + Obsequies of the Leader)_, Nanking, n. d. + + Bai-ko-nan (Mei Sung-nan); _San-min-shu-gi To Kai-kyu To-so (The + San Min Chu I and the Struggle between Capitalism and Labor)_, + Tokyo, 1929. + + Chung Kung-jên; _San Min Chu I Li Lun Ti Lien Chiu (A Study of the + Theory of the San Min Chu I)_, Shanghai, 1931. + + Huang Huan-wên; _Sun Wên Chu I Chen Ch'üan (The Real + Interpretation of the Principles of Sun Wên)_, Nanking, 1933. + + Lin Pai-k'ê (Linebarger, Paul M. W.), Hsü Chih-jên (translator); + _Sun I-hsien Chüan Chi (The Life of Sun Yat-sen)_, 4th ed., + Shanghai, 1927. + + +The Chinese translator has appended an excellent chronology of Sun's life. + + + Sun Fu-hao; _San Min Chu I Piao Chieh (An Elementary Explanation + of the Sun Min Chu I)_, Shanghai, 1933. + + Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, ed.; _Tsung-li Ch'üan Chi (The Complete + Works of the Leader)_, 4 vol. in 1; 2nd ed., Shanghai, 1930. + + +The best collection, but by no means complete. + + + Sun Yat-sen; _Sun Chung-shan Yen Chiang Chi (A Collection of the + Lectures of Sun Chung-shan)_, 3rd ed., Shanghai, 1927. + + Sun Yat-sen; _Tsung-li Yü Mo (The Posthumous Papers of the + Leader)_, Nanking, n. d. + + Têng Hsi; _Chung Shan Jên Shêng Shih Hsia Tan Yüan, (An Inquiry + into the Origin of Chung Shan's Philosophy of Life)_, Shanghai, + 1933. + + Tsao Kê-jen; _Sun Chung Shan Hsien-shêng Ching Chi Hsüeh Shê (The + Economic Theory of Mr. Sun Chung-shan)_, Nanking, 1935. + + + +II. Works on China or the Revolution. + + + Amann, Gustav; _Sun Yatsens Vermächtnis_, Berlin, 1928. + + Bland, J. O. and Backhouse, E.; _China Under the Empress Dowager_, + Philadelphia, 1910. + + Beresford, Lord Charles; _The Break-up of China_, London, 1899. + + Bonnard, Abel; _En Chine (1920-1921)_, Paris, 1924. + + Burgess, J. S.; _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928. + + Buxton, L. H. Dudley; _China, The Land and the People_, Oxford, + 1929. + + Chen Tsung-hsi, Wang An-tsiang, and Wang I-ting; _General Chiang + Kai-shek: The Builder of New China_, Shanghai, 1929. + + _Chinese Social and Political Science Review, The_, Peking + (Peiping), 1916-. The foremost journal of its kind in the Far + East. + + _China Today_, New York, 1934-. Communist Monthly. + + _China Weekly Review, The_, Shanghai, 1917-. + + The leading English-language weekly in China, Liberal in outlook. + + _China Year Book, The_, Shanghai, 1919-? + + +A necessary reference work for government personnel, trade statistics, and +chronology. Perhaps inferior to the corresponding volumes in other +countries. + + + Close, Upton, _pseud._ (Hall, Josef Washington); _Challenge: + Behind the Face of Japan_, New York, 1934. + + ----; _Eminent Asians_, New York, 1929. + + Coker, Francis; _Recent Political Thought_, New York, 1934. + + Creel, H. G.; Sinism, _A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese + World-view_, Chicago, 1929. + + Cressey, George Babcock; _China's Geographic Foundations_, New + York, 1934. + + de Groot, J. J. M.; _Religion in China_, New York and London, + 1912. + + Djang, Chu (Chang Tso); _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins + University doctoral dissertation, 1935. + + Douglas, Sir Robert K.; _Europe and the Far East 1506-1912_, New + York, 1913. + + Ellis, Henry; _Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to + China..._, Philadelphia, 1818. + + _Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences_, New York, 1930-. + + +Articles on "Kuomintang" and "Sun Yat-sen." + + + Erdberg, Oskar; _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932. + + Erkes, Eduard; _Chinesische Literatur_, Breslau, 1922. + + Foreign Office of Japan, The (?); _The Present Condition of + China_, Tokyo (?), 1932. + + +No author nor place of publication is given in this work, which presents a +description of those features of Chinese political and economic life that +might be construed as excusing Japanese intervention. + + + _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, The, New York, + 1934. + + Goodnow, Frank Johnson; _China: An Analysis_, Baltimore, 1926. + + Granet, Marcel; _Chinese Civilization_, New York, 1930. + + Harvey, E. D.; _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933. + + Holcombe, Arthur N.; _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge + (Massachusetts), 1930. + + ----; _The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution_, New York, 1930. + + Hsia Ching-lin; Chow, James L. E.; and Chang, Yukon (translators); + _The Civil Code of The Republic of China_, Shanghai, 1930. + + Hsieh, Pao Chao; _The Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore, + 1925. + + Hsü, Leonard Shih-lien; _The Political Philosophy of + Confucianism_, New York, 1932. + + Hsü, Pao-chien; _Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian Thought_, + Dissertation, Columbia University, n. d. + + +Suggests the position of Sun Yat-sen in the history of Chinese philosophy. + + + Hu Shih; and Lin Yu-tang; _China's Own Critics_, Peiping, 1931. + + Isaacs, Harold (editor); _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_, + Shanghai, 1931. + + Johnston, Reginald; _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, London, + 1934. + + Koo, V. K. Wellington; _Memoranda Presented to the Lytton + Commission_, New York, n. d. + + Kotenev, Anatol M.; _New Lamps for Old_, Shanghai, 1931. + + Kulp, D. H.; _Family Life in South China: The Sociology of + Familism_, New York, 1925. + + Latourette, Kenneth; _The Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New + York, 1934. + + Lea, Homer; _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909. + + Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; _History of Chinese Political Thought_, New York + and London, 1930. + + Li Chi; _The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge + (Massachusetts), 1928. + + Lin Yutang; _My Country and My People_, New York, 1936. + + Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth; _Deutschlands Gegenwärtige + Gelegenheiten in China_, Brussels, 1936. + + Lou Kan-jou; _Histoire Sociale de l'Epoque Tcheou_, Paris, 1935. + + MacNair, Harley Farnsworth; _China in Revolution_, Chicago, 1931. + + ----; _Modern Chinese History--Selected Readings_, Shanghai, 1923. + + Mänchen-Helfen, Otto; _China_, Dresden, 1931. + + Maybon, Albert; _La Politique Chinoise_, Paris, 1908. + + +Sun Yat-sen presented a copy of this book to Judge Linebarger, and +enthusiastically recommended it. + + + Maybon, Albert; _La Republique Chinoise_, Paris, 1914. + + Mayers, William Frederick; _The Chinese Government, A Manual of + Chinese Titles, Categorically Explained and Arranged, with an + Appendix_, Shanghai, 1897. + + McGovern, William Montgomery; _Modern Japan, Its Political, + Military, and Industrial Organization_, London, 1920. + + Myron, Paul, pseud. (Linebarger, Paul M. W.); _Our Chinese Chances + Through Europe's War_, Chicago, 1915. + + Meadows, Thomas Taylor; _The Chinese and Their Rebellions_, + London, 1856. + + +One of the permanently outstanding books on China; dealing primarily with +the T'ai P'ing rebellion, it presents an extraordinarily keen analysis of +the politics of the old Chinese social system. + + + Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A.; _The Meaning of Meaning_, New + York and London, 1927. + + +It is largely upon this work that the present author has sought to base +his technique of ideological analysis. + + + Peffer, Nathaniel; _The Collapse of a Civilization_, New York, + 1930. + + Price, Ernest Batson; _The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 + Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia_, Baltimore, 1933. + + +Pages 1-13 present stimulating suggestions as to the nature of "China." + + + Reichwein, Adolf; _China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic + Contacts in the Eighteenth Century_, New York, 1925. + + Roffe, Jean; _La Chine Nationaliste 1912-1930_, Paris, 1931. + + Roy, Manabendra Nath; _Revolution und Konterrevolution in China_, + Berlin, 1930. + + Ruffé, R. d'Auxion de; _Is China Mad?_ Shanghai, 1928. + + +The author, violently hostile to Sun Yat-sen, presents some details of +Sun's life not published elsewhere. + + + Smith, Arthur; _Village Life in China_, New York, 1899. + + Sheean, Vincent; _Personal History_, New York, 1935. + + Shryock, John Knight; _The Origin and Development of the State + Cult of Confucius_, New York, 1932. + + Starr, Frederick; _Confucianism_, New York, 1930. + + Stoddard, Lothrop; _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World + Supremacy_, New York, 1930. + + T'ang Leang-li; _The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution_, New + York, 1930. + + ----; _Wang ching-wei_, Peiping, 1931. + + Tawney, Richard Henry; _Land and Labour in China_, London, 1932. + + Thomas, Elbert Duncan; _Chinese Political Thought_, New York, + 1927. + + Treat, Payson J.; _The Far East_, New York and London, 1928. + + Trotsky, Leon; _Problems of the Chinese Revolution_, New York, + 1932. + + Tyau Min-ch'ien T. Z.; _Two Years of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, + 1930. + + van Dorn, Harold Archer; _Twenty Years of The Chinese Republic_, + New York, 1932. + + Vinacke, Harold Monk; _Modern Constitutional Development in + China_, Princeton, 1920. + + Wang Ch'ing-wei et al.; _The Chinese National Revolution_, + Peiping, 1930. + + Weale, E. L. Putnam, _pseud._ (Simpson, Bertram Lennox); _The + Vanished Empire_, London, 1926. + + Weber, Max; _Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie_, + Tübingen, 1922. + + Wieger, Leon, S. J.; _Chine Moderne_, 10 volumes, Hsien-hsien, + 1921-32. + + +An enormous scrapbook of translations from the Chinese illustrating +political and religious trends. Catholic point of view. + + + ----; _Textes Historiques: Histoire Politique de la Chine_, + Hsien-hsien, 1929. + + ---- and Davrout, L., S. J.; _Chinese Characters_, Hsien-hsien, + 1927. + + Wilhelm, Richard (Danton, G. H. and Danton, A. P., translators); + _Confucius and Confucianism_, New York, 1931. + + ----; _Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie_, Breslau, 1929. + + ----; _Ostasien, Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises_, + Potsdam and Zürich, 1928. + + +Perhaps the best of all works introductory to Chinese civilization. + + + Williams, S. Wells; _The Middle Kingdom_, New York, 1895. + + ----; _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language_, Tungchou, + 1909. + + Wu Ch'ao-ch'u, _The Nationalist Program for China_, New Haven, + 1930. + + Wu Kuo-cheng; _Ancient Chinese Political Theories_, Shanghai, + 1928. + + Ziah, C. F.; _Philosophie Politique de la Chine Ancienne (700-221 + AV. J.-C.)_, Paris, 1934. + + + + + +CHINESE-ENGLISH GLOSSARY. + + +The author has not sought to prepare a lexicon of modern Chinese political +terms. He presents, however, a list of those Chinese words which have +frequently been left untranslated in the text, together with the +ideographs by which they are written in China, and brief definitions. +Variant meanings, however significant, have been omitted. Peculiar +definitions, to be found only in the present work, have been enclosed in +brackets. To locate the phrases, and discussions of them, consult the +index. + + {~UNKNOWN~} _chêng_; right; rectified + {~UNKNOWN~} _chu_; used as a compound with _i_, below, to make _chu-i_: + principle, -ism + {~UNKNOWN~} _ch'üan_; power + {~UNKNOWN~} _hui_; society; guild + {~UNKNOWN~} _hsien_; district (a political subdivision) + {~UNKNOWN~} _i_; propriety + {~UNKNOWN~} _jên_; humanity; fellow-feeling; benevolence, etc. [consciousness + of social orientation] + {~UNKNOWN~} _li_; rites; ceremonies [ideological conformity] + {~UNKNOWN~} _min_; people; _Volk_ + {~UNKNOWN~} _ming_; name [terminology, or, a part of ideology] + {~UNKNOWN~} _nêng_; capacity + {~UNKNOWN~} _pa_; violence; violent; tyrant; tyrannous + {~UNKNOWN~} _san_; three + {~UNKNOWN~} _shêng_; life; regeneration; livelihood + {~UNKNOWN~} _ta_; great + {~UNKNOWN~} _tao_; path; way; principle + {~UNKNOWN~} _têh_; virtue + {~UNKNOWN~} _tsu_; unity; kinship + {~UNKNOWN~} _t'ung_; harmony; concord + {~UNKNOWN~} _wang_; king; kingly + {~UNKNOWN~} _yüeh_; rhythm + + + + + +INDEX. + + +PROPER NAMES AND SPECIAL TERMS + +America (_see also_ United States), 62, 220 + +American Indians, 124 + +Anglo-Saxons, 62 + +Annam, 127 + +Austria, 62 + +Beresford, Lord Charles, 187 + +Bismarck, 254 ff. + +Bolsheviks (_see_ Russians, Marxian philosophy) + +Borodin, 5, 7, 161 + +Boxer Rebellion, 78 + +British Empire, 71, 199 + +Burgess, J. S., 41.. + +Cantlie, Sir James, 84 + +Canton, 7, 66, 126, 233 + +Catherine I of Russia, 243 + +Catholic Church, 54n., 122 + +Chang Tso (Djang Chu), 186n. + +Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, 6 + +Chen, Eugene, 159n. + +Chêng, state of, 27 + +_chêng ming_, 31ff., 83ff., 104, 114, 210 + +_ch'i_, 110 + +Chiang Chieh-shih (Chiang Kai-shek), 102n., 158n., 163n., 206 + +_Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (see _The Program of National Reconstruction_) + +_Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (see _see The Outline of National Reconstruction_) + +Ch'ien Lung, the Emperor, 168 + +Ch'in dynasty, 47 + +Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, the, 26n., 37 + +Chinese Eastern Railway, the, 201 + +Ch'ing dynasty (_see_ Manchu dynasty) + +Chou dynasty, 25, 28 + +Christianity, 49, 67, 133n., 155n. + +_ch'üan_, 107ff., 141, 218 + +_chun ch'üan_, 100n. + +Chung Hua, The Republic of, 190 + +Cohen, Morris, 8n. + +Coker, Francis W., 147ff. + +Communists, 10, 64ff., 66, 106, 122, 160, 161, 163ff., 189, 205, 246ff. + +Confucianism, 23ff., 60, 66ff., 82ff., 90ff., 106, 109, 113ff., 210 + +Confucius (K'ung Ch'iu), 25ff., 60, 76, 97, 105, 261 + +Creel, H. G., 23n. + +Cressey, George B., 127n. + +Davrout, L., 32n. + +d'Elia, Paschal M., 4n. + +Donbas region, 246 + +Douglas, Sir Robert K., 243n. + +Dutch, the, 44n. + +Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, the, 131 + +England, 62, 150n., 188 + +Erdberg, Oskar, 161n. + +Fascism, 54, 146ff., 244 + +Ford, Henry, 132 + +_Four Books, The_, 75 + +France, 188 + +Gandhi, M. K., 156n., 180 + +Genro, the, 131 + +George III of England, 243 + +George, Henry, 72, 136ff., 144, 256 + +Germany, 62, 100, 196, 254ff. + +Goodnow, Frank J., 97 + +Granet, Marcel, 23n. + +Great Britain (_see_ British Empire, England) + +_Great Learning, The_, 74 + +Greeks, the, 133 + +Hai Ching Kung, the, 44n. + +Hamilton, Alexander, 77 + +Han Fei-tzu, 29, 93 + +Harvey, E. D., 154n. + +Hawaii, 61n. + +Hitler, Adolf, 56 + +Holcombe, Arthur N., 11n. + +Hongkong, 51n. + +Honolulu, 126 + +_hou chih hou chou_, the, 105 + +Hsieh, Pao-chao, 45n. + +_hsien_, 45, 211ff., 230ff. + +_hsien chih hsien chou_, the, 104, 106 + +Hsin dynasty, 58 + +Hsü, Leonard Shih-lien, 4n. + +Hu Han-min, 4n., 186 + +_hui_, 38, 41, 95, 165 + +Hulutao port, 260 + +_hung fang_, 100n. + +Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, 58 + +Hung Jair, 236n. + +"ideology," 18ff. + +India, 90, 181 + +_International Development of China, The_, 4 + +Isaacs, Harold, 161n. + +Japan, 28, 40, 47, 48, 51, 59, 63, 90, 170, 184, 188, 199ff., 240, 260 + +_jên_, 14, 30ff., 72ff., 141, 142, 144ff., 154, 263 + +Jên T'ai, 31n. + +Jews, the, 168 + +Joffe, Adolf, 64 + +Johnston, Sir Reginald, 119 + +Kailan Mining Administration, The, 179 + +K'ang Hsi, the Emperor, 168 + +"Kang Têh" (_see_ P'u Yi) + +Koo, V. K. Wellington, 122n. + +Korea (Chosen), 48, 59, 70, 127, 200 + +Kulp, D. H., 38n. + +Ku Hung-ming, 77 + +K'ung family, 90 + +Kung, H. H., 122n. + +Kuo Hsing-hua, 44n. + +Kuomintang, the, 104, 158ff., 205 + +Kwangtung Province (_see_ Canton) + +Kuzbas region, 246 + +Lao Tzu, 25 + +Latins, the, 62 + +Latourette, Kenneth Scott, 91n. + +Lea, Homer, 195 + +Lee, Frank C., 122n. + +Legge translations, the, 23n., 75n. + +Lenin, V. I., 132, 230n., 247 + +_li_, 31ff., 104, 115 + +Li Chao-wei, 219n. + +Li Chi, 86n. + +Li Ti-tsun, 137n. + +Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 30, 31n. + +Lin Shen, President, 122n. + +Lincoln, Abraham, 262 + +Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth, 8n., 84 + +Lotus society, the, 41 + +Lovejoy, Arthur O., 18n. + +Lynn, Jermyn Chi-hung, 221n. + +Macao, 49 + +Machiavelli, Niccolò, 26 + +"machine state," 54 + +MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, 11n. + +Malaysia, 186 + +Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, 22, 43, 44n., 47, 58ff., 96, 111, 119, 124, 131, +159ff., 167ff., 172ff., 182, 190, 227 + +"Manchukuo" ("Manchoukuo"), 71 + +Manchuria, 2, 51, 201, 205, 260 + +Mandarins, 104ff. + +_Manifesto_ of the first Party congress, 4 + +Mannheim, Karl, 18n. + +Marx, Karl, 72n., 163 + +Marxian philosophy, 14ff., 52, 55, 70, 72, 81n., 106, 125, 134n., 137ff., +144, 192ff., 209ff., 236, 257ff. + +Marxism-Leninism, 81, 136, 182, 189, 192ff. + +Mayers, William Frederick, 45n. + +Meiji Emperor, the, 82, 131 + +Mencius (Mêng Tzu), 76, 93, 97 + +Miao tribes, 168 + +Mill, John Stuart, 98n. + +Millar, John, 98 + +_min_, 217 + +_min ch'üan_, 99, 100n., 209ff. + +_Min Ch'üan Ts'u Pu_ (see _The Primer of Democracy_) + +_min shêng_, 12, 101, 121, 122ff., 141, 180, 193, 236ff. + +_min tsu_, 36, 99, 120 + +Ming dynasty, 96, 124 + +Ming T'ai Tsung, the Emperor, 124 + +Mo Ti, 93 + +Mohammedans, 190 + +Mongol (Yüan) dynasty, 47 + +Mongolia, 2, 87, 190 + +Montesquieu, Charles de S., Baron, 112, 221 + +Mussolini, Benito, 56 + +National Government of China, The, 3 + +_nêng_, 107ff., 141, 218 + +New Deal, the, 238n. + +New Life Movement, the, 102n. + +_Outline of National Reconstruction, The_, 4 + +_pa tao_, 71, 200 + +Pan-Asia, 197ff. + +Pareto, Vilfredo, 15ff. + +Peffer, Nathaniel, 10n. + +Peru, 165 + +Philippines, 186, 187n., 200 + +_Philosophy of Sun Wên, The_ (see _Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_) + +Piatiletka (The Five-Year Plan), 132, 238n., 246 + +Plato, 79 + +Poland, 168 + +_Political Testament, The_, 2 + +Ponce, Mariano, 97 + +Portuguese, the, 49 + +Presidency of ancient states, the, 28 + +Price, Frank W., 4n. + +_Primer of Democracy, The_, 4 + +_Program of National Reconstruction, The_, 4 + +_pu chih pu chou_, the, 105 + +P'u Yi, 119n. + +Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 91 + +Rea, George Bronson, 183 + +Reichwein, Adolf, 50n. + +_Republic, The_, 79 + +Rome, 215 + +Roy, Manabendra Nath, 52n. + +Russians (_see also_ Soviet Union), 49, 51, 100, 103n., 137, 194ff., 240 + +_San Min Chu I_, 4ff. + +Sharman, Lyon, 1n. + +Sheean, Vincent, 161n. + +_shen ch'üan_, 100n. + +_Shih Yeh Chi Hua_, 4 + +Shryock, John K., 36n. + +Shun, the Emperor, 97, 168 + +Siam, 187 + +Smith, Adam, 237 + +Smith, Arthur, 40n. + +South Manchuria Railway, The, 179 + +Soviets in China, 2, 212 + +Soviet Union (U. S. S. R.), 64, 147, 155n., 184ff., 189, 199, 201 + +Spring and Autumn Period, 27 + +Stalin, Joseph, 56, 158n. + +Starr, Frederick, 23n. + +Stoddard, Lothrop, 197 + +Sun-Joffe Manifesto, The, 64 + +_Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_, 4 + +Sun Yat-sen, Mme. (née Soong Ching-ling), 122n., 158n., 159n., 253n. + +Sung Chiao-jên, 138 + +Sung dynasty, 58 + +_ta chia_, 141 + +_ta t'ung_, 120, 210, 261 + +Tagore, Sir Rabindranath, 132, 156n. + +Tai Chi-tao, 69 + +Tai-p'ing Rebellion, the, 50, 58, 172 + +Taiwan (Formosa), 44n., 51n. + +T'ang Liang-li (T'ang Leang-li), 5n., 56n. + +_tang pu_, 164 + +Taoism, 25 + +Tao Kuang, the Emperor, 243 + +Tawney, R. H., 45n. + +_têh_ (_tê_), 31ff. + +Thomas, Elbert Duncan, 25n. + +Tibet, 2, 190 + +Triad Society, the, 41 + +_Triple Demism, The_ (see _San Min Chu I_) + +_Ts'an Yi Yüan_, the, 228 + +Tsao Kun, 119n. + +Tsiang Kuen, 236n. + +Tsinanfu, 205 + +Tsui Shu-chin 10n. + +_Tsung Li_, 162 + +Tung Meng Hui, 136ff. + +Turkey, 199, 201 + +Tyau, Minch'ien T. Z., 5n. + +United States of America, The, 79, 97, 112, 130, 187n., 188, 199, 205 + +Versailles Conference, the, 190 + +Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., 4n. + +Vinacke, Harold Monk, 227n. + +Vladislavich, 243 + +Wang An-shih, 58 + +Wang Ch'ing-wei, 5, 164, 206 + +Wang Mang, 58 + +_wang tao_, 71 + +Wang Yang-ming, 80n., 84 + +Warring States, the Age of, 27 + +Washington Conference, the, 188 + +Weale, Putnam (B. L. Simpson), 50, 225 + +Weber, Max, 15 + +Wei Yung, 4n. + +Wên Wang, the, 168 + +Wieger, Leon, 32n. + +Wilhelm, Richard, 23n., 68 + +William, Maurice, 10, 72, 142ff. + +Williams, S. Wells, 44, 122n. + +Wilson, Woodrow, 6, 190 + +Wittfogel, Karl, 4n. + +Wou Saofong, 111n. + +Wu Pei-fu, 222n. + +Yangtze river (the _Ch'ang Chiang_), 100 + +Yao, the Emperor, 76, 97, 219, 233 + +Yellow river (the _Huang Ho_), 100 + +Yen Shing Kung, the, 44n. + +_yi_ (_i_), 31ff. + +Yoshemitsu, the Ashikaga Shogun, 183 + +Yuan, the Five, 224 + +Yüan dynasty (_see_ Mongol dynasty) + +Yüan Shih-k'ai, 159, 166, 173, 183, 220, 251 + +_yüeh_, 91ff. + + + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + +_ 1 China Today_ (March, 1935), I, No. 6, p. 112. This is the leading + English-language journal of the Chinese Communists. Mme. Sun's + letter to the paper is characteristic of the attitude toward Nanking + adopted throughout the magazine. + + 2 These manuscripts consist of the following chief items: Linebarger, + Paul Myron Wentworth, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen 1919-1922_ + (written in 1933-1935); the same, _A Commentary on the San Min Chu + I_ (four volumes, 1932-1933); and Sun Yat-sen, _How China Was Made a + Republic_ (Shanghai, 1919). These are all typescripts, with + autograph corrections by their respective authors. The manuscripts + of Judge Linebarger represent his attempts to replace, from memory, + books which were destroyed at the time of the bombardment of the + Commercial Press in Shanghai by the Japanese. He had prepared a + two-volume work on the life and principles of Sun Yat-sen and had + left his manuscripts and other papers in the vaults of the Press. + When the Press was bombed the manuscripts, documents, plates and + Chinese translations were all destroyed; the only things remaining + were a few pages of proof sheets for _The Life and Principles of Sun + Chung-san_, which remain in the possession of the present author. + Judge Linebarger attempted to replace these volumes. He had a few + notebooks in which he had kept the outlines of his own speeches; he + had not used these, because of the secondary value. When, however, + the major volumes were lost, he returned to these notebooks and + reconstructed his speeches. They were issued in Paris in 1932 under + the title of _The Gospel of Sun Chung-shan_. He also prepared the + _Commentary_ and the _Conversations_ from memory. These manuscripts + possess a certain somewhat questionable value. Judge Linebarger + himself suggested that they be allowed the same weight that + testimony, based upon memory but delivered under oath, upon a + subject ten years past would receive in a court of justice. The + seven volumes described are in the possession of the present author. + Other materials to which the author has had access are his father's + diaries and various other private papers; but since he has not cited + them for references, he does not believe any description of them + necessary. Finally, there are the manuscripts of _Sun Yat-sen and + the Chinese Republic_, which contain a considerable amount of + material deleted from the published version of that work, which + appeared in New York in 1925. For comments on other source material + for Sun Yat-sen which is not generally used, see Bibliography. + + 3 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning_, New York, + 1934, p. 405. + + 4 He did this in his _Political Testament_, which is given in almost + every work on Sun Yat-sen or on modern Chinese politics. It was + written in February and signed in March 1925, shortly before his + death. + + 5 The Chinese text of these is given in Hu Han-min, _ed._, _Tsung-li + Ch'üan Chi_ (_The Complete Works of the Leader_), 4 vol. in 1, + Shanghai, 1930. This collection comprises the most important works + of Sun which were published in his lifetime. Edited by one of the + two scholars closest to Sun, it is the standard edition of his + works. English versions of varying amounts of this material are + given in Paschal M. d'Elia, _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, + Wuchang, 1931; Frank W. Price, _San Min Chu I, The Three Principles + of the People_, Shanghai, 1930; and Leonard Shih-lien Hsü, _Sun + Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933. Each + of these works will henceforth be cited by the name of its editor; + for brief descriptions and appraisals, see the bibliography. + + 6 The only English version of this work is one prepared by Wei Yung, + under the title of _The Cult of Dr. Sun_, Shanghai, 1931. Fragments + of this work are also to be found in Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., + _Sun' Iat-sen, Otets Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii_, (_Sun Yat-sen, Father + of the Chinese Revolution_), Moscow, 1925; _Zapiski Kitaiskogo + Revoliutsionera_, (_Notes of a Chinese Revolutionary_), Moscow, + 1926; _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d.; and + Karl Wittfogel, _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen + Revolutionärs_, Vienna & Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927). + + 7 This work has not been translated into any Western language. + + 8 Sun Yat-sen, _The International Development of China_, New York and + London, 1929. + + 9 This is given in Hsü, cited above, and in Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau, + _Two Years of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, pp. 439-442. Dr. + Tyau substitutes the word "Fundamentals" for "Outline," a rather + happy choice. + + 10 See bibliography for a complete list of the translations. d'Elia + translation, cited, pp. 36-49, dedicates a whole chapter to the + problem of an adequate translation of the Chinese phrase _San Min + Chu I_. He concludes that it can only be rendered by a nelogism + based upon Greek roots: _the triple demism_, "demism" including the + meaning of "principle concerning and for the people" and "popular + principle." + + 11 T'ang Leang-li, _The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution_, New + York, 1930, p. 166. + + 12 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 58. + + 13 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 58. + + 14 See Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning_, New York, + 1934, p. 292, for a stimulating discussion of the parts that the + various documents played in the so-called "cult of Sun Yat-sen." + + 15 Sharman, cited, p. 270. + + 16 A typical instance of this sort of criticism is to be found in the + annotations to the anonymous translation of the _San Min Chu I_ + which was published by a British newspaper in 1927 (_The Three + Principles_, Shanghai, 1927). The translator and annotator both + remained anonymous; the translation was wholly inadequate; and the + annotations a marvel of invective. Almost every page of the + translation was studded with notes pointing out and gloating over + the most trivial errors and inconsistencies. The inflamed opinion of + the time was not confined to the Chinese. + + 17 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Deutschlands Gegenwärtige Gelegenheiten in + China_, Brussels, 1936, p. 53. Judge Linebarger repeats the story + told him by General Morris Cohen, the Canadian who was Sun's + bodyguard throughout this period. + + 18 Nathaniel Peffer, _China: The Collapse of a Civilization_, New York, + 1930, p. 155. + + 19 d'Elia, cited; Hsü, cited; and Wittfogel, cited. + + 20 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932; + and Tsui Shu-chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon + Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy_, in _The Social and Political + Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934; and other works + listed in bibliography, pp. 268-269. + + 21 Two such are the chapters on Sun Yat-sen's thought to be found in + Harley Farnsworth MacNair, _China in Revolution_, Chicago, 1931, pp. + 78-91 (Chapter VI, "The Ideology and Plans of Sun Yat-sen") and + Arthur N. Holcombe, _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge + (Massachusetts), 1930, pp. 120-155 (Chapter V, "The Revolutionary + Politics of Sun Yat-sen"). The former is the shorter of the two, and + is a summary of the various documents involved. The distinction + between the ideology and the plans is so convenient and illuminating + that the present writer has adopted it. Except for the comments on + the influence of William upon Sun Yat-sen, it is completely + reliable. The latter is a discussion, rather than an outline, and + admirably presents the gist of Sun's thought. + + 22 Holcombe, cited, p. 136 ff. + + 23 The word "ideology" is one of the catchwords of the hour. The author + regrets having to use it, but dares not coin a neologism to replace + it. He does not desire that "ideology" be opposed to "truth," but + uses the word in its broadest possible sense, referring to the whole + socio-psychological conditioning of a group of people. He does not, + therefore, speak of ideologies as a collection of Paretian + derivations, fictions which mask some "truth." He considers his own + background--or Pareto's, for that matter--as ideological, and--in the + sense of the word here employed--cannot conceive of any human belief + or utterance _not_ ideological. The task he has set himself is the + transposition of a pattern of Chinese ideas concerning government + from the Chinese ideology to the Western-traditionalist ideology of + the twentieth century. Whether one, the other, neither, or both, is + "right," is quite beside the point, so far as the present enterprise + is concerned. In calling the whole non-physical background of a + society the ideology of that society, the author can excuse his + novel use of the term only if he admits that he establishes the new + meaning by definition, without any necessary reference to the + previous use of the term. He has no intention of following, in the + present work, any "theory of ideology" or definition of "ideology" + established by political philosophers, such as Marx, or sociologists + such as Weber, Mannheim, or Pareto. (Professor A. O. Lovejoy + suggested the following definition of the term, "ideology," after + having seen the way it was employed in this work: "_Ideology_ means + a complex of ideas, in part ethical, in part political, in part + often religious, which is current in a society, or which the + proponents of it desire to make current, as an effective means of + controlling behavior.") + + 24 Confucianism may be read in the Legge translations, a popular + abridged edition of which was issued in 1930 in Shanghai under the + title of _The Four Books_. Commentaries on Confucius which present + him in a well-rounded setting are Richard Wilhelm, _Confucius and + Confucianism_, New York, 1931; the same, _Ostasien, Werden und + Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises_, Potsdam, 1928, for a very + concise account and the celebrated _Geschichte der chinesischen + Kultur_, Munich, 1928, for a longer account in a complete historical + setting; Frederick Starr, _Confucianism_, New York, 1930; H. G. + Creel, _Sinism_, Chicago, 1929; and Marcel Granet, _La Civilization + Chinoise_, Paris, 1929. Bibliographies are found in several of these + works. They deal with Confucius either in his historical setting or + as the main object of study, and are under no necessity of + distorting Confucius' historical rôle for the purpose of showing his + connection with some other topic. The reader may gauge the amount of + distortion necessary when he imagines a work on Lenin, written for + the information and edification of Soviet Eskimos, which--for the + sake of clarity--was forced to summarize all Western thought, from + Plato and Jesus Christ down to Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, in a few + pages providing a background to Lenin. + + 25 There is a work on Confucianism upon which the author has leaned + quite heavily: Leonard Shih-lien Hsü, _The Political Philosophy of + Confucianism_, New York, 1932. Dr. Hsü is interested in sociological + political theory. The novelty of his work has aroused a great amount + of criticism among Chinese scholars of the older disciplines, + whether the relatively conservative and established Western + disciplines or the ultra-conservative schools of the truly classical + literati. His work cannot be recommended for any purposes other than + those which Dr. Hsü himself had in mind; there are several other + works, the product of philosophers, historians, and literary + historians, which will present a portrait of Confucius and + Confucianism more conventionally exact. In its own narrow but + definite field Dr. Hsü's work is an impressive accomplishment; he + transposes the Confucian terms into those of the most advanced + schools of social thought. A reader not forewarned might suffer by + this, and read into Confucius an unwarranted modernity of outlook; + if, however, the up-to-dateness is recognized as Dr. Hsü's and not + Confucius', the work is valuable. It puts Confucius on common ground + with modern social theory, ground on which he does not belong, but + where his ideas are still relevant and interesting. The present + author follows Dr. Hsü in this transposition of Confucius, but begs + the reader to remember that this is one made for purposes of + comparison only, and not intended as valid for all purposes. (He + must acknowledge the stimulating criticism of Mr. Jan Tai, of the + Library of Congress, who made it clear that this distortion of + Confucius was one which could be excused only if it were + admitted.)--An interesting presentation of Confucius as transposed + into the older political theory, untouched by sociology, is to be + found in Senator Elbert Duncan Thomas, _Chinese Political Thought_, + New York, 1927. + + 26 Granet, _Chinese Civilization_, cited, p. 84. Granet's work, while + challenged by many sinologues as well as by anthropologists, is the + most brilliant portrayal of Chinese civilization to the time of Shih + Huang Ti. His interpretations make the language of the _Odes_ + (collected by Confucius) intelligible, and clear up the somewhat + obscure transition from the oldest feudal society to the epoch of + the proto-nations and then to the inauguration of the world order. + + 27 Granet, cited, pp. 87-88. + + 28 Richard Wilhelm, _Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie_, Breslau, + 1929, p. 19. + + 29 One could therefore say that membership in a society is determined + by the outlook of the individual concerned. + + 30 In modern Western political thought, this doctrine is most clearly + demonstrated in the Marxian thesis of the withering-away of the + state. The Marxists hold that, as the relics of the class struggle + are eliminated from the new society, and classlessness and uniform + indoctrination come to prevail, the necessity for a state--which + they, however, consider an instrument of class domination--will + decline and the state will atrophy and disappear. + + 31 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, _History of Chinese Political Thought during the + early Tsin Period_, translated by L. T. Chen, New York, 1930, p. 38. + + 32 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (cited, p. 48 and following) discusses these + points.--The author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the explanation of + the relation of these various factors in the Confucian ideology. + + 33 Leon Wieger and L. Davrout, _Chinese Characters_, Hsien-hsien, 1927, + p. 6. + + 34 Hsü, cited above, chapter three, contains an excellent discussion of + the doctrine of rectification. + + 35 A stimulating discussion of the pragmatism of early Chinese thought + is to be found in Creel, cited. + + 36 It must be pointed out in this connection that Confucius advocated + an ideology which would not only be socially useful but + scientifically and morally exact. He did not consider, as have some + Western thinkers of the past century, that the ideology might be a + quite amoral instrument of control, and might contain deliberate or + unconscious deception. Hsü writes, in his _Confucianism_, cited, p. + 93, of the various translations of the word _li_ into English: "The + word _li_ has no English equivalent. It has been erroneously + translated as 'rites' or 'propriety'. It has been suggested that the + term civilization is its nearest English equivalent; but + 'civilization' is a broader term, without necessarily implying + ethical values, while _li_ is essentially a term implying such + values." _Li_ is civilized behavior; that is, behavior which is + civilized in being in conformance with the ideology and the values + it contains. + + 37 Hsü, cited, p. 103. + + 38 Confucius the individual was quite nationalistically devoted to his + native state of Lu, and, more philosophically, hostile to the + barbarians. Hsü, cited, p. 118. + + 39 John K. Shryock, _The Origin and Development of The State Cult of + Confucius_, New York, 1932, traces this growth with great clarity + and superlative scholarship. The work is invaluable as a means to + the understanding of the political and educational structure + commonly called "Confucian civilization." + + 40 This expansion took place in China in the reign of Ch'in Shih Huang + Ti, who used the state of Ch'in as an instrument by means of which + to destroy the multiple state-system and replace it with a powerful + unitary state for all China. He sought to wipe out the past, raising + the imperial office to a position of real power, and destroying the + whole feudal organization. He abolished tenantry and supplanted it + with a system of small freeholds. Although his immediate successors + did much to restore the forms and appearances of the past, his work + was not altogether undone. Himself hostile to Confucius, his actions + implemented the teachings to an enormous degree. See Granet, cited, + pp. 96-104. + + 41 D. H. Kulp, _Family Life in South China_, New York, 1925, p. xxiv. + + 42 H. G. Creel, cited, p. 10. Creole writes as follows of the + significance of the village: "The village life is very important, + for it appears to be the archetype from which the entire Chinese + conception of the world and even of the cosmos grew. The village + was, as has been said, small. It was based on agriculture. It was + apparently a community of a peaceful regularity and a social + solidarity beyond anything which we of the present can imagine." + + 43 Arthur Smith, one of the few Westerners to live in a Chinese village + for any length of years, wrote: "It is a noteworthy fact that the + government of China, while in theory more or less despotic, places + no practical restrictions upon the right of free assemblage by the + people for the consideration of their own affairs. The people of any + village can, if they choose, meet every day of the year. There is no + government censor present, and no restriction upon the liberty of + debate. The people can say what they like, and the local Magistrate + neither knows nor cares what is said.... But should insurrection + break out, these popular rights might be extinguished in a moment, a + fact of which all the people are perfectly well aware." _Village + Life in China_, New York, 1899, p. 228. This was written thirteen + years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty. + + 44 J. S. Burgess, _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928. This is + perhaps the best work on the subject of the guilds which has yet + appeared. The information was gathered by the students of the + author, who as a teacher had excellent facilities for developing + contacts. The students, as Chinese, were able to gather data from + the conservative guild leaders in a manner and to a degree that no + Westerner could have done. The classification here given is a + modification of Burgess'. + + 45 S. Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, New York, 1895, p. 405. Dr. + Williams, whose work is perhaps the most celebrated single work on + China in the English language, wrote as follows concerning the + nobility under the Ch'ing: + + "The titular nobility of the Empire, as a whole, is a body whose + members are without power, land, wealth, office, or influence, in + virtue of their honors; some of them are more or less hereditary, + but the whole system has been so devised, and the designations so + conferred, as to tickle the vanity of those who receive them, + without granting them any real power. The titles are not derived + from landed estates, but the rank is simply designated in addition + to the name...." He also pointed out that, under the Ch'ing, the + only hereditary titles of any significance were _Yen Shing Kung_ + (for the descendant of Confucius) and _Hai Ching Kung_ (for the + descendant of Kuo Hsing-hua, the formidable sea adventurer who drove + the Dutch out of Taiwan and made himself master of that island). + + 46 William Frederick Mayers, _The Chinese Government, A Manual of + Chinese Titles ..._, Shanghai, 1897, devotes one hundred and + ninety-five pages to the enumeration of the Ch'ing titles. His work, + intended to be used as an office manual for foreigners having + relations with Chinese officials, remains extremely useful as a + presentation of the administrative outline of the Chinese government + in its last days before the appearance of Sun Yat-sen and the + Kuomintang. Pao Chao Hsieh, _The Government of China (1644-1911)_, + Baltimore, 1925, is a more descriptive work dealing with the whole + administration of the Ch'ing dynasty. No work has as yet appeared in + the West, to the knowledge of the present author, which describes + the historical development of government in China in any detail. + + 47 The figures given are those of the present day, which may be more or + less exact for the past century. For earlier times, the number will + have to be reduced in proportion with the remoteness in time. See + Richard Henry Tawney, _Land and Labour in China_, London, 1932. + + 48 Richard Wilhelm, _Confucius and Confucianism_, cited, pp. 130-132. + The connection between the naming of names and the operation of the + popular check of revolution is made evident by Wilhelm in a + brilliant passage. If a righteous ruler died a violent death at the + hands of one of his subjects, he was murdered; were he unrighteous, + he was only killed. Confucius himself used such terms in his annals. + His use of varying terms, terms carrying condemnation or + condonement, even of such a subject as regicide, electrified the + scholars of his day. + + 49 An exception must be made in the case of the first Russian colony in + Peking, which was lost in two centuries and became virtually + indistinguishable from the mass of the population. The Portuguese, + at Macao, displayed that tendency to compromise and miscegenate + which marked their whole progress along the coasts of Asia, but they + maintained their political supremacy in that city; today the + Macanese are largely of Chinese blood, but Portuguese-speaking, and + proud of their separateness. + + 50 Too many works have been written on the relations of the Chinese and + Westerners to permit any citations, with one exception. Putnam + Weale's _The Vanished Empire_, New York, 1925, is an extraordinarily + vivid history of the collision of the civilizations. It is not + particularly commendable as a factual record, but as a brilliant and + moving piece of literature presenting the Chinese viewpoint, it is + unexcelled. + + 51 See Adolf Reichwein, _China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic + Contacts in the Eighteenth Century_, New York, 1925, which makes + apparent the full extent to which modern Europe is indebted to China + for the luxuries of its culture. + + 52 In this connection, it might be pointed out that the attractive + strength of the two civilizations has not, as yet, been adequately + studied, although there is an enormous amount of loose + generalization on the subject: "The Chinese are becoming completely + Westernized," or "The Chinese, in spite of their veneer, are always + Chinese; they will, in the end, absorb their conquerors." But will + they? In the face of a modern educational and propaganda system, + there is at least room for doubt; it is not beyond all conjecture + that the Chinese of Manchuria might be Japanized as easily as the + fiercely chauvinistic Japanese might be sinicized. The only adequate + answer to the question would be through detailed studies of the + social conditioning and preferences of Chinese under foreign + influence (as in Hongkong, Taiwan, Manchuria), and of foreigners + under Chinese influence (the White Russians in China, the few other + Westerners in preëminently Chinese milieux). + + 53 An example of this is to be found in Manabendra Nath Roy, + _Revolution und Konterrevolution in China_, Berlin, 1930. Roy was + one of the emissaries of the Third International to the + Nationalists, and his ineptness in practical politics assisted + materially in the weakening of the Communist position. His work + quite seriously employs all the familiar clichés of Western class + dispute, and analyzes the Chinese situation in terms that ignore the + fact that China is Chinese. + + 54 This same line of attack seems, in the West, to be employed only by + the Catholic church which, while opposing any avowedly + collectivistic totalitarian state, seeks to maintain control on an + ideological and not a political basis, over almost all aspects of + the life of its members. No political party or governing group seems + to share this attitude. + + 55 Karl A. Wittfogel, in his _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, as well as Roy, in + the work cited, thinks very little of the justice of Confucianism. + The extreme mobility of Chinese society, which largely precluded the + development of any permanent class rule, is either unknown to them + or ignored. If the ideologue-officials of old China composed a + class, they were a class like no other known, for they provided for + the continuous purging of their own class, and its continuous + recruitment from all levels of society--excepting that of prostitutes + and soldiers. + + 56 T'ang Leang-li writes, in _The Inner History of the Chinese + Revolution_, New York, 1930, p. 168, as follows concerning Sun + Yat-sen's early teaching of nationalism: + + "Previous to the Republican Revolution of 1911, the principle of + nationality was known as the principle of racial struggle, and was + in effect little more than _a primitive tribalism rationalized to + serve as a weapon_ in the struggle against the Manchu oppressors. It + was the corner-stone of revolutionary theory, and by emphasizing the + racial distinction between the ruling and the oppressed classes, + succeeded in uniting the entire Chinese people against the Manchu + dynasty." (Italics mine.) In speaking of _min ts'u_ as a primitive + tribalism which had been rationalized as a weapon, Dr. T'ang might + lead some of his readers to infer that Sun Yat-sen did not believe + what he taught, and that--as a master-stroke of practical politics--he + had devised an ideological weapon which, regardless of its + truthfulness, would serve him in his struggles. But, it may be + asked, what was Sun Yat-sen struggling for, if not the union and + preservation of the Chinese people? + + 57 See sections, below, on the programs of nationalism. + + 58 d'Elia translation, p. 131. Sun Yat-sen said: "Formerly China too + entertained the ambition of becoming mistress of the whole world and + of rising above all other countries; so she (too) advocated + cosmopolitanism.... When the Manchus entered the Great Wall, they + were very few; they numbered 100,000 men. How were those 100,000 men + able to subject hundreds of millions of others? Because the majority + of Chinese at that time favored cosmopolitanism and said nothing + about nationalism." + + 59 d'Elia translation, pp. 126 ff. + + 60 It seems to the present writer that, whatever criteria are selected + for the determination of the nationhood of a given society, + _uniqueness_ certainly is _not_ one of the qualities attributed to a + "nation." It is not appropriate for the author to venture upon any + extended search for a "true nation"; he might observe, however, that + in his own use--in contrast to Sun Yat-sen's--he employs the term in a + consciously relative sense, contrasting it with the old Chinese + cosmopolitan society, which thought itself unique except for certain + imitations of itself on the part of half-civilized barbarians. A + "nation" must signify, among other things, for the purposes of this + work, a society calling itself such and recognizing the existence of + other societies of more or less the same nature. Sun Yat-sen, on the + other hand, regarded a nation as a group of persons as real as a + family group, and consistently spoke of the Chinese nation as having + existed throughout the ages--even in those times when the Chinese + themselves regarded their own society as the civilized world, and + did so with some show of exactness, if their own viewpoint is taken + into account. + + 61 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 130-131. d'Elia's italics, covering + the last two sentences in the quotation, have been omitted as + superfluous. As an illustration of the difference between the + translation of d'Elia and that of Hsü, the same paragraph might also + be cited from the latter translation. "The ethical value of + everything is relative and so nothing in the world is innately good + or innately bad. It is determined by circumstances. A thing that is + useful to us is a good thing; otherwise, a bad thing. Also, a thing + that is useful and advantageous to the world is a good thing; + otherwise, a bad thing." Hsü translation, cited, pp. 210-211. + Excepting for occasional purposes of comparison, the translation of + Father d'Elia will be referred to in citing the sixteen lectures on + the _San Min Chu I_. + + 62 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 70. The curiously significant use of + the word "forever" is reminiscent of the teleology of the Chinese + family system, according to which the flesh-and-blood immortality of + man, and the preservation of identity through the survival of + descendants, is a true immortality. + +_ 63 Wo-men Chung-kuo jen_ and _ni-men wai-kuo jen_. + + 64 Paul M. Linebarger, _The Life and Principles of Sun Chung-shan_, p. + 102. There is here told the anecdote of Sun Yat-sen's first + encounter with race-hatred. At Ewa, Hawaii, in 1880, Sun, then a + young lad just arrived from China, met a Westerner on the road. The + Westerner threatened him, and called him "Damn Chinaman!" and + various other epithets. When Sun Yat-sen discovered that the man was + neither deranged nor intoxicated, but simply venting his general + hatred of all Chinese, he was so much impressed with the incident + that he never forgot it. + + 65 Hsü translation, cited, p. 168; d'Elia translation, cited, p. 68. + + 66 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 70. + + 67 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 71. + + 68 Sun Yat-sen said: "A scrap of paper, a pen, and a mutual agreement + will be enough for the ruin of China ... in order to wipe her out by + common agreement, it suffices that the diplomats of the different + countries meet somewhere and affix their signatures.... One morning + will suffice to annihilate a nation." d'Elia translation, cited, p. + 170. + + 69 The danger of relying too much on foreign aid can be illustrated by + a reference to Sun-Joffe Manifesto issued in Shanghai, January 26, + 1922. Sun Yat-sen, as the leader of the Chinese Nationalist + movement, and Adolf Joffe, as the Soviet Special Envoy, signed a + joint statement, the first paragraph of which reads as follows: + + "Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet + System cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do + not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of + either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. + Joffe who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most + pressing problem is to achieve unification and attain full national + independence, and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun + Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people + and can count on the support of Russia." + + See T'ang Leang-li, cited, p. 156. + + In view of the subsequent Communist attempt, in 1927, to convert the + Nationalist movement into a mere stage in the proletarian conquest + of power in China, in violation of the terms of the understanding + upon which the Communists and the Chinese Nationalists had worked + together, the leaders of the Kuomintang are today as mistrustful of + what they term Communist politico-cultural imperialism as they are + of capitalist politico-economic imperialism. It is curious that the + APRA leaders in Peru have adopted practically the same attitude. + + 70 It is necessary to remember that in the four decades before 1925, + during which Sun Yat-sen advocated _nationalism_, the word had not + acquired the ugly connotations that recent events have given it. The + nationalism of Sun Yat-sen was conceived of by him as a pacific and + defensive instrument, for the perpetuation of an independent Chinese + race and civilization. See Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations + with Sun Yat-sen, 1919-1922_, Book I, ch. 5, "Defensive + Nationalism," and ch. 6, "Pacific Nationalism," for a further + discussion of this phase of Sun Yat-sen's thought. + +_ 71 tien sha wei kung._ + + 72 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 184. A reference to clan organization, + to be discussed later, has been deleted. + + 73 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 181 (summary of the sixth lecture on + nationalism). + + 74 Richard Wilhelm's preface to _Die Geistigen Grundlagen des Sun Yat + Senismus_ of Tai Chi-tao (The Intellectual Foundations of + Sun-Yat-senism), Berlin, 1931 (henceforth cited as "Tai Chi-tao"), + pp. 8-9; "Die Grösse Sun Yat Sens beruht nun darauf, dass er eine + lebendige Synthese gefunden hat zwischen den Grundprinzipien des + Konfuzianismus and den Anforderungen der neuen Zeit, eine Synthese, + die über die Grenzen Chinas hinaus für die ganze Menschheit noch + einmal von Bedeutung werden kann. Sun Yat Sen vereinigt in sich die + eherne Konsequenz des Revolutionärs und die grosse Menschenliebe des + Erneuerers. Sun Yat Sen ist der gütigste von allen Revolutionären + der Menschheit gewesen. Und diese Güte hat er dem Erbe des Konfuzius + entnommen. So steht sein geistiges Werk da als eine verbindende + Brücke swischen der alten und der neuen Zeit. Und es wird das Heil + Chinas sein, wenn es entschlossen diese Brücke beschreitet." + + 75 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 65. + + 76 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 186. + + 77 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 187-8. Sun Yat-sen's discussion of + the old morality forms the first part of his lecture on nationalism, + pp. 184-194 of the d'Elia translation. + + 78 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 66. The translation employs the words. + + 79 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 129. In connection with the doctrine + of _wang tao_, it may be mentioned that this doctrine has been made + the state philosophy of "Manchukuo." See the coronation issue of the + _Manchuria Daily News_, Dairen, March 1, 1934, pp. 71-80, and the + _Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book_, Tokyo, 1934, pp. 634-635. The advocacy + of _wang tao_ in a state which is a consequence of one of the + perfect illustrations of _pa tao_ in the modern Far East, is + astonishing. Its use does possess significance, in demonstrating + that the shibboleths of ancient virtue are believed by the Japanese + and by "Emperor Kang Teh" to possess value in contemporary politics. + + 80 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 528, 529. + + 81 See below, for discussion of the influence that Henry George, Karl + Marx, and Maurice William had upon the social interpretation of + history so far as economic matters were concerned. + + 82 See "The Theory of the Confucian World Society," above. + + 83 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341. + + 84 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 199. + + 85 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 194. + + 86 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 194. The original quotation, in + Chinese and in English, may be found in James Legge, translator, + _The Four Books_, Shanghai, 1930, p. 313. + + 87 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 194-195. + + 88 Judge Paul Linebarger, in _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_ + (unpublished), states that Sun said to him: "China will go down in + history as the greatest literary civilization the world has ever + known, or ever will know, but what good does this deep literary + knowledge do us if we cannot combine it with the modernity of + Western science?" p. 64, Book Four. + + 89 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 62. The passage reads in full: "Sun Yat-sen + umfasst vollkommen die wahren Gedanken Chinas, wie sie bei Yau und + Schun und auch bei Kung Dsï und Mong Dsï wiederfinden. Dadurch wird + uns klar, dass Sun Yat Sen der Erneuerer der seit 2000 Jahre + ununterbrochenen chinesischen sittlichen Kultur ist. Im vergangenen + Jahr hat ein russischer Revolutionär an Sun Yat Sen die folgende + Frage gerichtet: 'Welche Grundlage haben Ihre Revolutionsgedanken?' + Sun Yat Sen hat darauf geantwortet: 'In China hat es ein sittlichen + Gedanken gegeben, der von Yau, Schun, Yü, Tang, Wen Wang, Wu Wang, + Dschou Gung his zu Kung Dsï getragen worden ist; seither ist er + ununterbrochen, ich habe wieder an ihn angeknüpft und versacht, ihn + weiter zu entwickeln.' Der Fragende hat dies nicht verstehen können + und sich weiter erkundigt; Sun Yat Sen hat noch mehrmals versucht, + ihm seine Antwort zu erklären. Aus dieser Unterredung können wir + ersehen, dass Sun Yat Sen von seine Gedanken überzeugt war, + gleichzeitig können wir ersehen, dass seine Nationalrevolution auf + dem Widererwachen der chinesischen Kultur beruht. Er hat die + schöpferische Kraft Chinas wieder ins Leben rufen und den Wert der + chinesischen Kultur fur die ganze Welt nutzbar machen wollen, um + somit den Universalismus verwirklichen zu können." Allowance will + have to be made, as it should always in the case of Tai Chi-tao, for + the author's deep appreciation of and consequent devotion to the + virtues of Chinese culture. Other disciples of Sun Yat-sen wrote in + a quite different vein. The present author inclines to the opinion, + however, that Tai Chi-tao's summary is a just rendition of Sun + Yat-sen's attitude. Sun Yat-sen loved and fought for the struggling + masses of China, whose misery was always before his pitying eyes; he + also fought for the accomplishments of Chinese civilization. In + modern China, many leaders have fought for the culture, and + forgotten the masses (men such as Ku Hung-ming were typical); others + loved the populace and forgot the culture. It was one of the + elements of Sun Yat-sen's greatness that he was able to remember + both. + + 90 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 199-202. + + 91 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 259. + + 92 This idea, of wealth as national capacity to produce, is of course + not a new one. It is found in the writings of Alexander Hamilton, + among others. + + 93 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 337. + + 94 Wei Yung, translator, _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_, + cited. See the discussion on dietetics, pp. 3-9. + + 95 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 337. + + 96 Wei Yung's translation, cited, is an English version of _The Outline + of Psychological Reconstruction_ of Sun Yat-sen. This work is + devoted to a refutation of the thesis, first propounded by Wang + Yang-ming (ca. 1472-1528), that knowledge is easy and action + difficult. In a society where the ideology had been stabilized for + almost two millenia, this was undoubtedly quite true. In modern + China, however, faced with the terrific problem of again settling + the problem of an adequate ideology, the reverse was true: knowledge + was difficult, and action easy. This was one of the favorite + aphorisms of Sun Yat-sen, and he devoted much time, effort, and + thought to making it plain to his countrymen. The comparative points + of view of Wang Yang-ming and Sun Yat-sen afford a quite clear-cut + example of the contrast between an established and unsettled + ideology. + + 97 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 336-345. This discussion occurs in + the fifth lecture on democracy, incidental to Sun Yat-sen's + explaining the failure of the parliamentary Republic in Peking, and + the general inapplicability of Western ideas of democracy to China. + + 98 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344. + + 99 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344. + + 100 It might again be pointed out that Sun Yat-sen differed with Marxism + which, while it, of course, does not hold that all knowledge is + already found, certainly keeps its own first premises beyond all + dispute, and its own interpretations sacrosanct. The dialectics of + Marx and Hegel would certainly appear peculiar in the Chinese + environment. Without going out of his way to point out the + difference between Sun's Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, the + author cannot refrain--in view of the quite popular misconception + that Sun Yat-sen was at one time almost a Marxist convert--from + pointing out the extreme difference between the premises, the + methods, and the conclusions of the two philosophies. + + 101 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344. + + 102 Hsü, _Confucianism_, cited, contains two chapters relevant to the + consideration of this problem. Ch. III, "The Doctrine of + Rectification" (pp. 43-61), and Ch. XI, "Social Evolution" (pp. + 219-232), discuss rectification and ideological development within + the Confucian ideology. + + 103 As an illustration of Dr. Sun's continued activity as a medical man, + the author begs the reader's tolerance of a short anecdote. In 1920 + or 1921, when both Judge Linebarger and Sun Yat-sen were in + Shanghai, and were working together on the book that was to appear + as _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, the younger son of Judge + Linebarger--the brother of the present author--fell ill with a rather + obscure stomach disorder. The Western physicians having made little + or no progress in the case, Sun Yat-sen intervened with an old + Chinese herbal prescription, which he, a Western-trained physician, + was willing to endorse. The remedy was relatively efficacious--more + so than the suggestions of the European doctors. Even though Sun + Yat-sen very early abandoned his career of professional medical man + for that of revolutionist, he appears to have practised medicine + intermittently throughout his life. + + 104 Sun Yat-sen wrote, in Wei Yung translation, cited, p. 115: "In our + age of scientific progress the undertaker [sic!], seeks to know + first before undertaking. This is due to the desire to forestall + blunders and accidents so as to ensure efficiency and economy of + labor. He who is able to develop ideas from knowledge, plans from + ideas, and action from plans can be crowned with success in any + undertaking irrespective of its profoundness or the magnitude of + labor involved." + + 105 Tai, cited, p. 66: "Wir sind Chinesen, und was wir zunächst zu + ändern haben liegt in China. Aber wenn alle Dinge in China wertlos + gewerden sind, wenn die chinesische Kultur in der Kulturgeschichte + der Welt keine Bedeutung mehr hat, und wenn das chinesische Volk die + Kraft, seine Kultur hochzuhalten, verloren hat, dann können wir + gleich mit gebundenen Händen den Tod abwarten; zu welchem Zweck + brauchen wir dann noch Revolution zu treiben!" + + 106 An interesting discussion of this attitude is to be found in Li Chi, + _The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge (Massachusetts), + 1928. + + 107 See Tsui Shu-chin, cited, pp. 96-146. The work of Tsui is good for + the field covered; his discussion of the contrasting policy of the + Communists and of Sun Yat-sen with respect to nationalities may be + regarded as reliable. + + 108 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 67 and following. + + 109 See above, "The Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity." + + 110 The present state of Western knowledge of the sociology of China is + not sufficient to warrant reference to any authorities for the + description of egalitarianism and mobility. These matters are still + on that level of unspecialized knowledge where every visitor to + China may observe for himself. The bibliography on the social life + of the Chinese on pp. 240-242 of Kenneth Scott Latourette, _The + Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New York, 1934, contains some + of the leading titles that touch on the subject. Prof. A. R. + Radcliffe-Brown of the University of Chicago informed the present + author that he contemplates the planning of an extensive program of + socio-anthropological field work in Chinese villages which will + assist considerably in the understanding of the sociology of old + China. + + 111 Hsü, _Confucianism_, cited, p. 49, states the function of the + Confucian leaders quite succinctly: "... the Confucian school + advocates political and social reorganization by changing the social + mind through political action." + + 112 Hsü, cited, p. 104. + + 113 Hsü, cited, pp. 195-196. + + 114 Mariano Ponce, _Sun Yat Sen, El fundador de la Republica de China_, + Manila, 1912, p. 23. + + "Y tampoco era posible sustituirla por otra dinastía nacional. Sólo + existen al presente dos familias en China, de donde podían salir los + soberanos: uno es la descendencia de la dinastía Ming, de que + usurparon los mandchüs el trone, hace más de dos siglos y medio, y + la otra es la del filósofo Confucio, cuyo descendiente lineal + reconocido es el actual duque Kung. Ni en una, ni en otra existen + vástagos acondicionados para regir un Estado conforme á los + requerimientos de los tiempos actuales. Hubo de descartarse, pues, + de la plataforma de la 'Joven China' el pensamiento de instalar en + el trono á una dinastía nacional. Y sin dinastía holgaba el trono. + + "No sabemos si aún habiendo en las dos familias mencionados miembros + con condiciones suficientes para ser el Jefe supremo de un Estado + moderno, hubiese prosperado el programa monarquico. + + "Lo que sí pueda decir es que desde los primeros momentos + evolucionayon las ideas de Sun Yat Sen hacia el republicanismo...." + + Ponce then goes on to point out Sun Yat-sen's having said that the + decentralized system of old government and the comparative autonomy + of the vice-regencies presented a background of "a sort of + aristocratic republic" ("une especie de república aristocrática"). + + 115 Ponce, cited, p. 24. "... la única garantía posible, el único medio + por excelencia para obtener los mejores gobernantes...." + + 116 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 234. + + 117 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 235. + + 118 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 255. + + 119 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 266, note 1. Father d'Elia discusses + the reasons which made it seem more probable that Sun was + transliterating the name Millar into Chinese rather than (John + Stuart) Mill. + + 120 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 256 and following. + + 121 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 271. + + 122 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 273. + + 123 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 242-243. + + 124 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 223 and following. Dr. Hsü (cited, p. + 263 and following) translates these four epochs as following: _hung + fang_, "the stage of the great wilderness"; _shen ch'üan_, "the + state of theocracy"; _chun ch'üan_, "the stage of monarchy"; and + _min ch'üan_, "the stage of democracy." + + 125 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 241-242. + + 126 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book II, ch. 2. + + 127 It is of interest to note that the "New Life Movement" inaugurated + by Chiang Chieh-shih is concerned with many such petty matters such + as those enumerated above. Each of these small problems is in itself + of little consequence; in the aggregate they loom large. + + 128 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 331. + + 129 Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. It is interesting to note that the + translation by Father d'Elia gives a more literal translation of the + names that Sun Yat-sen applied to these categories. He translates + the Chinese terms as _pre-seeing_, _post-seeing_, and _non-seeing_. + + 130 Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. + + 131 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 348. + + 132 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 352. Sun Yat-sen defined democracy + thus: "... under a republican government, the people is sovereign." + + 133 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 25, refers to this distinction as being + between force (_Gewalt_) and power (_Macht_). To the people + belonged, and rightfully, the force which could sanction or refuse + to sanction the existence of the government and the confirmation of + its policies. The government had the power (_Macht_), which the + people did not have, of formulating intelligent policies and + carrying them out in an organized manner. + + 134 Liang Chi-ch'ao, cited, pp. 50-52. + + 135 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 279 and following. + + 136 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 368. + + 137 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 368-9. Dr. Wou Saofong, in his _Sun + Yat-sen_ (Paris, 1929), summarizes his thesis of Sun Yat-sen in + somewhat different terms: "... Sun Yat-sen compare, le gouvernement + à un appareil mécanique, dont le moteur est constitué _par les lois_ + ou les ministres, tandis que l'ingénieur que dirige la machine était + autrefois le roi et aujourd'hui le peuple," p. 124. (Italics mine.) + This suggestion that the state-machine, in the theory of Sun + Yat-sen, is composed of laws as well as men is quite interesting; + Sun Yat-sen himself does not seem to have used this figure of speech + and it may be Dr. Wou's applying the juristic interpretation on his + own initiative. Sun Yat-sen, in his sixth lecture on democracy, + says, "Statesmen and lawyers of Europe and America say that + government is a machine of which law is a tool." (d'Elia + translation, cited, p. 368.) + + 138 It must always remain one of those conjectures upon which scholars + may expend their fantasy what Sun Yat-sen would have thought of the + necessity of the juristic state, which involved a quite radical + change throughout the Chinese social organism, had he lived to see + the ebb of juristic polity and, for all that, of voting democracy. + It is not unlikely that his early impressions of the United States + and his reading of Montesquieu would have led him to retain his + belief in a juristic-democratic state in spite of the fact that such + a state would no longer represent the acme of ultra-modernism. + + 139 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 378 and following. + + 140 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 369. + + 141 Reginald Johnston, _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited above, + presents an apparently true account of the conspiracies of the + various Northern generals which centered around the person of P'u + Yi. According to Johnston Tsao Kun was defeated in his attempt to + restore the Manchu Emperor only by the jealousies of his + fellow-militarists. + + 142 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 406. + + 143 Father d'Elia devotes the whole second chapter of his introduction + to the consideration of a suitable rendition of _San Min Chu I_, + which he calls the Triple Demism. (Work cited, pp. 36-49.) Again on + p. 402, he explains that, while he had translated _min shêng_ as + _socialism_ in the first French edition of his work, he now renders + it as _the economic Demism_ or _sociology_. The most current + translation, that of Frank Price, cited, gives _the principle of + livelihood_. Paul Linebarger gave it as _socialism_ as far back as + 1917 (_The Chinese Nationalist Monthly_, December, 1917, Chicago) in + Chicago, at the time when Lin Shen, Frank C. Lee and he were all + working for Sun in that city. Dr. H. H. Kung, a high government + official related by marriage to Mme. Sun Yat-sen, speaks of the + three principles of _liberty_, _democracy_, and _economic + well-being_ (preface to Hsü, _Sun_, cited, p. xvi). Dr. V. K. + Wellington Koo, one of China's most eminent diplomats, speaks of + _social organization_ (_Memoranda Presented to the Lytton + Commission_, New York City, n. d.). Citations could be presented + almost indefinitely. _Min_ means "people," and _shêng_ means "life; + vitality, the living, birth, means of living" according to the + dictionary (S. Wells Williams, _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese + Language_, Tungchou, 1909). The mere terms are of very little help + in solving the riddle of _min shêng_. Laborious examination is + needed, and even this will not, perhaps, lead us to anything more + than probability. Sun Yat-sen, in his lectures, called it by several + different names, which seem at first sight to contradict each other. + + 144 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 91-92. + + 145 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Bk. IV, p. 62: "I must confess + that the idea of using the sacred cult of ancestor worship as a + political machine is very abhorrent to me. In fact, I think that + even the rashest fool would never attempt to use this intimate cult + with its exclusively domestic privacy as a revolutionary + instrument." + + 146 Linebarger, _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, New York, 1925, + pp. 68-9. + + 147 The same, pp. 135-139. + + 148 The same, pp. 104-105. + + 149 The same, pp. 122-123. + + 150 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472. + + 151 Karl A. Wittfogel, _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig, + 1931. The author, the German Marxian who wrote the best Marxist + critique of Sun Yat-sen, is the only scholar to seek a really + complete picture of the old Chinese economy by the technique of + modern Western economic analysis. Described by the author as an + "attempt," the first volume of this work runs to 737 pages. It is + valuable for the large amount of statistical material which it + contains, and for its systematic method; its Marxian bias narrows + its interest considerably. + + 152 Both works of Wittfogel, cited above, are useful for the + understanding of the transition from the old economy to the new. For + a general view of the economic situation and potentialities of + China, see George B. Cressey, _China's Geographic Foundations_, New + York, 1934. The bibliography on Chinese economy to be found in + Latourette, cited above, vol. II, pp. 116-119, is useful. + + 153 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 97. + + 154 See below, section on the national economic revolution. + + 155 Hsü translation, cited, pp. 186-187. The d'Elia translation gives a + more exact rendering of Sun Yat-sen's words (p. 97), but, by + following Sun Yat-sen in calling China a hypo-colony, is less + immediately plain to the Western reader than is the translation of + Dr. Hsü, who in this instance uses "sub" and "hypo" interchangeably. + + 156 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 443. + + 157 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 452. + + 158 His _International Development of China_, New York, 1922 + (republished 1929), is a colossal plan which could only be compared + with the _Piatiletka_ or with the New Deal in the United States, + since Sun Yat-sen suggested that--in order to avoid the consequences + of a post-war depression--the nations of the world might cooperate in + the equal exploitation of Chinese national resources with the + Chinese. He proposed the modernization of China by a vast + international loan which could permit the Western nations to + maintain their war-time peak production, supplying China (1929 ed., + p. 8). He concludes the work: "In a nutshell, it is my idea to make + capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic + forces of human civilization will work side by side in future + civilization" (p. 237). The work is, however, generally regarded as + a transportation plan, since Sun Yat-sen sketched out a railway map + of China which would require decades to realize, and which + overshadowed, by its very magnitude, the other aspects of his + proposals. + + 159 At the risk of digression, one might comment on an interesting + element of the Euramerican ideology which is in sharp contrast to + the Chinese. The West has, apparently, always been devoted to + dichotomies of morality. The Greeks had reason and unenlightenment, + and whole series of ideals that could be fought for and against, but + the real division of good and bad in the West came, of course, with + Christianity, which accustomed Westerners to think for centuries in + terms of holiness versus evil--they being, geographically, holy, and + the outsiders (heathen), evil. Now that the supernatural foundations + of Christianity have been shaken by the progress of scientific and + intellectual uncertainty, many Westerners find an emotional and an + intellectual satisfaction in dividing the world into pure and + unclean along lines of sometimes rather abstruse economic questions. + This new morality seems to be based on distributive economics rather + than on deity. It is employed, of course, by the Marxians, but their + adversaries, in opposing them with equal passion, fall into the same + habit. It is shocking and unbelievable to such persons to discover + that there is a society whose ideology does not center around the + all-meaningful point of the ownership of the means of production. + Their only reaction is a negation of the possibility of such + thought, or, at least, of its realism. The intellectual position of + Sun Yat-sen in the modern world would be more clearly appreciated if + the intellectuals of the West were not adjusting their ideological + and emotional habits from religion to economics, and meanwhile + judging all men and events in economic terms. The present discussion + of Sun Yat-sen's economic ideology is a quite subordinate one in + comparison to the examination of his ideology as a whole, but some + persons will regard it as the only really important point that could + be raised concerning him. + + 160 Tsui, cited, p. 345, quotes Nathaniel Peffer: "... Peffer said that + Dr. Sun never 'attained intellectual maturity, and he was completely + devoid of the faculty of reason. He functioned mentally in sporadic + hunches. It was typical of him that he met Joffe, read the Communist + Manifesto, and turned Communist, and then read one book by an + American of whom he knew nothing, and rejected communism all in a + few months.' " Sun Yat-sen knew Marxism, years before the Russian + Revolution. The Communist Manifesto was not new to him. He was + extraordinarily well read in Western political and economic thought. + Sun Yat-sen never turned Communist, nor did he subsequently reject + communism any more than he had done for years. + + 161 The author hopes, at some future time, to be able to fill in the + intellectual background of Sun Yat-sen much more thoroughly than he + is able to at the present, for lack of materials. One interesting + method would involve the listing of every Western book with which + Sun Yat-sen can be shown to have been acquainted. It might be a + fairly accurate gauge of the breadth of his information. + + 162 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 461-468. Father d'Elia's note on the + relative positions of Henry George and Sun (p. 466) is interesting. + For a discussion of the actual program proposed by Sun, see below, + "The Program of _Min Shêng_" section on land policy. + + 163 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 58. + + 164 The same, pp. 98-99. There is an inconsistency of wording here, + which may or may not be the fault of the translator. The oath refers + to the "equitable redistribution of the land" (p. 98); the platform + speaks of "the nationalization of land" (p. 98); and one of the + slogans is "Equalize land-ownership!" + + 165 See also the discussion in Tsui, _Canton-Moscow Entente_, cited, pp. + 371-376; and in Li Ti-tsun, "The Sunyatsenian principle of + Livelihood," _The Chinese Students' Monthly_, XXIV (March 1929), pp. + 230. Li declares that Sun envisioned immediate redistribution but + ultimate socialization, but does not cite his source for this. Li's + discussion of sources is good otherwise. + + 166 Sharman, p. 58; the same authority for the statement as to the 1905 + manifesto. + + 167 Sharman, p. 94. + + 168 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 61. + + 169 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 66: "Dieses sehr unpräzise + Programm, das die Frage der Klasseninteressen und des Klassenkampfes + als des Mittels zur Brechung privilegierter Klasseninteressen nicht + aufwirft, war objektiv gar nicht Sozialismus, sondern etwas durchaus + anderes: Lenin hat die Formel '_Subjektiver Sozialismus_' dafür + geprägt." + + 170 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 67: "So bedeutete denn Suns + 'Sozialismus' im Munde der Chinesischen Bourgeoisie nichts als ein + Art Bekenntness zu einer 'sozialen,' d.h. massenfreundlichen + Wirtschaftspolitik." + + 171 T'ang, cited, p. 46. + + 172 T'ang, cited, p. 172. + + 173 T'ang, cited, p. 172. + + 174 T'ang, cited, pp. 171-172. + + 175 Wittfogel, cited, pp. 117-118. + + 176 Wittfogel, cited, p. 140: "... Seine Drei Prinzipien verkörpern in + ihrer _Entwicklung_ den objektiven Wandel der ökonomisch-sozialen + Situation Chinas, in ihren _Widersprüchen_ die realen Widersprüche + der chinesischen Revolution, in ihren _jüngsten Tendenzen_ die + Verlagerung des sozialen Schwerpunktes der Revolution, die Klassen + in Aktion setzt, deren Ziel nicht mehr ein + bürgerlich-kapitalistisches, sondern ein + proletarisch-sozialistisches und ein bauerlich-agrar-revolutionäres + ist. + + "Sun Yat-sen ist demnach nicht nur der bisher mächtigste + Repräsentant der bürgerlich-nationalen, antiimperialistischen + Revolutionen des erwach-enden Asiens überhaupt, er weist zugleich + über die bürgerliche Klassen-schranke dieser ersten Etappe der + asiatischen Befreiungsbewegung hinaus. Dies zu verkennen, wäre + verhängnisvoll, gerade auch für die proletarisch-kommunistische + Bewegung Ostasiens selbst." + + 177 Statement of Judge Linebarger to the author. See also Linebarger, + _Conversations_, references to Communism which occur throughout the + whole book. + + 178 Tsui, cited, p. 144. It would involve a duplication of effort for + the present author to repeat the material of Dr. Tsui's excellent + monograph on Sun Yat-sen and the Bolsheviks. Since the purpose of + the present work is to undertake an exposition of the Nationalist + political ideology and programs against the background of the old + Chinese ideology, such an emphasis upon one comparatively small + point in Sun Yat-sen's doctrines would be entirely disproportionate + as well as superfluous. The reader is referred to the work of Dr. + Tsui for any details of these relations that he may wish to examine. + + 179 See Tsui, cited, and section below, on the class struggle of the + nations. + + 180 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 450. See also Tsui, cited, pp. + 353-354; and Li, cited, pp. 229 and following. + + 181 Sun, _Development of China_, cited, p. 237. + + 182 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932, p. + 4. + + 183 William, in his _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, cited, proves beyond + doubt that Sun Yat-sen was strongly indebted to him for many + anti-Marxian arguments. + + 184 See above, Chapter One, second, third, and fourth sections. + + 185 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 423. + + 186 Tsui, cited, pp. 121-123, n. 72. + + 187 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472. + + 188 Hsü translation, cited, p. 422. The Hsü version will be cited from + time to time, whenever Father d'Elia's interesting neologisms might + make the citation too disharmonious, in wording, with the comment. + + 189 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 294. + + 190 Francis W. Coker, _Recent Political Thought_, New York--London, 1934, + pp. 545-562, Ch. XX, "Empirical Collectivism." + + 191 Coker, cited, pp. 546-547. + + 192 Coker, cited, pp. 548-549. Throughout the discussion of empirical + collectivism the present author will cite, by and large, the + categories given by Coker. Any special exceptions will be noted, but + otherwise the discussion will be based on Coker's chapter on + "Empirical Collectivism," cited above. + + 193 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 31. + + 194 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 30. + + 195 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 475. + + 196 See, however, the d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 298-301, for a + reference to labor unions and a statement for their need of + competent and honest leadership. + + 197 See Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, "Die Arbeiter," pp. 97-99. + T'ang, Hsü, and the various biographies of Sun almost all contain + references from time to time to Sun's friendliness toward and + approval of organized labor. + + 198 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, pp. 325-329. The next speech of Sun + Yat-sen given in Wittfogel's work is Sun's indignant attack on "the + so-called Labor Government" of England, which permitted the old + methods of British Far Eastern imperialism to continue. + + 199 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 18. This work, + while it cannot be given the weight of direct quotations from Sun's + own writings or speeches, does contain a good deal about the + policies of _min shêng_ which does not appear elsewhere. The author + has sought to avoid citation of it where direct sources are + available, since the nature of the material makes it by no means so + authoritative as others might be. + + 200 Coker, cited, p. 551. + + 201 E. D. Harvey, _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933, deals + extensively with these supernatural elements. The reader who turns + to it should keep in mind the fact that the supernatural plays a + rôle in China distinctly less important than that which it did, say, + in medieval Europe, and that a strong agnostic, rather than a + skeptical, spirit among the Chinese has preserved them from the + grossest errors of superstition. + + 202 Latourette, cited, p. 129. Dr. Latourette's sketch of Chinese + religious thought is especially good, as indeed it might be, since + he is one of the most celebrated American scholars in the field of + Western religion in China. + + 203 H. G. Creel, work cited, p. 127. + + 204 The author cannot give a documentary citation for this observation. + It was communicated to him many times by his father, Judge Paul + Linebarger, who stated that Sun Yat-sen was most apt to talk in + terms of morality and morale by preference. The fact that Sun + Yat-sen came from a Chinese Confucian background into a Western + Christian one cannot be ignored. He did not permit his Christianity + to sway him from what he considered his necessary lines of behavior + in politics; it did not, for example, prevent him from being + extremely cordial to the Soviet Union at the time that that state + was still more or less outcaste. And yet, speaking of the Christian + God, he is reputably reported to have said: "God sent me to China to + free her from bondage and oppression, and I have not been + disobedient to the Heavenly mission"; and, again, to have said on + the day before his death: "I am a Christian; God sent me to fight + evil for my people. Jesus was a revolutionist; so am I." (Both + quotations from appendix to the d'Elia translation, p. 718.) + + 205 Sun Yat-sen authorized the biography, cited, which Judge Linebarger + wrote of him. It was a propaganda work, and neither he nor the + author had any particular expectation that it would ever be regarded + as a source, or as an academically prepared document. The last + chapter of this authorized biography bears the title, "Conclusion: + Sun the Moral Force." This, perhaps, is significant as to Sun's own + attitude. + + 206 Note the contrast between the thought of Sun in this respect and + that of Tagore or Gandhi. This has been pointed out by many Western + writers on China. + + 207 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 20. + + 208 Sharman, cited, p. 282. + + 209 The reader must bear in mind the fact that what is presented here is + Sun Yat-sen's political program for China. In many instances the + course of affairs has deviated quite definitely from that program, + and it can be only a matter of conjecture as to what Sun Yat-sen + would do were he to return and observe the Nationalist movement as + it now is. It is manifestly impossible to trace all the changes in + this program. The actual developments have conformed only in part + with Sun Yat-sen's plans, although the leaders seek to have it + appear as though they are following as close to Sun Yat-sen's + democratic politics as they can. Many persons who were close to Sun + Yat-sen, such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, believe that the National + Government has betrayed the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and that + Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih has made himself the autocrat of the + National Government. It is, of course, impossible within the scope + of this thesis to enter into this dispute. Who rules the + Soviet--Stalin, or the Communist Party? Who rules China--Chiang + Chieh-shih, or the Kuomintang? In each case there is the question of + whether the leader could get along without the party, and whether + the party could get along without the leader, as well as the + question of the leader's sincerity. These issues, however burning + they might be in real life, could not be adequately treated in a + work such as this. The author has sought to present Sun Yat-sen's + theory of applied politics. Where events which Sun Yat-sen foresaw + have come to pass, the author has referred to them. He does not wish + to be understood as presenting a description of the whole course of + events in China. + + 210 Here, again, one must remember that Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen, + and others charge that the Party no longer rules, that it has been + prostituted by Chiang Chieh-shih, and now serves only to cloak a + military despotism. It may be noted, so far as the other side of the + question is concerned, that a greater number of the persons who were + eminent in the Party before Sun Yat-sen died have remained in it + than have left it. + + 211 See T'ang, work cited for an excellent description of the mutations + of the revolutionary party. T'ang criticizes the present personnel + of the Kuomintang severely, but the reader must keep in mind the + fact that he has since become reconciled with the present + leadership, and make allowances for the somewhat emphatic + indignation voiced at the time of writing the book. The brilliance + of the author guarantees that the story is well told, but it is not + told for the last time. See also, Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau, _Two Years + of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, for a summary that is as + excellent as it is short. Various changes have occurred in party + function, organization, and personnel since that time, but they have + not--to the knowledge of the author--been completely and adequately + covered by any one work. + + 212 For a history of this period, see T'ang, Sharman, or Tsui Shu-chin, + all cited above. The Communist side of the story is told by Harold + Isaacs (editor), _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_, Shanghai, + 1932, and in the various works of the Stalinist and Trotskyist + groups concerning the intervention of the Third Internationale in + China. Two graphic personal accounts cast in semi-fictional form, + are Oscar Erdberg, _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932, and + Vincent Sheean, _Personal History_, New York, 1935; these present + the Communist and the left-liberal viewpoints, respectively. The + dramatic story of the Entente, the separation, and the ensuing + conflict are not yet remote enough to have cooled into material + ready for the historian. + + 213 The Kuomintang, in accepting the Communist administrative structure, + was not violating traditional Chinese patterns altogether. It has + been pointed out that the revised structure of the Kuomintang + resembled older Chinese guild patterns as well as the new Russian + style (Sharman, work cited, p. 262). + + 214 Here, again, one might refer to the disputes as to the orthodoxy and + integrity of the present leadership. The preëminence of + Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih, which cannot be doubted, is seen by + persons friendly to him as a strong and beneficent influence upon + the C. E. C. Persons hostile to him charge that he has packed the C. + E. C. with his adherents, and controls it as he chooses. + + 215 An interesting piece of research could deal with the method of + recruitment and registration in the Kuomintang before the coming of + the Communist advisers. There was rarely any doubt as to who was, or + was not, a member, but there was constant trouble as to the good + standing of members. Recruitment seems to have been on a basis of + oath-taking, initiation, etc.; what Party discipline there was seems + to have been applied only in the most extreme cases, and then + crudely. + + 216 It is interesting to note that the Kuomintang is to a certain degree + democratic in representing the various occupational groups in China. + Tyau, cited above, p. 25 and following, lists the percentages in the + membership in the Kuomintang according to occupation, as they stood + in 1930: Party work, 5.84%; government service, 6.61%; army and + navy, 3.26%; police, 4.09%; labor (in general), 7.32%; agriculture, + 10.43%; navigation, 1.20%; railway, 1.14%; commerce, 10.47%; + students, 10.47%; teaching, 21.31%; independent professions, 1.66%; + social work, 1.68%; unemployed, O.54%; unclassified, 3.13%; + incomplete returns, 15.09%. + + 217 See above, pp. 59 and following. + + 218 Sun Yat-sen, _Kidnapped in London_, cited, _passim_. + + 219 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 122-123. + + 220 The present instances are all taken from the third lecture on + nationalism, d'Elia translation, cited pp. 127-128. The Hsü + translation, in spite of its many merits, is not strong on + geography. Thus, in the translation referring to Poland which has + just been cited, the Hsü reading runs: "Although Persia was + partitioned by foreigners over a century ago, Persian nationalism + was not lost; consequently the Persians have been able to restore + their country to independence; and now Persia has the status of a + second or third class power in Europe" (p. 208), this in spite of + the fact that Persia is translated correctly further on (p. 327). + Another misreading is: "After the war, two new Slavic states were + born, namely Czechoslovakia and Jugoslovakia" (p. 217). These minor + errors are, however, among the very few which can be discovered in + the whole book, and do not mar the text to any appreciable extent. + + 221 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 132. + + 222 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 63. + + 223 T'ang, cited, pp. 168 and following, gives the various documents of + the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, which place the + application of nationalism first in their programs. "The Manifesto + On Going to Peking," issued by Sun November 10, 1924, refers to + various points to be achieved; the first is, "National freedom from + external restriction will enable China to develop her national + economy and to increase her productivity." (Hsü translation, p. + 148.) This might imply that the execution of _min shêng_ was to be + coincidental with or anterior to the fulfillment of nationalism; it + probably does not. + + 224 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187. + + 225 Discussions of this are to be found in Sir Reginald Johnston's + _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited. + + 226 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 244. + + 227 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 245-247. + + 228 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187. Numerals have been written out by + the present author. + + 229 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 365. Italics are omitted. + + 230 This is not due to any mystical veneration of numbers, or religious + influence. In spreading doctrines which would have to be followed by + the unlettered as well as by the scholars, Sun Yat-sen found it + necessary to develop the general outline of his principles in such a + way as to give them a considerable mnemonic appeal. Thus, the three + principles--and the three French (liberty, equality, fraternity) and + American (of, by, for the people) principles--and the triple foreign + aggression, the four popular powers, the five governmental rights. + The use of the number three permitted Sun Yat-sen to weave together + the various strands of his teaching, and to attain a considerable + degree of cross-reference. It cannot be shown to have induced any + actual distortion of his theories. + + 231 Hsü translation, cited, p. 213. See also d'Elia translation, p. 134. + + 232 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 114. + + 233 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 101. + + 234 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. The whole present discussion of + economic oppression is drawn from the latter part of the second + lecture. Except in the case of direct quotation, no further + reference will be given to this section, which occurs at pp. 97-115 + of the d'Elia translation. + + 235 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 106. + + 236 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. + + 237 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. + + 238 In referring to a sub-principle, the author is following Sun + Yat-sen's arrangement of his ideas, even though the exact term, + "sub-principle," is not to be found in Sun's works. Each of the + three principles can be considered with respect to national unity, + national autonomy, and national survival. The correlation of the + three principles, each with itself and then the two others, + logically leads to the appearance of nine sub-principles. The writer + has not followed any artificial compulsion of numbers, merely for + the sake of producing a pretty outline, but has followed Sun Yat-sen + in seeking to make clear the specific relations of each of the three + principles to the three cardinal points which they embody. + + 239 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 179-180. + + 240 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180. + + 241 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180. + + 242 Tsui, cited, pp. 113-114. + + 243 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, pp. 21 and following, Book I. + + 244 Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking foreign + capital for the just and honorable national development of China + through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul + Linebarger. Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure + loans for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never + used the document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr. + Rea to the author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that + the former was "Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs of Manchoukuo," despite his former Chinese connections.) + Judge Linebarger was also unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more + interested in having Judge Linebarger stop any assistance offered by + the Consortium to the Northern "Republic of China" than in having + him procure any actual funds. + + 245 It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to + Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power + and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world + hegemony; they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think + of restoring the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which + they had enjoyed in the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga + Shogun. + + 246 Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116. + + 247 Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63. + + 248 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this + curious relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang + Chu (Chang Tso), _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins University + doctoral dissertation, 1935. The submission to China was, among + other things, a means by which the rulers of the peripheral states + could get themselves recognized by an authority higher than + themselves, thus legitimizing their position. + + 249 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 153. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had a + high opinion of the American administration of the Philippines, + saying: The United States "... even allows the Filipinos to send + delegations to Congress in Washington. Not only does the United + States require no annual tribute in money from them, but, on the + contrary, she gives the Filipinos considerable subsidies to build + and maintain their roads and to promote education. It seems as + though so humanitarian a treatment would be regarded as the utmost + benevolence. Still, until the present day, the Filipinos do not + boast of being 'Americanized'; they are daily clamoring for + independence" (d'Elia translation, p. 153). This statement is + interesting in two connections. In the first place, although Sun + Yat-sen had once thought of sending men, money, or munitions to help + the Filipino nationalists in their struggles against the Americans, + he seems to have conceived a warm admiration for the American + administration in those islands. Secondly, the reader may consider + that Sun Yat-sen, at the time that he made this comment, was in the + course of attacking imperialism. If Sun Yat-sen could offer so + enthusiastic an apology for the Americans in the Philippines, it + shows that he must have let the abstract principle ride, and judged + only on the basis of his own observation. To the orthodox Communist + the American rule of the Philippines is peculiarly wicked because of + the American denial of imperialist practises. + + 250 Some of the older books on China give interesting maps of that + country divided up into spheres of influence between the various + powers. It was quite fashionable among journalists to sketch the + various Chinese possessions of the great powers; the powers never + got around to the partition. The American declaration of the "Open + Door" may have had something to do with this, and the British + enunciation of the same doctrine probably carried weight. For a + time, however, the Europeans seemed quite convinced of the almost + immediate break-up of China into three or four big colonies. Lord + Charles Beresford, a prominent English peer, wrote a work which was + extremely popular; its title was _The Break-Up of China_ (London, + 1899). + + 251 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 93. + + 252 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 165. + + 253 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 165-170. + + 254 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 170. + + 255 The Communists envision three types of conflict to be produced by + the contradictions of imperialism: intra-national class war, + international class war, and inter-imperialist war. The first is the + struggle of the proletariat of the whole world against the various + national bourgeois governments; the second, the struggle of the + oppressed peoples, under revolutionary bourgeois or proletarian + leadership, against the oppressions of Western imperialism; and the + last, the conflict of the various imperialist powers with one + another. Sun Yat-sen's theory agreed definitely with the second + point, the international class war; he seems to have admitted the + probability of class war within the nations of the West, and of + inter-imperialist war, but he did not draw the three types of + conflict together and because of them predicate an Armageddon and a + millenium. His flexible, pragmatic thought never ran to extremes; + although he agreed, more or less distinctly, with the Bolshevik + premises of the three conflicts of the imperialist epoch, he did not + follow them to their conclusion. + + 256 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 75. + + 257 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 148-149. + + 258 Such works as Lea's _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909, and + Stoddard's _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy_, + New York, 1920, make precisely the same sort of statements, + although, of course, they regard the "Saxon" or "Teutonic" race as + the logical master-race of the world. Since Lea was associated for + some time with Sun Yat-sen, accompanying him from Europe to Nanking + in 1911, and undoubtedly had plenty of time to talk with him, it may + be that some of the particular terms used by Sun in this discussion + are those which he may have developed in his probable conversations + with Lea. Nothing more definite than this can be stated. + + 259 Quoted by Sun in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 138. The remark does + not sound like Lenin. A Communist would not invoke nature, nor would + he count the whole membership of an imperialist nation as + imperialist. The world, to him, is misguided by a tiny handful of + capitalists and traditional ideologues and their hangers-on, not by + the masses of any nation. + + 260 Note, however, the reference in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 76, or + the Price translation, p. 18. Sun Yat-sen speaks of _international + wars, within_ races, on the lines of social _classes_. He may have + meant international wars within the races and across race lines on + the basis of the oppressed nations of the world fighting the + oppressing nations. He may, however, have meant intra-national class + wars. Since he recognized the presence of the class conflict in the + developed capitalistic states of the West, this would not + necessarily imply his expectation of an intra-national class war in + China. + + 261 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 331-337, gives the whole text of the + speech. Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 304, refers to it. + + 262 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335. "Es ist gegen Gerechtigkeit und + Menschlichkeit, dass eine Minderheit von vierhundert Millionen eine + Mehrheit von neunhundert Millionen unterdrückt...." + + 263 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 333. "Die Europäer halten uns Asiaten + durch die Macht ihrer materiellen Errungenschaften zu Boden." + + 264 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 333. "Wenn wir + zweitausendfünf-hundert Jahre zurückdenken, so war China damals das + mächtigste Volk der Welt. Es nahm damals eine Stellung ein wie heute + Grossbritannien und Amerika. Doch während Grossbritannien und die + Vereinigten Staaten heute zur zwei unter einer Reihe von Weltmächten + sind, war China damals die einzige grosse Macht." + + 265 Ponce, work cited, p. xiv: "_Conozcámonos y nos amaremos más_--decía + el gran Sun Yat-sen á sus amigos orientales." This work is, by the + way, the most extensive for its account of Sun's associations with + Koreans, Filipinos, and Japanese. It has been completely overlooked + by the various biographers of and commentators on Sun, with the + exception of Judge Linebarger, to whom Sun Yat-sen presented a copy + of the work. + + 266 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 337: "In England und Amerika gibt es + immerhin eine kleine Zahl von Menschen, die diese unsere Ideale im + Einklang mit einer allgemeinen Weltbewegung verteidigen. Was die + anderen Barbarennationen anbelangt, so dürfte es auch in ihren + Reihen Menschen geben, die von der gleichen Überzeugung beseelt + sind." + + 267 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335: "Wenn wir Asiaten nach der + Herstellung einer panasiatischen Einheitsfront streben, müssen wir + selbst in unserer Zeit daran denken, auf welcher grundlegenden + Auffassung wir diese Einheitsfront errichten wollen. Wir sollen + dasjenige zugrunde legen, was die besondere Eigentümlichkeit unserer + östlichen Kultur gewesen ist, wir sollten unseren Nachdruck legen + auf die moralischen Werte, auf Güte und Gerechtigkeit. Sie sollen + das Fundament der Einheit ganz Asiens werden." + + 268 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 207. Italics omitted. + + 269 The article by Tsui, cited, p. 177 and following, goes into a quite + detailed comparison of the Chinese Nationalist and the Marxian + Communist theories of the three stages of revolution. He draws + attention to the fact that, while the Communists do not speak of + "three stages" and prefer to emphasize the transitional stage of the + dictatorship of the proletariat, the two theories are similar almost + to the point of being identical. + + 270 Tsui, cited, p. 181. + + 271 Tyau, cited, p. 439 and following. It is also available in Hsü, _Sun + Yat-sen_, cited above, p. 85 and following. The Tyau translation was + preferred since it was written by an official of the Ministry of + Foreign Affairs, and may be regarded as the work of a Government + spokesman. It is interesting, by way of contrast, to quote a passage + from the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, so-called: + "The Chinese Soviet Government is building up a state of the + democratic dictatorship [sic!] of the workers and peasants. All + power shall be vested in the Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Red + Army men." _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New + York, 1934, p. 18. The absence of an acknowledged period of + tutelage, in view of the unfamiliarity of the Chinese people with + democratic forms, is significant. The constitutional jurisprudence + of the Chinese Communists is, however, primarily a matter of + academic interest, since the Soviets, where they have existed, have + existed in a state of perpetual emergency, shielded by the Red + Terror and other devices of revolutionary control. The contrast + between a pronouncement of Sun Yat-sen and a constitution is a fair + one, since the writings of Sun Yat-sen form the final authority in + the Nationalist movement and government; in a dispute as to the + higher validity of a governmental provision or a flat contrary + statement of Sun Yat-sen, there can be little question as to which + would--or, in the eyes of the Nationalists, should--prevail. + + 272 It is interesting to note that the institution which most Western + writers would incline to regard as the very key-stone of democracy, + parliament, has a quite inferior place in the Sun Yat-sen system. In + the National Government of China, the Legislative Yuan is more like + a department than like a chamber. This question, however, will be + discussed under the heading of the Five Rights. + + 273 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341. + + 274 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 342. + + 275 A discussion of the four powers and the five rights is to be found + in Li Chao-wei, _La Souveraineté Nationale d'après la Doctrine + Politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934. This work, a doctoral thesis + submitted to the University of Dijon, treats the Western theory of + democracy and Sun's theory comparatively. It is excellent in + portraying the legal outline of the Chinese governmental structure, + and points out many significant analogies between the two theories. + + 276 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 391. + + 277 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 395. + + 278 The unfavorable view of the Five Powers is taken by Dr. Jermyn + Chi-hung Lynn in his excellent little book, _Political Parties in + China_, Peiping, 1930. Since Dr. Lynn speaks kindly and hopefully of + the plans of Wu Pei-fu, one of the war-lords hostile to Sun Yat-sen + and the whole Nationalist movement, his criticism of Sun Yat-sen + need not be taken as completely impartial. It represents a point + that has been made time and time again by persons antagonistic to + the _San Min Chu I_. + + "The Wu Chuan Hsien Fa is also no discovery of Dr. Sun's. As is + known, the three power constitution, consisting of the legislative, + judiciary [sic!] and executive functions, was originally developed, + more or less unconsciously, by the English, whose constitution was + critically examined by Montesquieu, and its working elaborately + described by him for the benefit of his fellow-countrymen. And the + unwritten constitution of Old China contained the civil service + examination and an independent Board of Censors. Now the + much-advertised Wu Chuan Hsien Fa or Five-Power constitution only + added the systems of state examination and public censure to the + traditional form of constitution first advocated by the French + jurist." P. 66, work cited. + + 279 Hsü translation, cited, p. 104. + + 280 For an intensively vivid description of this government, which Sun + Yat-sen's planned democracy was to relegate to limbo, see B. L. + Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926. Putnam Weale was + the pseudonym of Bertram Lennox Simpson, an Englishman born and + reared in China, who understood and participated in Chinese life and + policies as have few since the days of Marco Polo; he was an advisor + to the insurrectionary Peking "Nationalist" Government of 1931 when + he was shot to death in his home at Tientsin. Few other Westerners + have left such a wealth of accurate and sympathetic material about + modern China. + + 281 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 399. + + 282 Harold Monk Vinacke, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_, + Princeton, 1920, p. 100. + + 283 Vinacke, cited, p. 141 and following. While Dr. Vinacke's book is + now out of date, it contains excellent material for the period + covered, roughly 1898 to 1919. He quotes Morse's comment on the + provinces with approval: "The Provinces are satrapies to the extent + that so long as the tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and + the general policy of the central administration followed, they are + free to administer their own affairs in detail as may seem best to + their own provincial authorities." (Hosea Ballou Morse, _The Trade + and Administration of China_, London, 1913, p. 46, quoted in + Vinacke, work cited, p. 5.) + + 284 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_, mss., 1934; + Book two, Chapter Five, "Democratic Provincial Home Rule." + + 285 Hsü, cited, p. 124. + + 286 Tyau, cited, p. 441. From "The Outline of National Reconstruction." + + 287 Tyau, cited, p. 450. + + 288 V. I. Lenin, _State and Revolution_, New York, 1932. Lenin's + discussion of Marx's point, p. 39 and following, is stimulating + although inclining to the ingenious. + + 289 The number of the villages is taken from Tawney, Richard Henry, + _Land and Labor in China_, London, 1932; and the number of _hsien_ + from Tyau, cited, p. 85. + + 290 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited above; throughout this volume, + Judge Linebarger recalls references made by Sun Yat-sen to him + concerning the _hsien_. + + 291 It is but fair to state, at the beginning, that this point of the + family system as one of the institutions of the democratic nation + has been very largely neglected by the Kuomintang and the National + Government. To the knowledge of the author, no plan has ever been + drafted either by Party or by Government which would erect the + system that Sun Yat-sen proposed. It is not beyond all conjecture + that Sun's suggestion may at a later date seem more practicable to + the leaders than now appears, and be put into operation in some + manner. + + 292 Hsü, cited, p. 164. + + 293 Hsü, cited, p. 243. + + 294 The material concerning the clans has been taken from the fifth + lecture on Nationalism (Hsü, cited, p. 240 and following; d'Elia, + cited, p. 174 and following). Judge Linebarger recorded Sun + Yat-sen's mention of a convention of the clans in _Conversations_, + cited above, Book One, Chapter Eight, "The Clans in the Nation." + + 295 There are three excellent discussions of the _min shêng_ programs. + Wou, cited, gives a clear precis of the doctrine. Hung Jair, _Les + idées économiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934, and Tsiang Kuen, + _Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme de Sun Yat + Sen_, Paris, 1933, cover essentially the same ground, although they + are both doctoral dissertations submitted to French universities. + The former deals primarily with the theory of Sun's economic ideas, + contrasting them with the economic thought of Adam Smith and of the + Marxians. The latter gives a rather extensive historical and + statistical background to Sun's _min shêng_, and traces the Chinese + economic system, whence _min shêng_ was derived in part, quite + fully. These authors have covered the field so widely that the + present work need not enter into the discussion of the precise + immediate policies to be advocated under _min shêng_. Enough will be + given to describe the relations of _min shêng_ with the more + formally political principles of nationalism and democracy, and to + afford the reader an opportunity to assess its scope and + significance for himself. The works of Hung Jair, Tsiang Kuen, Wou + Saofong, and Li Ti-tsun all measure _min shêng_ in terms of + classical Western _laissez-faire_ economics and then in terms of + Marxism; they all proceed in considerable detail to recapitulate the + various concrete plans that Sun projected. The present author will + not enter into the minutiae of the problems of clothing, of + transport, of communications, etc., inasmuch as they have already + been dealt with and because they are not directly relevant to the + political or ideological features of Sun's thought. + + 296 Tsui, cited, p. 378, n. 125. + +_ 297 The International Development of China_ was welcomed as an + interesting fantasy in a world which had not yet heard of the Five + Year Plans and the programs of the New Deal. The fact that Sun + Yat-sen was a few years ahead of his contemporaries gave him the air + of a dreamer, which was scarcely deserved. + + 298 Hsü translation, "The Outline of National Reconstruction," p. 85. + Two points of detail may be noted here. In the first place, _min + shêng_ has been emphasized by being placed first, although Sun + Yat-sen generally arranged his principles in their logical order: + nationalism, democracy, _min shêng_. Secondly, _min shêng_, although + emphasized, is dealt with in one single paragraph in this vitally + important document. The question of the _hsien_ is given eight + paragraphs to the one on _min shêng_. This is indicative of the + point stressed above, namely, that Sun Yat-sen, while he was sure of + the importance of _min shêng_, did not believe in hard and fast + rules concerning its development. + + 299 Work cited, p. 232. + + 300 See above, p. 180 ff. + + 301 The author uses the term "national economic revolution" to + distinguish those parts of the _ming shêng chu i_ which treat the + transformation of the Chinese economy in relation to the development + of a nation-state. Obviously, there is a great difference between + the economy of a society regarding itself as ecumenical, and one + faced with the problem of dealing with other equal societies. The + presence of a state implies a certain minimum of state interference + with economic matters; the national economic revolution of Sun + Yat-sen was to give the Chinese economy a national character, + coordinating the economic with the other programs of nationalism. + Hence, the significant stress in the phrase "national economic + revolution" should rest upon the word "national." + + 302 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 329. "Genossen, die hier + Versammelten sind alle Arbeiter und stellen eine Teil der Nation + dar. Auf den chinesischen Arbeitern lastet eine grosse Verantwortung + und wenn ihr dieser Aufgabe entsprechen werdet, so wird China eine + grosse Nation und ihr eine mächtige Arbeiterklasse." + + 303 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 329. "Ausser dem wirtschaftlichen Kampf + für die Kürzung des Arbeitstages und die Erhöhung der Löhne stehen + vor Euch noch viel wichtigere Fragen von politischem Charakter. Für + die politischen Ziele müsst ihr meine Drei Prinzipien befolgen und + die Revolution unterstützen." + + 304 Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926, pp. 145-147. The + same observation had been made to the Russian ambassador, + Vladislavich, sent by Catherine I to Peking in 1727. The Chinese + said at that time, " ... that foreign trade had no attraction for + the people, who were amply supplied with all the necessaries of life + from the products of their own country." Sir Robert K. Douglas, + _Europe and the Far East 1506-1912_, New York, 1913, pp. 28-29. + + 305 See above, p. 47 ff. + +_ 306 International Development_, cited, p. 237. + +_ 307 International Development_, p. 12. + +_ 308 International Development_, p. 21. + + 309 Wou Saofong, cited, gives an excellent summary of the plan, pp. + 184-202. There is no particular reason, however, why the work by + Sun, which he wrote in fluent and simple English, should not be + consulted. The American edition is so well put together with maps + and outlines that a layman will find it comprehensible and + stimulating. + +_ 310 International Development_, pp. 220-221. + +_ 311 International Development_, pp. 6-8. + +_ 312 International Development_, p. 198. + +_ 313 International Development_, p. 199. Sun Yat-sen discussed only two + of these essentials (food, clothing) in his lectures on the _San Min + Chu I_. According to Tai Chi-tao, he was to have continued to speak + on the topics of "Housing," "Health," "Death," "Conclusions on + Livelihood," and "Conclusions on the San Min Doctrine," but the only + person who may know what he intended to say on these subjects is + Mme. Sun Yat-sen. (See Hsü translation, "The Basic Literature of + Sunyatsenism," pp. 39-40.) + + 314 This is based upon statements made by Judge Linebarger to the + author. According to him, Sun Yat-sen had few of the prejudices of + class, one way or the other, that affect the outlook of so many + Western leaders. He did not believe that the only possible solution + to the problem of livelihood was the Marxian one, and was confident + that the Chinese Nationalists would be able to solve the problem. + This question was to him paramount above all others; the life of the + masses of Chinese citizens was the life of China itself. + +_ 315 International Development_, p. 11. + + 316 The same, p. 11. + + 317 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 326. The discussion of Bismarck runs + from p. 322 to 326; the length of the discussion shows what Sun + thinks of Bismarck's acuteness, although he disapproved of + Bismarck's anti-democratic stand. + +_ 318 International Development_, p. 4. + + 319 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 426. + + 320 Price translation, pp. 434-435. In the d'Elia translation, pp. + 465-466. The Price translation has been quoted in this instance + because Father d'Elia translates _min shêng_ as "the economic + Demism," which--although interesting when used consistently--might not + be clear in its present context. Sun Yat-sen's courteous use of the + word "communism," in view of the Canton-Moscow entente then + existing, has caused a great deal of confusion. The reader may judge + for himself how much Sun's policy constitutes communism. + + 321 One or two further points concerning the land policy may be + mentioned. In the first place, it is the land which is to be taxed. + A tax will be applied, according to this theory, on the land, and + the increment will also be confiscated. These are two separate forms + of revenue. Furthermore, lest all land-holders simply surrender + their land to the government, Sun makes clear that his taxation + program applies only to land. It would consequently be quite + advantageous for the owner to keep the land; the buildings on it + would not be affected by the increment-seizure program, and the land + would be worth keeping. "The value of the land as declared at + present by the landowner will still remain the property of each + individual landowner." (d'Elia translation, p. 466; Father d'Elia's + note on this page is informing.) The landowner might conceivably put + a mortgage on the land to pay the government the amount of the + unearned increment, and still make a handsome enough profit from the + use of the land to amortize the mortgage. + + 322 Linebarger, _Conversations_, Book III, p. 25. + + 323 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 328. "Die chinesischen Kapitalisten + sind nicht so stark, dass sie die chinesischen Arbeiter unterdrücken + könnten." + + 324 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 469. Italics omitted. For the + discussion of the relation of the program of _min shêng_ to + capitalism, see d'Elia's various footnotes and appendices dealing + with the subject. Father d'Elia, as a devout Catholic, does a + thorough piece of work in demonstrating that Sun Yat-sen was not a + Bolshevik and not hostile to the Roman Catholic Church, and had a + warm although infrequently expressed admiration for that + organization. Li Ti-tsun, in "The Sunyatsenian Principle of + Livelihood," cited, tries to find the exact shade of left + orientation in _min shêng_, and digests the main policies. Wou and + Tsui, both cited, also discuss this point. + +_ 325 International Development_, pp. 36-39. + + 326 By an irony of fate, the most conspicuous example of the realization + of any one of these plans was the beginning of the port of Hulutao, + which was to be "The Great Northern Port" of Sun's vision. The + National Government had already started work on this port when the + Japanese, invading Manchuria, took it. There is so much pathos in + Sun's own life that this frustation of his plans after his death + seems disappointing beyond words to his followers. In his own trust + in mankind, in the eagerness and the sincerity of his enthusiasms, + in the grandeur of his vision--here are to be found the most vital + clues to the tragedy of Sun Yat-sen. Like the other great founders + of the earth's ideals, he charted worlds within the vision but, + perhaps, beyond the accomplishment of ordinary men. + + 327 Hsü translation, cited, p. 440; Price translation, p. 444; d'Elia + translation, cited, p. 476. The first has been preferred purely as a + matter of style. The Chinese words _min shêng_ and _San Min Chu I_ + have been used instead of the English renderings which Hsü gives, + again as a pure matter of form and consistency with the text. + + 328 The author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the clarification of this + ideal of dual continuity--of the family system, preserving the flesh, + and the intellectual tradition, preserving the cultural heritages. + + 329 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 538. + + + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF SUN YAT-SEN: AN EXPOSITION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I*** + + + +CREDITS + + +April 2, 2012 + + Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1 + Produced by Adam Buchbinder, David King, and the Online + Distributed Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + + + +A WORD FROM PROJECT GUTENBERG + + +This file should be named 39356-8.txt or 39356-8.zip. + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + + + http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/9/3/5/39356/ + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one -- the old editions will be +renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no one +owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and +you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission +and without paying copyright royalties. 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