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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An
+Exposition of the San Min Chu I by Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger
+
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no
+restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under
+the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or
+online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license
+
+
+
+Title: The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min
+       Chu I
+
+Author: Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger
+
+Release Date: April 2, 2012 [Ebook #39356]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: US-ASCII
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF SUN YAT-SEN: AN EXPOSITION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I***
+
+
+
+
+
+                  The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen
+
+                   An Exposition of the _Sun Min Chu I_
+
+                                    By
+
+                   Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Ph.D.
+
+             The Department of Government, Harvard University
+
+                       Greenwood Press, Publishers
+
+                          Westport, Connecticut
+
+                 Copyright 1937, The Johns Hopkins Press
+
+                     First Greenwood Reprinting 1973
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+Foreword.
+Preface.
+Introduction.
+   The Problem of the _San Min Chu I_.
+      The Materials.
+      The Necessity of an Exposition.
+Chapter I. The Ideological, Social, and Political Background.
+   The Rationale of the Readjustment.
+   Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity.
+   The Theory of the Confucian World-Society.
+   The Chinese World-Society of Eastern Asia.
+   The Impact of the West.
+   The Continuing Significance of the Background.
+Chapter II The Theory of Nationalism.
+   The Emergence of the Chinese Race-Nation.
+   The Necessity of Nationalism.
+   The Return to the Old Morality.
+   The Return to the Ancient Knowledge.
+   Western Physical Science in the New Ideology.
+   The Consequences of the Nationalist Ideology.
+Chapter III. The Theory of Democracy.
+   Democracy in the Old World-Society.
+   Five Justifications of a Democratic Ideology.
+   The Three Natural Classes of Men.
+   Ch'uean and Neng.
+   The Democratic Machine State.
+   Democratic-Political Versus Ideological Control.
+Chapter IV. The Theory of _Min Sheng_.
+   _Min Sheng_ in the Ideology.
+   The Economic Background of _Min Sheng_.
+   The Three Meanings of _Min Sheng_.
+   Western Influences: Henry George, Marxism and Maurice William.
+   _Min Sheng_ as a Socio-Economic Doctrine.
+   _Min Sheng_ as an Ethical Doctrine.
+Chapter V. The Programs of Nationalism.
+   Kuomintang.
+   The Dragon Throne and State Allegiance.
+   Economic Nationalism.
+   Political Nationalism for National Autonomy.
+   The Class War of the Nations.
+   Racial Nationalism and Pan-Asia.
+   The General Program of Nationalism.
+Chapter VI. The Programs of Democracy.
+   The Three Stages of Revolution.
+   The Adjustment of Democracy to China.
+   The Four Powers.
+   The Five Rights.
+   Confederacy Versus Centralism.
+   The _Hsien_ in a Democracy.
+   The Family System.
+Chapter VII. The Programs of _Min Sheng_.
+   The Three Programs of _Min Sheng_.
+   The National Economic Revolution.
+   The Industrial Revolution.
+   The Social Revolution.
+   The Utopia of _Min Sheng_.
+Bibliography.
+Chinese-English Glossary.
+Index.
+Footnotes
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FOREWORD.
+
+
+The importance of introducing Western political thought to the Far East
+has long been emphasized in the West. The Chinese conception of a rational
+world order was manifestly incompatible with the Western system of
+independent sovereign states and the Chinese code of political ethics was
+difficult to reconcile with the Western preference for a reign of law. No
+argument has been necessary to persuade Westerners that Chinese political
+philosophy would be improved by the influence of Western political
+science.
+
+The superior qualifications of Sun Yat-sen for the interpretation of
+Western political science to the Chinese have also been widely recognized
+in the West, particularly in the United States. Dr. Sun received a modern
+education in medicine and surgery and presumably grasped the spirit of
+Western science. He read widely, more widely perhaps than any contemporary
+political leader of the first rank except Woodrow Wilson, in the
+literature of Western political science. He was thoroughly familiar with
+the development of American political thought and full of sympathy for
+American political ideals. His aspiration to build a modern democratic
+republic amidst the ruins of the medieval Manchu Empire, Americans at
+least can readily understand.
+
+What is only beginning to be understood, however, in the West is, that it
+is equally important to interpret Chinese political philosophy to the rest
+of the world. Western political science has contributed a great deal to
+the development of political power. But it has failed lamentably to
+illuminate the ends for which such power should be used. Political ethics
+is by no means superfluous in lands where a government of law is supposed
+to be established in lieu of a government of men. The limitation of the
+authority of sovereign states in the interest of a better world order is
+an enterprise to which at last, it may be hoped not too late, Westerners
+are beginning to dedicate themselves.
+
+As an interpreter of Chinese political philosophy to the West Dr. Sun has
+no peer. Better than any other Chinese revolutionary leader he appreciated
+the durable values in the classical political philosophy of the Far East.
+He understood the necessity for preserving those values, while introducing
+the Western political ideas deemed most proper for adapting the Chinese
+political system to its new place in the modern world. His system of
+political thought, therefore, forms a blend of Far Eastern political
+philosophy and Western political science. It suggests at the same time
+both what is suitable in Western political science for the use of the Far
+East and what is desirable in Far Eastern political philosophy for the
+improvement of the West.
+
+Dr. Linebarger has analyzed Dr. Sun's political ideas, and also his plans
+for the political rehabilitation of China, with a view to the interests of
+Western students of politics. For this task his training and experience
+have given him exceptional competence. The result is a book, which not
+only renders obsolete all previous volumes in Western languages on modern
+Chinese political philosophy, but also makes available for the political
+scientists and politicians of the West the best political thought of the
+Far East on the fundamental problems of Western politics.
+
+ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
+_Harvard University_
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+This book represents an exploration into a field of political thought
+which is still more or less unknown. The Chinese revolution has received
+much attention from publicists and historians, and a vast number of works
+dealing with almost every phase of Chinese life and events appears every
+year in the West. The extraordinary difficulty of the language, the
+obscurity--to Westerners--of the Chinese cultural background, and the
+greater vividness of events as compared with theories have led Western
+scholars to devote their attention, for the most part, to descriptions of
+Chinese politics rather than to venture into the more difficult field of
+Chinese political thought, without which, however, the political events
+are scarcely intelligible.
+
+The author has sought to examine one small part of modern Chinese
+political thought, partly as a sample of the whole body of thought, and
+partly because the selection, although small, is an important one. Sun
+Yat-sen is by far the most conspicuous figure in recent Chinese history,
+and his doctrines, irrespective of the effectiveness or permanence of the
+consequences of their propagation, have a certain distinct position in
+history. The _San Min Chu I_, his chief work, not only represents an
+important phase in the revolution of Chinese social and political thought,
+but solely and simply as doctrine, may be regarded as a Chinese expression
+of tendencies of political thought current in the Western world.
+
+The personal motives, arising out of an early and rather intimate family
+relationship with the Chinese nationalist movement centering around the
+person of Sun Yat-sen, that led the author to undertake this subject, have
+their advantages and disadvantages. The chief disadvantage lies in the
+fact that the thesis must of necessity treat of many matters which are the
+objects of hot controversy, and that the author, friendly to the movement
+as a whole but neutral as between its factions, may seem at times to deal
+unjustly or over-generously with certain persons and groups. The younger
+widow of Sun Yat-sen (nee Soong Ching-ling) may regard the mention of her
+husband and the Nanking government in the same breath as an act of
+treachery. Devoted to the memory of her husband, she has turned,
+nevertheless, to the Left, and works on cordial terms with the Communists.
+She said: "... the Nanking Government has crushed every open liberal,
+democratic, or humanitarian movement in our country. It has destroyed all
+trade unions, smashed every strike of the workers for the right to
+existence, has thrown hordes of criminal gangsters who are simultaneously
+Fascist 'Blue Shirts' against every labor, cultural, or national
+revolutionary movement in the country."(1) The author, from what he
+himself has seen of the National Government, is positive that it is not
+merely dictatorial, ruthless, cruel, treacherous, or historically
+unnecessary; nor would he, contrarily, assert that the National Government
+lives up to or surpasses the brilliant ideals of Sun Yat-sen. He seeks to
+deal charitably with all factions, to follow a middle course whenever he
+can, and in any case to state fairly the positions of both sides.
+
+The advantages may serve to offset the disadvantages. In the first place,
+the author's acquaintance with the Nationalist movement has given him
+something of a background from which to present his exposition. This
+background cannot, of course, be documented, but it may serve to make the
+presentation more assured and more vivid. In the second place, the author
+has had access to certain private manuscripts and papers, and has had the
+benefit of his father's counsel on several points in this work.(2) The
+author believes that on the basis of this material and background he is
+justified in venturing into this comparatively unknown field.
+
+The primary sources for this work have been Sun Yat-sen's own works. A
+considerable number of these were written originally in the English
+language. Translations of his major Chinese works are more or less fully
+available in English, German, French, or Spanish. The author's highly
+inadequate knowledge of the Chinese written language has led him to depend
+almost altogether upon translations, but he has sought--in some cases,
+perhaps, unsuccessfully--to minimize the possibility of misunderstanding or
+error by checking the translations against one another. Through the
+assistance of his Chinese friends, he has been able to refer to Sun's
+complete works in Chinese and to Chinese books on Sun wherever such
+reference was imperatively necessary. A list of the Chinese titles thus
+made available is included in the bibliography. The language difficulty,
+while an annoyance and a handicap, has not been so considerable as to give
+the author reason to suppose that his conclusions would have been
+different in any significant respect had he been able to make free and
+continuous use of Chinese and Russian sources.
+
+The author has thought of the present work as a contribution to political
+theory rather than to sinology, and has tried to keep the discussion of
+sinological questions at a minimum. In the transliteration of Chinese
+words and names he has adhered more or less closely to the Wade system,
+and has rendered most terms in the _kuo yue_, or national language. Despite
+this rule, he gives the name of President Sun in its more commonly known
+Cantonese form, Sun Yat-sen, rather than in the _kuo yue_, Sun I-hsien.
+
+In acknowledging assistance and encouragement received, the author must
+first of all turn to his father, Judge Paul Myron Wentworth Linebarger,
+Legal Advisor to The National Government of China, counsellor to and
+biographer of Sun Yat-sen during the latter's lifetime. Without his
+patient encouragement and his concrete assistance, this book could neither
+have been begun nor brought to a conclusion after it was started. The
+author desires, however, to make it perfectly clear that this work has no
+relation to the connections of Judge Linebarger with the Chinese
+Government or with the Nationalist Party. No information coming to the
+knowledge of Judge Linebarger in the course of his official duties has
+been here incorporated. Anxiously scrupulous to maintain a completely
+detached point of view, the author has refrained from communicating with
+or submitting the book to Chinese Government or Party officials, and
+writes purely as an American student of China.
+
+Professor James Hart, formerly at The Johns Hopkins University and now at
+The University of Virginia, Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Johns Hopkins
+University, Professor Harley Farnsworth MacNair and Dr. Ernest Price, both
+of The University of Chicago, have rendered inestimable assistance by
+reading the manuscript and giving the author the benefit of their advice.
+Professor Hart has criticized the work as an enterprise in political
+science. Professor Lovejoy assisted the author by reading the first third
+of the work, and selections of the later parts, and applying his thorough
+and stimulating criticism; the author regrets that he was unable to adopt
+all of Professor Lovejoy's suggestions in full, and is deeply grateful for
+the help. Professor MacNair read the book as a referee for a dissertation,
+and made a great number of comments which have made the book clearer and
+more accurate; the author would not have ventured to present this work to
+the public had it not been for the reassurances and encouragement given
+him by Professor MacNair. Dr. Ernest Price, while at The Hopkins,
+supervised the composition of the first drafts; his judicious and balanced
+criticism, based upon sixteen years' intimacy with the public and private
+life of the Chinese, and a sensitive appreciation of Chinese values, were
+of great value to the author in establishing his perspective and lines of
+study. The author takes this opportunity to thank these four gentlemen for
+their great kindness and invaluable assistance.
+
+It is with deep regret that the author abbreviates his acknowledgments and
+thanks for the inspiration and the favors he received in his study of
+Chinese politics from Dr. C. Walter Young; Professor Frederic Ogg, of The
+University of Wisconsin; Professors Kenneth Colegrove, William McGovern,
+and Ikuo Oyama, of The Northwestern University; Dr. Arthur Hummel, of The
+Library of Congress; Professor Frederick Dunn, of Yale University;
+Professor Arthur Holcombe, of Harvard University; Professor Quincy Wright,
+of The University of Chicago; and Dr. Wallace McClure, of The Department
+of State. Many of the author's Chinese friends assisted by reading the
+manuscript and criticizing it from their more intimate knowledge of their
+own country, among them being Messrs. Miao Chung-yi and Djang Chu, at The
+Johns Hopkins University; Professor Jen T'ai, of Nankai University; and
+Messrs. Wang Kung-shou, Ch'ing Ju-chi, and Lin Mou-sheng, of The
+University of Chicago, made many helpful suggestions. The author must
+thank his teachers at The Johns Hopkins University, to whom he is indebted
+for three years of the most patient assistance and stimulating
+instruction, in respect of both the present work and other fields in the
+study of government: Dr. Johannes Mattern; Dr. Albert Weinberg; Mr. Leon
+Sachs; and Professor W. W. Willoughby. Finally, he must acknowledge his
+indebtedness to his wife, Margaret Snow Linebarger, for her patient
+assistance in preparing this volume for the press.
+
+PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER.
+
+December, 1936.
+
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+
+
+The Problem of the _San Min Chu I_.
+
+
+
+The Materials.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen played many roles in the history of his times. He was one of
+those dramatic and somewhat formidable figures who engage the world's
+attention at the very outset of their careers. In the late years of the
+nineteenth century, he was already winning some renown in the West; it was
+picturesque that a Cantonese, a Christian physician, should engage in
+desperate conspiracies against the Manchu throne. Sun became known as a
+political adventurer, a forerunner, as it were, of such mutually
+dissimilar personages as Trotsky, Lawrence, and Major-General Doihara.
+With the illusory success of the revolution of 1911, and his Presidency of
+the first Republic, Sun ceased being a conspirator in the eyes of the
+world's press, and became the George Washington of China. It is in this
+role that he is most commonly known, and his name most generally recalled.
+After the world war, in the atmosphere of extreme tension developed,
+perhaps, by the Bolshevik revolution, Sun was regarded as an enigmatic
+leader, especially significant in the struggle between Asiatic
+nationalisms allied with the Soviets against the traditional capitalist
+state-system. It was through him that the Red anti-imperialist policy was
+pushed to its greatest success, and he was hated and admired, ridiculed
+and feared, down to the last moments of his life. When he died, American
+reporters in Latvia cabled New York their reports of Russian comments on
+the event.(3) More, perhaps, than any other Chinese of modern times, Sun
+symbolized the entrance of China into world affairs, and the inevitable
+confluence of Western and Far Eastern history.
+
+It is characteristic of Sun that he should have appeared in another and
+final role after his death. He had been thought of as conspirator,
+statesman, and mass leader; but with the advent of his party to power it
+became publicly apparent that he had also been a political philosopher.
+The tremendous prestige enjoyed by him as state-founder and party leader
+was enhanced by his importance as prophet and law-giver. His doctrines
+became the state philosophy of China, and for a while his most zealous
+followers sought to have him canonized in a quite literal fashion, and at
+one stroke to make him replace Confucius and the Sons of Heaven. After the
+extreme enthusiasms of the Sun Yat-sen cult subsided, Sun remained the
+great national hero-sage of modern China. Even in those territories where
+the authority of his political heirs was not completely effective, his
+flag was flown and his doctrines taught.
+
+His doctrines have provided the theories upon which the Nationalist
+revolution was based; they form the extra-juridical constitution of the
+National Government of China. When the forces hostile to Sun Yat-sen and
+his followers are considered, it is amazing that his ideas and ideals
+should have survived. An empire established with the aid of Japanese arms,
+and still under Japanese hegemony, controls Manchuria; parts of north
+China are ruled by a bastard government, born of a compromise between
+enemies; a largely unrecognized but powerful Soviet Republic exists in
+outer Mongolia; the lamaist oligarchy goes on in Tibet; and somewhere, in
+central and western China, a Soviet group, not quite a government but more
+than a conspiracy, is fighting for existence. It is quite probable that
+nowhere else in the world can there be found a greater variety of
+principles, each scheme of principles fostered by an armed organization
+struggling with its rivals. In this chaos the National Government has made
+the most effective bid for authority and the greatest effort for the
+reestablishment of order; through it the principles of Sun Yat-sen rule
+the political life of a population greater than that of the United States
+or of the Soviet Union.
+
+It is difficult to evaluate the importance of political doctrines. Even if
+_The Three Principles_ is judged by the extent of the population which its
+followers control, it has achieved greater results in practical politics
+in fifteen years than has Marxism in ninety. Such a criterion may well be
+disputed, but, whatever the test, it cannot be denied that the thought of
+Sun Yat-sen has played a major part in the political development of his
+native land. It may continue into the indefinitely remote future, or may
+succumb to the perils that surround its advocates; in any case, these
+doctrines have been taught long enough and broadly enough to make an
+impress on the age, and have been so significant in political and cultural
+history that they can never sink into complete obscurity.
+
+What are these doctrines? Sun Yat-sen was so voluminous a writer that it
+would be impossible for his followers to digest and codify all his
+writings into one neat and coherent handbook; he himself did not provide
+one. Before printing became common, there was a certain automatic process
+of condensation which preserved the important utterances of great men, and
+let their trivial sayings perish. Sun, however, must have realized that he
+was leaving a vast legacy of materials which are not altogether coherent
+or consistent with one another. Certain of his works were naturally more
+important than others, but, to make the choice definitive, he himself
+indicated four sources which his followers might draw upon for a
+definitive statement of his views.(4)
+
+His _Political Testament_ cites the _Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (_The Program of
+National Reconstruction_), the _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (_The Outline of
+National Reconstruction_), the _San Min Chu I_ (_The Triple Demism_, also
+translated as _The Three Principles of the People_), and the _Manifesto_
+issued by the first national congress of the Party.(5) These four items
+differ quite sharply from one another in form. No one of them can be
+relied upon to give the whole of Sun's doctrines.
+
+The _Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (_The Program of National Reconstruction_) is in
+reality three works, only remotely related to one another. The first item
+in the trilogy is the _Sun Wen Hsueeh She_ (_The Philosophy of Sun Wen_);
+it is a series of familiar essays on the Chinese way of thought.(6) The
+second is the _Min Ch'uean Ts'u Pu_, _The Primer of Democracy_, which is
+little more than a text on parliamentary law.(7) The third is the _Shih
+Yeh Chi Hua_, known in English as _The International Development __ of
+China_, which Sun wrote in both English and Chinese.(8) These three works,
+under the alternate titles of "The Program of Psychological
+Reconstruction," "The Program of Social Reconstruction," and "The Program
+of Material Reconstruction" form _The Program of National Reconstruction_.
+
+The _Chien Kuo Ta Kang, The Outline of National Reconstruction_, is an
+outline of twenty-five points, giving the necessary steps towards the
+national reconstruction in their most concise form.(9)
+
+The _San Min Chu I_ is Sun's most important work. It comprises sixteen
+lectures setting forth his socio-political theories and his programs. The
+title most commonly used in Western versions is _The Three Principles of
+the People_.(10)
+
+The last document mentioned in Sun Yat-sen's will was the _Manifesto_ of
+the first national congress of the Kuomintang. This was not written by
+himself, but was drafted by Wang Ch'ing-wei, one of his closest followers,
+and embodies essentially the same ideas as do the other three items, even
+though Borodin--the emissary of the Third International--had been consulted
+in its preparation.(11)
+
+Sun undoubtedly regretted leaving such a heterogeneous and ill-assembled
+group of works as his literary bequest. Throughout the latter years of his
+life he was studying political science in the hope that he might be able
+to complete a great treatise which he had projected, an analysis and
+statement of the programs of the Chinese nationalists. One attempt toward
+actualization of this work was frustrated when Sun's manuscripts and a
+great part of his library were burned in the attack launched against him
+by Ch'en Ch'iung-ming in 1922. His apology for the makeshift volume on the
+_San Min Chu I_ is pathetic: "As I had neither time to prepare nor books
+to use as references, I could do nothing else in these lectures but
+improvise after I ascended the platform. Thus I have omitted and forgotten
+many things which were in my original manuscript. Although before having
+them printed, I revised them, added (passages) and eliminated (others),
+yet, those lectures are far from coming up to my original manuscripts,
+either in the subject matter itself, or in the concatenations of the
+discussion, or in the facts adduced as proofs."(12) Sun was in all
+probability a more assiduous and widely read student of political science
+than any other world leader of his day except Wilson; he studied
+innumerable treatises on government, and was surprisingly familiar with
+the general background of Western politics, in theory and practice. He was
+aware of the shabby appearance that these undigested occasional pieces
+would present when put forth as the bible of a new China, and earnestly
+enjoined his followers to carry on his labors and bring them to
+fruition.(13)
+
+The various works included in the _Chien Kuo Fang Lo_, while satisfactory
+for the purposes Sun had in mind when he wrote them, are not enough to
+outline the fundamentals both of political theory and a governmental plan.
+The familiar essays have an important bearing on the formation of the
+ideology of a new China; the primer of democracy, less; the industrial
+plan is one of those magnificent dreams which, in the turn of a decade,
+may inspire an equally great reality. The outline and the manifesto are no
+more suited to the role of classics; they are decalogues rather than
+bibles.(14) There remains the _San Min Chu I_.
+
+The _San Min Chu I_ is a collection of sixteen lectures delivered in
+Canton in 1924. There were to have been eighteen, but Sun was unable to
+give the last two. Legend has it that Borodin persuaded Sun to give the
+series.(15) Whatever the cause of their being offered, they attracted
+immediate attention. Interest in Sun and in his ideas was at a fever heat;
+his friends turned to the printed lectures for guidance; his enemies, for
+statements which could be turned against him. Both friends and enemies
+found what they wanted. To the friends, the _San Min Chu I_ presented a
+fairly complete outline of Sun's political and social thought in such a
+form that it could be preserved and broadcast readily. There was danger,
+before the book appeared, that the intrinsic unity in Sun's thinking would
+be lost sight of by posterity, that his ideas would appear as a
+disconnected jumble of brilliant inspirations. The sixteen lectures
+incorporated a great part of the doctrines which he had been preaching for
+more than a generation. To the enemies of Sun, the work was welcome. They
+pointed out the numerous simplifications and inconsistencies, the frequent
+contradictions in matters of detail, the then outrageous denunciations of
+the economic and political system predominant in the Far East. They
+ridiculed Sun because he was Chinese, and because he was not Chinese
+enough, and backed up their criticisms with passages from the book.(16)
+
+When Sun gave the lectures, he was a sick man. He carried an ivory-headed
+sword cane with him on the platform; occasionally, holding it behind him
+and locking his arms through it, he would press it against his back to
+relieve the intolerable pain.(17) The business awaiting him after each
+lecture was vitally important; the revolution was proceeding by leaps and
+bounds. The lectures are the lectures of a sick man, given to a popular
+audience in the uproar of revolution, without adequate preparation,
+improvised in large part, and offered as one side of a crucial and
+bitterly disputed question. The secretaries who took down the lectures may
+not have succeeded in following them completely; Sun had no leisure to do
+more than skim through the book before releasing it to the press.
+
+These improvised lectures have had to serve as the fundamental document of
+Nationalist China. Sun Yat-sen died without writing the treatise he had
+planned. The materials he left behind were a challenge to scholars and to
+his followers. Many persons set to work interpreting them, each with a
+conscious or unconscious end in view. A German Marxian showed Sun to be a
+forerunner of bolshevism; an American liberal showed Sun to be a bulwark
+against bolshevism. A Chinese classicist demonstrated Sun's reverence for
+the past; a Jesuit father explained much by Sun's modern and Christian
+background. His works have been translated into Western languages without
+notes; the improvised lectures, torn from their context of a revolutionary
+crisis, have served poorly to explain the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, and his
+long range political, social, and economic plans.
+
+
+
+The Necessity of an Exposition.
+
+
+Followers of Sun who knew him personally, or were members of that circle
+in which his ideas and opinions were well known, have found the _San Min
+Chu I_ and other literary remains helpful; they have been able to turn to
+the documents to refresh their memories of Sun on some particular point,
+or to experience the encouraging force of his faith and enthusiasm again.
+They need not be reminded of the main tenets of his thought, or of the
+fundamental values upon which he based his life and his political
+activities. His sense of leadership, which strangers have at times thought
+fantastic, is one which they admire in him, since they, too, have felt the
+power of his personality and have experienced that leadership in the
+course of their own lives. His voice is ringing in their consciences; they
+feel no need of a guide to his mind. At the present day many members of
+Sun's own family, and a considerable number of his veteran disciples are
+still living; the control of the National Government is in their hands.
+They are people who need no commentary on Sun Yat-sen; to them, he died
+only yesterday.
+
+Others, who met Sun only casually, or who could know him only through his
+writings, have a quite different impression of his thought. They perforce
+assume that he thought as he wrote, and fail to realize that virtually all
+his writings and speeches were occasional pieces, improvisations designed
+as propaganda. One of the most respected American authorities on China
+says that in the _San Min Chu I_ "... there is a combination of sound
+social analysis, keen comment on comparative political science, and
+bombast, journalistic inaccuracy, jejune philosophizing and sophomoric
+economics."(18) This view is one which can scarcely be attacked, if one
+considers only the printed lectures, and overlooks the other utterances
+and the personality of Sun. To apply this, or any similar estimate (and
+there are many of them), to all of Sun Yat-sen's thought would be woefully
+inaccurate. It is not the critic's fault that Sun never found time to
+write a sober, definitive political treatise expressing his ideas; it is,
+nevertheless, the critic's responsibility to weigh the value of the _San
+Min Chu I_, and consider the importance which Sun himself attached to it,
+before judging Sun's whole philosophy by a hastily-composed and poorly
+written book.
+
+Yet, if the Western student of modern Chinese history were to look
+elsewhere for some general exposition of Sun Yat-sen's political ideas, he
+would find none. He could discover several excellent translations of the
+sixteen lectures, and parts of the other work of Sun. He would be helped
+by the prefatory notes to some of these translations.(19) A few treatises
+would be available to him on special phases of Sun's thought: the
+influence of Maurice William, and the influence of the Russian
+Communists.(20) In addition, there would be the biographies, of which
+there are more than a dozen, and a few other useful although not general
+works. None of these sifts Sun's thought, seeking to separate the
+transitory from the permanent in his ideas. For this the searcher would
+have to rely on brief outlines of Sun's ideas, to be found in works
+dealing with modern China or the Chinese revolution.(21)
+
+This relative scarcity of exegetic material concerning the ideology and
+programs of Sun is not the result of any inadequacy on the part of those
+persons, both Chinese and Western, who have devoted thought and time to
+his life or to the translation of his works. It is one thing to point out
+a task that has yet to be done; and quite another, actually to perform it.
+An interpretation or exposition of Sun's thought, to be worthy of the
+great significance of the original, must be very thorough; but scarcely
+enough time has elapsed to allow a perspective of all the materials, let
+alone an orientation of Sun in the Far Eastern scene. Yet the importance
+of Sun demands that something be done to bring his thought to the
+attention of the world, so that the usual distortion of his
+personality--arising from the lack of commentaries--may be avoided in
+present day works. In a sense, the time is not ripe for a definitive
+treatment of Sun, either as a figure in history or as a contributor to the
+significant and enduring political thought of modern times; any work now
+done will, as time passes, fall grotesquely far short of adequacy. On the
+other hand, there is so much material of a perishable nature--anecdotes and
+legends not yet committed to print, and the memories of living men--now
+available, that a present-day work on Sun may gain in color and intimacy
+what it loses in judgment and objectivity, may gain in proximity what it
+has to forgo in detachment. And, lastly, the complete absence of any
+systematic presentation of Sun's ideas in any Western language is so great
+a deficiency in the fields of Far Eastern history and world political
+thought, that even a relatively inadequate exposition of the thought of
+Sun Yat-sen may prove to be not without value. Sun himself never explained
+his philosophy, whether theoretical or applied, in any broad, systematic
+fashion; nor has anyone else done so.
+
+If the permissibility of an exposition of Sun Yat-sen's thought be
+conceded, there still remains the vexing problem of a choice of method.
+While the far-flung peripheries of Sun's thought touch almost every field
+of knowledge and opinion, a systematic condensation of his views cannot
+hope to survey the same broad ranges. The problem of proportion, of just
+emphasis, involves the nice appraisal of the degree of importance which
+each of Sun's minor roles had in his intellectual career as a whole. Nor
+do the difficulties concerning method end with the consideration of
+proportion; they merely begin, for there remains the far more important
+and perplexing problem of a technique of interpretation.
+
+Interpretation obviously relates to the problem of language. The
+translation of theoretical terms from Chinese into English constitutes a
+formidable difficulty which proves, in several instances, to be
+insuperable. No satisfactory equivalent for _min sheng_ (usually rendered
+"livelihood") can be found in English; even simpler and less specialized
+terms are extremely difficult to render. Sometimes it would be convenient
+to employ four or five alternative translations for one Chinese term. Sun
+uses the word "nationalism" in the sense that a Westerner would, in
+advocating national consciousness in a China hitherto unfamiliar with the
+conception of nation-states; but, in a different context, he uses it in
+the sense of "patriotism."(22) These difficulties must be faced and,
+somehow or other, overcome. When the Western reader encounters a familiar
+term in an unexpected place, he must be prepared to meet a shift of
+meaning. No amount of definition can make a Chinese term, which has no
+exact Western equivalent, completely clear. It is simpler to grow
+accustomed to the term, to gather together its connotations, to understand
+something of the frame of reference wherein it is set, and thereby to
+learn it as a child learns a word. A dictionary is no help to a baby; in a
+realm of unfamiliar ideas even scholars must learn terms step by step.
+
+Less obviously than language, the translation of ideas and of values is
+also involved in interpretation. In dealing with the intellectual content
+of a civilization as alien as that of China, the Westerner must be wary of
+the easy analogy. The full, forceful application of Western ideas and
+values in a world to which they are completely irrelevant produced strange
+results during the nineteenth century. Western notions of goodness and
+reasonableness did not fit the Chinese scheme of things. Under such a test
+a wildly distorted image of China was obtained. China seemed peculiar,
+topsy-turvy, fantastic. To themselves the Chinese still seemed quite
+matter-of-fact, and the Westerners thought even this odd and ridiculous:
+not only was China upside-down, but the Chinese did not know it! In any
+case, the present-day scholar, to whom so much material concerning the
+Chinese is available and China so near, has little justification for
+applying Western tests of virtue and rationality to things Chinese.
+
+If the application of Western values to China is avoided, there is still
+the danger that the Chinese scheme of things may not be interpreted at
+all. The literal translation of Chinese terms strips them of their
+contexts. The result may be unintelligibility. The Chinese term _jen_ is
+frequently rendered "benevolence," a Western word which, while at times an
+approximate equivalent, fails to carry the full burden of meaning. Sun
+speaks of an interpretation of history antagonistic to dialectical
+materialism--the interpretation of history by _jen_. A "benevolent"
+interpretation of history means nothing whatever to a Westerner. If _jen_
+is translated into a different configuration of words, and given as
+"group-consciousness" or "social fellow-feeling," the result, while still
+not an exact equivalent of the Chinese, is distinctly more intelligible.
+
+To effect this translation of ideas and values, several methods are
+available. The issue cannot be dodged by a denial of its existence; the
+mere act of explanation involves some process, whether deliberate or
+unconscious, of translation and transvaluation. If the interpreter refuses
+to deal with the problem consciously, he will nevertheless be guided by
+his unrevealed assumptions. To give an accounting for what he has done, he
+must, first, admit that he is interpreting, and second, seek to make plain
+what he is doing, so that his readers may allow for the process. The
+demonstration of the consequences of interpretation minimizes their
+possible adverse effects. The simplest way to allow for the alterations
+(beyond mere reproduction) arising from interpretation would be to adopt a
+technique so widely known that others could, in their own minds, try to
+re-trace the steps of the process and negate the changes. Among such
+widely known techniques are the Marxian and the sociological.
+
+Both these scarcely seem adapted to the problems presented by an
+interpretation of Sun Yat-sen. The Marxian terminology is so peculiarly
+suited to the ulterior purposes the Marxians keep in mind, and is so
+esoteric when applied to matters not related to the general fields in
+which the Marxians are interested, that it could scarcely be applied in
+the present instance. A non-Marxian would find it a hazardous task. The
+interpreter of Sun Yat-sen must interpret _into_ something; what, depends
+on the audience. Dialectical materialism, in the abstract excellent as a
+technique, would scarcely make Sun understandable to most Americans of the
+present day. Sun himself rejected the Marxian method of interpretation; an
+American audience would also reject it; these two factors outweigh all the
+conceivable advantages.
+
+The sociological technique of interpretation is quite another question.
+The various methods of analysis developed by each of the schools of
+sociologists are still the objects rather than the tools of study. Such
+men as Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto have made contributions to Western
+social thought which enrich the scope and method of the social studies.
+Their methods of analysis are not weighted down by a body of extraneous
+considerations, as is the Marxian, and they promise an objectivity not
+otherwise attainable. On the other hand, they are still at that stage of
+development where the technique obtrudes itself; it has not, as has the
+inductive method in general, become so much taken for granted as to be
+invisible.
+
+The sociological approach need not, however, be carried to the full extent
+thought necessary by its advocates. In the study of law, the consideration
+of extra-juridical materials is called sociological in contrast to the
+strictly juristic. If the legal scholar goes beyond the strict framework
+of the law, and considers other elements in man's behavior and knowledge
+while dealing with legal problems, he is apt to be called a sociological
+jurist. In doing so he is not committed, however, to belief in or use of
+any particular form of what is known as the science of society or
+sociology. He may adopt almost any sort of social outlook, or may be
+committed to any one of many doctrines of social value and to any one of
+widely varying methods of social study.
+
+This negative, broad sense of the sociological, when applied to the study
+of politics, has commonly meant that the scholars employing it began with
+the notion of the political, but, finding it too narrow, touched upon
+related fields. An interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's politics might be based
+on this method. It would still be a political work, in that it sought to
+associate his ideas with the ideas concerning government to be found in
+the West, but would be free, nevertheless, to touch upon non-political
+materials relevant to Sun's politics. The Chinese have had notions of
+authority and control radically different from those developed in the
+West; a purely juristic interpretation of the various Chinese politics
+would simply scrape the lacquer off the screen.
+
+The Chinese have not had the sharp distinction of disciplines which runs
+through all Western learning. Since one of the most conspicuous
+ingredients in their thought--conspicuous, that is, to Westerners looking
+in from outside--has been the ethical, many Westerners have dismissed
+Chinese historical, political and more strictly philosophical thought as
+being loosely and amiably ethical but never getting anywhere. The Chinese
+did not departmentalize their learning to any considerable degree.
+Politics was not the special activity of a definite group of men, or the
+study of a select body of scholars. Politics ran through and across most
+of the activities in society, and was largely the interest of that
+intellectual elite by which China has been so distinguished on the roster
+of civilizations. In becoming everything, politics ceased being politics;
+that is, those elements in man's thought and behavior which Westerners
+have termed political were not separated and labelled. The Westerner must
+say that politics was everything in China, or that it was nothing.
+
+An interpretation of Sun Yat-sen must keep in mind these differences
+between Chinese and Western categories. In doing so it will pass beyond
+the limits of what is commonly known as politics, since no sharp
+boundaries of "politics" are to be found in China. Yet, as an
+interpretation designed to serve Western readers, it must return again and
+again to Western politics, making comparisons when they are justified,
+pointing out differences between China and the West as they become
+relevant and clear. The interpretation will thus weave back and forth
+between conventional Western political science, with its state-mindedness,
+and the wholly different material of traditions and customs out of which
+Sun sought to construct an ideology and a system of working politics for
+China in the modern world.
+
+How can this interpretation seek to avoid the misfortunes and errors into
+which so many similar attempts have fallen? It must proceed without the
+aid of such specialized techniques as dialectical-materialistic or
+Paretian analysis, and yet aim at the scientific, the rationally
+defensible, the objective. In seeking to apply a method in the
+interpretation of Sun Yat-sen, the work must face criticism of its method,
+must make the method explicit and simple enough to allow criticism. If the
+thought of Sun really is to emerge from the exposition, the exposition
+must allow itself to be judged, so that it can be appraised, and so that,
+one way or another, it may not interfere with the just evaluation of the
+materials which it seeks to present. Sun Yat-sen should not be judged poor
+because of a poor interpretation; nor, on the other hand, should his
+thought be adjudged more excellent or more exact than it seems to the
+Chinese, merely because the expositor has suggested an interpretation
+possibly more precise.
+
+The technique adopted in the present work is a relatively simple one. It
+is an attempt to start _de novo_ with certain concepts of society and
+government. Several simple although novel terms are introduced, to provide
+a foundation upon which the procedure may rest. One of these, for
+instance, is "ideology," which in the present work refers to the whole
+psychological conditioning of a group of persons.(23) No attempt is made,
+at the beginning or at any later phase of the exposition, to distinguish
+between the ideology as belief and the ideology as truth. Whether the
+Chinese were and are right, or the Westerners, are questions, not for the
+student of comparative political science, but for the philosopher and the
+psychologist. The interpretation seeks, as far as possible, to transpose
+certain parts of the traditional Chinese ideology, as they were, and as
+Sun Yat-sen re-shaped them, into one frame of reference provided by the
+ideology of twentieth-century America. What the "real truth" is, does not
+matter; the Marxians would say that both ideologies were inexact; so might
+the Roman Catholics. If the ideology of old China, and the ideology that
+Sun wished to see developed in the minds of the Chinese people of the
+future, can be made comprehensible in terms of contemporary American
+beliefs, of fact or of value, this venture will have been successful.
+
+The Chinese ideology cannot be explained in its own terms; these exist
+only in the Chinese language. If Sun Yat-sen's own arrangement of his
+works is inadequate for the Chinese, rearrangement is a task for the
+Chinese and not for the Western scholars to perform. The Westerners who
+deal with Sun can contribute substantially only if they give what the
+Chinese cannot--enough of a reference to their own ideology to permit a
+broader scale for the analysis and the appreciation of Sun's thought.
+Their knowledge of their own world of ideas is the special tool which
+justifies their intervention in this Chinese field of knowledge.
+
+In avoiding the unjustifiable imposition of Western ideas and values upon
+the Chinese, and yet orienting Sun's thought with respect to the West, the
+interpretation will have to resort to several fairly evident means. In the
+first place, it will have to transpose Chinese ideas into the Western
+ideology, and yet avoid distortions of meaning. This can be partly done by
+the use of neutral terms, of terms which are simple and clear enough to
+reproduce the Chinese, and nevertheless not so heavily burdened with
+connotations that they will cause a reading-in of Western ideas not
+relevant to the point in question. More simply, the Chinese ideas must be
+represented by terms which approximate the same set of values in the West
+that their originals have in China. This will sometimes require the use of
+unfamiliar periphrases: the words "music" and "rites" may be given as "the
+rhythm of life" and "conformity to the ideology." Secondly, the Chinese
+ideology need not be given as a whole; it is improbable that it could,
+without a terrific expansion of the Western ideology to accommodate it;
+but enough of the Chinese ideology must be given to explain the
+significant differences between the Chinese system of controlling the
+behavior of men, and the Western. This latter involves the choice of
+material, and is therefore by its nature challengeable.
+
+Again, in demonstrating significant differences instead of merely seeking
+analogous (and probably misleading) examples, the interpretation might
+turn to certain aspects of Chinese philosophy which appear as strikingly
+illustrative of the point of view of the Chinese. Confucius the political
+thinker is only a small part of Confucius the man and the philosopher;
+Chinese political thought, although a vast field, is only a small part of
+the social thought of the Chinese. Only an infinitesimal part of this
+comparatively minor area of Chinese study will suffice to make clear some,
+at least, of the sharp differences of outlook between China and the West.
+
+A recapitulation of this declaration of technique may be found helpful,
+for an understanding of Sun Yat-sen by Westerners is necessary because of
+the vastly different background of his thought. Even apart from the
+strangeness of his thought to the West, it is scattered in the original,
+and must be pieced together. An exposition of his ideas which would, at
+one and the same time, present a systematic outline of his ideas, and
+transpose them into a frame of reference where Western scholars might
+grasp them, might be a labor meriting performance. His terms would have to
+be rendered by neutral words (not overladen with particular Western
+contexts) or by neologisms, or simply left in the original, to develop
+meaning as a configuration of related ideas is built up about them. The
+problem of interpretation cannot, however, be solved by settling the
+difficulty of language: there still remains the question of a technique
+which can pretend to the scientific, the exact, the rationally defensible.
+Despite their great merits, the Marxian and Paretian techniques are not
+suited to the present task. The point of view and means of study of
+political science may be kept, if a few necessary borrowings from
+sociological thought (not necessarily sociology) are introduced. Such
+borrowing includes the use of notions such as non-political society,
+patterns of authority, and ideology, none of which are to be found in the
+more law-minded part of political science. By seeking to point out the
+Chinese, then the Western, ideas involved, without confusing the two, the
+presentation may succeed in transposing the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as
+well as his beliefs concerning working politics, into the English language
+and into an explanatory but not distorting background. To do this, a small
+sampling of certain aspects of old Chinese social thought and behavior
+will be a required preliminary.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I. THE IDEOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND.
+
+
+
+
+The Rationale of the Readjustment.
+
+
+The _San Min Chu I_ and related works of Sun Yat-sen represent in their
+entirety one of the most ambitious bodies of doctrine ever set forth by a
+political leader. They differ from such a document as the Communist
+Manifesto in that they comprehend a much greater range of subject matter
+and deal with it in much greater detail. They pertain not merely to the
+reconstitution of an economic or political system; they propose a plan for
+the reconstruction of a whole civilization, the reformation of a way of
+thought customary among a great part of the human race, and a consequent
+transformation of men's behavior. Conceived in the bold flights of a
+penetrating, pioneering mind, avowedly experimental at the time of their
+first utterance, these works of Sun have already played a most significant
+role in the Far East and may continue to affect history for a long time to
+come. They may quite legitimately be called the bible of new China.
+
+Social change is a consequence of maladjustment. The thought of Sun
+Yat-sen is a program of change--change which, if it is to be understood,
+must be seen at its beginning and its end. The background from which Sun
+emerged and which was an implicit condition of all his utterances must be
+mentioned, so that the problems he faced may be understood. Only then will
+it be possible to turn to the plans he devised for the rethinking of
+Chinese tradition and the reorganization of Chinese polity. A vast
+maladjustment between the Chinese and the world outside led to the
+downfall of the Manchu Empire in China and has threatened the stability of
+every government erected since that time; Chinese society is in a state of
+profound unrest and recurrent turmoil. Sun Yat-sen contributed to the
+change, and sought a new order, to be developed from the disorder which,
+voluntarily or not, he helped in part to bring about.
+
+The old order that failed, the _interregnum_ (in the etymological sense of
+the word), and the new order proposed by Sun must be taken all together in
+order to obtain a just understanding of Sun's thought. No vast history
+need be written, no _Decline and Fall of the Chinese Empire_ is necessary,
+but some indication of the age-old foundations and proximate conditions of
+Sun's thought must be obtained.
+
+These may, perhaps, be found in a sampling of certain data from the
+thought and behavior of the Chinese as a group under the old system, and
+the selection of a few important facts from the history of China since the
+first stages of the maladjustment. An exposition of Sun's thought must not
+slur the great importance of the past, yet it dare not linger too long on
+this theme lest the present--in which, after all, uncounted millions of
+Chinese are desperately struggling for life--come to seem insignificant.
+
+Confucianism is a philosophy so broad and so highly developed that any
+selection does violence to its balance and proportion, which are among its
+chief merits.(24) Yet only those few facts can be taken from the history
+and thought of the Chinese which may assist the Westerner in becoming
+familiar with a few terms which recur again and again in the works of Sun
+Yat-sen. If the present work purported to be a study of Chinese history,
+or a complete analysis of the Chinese social system, such an extreme
+selectivity could not be condoned; since it, however, tries only to
+outline Sun's thought, the selection of a few Confucian doctrines and the
+complete ignoring of others, may be forgiven. All the schools of the past,
+and the literary traditions which developed from them, and social
+tendencies that were bound up with these have to be omitted, and those few
+ideas and customs described which bear directly on one single point--the
+most significant ideological differences between the Chinese and the West
+with respect to the political order, i. e. the control of men in society
+in the name of all society.(25)
+
+
+
+
+Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity.
+
+
+The Confucian system, against which Sun Yat-sen reacted in part and in
+part sought to preserve, was a set of ideas and institutions developed as
+a reaction against certain conditions in ancient China. These conditions
+may be roughly described as having arisen from a system of
+proto-nationalisms, at a time when the old--perhaps prehistorically
+ancient--Chinese feudal system was rapidly declining and an early form of
+capitalism and of states was taking its place. The Chou dynasty (ca.
+1150-221 B.C.) was in power at the time of this transition; under its rule
+the golden age of Chinese philosophy appeared--Confucius (552-479 B.C.) and
+Lao Tzu (ca. 570-ca. 490 B.C.) lived and taught.
+
+Their philosophies, contrary to the popular Western beliefs concerning
+Chinese philosophies, were protests against a world which seemed to them
+well-nigh intolerable. The old Chinese system, which may seem to
+Westerners a highly mystical feudal organization, was in its century-long
+death-agonies; the virtues it had taught were not the virtues of the hour;
+the loyalties it had set up were loyalties which could scarcely be
+maintained in a time when rising states, acting more and more as states
+have acted in the West, were disrupting the earlier organization of
+society, waging struggles--in the manner that, centuries later, Machiavelli
+was to portray--of intrigue and warfare for the eventual hegemony over that
+whole area of eastern Asia which the Chinese of that time regarded as the
+civilized world.
+
+The political aspects of the transition from the feudal to the
+proto-national system is described by one of the most eminent of the
+Western authorities on China in the following terms: "The aim of all the
+Leaders was to control western Ho-nan. There is the heart of ancient
+China.... All around about, in vaster regions occupied no doubt by less
+dense and more shifting populations, great States formed, increasing first
+towards the exterior, seeking (as we have seen in the case of China) to
+cut the communication of their rivals with the Barbarians, mutually
+forcing each other to change the directions of the expansion, exercising
+on each other a pressure from behind, and a converging pressure on the
+central overlordships. All schemed to conquer them. Thus an amalgamation
+was achieved. Whilst in the centre the Chinese nation was coming into
+being, on the outer borders States were being formed which, aiming at
+annexing the centre of China, ended by themselves also becoming
+Chinese."(26) Not only did the newer, political organization of society
+begin to make itself distinct from the family, feudal, and religious
+organization; it began to engage in activities which increased its
+resemblance to the Western system of nations. Tributes of textiles,
+horses, and compulsory labor were demanded. A non-feudal economy was
+encouraged; the state of Ch'i encouraged artisans and merchants, and
+favored the trade in fish and salt. Mining, metallurgy and currency were
+studied. State monopolies were created out of the products of forests,
+lakes, marshes, shell-fish beds, and salt pans. Mines also became
+"treasures of the state."(27)
+
+The history of these states reads like a page torn out of the history of
+early modern Europe. The struggle was half diplomatic and half military.
+From the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.) to the
+end of the Age of Warring States (491-221 B.C.), China was subject to
+frequent war and unstable peace. The character of war itself changed, from
+a chivalrous exercise almost ritualistic in nature, to a struggle of
+unrestricted force. The units of government which were to develop into
+states, and almost into nations, began as feudal overlordships;
+traditional hatreds and sentiments were developed; diplomatic and military
+policies crystallized and became consistent; and activities of a state
+nature became increasingly prominent.
+
+Concurrently, other factors operated to prevent an indefinite continuance
+of these struggles of proto-national states and to avoid the appearance of
+a permanent system of armed nations such as that which has appeared in
+modern Europe. The feudal system of China left a strong ethnical,
+linguistic and intellectual heritage of unity, which was stronger than the
+cultural disunities and particularities appearing in certain of the
+states. (The state of Cheng was particularly conspicuous in developing a
+peculiar state culture.)(28) As the states became larger and larger with
+the passing of time, they tended not only to develop certain large
+differences between themselves, but to eradicate the minute local
+peculiarities of the old system, and in so doing to increase the general
+homogeneity which was also a heritage of the past ages. This general
+homogeneity found a living symbol in the persons of the Chou Emperors who,
+possessed of no more power than the Tennos under the Shogunate, acted, as
+did their Japanese analogues two thousand years later, as the
+quasi-religious personifications of the whole general community. It thus
+occurred that the old feudal system was destroyed by the growth of a
+general non-feudal economy and political order, which, in its turn, led to
+the development of the great imperial system under which China continued
+for many centuries. The period of the transition, during which the
+traditional feudal unity had been shaken and the new imperial unity not
+yet established, was a tumultuous and bloody one. The presence of a
+confederation under the hegemony of some one state--the so-called
+Presidency--provided a suitable framework for rivalries toward power,
+without particularly increasing the general peace.
+
+The transition, as it took place, was neither apparent nor agreeable. The
+political turmoil was but slightly less than the intellectual unrest and
+disturbance. Everywhere faith and acceptance seemed to have been lost to
+humanity; licentiousness and impiety fed discord. The lack of harmony,
+made doubly vivid by the presence of a strong tradition of primeval
+Arcadian peace and unity under the mythological Emperors, was bitter to
+the scholars and men of virtue of the time. It was quite inevitable that
+protests should be raised which would hasten the advent, or return, of
+unity and peace. These protests form the subject of the work of Confucius
+and the other great philosophers, and schools of thinkers, of the Chou
+dynasty. It was, in later ages, upon these philosophies that the great
+structure of Chinese society developed and continued down until modern
+times.
+
+
+
+
+The Theory of the Confucian World-Society.
+
+
+The various types of protest against the development of states and the
+consequent anarchy of the Chinese society considered as a whole cannot be
+considered in this work; many were primarily religious; Taoism, while
+ranking as one of the most conspicuous religions of the world, has little
+bearing on politics. Even Confucianism, which merits careful study, must
+be summarized and re-stated as briefly as possible. Confucianism has
+suffered from an ambiguity and exoticism of terms, when presented to the
+West; its full significance as a political philosophy can become fully
+apparent only when it is rendered in the words of the hour.
+
+What was it that Confucius did in protest against the established discord
+of the world he knew? He struck directly at the foundations of politics.
+His criticisms and remedies can be fully appreciated only by reference to
+a theory of ideology.
+
+Confucius perceived that the underlying problem of society was that of
+ideology; he seems to have realized that the character of a society itself
+essentially depends upon the character of the moral ideas generally
+prevalent among the individuals composing it, and that where there is no
+common body of ideas a society can scarcely be said to exist.(29) He did
+not consider, as did Han Fei-tzu and the legalist school of philosophers,
+questions of law the preeminent social problem. He realized that state and
+law were remedies, and that the prime questions of organization were those
+anterior to the political, and that the state existed for the purpose of
+filling out the shortcomings of social harmony.(30)
+
+In a society--such as Confucius dreamed of--where there was no disagreement
+in outlook, policy would not be a governmental question; if there were no
+disharmony of thought and of behavior, there would be no necessity of
+enforcing conformance to the generally accepted criteria of conduct. From
+this standpoint, government itself is socially pathological, a remedy for
+a poorly ordered society. Men are controlled indirectly by the examples of
+virtue; they do good because they have learned to do good and do it
+unquestioningly and simply. Whatever control is exercised over men is
+exercised by their ideology, and if other men desire control they must
+seek it through shaping the ideas of others. At its full expression, such
+a doctrine would not lead to mere anarchy; but it would eliminate the
+political altogether from the culture of man, replacing it with an
+educational process. Ideological control would need to be supplemented by
+political only if it failed to cover the total range of social behavior,
+and left loopholes for conflict and dispute.
+
+This doctrine is framed in quite different terms by Confucius, who spoke
+and wrote in an age when the mystical elements of the old feudal ideology
+still exercised powerful and persuasive influence, and when there was no
+other society than his own which he might make the object of his study.
+The central point of his teachings is the doctrine of _jen_. Liang
+Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the most brilliant modern exponents of ancient Chinese
+philosophy, wrote of this:
+
+
+    In the simplest terms, "Jen" means fellow-feeling for one's kind.
+    Once Fan Chih, one of his disciples, asked Confucius what "Jen"
+    meant. Confucius replied, "To love fellow-men"; in other words
+    this means to have a feeling of sympathy toward mankind....
+
+    Intellectually the relationship becomes common purpose;
+    emotionally it takes the form of fellow-feeling.(31)
+
+
+This doctrine appears more specific in its application when it is realized
+that Confucius regarded his own society and mankind as coterminous.
+Barbarians, haunting the fringes of the world, were unconscious of _jen_;
+not being in sympathy with mankind, they were not as yet fully human.
+
+_Jen_ is a word which cannot be exactly translated into English. It is
+laden with a burden of connotations which it has acquired through the
+centuries; its variability of translation may be shown by the fact that,
+in the standard translations of the Chinese classics, it is written
+"Benevolence." It might equally well be given as "consciousness of one's
+place and function in society." The man who followed _jen_ was one who was
+aware of his place in society, and of his participation in the common
+endeavors of mankind.
+
+_Jen_, or society-mindedness, leads to an awareness of virtue and
+propriety (_teh_ and _yi_). When virtue and propriety exist, it is
+obligatory that men follow them. Behavior in accordance with virtue and
+propriety is _li_. Commonly translated "ethics," this is seen as the
+fruition of the force of _jen_ in human society. _Jen_ underlies and
+establishes society, from the existence of which spring virtue and
+propriety; these prescribe principles for human conduct, the formulation
+of which rules is _li_.(32) Auxiliary to _li_ is _cheng ming_. _Cheng
+ming_ is the rightness of names: _li_, the appropriateness of
+relationships. _Li_, it may be noted, is also translated "rites" or
+"ceremonies"; a rendering which, while not inexact, fails to convey the
+full import of the term.
+
+_Cheng ming_, the rectification of names, may be regarded as a protest
+against the discords in language that had developed during the
+transitional period from feudalism to eventual unity. Confucius, of
+course, did not have as sharp an issue confronting him as do the modern
+Western innovators in social and political ideology. Nevertheless, the
+linguistic difficulty was clear to him. The expansion of the Chinese
+written language was so great at that time that it led to the
+indiscriminate coining of neologisms, and there was a tendency towards a
+sophisticated hypocrisy in the use of words.(33)
+
+Confucius saw that, in obtaining harmony, language needed to be exact;
+otherwise long and fruitless disputes over empty words might be engaged in
+or, what was even worse, words might not conform to the realities of
+social life, and might be used as instruments of ill-doing. Confucius did
+not, however, present a scheme of word-worship. He wanted communication to
+cement society, to be an instrument of concord. He wanted, in modern
+terms, a terminology which by its exactness and suitability would of
+itself lead to harmony.(34) In advocating the rectification of names,
+Confucius differed from many other founders of philosophies and religions;
+they, too, wanted names rectified--terminology reorganized--to suit their
+particular doctrines; but there they stopped short. Confucius regarded the
+rectification of names as a continuous process, one which had to be
+carried on unceasingly if communication, for the sake of social harmony,
+was to remain just and exact.
+
+_Cheng ming_ is highly significant in Confucian thought, and exhibits the
+striking difference between the Chinese and the older Western political
+study. If the terms by means of which the communication within a society
+is effected, and in which the group beliefs of fact or of value are to be
+found, can be the subject of control, there is opened up a great field of
+social engineering. _Cheng ming_ states, in recognizable although archaic
+terms, the existence of ideology, and proposes the strengthening of
+ideology. In recognizing the group (in his case, mankind) as dependent
+upon ideology for group existence, Confucius delivered Chinese political
+thought from any search for an ontology of the _real state_. It became
+possible to continue, in the traditional pragmatic manner,(35) thinking of
+men in simple terms referring only to individual men, avoiding the
+hypostatizations common in the West. In pointing out the necessity for the
+control of ideology by men, Confucius anticipated theories of the
+"pedagogical state" by some twenty centuries.
+
+_Li_, in the terminology of the present work, is the conformity of the
+individual to the moral ideology, or, stated in another manner, the
+control of men by the ideology.(36)
+
+_Li_, conformity to the ideology, implies, of course, conformity to those
+parts of it which determine value. _Li_ prescribes the do-able, the
+thinkable. In so far as the ideology consists of valuations, so far do
+those valuations determine _li_. Hsue lists the operations of _li_ in six
+specific categories:
+
+
+    (1) it furnishes the principles of political organization; (2) it
+    furnishes details for the application of the doctrine of
+    ratification; (3) it discusses the functions of government; (4) it
+    prescribes the limitations of governmental authority; (5) it
+    advances principles of social administration; and (6) it provides
+    a foundation for crime and lawsuits. These are only the political
+    functions of _li_. Its force is to be regarded as equally
+    effective in every other type of human behavior.(37)
+
+
+The approach to society contained in the doctrines of _jen_, _cheng ming_,
+and _li_ is, therefore, one which largely eliminates the necessity for
+politics. Its influence may be estimated from three points of view: (1) to
+what degree was government different from what it might have been had it
+followed the line of development that government did in the West? (2) what
+was the range of governmental action in such a system? and (3) what was
+the relation of government to the other institutions of a Confucian
+society?
+
+In regard to the first point, it will be seen immediately that government,
+once _cheng ming_ has been set in motion, is not a policy-making body.
+There is no question of policy, no room for disagreement, no alternative.
+What is right is apparent. Politics, in the narrow sense of the word,
+ceases to be a function of government; only administration remains.
+
+Secondly, government needs to administer only for two purposes. The chief
+of these is the maintenance of the ideology. Once right views are
+established, no individual is entitled to think otherwise. Government must
+treat the heterodox as malefactors. Their crime is greater than ordinary
+crime, which is a mere violation of right behavior; they pollute right
+thought, set in motion the forces of discord, and initiate evils which may
+work on and on through the society, even after the evil-thinkers
+themselves are dead. To protect the society actively against discord, the
+government must encourage the utterance of the accepted truth. The scholar
+is thus the highest of all the social classes; it is he who maintains
+agreement and order. The government becomes, in maintaining the ideology,
+the educational system. The whole political life is education, formal or
+informal. Every act of the leader is a precept and an example. The ruler
+does not compel virtue by law; he spreads it by his conspicuous example.
+
+The other function of the government in maintaining the ideology lies in
+the necessity of dealing with persons not affected by the ideology.
+Barbarians are especially formidable, since both heretics and criminals
+may be restored to the use of their reason, while barbarians may not, so
+long as they remain barbarians. Accordingly, the government is also a
+defense system. It is a defense against open and physical disruption from
+within--as in the case of insurrectionaries or bandits--and a defense
+against forces from without which, as veritable powers of darkness, cannot
+be taught and are amenable only to brute force.
+
+In connection with the third point, government itself appears as subject
+to _li_. It has no right to do wrong. The truth is apparent to everyone,
+and especially to the scholars. In this wise the Chinese governments were
+at the mercy of their subjects. No divine right shielded them when public
+opinion condemned them; ill-doing governments were twice guilty and
+contemptible, because of the great force of their examples. An evil
+emperor was not only a criminal; he was a heresiarch, leading many astray,
+and corrupting the virtue upon which society rested--virtue being the
+maintenance of a true and moral ideology, and conformity to it.
+
+The consequence of these teachings was such that we may say, without
+sacrificing truth to paradox, that the aim of Chinese government was
+anarchy--not in the sense of disorder, but in the sense of an order so just
+and so complete that it needed no governing. The _laissez-faire_ of the
+Chinese was not only economic; it was political. The Great Harmony of
+Confucius, which was his Utopia, was conceived of as a society where the
+excellence of ideology and the thoroughness of conformity to ideology had
+brought perfect virtue, perfect happiness.
+
+The other doctrines of Confucius, his practical teachings on
+statesmanship, his discourses on the family--these cannot be entered into
+here. Enough has, perhaps, been shown to demonstrate the thoroughness of
+Confucius' reaction against state and nation.(38) This reaction was to
+continue, and to become so typical that the whole Chinese system of
+subsequent centuries was called Confucian,(39) until the exigencies of a
+newer, larger, and more perilous world led to Sun Yat-sen's teaching of
+modern Chinese nationalism. Before taking up the doctrine of _min tsu_, it
+may be worthwhile to summarize the manner in which Chinese society,
+deliberately and accidentally, each in part, followed out the doctrines of
+Confucius in its practical organization.
+
+
+
+
+The Chinese World-Society of Eastern Asia.
+
+
+It would be, of course, absurd to pretend to analyze the social system of
+China in a few paragraphs; and yet it is necessary to the study of Sun
+Yat-sen that certain characteristics be at least mentioned. Several
+problems appear which are quite outstanding. What was the social position
+and function of each individual? How were refractory individuals to be
+disciplined in accordance with the requirements that the general opinion
+of society imposed? What were the ultimate ends which the organization of
+Chinese society was to realize? How were the educational system and the
+frontier defenses to be maintained? What was to be the position and power
+of the political organization?
+
+At the outset it is necessary that a working demarcation of the political
+be established. Accepting, by definition, those coercive controls as
+political which are operated for the preservation of society as a whole,
+and are recognized within the society as so doing, we see immediately that
+the range of the political must have been much less in old China than it
+has been in the West. Western societies tend, at least in law, to
+emphasize the relationship between the individual and the society as a
+whole; free and unassociated individuals tend to become extraordinarily
+unstable. In the old Chinese society the control of the individual was so
+much an ideological one, that political control was infinitely narrower
+than in the West. But, in order to effectuate ideological control, there
+must be an organization which will permit pressure to be exercised on the
+individual in such a compelling manner that the exercise of external
+coercion becomes unnecessary. In a society in which the state has withered
+away, after an enormous expansion in the subject-matter of its
+control,(40) the totalitarian state is succeeded by the totalitarian
+tradition, if--and the qualification is an important one--the indoctrination
+has been so effective that the ideology can maintain itself in the minds
+of men without the continuing coercive power of the state to uphold it. If
+the ideology is secure, then control of the individual will devolve upon
+those persons making up his immediate social environment, who--in view of
+the uniform and secure notions of right and justice prevailing--can be
+relied upon to attend to him in a manner which will be approved by the
+society in general.
+
+In China the groups most conspicuous within the society were the family
+system, the village and district, and the _hui_ (association; league;
+society, in the everyday sense of the word).
+
+The family was an intricate structure. A fairly typical instance of family
+organization within a specific village has been described in the following
+terms: "The village is occupied by one sib, a uni-lateral kinship group,
+exogamous, monogamous but polygynous, composed of a plurality of kin
+alignments into four families: the natural family, the economic-family,
+the religious-family, and the sib."(41) The natural family corresponded to
+the family of the West. The economic family may have had a natural family
+as its core, but commonly extended through several degrees of kinship, and
+may have included from thirty to one hundred persons, who formed a single
+economic unit, living and consuming collectively. The religious family was
+an aggregate of economic families, of which it would be very difficult to
+give any specified number as an average. It was religious in that it
+provided the organization for the proper commemoration and reverence of
+ancestors, and maintained an ancestral shrine where the proper
+genealogical records could be kept; the cult feature has largely
+disappeared in modern times. The sib corresponded roughly to the clan,
+found in some Western communities; its role was determined by the
+immediate environment. In some cases--as especially in the south--the sib
+was powerful enough to engage in feuds; at times one or more sibs
+dominated whole communities; in the greater part of China it was a loose
+organization, holding meetings from time to time to unite the various
+local religious families which constituted it.
+
+Family consciousness played its part in sustaining certain elements of the
+Confucian ideology. It stressed the idea of the carnal immortality of the
+human race; it oriented the individual, not only philosophically, but
+socially as well. The size of each family determined his position
+spatially, and family continuity fixed a definite location in time for
+him. With its many-handed grasp upon the individual, the family system
+held him securely in place and prevented his aspiring to the arrogant
+heights of nobility or falling to the degradation of a slavery in which he
+might become a mere commodity. A Chinese surrounded by his kinsmen was
+shielded against humiliations inflicted upon him by outsiders or the
+menace of his own potential follies. It was largely through the family
+system, with its religious as well as economic and social foundation, that
+the Chinese solved the problem of adequate mobility of individuals in a
+society stable as a whole, and gave to that stability a clear and
+undeniable purpose--the continued generation of the human race through the
+continuity of a multitude of families, each determined upon survival.
+
+The family was the most obviously significant of the groupings within the
+society, but it was equalled if not excelled in importance by the
+village.(42)
+
+Had the family been the only important social grouping, it might have been
+impossible for any democracy to develop in China. It so occurred that the
+family pattern provided, indeed, the model for the government, but the
+importance of villages in Chinese life negated the too sharp influence of
+a familistic government. It would have been the most awful heresy, as it
+is in Japan today, to revolt against and depose an unrighteous father;
+there was nothing to prevent the deposition or destruction of an evil
+village elder. In times of concord, the Emperor was the father of the
+society; at other times, when his rule was less successful, he was a
+fellow-villager subject to the criticism of the people.
+
+The village was the largest working unit of non-political administration;
+that is to say, groups within and up to the village were almost completely
+autonomous and not subject to interference, except in very rare cases,
+from outside. The village was the smallest unit of the political. The
+District Magistrate, as the lowest officer in the political-educational
+system, was in control of a district containing from one to twenty
+villages, and negotiated, in performing the duties imposed upon him, with
+the village leaders. The villages acted as self-ruling communes, at times
+very democratic.(43)
+
+Next in importance, among Chinese social groups, after the family and the
+village was the _hui_. It was in all probability the last to appear.
+Neither ordained, as the family seemed to be, by the eternal physical and
+biological order of things, nor made to seem natural, as was the village,
+by the geographic and economic environment, the association found its
+justification in the deeply ingrained propensities of the Chinese to
+cooeperate. Paralleling and supplementing the former two, the _hui_ won for
+itself a definite and unchallenged place in the Chinese social structure.
+The kinds of _hui_ may be classified into six categories:(44) 1) the
+fraternal societies; 2) insurance groups; 3) economic guilds; 4) religious
+societies; 5) political societies; and 6) organizations of militia and
+vigilantes. The _hui_ made up, in their economic form, the greater part of
+the economic organization of old China, and provided the system of
+vocational education for persons not destined to literature and
+administration. Politically, it was the _hui_--under such names as the
+Triad and the Lotus--that provided the party organizations of old China and
+challenged the dynasties whenever objectionable social or economic
+conditions developed.
+
+The old Chinese society, made up of innumerable families, villages, and
+_hui_, comprised a whole "known world." Its strength was like that of a
+dinosaur in modern fable; having no one nerve-centre, the world-society
+could not be destroyed by inroads of barbarians, or the ravages of famine,
+pestilence, and insurrection. The ideology which has been called Confucian
+continued. At no one time were conditions so bad as to break the many
+threads of Chinese culture and to release a new generation of persons
+emancipated from the tradition. Throughout the centuries education and
+government went forward, even though dynasties fell and the whole country
+was occasionally over-run by conquerors. The absence of any juristically
+rigid organization permitted the Chinese to maintain a certain minimum of
+order, even in the absence of an emperor, or, as more commonly occurred,
+in the presence of several.
+
+The governmental superstructure cemented the whole Chinese world together
+in a formal manner; it did not create it. The family, the village, and the
+_hui_ were fit subjects for imperial comment, but there was nothing in
+their organization to persuade the student that the Emperor--by virtue of
+some Western-type _Kompetenz Kompetenz_--could remove his sanction from
+their existence and thereby annihilate them. There was no precarious legal
+personality behind the family, the village, and the _hui_, which could be
+destroyed by a stroke of law. It was possible for the English kings to
+destroy the Highland clan of the MacGregor--"the proscribed name"--without
+liquidating the members of the clan _in toto_. In China the Emperor beheld
+a family as a quasi-individual, and when enraged at them was prone to wipe
+them out with massacre. Only in a very few cases was it possible for him
+to destroy an organization without destroying the persons composing it; he
+could, for example, remove the privilege of a scholarship system from a
+district, prefecture, or province without necessarily disposing of all the
+scholars involved in the move. The government of China--which, in the
+normal run of affairs, had no questions of policy, because policy was
+traditional and inviolable--continued to be an administration dedicated to
+three main ends--the maintenance of the ideology (education), the defense
+of the society as a whole against barbarians (military affairs) and
+against the adverse forces of nature (public works on the most
+extensive--and not intensive--scale), and the collection of funds for the
+fulfillment of the first two ends (revenue). The Emperor was also the
+titular family head of the Chinese world.
+
+The educational system was identical with the administrative, except in
+the case of the foreign dynasties. (Under the Manchus, for example, a
+certain quota of Manchu officials were assigned throughout the government,
+irrespective of their scholastic rank in contrast to the Chinese.) It was
+a civil service, an educational structure, and a ritualist organization.
+Selected from the people at large, scholars could--at least in
+theory--proceed on the basis of sheer merit to any office in the Empire
+excepting the Throne. Their advancement was graduated on a very elaborate
+scale of degrees, which could be attained only by the passing of
+examinations involving an almost perfect knowledge of the literature of
+antiquity and the ability to think in harmony with and reproduce that
+literature. The Chinese scholar-official had to learn to do his own
+thinking by means of the cliches which he could learn from the classics;
+he had to make every thought and act of his life conform to the pattern of
+the ideology. Resourceful men may have found in this a proper
+fortification for their originality, as soon as they were able to cloak it
+with the expressions of respect; mediocre persons were helpless beyond the
+bounds of what they had learned.
+
+The combination of education and administration had one particular very
+stabilizing effect upon Chinese society. It made literacy and rulership
+identical. Every educated man was either a government official or expected
+to become one. There was no hostile scholar class, no break with the
+tradition. Struggle between scholars generally took the form of conflicts
+between cliques and were not founded--except in rare instances--on any
+cleavage of ideas. The Throne secured its own position and the continuity
+of the ideology through establishing intellectuality as a government
+monopoly. The consequences of the educational-administrative system
+fostered democratic tendencies quite as much as they tended to maintain
+the status quo. The scholars were all men, and Chinese, owing allegiance
+to families and to native districts. In this manner a form of
+representation was assured the government which kept it from losing touch
+with the people, and which permitted the people to exercise influence upon
+the government in the advancement of any special interests that could
+profit by government assistance. The educational system also served as the
+substitute for a nobility. Hereditary class distinctions existed in China
+on so small a scale that they amounted to nothing. The way to power was
+through the educational hierarchy.(45) In a society which offered no
+financial or military short cuts to power, and which had no powerful
+nobility to block the way upward, the educational system provided an
+upward channel of social mobility which was highly important in the
+organization of the Chinese world order.
+
+The scholars, once they had passed the examinations, were given either
+subsistence allowances or posts, according to the rank which they had
+secured in the tests. (This was, of course, the theory; in actuality
+bribery and nepotism played roles varying with the time and the locality.)
+They made up the administration of the civilized world. They were not only
+the officials but the literati.
+
+It would be impossible even to enumerate the many posts and types of
+organization in the administration of imperial China.(46) Its most
+conspicuous features may be enumerated as follows: China consisted of half
+a million cities, towns, villages, and hamlets, each to a large extent
+autonomous.(47) These were divided among, roughly, two thousand _hsien_,
+in each of which an over-burdened District Magistrate sought to carry out
+all the recognized functions of government in so far as they applied to
+his locality. He did this largely by negotiation with the leaders of the
+social groups in his bailiwick, the heads of families, the elders of
+villages, the functionaries of _hui_. He was supervised by a variety of
+travelling prefects and superintendents, but the next officer above him
+who possessed a high degree of independence was the viceroy or
+governor--whichever type happened to rule the province or group of
+provinces. Except for their non-hereditability, these last offices were to
+all intents and purposes satrapies. The enormous extent of the Chinese
+civilized world, the difficulty of communicating with the capital, the
+cumbersomeness of the administrative organization, the rivalry and
+unfriendliness between the inhabitants of various provinces--all these
+encouraged independence of a high degree. If Chinese society was divided
+into largely autonomous communes, the Chinese political system was made up
+of largely autonomous provinces. Everywhere there was elasticity.
+
+At the top of the whole structure stood the Emperor. In the mystical
+doctrines which Confucianism transmitted from the animism of the feudal
+ages of China, the Emperor was the intermediary between the forces of
+nature and mankind. The Son of Heaven became the chief ritualist; in more
+sophisticated times he was the patron of civilization to the scholars, and
+the object of supernatural veneration to the uneducated. His function was
+to provide a constant pattern of propriety. He was to act as chief of the
+scholars. To the scholars the ideology was recognized as an ideology,
+albeit the most exact one; to the common people it was an objective
+reality of thought and value. As the dictates of reason were not subject
+to change, the power and the functions of the Emperor were delimited; he
+was not, therefore, responsible to himself alone. He was responsible to
+reason, which the people could enforce when the Emperor failed. Popular
+intervention was regarded as _de jure_ in proportion to its effectiveness
+_de facto_. The Imperial structure might be called, in Western terms, the
+constitutionalism of common sense.(48) The Dragon Throne did not enjoy the
+mysterious and awful prestige which surrounds the modern Tenno of Nippon;
+although sublime in the Confucian theory, it was, even in the theory, at
+the mercy of its subjects, who were themselves the arbiters of reason.
+There was no authority higher than reason; and no reason beyond the reason
+discovered and made manifest in the ages of antiquity.
+
+
+
+
+The Impact of the West.
+
+
+Mere physical shock could not derange the old Chinese society as easily as
+it might some other, dependent for its stability upon complex, fragile
+political mechanisms. China was over-run many times by barbarians; the
+continuity of its civilization was undisturbed. Each group of conquerors
+added to the racial composition of the Chinese, but contributed little to
+the culture. The Ch'in, the Mongols, the Manchus--all ruled China as
+Chinese rulers.
+
+This strength of the Chinese society--in contrast to the Roman--must not,
+however, lead us to suppose that there were any extraordinary virtues in
+the Chinese social organization that made Chinese civilization
+indestructible. On the contrary, the continued life of the Chinese society
+may be ascribed, among others, to four conditions acting definitely and
+overwhelmingly in its favor: China's greater physical extent, homogeneity,
+wealth, and culture.
+
+No barbarian conqueror, with the possible exception of the Mongol, would
+have been a match for an orderly and united China. Without exception, the
+barbarian incursions occurred in times of social and political disorder
+and weakness. That this is no freakish coincidence, may be shown by the
+contrast between China and any of the peripheral realms. None approached
+China in extent, in heaviness of population. Conquest of China was always
+conquest by sufferance of the Chinese.
+
+Second, China's neighbors were divided among themselves. There was never
+any coalition extensive enough to present a genuine threat to a thriving
+China. The Chinese, in spite of diversities of spoken language, were
+united--so far as they were literate--by a common writing and literature;
+the common ideology had, moreover, fostered an extreme sympathy of thought
+and behavior among the Chinese. Persons speaking mutually unintelligible
+dialects, of different racial composition, and in completely different
+economic and geographical environments displayed--and, for all that, still
+display in modern times--an uncanny uniformity of social conditioning.
+China faced barbarians on many fronts; China was cooerdinated, homogeneous;
+the barbarians of North and South did not, in all probability, know
+anything of each other's existence, except what they heard from the
+Chinese.
+
+Third, China's wealth was a socially fortifying factor. In all Eastern
+Asia, no other society or form of social organization appeared which could
+produce a higher scale of living. The Chinese were always materially
+better off than their neighbors, with the possible exception of the
+Koreans and Japanese.
+
+Fourth, Eastern Asia was Chinese just as Europe was Graeco-Roman. The
+peripheral societies all owed a great part, if not all, of their culture
+to the Chinese. China's conquerors were already under the spell of Chinese
+civilization when they swept down upon it. None of them were anxious to
+destroy the heritage of science, arts, and invention which the Chinese had
+developed.
+
+With these advantages in mind, it is easy to understand the peculiarity of
+the Westerners, as contrasted with the other peoples whom the Chinese met
+and fought. The formidable physical power of the Chinese was, after the
+first few decades of intercourse, seen to be quite unequal to the superior
+military technique of the West. The Westerners, although different from
+one another at home, tended to appear as united in the Far East. In any
+case, Chinese unity availed little in the face of greater military power.
+The economic factor, while a great attraction to the Westerners, was no
+inducement to them to become Chinese; they were willing to gain Chinese
+wealth, and dreamed of conquering it, but not of making wealth in the
+Chinese manner. And lastly, and most importantly, the Westerners presented
+a culture of their own which--after the first beginnings of regular
+intercourse--was quite well able to hold its own against the Chinese.(49)
+
+To the utter certainty of the Chinese way of life, the Westerners
+presented the equally unshakable dogma of Christianity. They regarded the
+Chinese--as did the Chinese them--as outlanders on the edge of the known
+world. They exhibited, in short, almost the same attitude toward the
+Chinese that the Chinese had toward barbarians. Consequently, each group
+regarded the other as perverse. The chief distinction between the Chinese
+and the Westerners lay in the fact that the Chinese would in all
+probability have been satisfied if the West had minded its own business,
+while the West, feverish with expansionism, cajoled and fought for the
+right to come, trade, and teach.(50)
+
+At times, the two races met on agreeable and equal terms. The Jesuit
+missionaries ingratiated themselves with the Chinese and, by respecting
+Chinese culture, won a certain admiration for their own. The eighteenth
+century in Europe was the century of _chinoiserie_, when Chinese models
+exercised a profound influence on the fine and domestic arts of
+Europe.(51) The great upsurge of economic power in the period of the
+European industrial revolution led to increased self-assurance on the part
+of the Europeans. The new standards of value alienated them from those
+features of Chinese culture which the eighteenth century had begun to
+appreciate, and placed them in a position to sell to the Chinese as well
+as buy. More and more the economic position of the two societies changed
+about; the Westerners had come to purchase the superior artizan-made goods
+of China, giving in exchange metals or raw materials. A tendency now
+developed for them to sell their own more cheaply, and, in some cases,
+better manufactured products to the Chinese. The era of good feeling and
+mutual appreciation, which had never been very strong, now drew to a
+close.
+
+The vassal states of China were conquered. The British fought the Chinese
+on several occasions, and conquered each time. The full extent of Western
+military superiority was revealed in the capture of Peking in 1860, and in
+the effectiveness--entirely disproportionate to their numbers--that
+Western-trained Imperial troops had in suppressing the Chinese T'ai-p'ing
+rebels.
+
+When Sun Yat-sen was a boy, the country was afire with fear and
+uncertainty. Barbarians who could neither be absorbed nor defeated had
+appeared. Instead of adopting Chinese thought and manners, they were
+vigorously teaching their own to the Chinese. The traditional Chinese
+mechanisms of defense against barbarians were not working.(52) Something
+was vitally wrong. The Chinese could not be persuaded, as some other
+non-European peoples conquered in the age of Western world-dominion seem
+to have been, that all error lay with themselves, and that their own
+ideology was not worth the saving; nor could they, in face of the
+unfortunate facts, still believe that they themselves were completely
+right, or, at least, that their own notions of rightness were completely
+expedient. In view of the pragmatic foundations of the whole Chinese
+ideology and way of life, the seriousness of these consequences cannot be
+over-estimated. Little wonder that China was disturbed! The pragmatic,
+realistic method of organization that the Chinese had had, no longer
+worked in a new environment rising, as it were, from the sea.
+
+The Western impact, consequently, affected China in two ways. In the first
+place, the amorphous Chinese society was threatened and dictated to by the
+strong, clearly organized states of the West. In the second place, the
+introduction of disharmonious values from the West destroyed, in large
+part, that appearance of universality, upon which the effectiveness of the
+Chinese ideology depended, and shocked Chinese thought and action until
+even their first premises seemed doubtful.
+
+This, in short, was the dilemma of the Chinese at the advent of Sun
+Yat-sen. His life was to be dedicated to its solution; it is his analyses
+that are to be studied in the explanation of the Chinese society in the
+modern world.
+
+
+
+
+The Continuing Significance of the Background.
+
+
+Before proceeding to the exposition of Sun Yat-sen's theories and
+programs, it is necessary that a superlatively important consideration be
+emphasized: namely, that Sun Yat-sen was a Chinese, that the nation he
+worked for was China, and that the intellectual and social background of
+his labors was one completely different from that of the Euramerican
+world. A great part of the vaporous disputation which has hidden Chinese
+politics in a cloud of words has been the consequence of the ignoring, by
+Westernized Chinese as well as by Westerners, of the monumental fact that
+China is in only a few respects comparable to the West, and that the ideas
+and methods of the West lose the greater part of their relevance when
+applied to the Chinese milieu. Political dialecticians in China split
+Marxian hairs as passionately and sincerely as though they were in
+nineteenth-century Germany.(53) Sun Yat-sen, though accused of this
+fantastic fault by some of his adversaries, was--as his theories show upon
+close examination--much less influenced by Western thought than is commonly
+supposed to be the case, and in applying Western doctrines to Chinese
+affairs was apt to look upon this as a fortunate coincidence, instead of
+assuming the universal exactness of recent Western social and political
+thought.
+
+What are the features of the Chinese background that must be remembered in
+order to throw a just light upon the beliefs of Sun Yat-sen? Primarily, it
+must have become apparent, from the foregoing discussion of Confucianism
+and the old social order, that China, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen,
+was beginning to draw away from an order of things which the West--or at
+least a part of the West--aspires to achieve: a world-society in which the
+state had withered away. This ideal, while never completely realized in
+China, was perhaps more closely attained than it has ever been in any
+other society. Modern actualities led away from this ideal. The West,
+dreaming of world unity, was divided and armed; China too had to abandon
+the old notions of universal peace, and arm. The West, seeking social
+stability, was mobile; China too had to move.
+
+The old society was in its controls totalitarian. Diffuse and extensive
+controls operated fairly evenly throughout the system. The West possessed
+a state system which was fundamentally different. By limiting the range of
+law to the reinforcement of certain particular _mores_, the Westerners
+were able to obtain a terrific concentration of political power within the
+sphere of what they conceived to be legitimate state control. On the other
+hand the presence of a large number of activities not subject to state
+control led individuals to cherish their freedom--a freedom which in most
+cases did not impair the military and political effectiveness of the state
+in external action.
+
+Since Fascism seeks to reestablish order and certainty, as does Communism
+(although an order and certainty of a different kind), by the extension of
+state activities; and since Sun Yat-sen proposed to improve the political
+position of China by developing a modern state (of narrow, but intense
+activities in contrast to the loose general controls of the old society),
+the drift in China may be regarded, in this respect, as Fascism in
+reverse. Beginning with the same premises--the regeneration of the
+nation--Mussolini was led to a course of policy diametrically opposite to
+that plotted by Sun Yat-sen.
+
+Even, however, with his plans for developing a "machine state" in a
+society where states had long since perished, Sun Yat-sen did not propose
+to destroy Chinese morality and non-political discipline for the sake of
+instituting a sharp juristic law-and-order organization. He was anxious
+that the old Chinese morality and social knowledge be applied. In this, he
+differed from most of the other modern leaders of China, who were for
+veneering China with a Parliament and police without delay. Sun Yat-sen
+realized that a state was necessary in China, and hoped to establish one;
+he also hoped that, beyond the limits of the new state activity,
+individualism and disorder would not come to prevail, but that the old
+controls would continue to operate.
+
+Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen's thought cannot be studied as a mere offshoot of
+recent Western thought. It must be realized that he proposed two ends
+which, of all the countries of the world, would be mutually compatible
+only in China: the development of a state, and the full continuation of
+non-political controls.(54)
+
+In fostering the continuation of ideological control, Sun Yat-sen hoped to
+modify the old ideology so that it would become applicable to the new
+situations. As will be made clear later, he was redefining the old
+world-view so that, without disturbing the consequences to which it would
+lead, it might apply in a novel and unprecedentedly disturbed world. He
+was, in short, switching the premises and trying to preserve the
+conclusions, modifying the actual behavior of the Chinese only in so far
+as it was necessary for the purpose of strengthening and invigorating the
+whole body politic of China.
+
+Another strain of the ancient thought penetrates Sun Yat-sen's theories.
+Ideological control was not to the Confucians, as some Marxian critics
+aver,(55) a rather naive duplicity by which the gentry of China could
+maintain themselves in power indefinitely. Confucius can not be accused,
+save on the basis of unwarrantable reading-in, of insincerity in his
+teaching of order. He was conservative, and knew what he was doing, in
+seeking for the general self-discipline of men, and the rule of precept
+and virtue; but to believe that he desired one public philosophy and
+another private one goes beyond the realm of historically justifiable
+interpretation. An ideology may, of course, be deceptive to its
+promulgators, but the absence of any genuine class-society--as known in the
+West--must serve as a testimonial to the sincerity of Confucian teachings.
+The Confucian ideology was to the ancients not only an instrument for
+good; it was common sense.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not, as a Western leader in his position might have done,
+seek to befuddle the masses for their own good. Since he proposed to
+entrust China's destinies to the votes of the masses, he could scarcely
+have believed them liable to fall victims to deceit over a great length of
+time. In teaching of the race-nation, and of the nature of Chinese
+society, Sun Yat-sen was telling the people what it would be good for them
+to believe; it was good for them because it was the truth--that is, most in
+accord with the actual situation of China in the general society of the
+world.
+
+Few today would dare say what is really in the minds of European leaders
+such as Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler. These men may themselves believe
+what they say; or, not believing it, say it nevertheless because they
+think it the right thing for the masses, in the masses' own interests, to
+believe. Their respective enemies accuse them of saying what they do in
+order to mislead the masses and to dominate the masses for hidden purposes
+of their own. No such accusation has been levelled against Sun Yat-sen.
+Apart from his personal sincerity, his belief in the qualities of the
+common people was such that he did not consider it necessary to deceive
+them, even for their own good.
+
+Consequently, in dealing with the various doctrines that Sun preached, it
+must be remembered that he himself believed what he was saying. He did not
+merely think that the people should regard the Chinese society as a
+race-nation; he thought that China _was_ a race-nation. The modifications
+of the Confucian philosophy were to be contemplated, as was the original
+philosophy, as pragmatically true.(56)
+
+These two factors must be reckoned with--that Sun Yat-sen was teaching and
+working in the Chinese milieu, and that his ideology was an ideology not
+in the older pejorative sense of the word, which connoted duplicity, but
+an ideology in the sense of a scheme of exact knowledge which, by its very
+truthfulness, was a political and social instrument.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II THE THEORY OF NATIONALISM.
+
+
+
+
+The Emergence of the Chinese Race-Nation.
+
+
+It could, at first thought, be supposed that the reconstruction of Chinese
+society might have been necessitated by internal weakness just as much as
+by a changed environment. The process of organizing and developing a
+tight, clear scheme of political control organizations within the society
+(stateification), and delimiting the extent and aims of the society
+(nationalism) were the chief characteristics of this reconstruction.
+
+It is only by means of a disregard of actual conditions that the
+supposition of an internal weakness so great as to require radical change
+can be maintained. While the latter days of the Manchu Empire represented
+a decline, it was a decline no more serious than others through which
+Chinese culture had passed and resurged many times in its history. It is
+still a debatable matter as to whether China had actually become
+intellectually and artistically sterile during this period. In any event,
+it is questionable whether the completely revolutionary reorganization of
+Chinese society--of the type that Sun Yat-sen found it necessary to
+support--would have been either worth-while or probable in the absence of
+Euramerican aggression, and the appearance, all about China, of a new,
+hostile, and unstable environment. If it had not been for the impact of
+the West it is conceivable--although all comment on this must remain mere
+speculation--that a social revolution such as those which occurred under
+Wang Mang (usurper-founder of the unrecognized Hsin Dynasty, 9-25 A.D.),
+Wang An-shih (prime minister, 1069-1076 A.D., under the Sung dynasty), or
+Hung Hsiu-ch'uean (founder of the rebel T'ai P'ing dynasty, 1849-1865),
+might have adjusted matters by a general redistribution of wealth and
+administrative reorganization.
+
+In his earliest agitations Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the Manchus.(57) In
+this connection he developed a peculiar and interesting theory concerning
+nationalism. He held, briefly, that the Chinese had, at the noon-day glory
+of their Empire, fallen under the lure of a cosmopolitanism which was not
+in accord with the realities of political existence. It was this lack of
+distinction between themselves and outsiders which had permitted hundreds
+of millions of Chinese to fall prey to one hundred thousand Manchus in the
+early seventeenth century,(58) with the consequence that the Manchus, once
+on the throne of China, made every effort to erase their barbarian origin
+from the minds of the Chinese, and, with this end in view, did everything
+possible, as modern Japan is doing in Korea, to destroy the national
+consciousness of the Chinese.(59) China, to Sun Yat-sen, had always been a
+nation, but its inhabitants did not believe it a nation. They had lost the
+precious treasure of nationalism. Without contradicting Sun Yat-sen, but
+differing from him only in the use of words, Westerners might say that the
+Chinese had once known nationalism as members of the antique Chinese
+states, but had later formed--in the place of a nation--a cosmopolitan
+society which comprehended the civilized world of Eastern Asia.(60)
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not blame Confucius for cosmopolitanism. There is, indeed,
+nowhere in his works the implication that Confucianism was an evil in
+itself, deserving destruction; why then did Sun Yat-sen believe that, even
+though the old ideology was not invalid for the organization of China
+internally, the old world-view had broken down as an effective instrument
+for the preservation of China?
+
+First of all, Sun stated, in terms more general than did the ancients, the
+necessity of establishing the ideology on the basis of pragmatism. He
+stated:
+
+
+    We cannot say in general that ideas, as ideas, are good or bad. We
+    must judge whether, when put into practice, they prove useful to
+    us or not. If they are of practical value to us, they are good; if
+    they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful to the
+    world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they
+    are not good.(61)
+
+
+He states, also, that if the Chinese race is to survive, it must adopt
+nationalism. "... if we now want to save China, if we wish to see the
+Chinese race survive forever, we must preach Nationalism."(62) Hitherto
+they had been no more conscious of race than were the Europeans of the
+middle ages. To be sure, they were barbarians, whose features were
+strange; but the Chinese were not conscious of themselves as a racial
+unity in competition and conflict with other equal or superior racial
+unities. The self-consciousness of the Chinese was a cultural rather than
+a racial one, and the juxtaposition that presented itself to the Chinese
+mind was between "Ourselves of the Central Realm" and "You the
+Outsiders."(63) Sun Yat-sen became intensely conscious of being a Chinese
+by race,(64) and so did many other of his compatriots, by the
+extraordinary race-pride of the _White Men_ in China. In common with many
+others of his generation, Sun Yat-sen turned to race-consciousness as the
+name for Chinese solidarity.
+
+There is nowhere in his works, so far as the writer knows, any attempt to
+find a value higher than the necessity of perpetuating the Chinese race.
+Sun Yat-sen was a Chinese; his followers were Chinese; whatever benefits
+they contemplated bestowing upon the world as a whole were incidental to
+their work for a powerful and continued China. At various times Sun
+Yat-sen and his followers expressed sympathy with the whole world, with
+the oppressed of the earth, or with all Asia, but the paramount drive
+behind the new movement has been the defense and reconstruction of China,
+no longer conceived of as a core-society maintaining the flower of human
+civilization, but regarded as a race abruptly plunged into the chaos of
+hostile and greedy nations.
+
+Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen called China a nation. We may suppose
+that he never thought that Chinese society need not necessarily be called
+a nation, even in the modern world. What he did do, though, was to
+conceive of China as a unique type of nation: a race-nation. He stated
+that races could be distinguished by a study of physical characteristics,
+occupation, language, religion and folkways or customs.(65) Dividing the
+world first into the usual old-style five primary races (white, black,
+yellow, brown, and red), he divides these races into sub-races in the
+narrow sense of the term. The Chinese race, in the narrow sense of the
+term, is both a race and a nation. The Anglo-Saxons are divided between
+England and America, the Germans between Germany and Austria, the Latins
+among the Mediterranean nations, and so forth; but China is at the same
+time both the Chinese race and the Chinese nation. If the Chinese wish
+their race to perpetuate itself forever, they must adopt and follow the
+doctrine of Nationalism.(66) Otherwise China faces the tragedy of being
+"despoiled as a nation and extinct as a race."(67)
+
+Sun Yat-sen felt that China was menaced and oppressed ethnically,
+politically and economically. Ethnically, he believed that the
+extraordinary population increase of the white race within the past few
+centuries represented a trend which, if not counterbalanced, would simply
+result in the Chinese race being crowded off the earth. Politically he
+observed that the Chinese dependencies had been alienated by the Western
+powers and Japan; that China was at the mercy of any military nation that
+chose to attack; that it was a temporary deadlock between the conquering
+powers rather than any strength of China that prevented, at least for the
+time being, the partition of China and that a diplomatic attack, which
+could break the deadlock of the covetous states, would be even more deadly
+and drastic than simple military attack.(68)
+
+It must be remembered that Sun Yat-sen saw a nation while the majority of
+his compatriots still envisioned the serene, indestructible society of the
+Confucians. Others may have realized that the Western impact was more than
+a frontier squabble on a grand scale; they may have thought it to have
+assumed epic proportions. But Sun Yat-sen, oppressed by his superior
+knowledge of the Western nations, obtained at the cost of considerable
+sympathy with them, struggled desperately to make his countrymen aware of
+the fact, irrefutable to him, that China was engaged in a conflict
+different not only in degree but in kind from any other in Chinese
+history. The Great Central Realm had become simply China. Endangered and
+yet supine, it faced the imperative necessity of complete reconstitution,
+with the bitter alternative of decay and extinction--a race tragedy to be
+compounded of millions of individual tragedies. And yet reconstitution
+could not be of a kind that would itself be a surrender and treason to the
+past; China must fit itself for the modern world, and nevertheless be
+China. This was the dilemma of the Chinese world-society, suddenly become
+a nation. Sun Yat-sen's life and thought were devoted to solving it.
+
+
+
+
+The Necessity of Nationalism.
+
+
+An abstract theorist might observe that the Chinese, finding their
+loose-knit but stable society surrounded by compact and aggressive
+nations, might have solved the question of the perpetuation of Chinese
+society in the new environment by one of two expedients: first, by
+nationalizing, as it were, their non-national civilization; or second, by
+launching themselves into a campaign against the system of nations as
+such. The second alternative does not seem to have occurred to Sun
+Yat-sen. Though he never ventured upon any complete race-war theory, he
+was nevertheless anxious to maintain the self-sufficient power of China as
+it had been until the advent of the West. In his negotiations with the
+Communists, for example, neither he nor they suggested--as might have been
+done in harmony with communist theory--the fusion of China and the Soviet
+Union under a nuclear world government. We may assume with a fair degree
+of certainty that, had a suggestion been made, Sun Yat-sen would have
+rejected it with mistrust if not indignation. He had spent a great part of
+his life in the West. He knew, therefore, the incalculable gulf between
+the civilizations, and was unwilling to entrust the destinies of China to
+persons other than Chinese.(69)
+
+Once the possibility of a successful counter-attack upon the system of
+nations is discounted, nationalism is seen as the sole solution to China's
+difficulties. It must, however, be understood that, whereas nationalism in
+the West implies an intensification of the already definite national
+consciousness of the peoples, nationalism in China might mean only as
+little as the introduction of such an awareness of nationality.
+Nationalism in China might, as a matter of logic, include the possibility
+of improved personal relations between the Chinese and the nationals of
+other states since, on the one hand, the Chinese would be relieved of an
+intolerable sense of humiliation in the face of Western power, and, on the
+other, be disabused of any archaic notions they might retain concerning
+themselves as the sole civilized people of the earth.(70)
+
+A brief historical reference may explain the apparent necessity of
+nationalism in China. In the nineteenth century foreigners in China
+generally suffered reverses when they came into conflict with a village, a
+family, or a guild. But when they met the government, they were almost
+always in a position to bully it. It was commonly of little or no concern
+to the people what their government did to the barbarians; the whole
+affair was too remote to be much thought about. We find, for example, that
+the British had no trouble in obtaining labor auxiliaries in Canton to
+fight with the British troops against the Imperial government at Peking in
+1860; it is quite probable that these Cantonese, who certainly did not
+think that they were renegades, had no anti-dynastic intentions. Chinese
+served the foreign enemies of China at various times as quasi-military
+constabulary, and served faithfully. Before the rise of Chinese
+nationalism it was not beyond possibility that China would be partitioned
+into four or five colonies appurtenant to the various great powers and
+that the Chinese in each separate colony, if considerately and tactfully
+treated, would have become quite loyal to their respective foreign
+masters. The menace of such possibilities made the need of Chinese
+nationalism very real to Sun Yat-sen; the passing of time may serve
+further to vindicate his judgment.
+
+Sun Yat-sen's nationalism, though most vividly clear when considered as a
+practical expedient of social engineering, may also be regarded more
+philosophically as a derivation of, or at least having an affinity with,
+certain older ideas of the Chinese. Confucian thinking, as re-expressed in
+Western terms, implants in the individual a sense of his responsibility to
+all humanity, united in space and time. Confucianism stressed the
+solidarity of humanity, continuous, immortal, bound together by the
+closest conceivable ties--blood relationships. Sun Yat-sen's nationalism
+may represent a narrowing of this conception, and the substitution of the
+modern Chinese race for Confucian humanity. In fairness to Sun Yat-sen it
+must, however, be admitted that he liked to think, in Christian and
+Confucian terms, of the brotherhood of man; one of his favorite
+expressions was "under heaven all men shall work for the common good."(71)
+
+Nationalism was to Sun Yat-sen the prime condition of his movement and of
+his other principles. The Communists of the West regard every aspect of
+their lives significant only in so far as it is instrumental in the class
+struggle. Sun Yat-sen, meeting them, was willing to use the term "class
+struggle" as an instrument for Chinese nationalism. He thought of China,
+of the vital and immediate necessity of defending and strengthening China,
+and sacrificed everything to the effectuation of a genuine nationalism. To
+him only nationalism could tighten, organize, and clarify the Chinese
+social system so that China, whatever it was to be, might not be lost.
+
+The early philosophers of China, looking upon a unicultural world, saw
+social organization as the supreme criterion of civilization and humanity.
+Sun Yat-sen, in a world of many mutually incomprehensible and hostile
+cultures saw nationalism (in the sense of race solidarity) as the supreme
+condition for the survival of the race-nation China. Democracy and social
+welfare were necessary to the stability and effectiveness of this
+nationalism, but the preservation and continuation of the race-nation was
+always to remain the prime desideratum.
+
+
+
+
+The Return to the Old Morality.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen quite unequivocally stated the necessity for establishing a
+new Nationalist ideology in order to effectuate the purposes of China's
+regeneration. He spoke of the two steps of ideological reconstitution and
+political reconstitution as follows: "In order today to restore our
+national standing we must, first of all, revive the national spirit. But
+in order to revive the national spirit, we must fulfill two conditions.
+First, we must realize that we are at present in a very critical
+situation. Second ... we must unite ... and form a large national
+association."(72) He evidently regarded the ideological reconstitution as
+anterior to the political, although he adjusted the common development of
+the two quite detailedly in his doctrine of tutelage.
+
+He proposed three ideological methods for the regeneration of China, which
+might again make the Chinese the leading society (nation) of the world.
+There were: first, the return to the ancient Chinese morality; second, the
+return to the ancient Chinese learning; and third, the adoption of Western
+science.(73)
+
+Sun Yat-sen's never-shaken belief in the applicability of the ancient
+Chinese ethical system, and in the wisdom of old China in social
+organization, is such that of itself it prevents his being regarded as a
+mere imitator of the West, a barbarized Chinese returning to barbarize his
+countrymen. His devotion to Confucianism was so great that Richard
+Wilhelm, the greatest of German sinologues, wrote of him: "The greatness
+of Sun Yat-sen rests, therefore, upon the fact that he has found a living
+synthesis between the fundamental principles of Confucianism and the
+demands of modern times, a synthesis which, beyond the borders of China,
+can again become significant to all humanity. Sun Yat-sen combined in
+himself the brazen consistency of a revolutionary and the great love of
+humanity of a renewer. Sun Yat-sen has been the kindest of all the
+revolutionaries of mankind. And this kindness was taken by him from the
+heritage of Confucius. Hence his intellectual work stands as a connecting
+bridge between the old and the modern ages. And it will be the salvation
+of China, if it determinedly treads that bridge."(74) And Tai Chi-tao, one
+of Sun Yat-sen's most respected followers, had said: "Sun Yat-sen was the
+only one among all the revolutionaries who was not an enemy to Confucius;
+Sun Yat-sen himself said that his ideas embodied China, and that they were
+derived from the ideas of Confucius."(75) The invocation of authorities
+need not be relied upon to demonstrate the importance of Sun Yat-sen's
+demand for ideological reconstruction upon the basis of a return to the
+traditional morality; he himself stated his position in his sixth lecture
+on nationalism: "If we now wish to restore to our nation its former
+position, besides uniting all of us into a national body, we must also
+first revive our own ancient morality; when we have achieved that, we can
+hope to give back to our nation the position which she once held."(76)
+
+What are the chief elements of the old morality? These are: 1) loyalty and
+filial piety, 2) humanity and charity, 3) faithfulness and justice, and 4)
+peace. These four, however, are all expressions of _humanity_, to which
+_knowledge_ and _valor_ must be joined, and _sincerity_ employed in
+expressing them.
+
+The problem of loyalty was one very difficult to solve. Under the Empire
+it was easy enough to consider the Emperor as the father of the great
+society, and to teach loyalty to him. This was easy to grasp, even for the
+simplest mind. Sun Yat-sen urged loyalty to the people, and loyalty to
+duty, as successors to the loyalty once owed to the sovereign. He deplored
+the tendency, which appeared in Republican times, for the masses to assume
+that since there was no more Emperor, there was no more loyalty; and it
+has, since the passing of Sun Yat-sen, been one of the efforts of the
+Nationalists to build up a tradition of loyalty to the spirit of Sun
+Yat-sen as the timeless and undying leader of modern China.
+
+Sun Yat-sen was also deeply devoted to filial piety in China, which was--in
+the old philosophy--simply a manifestation, in another direction, of the
+same virtue as loyalty. He called filial piety indispensable, and was
+proud that none of the Western nations had ever approached the excellence
+of the Chinese in this virtue.(77) At the time that he said this, Sun
+Yat-sen was accused of being a virtual Communist, and of having succumbed
+to the lure of Soviet doctrines. It is at least a little strange that a
+man supposedly infatuated with Marxism should praise that most
+conservative of all virtues: filial piety!
+
+Sun Yat-sen then commented on each of the other virtues, pointing out
+their excellence in old China, and their necessity to modern China. In the
+case of faithfulness, for example, he cited the traditional reliability of
+the Chinese in commercial honor. Concerning justice, he pointed out that
+the Chinese political technique was one fundamentally just; an instance of
+the application of this was Korea, which was-allowed to enjoy peace and
+autonomy as a Chinese vassal state for centuries, and then was destroyed
+shortly after becoming a Japanese protectorate. Chinese faithfulness and
+justice were obviously superior to that of the Japanese.
+
+In politics the two most important contributions of the old morality to
+the Nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen were (1) the doctrine of _wang
+tao_, and (2) the social interpretation of history.
+
+_Wang tao_ is the way of kings--the way of right as opposed to _pa tao_,
+the way of might. It consisted, in the old ideology, of the course of
+action of the kingly man, who ruled in harmony with nature and did not
+violate the established proprieties of mankind. Sun Yat-sen's teachings
+afford us several applications of _wang tao_. In the first place, a group
+which has been formed by the forces of nature is a race; it has been
+formed according to _wang tao_. A group which has been organized by brute
+force is a state, and is formed by _pa tao_. The Chinese Empire was built
+according to _wang tao_; the British Empire by _pa tao_. The former was a
+natural organization of a homogeneous race; the latter, a military outrage
+against the natural order of mankind.(78)
+
+_Wang tao_ is also seen in the relation between China and her vassal
+states, a benevolent relationship which stood in sharp contrast, at times,
+though not always, to the methods later to be used by the Europeans in
+Asia.(79) Again, economic development on a basis of the free play of
+economic forces was regarded as _wang tao_ by Sun Yat-sen, even though its
+consequences might be adverse. _Pa tao_ appeared only when the political
+was employed to do violence to the economic.(80) This doctrine of good and
+bad aspects of economic relationships stands in distinct contrast to the
+Communist theory. He believed that the political was frequently employed
+to bring about unjust international economic relationships, and extenuated
+adverse economic conditions simply because they were the free result of
+the operations of a _laissez-faire_ economy.
+
+Economically, the interpretation of history was, according to Sun Yat-sen,
+to be performed through the study of consumption, and not of the means of
+production. In this he was indebted to Maurice William--at least in
+part.(81) The social interpretation of history is, however, associated not
+only with economic matters, but with the ancient Chinese moral system as
+well. Tai Chi-tao, whose work has most clearly demonstrated the
+relationship between Confucianism and Sunyatsenism, points out in his
+diagram of Sun Yat-sen's ethical system that _humanity_ (_jen_) was to Sun
+Yat-sen the key to the interpretation of history. We have already seen
+that _jen_ is the doctrine of social consciousness, of awareness of
+membership in society.(82) Sun Yat-sen, according to Tai Chi-tao, regarded
+man's development as a social animal, the development of his humanity, as
+the key to history. This would include, of course, among other things, his
+methods of production and of consumption. The distinction between Sun
+Yat-sen and the Western Marxian thinkers lies in the fact that the latter
+trace their philosophical genealogy back through the main currents of
+Western philosophy, while Sun Yat-sen derives his from Confucius. Nothing
+could be further from dialectical materialism than the socio-ethical
+interpretation that Sun Yat-sen developed from the Confucian theories.
+
+The role played by the old Chinese morality in the ideology of Sun Yat-sen
+is, it is apparent, an important one. First, Sun Yat-sen believed that
+Chinese nationalism and the regeneration of the Chinese people had to be
+based on the old morality of China, which was superior to any other
+morality that the world had known, and which was among the treasures of
+the Chinese people. Second, he believed that, in practical politics as
+well as national ideology, the application of the old virtues would be
+fruitful in bringing about the development of a strong China. Third, he
+derived the idea of _wang tao_, the right, the royal, the natural way,
+from antiquity. He pointed out that violence to the established order--of
+race, as in the case of the British Empire, of economics, as in the case
+of the political methods of imperialism--was directly antithetical to the
+natural, peaceful way of doing things that had led to the supreme
+greatness of China in past ages. Fourth, he employed the doctrine of
+_jen_, of social-consciousness, which had already been used, by the
+Confucians, and formed the cornerstone of their teaching, as the key to
+his interpretation. In regard to the individual, this was, as we have
+seen, consciousness of social orientation; with regard to the group, it
+was the development of strength and harmony. It has also been translated
+_humanity_, which broadly and ethically, carries the value scheme with
+which _jen_ is connected.
+
+Even this heavy indebtedness to Chinese antiquity in adopting and adapting
+the morality of the ancients for the salvation of their children in the
+modern world, was not the total of Sun Yat-sen's political traditionalism.
+He also wished to renew the ancient Chinese knowledge, especially in the
+fields of social and political science. Only after these did he desire
+that Western technics be introduced.
+
+
+
+
+The Return to the Ancient Knowledge.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the return to the ancient Chinese knowledge may
+be divided into three parts. First, he praised the ancient Chinese
+superiority in the field of social science, but distinctly stressed the
+necessity of Western knowledge in the field of the physical and applied
+sciences alone.(83) Second, he pointed out the many practical
+accomplishments of the ancient Chinese knowledge, and the excellence and
+versatility of Chinese invention.(84) Third, his emphasis upon the
+development of talents in the material sciences hints at, although it does
+not state, a theory of national wealth based upon labor capacity.
+
+Sun Yat-sen said, "Besides reviving our ancient Chinese morality, we must
+also revive our wisdom and ability.... If today we want to revive our
+national spirit, we must revive not only the morality which is proper to
+us, but we must revive also our own knowledge."(85) He goes on to say that
+the peculiar excellence of the ancient Chinese knowledge lay in the field
+of political philosophy, and states that the Chinese political philosophy
+surpassed the Western, at least in clearness.
+
+He quotes _The Great Learning_ for the summation, in a few words, of the
+highlights of this ancient Chinese social knowledge: "Investigate into
+things, attain the utmost knowledge, make the thoughts sincere, rectify
+the heart, cultivate the person, regulate the family, govern the country
+rightly, pacify the world."(86) This is, as we have seen, what may be
+called the Confucian doctrine of ideological control. Sun Yat-sen lavished
+praise upon it. "Such a theory, so detailed, minute, and progressive, was
+neither discovered nor spoken of by any foreign political philosopher. It
+is a peculiar intellectual treasure pertaining to our political
+philosophy, which we must preserve."(87) The endorsement is doubly
+significant. In the first place, it demonstrates the fact that Sun Yat-sen
+thought of himself as a rebuilder and not as a destroyer of the ancient
+Chinese culture, and the traditional methods of organization and control.
+In the second place, it points out that his Chinese background was most
+clear to him, and that he was in his own mind the transmitter of the
+Chinese heritage.
+
+In speaking of Chinese excellence in the field of the social science, Sun
+Yat-sen did not confine his discussion to any one time. Whenever he
+referred to a political theory, he mentioned its Chinese origin if it were
+one of those known to Chinese antiquity: anarchism, communism, democracy.
+He never attacked Chinese intellectual knowledge for being what it was,
+but only for what it omitted: physical science.(88) He was undoubtedly
+more conservative than many of his contemporaries, who were actually
+hostile to the inheritance.
+
+The summary of Sun Yat-sen's beliefs and position in respect to the
+ancient intellectual knowledge is so well given by Tai Chi-tao that any
+other statement would almost have to verge on paraphrase. Tai Chi-tao
+wrote:
+
+
+    Sun Yat-sen (in his teachings) completely includes the true ideas
+    of China as they recur again and again from Yao and Shun,
+    Confucius and Mencius. It will be clear to us, therefore, that Sun
+    Yat-sen is the renewal of Chinese moral culture, unbroken for two
+    thousand years ... we can see that Sun Yat-sen was convinced of
+    the truth of his own words, and at the same time we can also
+    recognize that his national revolution was based upon the
+    re-awakening of Chinese culture. He wanted to call the creative
+    power of China to life again, and to make the value of Chinese
+    culture useful to the whole world, and in that way to realize
+    cosmopolitanism.(89)
+
+
+Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen's doctrines may not only be regarded as having
+been based upon the tacit premises of the Chinese intellectual milieu, but
+as having been incorporated in them as supports. Sun Yat-sen's theories
+were, therefore, consciously as well as unconsciously Chinese.
+
+Sun Yat-sen was proud of the accomplishment of the Chinese in physical and
+applied knowledge. He praised Chinese craftsmanship and skill, and
+extolled the talents of the people which had invented the mariner's
+compass, printing, porcelain, gunpowder, tea, silks, arches, and
+suspension bridges.(90) He urged the revival of the talents of the
+Chinese, and the return of material development. This teaching, in
+conjunction with his advocacy of Western knowledge, leads to another
+suggestive point.
+
+Sun Yat-sen pointed out that _wealth_ was to the modern Chinese what
+_liberty_ was to the Europeans of the eighteenth century--the supreme
+condition of further progress.(91) The way to progress and wealth was
+through social reorganization, and through the use of the capacities of
+the people. It may be inferred, although it cannot be stated positively,
+that Sun Yat-sen measured wealth not merely in metals or commodities, but
+in the productive capacities of the country, which, as they depend upon
+the labor skill of the workers, are in the last analysis cultural and
+psychological rather than exclusively physical in nature.(92)
+
+China, following the ancient morality, conscious of its intellectual and
+social heritage, and of its latent practical talents, needed only one more
+lesson to learn: the need of Western science.
+
+
+
+
+Western Physical Science in the New Ideology.
+
+
+The third element of the nationalist ideology proposed by Sun Yat-sen was
+the introduction of Western science. It is upon this that his break with
+the past arose; it is this that gives his ideology its partially
+revolutionary character, for the ideology was, as we have seen, strongly
+reconstitutional in two of its elements. Sun Yat-sen was, however, willing
+to tear down if he could rebuild, and rebuild with the addition of Western
+science. These questions immediately arise: why did he wish to add Western
+science to the intellectual background of modern China? what, in Western
+science, did he wish to add? to what degree did he wish Western science to
+play its role in the development of a new ideology for China?
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not have to teach the addition of Western science to the
+Chinese ideology. In his own lifetime the terrific swing from arrogant
+self-assurance to abject imitativeness had taken place. Sun Yat-sen said
+that the Boxer Rebellion was the last surge of the old Chinese
+nationalism, "But the war of 1900 was the last manifestation of
+self-confidence thoughts and self-confidence power on the part of the
+Chinese to oppose the new civilization of Europe and of America.... They
+understood that the civilization of Europe and of America was really much
+superior to the ancient civilization of China."(93) He added that this
+superiority was naturally evident in the matter of armaments. This
+illustrates both consequences of the impact of the West--the endangered
+position of the Chinese society, and the consequent instability of the
+Chinese ideology.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not regard the introduction of Western science into
+Chinese life as merely remedial in nature, but, on the contrary, saw much
+benefit in it. This was especially clear to him as a physician; his
+training led him to see the abominable practices of many of the Chinese in
+matters of diet and hygiene.(94) He made a sweeping claim of Western
+superiority, which is at the same time a sharp limitation of it in fields
+which the conservative European would be likely to think of as
+foremost--politics, ethics, religion. "Besides the matter of armaments, the
+means of communication ... are far superior.... Moreover, in everything
+else that relates to machinery or daily human labor, in methods of
+agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, all (foreign) methods by far
+surpass those of China."(95)
+
+Sun Yat-sen pointed out the fact that while manuals of warfare become
+obsolete in a very few years in the West, political ideas and institutions
+do not. He cited the continuance of the same pattern of government in the
+United States, and the lasting authority of the _Republic_ of Plato, as
+examples of the stagnation of the Western social sciences as contrasted
+with physical sciences. Already prepossessed in favor of the Chinese
+knowledge and morality in non-technical matters, he did not demand the
+introduction of Western social methods as well. He had lived long enough
+in the West to lose some of the West-worship that characterized so many
+Chinese and Japanese of his generation. He was willing, even anxious, that
+the experimental method, by itself, be introduced into Chinese thought in
+all fields,(96) but not particularly impressed with the general
+superiority of Western social thought.
+
+Sun Yat-sen's own exposition of the reasons for his desiring to limit the
+role played by Western science in China is quite clear.(97) In the first
+place, Sun Yat-sen was vigorously in favor of adopting the experimental
+method in attaining knowledge. He stood firmly for the pragmatic
+foundation of knowledge, and for the exercise of the greatest care and
+most strenuous effort in discovering it. Secondly, he believed in taking
+over the physical knowledge of the Westerners, although--in his emphasis on
+Chinese talent--he by no means believed that Western physical knowledge
+would displace that of the Chinese altogether. "We can safely imitate the
+material civilization of Europe and of America; we may follow it blindly,
+and if we introduce it in China, it will make good headway."(98) Thirdly,
+he believed that the social science of the West, and especially its
+political philosophy, might lead the Chinese into gross error, since it
+was derived from a quite different ideology, and not relevant to Chinese
+conditions. "It would be a gross error on our part, if, disregarding our
+own Chinese customs and human sentiments, we were to try to force upon
+(our people) a foreign type of social government just as we copy a foreign
+make of machinery."(99) Fourthly, even apart from the difference between
+China and the West which invalidated Western social science in China, he
+did not believe that the West had attained to anything like the same
+certainty in social science that it had in physical science.(100) Fifthly,
+Sun Yat-sen believed that the Chinese should profit by observing the
+experiments and theories of the West in regard to social organization,
+without necessarily following them.
+
+The great break between Sun Yat-sen's acceptance of Western physical
+science and his rejection of Western social science is demonstrated by his
+belief that government is psychological in its foundations. "Laws of human
+government also constitute an abstract piece of machinery--for that reason
+we speak of the machinery of an organized government--but a material piece
+of machinery is based on nature, whereas the immaterial machinery of
+government is based on psychology."(101) Sun Yat-sen pointed out, although
+in different words, that government was based upon the ideology and that
+the ideology of a society was an element in the last analysis
+psychological, however much it might be conditioned by the material
+environment.
+
+Of these three elements--Chinese morality, Chinese social and political
+knowledge, and Western physical science--the new ideology for the modern
+Chinese society was to be formed. What the immediate and the ultimate
+forms of that society were to be, remains to be studied.
+
+
+
+
+The Consequences of the Nationalist Ideology.
+
+
+What are the consequences of this Nationalistic ideology? What sort of
+society did Sun Yat-sen envision? How much of it was to be Chinese, and
+how much Western? Were the Chinese, like some modern Japanese, to take
+pride in being simultaneously the most Eastern of Eastern nations and the
+most Western of Western or were they to seek to remain fundamentally what
+their ancestors had been for uncounted centuries?
+
+In the first place, Sun Yat-sen's proposed ideology was, as we have seen,
+to be composed of four elements. First, the essential core of the old
+ideology, to which the three necessary revivifying elements were to be
+added. This vast unmentioned foundation is highly significant to the
+assessment of the nature of the new Chinese ideology. (It is quite
+apparent that Sun Yat-sen never dreamed, as did the Russians, of
+overthrowing the _entire_ traditional order of things. His three
+modifications were to be added to the existing Chinese civilization.)
+Second, he wished to revive the old morality. Third, he desired to restore
+the ancient knowledge and skill of the Chinese to their full creative
+energy. Fourth, he desired to add Western science. The full significance
+of this must be realized in a consideration of Chinese nationalism. Sun
+Yat-sen did not, like the Meiji Emperor, desire to add the whole front of
+Western culture; he was even further from emulating the Russians in a
+destruction of the existing order and the development of an entirely new
+system. His energies were directed to the purification and reconstitution
+of the Chinese ideology by the strengthening of its own latent moral and
+intellectual values, and by the innovation of Western physical science and
+the experimental method. Of the range of the ideology, of the
+indescribably complex intellectual conditionings in which the many
+activities of the Chinese in their own civilization were carried on, Sun
+Yat-sen proposed to modify only those which could be improved by a
+reaction to the excellencies of Chinese antiquity, or benefited by the
+influence of Western science. Sun Yat-sen was, as Wilhelm states, both a
+revolutionary and a reconstitutionary. He was reconstitutionary in the
+ideology which he proposed, and a revolutionary by virtue of the political
+methods which he was willing to sanction and employ in carrying the
+ideology into the minds of the Chinese populace.
+
+In the second place, Sun Yat-sen proposed to modify the old ideology not
+only with respect to content but also with regard to method of
+development. The Confucians had, as we have seen, provided for the
+continual modification and rectification of the ideology by means of the
+doctrine of _cheng ming_. It is a matter of dispute as to what degree that
+doctrine constituted a scientific method for propagating knowledge.(102)
+Whatever the method of the ancients, Sun Yat-sen proposed to modify it in
+three steps: the acknowledgment of the pragmatic foundations of social
+ideas, the recognition of the necessity for knowledge before action, and
+the introduction of the experimental method. His pragmatic position shows
+no particular indication of having been derived from any specific source;
+it was a common enough tendency in old Chinese thought, from the
+beginning; in advocating it, Sun Yat-sen may have been revolutionary only
+in his championing of an idea which he may well have had since early
+childhood. His stress upon the necessity of ideological clarity as
+antecedent to revolutionary or any other kind of action is negatively
+derived from Wang Yang-ming, whose statement of the converse Sun Yat-sen
+was wont to attack. The belief in the experimental method is clearly
+enough the result of his Western scientific training--possibly in so direct
+a fashion as the personal influence of one of his instructors, Dr. James
+Cantlie, later Sir James Cantlie, of Queen's College, Hongkong. Sun
+Yat-sen was a physician; his degree _Dr._ was a medical and not an
+academic one; and there is no reason to overlook the influence of his
+vocation, a Western one, in estimating the influence of the Western
+experimental method.(103)
+
+The overwhelming preponderance of Chinese elements in the new ideology
+proposed by Sun Yat-sen must not hide the fact that, in so stable an
+ideology as that of old China, the modifications which Sun advocated were
+highly significant. In method, experimentalism;(104) in background, the
+whole present body of Western science--these were to move China deeply,
+albeit a China that remained Chinese. There is a fundamental difference
+between Sun's doctrine of ideological extension ("the need for knowledge")
+and Confucius' doctrine of ideological rectification (_cheng ming_).
+Confucius advocated the establishment of a powerful ideology for the
+purpose of extending ideological control and thereby of minimizing the
+then pernicious effects of the politically active proto-nations of his
+time. Sun Yat-sen, reared in a world subject to ideological control, saw
+no real necessity for strengthening it; what he desired was to prepare
+China psychologically for the development of a clear-cut conscious nation
+and a powerful government as the political instrument of that nation. In
+spite of the great Chinese emphasis which Sun pronounced in his ideology,
+and in spite of his many close associations with old Chinese thought, his
+governmental principles are in a sense diametrically opposed to
+Confucianism. Confucius sought to establish a totalitarian system of
+traditional controls which would perpetuate society and civilization
+regardless of the misadventures or inadequacies of government. Sun Yat-sen
+was seeking to build a strong liberal protective state within the
+framework of an immemorial society which was largely non-political; his
+doctrine, which we may call totalitarianism in reverse, tended to
+encourage intellectual freedom rather than any rigid ideological
+cooerdination. The mere fact that Sun Yat-sen trusted the old Chinese
+ideology to the ordeal of free criticism is, of course, further testimony
+to his belief in the fundamental soundness of the old intellectual
+order--an order which needed revision and supplementation to guide modern
+China through the perils of its destiny.
+
+Before passing to a brief consideration of the nature of the society to be
+developed through this nationalist ideology, it may be interesting to note
+the value-scheme in the ideology. There was but one value--the survival of
+the Chinese people with their own civilization. All other considerations
+were secondary; all other reforms were means and not ends. Nationalism,
+democracy, and _min sheng_ were each indispensable, but none was superior
+to the supreme desideratum, Chinese survival. That this survival was a
+vivid problem to Sun, almost any of his lectures will testify. Tai
+Chi-tao, one of the inner circle of Sun Yat-sen's disciples, summarized
+the spirit of this nationalism when he wrote; "We are Chinese, and those
+things that we have to change first lie in China. But if all things in
+China have become worthless, if Chinese culture no longer has any
+significance in the cultural history of the world, if the Chinese people
+has lost its power of holding its culture high, we might as well wait for
+death with bound hands--what would be the use of going on with
+revolution?"(105) Sun Yat-sen made concessions to cosmopolitanism, which
+he saw as ideal to be realized in the remote future. First and last,
+however, he was concerned with his own people, the Chinese.
+
+What was to be the nature of the society which would arise from the
+knowledge and application of the new ideology? Sun planned to introduce
+the idea of a race-nation into the Chinese ideology, to replace the
+definite but formless we-you outlook which the Chinese of old China had
+had toward outsiders almost indiscriminately.(106) The old anti-barbarian
+sentiment had from time to time in the past been very powerful; Sun
+Yat-sen called this nationalism also, not distinguishing it from the new
+kind of nationalism which he advocated--a modern nationalism necessarily
+connoting a plurality of equal nations. The self-consciousness of the
+Chinese he wished to restore, although on a basis of justice and the
+mutual recognition by the nations of each other's right to exist. But this
+nationalism was not to be a complete break with the past, for the new
+China was to continue the traditional function of old China--of being the
+teacher and protectress of Eastern Asia. It was the duty of China to
+defend the oppressed among the nations, and to smite down the Great Powers
+in their oppressiveness. We may suppose that this benevolence of the
+Chinese race-nation would benefit the neighbors of China only so long as
+those neighbors, quickened themselves by nationalist resurgences, did not
+see something sinister in the benevolent manifest destiny of the Chinese.
+
+It was a matter of policy, rather than of ideology, as to what the Chinese
+nation was to include. There were possibilities of a conflict with the
+Communists over the question of Outer Mongolia. Physically, Sun saw the
+Mongols as one of the five component peoples of the Great Chung-hua
+Republic. At another time he suggested that they might become assimilated.
+He never urged the Mongols to separate from China and join the Soviet
+Union, or even continue as a completely independent state.(107) There was
+always the possibility of uncertainty in the case of persons who were--by
+the five principle elements of race (according to Sun Yat-sen, blood,
+livelihood, language, religion, and mores)(108)--members of the Chinese
+race-nation but did not consider themselves such.
+
+Chinese nationalism was to lead to cosmopolitanism. Any attempt to foster
+cosmopolitanism before solving the national problem was not only Utopian
+but perverse. The weakness of the Chinese had in great part been derived
+from their delusions of world-order in a world that was greater than they
+imagined, and the true solution to the Chinese question was to be found,
+not in any vain theory for the immediate salvation of the world as a
+whole, but in the diligent and patriotic activities of the Chinese in
+their own country. China was to help the oppressed nations of the earth,
+not the oppressed classes. China was to help all Asia, and especially the
+countries which had depended upon China for protection, and had been
+failed in their hour of need by the impotent Manchu Dynasty. China was,
+indeed, to seek the cooeperation of the whole world, and the promotion of
+universal peace. But China was to do all this only when she was in a
+position to be able to do so, and not in the meantime venture forth on any
+splendid fantasies which would profit no people.
+
+The survival of China was the supreme aim of Sun Yat-sen. How did he
+propose that China, once conscious of itself, should control itself to
+survive and go onwards to the liberation and enrichment of mankind? These
+are questions that he answered in his ideology of democracy and of _min
+sheng_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III. THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.
+
+
+
+
+Democracy in the Old World-Society.
+
+
+In describing a few of the characteristics of the old ideology and the old
+society which may assist the clarification of the principle of democracy,
+it may prove useful to enter into a brief examination of what the word may
+mean in the West, to refer to some of the ideas and institutions of old
+China that were or were not in accord with the Western notion of
+democracy, and, finally, to see what connection Sun Yat-sen's theory of
+democracy may have either with the Western term or with elements in the
+Chinese background. Did Sun Yat-sen propound an entirely new theory as the
+foundation of his theory of democracy for the Chinese race-nation, or did
+he associate several hitherto unrelated ideas and systems to make a new
+whole?
+
+The European word _democracy_ may, for the purposes of this examination,
+be taken to have two parts to its meaning; first, with regard to the
+status of individuals in society; second, with respect to the allocation
+of political power in society. In the former sense, democracy may refer to
+an equalitarianism of status, or to a social mobility so easy and so
+general as to encourage the impression that position is a consequence of
+the behavior of the individual, and a fair gauge to his merit. In the
+latter part of the meaning, democracy may refer to the identification of
+the governed and the governors, or to the coincidence of the actions of
+the governors with the wishes of the governed. Each of these
+ideas--equalitarianism, free mobility, popular government, and
+representative government--has been referred to as the essence of
+democracy. One of them may lead to the discovery of a significance for
+democracy relevant to the scheme of things in the old Chinese society.
+
+Egalitarianism and mobility were both present in old Chinese society. The
+Chinese have had neither an hereditary aristocracy equivalent to the
+Western, nor a caste-system resembling that of India or Japan, since the
+breakdown of the feudal system twenty-three centuries ago.(109) The
+extra-legal egalitarianism of the Chinese has been so generally remarked
+upon by persons familiar with that nation, that further discussion of it
+here is superfluous. Birth has probably counted less in China than it has
+in any other country in the world.
+
+The egalitarianism of intercourse was a powerful aid to social mobility.
+The Chinese never pretended to economic, political, or intellectual
+equality; the mere statement of such a doctrine would have been sufficient
+refutation of it to the members of the old society. Yet there were no
+gradations of weight beyond educational, political, and economic
+distinctions, and the organization of the old society was such that
+mobility in these was relatively free. Movement of an individual either
+upwards or downwards in the economic, political, or academic scale was
+retarded by the influence of the family, which acted as a drag either way.
+Movement was nevertheless continuous and conspicuous; a proof of this
+movement is to be found in the fact that there are really no supremely
+great families in China, comparable to the great names of Japan or of the
+Euramerican nations. (The closest approximation to this is the _K'ung_
+family, the family of Confucius; since the family is large, its eminence
+is scarcely more than nominal and it has no political power.).
+
+Mobility in China was fostered by the political arrangements. The
+educational-administrative system provided a channel upwards and
+downwards. The government tended, for the most part, to be the way up,
+while the economic system was the way down for prominent official
+families. Few families managed to remain eminent for more than a few
+generations, and--with the great size of families--there was always room at
+the top. If a man were not advancing himself, there was always the
+possibility that a kinsman might win preferment, to the economic and
+political advantage of the whole family group.
+
+Social relations--in the narrowest sense of the word--were characterized by
+an extreme attention to form as such, and great contempt for it otherwise.
+Ritualism never became a chivalry or a cult of honor. There was always the
+emphasis upon propriety and courtesy but, once the formalities were done
+with, there was little social distinction between members of different
+economic, political, or academic classes.(110)
+
+In connection with control and representation, a great deal more can be
+said. In the first place, the relations between the governing ideologue in
+the Confucian teachings,(111) and the governed accepters of the ideology
+in the Confucian system were to be discovered through _yueeh_.
+
+_Yueeh_, commonly translated "music" or "harmony," plays a peculiar role in
+the Confucian teachings. It is the mass and individual emotional pattern,
+as _li_ is the behavior pattern. If the people follow the proper behavior
+pattern, their emotional pattern must also be good. Consequently, the
+function of a truly excellent ruler was the scrutiny of _yueeh_. If he were
+a man of superior penetration, he should be able to feel the _yueeh_ about
+him, and thus discover the temper of the populace, without reference to
+electoral machinery or any other government instrumentality. _Yueeh_ is to
+be seen in the tone of voices, in the rhythm of behavior. If it is good,
+it will act with increasing effect upon itself. If bad, it serves as a
+warning to the authorities. As Prof. Hsue says, "For rulers and
+administrators _yueeh_ has two uses; first, it enables them to ascertain
+the general sentiment of the people toward the government and political
+life; and second, it cultivates a type of individual attitude that is most
+harmonious with the environment. The joint work of _li_ and _yueeh_ would
+produce social harmony and social happiness--which is the ultimate aim of
+the State."(112)
+
+_Yueeh_ is, however, a peculiar phenomenon, which can scarcely be called
+either representation or control. It is an idea rooted in the curiously
+pragmatic-mystical world-view of the Confucians, that same world-view
+which elevated virtue almost to the level of a physical substance, subject
+to the same sort of laws of disruption or transmission. Nothing like
+_yueeh_ can be found in Western political thought; however significant it
+may have been in China, any attempt to deal with it in a Western language
+would have more than a touch of futility, because of the great chasm of
+strangeness that separates the two intellectual worlds at so many places.
+
+A more concrete illustration of the old Chinese ideas of popular control
+may be found in the implications of political Confucianism, as Hsue renders
+them:
+
+
+    From the Confucian doctrine of stewardship, namely, that the king
+    is an ordinary person selected by God upon his merit to serve as
+    the steward of God in the control of the affairs of the people for
+    the welfare of the people, there are deduced five theories of
+    political democracy. In the first place, the government must
+    respect public opinion. The will of the people is the will of God,
+    and thus the king should obey both the will of the people and the
+    will of God....
+
+    In the second place, government should be based upon the consent
+    of the governed....
+
+    In the third place, the people have a duty as well as a right to
+    carry on revolution as the last resort in stopping tyranny....
+    Revolution is regarded as a natural blessing; it guards against
+    tyranny and promotes the vitality of the people. It is in complete
+    harmony with natural law.
+
+    In the fourth place, the government exists for the welfare of the
+    people.
+
+    In the fifth place, liberty, equality and equity should be
+    preserved. The State belong equally to all; and so hereditary
+    nobility, hereditary monarchy, and despotism are deplored.
+    Confucius and his disciples seem to advocate a democracy under the
+    form of an elective monarchy or a constitutional monarchy....
+
+    Local self-government is recognized in the Confucian system of
+    government.... The Confucian theory of educational election
+    suggests the distinctly new idea of representation.(113)
+
+
+This summary could scarcely be improved upon although it represents a
+considerable latitude of interpretation in the subject-matter of the
+classics. The voice of the people was the voice of God. From other
+political writers of antiquity--Meng Tzu, Mo Ti, Han Fei Tzu and the
+Legalists, and others--the Chinese received a variety of political
+interpretations, none of which fostered the development of autocracy as it
+developed in Europe.
+
+The reason for this is simple. In addition to the eventual popular control
+of government, and the necessity for the close attention of the government
+to the wishes of the people, the classical writers, for the most part, did
+not emphasize the position of government. With the increasing ideological
+solidarity of the Chinese world, the increasing antiquity and authority of
+tradition, and the stability of the social system, the Chinese states
+withered away--never completely, but definitely more so than their
+analogues in the West. There appeared, consequently, in China a form of
+laissez-faire that surpassed that of Europe completely in thoroughness.
+Not only were the economic functions of the state reduced to a minimum--so
+was its police activity. Old China operated with a government in reserve,
+as it were; a government which was nowhere nearly so important to its
+subjects as Western governments commonly are. The government system was
+one democratic in that it was rooted in a society without intransigeant
+class lines, with a considerable degree of social mobility for the
+individual, with the total number of individuals exercising a terrific and
+occasionally overwhelming pressure against the political system. And yet
+it was not the governmental system upon which old China might have based
+its claim to be a democracy. It could have, had it so wished, claimed that
+name because of the weakness or the absence of government, and the
+presence of other social organizations permitting the individual a
+considerable amount of latent pressure to exercise upon his social
+environment.
+
+This arose from the nature of the large non-political organizations which
+sustained Chinese civilization even more than did the
+educational-administrative authorities. It is obvious that, in theory, a
+free and unassociated individual in a laissez-faire polity would be
+defenseless against extra-politically organized persons. The equities of
+modern democracy lie largely in the development of a check and balance
+system of pressure groups, affording each individual adequate means of
+exercising pressure on behalf of his various interests. It was this
+function--the development of a just statement of pressure-groups--which the
+old Chinese world-society developed for the sufficient representation of
+the individual.
+
+There was no illusion of complete personal liberty. Such a notion was
+scarcely thinkable. Every individual had his family, his village,
+and--although this was by no means universally true--his _hui_, whether one
+or, less commonly, several. He was never left solitary and defenseless
+against powerfully organized interests. No more intimate community of
+interests could be discovered than that of a family, since the community
+of interests there would verge on the total. Ancient Chinese society
+provided the individual with mechanisms to make his interests felt and
+effective, through the family, the village, and the association.
+
+In the West the line of influence runs from the individual, who feels a
+want, to the group which assists him in expressing it, to the government,
+upon which the group exercises pressure, in order that the government may
+use its power to secure what the first group wants from some other group.
+The line runs, as it were, in the following manner:
+individual-group-government-group. In China the group exercised its
+pressure for the most part directly. The individual need not incorporate
+himself in a group to secure the recognition and fulfillment of his
+interests; he was by birth a member of the group, and with the group was
+mobile. In a sense old Chinese society was thoroughly democratic.
+
+On the basis of such a background, Sun Yat-sen did not believe that the
+Chinese had too much government, but, rather, too little. He did not cry
+for liberty; he denounced its excess instead. On the basis of the old
+social organization, which was fluid and yet stable, he sought to create a
+democracy which would pertain to the interests of the nation as a whole,
+not to the interests of individuals or groups. These could go on in the
+traditional manner. The qualifications implicit in Sun Yat-sen's
+championship of democracy must be kept in mind, and his acquaintance with
+the democratic techniques of the old society be allowed for. Otherwise his
+advocacy of the recognition of nationalist rights and his neglect or
+denunciation of individual liberties might be taken for the dogma of a
+lover of tyranny or dictatorship.
+
+Old China possessed a considerable degree of egalitarianism, of social
+mobility, of popular control, and of popular participation, through the
+civil service, in what little government there was. In addition,
+ideological control ensured a minimum of conflicts of interests and
+consequently a maximum facility for self-expression without conflict with
+other individuals, groups, or society as a whole. Finally, the protection
+and advancement of individuals' rights and interests were fostered by a
+system of group relationships which bound virtually every individual into
+a group and left none to fall, solitary, at the mercy of others who were
+organized.
+
+Why then did Sun Yat-sen advocate democracy? What were his justifications
+for it, in a society already so democratic?
+
+
+
+
+Five Justifications of a Democratic Ideology.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen, realizing the inescapable necessity of nationalism, did not
+immediately turn to democracy as a necessary instrument for its promotion.
+He hated the Manchus on the Dragon Throne--human symbols of China's
+subjugation--but at first considered replacing them with a new Chinese
+dynasty. It was only after he had found the heirs of the Ming dynasty and
+the descendants of Confucius to be unworthy that he turned to
+republicanism and found democracy, with its many virtues.(114) He early
+became enamored of the elective system, as found in the United States, as
+the only means of obtaining the best governors.(115) In the final stage he
+had departed so far from his earlier way of thinking that he criticized
+Dr. Goodnow severely for recommending the re-introduction of a monarchy in
+China.
+
+Sun Yat-sen, as a good nationalist, made earnest efforts to associate his
+doctrines with those of the sages and to avoid appearing as a proponent of
+Western civilization. It is, consequently, not unusual to discover him
+citing Confucius and Mencius on _vox populi vox dei_, and saying,
+
+"The government of Yao and Shun was monarchical in name but democratic in
+practice, and for that reason Confucius honored these men."(116)
+
+He considered that democracy was to the sages an "ideal that could not be
+immediately realized,"(117) and therefore implied that modern China, in
+realizing democracy, was attaining an ideal cherished by the past.
+Democracy, other things apart, was a filial duty. This argument, while
+persuasive in Chinese, can scarcely be considered Sun Yat-sen's most
+important one in favor of democracy.
+
+His most cogent and perhaps most necessary argument was based on his
+conception of national liberty as opposed to the liberty of the
+individual. He delivered a spirited denunciation of those foreigners who
+criticized the Chinese for being without liberty, and in the next breath
+complained that the Chinese had no government, that they were "loose
+sand." (Another fashionable way of expressing this idea is by saying that
+"China is a geographical expression.") He said: "If, for instance, the
+foreigners say that China is 'loose sand,' what do they finally mean by
+that expression? They mean to say that each individual is free, that
+everybody is free, that each one takes the maximum of liberty, and that,
+as a result, they are 'loose sand'."(118) He pointed out that the Chinese
+had not suffered from the loose autocracy in the Empire, and that they had
+no historical justification for parroting the cry "Liberty!" simply
+because the Westerners, who had really lacked it, had cried and fought for
+it. He cited John Millar's definition of liberty, given in _The Progress
+of Science Relative to Law and Government_, 1787: "True liberty consists
+in this: that the liberty of each individual is limited by the
+non-infringement on the liberty of others; when it invades the liberty of
+others, it is no longer liberty."(119) Sun Yat-sen had himself defined
+liberty as follows: "Liberty consists in being able to move, in having
+freedom of action within an organized group."(120) China, disorganized,
+had no problem of individual liberty. There was, as a matter of fact, too
+much liberty.(121) What the Chinese had to do was to sacrifice some of
+their individual liberty for the sake of the organized nation. Here we
+find a curious turn of thought of which several other examples may be
+found in the _San Min Chu I_: Sun Yat-sen has taken a doctrine which in
+the West applies to the individual, and has applied it to the nation. He
+believes in liberty; but it is not the liberty of the individual which is
+endangered in China. It is the liberty of the nation--which has been lost
+before foreign oppression and exploitation. Consequently he preaches
+national and not individual liberty. Individual liberty must be sacrificed
+for the sake of a free nation.(122) Without discipline there is no order;
+without order the nation is weak and oppressed. The first step to China's
+redemption is _min tsu_, the union (nationalism) of the people. Then comes
+_min ch'uean_, the power of the people. The liberty of the nation is
+expressed through the power of the people.
+
+How is the power of the people to be exercised? It is to be exercised by
+democratic means. To Sun Yat-sen, the liberty of the nation and the power
+of the people were virtually identical. If the Chinese race gained its
+freedom, that freedom, exercised in an orderly manner, could mean only
+democracy. It is this close association of nationalism (_min tsu_) and
+democracy (_min ch'uean_), this consideration of democracy as the
+expression of nationalism, that forms, within the framework of the _San
+Min Chu I_, what is probably the best nationalist argument for
+democracy--best, that is, in being most coherent with the Three Principles
+as a whole.
+
+If the view of democracy just expressed be considered an exposition of the
+fundamental necessity of democracy, the third argument may be termed the
+dialectical or historical championship of democracy. Sun Yat-sen believed
+in the existence of progress, and considered that there was an inevitable
+tendency toward democracy: the overthrow of the Manchus was a result of
+the "... world tide. That world current can be compared to the course of
+the Yangtze or the Yellow River. The flow of the stream turns perhaps in
+many directions, now toward the north, now toward the south, but in the
+end flows toward the east in spite of all obstacles; nothing can stem it.
+In the same way the world-tide passes ...; now it has arrived at
+democracy, and there is no way to stem it."(123) This belief in the
+inevitability as well as the justice of his cause encouraged Sun, and has
+lent to his movement--as his followers see it--something of the impressive
+sweep that the Communists see in their movement.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not devise any elaborate scheme of dialectical materialism
+or economic determinism to bolster his belief in the irreversibility of
+the flow to democracy. With infinite simplicity, he presented an
+exposition of democracy in space and time. In time, he saw a change from
+the rule of force to theocracy, then to monarchy, and then to democracy;
+this change was a part of the progress of mankind, which to him was
+self-evident and inevitable.(124) In space he perceived that increasingly
+great numbers of people threw off monarchical rule and turned to
+democracy. He hailed the breakdown of the great empires, Germany and
+Russia, as evidence of the power of democracy. "... if we observe (things)
+from all angles, we see that the world progresses daily, and we realize
+that the present tide has already swept into the age of democracy; and
+that no matter how great drawbacks and failures may be, _democracy will
+maintain itself in the world for a long time_ (_to come_). For that
+reason, thirty years ago, we promoters of the revolution, _resolved that
+it was impossible to speak of the greatness of China or to carry out the
+revolution without advocating democracy_."(125)
+
+A fourth argument in favor of democracy, and one which cannot be expanded
+here, since it involves reference to Sun Yat-sen's practical plans for the
+political regeneration of China, was his assertion that democracy was an
+adjunct to appropriate and effective public administration. Sun Yat-sen's
+plans concerning the selection of officials in a democratic state showed
+that he believed the merging of the Chinese academic-civil service
+technique with Western democracy would produce a paragon among practicable
+governments.
+
+Fifthly and finally, Sun regarded democracy as an essential modernizing
+force.(126) In the introduction of Western material civilization, which
+was always an important consideration to his mind, he felt that a certain
+ideological and political change had to accompany the economic and
+technological revolution that--in part natural and in part to be stimulated
+by nationalist political interference--was to revolutionize the _min sheng_
+of China, the economic and social welfare of the Chinese people. While
+this argument in favor of democracy is similar to the historical argument,
+it differs from the latter in that Sun Yat-sen saw the technique of
+democracy influencing not only the political, but the economic and social,
+life of the people as well. The growth of corporate responsibility, the
+development of a more rigid ethical system in matters of finance, the
+disappearance of too strict an emphasis upon the personal element in
+politics (which has clouded Chinese politics with a fog of conspiracy and
+intrigue for centuries), a trust in mathematics (as shown in reliance upon
+the voting technique for ascertaining public opinion), and the development
+of a new kind of individual aggressiveness and uprightness were among the
+changes which, necessary if China was to compete in the modern world,
+democracy might assist in effecting. While these desiderata do not seem
+large when set down in the vast field of political philosophy, they are of
+irritating importance in the inevitable trivalities upon which so much of
+day-to-day life depends, and would undoubtedly improve the personal tone
+of Sino-Western relations. Sun never divorced the theoretical aspects of
+his thought from the practical, as has been done here for purposes of
+exposition, and even the tiniest details of everyday existence were the
+objects of his consideration and criticism. In itself, therefore, the
+modernizing force of democracy, as seen in Sun's theory, may not amount to
+much; nevertheless, it must not be forgotten.(127)
+
+Democracy, although secondary in point of time to his theory, is of great
+importance in Sun's plans for the political nature of the new China. He
+justified democracy because it was (1) an obligation laid upon modern
+China by the sages of antiquity; (2) a necessary consequence of
+nationalism, since nationalism was the self-rule of a free people, and
+democracy the effectuation of that self-rule, and democracy the
+effectuation of that self-rule; (3) the government of the modern age;
+China, along with the rest of the world, was drawn by the tide of progress
+into the age of democratic achievement; (4) the political form best
+calculated for the obtaining of good administration; and (5) a modernizing
+force that would stir and change the Chinese people so as to equip them
+for the competitions of the modern world.
+
+In the lecture in which he criticized the inadequacies of democracy as
+applied in the West, Sun Yat-sen made an interesting comment on the
+proletarian dictatorship which had recently been established in Russia.
+"Recently Russia invented another form of government. That government is
+not representative; it is _absolute popular government_. In what does that
+absolute popular government really consist? As we know very little about
+it, we cannot judge it aright, but we believe that this (absolute popular
+government) is _evidently much better than a representative
+government_."(128) He went on immediately to say that the Three Principles
+were what China needed, and that the Chinese should not imitate the
+political systems advocated in Europe and America, but should adapt
+democracy in their own way. In view of his objection to a permanent class
+dictatorship, as opposed to a provisional party dictatorship, and the very
+enthusiastic advocacy of democracy represented by the arguments described
+above, it appears unlikely in the extreme that Sun Yat-sen, had he lived
+beyond 1925, would have abandoned his own plan of democracy for China in
+favor of "absolute popular government." The phrase was, at the time, since
+Sun Yat-sen was seeking Russian assistance, expedient for a popular
+lecture. Its importance might easily be exaggerated.
+
+
+
+
+The Three Natural Classes of Men.
+
+
+Having in mind the extreme peril in which the Chinese race-nation stood,
+its importance in a world of Western or Western-type states, and seeing
+nationalism as the sole means of defending and preserving China, Sun
+Yat-sen demanded that the Chinese ideology be extended by the acquisition
+of knowledge. If this modernizing and, if a neologism be permitted,
+stateizing process were to succeed, it must needs be fostered by a
+well-prepared group of persons within the society.
+
+In the case of the Confucian social theory, it was the scholars who took
+the ideology from the beliefs and traditions of the agrarian masses or
+whole people, rectified it, and gave it back to them. This continuous
+process of ideological maintenance by means of conformity (_li_) and, when
+found necessary, rectification (_cheng ming_) was carried on by an
+educational-political system based upon a non-hereditary caste of
+academician-officials called _Mandarins_ by the early Western travellers.
+In the case of those modern Western states which base their power upon
+peculiar ideologies, the philosophy-imposing caste has been a more or less
+permanent party- or class-dictatorship. Superficially, the
+party-dictatorship planned by Sun Yat-sen would seem to resemble these.
+His theory, however, presents two bases for a class of ideologues: one
+theoretical, and presumably based upon the Chinese; and one applied, which
+is either of his own invention or derived from Western sources. The class
+of ideological reformers proposed in what may be called the applied aspect
+of his theory was to be organized by means of the party-dictatorship of
+the Kuomintang. His other basis for finding a class of persons whose
+influence over the ideology was to be paramount was more theoretical, and
+deserves consideration among the more abstract aspects of his doctrines.
+
+He hypothecated a tripartite division of men:
+
+
+    Men may be divided into three classes according to their innate
+    ability or intelligence. The first class of men may be called
+    _hsien chih hsien cho_ or the "geniuses." The geniuses are endowed
+    with unusual intelligence and ability. They are the creators of
+    new ideas, fathers of invention, and originators of new
+    achievements. They think in terms of group welfare and so they are
+    the promoters of progress. Next are the _hou chih hou cho_ or the
+    "followers." Being less intelligent and capable than the _hsien
+    chih hsien cho_, they do not create or invent or originate, but
+    they are good imitators and followers of the first class of men.
+    The last are the _pu chih pu cho_, or the "unthinking," whose
+    intelligence is inferior to that of the other two classes of men.
+    These people do what the others instruct them to do, but they do
+    not think about it. In every sphere of activity all three classes
+    of men are present. In politics, for example, there are the
+    creators or inventors of new ideas and movements, then the
+    propagators of these ideas and movements, and lastly the mass of
+    men who are taught to practice these ideas.(129)
+
+
+The harmony of this conception with the views of Confucius is evident.
+Presbyter is Priest writ large; genius is another name for scholar. Sun,
+although bitterly opposed to the mandarinate of the Empire and the
+pseudo-Republic, could not rid himself of the age-old Chinese idea of a
+class organization on a basis of intellect rather than of property. He
+could not champion a revolutionary creed based upon an economic class-war
+which he did not think existed, and which he did not wish to foster, in
+his own country. He continued instead the consistent theory of an
+aristocracy of intellect, such as had controlled China before his coming.
+
+The aristocracy of intellect is not to be judged, however, by the old
+criteria. Under the old regime, a scholar-ruler was one who deferred to
+the wisdom of the ancients, who was fit to perpetuate the mysteries of the
+written language and culture for the benefit of future ages, and who was
+meanwhile qualified by his training to assume the role of counsellor and
+authority in society. In the theory of Sun Yat-sen, the genius leader is
+not the perpetuator but the discoverer. He is the social engineer. His
+work is similar to that of the architect who devises plans for a building
+which is to be built by workers (the unthinking) under the guidance of
+foremen (the followers).(130) In this guise, the new intellectual
+aristocrat is a figure more akin to the romantic Western pioneers and
+inventors than to the serene, conservative scholars of China in the past.
+
+The break with Western thought comes in Sun's distinguishing three
+permanent, natural classes of men. Though in their aptitudes the _hsien
+chih hsien cho_ are more like modern engineers than like archaic literary
+historians, they form a class that is inevitably the ruling class. To
+Marxism this is anathema; it would imply that the Communist party is
+merely the successor of the bourgeoisie in leading the unthinking masses
+about--a more benevolent successor, to be sure, but still a class distinct
+from the led proletariat of the intellect. To Western democratic thought,
+this distinction would seem at first glance to invalidate any future
+advocacy of democracy. To the student interested in contrasting
+ideological control and political government, the tripartite division of
+Sun Yat-sen is significant of the redefinition in modern terms, and in an
+even more clear-cut manner, of the Confucian theory of scholarly
+leadership.
+
+How were the geniuses of the Chinese resurgence to make their knowledge
+useful to the race-nation? How could democracy be recognized with the
+leadership and ideological control of an intellectual class? To what
+degree would such a reconciliation, if effected, represent a continuation,
+in different terms, of the traditions and institutions of the old Chinese
+world? Questions such as these arise from the fusion of the old traditions
+and new necessities.
+
+
+
+
+Ch'uean and Neng.
+
+
+The contrast between _ch'uean_ and _neng_ is one of the few aspects of Sun
+Yat-sen's theory of democracy which persons not interested in China may,
+conceivably, regard as a contribution to political science. There is an
+extraordinarily large number of possible translations for each of these
+words.(131) A version which may prove convenient and not inaccurate, can
+be obtained by translating each Chinese term according to its context.
+Thus, a fairly clear idea of _ch'uean_ may be obtained if one says that,
+applied to the individual, it means "power," or "right," and when applied
+to the exercise of political functions, it means "sovereignty" or
+"political proprietorship." _Neng_, applied to the individual, may mean
+"competency" (in the everyday sense of the word), "capacity" or "ability
+to administer." Applied to the individual, the contrast is between the
+ability to have political rights in a democracy, and the ability to
+administer public affairs. Applied to the nation, the contrast is between
+sovereignty and administration.(132)
+
+Without this contrast, the doctrine of the tripartite classification of
+men might destroy all possibilities of a practical democracy. If the
+Unthinking are the majority, how can democracy be trusted? This contrast,
+furthermore, serves to illuminate a further problem: the paradoxical
+necessity of an all-powerful government which the people are able to
+control.
+
+If this distinction is accepted in the establishment of a democracy, what
+will the consequences be?(133)
+
+In the first place, the masses who rule will not necessarily govern.
+Within the framework of a democratic constitution, they will be able to
+express their wishes, and make those wishes effective; but it will be
+impossible for them to interfere in the personnel of government, whether
+merely administrative or in the highest positions. It will be forever
+impossible that a "swine-representative" should be elected, or that one of
+those transient epochs of carpet-baggery, which appear from time to time
+in most Western democracies, should corrupt the government. By means of
+the popular rights of initiative, referendum, election and recall, the
+people will be able to control their government in the broad sweep of
+policy. The government will be beyond their reach insofar as petty
+political interference, leading to inferiority or corruption, is
+concerned.
+
+In the second place, the benefits of aristocracy will be obtained without
+its cost. The government will be made up of men especially fit and trained
+to govern. There will, hence, be no difficulty in permitting the
+government to become extraordinarily powerful in contrast with Western
+governments. Since the masses will be able to choose between a wide
+selection of able leaders, the democracy will be safeguarded.
+
+Sun Yat-sen regarded this as one of the cardinal points in his doctrines.
+In retaining the old Chinese idea of a scholar class and simultaneously
+admitting Western elective and other democratic techniques, he believed
+that he had found a scheme which surpassed all others. He saw the people
+as stockholders in a company, and the administrators as directors; he saw
+the people as the owner of an automobile, and the administrators as the
+chauffeur.
+
+A further consequence of this difference between the right of voting and
+the right of being voted for, but one to which Sun Yat-sen did not refer,
+necessarily arises from his postulation of a class of geniuses leading
+their followers, who control the unthinking masses. That is the continuity
+which such a group of ideological controllers would impart to a democracy.
+Sun Yat-sen, addressing Chinese, took the Chinese world for granted. A
+Westerner, unmindful of the background, might well overlook some
+comparatively simple points. The old system, under which the Empire was a
+sort of educational system, was a familiar feature in the politics which
+Sun Yat-sen criticized. In arguing for the political acceptance of
+inequality and the guarantee of government by a select group, Sun was
+continuing the old idea of leadership, modifying it only so far as to make
+it consistent with democracy. Under the system he proposed, the two great
+defects of democracy, untrustworthiness and lack of continuity of policy,
+would be largely eliminated.
+
+
+
+
+The Democratic Machine State.
+
+
+Throughout pre-modern Chinese thought there runs the idea of personal
+behavior and personal controls. The Chinese could not hypostatize in the
+manner of the West. Looking at men they saw men and nothing more.
+Considering the problems and difficulties which men encountered, they
+sought solutions in terms of men and the conditioning intimacies of each
+individual's life. The Confucian Prince was not so much an administrator
+as a moral leader; his influence, extending itself through imitation on
+the part of others, was personal and social rather than political.(134) In
+succeeding ages, the scholars thought of themselves as the leaven of
+virtue in society. They stressed deportment and sought, only too
+frequently by means of petty formalities, to impress their own excellence
+and pre-eminence upon the people. Rarely, if ever, did the
+scholar-official appeal to formal political law. He was more likely to
+invoke propriety and proceed to exercise his authority theoretically in
+accordance with it.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not feel that further appeal to the intellectual leaders
+was necessary. In an environment still dominated by the past, an
+exhortation for the traditional personal aspect of leadership would
+probably have appeared as a centuries-old triteness. The far-seeing men,
+the geniuses that Sun saw in all society, owed their superiority not to
+artificial inequality but to natural inequality;(135) by their ability
+they were outstanding. Laws and customs could outrage this natural
+inequality, or conceal it behind a legal facade of artificial inequality
+or equally artificial equality. Laws and customs do not change the facts.
+The superior man was innately the superior man.
+
+Nevertheless, the geniuses of the Chinese revolution could not rely upon
+the loose and personal system of influence hitherto trusted. To organize
+Chinese nationalism, to give it direction as well as force, the power of
+the people must be run through a machine--the State.
+
+A distinction must be made here. The term "machine," applied to
+government, was itself a neologism introduced from the Japanese.(136) Not
+only was the word but the thing itself was alien to the Chinese, since the
+same term (_ch'i_) meant machinery, tool, or instrument. The introduction
+of the view of the state as a machine does not imply that Sun Yat-sen
+wished to introduce a specific form of Western state-machine into China--as
+will be later explained (in the pages which concern themselves with the
+applied political science of Sun Yat-sen).
+
+Sun was careful, moreover, to explain that his analogy between industrial
+machinery and political machinery was merely an analogy. He said, "The
+machinery of the government is entirely composed of human beings. All its
+motions are brought about by men and not by material objects. Therefore,
+there is a very great difference between the machinery of the government
+and the manufacturing machine ... the machinery of the government is moved
+by human agency whereas the manufacturing machine is set in motion by
+material forces."(137)
+
+Even after allowance has been made for the fact that Sun Yat-sen did not
+desire to import Western governmental machinery, nor even to stress the
+machine and state analogy too far, it still remains extraordinarily
+significant that he should have impressed upon his followers the necessity
+of what may be called a mechanical rather than an organic type of
+government. The administrative machine of the Ch'ing dynasty, insofar as
+it was a machine at all, was a chaotic mass of political authorities
+melting vaguely into the social system. Sun's desire to have a clear-cut
+machine of government, while not of supreme importance in his ideological
+projects, was of great significance in his practical proposal. In his
+theory the state machine bears the same resemblance to the old government
+that the Chinese race-nation bears to the now somewhat ambiguous civilized
+humanity of the Confucians. In both instances he was seeking sharper and
+more distinct lines of demarcation.
+
+In putting forth his proposals for the reconstitution of the Chinese
+government he was thinking, in speaking of a state-machine, of the more or
+less clearly understood juristic states of the West.(138) His concrete
+proposals dealing with the minutiae of administrative organization, his
+emphasis on constitution and law, and his interest in the exact allocation
+of control all testify to his complete acceptance of a sharply delimited
+state. On the other hand, he was extraordinary for his time in demanding
+an unusual extent, both qualitative and quantitative, of power for the
+state which he wished to hammer out on the forges of the nationalist
+social and political revolution.
+
+In summarizing this description of the instrument with which Sun Yat-sen
+hoped to organize the intellectual leaders of China so as to implement the
+force of the revolution, it may be said that it was to be a state-machine,
+as opposed to a totalitarian state, based upon Western juristic theory in
+general but organized out of the materials of old Chinese political
+philosophy and the Imperial experience in government.(139) The state
+machine was to be built along lines which Sun Yat-sen laid out in some
+detail. Yet, even with his elaborate plans already prepared, and in the
+midst of a revolution, he pointed out the difficulty of political
+experimentation, in the following words:
+
+
+    ... the progress of human machinery, as government organizations
+    and the like, has been very slow. What is the reason? It is that
+    once a manufacturing machine has been constructed, it can easily
+    be tested, and after it has been tried out, it can easily be put
+    aside if it is not good, and if it is not perfect, it can easily
+    be perfected. But it is very difficult to try out a human machine
+    and more difficult still to perfect it after it has been tried
+    out. It is impossible to perfect it without bringing about a
+    revolution. The only other way would be to regard it as a useless
+    material machine which can easily be turned into scrap iron. But
+    this is not workable.(140)
+
+
+
+
+Democratic-Political Versus Ideological Control.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen accepted an organization of society based upon intellectual
+differences, despite his belief in the justifiability and necessity of
+formal democracy, and his reconciliation of the two at first contradictory
+theses in a plan for a machine state to be based upon a distinction
+between _ch'uean_ and _neng_. It may now be asked, why did Sun Yat-sen,
+familiar with the old method of ideological control, and himself proposing
+a new ideology which would not only restore internal harmony but also put
+China into harmony with the actual political condition of the world,
+desire to add formal popular control to ideological control?
+
+The answer is not difficult, although it must be based for the most part
+on inference rather than on direct citation of Sun Yat-sen's own words. In
+the consideration of the system of ideological control fostered by the
+Confucians, ideological control presented two distinct aspects: the
+formation of the ideology by men, and control of men by the ideology. The
+ideology controlled men; some men sought to control the ideology; the
+whole ideological control system was based upon the continuous interaction
+of cause and effect, wherein tradition influenced the men who sought to
+use the system as a means of mastery, while the same men succeeded in a
+greater or less degree in directing the development of the ideology.
+
+In the old Chinese world-society the control of the ideology was normally
+vested in the _literati_ who were either government officials or hoped to
+become such. The populace, however, acting in conformity with the
+ideology, could overthrow the government, and, to that extent, consciously
+control the content and the development of the ideology. Moreover, as the
+efficacy of an ideology depends upon its greater acceptance, the populace
+had the last word in control of the ideology both consciously and
+unconsciously. Politics, however, rarely comes to the last word. In the
+normal and ordinary conduct of social affairs, the populace was willing to
+let the _literati_ uphold the classics and modify their teachings in
+accordance with the development of the ideology--in the name of _cheng
+ming_. The old ideology was so skilfully put together out of traditional
+elements that are indissociable from the main traits of Chinese culture,
+together with the revisions made by Confucius and his successors, that it
+was well-nigh unchallengeable. The whole Confucian method of government
+was based, as previously stated, on the control of men through the control
+of their ideas by men--and these latter men, the ideologues, were the
+scholar administrators of successive dynasties. The identification of the
+_literati_ and officials, the respect in which learning was held, the
+general distribution of a leaven of scholars through all the families of
+the Empire, and the completeness--almost incredible to a Westerner--of
+traditional orthodoxy, permitted the interpreters of the tradition also to
+mould and transform it to a considerable degree. As a means of adjusting
+the mores through the course of centuries, interpretation succeeded in
+gradually changing popular ideas, where open and revolutionary heterodoxy
+would have failed.
+
+Now, in modern times, even though men might still remain largely under the
+control of the ideology (learn to behave rightly instead of being
+governed), the ideology was necessarily weakened in two ways: by the
+appearance of men who were recalcitrant to the ideology, and by the
+emergence of conceptions and ideas which could not find a place in the
+ideology, and which consequently opened up extra-ideological fields of
+individual behavior. In other words, _li_ was no longer all-inclusive,
+either as to men or as to realms of thought. Its control had never, of
+course, been complete, for in that case all institutions of government
+would have become superfluous in China and would have vanished; but its
+deficiencies in past ages had never been so great; either with reference
+to insubordinate individuals or in regard to unassimilable ideas, as they
+were in modern times.
+
+Hence the province of government had to be greatly extended. The control
+of men by the ideology was incomplete wherever the foreign culture had
+really struck the Chinese--as, for instance, in the case of the
+newly-developed Chinese proletariat, which could not follow the Confucian
+precepts in the slums of twentieth-century industry. The family system,
+the village, and the guild were to the Chinese proletarians mere shadows
+of a past; they were faced individually with the problems of a foreign
+social life suddenly interjected into that of the Chinese. True instances
+of the interpenetration of opposites, they were Chinese from the still
+existing old society of China suddenly transposed into an industrial world
+in which the old ideology was of little relevance. If they were to remain
+Chinese they had to be brought again into the fold of the Chinese
+ideology; and, meanwhile, instead of being controlled ideologically, they
+must be controlled by the sharp, clear action of government possessing a
+monopoly of the power of coercion. The proletarians were not, indeed, the
+only group of Chinese over whom the old ideology had lost control. There
+were the overseas Chinese, the new Chinese finance-capitalists, and others
+who had adjusted their personal lives to the Western world. These had done
+so incompletely, and needed the action of government to shield them not
+only from themselves and from one another, but from their precarious
+position in their relations with the Westerners.
+
+Other groups had not completely fallen away from the ideology, but had
+found major sections of it to be unsuitable to the regulation of their own
+lives. Virtue could not be found in a family system which was slowly
+losing its polygynous character and also slowly giving place to a sort of
+social atomism; the intervention of the machine state was required to
+serve as a substitute for ideological regulation until such a time as the
+new ideology should have developed sufficiently to restore relevance to
+traditions.
+
+Indeed, throughout all China, there were few people who were not touched
+to a greater or less degree by the consequences of the collision of the
+two intellectual worlds, the nationalistic West and the old Chinese
+world-society. However much Chinese might desire to continue in their
+traditional modes of behavior, it was impossible for them to live happy
+and progressive lives by virtue of having memorized the classics and paid
+respect to the precepts of tradition, as had their forefathers. In all
+cases where the old ideas failed, state and law suddenly acquired a new
+importance--almost overwhelming to some Chinese--as the establishers of the
+new order of life. Even etiquette was established by decree, in the days
+of the parliamentary Republic at Peking; the age-old assurance of Chinese
+dress and manners was suddenly swept away, and the government found itself
+forced to decree frock-coats.
+
+Successive governments in the new China had fallen, not because they did
+too much, but because they did too little. The sphere of state activity
+had become enormous in contrast to what it had been under more than a
+score of dynasties, and the state had perforce to intervene in almost
+every walk of life, and every detail of behavior. Yet this intervention,
+although imperative, was met by the age-old Chinese contempt for
+government, by the determined adherence to traditional methods of control
+in the face of situations to which now they were no longer relevant. It
+was this paradox, the ever-broadening necessity of state activity in the
+face of traditional and unrealistic opposition to state activity, which
+caused a great part of the turmoil in the new China. Officials made
+concessions to the necessity for state action by drafting elaborate codes
+on almost every subject, and then, turning about, also made concessions to
+the traditional non-political habits of their countrymen by failing to
+enforce the codes which they had just promulgated. The leaders of the
+Republic, and their followers in the provinces, found themselves with laws
+which could not possibly be introduced in a nation unaccustomed to law and
+especially unaccustomed to law dealing with life in a Western way; thus
+baffled, but perhaps not disappointed, the pseudo-republican government
+officials were content with developing a shadow state, a shadow body of
+law, and then ignoring it except as a tool in the vast pandemonium of the
+tuchunates--where state and law were valued only in so far as they served
+to aggrandize or enrich military rulers and their hangers-on.
+
+This tragic dilemma led Sun Yat-sen to call for a new kind of state, a
+state which was to be democratic and yet to lead back to ideological
+control. The emergency of imperialism and internal impotence made it
+imperative that the state limit its activities to those provinces of human
+behavior in which it could actually effectuate its decrees, and that,
+after having so limited the field of its action, it be well-nigh
+authoritarian within that field. Yet throughout the whole scheme, Sun
+Yat-sen's deep faith in the common people required him to demand that the
+state be democratic in principle and practice.
+
+It may begin to be apparent that, at least for Sun Yat-sen, the control of
+the race-nation by the ideology was not inconsistent with the political
+control of the race-nation by itself. In the interval between the old
+certainty and the new, political authority had to prevail. This authority
+was to be directed by the people but actually wielded by the geniuses of
+the revolution. The new ideology was to emerge from the progress of
+knowledge not, as before, among a special class of literary persons, but
+through all the people. It was to be an ideology based on practical
+experience and on the experimental method, and consequently, perhaps, less
+certain then the old Confucian ideology, which was in its foundations
+religious. To fill in the gaps where uniformity of thought and behavior,
+on the basis of truth, had not been established, the state was to act, and
+the state had to be responsible to the people.
+
+At this point it may be remembered that Sun Yat-sen was among the very few
+Chinese leaders of his day who could give the historians of the future any
+valid reasons for supposing that they believed in republican principles.
+Too many of the militarists and scholar-politicians of the North and South
+paid a half-contemptuous lip-service to the republic, primarily because
+they could not agree as to which one of them should have the Dragon
+Throne, or, at the least, the honor of restoring the Manchu Emperor--who
+stayed on in the Forbidden City until 1924.(141) Sun Yat-sen had a deep
+faith in the judgment and trustworthiness of the uncounted swarms of
+coolies and farmers whom most Chinese leaders ignored. He was perhaps the
+only man of his day really loved by the illiterate classes that knew of
+him, and was always faithful to their love. Other leaders, both Chinese
+and Western, have praised the masses but refused to trust them for their
+own good. Sun's implicit belief in the political abilities of the common
+people in all matters which their knowledge equipped them to judge, was
+little short of ludicrous to many of his contemporaries, and positively
+irritating to some persons who wished him well personally but did not--at
+least privately--follow all of his ideas.
+
+To return to the consideration of the parts played by ideology and popular
+government in social control: there was another point of great difference
+between the old ideology and the new. The old was the creation, largely,
+of a special class of scholars, who for that purpose ranked highest in the
+social hierarchy of old China. Now even though the three natural classes
+might continue to be recognized in China, the higher standard of living
+and the increased literacy of the populace was to enlarge the number of
+persons participating in the life of ideas. The people were to form the
+ideology in part, and in part control the government under whose control
+the revolutionary geniuses were to form the rest of the ideology, and
+propagate it through a national educational program. In all respects the
+eventual control was to rest with the people of the Chinese race-nation,
+united, self-ruling, and determined to survive.
+
+How, then, does the pattern of _min ch'uean_ fit into the larger scheme of
+the continuation of Confucian civilization and ideological control? First,
+the old was to continue undisturbed where it might. Second, those persons
+completely lost to the discipline of the old ideology must be controlled
+by the state. Third, those areas of behavior which were disturbed by the
+Western impact required state guidance. Fourth, the machine state was to
+control both these fields, of men, and of ideas, and within this limited
+field was to be authoritarian ("an all-powerful state") and yet democratic
+("nevertheless subject to the control of the people"). Fifth, the ideology
+was to arise in part from the general body of the people. Sixth, the other
+parts of it were to be developed by the intellectuals, assisted by the
+government, which was to be also under the control of the people. Seventh,
+since the world was generally in an unstable condition, and since many
+wrongs remained to be righted, it was not immediately probable that the
+Chinese would settle down to ideological serenity and certainty, and
+consequently State policy would still remain as a governmental question,
+to be decided by the will of the whole race-nation.
+
+To recapitulate, then the people was to rule itself until the reappearance
+of perfect tranquility--_ta t'ung_--or its nearest mundane equivalent. The
+government was to serve as a canalization of the power of the Chinese
+race-nation in fighting against the oppressor-nations of the world for
+survival.
+
+The last principle of the nationalist ideology remains to be studied. _Min
+tsu_, nationalism, was to provide an instrumentality for self-control and
+for external defense in a world of armed states. But these two would
+remain ineffectual in a starved and backward country, if they were not
+supplemented by a third principle designed to relieve the physical
+impotence of the nation, to promote the material happiness of its
+individual members and to guarantee the continued survival of the Chinese
+society as a whole. Union and self-rule could be frustrated by starvation.
+China needed not only to become united and free as a nation; it had also
+to become physically healthy and wealthy. This was to be effected through
+_min sheng_, the third of the three principles.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV. THE THEORY OF _MIN SHENG_.
+
+
+
+
+_Min Sheng_ in the Ideology.
+
+
+The principle of _min sheng_ has been the one most disputed. Sun Yat-sen
+made his greatest break with the old ideology in promulgating this last
+element in his triune doctrine; the original Chinese term carried little
+meaning that could be used in an approach to the new meaning that Sun
+Yat-sen gave it. He himself stated that the two words had become rather
+meaningless in their old usage, and that he intended to use them with
+reference to special conditions in the modern world.(142) He then went on
+to state the principle in terms so broad, so seemingly contradictory, that
+at times it appears possible for each man to read in it what he will, as
+he may in the Bible. The Communists and the Catholics each approve of the
+third principle, but translate it differently; the liberals render it by a
+term which is not only innocuous but colorless.(143) Had Sun Yat-sen lived
+to finish the lectures on _min sheng_, he might have succeeded in rounding
+off his discussion of the principle.
+
+There are two methods by means of which the principle of _min sheng_ may
+be examined. It might be described on the basis of the various definitions
+which Sun Yat-sen gave it in his four lectures and in other speeches and
+papers, and outlined, point by point, by means of the various functions
+and limits that he set for it. This would also permit some consideration
+of the relation of _min sheng_ to various other theories of political
+economy. The other approach may be a less academic one, but perhaps not
+altogether unprofitable. By means of a reconsideration of the first two
+principles, and of the structure and meaning of the three principles as a
+whole, it is possible to surmise, if not to establish, the meaning of _min
+sheng_, that is, to discover it through a sort of political triangulation:
+the first two principles being given, to what third principle do they
+lead?
+
+This latter method may be taken first, since it will afford a general view
+of the three principles which will permit the orientation of _min sheng_
+with reference to the nationalist ideology as a whole, and prepare the
+student for a solution of some of the apparent contradictions which are to
+be found in the various specific definitions of _min sheng_.
+
+Accepting the elementary thesis of the necessary awakening of the
+race-nation, and its equally necessary self-rule, both as a nation
+_vis-a-vis_ other nations, and as a world by itself, one may see that
+these are each social problems of organization which do not necessarily
+involve the physical conditions of the country, although, as a matter of
+application, they would be ineffectual in a country which did not have the
+adequate means of self-support. Sun Yat-sen was interested in seeing the
+Chinese people and Chinese civilization survive, and by survival he meant
+not only the continuation of social organization and moral and
+intellectual excellence, but, more than these, the actual continued
+existence of the great bulk of the population. The most vital problem was
+that of the continued existence of the Chinese as a people, which was
+threatened by the constant expansion of the West and might conceivably
+share the fate of the American Indians--a remnant of a once great race
+living on the charity of their conquerors. Sun Yat-sen expressly
+recognized this problem as the supreme one, requiring immediate
+attention.(144) Nationalism and democracy would have no effect if the race
+did not survive to practise them.
+
+The old Chinese society may be conceived as a vast system of living men,
+who survived by eating and breeding, and who were connected with one
+another in time by the proper attention to the ancestral cults, and in
+space by a common consciousness of themselves as the standard-bearers of
+the civilization of the world. Sun Yat-sen, although a Christian, was not
+unmindful of this outlook; he too was sensible of the meaning of the
+living race through the centuries. He dutifully informed the Emperor T'ai
+Tsung of Ming that the Manchus had been driven from the throne, and some
+years later he expressed the deepest reverence for the ancestral
+cult.(145) But in facing the emergency with which his race was confronted,
+Sun Yat-sen could not overlook the practical question of physical
+survival.
+
+He was, therefore, materialistic in so far as his recognition of the
+importance of the material well-being of the race-nation made him so. At
+this point he may be found sympathetic with the Marxians, though his
+ideology as a whole is profoundly Chinese. The destitution, the economic
+weakness, the slow progress of his native land were a torture to his
+conscience. In a world of the most grinding poverty, where war,
+pestilence, and famine made even mere existence uncertain, he could not
+possibly overlook the problem of the adequate material care of the vast
+populace that constituted the race-nation.
+
+_Min sheng_, accordingly, meant primarily the survival of the race-nation,
+as nationalism was its awakening, and democracy its self-control. No one
+of these could be effective without the two others. In the fundamentals of
+Sun Yat-sen's ideology, the necessity for survival and prosperity is
+superlative and self-evident. All other features of the doctrine are, as
+it were, optional. The first two principles definitely required a third
+that would give them a body of persons upon which to operate; they did not
+necessarily require that the third principle advance any specific
+doctrine. If this be the case, it is evident that the question of the
+content of _min sheng_, while important, is secondary to the first
+premises of the _San Min Chu I_. The need for a third principle--one of
+popular subsistence--in the ideology is vital; the _San Min Chu I_ would be
+crippled without it.
+
+
+
+
+The Economic Background of _Min Sheng_.
+
+
+What was the nature of the background which decided Sun Yat-sen to draw an
+economic program into the total of his nationalist ideology for the
+regeneration of China through a nationalist revolution? Was Sun Yat-sen
+dissatisfied with the economic order of the old society? Was he interested
+in a reconstitution of the economic system for the sake of defense against
+Western powers?
+
+He was unquestionably dissatisfied with the economic order of things in
+the old society, but it was a dissatisfaction with what the old order had
+failed to achieve rather than a feeling of the injustice of the Chinese
+distributive system. He was bitter against a taxation system which worked
+out unevenly,(146) and against the extortions of the internal-transit
+revenue officials under the Empire.(147) He was deeply impressed by his
+first encounter with Western mechanical achievement--the S. S. _Grannoch_,
+which took him from Kwangtung to Honolulu.(148) But he had served in the
+shop of his brother as a young boy,(149) and knew the small farm life of
+South China intimately. On the basis of this first-hand knowledge, and his
+many years of association with the working people of China, he was not
+likely to attack the old economic system for its injustice so much as for
+its inadequacy.(150)
+
+That there were injustices in the old system of Chinese economy, no one
+can deny, but these injustices were scarcely sufficient to provoke, of
+themselves alone, the complete alteration of economic outlook that Sun
+Yat-sen proposed. Chinese capitalism had not reached the state of
+industrial capitalism until after its contact with the West; at the most
+it was a primitive sort of usury-capitalism practised by the three
+economically dominant groups of old China--landholders, officials, and
+merchant-usurers.(151) The disturbances which hurt the economic condition
+of the country, and thereby led to greater disturbances, had involved
+China in a vicious cycle of decline which could scarcely be blamed on any
+one feature or any one group in the old economy. The essential fault lay
+with the condition of the country as a whole, directly affected by the
+economic consequences of Western trade and partial industrialization.(152)
+
+Sun Yat-sen's positive dissatisfaction with the economy of his time arose
+from the position which he felt China had in the modern business world. He
+believed that, by virtue of the economic oppression of the Chinese by the
+Western powers, China had been degraded to the position of the lowest
+nation on earth--that the Chinese were even more unfortunate than "slaves
+without a country," such as the Koreans and the Annamites.(153) The
+particular forms of this oppression, and Sun Yat-sen's plans for meeting
+it, may be more aptly described in the consideration of his program of
+economic national regeneration.(154) The Chinese nation occupied the
+ignominious position of a sub-colony or--as Sun himself termed it--"a
+hypo-colony"; "Our people are realizing that to be a semi-colony is a
+national disgrace; but our case is worse than that; our country is in the
+position of a sub-colony (since it is the colony of all the Great Powers
+and not merely subject to one of them), a position which is inferior to an
+ordinary colony such as Korea and Annam."(155)
+
+What, then, were the positive implications of the principle of _min sheng_
+in the nationalist ideology?
+
+
+
+
+The Three Meanings of _Min Sheng_.
+
+
+First, _min sheng_ is the doctrine leading the nationalist democracy on
+its road to a high position among the nations of the earth; only through
+the material strength to be found in _min sheng_ can the Chinese attain a
+position by which they can exert the full force of their new-formed state
+against the invaders and oppressors, and be able to lift up the populace
+so that democracy will possess some actual operative meaning. _Min sheng_
+is "... the center of politics, of economics, of all kinds of historical
+movements; it is similar to the center of gravity in space."(156) It
+provides the implementation of nationalism and democracy.
+
+Secondly, _min sheng_ means national enrichment. The problem of China is
+primarily one of poverty. Sun wanted consideration of the problem of the
+livelihood of the people to begin with the supreme economic reality in
+China. What was this reality? "It is the poverty from which we all suffer.
+The Chinese in general are poor; among them there is no privileged wealthy
+class, but only a generality of ordinary poor people."(157) However this
+enrichment was to be brought about, it was imperative.
+
+Thirdly, _min sheng_, as the doctrine of enrichment, was also the doctrine
+of economic justice. If the nation was to become economically healthy, it
+could only do so on the basis of the proper distribution of property among
+its citizens. Its wealth would not bring about well-being unless it were
+properly distributed.
+
+More briefly, _min sheng_ may be said to be the thesis of the
+indispensability of: 1) a national economic revolution against imperialism
+and for democracy; 2) an industrial revolution for the enrichment of
+China; and 3) a prophylactic against social revolution.
+
+The significance of _min sheng_ as the economic implementation of
+nationalism and democracy is clear enough to require no further
+discussion. Its significance as a doctrine for the promotion of the
+industrial revolution is considerable, and worth attention.
+
+Western science was to sow the seed. _Min sheng_ economy was to reap the
+harvest. By means of the details in Sun Yat-sen's programs which he
+believed sufficient for the purposes, the modernization of China, which
+was to be a consequence of Western science in the ideology, was to lead at
+the same time to the actual physical enrichment of the economic goods and
+services of the country. The advocacy of industrial development is, of
+course, a commonplace in the Western world, but in China it was strikingly
+novel. Sun Yat-sen did not regard industrialism as a necessary evil; he
+considered it a positive blessing, as the means of increasing the material
+welfare of the Chinese people.
+
+Time and time again, Sun Yat-sen emphasized the necessity of
+modernization. His theory of nationalism led him to urge the introduction
+of Western physical science into the ideology. His theory of democracy was
+justified in part by the fact that democracy was to be regarded as a
+modernizing force. Now his principle of _min sheng_ was also to lead to
+that great end--the modernization of China to a degree to permit the
+race-nation to regain in the modern world, which encompassed the whole
+planet, the position it had once had in the smaller world of Eastern Asia.
+
+The wealth of old China had been one of the factors enabling it to resist
+destruction at the spear-points of its barbarian conquerors. Sun Yat-sen
+knew this, and knew also that the position of the United States--which had
+probably the greatest concentration of social and physical wealth and
+power under one political system that the world had ever known--made that
+nation impregnable in the modern world. Seeing that wealth was not only a
+blessing to individuals, but to nations as well, he was anxious that his
+beloved China should be guarded and assisted by the strength that the
+ideology of _min sheng_, once accepted and effectuated, could give it.
+
+_Min sheng_ is more than a vague aspiration for national welfare. The
+general theory of nationalism and democracy required an additional point
+to make them effective in the realities of international politics, and
+_min sheng_ was to supply the hygienic and economic strength that the
+Chinese race-nation needed for competition and survival; but it was to do
+more.
+
+_Min sheng_ is at the same time the last step of Chinese resistance and
+the first of Chinese submission to Western culture. In seeking an economic
+policy and an ideology which would lead to increased wealth of the nation,
+the Chinese were preparing to resist the West with its own weapons. _Min
+sheng_ is a submission in that it is a deliberate declaration of
+industrial revolution.
+
+It is beside the point to consider the ideological bases of the Western
+industrial revolution. It was perhaps neither a voluntary nor a deliberate
+process at all; no man in the first few decades of the nineteenth century
+could have foretold what the end of a process of mechanization would
+bring, or was likely to advocate the intentional following of a policy
+which would transform the orientation and organization of man more
+thoroughly than had any previous religious, political, and economic
+transition. The industrial revolution of Euramerica, when viewed from the
+outside, presents the appearance of a colossal accident, whether for good
+or for bad, which was but half-perceived by the participants in it. Even
+today, when the ideology and the institutional outline of the
+agrarian-handicraft past is fading swiftly away in the new brilliance of
+Western machine-culture, the new certainty, the new order have not yet
+appeared. The great transition works its way beyond the knowledge or the
+intervention of individual men.
+
+This was decidedly not the case in China. Industrialism was something
+which could be studied from the outside, which could be appraised, and
+then acclaimed or resisted. Emperor Meiji and his Genro, with a flash of
+intuition or an intellectual penetration almost unparalleled in the
+political history of the world, guided Japan into the swift current of
+mechanical progress; the island empire swept ahead of Asia, abreast of the
+most powerful states of the world. The Chinese court, under the resolute,
+but blind, guidance of the Empress Dowager, made a few feeble gestures in
+favor of modernization, but vigorously opposed any change which might
+seriously modify the order of Chinese society or the position of the
+Manchus. In the shadow of the foreign guns, industrialism crept into
+China, along the coasts and up the banks of the navigable rivers. One
+might suppose that the Chinese were in a position to choose, deliberately,
+for or against industrialism. They were not; in China, as in the West, the
+machine age first appeared largely as an accident.
+
+It is here that the significance of Sun Yat-sen's _min sheng_ becomes
+apparent. Above all other subsidiary meanings, it is a deliberate
+declaration of the industrial revolution. Modernism had been an accident;
+Sun Yat-sen wished to transform it into a program. What would be the
+ideological consequences of such an attitude?
+
+In the first place, a plan was indicated for almost every type of human
+behavior. Sun Yat-sen himself drafted a preliminary scheme for a modern
+manufacturing and communications system.(158) The road that China was to
+take would not be the miserable, halting progress of industrialism,
+complicated by delays and wars, which the West had known in the painful
+centuries of readjustment from the medieval to modern civilization; China
+would not stumble forward, but would deliberately select the swiftest and
+easiest way to a sound industrialism, and then take it.
+
+_Min sheng_ thus not only provides the Chinese with a way to make their
+nationalism, their democracy, and their stateification felt in the hour of
+their ultimate triumph; it gives them something to do to bring about that
+triumph.
+
+On the basis of the outlines of the ideology and the social system that
+Sun Yat-sen proposed, viewed from the perspective of the old Confucian
+world-society, the reader will realize that this declaration of the
+industrial revolution is the boldest of Sun Yat-sen's acts, and that the
+meaning of _min sheng_ as a program of complete modernization and
+reconstruction is superior to other possible meanings it may have, in
+regard to theoretical national or social revolution. There is nothing
+remote or philosophical about the significance of _min sheng_ when so
+viewed; it is a plan to which a Lenin or a Henry Ford might subscribe with
+equal fervor--although a Tagore would deplore it. It is here that Sun
+Yat-sen appears as the champion of the West against the traditional
+technological stagnation of China. Yet just there, at the supreme point of
+his Westernism, we must remember what he was fighting for: the life of a
+race-nation and a civilization that was contradictory to the West. The
+stability of Confucianism could not serve as a cloak for reaction and
+stagnant thought. For its own good, nay, its own life, Chinese
+civilization had to modernize (i. e., Westernize economically) in order to
+compete in a West-ruled world. But what, more specifically, was the
+socio-economic position of Sun Yat-sen? Was he a Marxian? Was he a
+liberal? Was he neither?
+
+
+
+
+Western Influences: Henry George, Marxism and Maurice William.
+
+
+As previously stated there are three parts which may be distinguished in
+the ideology of the principle of _min sheng_. _Min sheng_ is, first, the
+economic aspect of the national revolution--the creation of an active
+race-nation of China implementing its power by, second, technological
+revolution. Third, it connotes also the necessity of a social revolution
+of some kind. Western commentators have been prone to ignore the
+significance of _min sheng_ in the first two of these meanings, and have
+concentrated on disputation concerning the third part. The question of the
+right system of distribution has become so prominent in much Western
+revolutionary thought that, to many, it sums up the whole moral issue
+concerning what is good and bad in society.(159) They are uninterested in
+or ignorant of the great importance that the first two aspects of _min
+sheng_ possess for the Chinese mind. The third part, the application of
+_min sheng_ to the problems that are in the West the cause of social
+revolution, and to the possible application of social revolution to China,
+is important, but is by no means the complete picture.
+
+In attempting to state the definitive position of Sun Yat-sen on this
+question several points must be kept in mind. The first is that Sun
+Yat-sen, born a Chinese of the nineteenth century, had the intellectual
+orientation of a member of the world-society, and an accepter of the
+Confucian ideology. Enough has been shown of the background of his
+theories to demonstrate their harmony with and relevance to society which
+had endured in China for centuries before the coming of the West. The
+second point to be remembered is that Westerners are prone to overlook
+this background and see only the Western influences which they are in such
+a good position to detect. Sun Yat-sen's mind grew and changed. His
+preferences in Western beliefs changed frequently. A few Westerners,
+seeing only this, are apt to call Sun unstable and devoid of reason.(160)
+
+It would, indeed, be strange to find any Western political or ideological
+leader who thought in precisely the same terms after the world war and the
+Russian revolution as before. Sun Yat-sen was, like many other
+receptive-minded leaders, sensitive to the new doctrines of Wilson and
+Lenin as they were shouted through the world. He was, perhaps, less
+affected by them than Western leaders, because his ideology was so largely
+rooted in the ideology of old China.
+
+Apart from the winds of doctrine that blew through the world during Sun's
+life-period, and the generally known Western influences to which he was
+exposed,(161) there were three writers whose influence has been supposed
+to have been critical in the development of his thinking. These three were
+Henry George, Karl Marx, and Maurice William of New York. A much greater
+amount of material is needed for a detailed study of the influences of
+various individual theories on Sun Yat-sen than for a general exposition
+of his political doctrines as a whole. At the present time scarcely enough
+has been written to permit any really authoritative description of the
+relations between the ideology of Sun Yat-sen and the thought of these
+three men. It is possible, nevertheless, to trace certain general outlines
+which may serve to clarify the possible influence that was exercised on
+Sun, and to correct some current misapprehensions as to the nature and
+extent of that influence.
+
+Sun Yat-sen's opposition to the "unearned increment" shows the influence
+of the thought of Henry George. Sun proposed an ingenious scheme for the
+government confiscation of unearned increment in an economy which would
+nevertheless permit private ownership of land. (Incidentally, he terms
+this, in his second lecture on _min sheng_, "communism," which indicates a
+use of the word different, in this respect at least, from the conventional
+Western use.)(162) The land problem was of course a very old one in China,
+although accentuated in the disorders resulting from the impact of the
+West. There can be little question that Sun's particular method of solving
+the problem was influenced by the idea of unearned increment.
+
+He knew of Henry George in 1897, the year the latter died,(163) and
+advocated redistribution of the land in the party oath, the platform, and
+the slogans of the _Tung Meng Hui_ of 1905.(164) Since, even at the time
+of the Canton-Moscow Entente, his land policy never approached the
+Marxist-Leninist program of nationalization or collectivization of land,
+but remained one of redistribution and confiscation of unearned increment,
+it is safe to say that Sun kept the theory of George in mind, although he
+by no means followed George to the latter's ultimate conclusions.(165) It
+may thus be inferred that the influence of Henry George upon the
+nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen was slight, but permanent. An idea was
+borrowed; the scheme of things was not.
+
+Sun Yat-sen encountered Marxism for the first recorded time in London in
+1897, when he met a group of Russian revolutionaries and also read in the
+subject. The fact that Sun was exposed to Marxism proves little except
+that he had had the opportunity of taking up Marxism and did not do
+so.(166) Again, the _Tung Meng Hui_ manifesto of 1905 may have been
+influenced by Marxism. It was not, however, until the development of his
+_Three Principles_ that the question of Marxian influence was raised. Sun
+Yat-sen made his first speech on the _Principles_ in Brussels in the
+spring of 1905.(167) By 1907 the three principles had taken on a clear
+form: nationalism, democracy, and _min sheng_, which the Chinese of that
+time seem to have translated _socialism_ when referring to it in Western
+languages.(168)
+
+The most careful Marxian critic of Sun Yat-sen, writing of the principle
+of _min sheng_ and its two main planks, land reform and state capitalism,
+says: "This very vague program, which does not refer to class interests
+nor to the class struggle as the means of breaking privileged class
+interests, was objectively not socialism at all, but something else
+altogether: Lenin coined the formula, 'subjective socialism,' for
+it."(169) He adds, later: "Hence Sun's socialism meant, on the lips of the
+Chinese bourgeoisie, nothing but a sort of declaration for a 'social'
+economic policy, that is, a policy friendly to the masses."(170) T'ang
+Liang-li declares that the third principle at this time adopted "a frankly
+socialistic attitude,"(171) but implies elsewhere that its inadequacy was
+seen by a Chinese Marxist, Chu Chih-hsin.(172) This evidence, as far as it
+goes, shows that Sun Yat-sen had had the opportunity to become acquainted
+with Marxism, and that even on the occasion of the first formulation of
+the principle of _min sheng_ he used none of its tenets. The revolutionary
+critic, T'ang Liang-li, who, a devoted and brilliant Nationalist in
+action, writes with a sort of European left-liberal orientation, suggests
+that the Third Principle grew with the growth of capitalist industrialism
+in China.(173) This is true: economic maladjustment would emphasize the
+need for ideological reconstruction with reference to the economy. There
+is no need to resort to Marxian analysis.
+
+That the third principle meant something to Sun Yat-sen is shown by the
+fact that when Sung Chiao-jen, who a few years later was to become one of
+the most celebrated martyrs of the revolution, suggested in the period of
+the first provisional Republic at Nanking that the Third Principle had
+better be omitted altogether, Sun was enraged, and declared that if _min
+sheng_ were to be given up, the whole revolution might as well be
+abandoned.(174)
+
+Since _min sheng_, in its third significance, that of the development of a
+socially just distributive system, was not Marxian nor yet unimportant, it
+may be contrasted once again with the communist doctrines, and then
+studied for its actual content. In contrasting it with Marxism, it might
+be of value to observe, first, the criticism that the Marxians levy
+against it, and second, the distinctions that nationalist and European
+critics make between _min sheng_ and communism.
+
+Dr. Karl Wittfogel, the German Marxist whose work on Sun Yat-sen is the
+most satisfactory of its kind, points out the apparent contradictions in
+the _San Min Chu I_: on the one hand, statements which are not only
+objectively but subjectively friendly to capitalism (on the excellence of
+the Ford plant; on the necessity for the cooeperation of capital and
+labor)--on the other, the unmerciful condemnation of capitalism; on the one
+hand, the declaration that there is no capitalism in China--on the other,
+that capitalism must be destroyed as it appears; on the right, the
+statement that communism and _min sheng_ are opposed--on the left, that the
+communist doctrines are a subsidiary part of the ideology of _min
+sheng_.(175) How, asks Wittfogel, does this all fit together? He answers
+by pointing out the significance of Sun's theses when considered in
+relation to the dialectical-materialist interpretation of recent Far
+Eastern history:
+
+
+    His three principles incorporate
+
+    in their _development_ the objective change in the socio-economic
+                situation of China,
+    in their _contradictions_ the real contradictions of the Chinese
+                revolution,
+    in their _latest tendencies_ the transposition of the social
+                center of gravity of the revolution, which sets the
+                classes in action, and whose aim is no longer a
+                bourgeois capitalist one, but proletarian-socialist
+                and peasant agrarian-revolutionary.
+
+    Sun Yat-sen is according to this not only the hitherto most
+    powerful representative of the bourgeois-national,
+    anti-imperialist revolutions of awakening Asia; he points at the
+    same time outwards over the bourgeois class limitations of the
+    first step of the Asiatic movement for liberation. To deny this
+    were portentuous, even for the proletarian communist movement of
+    Eastern Asia.(176)
+
+
+The modifications which the Marxians have introduced into their programs
+with respect to the class struggle in colonial countries do not imply a
+corresponding modification of their ideology. The determinism adopted from
+Hegel, the economic interpretation of history--these and other dogmas are
+held by the Marxians to be universally valid despite their Western origin.
+
+We have seen what Sun's chief Marxian exegete thinks of him. Now it may be
+worth while to consider the actual relations of Sun's doctrines with some
+of those in Marxism. In the first place, Sun Yat-sen, during his stay in
+Shanghai, 1919-1922 (with interruptions), was very much interested in
+Communism and friendly to the Russian people, but not at all inclined to
+adopt its ideology.(177)
+
+In reference to specific points of the Communist ideology, Sun Yat-sen was
+indebted to the Communists for the application of the principle of
+nationalism, as a means of propaganda, as anti-imperialism, although, as
+we have seen, it was fundamentally a thesis for the readjustment of the
+Chinese society from the ideological basis of a world-society over to a
+national state among national states.(178) Second, his habit of taking
+Western doctrines and applying them to the Chinese nation instead of to
+Chinese individuals, led him to apply nationalism to the class war of the
+oppressed nations against the oppressing nations. There was no
+justification of intra-national class war in the nationalist ideology of
+Sun Yat-sen.(179) In his doctrine of democracy, his application of a
+class-system based on intellect was a flat denial of the superior
+significance of the Marxian economic-class ideology, as was his favoring
+of the development of a five-power liberal government through _ch'uean_ and
+_neng_ in place of a dictatorship of the proletariat operating through
+soviets. Finally, in relation to _min sheng_, his use of the Confucian
+philosophy--the interpretation of history through _jen_--was a contradiction
+of the materialist interpretation of history by the Marxians. It also
+contradicted the class struggle; the loyalty of the Chinese to the
+race-nation was to be the supreme loyalty; it was to develop from the _ta
+chia_, the great family of all Chinese; and class lines within it could
+not transcend its significance. Furthermore, purely as a matter of
+economic development, Sun Yat-sen regarded the class struggle as
+_pathological_ in society. He said, "Out of his studies of the social
+question, Marx gained no other advantage than a knowledge of the diseases
+of social evolution; he failed to see the principle of social evolution.
+Hence we can say that Marx was a pathologist rather than a physiologist of
+society."(180) Finally, he did not accept the Marxian theory of surplus
+value or of the inevitable collapse of capitalism. He even spoke of
+capitalism and socialism as "two economic forces of human civilization"
+which might "work side by side in future civilization."(181)
+
+All in all, it may safely be said that Sun Yat-sen's ideology, as an
+adjustment of the old Chinese ideology to the modern world, was not
+inspired by the Marxist; that through the greater part of his life, he was
+acquainted with Marxism, and did not avail himself of the opportunities he
+had for adopting it, but consistently rejected it; and that while the
+Communists were of great use to him in the formulation and implementation
+of his program, they affected his ideology, either generally or with
+reference to _min sheng_, imperceptibly if at all.
+
+This conclusion is of significance in the estimation of the influence of
+Maurice William upon the thought of Sun Yat-sen. It is, briefly, the
+thesis of Dr. William that it was his own book which saved China from
+Bolshevism by making an anti-Marxian out of Sun after he had fallen prey
+to the Bolshevist philosophy. Dr. William writes of the lectures on
+Nationalism and Democracy; "In these lectures Dr. Sun makes clear that his
+position is strongly pro-Russian and pro-Marxian, that he endorses the
+class struggle, repudiates Western democracy, and advocates China's
+cooeperation with Bolshevist Russia against capitalist nations."(182) Dr.
+William then goes on to show, quite convincingly, that Sun Yat-sen, with
+very slight acknowledgments, quoted William's _The Social Interpretation
+of History_ almost verbatim for paragraph after paragraph in the lectures
+on _min sheng_.
+
+It would be unjust and untruthful to deny the great value that William's
+book had for Sun Yat-sen, who did quote it and use its arguments.(183) On
+the other hand, it is a manifest absurdity to assume that Sun Yat-sen,
+having once been a communist, suddenly reversed his position after reading
+one book by an American of whom he knew nothing. Even Dr. William writes
+with a tone of mild surprise when he speaks of the terrific _volte-face_
+which he thinks Sun Yat-sen performed.
+
+There are two necessary comments to be made on the question of the
+influence of Maurice William. In the first place, Sun Yat-sen had never
+swerved from the interpretation of history by _jen_, which may be
+interpreted as the humane or social interpretation of history. Enough of
+the old Chinese ideology has been outlined above to make clear what this
+outlook was.(184) Sun Yat-sen, in short, never having been a Marxian, was
+not converted to the social interpretation of history as put forth by Dr.
+William. He found in the latter's book, perhaps more clearly than in any
+other Western work an analysis of society that coincided with his own,
+which he had developed from the old Chinese philosophy and morality as
+rendered by Confucius. Consequently he said of William's rejection of the
+materialistic interpretation of history, "That sounds perfectly reasonable
+... the greatest discovery of the American scholar _fits in perfectly_
+with the (third) principle of our Party."(185) The accomplishment of
+Maurice William, therefore, was a great one, but one which has been
+misunderstood. He formulated a doctrine of social evolution which tallied
+perfectly with Chinese ideology, and did this without being informed on
+Chinese thought. He did not change the main currents of Sun's thought,
+which were consistent through the years. He did present Sun with several
+telling supplementary arguments in Western economic terms, by means of
+which he could reconcile his interpretation of social history not only
+with Confucian _jen_ but also with modern Western economics.
+
+The other point to be considered in relation to Maurice William is a
+matter of dates. The thesis of Maurice William, that Sun Yat-sen, after
+having turned Marxian or near-Marxian, was returned to democratic liberal
+thought by William's book, is based on contrast of the first twelve
+lectures in the _San Min Chu I_ and the last four on _min sheng_. Dr.
+William believes that Sun read his book in the meantime and changed his
+mind. A Chinese commentator points out that Sun Yat-sen referred to _The
+Social Interpretation of History_ in a speech on January 21, 1924; his
+first lecture on the _San Min Chu I_ was given January 24, 1924.(186)
+Hence, in the twelve lectures that Dr. William interprets as Marxian, Sun
+Yat-sen was speaking from a background which included not only Marxism,
+but _The Social Interpretation of History_, as well.
+
+Only on the third part does the influence of the Western thinkers appear
+unmistakably. Henry George gave Sun Yat-sen the idea of the unearned
+increment, but Sun Yat-sen, instead of accepting the whole body of
+doctrine that George put forth, simply kept this one idea, and built a
+novel land-policy of his own on it. Marxism may have influenced the verbal
+tone of Sun Yat-sen's lectures, but it did not affect his ideology,
+although it shows a definite imprint upon his programs. Maurice William
+gave Sun Yat-sen a set of arguments in modern economic terms which he
+attached to his ideological thesis of the _jen_ interpretation of history,
+which he based upon Confucianism. There is no evidence to show that at any
+time in his life Sun Yat-sen abandoned his Chinese ideological orientation
+and fell under the sway of any Western thinker. The strong consistency in
+the ideology of Sun Yat-sen is a consistency rooted in the old Chinese
+ideology. On minor points of doctrine he showed the influence of the West;
+this influence cannot be considered solely by itself. The present
+discussion of Western influences may, by its length, imply a
+disproportionate emphasis of Western thought in the political doctrines of
+Sun Yat-sen, but in a work written primarily for Westerners, this may be
+found excusable.
+
+
+
+
+_Min Sheng_ as a Socio-Economic Doctrine.
+
+
+If one were to attempt to define the relations of the _min sheng_ ideology
+to the various types of Western economic doctrines at present current,
+certain misapprehensions may be eliminated at the outset. First:
+Capitalism in its Western form was opposed by Sun Yat-sen; _min sheng_ was
+to put through the national economic revolution of enrichment through a
+deliberately-planned industrialization, but in doing so was to prevent
+China from going through all the painful stages which attended the growth
+of capitalism in the West. "We want," said Sun Yat-sen, "a preventive
+remedy; a remedy which will thwart the accumulation of large private
+capitals and so preserve future society from the great inconvenience of
+the inequality between rich and poor."(187) And yet he looked forward to a
+society which would ultimately be communistic, although never in its
+strict Marxian sense. "We may say that communism is the ideal of
+livelihood, and that the doctrine of livelihood is the practical
+application of communism; such is the difference between the doctrine of
+Marx and the doctrine of the Kuomintang. In the last analysis, there is no
+real difference in the principles of the two; where they differ is in
+method."(188) This is sufficient to show that Sun Yat-sen was not an
+orthodox Western apologist for capitalism; as a Chinese, it would have
+been hard for him to be one, for the logically consistent capitalist
+ideology is one which minimizes all human relationships excepting those
+individual-contractual ones based on money bargains. The marketing of
+goods and services in such a way as to disturb the traditional forms of
+Chinese society would have been repugnant to Sun Yat-sen.
+
+Second: if Sun Yat-sen's _min sheng_ ideology cannot be associated with
+capitalism, it can as little be affiliated with Marxism or the single-tax.
+What, then, in relation to Western socio-economic thought, is it? We have
+seen that the state it proposed was liberal-protective, and that the
+society from which it was derived and to which it was to lead back was one
+of extreme laissez-faire, bordering almost on anarchism. These political
+features are enough to distinguish it from the Western varieties of
+socialism, anarchism and syndicalism, since the ingredients of these
+ideologies of the West and that of Sun Yat-sen, while coincident on some
+points, cannot be fitted together.
+
+Superficially, there is a certain resemblance between the ideology of the
+_San Min Chu I_ and that of Fascism. The resemblances may be found in the
+emphasis on the nation, the rejection of the class war and of Marxism, the
+upholding of tradition, and the inclusion of a doctrine of intellectual
+inequality. But Sun Yat-sen seeks to reconcile all this with democracy in
+a form even more republican than that of the United States. The scheme of
+_min ch'uean_, with its election, recall, initiative and referendum, and
+with its definite demands of intellectual freedom, is in contradiction to
+the teachings of Fascism. His condemnation of Caesarism is unequivocal:
+"Therefore, if the Chinese Revolution has not until now been crowned with
+success, it is because the ambitions for the throne have not been
+completely rooted out nor suppressed altogether."(189) With these
+fundamental and irreconcilable distinctions, it is hard to find any
+possibility of agreement between the _San Min Chu I_ and the Fascist
+ideologies, although the transitional program of the _San Min Chu I_--in
+its advocacy of provisional party dictatorship, etc.--has something in
+common with Fascism as well as with Communism as applied in the Soviet
+Union.
+
+A recent well-received work on modern political thought describes a
+category of Western thinkers whose ideas are much in accord with those
+contained in the _min sheng_ ideology.(190) Professor Francis W. Coker of
+Yale, after reviewing the leading types of socialist and liberal thought,
+describes a group who might be called "empirical collectivists." The men
+to whom he applies this term reject socialist doctrines of economic
+determinism, labor-created value, and class war. They oppose, on the other
+hand, the making of a fetish of private ownership, and recognize that the
+vast mass of ordinary men in modern society do not always receive their
+just share of the produce of industry. They offer no single panacea for
+all economic troubles, and lay down no absolute and unchallengeable dogma
+concerning the rightness or wrongness of public or private ownership.(191)
+Professor Coker outlines their general point of view by examining their
+ideas with reference to several conspicuous economic problems of the
+present day: public ownership; labor legislation; regulation of prices;
+taxation; and land policies.(192)
+
+According to Coker, the empirical collectivist is not willing to forgo the
+profit motive except where necessary. He is anxious to see a great part of
+the ruthlessness of private competition eliminated, and capital generally
+subjected to a regulation which will prevent its use as an instrument of
+harm to the community as a whole. While not committed to public ownership
+of large enterprises as a matter of theory, he has little objection to the
+governmental operation of those which could, as a matter of practical
+expediency, be managed by the state on a nonprofit basis.
+
+Sun Yat-sen's position greatly resembles this, with respect to his more
+immediate objectives. Speaking of public utilities, he said to Judge
+Linebarger: "There are so many public utilities needed in China at the
+present time, that the government can't monopolize all of them for the
+advantage of the masses. Moreover, public utilities involve risks which a
+government cannot afford to take. Although the risks are comparatively
+small in single cases, the entire aggregate of such risks, if assumed by
+the government, would be of crushing proportions. Private initiative and
+capital can best perform the public utility development of China. We
+should, however, be very careful to limit the control of these public
+utilities enterprises, while at the same time encouraging private
+development as much as possible."(193) Sun had, however, already spoken of
+nationalization: "I think that when I hold power again, we should
+institute a nationalization program through a cautious and experimental
+evolution of (1) public utilities; (2) public domains; (3) industrial
+combines, syndicates, and cartels; (4) cooeperative department stores and
+other merchandising agencies."(194) It must be remembered that there were
+two considerations back of anything that Sun Yat-sen said concerning
+national ownership: first, China had already ventured into broad national
+ownership of communications and transport, even though these were in bad
+condition and heavily indebted; second, there was no question of
+expropriation of capital, but rather the free alternative of public and
+private industry. An incidental problem that arises in connection with the
+joint development of the country by public and by private capital is the
+use of foreign capital. Sun Yat-sen was opposed to imperialism, but he did
+not believe that the use of foreign capital at fair rates of interest
+constituted submission to imperialism. He said, in Canton, " ... we shall
+certainly have to borrow foreign capital in order to develop means of
+communication and transportation, and we cannot do otherwise than have
+recourse to those foreigners who are men of knowledge and of experience to
+manage these industries."(195) It may thus be said that Sun Yat-sen had no
+fixed prejudice against private capital or against foreign capital, when
+properly and justly regulated, although in general he favored the
+ownership of large enterprises by the state.
+
+Second--to follow again Professor Coker--the Western empirical collectivists
+favor labor legislation, and government intervention for the protection of
+the living standards of the working classes. This, while it did not figure
+conspicuously in the theories of Sun Yat-sen,(196) was a striking feature
+of all his practical programs.(197) In his address to Chinese labor, on
+the international Labor Day, 1924, he urged that Chinese labor organize in
+order to fight for its own cause and that of national liberation. It had
+nothing to fear from Chinese capitalism, but everything from foreign
+imperialistic capitalism.(198) Sun did not make a special hero class out
+of the workers; he did, however, advocate their organization for the
+purpose of getting their just share of the national wealth, and for
+resistance to the West and Japan.
+
+Third, the empirical collectivist tends to advocate price-control by the
+state, if not over the whole range of commodities, at least in certain
+designated fields. Sun was, has been stated, in favor of the regulation of
+capital at all points, and of public ownership in some. This naturally
+implies an approval of price-control. He more specifically objected to
+undue profits by middlemen, when, in discussing salesmen, he said: "Under
+ideal conditions, society does not need salesmen or any inducement to buy.
+If a thing is good, and the price reasonable, it should sell itself on its
+own merits without any salesmanship. This vast army of middlemen should
+hence be made to remember that they should expect no more from the
+nonproductive calling in which they are engaged than any other citizen
+obtains through harder labor."(199) In this, too, _min sheng_ coincides
+with empirical collectivism; the coincidence is made easy by the relative
+vagueness of the latter.
+
+Fourth, in the words of Mr. Coker, "many collectivists look upon taxation
+as a rational and practical means for reducing extreme differences in
+wealth and for achieving other desired economic changes."(200) Sun Yat-sen
+agrees with this definitely; his land policy is one based upon taxation
+and confiscation of the amount of the unearned increment (which, not
+involving the confiscation of the land itself, is perhaps also taxation),
+and proposes to apply taxes extensively. Quite apart from the question of
+distributive justice, a heavy tax burden would be necessary in a country
+which was being rigorously developed.
+
+Fifth, empirical collectivists believe in land control, not only in the
+cities, but in the open country as well, as a matter of agrarian reform.
+We have seen that the land figured extensively in the ideology of _min
+sheng_, and shall observe that Sun Yat-sen, in his plans for _min sheng_,
+stressed the importance of proper control of land.
+
+In summing up the theory of distributive justice which forms a third part
+of the principle of _min sheng_, one may say that, as far as any
+comparison between a Chinese and a Western idea is valid, the positive
+social-revolutionary content of _min sheng_ coincides with the doctrines
+of that group of Western politico-economic writers whom Coker calls
+empirical collectivists. The correspondence between the two may not be a
+mere coincidence of names, for in considering Sun Yat-sen's _min sheng_,
+one is struck by the empirical, almost opportunistic, nature of the
+theory. A great part of the activity of the Chinese, whether material or
+intellectual, has been characterized by a sort of opportunism; not
+necessarily an opportunism of insincerity, it may be more aptly described
+as a tendency to seek the golden mean, the reasonable in any situation. It
+is this habit of compromise with circumstance, this bland and happy
+disregard of absolutes in theory, which has preserved--with rare
+exceptions--the Chinese social mind from the torment of any really bitter
+and profound religious conflict, and which may, in these troubled times,
+keep even the most irreconcilable enemies from becoming insane with
+intolerance. This fashion of muddling through, of adhering to certain
+traditional general rules of reasonableness, while rendering lip-service
+to the doctrines of the moment, has been the despair of many Western
+students of China, who, embittered at the end, accuse the Chinese of
+complete insincerity. They do not realize that it is the moderateness of
+the Confucian ideology, the humane and conciliatory outlook that centuries
+of cramped civilized life have given the Chinese, that is the basis of
+this, and that this indisposition to adopt hard and fast systems has been
+one of the ameliorating influences in the present period of serious
+intellectual antagonisms. Generalizations concerning China are rarely
+worth much. It may be, however, that the doctrine of _min sheng_, with
+respect to its positive socio-economic content, may appear vague to the
+Western student, and that he may surmise it to be a mere cloak for
+demagogues. It could easily do that in the West, or in the hands of
+insincere and unscrupulous leaders. In China, however, it need not
+necessarily have been formulated more positively than it was, because, as
+we have seen, the intellectual temper of the Chinese makes any strict
+adherence to a schedule or a plan impossible. It is easy, always, to
+render the courtesies; it is hard to follow the specific content. Sun
+Yat-sen apparently realized this, and wished to leave a general body of
+doctrine which could be followed and which would not be likely to be
+violated. In any case, the theses of _min sheng_, both ideologically and
+programmatically, can scarcely be contrasted with the detailed schedules
+of social revolution to be found in the West.
+
+Sun Yat-sen's frequent expressions of sympathy with communism and
+socialism, and his occasional identification of the large principles of
+_min sheng_ with them, are an indication of his desire for ultimate
+collectivism. (It may be remarked, in passing, that Sun Yat-sen used the
+word _collectivist_ in a much more rigid sense than that employed by
+Coker.) His concessions to the economic situation of his time, the
+pragmatic, practical method in which he conceived and advocated his plans,
+are a manifestation of the empirical element in his collectivism.
+
+_Ming sheng_ cannot, however, be thought of as another Western doctrine
+for national economic strength, national economic reconstitution, and
+national distributive justice; it is also a program for the improvement of
+the morale of the people.
+
+How is the _min sheng_ doctrine to fit in with the essentially
+conservative spirit of the nationalist ideology? If, as Sun proposed, the
+new ideology is to be compounded of the old morality, the old knowledge,
+and modern physical science, how is _min sheng_, referring to social as
+well as material programs, to be developed in harmony with the old
+knowledge? In the terminology of ultramodern Western political science,
+the ethical, the moral, and the emotional are likely to appear as words of
+derision. In a milieu characterized by the curiously warmblooded social
+outlook of the Confucians, such terms are still relevant to reality, still
+significant in the lives of men. The sentimental is intangible in
+politics; for that reason it is hard to fit into contemporary thought, but
+though it cannot be measured and fully understood, its potency cannot be
+disregarded; and for Sun Yat-sen it was of the utmost importance.
+
+
+
+
+_Min Sheng_ as an Ethical Doctrine.
+
+
+Reference has been made to the Confucian doctrine of _jen_, the
+fellow-feeling of all mankind--each man's consciousness of membership in
+society. This doctrine was formulated in a society unacquainted with Greek
+logic, nor did it have the strange European emphasis upon sheer
+intellectuality which has played its way through Western thought. Not, of
+course, as profoundly introspective as Christianity, nor appealing so
+distinctly to the mystical in man's nature, it was nevertheless concerned
+with man's inner life, as well as with the ethics of his outward behavior.
+The Confucian was suffused throughout with the idea of virtue; the moral
+and the physical were inextricably intertwined. Its non-logical content
+scarcely approached the form of a religion; commentators on the old
+ideology have not called it religious, despite the prominence of beliefs
+in the supernatural.(201) The religion of the Chinese has been
+this-worldly,(202) but it has not on that account been indifferent to the
+subjective aspects of the moral life.(203)
+
+The nationalist ideology was designed as the inheritor of and successor
+to, the old ideology of China. The doctrine of nationalism narrowed the
+field of the application of Confucianism from the whole civilized world to
+the state-ized society of the Chinese race-nation. The doctrine of
+democracy implemented the old teachings of popular power and intellectual
+leadership with a political mechanism designed to bring forth the full
+strength of both. And the doctrine of _min sheng_ was the economic
+application of the old social ethos.
+
+It is in this last significance, rather than in any of its practical
+meanings of recovery, development, and reform, that Sun Yat-sen spoke most
+of it to one of his followers.(204) He was concerned with it as a moral
+force. His work was, among other things, a work of moral transformation of
+individual motives.(205) _Min sheng_ must, in addition to its other
+meanings be regarded as an attempt to extend the Chinese ideology to
+economic matters, to lead the Chinese to follow their old ethics. Sun
+Yat-sen had ample time in his visits to the West to observe the ravages
+that modern civilization had inflicted upon the older Western moral life,
+and did not desire that China should also follow the same course. The
+humanity of the old tradition must be kept by the Chinese in their venture
+into the elaborate and dangerous economy of modern life; the machine
+civilization was needed, and was itself desirable,(206) but it could not
+overthrow the humane civilization that preceded it and was to continue on
+beneath and throughout it.
+
+In this manner a follower of Sun Yat-sen seeks to recall his words: "I
+should say that _min sheng_ focuses our ethical tradition even more than
+the other two principles; after a Chinese has become nationalistic and
+democratic, he will become socialized through the idea of his own
+personality as an instrument of good for human welfare. In this proud
+feeling of importance to and for the world, egotism gives way to
+altruism.... So, I say again that _min sheng_ is an ethical endeavor ...
+this, the final principle (and yet, the first principle which I
+discovered, in the bitterness and poverty of my boyhood days), will come
+imperceptibly into our lives."(207)
+
+In a philosophy for intellectuals such attitudes need not, perhaps, be
+reckoned with; in an ideology for revolution and reconstitution, perhaps
+they should. Sun Yat-sen conceived of his own work and his ideology not
+only as political acts but as moral forces; _min sheng_ was at once to
+invigorate the national economy, to industrialize the material
+civilization, and to institute distributive justice, and in addition to
+this, it was to open a new, humane epoch in economic relations. That is
+why the term, instead of being translated, is left in the Chinese: _min
+sheng_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V. THE PROGRAMS OF NATIONALISM.
+
+
+
+
+Kuomintang.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen was a political leader as well as a political philosopher. His
+growth as a thinker was intimately associated with the development of his
+political activities. It would be difficult to say which came first,
+either in time or in importance, in his life--his teachings or his work. At
+times the line between the two becomes vague. Sun made vital commitments
+concerning his ideology in furthering his revolutionary work. These have
+to be sifted out from other utterances bearing only upon the immediate
+situation. This is not easy, but neither is it impossible. Lyon Sharman
+wrote, "It might be cogently argued that, in dealing with an easily
+absorbent, propagandist mind like Sun Yat-sen's one should not look to the
+shifting ideas for his real opinions, but to those formulations which he
+clung to tenaciously all his life."(208)
+
+The ideology of the _San Min Chu I_ provides a broad scheme of terms and
+values by means of which the Chinese of the twentieth century could orient
+themselves simultaneously in the modern world and in the continuing world
+of Confucian civilization. Between this philosophy and the necessity of
+immediate practical action there stands an intermediate step--that of the
+plans. The plans provide a theory of means leading to the establishment of
+the ends set up in the ideology. The ideology, left on paper by itself,
+could not bring about China's salvation; it had to be spread and
+implemented with political action. Sun Yat-sen planned the programs and
+activities of the Chinese revolutionaries in some detail; he proposed
+policies reaching far out into the future. While, since his death, these
+plans have been modified to a greater or less degree,(209) they have not
+lost all relevance to the course of affairs in China, and, in any case,
+possess an interest of their own in the history of political thought, as
+illustrating the political doctrines to which Sun Yat-sen's ideology led
+him. The first problem the plans had to include was that of providing a
+tool by which they could be set in motion.
+
+What instrument could preach nationalism to the Chinese people and awaken
+them, and, having awakened them, lead them on to a victorious defense of
+their race and civilization? Sun's answer was: "The Kuomintang." The
+nationalist revolutionary party was the designated heir to the leadership
+of the people, and even in his life-time Sun Yat-sen worked through the
+party that was almost entirely his own creation.
+
+This party had begun as a small group of the personal followers of Sun
+Yat-sen in the days when he was struggling against the Manchu monarchy
+almost singlehanded. Gradually this group increased and became a
+federation of the great secret orders which had resisted the Manchus for
+centuries. It developed into a modern parliamentary party under the name
+_Kuomintang_--literally _nation people party_--with the inauguration of the
+first republic, but was soon driven underground by the would-be emperor
+Yuean Shih-k'ai. It emerged again in South China at the end of the World
+War, was reorganized after the Communist model (so far as intra-party
+organization was concerned) before the death of Sun Yat-sen, led the
+revolution to the North, and, now, though somewhat less united than
+before, rules the greater part of China in the name of the Three
+Principles.(210)
+
+Confucius preached the slow transformation of society by means of an
+intellectual leaven, scholar class, which, by re-forming and clarifying
+the ideology, could gradually minimize conflict among men and bring about
+an epoch of concord in which all men would live by reason as found in
+tradition. The function of the Kuomintang was, in Sun's mind, only
+remotely similar. The Kuomintang was designed to intervene in a chaos of
+wars and corrupt politics, to propagate the nationalist ideology, and
+avert a tragic fate which would otherwise be inevitable--the disappearance
+of China from the map of the world, and the extinction not only of Chinese
+civilization but--as Sun Yat-sen thought--of the Chinese race as well.
+
+In the days before the downfall of the monarchy, and for the few years of
+defeat under the first republic, the Kuomintang was not highly organized.
+Sun Yat-sen's genius for leadership, and the fervor of his adherents--which
+can be understood only at first-hand, and cannot be explained in rational
+terms--were sufficient to hold the party together. But there was far too
+much discord as to final principles as well as to points of immediate
+action, and party activities were not so specialized as to permit maximum
+efficiency.(211) Furthermore, there was the question of the relations of
+the party and the state. It was somewhat absurd for the partizans of Sun
+Yat-sen, having brought about the revolution, to stand back and let
+whomever would walk away with it. The party's power had ebbed with its
+success in 1911. There had to be some way of keeping the party in power
+after it had achieved the overthrow of its enemies, and won the
+revolutionary control of the country. Reorganization was definitely
+necessary if party effectiveness were to be raised to the point of
+guaranteeing the success of the next revolution--which Sun did not live to
+see--and party supremacy to the point of assuring the Nationalists control
+of the government after the revolution had been accomplished.
+
+Reorganization was effected through the assistance of the Communists
+during the period of the Canton-Moscow entente (1923-1927).(212) Under the
+leadership of the extraordinarily able Michael Borodin, the Soviet
+advisers sent from Russia completely re-shaped the internal structure of
+the Kuomintang and won for themselves positions of considerable confidence
+and influence, which they lost only when they attempted to transform the
+principles and objectives of the Party as thoroughly as they had the
+organization.
+
+The Kuomintang of today, which is irreconcilably opposed to Marxism, still
+bears the imprint of Communist design.(213) Though the working details of
+the Party organization do not, for the most part, appear directly relevant
+to the principle of _min ch'uean_ of Sun Yat-sen, the arrangements for
+Party control illustrate the curious compromise between Chinese and
+Western democratic patterns, on the one hand, and the revolutionary
+requirements of absolutism, on the other, which have made Chinese
+republicanism seem a sham, if not a farce, to Western scholars who expect
+to find in China the same openness and freedom in democratic government to
+which they are accustomed at home.
+
+During the life-time of Sun there was no question of an elective headship
+for the Party. In spite of the fact that the party stood for democracy, it
+seemed impossible that any alternative to Sun Yat-sen himself should be
+considered. Sun Yat-sen's complete willingness to continue as head of the
+Party without troubling to have himself elected from time to time has been
+variously interpreted: his friends term it the humble and natural
+recognition of a celebrated fact; his enemies regard it as the
+hallucination of an egotism as distorted as it was colossal. The truth
+would appear to be that Sun regarded the initiation and the guidance of
+the Nationalist revolution as his particular mission in life. He was, in a
+sense, the intellectual proprietor of the Three Principles. Unselfish in
+all personal matters, he had few doubts of his own capacity when he had
+discovered what he believed to be his duty, and unquestioningly set out to
+perform it. In the lawlessness and tumult of the revolution, it would have
+seemed absurd for Sun Yat-sen to submit to the periodical formula of
+reelection for the sake of any merely theoretical harmony of action and
+theory.
+
+Not only was Sun Yat-sen the leader of the Party; he was not even to have
+a successor. The first revised constitution of the Kuomintang provided for
+his life-time headship; the second stipulated that the post of _Tsung Li_
+should never be filled by any other person. As _Tsung Li_--the Party
+Leader, it is still customary to refer to Sun Yat-sen in China today.
+This, again, was not the display of a superhuman vanity so much as a
+practical requirement designed to offset the possibility of conflict and
+intrigue among the most conspicuous party chiefs, which would quite
+probably arise should the question of a succession to Sun Yat-sen ever be
+mentioned. There was, of course, the element of respect in this
+gesture--the implication that the magistral chair of Sun Yat-sen was too
+high a place for any common man to sit.
+
+So far as leadership was concerned the Kuomintang was an autocracy until
+the death of Sun Yat-sen. In all other party matters attempts were made to
+cultivate democratic form and instil democratic morale. The prudence of
+this choice may seem to have been borne out by the course of history,
+since the Communists did not become ambitious, nor the Nationalists
+jealous, to the point of open conflict until after the death of Sun
+Yat-sen. Western thought will have to make extensive allowances before it
+can comprehend a democratic Party which operated under the unquestioned
+authority of a single man, without recourse to the formula of a plebiscite
+or election to a boss-ship in the form of a nominal post made significant
+only by the personal conspicuousness of the incumbent.
+
+Had Karl Marx lived to work in the Russian Revolution, he might have
+occupied a position analogous to that which Sun Yat-sen did in the
+Chinese. In other respects the new Kuomintang organization was remarkably
+like the Communist. There was the extraordinarily complex, but somehow
+effective, mechanism of a Party Congress, a Central Executive Committee,
+and a Standing Committee. There was a Political Bureau and an agency for
+overseas agitation. There were also the wide ramifications of an extensive
+net work of auxiliary organizations designed to draw strength from every
+popular enthusiasm, and deflect it to the cause of the Nationalist
+revolution. In due time these agencies were turned about and swung into
+action against the Communists who had attempted to master them.
+
+The precise details of Kuomintang organization need not be described. In
+general the pattern of authority proceeded from the whole membership, by a
+sequence of indirect elections, to the inner group of the Central
+Executive Committee, a body which possesses as much power in China as does
+its Soviet prototype.(214) An instance of its power may be given:
+representatives are sent by the _tang pu_ (Party Branches) to the Party
+Congress; in the event that delegates do not or cannot come, the C. E. C.
+has the power of appointing persons to serve _pro tempore_ as the
+representatives of the otherwise unrepresented branches. Since the same
+committee examines delegates' credentials, it is apparent that the
+trustworthiness of the Party Congress can be assured in the same manner
+that, to the understanding of the present author, the earlier All-Union
+Congresses of Soviets and the C. P. were assured in the Russian
+Revolution. The pattern given the Kuomintang by the Russians gave the
+Party a strong central control able to assure orthodoxy within the Party;
+for some years, as a matter of history, differences of opinion within the
+Party could only be expressed by schism (as in the case of the
+"Kuomintang" of Wang Ch'ing-wei). While the aim of the Party was
+democracy, it cannot be said truthfully that democracy worked in a
+militant Party engaged in turning an anarchy into a revolution. The
+requirements of revolutionary endeavor, among other things, seem to
+include an iron-handed leadership of the right sort. Such leadership
+could, in the Sun Yat-sen ideology, be justified by reference to the three
+stages of the revolution.
+
+The Kuomintang remained, so far as leadership was concerned, the creature
+of Sun Yat-sen. In structure it was extensively reorganized to resemble
+the Communist hierarchy found in Russia, with the administrative and
+legislative systems united into grades of conferences and committees. The
+Kuomintang also took over the Communist system of a registered and
+disciplined membership. To the time of the reorganization in 1923-1924,
+the Party had apparently admitted and expelled members in the informal,
+but effective, manner employed by the old Chinese _hui_--associations;
+guilds; or "tongs"--for centuries.(215) Without a complete system of
+personnel book-keeping, it was impossible to keep adequate records of the
+performance of each member and comb through the membership for the purpose
+of eliminating undesirables and inactives. At the time of the
+reorganization the membership was required to be reenrolled; in many cases
+certificates of membership were granted (in physical appearance resembling
+a European passport) which, in view of the Party power, entailed a
+considerable grant of privileges with the more or less corresponding
+burden of duties. Party finances notably improved. In time this systematic
+method of recording membership was applied for the purposes of ousting
+persons with Communist or pro-Communist views, or eliminating individuals
+too friendly with foreign interests believed antagonistic to the Party or
+its purposes. "Party purges" have been frequent and drastic since the
+organization of a complete membership record.
+
+The Kuomintang, as it was re-formed just before its swift rise to power
+and as it has essentially remained since, was a well-organized body of
+persons, subject to varying degrees of Party discipline, and trained in
+the methods of propaganda. The leadership was in the hands of Sun Yat-sen
+and, after his death, in the hands of his most trusted military and
+political aides. The membership, drawn from all parts of China and the
+world, was made up of persons from almost every class in society;
+representation was on the Russian plan, tending to centralize power in the
+C. E. C.(216) Intra-party democracy was not, for the most part, put into
+practice because of the disturbed political and economic conditions. The
+Party and its predecessors have, in the forty-odd years of their combined
+existence, been facing what amounted to a state of perpetual emergency.
+Sometimes badly, but more often effectively, they have struggled to
+establish a state which in turn can found the democratic ideology of Sun
+upon which the democracy of the future must, they believe, be based.
+
+Sun did not state definitely that the Party was to be dissolved after the
+task of its dictatorship was completed, and China had won a stable
+democratic government. That decision, of perpetuating the Party as one of
+many competing parties in the new democracy, or of abolishing it
+altogether, was presumably to be left to the Party leaders of the time. A
+precedent may be found in the behavior of Sun himself after the
+establishment of the Republic in 1912; he continued the Nationalist Party
+as one of the chief parties in the parliamentary republic. Yuean Shih-k'ai
+soon drove it underground again. From this it might be possible to
+conclude that the Party having done with its trusteeship, need not commit
+suicide as a party, but could continue in some form or another.
+
+The Kuomintang forms the link between the theories of Sun and the
+realities of the revolutionary struggle; it ties together his plans for a
+new democracy in China and his strategies in the conflicts of the moment.
+First instrument of the ideology, it bears the burden of bringing about
+the revolution, and bringing the country to the stage of testing the
+administrative and political theories of the founder, and simultaneously
+inculcating the democratic principle in the minds of those who are to bear
+the heritage of Chinese organization and culture on to the future.
+
+The genius of Sun Yat-sen, the Communist gift of organization, and the
+fervor of the membership brought about the defeat or submission--however
+nominal the latter may have been--of the warlords. By what stages,
+according to the theory of Sun Yat-sen, could national unity be realized?
+What, given power, should the Kuomintang do to guarantee the success of
+the revolution?
+
+
+
+
+The Dragon Throne and State Allegiance.
+
+
+The first task which the Kuomintang, once established, had to perform was
+a necessary preliminary to the other portions of its work--such as the
+leading of the first steps against the Western inroads, the opening up of
+the democratic technique of government, and the initiation of the first
+phases of _min sheng_. That task was to awaken the Chinese to the fact
+that they were a nation, and not only a nation, but an abused and
+endangered one as well.
+
+We have seen that Sun Yat-sen regarded nationalism as a precious treasure
+which the Chinese had lost.(217) He had said, many years before, in his
+_Kidnapped in London_, that the Manchus had followed a deliberate policy
+of intellectual suppression designed to extinguish or divert Chinese
+nationalism, and to make the great masses of Chinese on whom the Manchu
+power depended oblivious to the fact that they were the humiliated slaves
+of alien conquerors.(218) Again, in the third lecture on nationalism, he
+said that while the Emperors Kang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung were at least honest
+in acknowledging themselves to be Manchus, extenuating their presence on
+the Dragon Throne by claiming the imperial hero-sages, Shun and Wen Wang,
+of antiquity as fellow-barbarians, the Manchu Emperors after Ch'ien Lung
+did everything they could to suppress Chinese nationalist ideas. They even
+did not hesitate to revise the classics of history in order to obliterate
+whatever historical consciousness the Chinese may have had of
+themselves.(219) Sun Yat-sen pointed out that the strong
+group-consciousness of the Jews has kept Judea living through the
+centuries, even though the Jewish state was obliterated and the Jews
+themselves scattered to the four winds. He also praised the Poles,(220)
+who were subjugated by aliens as were the Chinese, but kept their
+nationalist ideas and were consequently restored as an honored nation
+after the world war. Hence, the first step in the program of Chinese
+nationalism was to be the creation of a consciousness of that nationalism.
+If the Chinese did not regain their nationalism, "that precious treasure
+which makes possible the subsistence of humanity,"(221) they might meet
+the fate of the Miao tribes whom the Chinese had pushed back into desolate
+lands and who faced an ignominious extinction.
+
+This consciousness of themselves as a race-national unity was not of
+itself enough. The Chinese had lost the favored position that they had
+held since before the beginning of recorded history, and were no longer in
+a position to view the frailties of outside nations with the charity to
+which their once impregnable position had entitled them. It was no longer
+a mere question of pushing through a recognition that China, hitherto
+regarded by the Chinese as the ecumene of civilization, was a nation, and
+not even an equal to the other nations. This idea had to be developed into
+a force.
+
+Sun Yat-sen wrote, of the significance of philosophy in action: "What is a
+principle? A principle is an idea, a belief, a force. As a rule, when men
+search for the truth of a thesis, they first reflect upon it, then their
+reflections grow into a belief, and that belief becomes a force. Hence in
+order to be firmly established, a principle must pass through the
+different stages of idea, belief, and force."(222) No more definite
+statement of the ideological consequences of thought could be found. Sun
+Yat-sen appreciated this, and realized that, in the carrying out of his
+ideology, the first necessity was the adoption of the ideology itself. All
+other steps must be secondary. The grouping of the important steps in the
+fulfillment of the program of nationalism may have differed from time to
+time,(223) but the actual work of Sun Yat-sen was based upon the method
+indicated: the establishment of at least the preliminary notions of the
+ideology as a prerequisite to effective social action. (In this
+connection, and in anticipation of further discussion, it might be pointed
+out that the advantage of the Moscow-Canton entente was not one gained
+from the superior appeal of the Communist ideology, but from the superior
+agitation techniques which the Nationalists learned from the Communists,
+and which enabled them to bring into play the full latent social force in
+Sun Yat-sen's ideas.) But if mere national-consciousness were insufficient
+of itself, what else was needed?
+
+Loyalty was necessary. Being aware of themselves as Chinese would not help
+them, unless they united and were loyal to that union. "To say that what
+the ancients understood by loyalty was loyalty toward the emperor, and
+that, since we no longer have an emperor, we (need no longer) speak of
+loyalty, and to believe that we can act as we please--that is a grave
+error."(224) Sun Yat-sen thus points out one of the most tragically
+perplexing of the problems of the new China.
+
+He was urging return to the ancient morality. The ancient code of loyalty
+was one built up to the emperor. Although the emperor did not have much
+power, in comparison with some despots who have changed history, he was
+nevertheless the man at the apex of society. The Confucian society was one
+built in general upon the grand design of an enormous family; a design
+which was, nevertheless, flexible enough to permit the deposition of a
+wicked or mad emperor--something which the Japanese order of things could
+not in theory, although it did in fact, tolerate. Filial piety was piety
+toward one's own family head; loyalty was piety toward the family head of
+all civilized society.
+
+Many writers have pointed out the discord and unhappiness which the
+abolition of the Empire brought to many Chinese. Their code of honor was
+outraged; the embodiment of their social stability was gone.(225) The
+critics who made the comment could not, of course, deny the general trend
+away of political organization throughout the world from monarchy. They
+did question the competence of the Chinese to make the readjustment at the
+present stage of their history, or believed that the Chinese could not
+preserve their traditional civilization under a governmental system which
+was alien to the form if not to the spirit of the Chinese tradition.
+Although their criticisms may be influenced too heavily by an antiquarian
+appreciation of the excellencies of the Chinese Imperial system, or a
+desire to preserve China as a sort of vast museum with all its
+quaintnesses of yesteryear, there is some point to what they say, since
+the transition to national-state allegiance was not an easy one. There
+were two factors involved in it, besides the tremendousness of the
+educational task of convincing almost half a billion people that they were
+no longer ruled by a properly deputized agent of the universe, but were
+quite free to manage their world as they collectively saw fit. These
+factors were, first, the necessity of preventing any possible resurrection
+of the Dragon Throne, and second, the inculcation of allegiance to an
+intangible state.
+
+Sun Yat-sen pointed out the enormous waste of blood and wealth involved in
+the change from one dynasty to another, when the highest post in the whole
+world was suddenly left open for the strongest man to seize. Republicanism
+would consequently tend to prevent civil wars in the future;(226) the
+cumbersome, murderous old method of expressing the popular will, as the
+Confucian ideology provided, was to be done away with, and peaceful
+changes of political personnel developed. He asserted that the T'ai P'ing
+rebels, of whose memory he was fond, had failed in their fierce attempt to
+establish a fantastic pseudo-Christian, proletarian, collectivistic
+dynasty in the sixth and seventh decade of the nineteenth century because
+of the dispute that arose within their ranks as to leadership.(227) He
+also pointed out that many of the militarists under the Republic knew well
+that the Dragon Throne was empty, but did not know that it was gone.
+
+The story of the eradication of monarchy from Chinese society is an
+interesting one, relevant to the question of the old and the new loyalty.
+Sun Yat-sen's full force was thrown at first against the Manchus. He
+taught the other two principles of democracy and _min sheng_, but in his
+earlier years he attracted most attention by his anti-Manchu activities.
+Now, in allowing the principle of nationalism to do the work of the
+principle of democracy, Sun Yat-sen was using the anti-dynastic
+revolutionary potentialities of the situation to push along an
+anti-monarchical movement. The Chinese constitutional arrangement was
+such, under the Manchus, that a foreign monarch, who was a sovereign in
+his own right, quite apart from China, sat on the Chinese throne. The
+Manchu Emperor occupied the Dragon Throne. Many were willing to rebel
+against a Manchu; they might have hesitated had an indigenous prince
+occupied that position.
+
+On the occasion of the establishment of the first Republic, in 1912, the
+Manchu Emperor was allowed to continue residence in Peking. Retaining his
+dynastic title and the use of the Forbidden City, he was to receive a
+stipend from the Chinese Republic and to be entitled to all the privileges
+normally accorded a foreign emperor by international law. There is a
+remote possibility, although the truth of this surmise cannot be
+substantiated, that he was left there as a sort of scarecrow, to prevent
+anyone from seizing the throne. Constitutional difficulties would have
+arisen if a pensioned Manchu Emperor and a native caesarian Emperor were
+to attempt to occupy the same throne.
+
+This peculiar arrangement does not seem to have helped matters much. There
+was not enough pro-Manchu sentiment to support any restoration movement on
+a large scale, such as a reactionary insurrection, and the personal
+unpopularity of the one man, Yuean Shih-k'ai, who, as dictator of the first
+Republic (1912-1916), sought the throne, was enough to keep any active
+monarchical movement from succeeding. The one attempt of the Manchu
+partizans, in 1917, failed utterly.
+
+That is not to say that the Dragon Throne was not missed. A general
+relaxation of political ethics was observable. The old tradition could not
+easily be reconciled to a juristic notion from outside. Sun Yat-sen sought
+most eagerly to impress upon the Chinese the necessity for state
+allegiance in place of monarchical devotion: "At present everybody says
+that morality was overthrown with the advent of the republic. The main
+reason is right here. Reasonably speaking we must practice loyalty even
+under a republican regime, not loyalty to a sovereign, but loyalty toward
+the nation, loyalty toward the people, loyalty toward our four hundred
+million men. Of course, loyalty toward four hundred million men is
+something much more exalted than loyalty toward one single man. Hence we
+must preserve the excellent virtue of loyalty."(228) A curious emphasis on
+the physical object of loyalty is present here. The Chinese, having no
+background of Western juristic hypostatizations, were unable to be
+faithful to a legal fiction; expressing state allegiance, Sun Yat-sen had
+to put it in its most tangible form, that of a concord of human beings.
+
+Nevertheless, under the republic, the old virtue of personal loyalty
+should not interfere with state allegiance. Sun Yat-sen was willing and
+anxious that the Chinese should consider their loyalty as being directed
+to the nation; he did not wish that the officials of the nation, as men,
+should get it. In that case the very purpose of democracy would be
+defeated, and a monarchy or an oligarchy set up with the formulae of a
+democracy. Sun Yat-sen was as radically republican as any early American.
+"In regard to the government of the nation, fundamentally, it is the
+people who have the power, but the administration of the government must
+be entrusted to experts who have the capacity. We need not regard those
+experts as stately and honorable presidents and ministers, but merely as
+chauffeurs of automobiles, as sentinels who guard the gate, as cooks who
+prepare the food, as doctors who attend to sicknesses, as carpenters who
+build houses, as tailors who make clothes."(229) State allegiance had to
+be directed between the Scylla of a monarchical restoration and the
+Charybdis of nominally republican personal government. The old form had to
+be discarded, and the old habits turned in a new direction, but not in the
+easiest direction that they might take.
+
+The problem of the supplanting of the Dragon Throne by a state was not an
+easy one. In the preparation of the Chinese people for the initiation of
+an active program of nationalism, the first elements of the nationalist
+ideology had to be inculcated. This involved race-consciousness. But the
+idea of race-consciousness and national-consciousness could not be exerted
+as a force unless the conscious union of the Chinese race-nation was
+accompanied by the erection of a powerful democratic state, and unless
+this state fell heir to the loyalty which had once been shown the Throne,
+or even a higher loyalty. This loyalty had to be based on the two
+suppositions that the Empire was gone forever, and that personal loyalty,
+even under the forms of a republic, should not be allowed to take its
+place. Only with a genuine state-allegiance could the Chinese advance to
+their national salvation.
+
+
+
+
+Economic Nationalism.
+
+
+The ideological establishment of a race-national outlook would have
+far-reaching consequences that might well continue working themselves out
+for centuries. The immediate exercise of this sense of unity was to be
+developed through a loyalty to state allegiance, which would also of
+itself be significant. These two new patterns--the one ideological, and the
+other institutional--running through the Chinese society and social mind
+were vitally necessary. But after the institutional habit of
+state-allegiance had been developed, what was the new democratic state,
+the instrument of the awakened race-nation, to do in the way of practical
+policies to give effect to the new consciousness and strength of Chinese
+nationalism?
+
+Sun Yat-sen, whose principles tended to develop themselves in terms of
+threes,(230) cited three perils constituting a threat to the Chinese
+society. The first was the peril to the Chinese race, which was faced with
+the possibility of decline in an expanding Western World and might even
+become vestigial or extinct. This peril was to be fought with
+race-nationalism. The second was the peril to the Chinese polity, the
+danger that China might become politically appurtenant to some foreign
+power of group of powers. This was to be fought with democratic
+race-nationalism. And the last, and most insidious, was the peril to the
+Chinese economy, the looting of China by the unfair economic measures of
+the great powers, to be met by a nationalist economic program. Sun Yat-sen
+was most apprehensive of the combined strength of these three pressures:
+"... I fear that our people are in a very difficult position; and I fear
+that we may perish in the near future. We are threatened by the three
+forces I have mentioned: namely, the increase of foreign population, the
+political force, and the economic force of the foreigners."(231)
+
+Of the three forms of the foreign oppression of China, the economic,
+because it did not show itself so readily, and was already working full
+force, was the most dangerous. It was from this oppression that China had
+sunk to the degraded position of a sub-colony. "This economic oppression,
+this immense tribute is a thing which we did not dream of; it is something
+which cannot be easily detected, and hence we do not feel the awful shame
+of it."(232)
+
+Sun Yat-sen, as stated above, was not hostile to the development of that
+portion of foreign capital which he regarded as fairly employed in China,
+and spent a great part of his life in seeking to introduce capital from
+outside. He did, however, make a distinction between the just operation of
+economic forces, and the unjust combination of the economic with the
+politically oppressive. Foreign capital in China was not oppressive
+because it was capital; it was oppressive because it held a privileged
+position, and because it was reinforced by political and military
+sanctions. There is no implication in Sun Yat-sen's works that the
+operations of finance, when not unjustly interfered with by political
+action, could, even when adverse to China, be regarded as wrong of
+themselves.
+
+In what ways, then, did foreign capital so invest its position with unjust
+non-economic advantages that it constituted a burden and an oppression?
+There were, according to Sun Yat-sen, six headings under which the various
+types of economic incursion could be classified, with the consequence that
+a total of one billion two hundred million Chinese dollars were unjustly
+exacted from the Chinese economy every year by the foreigners.
+
+First, the control of the Customs services having, by treaty, been
+surrendered by China, and a standard _ad valorem_ tariff having also been
+set by treaty, the Chinese had to leave their markets open to whatever
+foreign commerce might choose to come. They were not in a position to
+foster their new modern industries by erecting a protective tariff, as had
+the United States in the days of its great industrial development.(233)
+China's adverse balance in trade constituted a heavy loss to the already
+inadequate capital of the impoverished nation. Furthermore, the amount of
+the possible revenue which could be collected under an autonomous tariff
+system was lost. Again, foreign goods were not required, by treaty
+stipulation, to pay the internal transit taxes which Chinese goods had to
+pay. As a result, the customs situation really amounted to the development
+of a protective system for foreign goods in China, to the direct financial
+loss of the Chinese, and to the detriment of their industrial development.
+He estimated that half a billion dollars, Chinese, was lost yearly,
+through this politically established economic oppression.(234) Obviously,
+one of the first steps of Chinese economic nationalism had to be tariff
+autonomy.
+
+Second, the foreign banks occupied an unfair position in China. They had
+won a virtual monopoly of banking, with the consequence that the Chinese
+banks had to appear as marginal competitors, weak and unsound because the
+people were "poisoned by economic oppression."(235) The foreign banks
+issued paper money, which gave them cost-free capital; they discounted
+Chinese paper too heavily; and they paid either no or very little interest
+on deposits. In some cases they actually charged interest on deposits. A
+second step of economic nationalism had to be the elimination of the
+privileged position of the foreign banks, which were not subject to
+Chinese jurisdiction, and were thus able to compete unfairly with the
+native banks.
+
+Third, economic oppression manifested itself in transportation, chiefly by
+water. The economic impotence of the Chinese made them use foreign bottoms
+almost altogether; the possible revenue which could be saved or perhaps
+actually gained from the use of native shipping was lost.
+
+Fourth, the Western territorial concessions constituted an economic
+disadvantage to the Chinese. Wrested from the old Manchu government, they
+gave the foreigners a strangle-hold on the Chinese economy. Besides, they
+represented a direct loss to the Chinese by means of the following items:
+taxes paid to the foreign authorities in the conceded ports, which was
+paid by the Chinese and lost to China; land rents paid by Chinese to
+foreign individuals, who adopted this means of supplementing the tribute
+levied from the Chinese in the form of taxes; finally, the unearned
+increment paid out by Chinese to foreign land speculators, which amounted
+to an actual loss to China. Under a nationalist economic program, not only
+would the favorable position of the foreign banks be reduced to one
+comparable with that of the Chinese banks, but the concessions would be
+abolished. Taxes would go to the Chinese state, the land rent system would
+be corrected, and unearned increment would be confiscated under a somewhat
+novel tax scheme proposed by Sun Yat-sen.
+
+Fifth, the Chinese lost by reason of various foreign monopolies or special
+concessions. Such enterprises as the Kailan Mining Administration and the
+South Manchuria Railway were wholly foreign, and were, by privileges
+politically obtained, in a position to prevent Chinese competition. This
+too had to be corrected under a system of economic nationalism. The new
+state, initiated by the Kuomintang and carried on by the people, had to be
+able to assure the Chinese an equality of economic privilege in their own
+country.
+
+Sixth, the foreigners introduced "speculation and various other sorts of
+swindle" into China.(236) They had exchanges and lotteries by which the
+Chinese lost tens of millions of dollars yearly.
+
+Under these six headings Sun Yat-sen estimated the Chinese tribute to
+Western imperialism to be not less than one billion two hundred millions a
+year, silver. There were, of course, other forms of exaction which the
+Westerners practised on the Chinese, such as the requirement of war
+indemnities for the various wars which they had fought with China.
+Furthermore, the possible wealth which China might have gained from
+continued relations with her lost vassal states was diverted to the
+Western powers and Japan. Sun Yat-sen also referred to the possible losses
+of Chinese overseas, which they suffered because China was not powerful
+enough to watch their rights and to assure them equality of opportunity.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not expect that forces other than those which political
+nationalism exerted upon the economic situation could save the Chinese.
+"If we do not find remedies to that big leakage of $1,200,000,000.00 per
+year, that sum will increase every year; there is no reason why it should
+naturally decrease of its own accord."(237) The danger was great, and the
+Chinese had to use their nationalism to offset the imperialist economic
+oppression which was not only impoverishing the nation from year to year,
+but which was actually preventing the development of a new, strong, modern
+national economy.
+
+What is the relation of the sub-principle of economic nationalism to the
+principle of _min sheng_?(238) Economic nationalism was the preliminary
+remedy. The program of _min sheng_ was positive. It was the means of
+creating a wealthy state, a modern, just economic society. But the old
+oppressions of imperialism, lingering on, had to be cleared away before
+China could really initiate such a program. Not only was it the duty of
+the Chinese national and nationalist state to fight the political methods
+of Western imperialism; the Chinese people could help by using that old
+Asiatic weapon--the boycott.
+
+Sun Yat-sen was pleased and impressed with the consequences of Gandhi's
+policy of non-cooeperation. He pointed out that even India, which was a
+subject country, could practise non-cooeperation to the extreme discomfort
+of the British. The creation of race-nationalism, and of allegiance to a
+strong Chinese state, might take time. Non-cooeperation did not. It was a
+tool at hand. "The reason why India gained results from the
+non-cooeperation policy was that it could be practised by all the
+citizens."(239) The Chinese could begin their economic nationalist program
+immediately.
+
+Sun Yat-sen pointed out that the basis for the weakness of China, and its
+exploitation by the foreigners, was the inadequacy of the Chinese
+ideology. "The reason why we suffer from foreign oppression is our
+ignorance; we 'are born in a stupor and die in a dream'."(240) Conscious
+of the peril of the foreign economic oppression, the Chinese had to exert
+economic nationalism to clear the way for the positive initiation of a
+program of _min sheng_. In practising economic nationalism, there were two
+ways that the Chinese could make the force of their national union and
+national spirit felt: first, through the actual advancement of the
+programs of the whole of nationalism and the progress of the political and
+economic condition of the country; second, through non-cooeperation, "... a
+negative boycott which weakens the action of imperialism, protects
+national standing, and preserves from destruction."(241)
+
+
+
+
+Political Nationalism for National Autonomy.
+
+
+After the first steps of resistance to economic oppression, the Chinese
+nationalists would have to launch a counter-attack on the political
+oppression practised upon China by the Western powers. In his discussion
+of this, Sun Yat-sen described, though briefly, the past, the
+contemporary, and the future of that oppression, and referred to its
+methods. His theory also contained three answers to this oppression which
+need to be examined in a consideration of his theoretical program of
+Chinese nationalism: first, the question of China's nationalist program of
+political anti-imperialism; second, the nature of the ultimate development
+of nationalism and a national state; and third, the theory of the class
+war of the nations. In view of the fact that this last is a theory in
+itself, and one quite significant in the distinction between the doctrines
+of Sun Yat-sen and those of Marxism-Leninism, it will be considered
+separately. The first two questions of the program of nationalism are,
+then: what is to be the negative action for the advancement of China's
+national political strength, in opposing the political power of the West?
+and what is to be the positive, internal program of Chinese nationalism?
+
+As has been stated Sun Yat-sen used the anti-dynastic sentiment current in
+the last years of the Manchus as an instrument by means of which he could
+foster an anti-monarchical movement. The great significance of his
+nationalism as a nationalism of Chinese _vis-a-vis_ their
+Oriental-barbarian rulers quite overshadowed its importance as a teaching
+designed to protect China against its Western-barbarian exploiters. The
+triumph of the Republicans was so startling that, for a time, Sun Yat-sen
+seems to have believed that nationalism could develop of itself, that the
+Chinese, free from their Manchu overlords, would develop a strong
+race-national consciousness without the necessity of any political or
+party fostering of such an element in their ideology. Afire with all the
+idealism of the false dawn of the first Republic, Sun Yat-sen dropped the
+principle of nationalism from his program, and converted his fierce
+conspiratorial league into a parliamentary party designed to enter into
+amicable competition with the other parties of the new era.(242) This
+pleasant possibility did not develop. The work of nationalism was by no
+means done. The concept of state-allegiance had not entered into the
+Chinese ideology as yet, and the usurper-President Yuean Shih-k'ai was able
+to gather his henchmen about him and plan for a powerful modern Empire of
+which he should be forced by apparently popular acclamation to assume
+control.
+
+The further necessity for nationalism appeared in several ways. First, the
+Chinese had not become nationalistic enough in their attitude toward the
+powers. Sun Yat-sen, with his reluctance to enter into violent
+disagreement with the old ideology, was most unwilling that chauvinism
+should be allowed in China.(243) He hoped that the Western powers, seeing
+a fair bargain, would be willing to invest in China sufficient capital to
+advance Chinese industrial conditions. Instead, he saw Japanese capital
+pouring into Peking for illegitimate purposes, and accepted by a
+prostituted government of politicians. With the continuation of the
+unfavorable financial policy of the powers, and the continuing remoteness
+of any really helpful loans, he began to think that the Chinese had to
+rely on their own strength for their salvation.(244) Second, he realized
+that the foreigners in China were not generally interested in a strong,
+modern Chinese state if that state were to be developed by Chinese and not
+by themselves. Sun had understood from the beginning that the great aim of
+nationalism was to readjust the old world-society to nationhood in the
+modern world; he had not, perhaps, realized that the appearance of this
+nationhood was going to be opposed by foreigners.(245) When he came to
+power in 1912, he thought that the immediate end of nationalism--liberation
+of China from Manchu overlordship--had been achieved. He was preoccupied
+with the domestic problems of democracy and _min sheng_. When, however,
+the foreign powers refused to let his government at Canton exercise even
+the limited authority permitted the Chinese by the treaties over their own
+customs service, and did not let Sun take the surplus funds allowed the
+Chinese (after payment of interest due on the money they had lent various
+Chinese governments), his appreciation of the active propagation of
+nationalism was heightened. He realized that the Chinese had to fight
+their own battles, and that, while they might find individual friends
+among the Westerners, they could scarcely hope for a policy of the great
+powers which would actually foster the growth of the new national
+China.(246) Simultaneously, he found his advocacy of a nationalist program
+receiving unexpected support from the Soviet Union. His early contacts
+with the Russians, who were the only foreigners actually willing to
+intervene in his behalf with shipments of arms and money, made him
+interested in the doctrines lying behind their actions, so inconsistent
+with those of the other Western powers. In the Communist support of his
+nationalism as a stage in the struggle against imperialism, he found his
+third justification of a return, with full emphasis, to the program of
+nationalism.
+
+Hence, at the time that he delivered his sixteen lectures, which represent
+the final and most authoritative stage of his principles, and the one with
+which the present work is most concerned, he had returned to an advocacy
+of nationalism after a temporary hope that enough work had been done along
+that line. In expelling the alien Manchu rulers of China, he had hoped
+that the old Chinese nationalism might revive, as soon as it was free of
+the police restrictions had placed on race-national propaganda by the
+Empire. He had found that this suspension of a nationalist campaign was
+premature because nationalism had not firmly entrenched itself in the
+Chinese social mind. In the first place, state allegiance was weak;
+usurpers, dictators and military commandants strode about the Chinese
+countryside with personal armies at their heels. Secondly, the foreign
+powers, out of respect to whom, perhaps, a vigorous patriotic campaign had
+not been carried out, did not show themselves anxious to assist China--at
+least, not as anxious as Sun Yat-sen expected them to be. Third, the
+inspiration offered by a power which, although temporarily submerged, had
+recently been counted among the great powers of the world, and which had
+rejected the aggressive policy which the rest of the Western nations, to a
+greater or less degree, pursued in the Far East, was sufficient to
+convince Sun Yat-sen of the justice of the doctrines of that power. Soviet
+Russia did not stop with words; it offered to associate with China as an
+equal, and the Soviet representative in Peking was the first diplomat to
+be given the title of ambassador to China.
+
+The sharpening of the nationalist policy into a program of
+anti-imperialism seems to have been the direct result of the Communist
+teachings, one of the conspicuous contributions of the Marxians to the
+programmatic part of the theories of Sun Yat-sen. As earlier stated, their
+ideology influenced his almost not all. Their programs, on the other hand,
+were such an inspiration to the Chinese nationalists that the latter had
+no hesitation in accepting them. Hu Han-min, one of the moderate
+Kuomintang leaders, who would certainly not go out of his way to give the
+Communists credit which they did not deserve, stated unequivocally that
+the Chinese did not have the slogan, "Down with Imperialism!" in the 1911
+revolution, and gave much credit to the Bolsheviks for their
+anti-imperialist lesson to the Chinese.(247)
+
+In describing the political aggression of the Western states upon the
+Chinese society, Sun Yat-sen began by contrasting the nature of the
+inter-state vassalage which the peripheral Far Eastern states had once
+owed to the Chinese core-society. He stated that the Chinese did not
+practise aggression on their neighbors, and that the submission of the
+neighboring realms was a submission based on respect and not on
+compulsion. "If at that time all small states of Malaysia wanted to pay
+tribute and adopt Chinese customs, it was because they admired Chinese
+civilization and spontaneously wished to submit themselves; it was not
+because China oppressed them through military force."(248) Even the
+position of the Philippines, which Sun Yat-sen thought a very profitable
+and pleasant one under American rule, was not satisfactory to the
+Filipinos of modern times, who, unlike the citizens of the vassal states
+of old China, were dissatisfied with their subordinate positions.(249)
+
+He pointed out that this benevolent Chinese position was destroyed as the
+West appeared and annexed these various states, with the exception of
+Siam. He then emphasized that this may have been done in the past with a
+view to the division of China between the various great powers.(250)
+
+This partitioning had been retarded, but the danger was still present. The
+Chinese revolution of 1911 may have shown the powers that there was some
+nationalism still left in China.(251)
+
+The military danger was tremendous. "Political power can exterminate a
+nation in a morning's time. China who is now suffering through the
+political oppression of the powers is in danger of perishing at any
+moment. She is not safe from one day to the other."(252) Japan could
+conquer China in ten days. The United States could do it in one month.
+England would take two months at the most, as would France. The reason why
+the powers did not settle the Chinese question by taking the country was
+because of their mutual distrust; it was not due to any fear of China. No
+one country would start forth on such an adventure, lest it become
+involved with the others and start a new world war.(253)
+
+If this were the case, the danger from diplomacy would be greater even
+than that of war. A nation could be extinguished by the stroke of a pen.
+The Chinese had no reason to pride themselves on their possible military
+power, their diplomacy, or their present independence. Their military
+power was practically nil. Their diplomacy amounted to nothing. It was not
+the Chinese but the aggressors themselves that had brought about the
+long-enduring stalemate with respect to the Chinese question. The
+Washington Conference was an attempt on the part of the foreigners to
+apportion their rights and interests in China without fighting. This made
+possible the reduction of armaments.(254) The present position of China
+was not one in which the Chinese could take pride. It was humiliating.
+China, because it was not the colony of one great power, was the
+sub-colony of all. The Chinese were not even on a par with the colonial
+subjects of other countries.
+
+The shameful and dangerous position thus outlined by Sun could be remedied
+only by the development of nationalism and the carrying-on of the struggle
+against imperialism.
+
+Anti-imperialism was the fruit of his contact with the Bolsheviks. His
+nationalism had approached their programs of national liberation, but the
+precise verbal formulation had not been adopted until he came in contact
+with the Marxian dialecticians of the Third International. His
+anti-imperialism differed from theirs in several important respects. He
+was opposed to political intervention for economic purposes; this was
+imperialism, and unjust. The economic consequences of political
+intervention were no better than the intervention itself. Nevertheless, at
+no time did he offer an unqualified rejection of capitalism. He sought
+loans for China, and distinguished between capital which came to China in
+such a manner as to profit the Chinese as well as its owners, and that
+which came solely to profit the capitalists advancing it, to the economic
+disadvantage of the Chinese. In his ideology, Sun Yat-sen never appears to
+have accepted the Marxian thesis of the inevitable fall of capitalism, nor
+does he seem to have thought that imperialism was a necessary and final
+stage in the history of capitalism.
+
+In short, his program of anti-imperialism and the foreign policy of
+Chinese political nationalism, seem to be quite comparable to the policy
+held by the Soviets, apart from those attitudes and activities which their
+peculiar ideology imposed. In practical matters, in affairs and actions
+which he could observe with his own eyes, Sun Yat-sen was in accord with
+the anti-imperialism of Soviet Russia and of his Communist advisers. In
+the deeper implications of anti-imperialism and in the pattern of the
+Marxian-Leninist ideology underlying it in the U.S.S.R., he showed little
+interest. Ideologically he remained Chinese; programmatically he was
+willing to learn from the Russians.
+
+The internal program of his nationalism was one which seems to have been
+influenced by the outlook developed by himself. His vigorous denunciation
+of Utopian cosmopolitanism prevents his being considered an
+internationalist. He had, on the occasion of the institution of the first
+Republic, been in favor of the freedom of nations even when that freedom
+might be exercised at the expense of the Chinese. The Republic might
+conceivably have taken the attitude that it had fallen heir to the
+overlordship enjoyed by the Manchu Empire, and consequently refused
+representation to the Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and Mohammedans. It was,
+however, called the Republic of Chung Hua (instead of the Republic of
+Han), and a five-striped flag, representing its five constituent "races,"
+was adopted. Sun Yat-sen later gave a graphic description of the
+world-wide appeal of Woodrow Wilson's principle of national
+self-determination. He did not think that the principle, once enunciated,
+could be recalled; and stated that the defeat of the minor and colonial
+nations at the Versailles Conference, which drafted a very unjust treaty,
+was an instance of the deceitfulness of the great powers.
+
+His nationalism did not go so far as to permit his endorsing the entrance
+of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia into the Soviet Union. This
+doctrine of nationalism as a correlative of democratic national autonomy
+was his second principle, that of democracy; his first principle, that of
+race-nationalism, had other implications for the destiny of Mongolia. His
+positive program of nationalism was dedicated, in its "political"
+exercise, to the throwing-off of the imperialist bondage and the exercise
+of the self-rule of the Chinese people.
+
+It is only if one realizes that these three sub-principles of nationalism
+were re-emphases of the three principles that their position in the theory
+of the nationalist program becomes clear. Nationalism was to clear the way
+for _min sheng_ by resisting the Western economic oppression of the
+Chinese, and thus allowing the Chinese to enrich themselves. Nationalism
+was to strike down the political oppression of imperialism by eradicating
+the political holds of the West upon China, and thus allowing the Chinese
+people to rule itself. So long as China was at the mercy of Western power,
+any self-government that the Chinese might attempt would have to be
+essayed at the sufferance of the aggressors. Finally, nationalism was to
+reinforce itself by the application of race-nationalism to race-kinship;
+China was not only to be self-ruling--it was to help the other nations of
+Asia restore their autonomy and shield them with its tutelary benevolence.
+
+When one considers that to Sun Yat-sen democracy and autonomy are
+inextricably associated, the full significance of his stressing
+nationalism as a means to democracy appears. The Chinese people could not
+rule themselves if they were to be intimidated by the Western powers and
+Japan. They could not rule themselves completely if large portions of them
+were under alien jurisdiction in the treaty ports. These forms of
+political oppression were wounds in the body of Chinese society. Chinese
+nationalism, associated with democracy, required that the whole Chinese
+people be associated in one race-nation and that this race-nation rule
+itself through the mechanism of a democratic state.
+
+Here the code of values imposed by Sun Yat-sen's thinking in terms of the
+old ideology becomes apparent. The development of nationalism in China,
+while it threatened no one outside and sought only for the justification
+of China's interests at home, was an accentuation of the existence of the
+race-nation. The race-nation, freeing itself (political nationalism) and
+ruling itself (democracy), was to become more conscious of itself. Sun
+implicitly denied the immediate necessity for a general world-authority;
+perhaps he did so because he realized that in the present world, any
+supreme authority would be predominantly Western. The Chinese race-nation,
+once politically free, had a definite duty to perform on behalf of its
+peripheral states and on behalf of the suppressed states of the whole
+world. The first demand, however, was for the freedom of China; others
+could not be helped by China until China herself was free.
+
+The political application of nationalism envisaged (1) the elimination of
+existing foreign political control (imperialism) in China; (2) the
+strengthening of the country to such a degree that it would no longer be a
+hypo-colony or sub-colony, and would not have to live under the constant
+threat of invasion or partition; and (3) the resulting free exercise of
+self-rule by the Chinese people, through a nationalist democracy, so
+arranged that self-rule of China did not conflict with the equal right of
+self-rule of other peoples but, on the contrary, helped them.
+
+
+
+
+The Class War of the Nations.
+
+
+Now come to a consideration of the second part of the sub-principle of
+political nationalism. This is the theory held by Sun concerning the class
+war of the nations. It serves to illustrate three points in Sun Yat-sen's
+thought: first, that Sun never permitted a Western theory to disturb the
+fundamentals of Chinese ideology as he wished to re-orient it; second,
+that Sun frequently took Western political theories which had been
+developed in connection with the relations of individuals and applied them
+to the relations of nations; and third, that Sun was so much impressed
+with the cordiality and friendship proffered him by the Communists that he
+sought to cooeperate with them so far as his Chinese ideology permitted
+him.(255)
+
+One notes that the question of distributive justice is not as pressing in
+China as it is in the modern West. One also observes that the old Chinese
+ideology was an ideology of the totalitarian society, which rejected any
+higher allegiance of states or of classes. And one sees that Sun Yat-sen,
+in proposing a democracy, suggested an ideology which would continue the
+old Chinese thesis of eventual popular sovereignty as reconciled with
+administration by an intellectually disciplined elite. Each of these three
+points prevented Sun from endorsing the intra-national class struggle.
+
+He regarded the class struggle, not--as do the Marxians--as a feature of
+every kind of economically unequal social organization, but as a
+pathological development to be found in disordered societies. He
+considered the Marxian teachings in this respect to be as different from
+really adequate social doctrines as pathology is from physiology in
+medical science. The mobility of the old Chinese society, combined with
+the drags imposed by family, village, and _hui_, had resulted in a social
+order which by and large was remarkably just. By presenting the principle
+of _min sheng_ as a cardinal point in an ideology to be made up of old
+Chinese morality, old Chinese knowledge, and Western science, he hoped to
+avoid the evils of capitalism in the course of ethically sound enrichment,
+development and arrangement of China's economy.
+
+At the same time Sun was faced with the spectre of imperialism, and had to
+recognize that this unjust but effective alliance of economic exploitation
+and political subjection was an irreconcilable enemy to Chinese national
+freedom. He saw in Russia an ally, and did not see it figuratively. Years
+of disappointment had taught him that altruism is rare in the
+international financial relations of the modern world. After seeking
+everywhere else, he found the Russians, as it were, on his door-step
+offering him help. This convinced him as no theory could have. He regarded
+Russia as a new kind of power, and ascribed the general hatred for the
+Soviet to their stand against capitalism and imperialism: "Then all the
+countries of the world grew afraid of Russia. This fear of Russia, which
+the different countries entertain at present, is more terrible than the
+fear they formerly held, because this policy of peace not only overthrew
+the Russian imperialism, but (purposed) to overthrow also imperialism in
+the (whole world)."(256) This fight against imperialism was a good work in
+the mind of Sun Yat-sen.
+
+In considering the principles of Sun more than a decade after they were
+pronounced, one cannot permit one's own knowledge of the events of the
+last eleven years to make one demand of Sun Yat-sen a similar background.
+That would amount to requiring that he be a prophet. At the time when he
+spoke of the excellence of Russia he had no reason to question the good
+faith of the Communists who were helping him. It is conceivable that even
+the Bolsheviks who were aiding and advising the Nationalists did not
+realize how soon the parting of the ways would come, how much the two
+ideologies differed from one another, how much each of the two parties
+endangered the other's position. At the time Sun spoke, the Communists
+were his allies in the struggle against imperialism; they had agreed from
+the beginning that China was a country not suited to communism; and Sun
+Yat-sen, relying on them not to use him in some wider policy of theirs,
+had no cause to mistrust or fear them. What has happened since is history.
+Sun Yat-sen can scarcely be required to have predicted it. His comments on
+imperialism, therefore, must be accepted at face value in a consideration
+of the nationalist program in his theories.
+
+The method by means of which Sun reconciled his denial of the superiority
+of class to nation is an interesting one, profoundly significant as a clue
+to the understanding of his thought. He estimates the population of the
+world at 1500 million. Now, of this total 400 million are members of the
+white race, who constitute the most powerful and prosperous people in the
+modern world. "This white race regards (its 400,000,000 representatives)
+as the unit which must swallow up the other, colored races. Thus the Red
+tribes of America have already been exterminated.... The Yellow Asiatic
+race is now oppressed by the Whites, and it is possible that it will be
+exterminated before long."(257) Thus, as Sun viewed it, imperialism before
+the war was racial as well as economic. The White Peril was a reality.
+This emphasis on the doctrine of race shows the emphasis that Sun put upon
+race once he had narrowed down the old world-society to the Chinese
+race-nation. The most vigorous _Rassenpolitiker_, such as Homer Lea or
+Lothrop Stoddard,(258) would approve heartily of such a system of
+calculation in politics. Sun Yat-sen differed with them, as he differed
+with the Marxians, and with the race-theorists in general, by not
+following any one Western absolute to the bitter end, whether it was the
+class war or the race struggle.
+
+Russia fitted into this picture of race struggle. One hundred and fifty
+million Russians left the camp of the 400 million white oppressors, and
+came over to the just side of the 1100 million members of oppressed
+nations. Consequently the figures came out somewhat more favorably for the
+oppressed, in spite of the fact that the imperialist powers were still
+economically and militarily supreme. Sun Yat-sen quoted an apocryphal
+remark of Lenin's: "There are in the world two categories of people; one
+is composed of 1,250,000,000 men and the other of 250,000,000 men. These
+1,250,000,000 men are oppressed by the 250,000,000 men. The oppressors act
+against nature, and in defiance of her. We who oppose _might_ are
+following her."(259) Sun regarded the Russian Revolution as a shift in the
+race-struggle, in which Russia had come over to the side of the oppressed
+nations. (He did, of course, refer to Germany as an oppressed nation at
+another time, but did not include, so far as we can tell, the German
+population in the thesis under consideration.)
+
+On this basis China was to join Russia in the class struggle of the
+nations. The struggle was to be between the oppressed and the oppressors
+among the nations, and not between the races, as it might have been had
+not Russia come over to the cause of international equality.(260) After
+the class struggle of the nations had been done with, the time for the
+consideration of cosmopolitanism would have arrived.
+
+In taking class lines in a scheme of nations, Sun was reconciling the
+requirements of the old ideology and the international struggle against
+imperialism. It is characteristic of his deep adherence to what he
+believed to be the scheme of realities in political affairs that he did
+not violate his own well-knit ideology in adopting the Marxian ideology
+for the anti-imperialist struggle, but sought to preserve the marvellous
+unity of his own society--a society which he believed to have been the most
+nearly perfect of its time. The race-interpretation of the international
+class struggle is at one and the same time an assertion of the natural and
+indestructible unity of Chinese society, and the recognition of the fact
+that China and Russia, together with the smaller nations, had a common
+cause against the great advances of modern imperialism.
+
+
+
+
+Racial Nationalism and Pan-Asia.
+
+
+The dual orientation of Sun Yat-sen's anti-imperialist programs has
+already been made partly evident in the examination of this belief in a
+class war of the nations. A much more nearly complete exposition of this
+doctrine, although with the emphasis on its racial rather than on its
+economic aspects, is to be found in the third sub-principle of the
+nationalist program: the race-national aspect of the national revolution.
+Each of the three principles was to contribute to this implementation of
+nationalism. _Min sheng_ was to provide the foundation for economic
+nationalism. Democracy was to follow and reinforce political nationalism,
+which would clear away the political imperialism and let the Chinese,
+inculcated with state-allegiance, really rule themselves.
+
+At the end of his life, even after he had delivered the sixteen lectures
+on the three principles, Sun Yat-sen issued another call for the
+fulfillment in action of his principle of nationalism. This, too, praised
+Russia and stressed the significance of the defection of Russia from the
+band of the white oppressing powers; but it is important as showing the
+wider implications of Sun Yat-sen's race-national doctrines. During the
+greater part of his life, Sun spoke of the Chinese race-nation alone. His
+racial theory led him into no wider implications, such as the political
+reality of race kinship. In this last pronouncement, he recognized the
+wide sweep of consequences to which his premises of race-reality had led
+him. This call was issued in his celebrated Pan-Asiatic Speech of November
+28, 1924, given in Kobe, Japan.(261)
+
+The content of the speech is narrower than the configuration of auxiliary
+doctrines which may be discussed in connection with it. These are: the
+race orientation of the Chinese race-nation; the possibility of Pan-Asia;
+and the necessary function of the future Chinese society as the protector
+and teacher of Asia, and of the whole world. These points in his
+theoretical program were still far in the future when he spoke of them,
+and consequently did not receive much attention. In the light of the
+developments of the last several years, and the continued references to
+Sun's Pan-Asia which Japanese officials and propagandists have been
+making, this part of his program requires new attention.
+
+The speech itself is a re-statement of the race-class war of the nations.
+He points out that "It is contrary to justice and humanity that a minority
+of four hundred million should oppress a majority of nine hundred
+million...."(262) "The Europeans hold us Asiatics down through the power
+of their material accomplishments."(263) He then goes on to stress the
+necessity of emulating the material development of the West not in order
+to copy the West in politics and imperialism as well, but solely for the
+purpose of national defense. He praises Japan, Turkey, and the Soviet
+Union as leaders of the oppressed class of nations and predicts that the
+time will come when China will resume the position she once had of a great
+and benevolent power. He distinguishes, however, between the position of
+China in the past and Great Britain and the United States in the present.
+"If we look back two thousand five hundred years, we see that China was
+the most powerful people of the world. It then occupied the position which
+Great Britain and the United States do today. But while Great Britain and
+the United States today are only two of a series of world powers, China
+was then the only world power."(264) Sun also refers to the significant
+position of Turkey and Japan as the two bulwarks of Asia, and emphasizes
+the strangely just position of Russia.
+
+In his earlier days Sun Yat-sen had been preoccupied with Chinese
+problems, but not so much so as to prevent his taking a friendly interest
+in the nationalist revolutions of the Koreans against the Japanese, and
+the Filipinos against the Americans. This interest seems to have been a
+personally political one, rather than a preliminary to a definition of
+policy. He said to the Filipinos: "Let us know one another and we shall
+love each other more."(265) The transformation of the ideology in China
+did not necessarily lead to the development of outside affiliations. The
+Confucian world-society, becoming the Chinese race-nation, was to be
+independent.
+
+In the development of his emphasis upon race kinship on the achievement of
+race-nationalism, Sun Yat-sen initiated a program which may not be without
+great meaning in the furthering of the nationalist program. He showed that
+the Chinese race-nation, having racial affinities with the other Asiatic
+nations, was bound to them nationally in policy in two ways: racially,
+and--as noted--anti-imperialistically. This theory would permit the Chinese
+to be drawn into a Pan-Asiatic movement as well as into an
+anti-imperialist struggle. This theory may now be used as a justification
+for either alternative in the event of China's having to choose aides in
+Russo-Japanese conflict. China is bound to Russia by the theory of the
+class war of the nations, but could declare that Russia had merely devised
+a new form for imperialism. China is bound to Japan by the common heritage
+of Asiatic blood and civilization, but could declare that Japan had gone
+over to the _pa tao_ side of Western imperialism, and prostituted herself
+to the status of another Westernized-imperialized aggressive power.
+Whatever the interpretations of this doctrine may be, it will afford the
+Chinese a basis for their foreign policy based on the _San Min Chu I_.
+
+When Sun Yat-sen spoke, Russia and China had not fought over the Chinese
+Eastern Railway and the Chinese Communist problem, nor had Japan and China
+entered into the Manchurian conflict. He was therefore in no position to
+see that his expressions of approval for Pan-Asianism and for pro-Soviet
+foreign policy might conflict. In one breath he praised Japan as the
+leader and inspirer of modern Asia, and lauded Russia as the pioneer in a
+new, just policy on the part of the Western powers. He saw little hope
+that the example of the Soviet Union would be followed by any other
+Western power, although he did state that there was " ... in England and
+America a small number of people, who defend these our ideals in harmony
+with a general world movement. As far as the other barbarian nations are
+concerned, there might be among them people who are inspired by the same
+convictions."(266) The possibility of finding allies in the West did not
+appear to be a great one to Sun Yat-sen.
+
+Sun did something in this speech which he had rarely hitherto done. He
+generalized about the whole character of the East, and included in that
+everything which the Westerners regarded as Eastern, from Turkey to Japan.
+We have seen that the Chinese world of Eastern Asia had little in common
+with the middle or near East. In this speech Sun accepted the Western idea
+of a related Orient and speaks of Asiatic ideals of kindliness and
+justice. This is most strange. "If we Asiatics struggle for the creation
+of a pan-Asiatic united front, we must consider ... on what fundamental
+constitution we wish to erect this united front. We must lay at the
+foundations whatever has been the special peculiarity of our Eastern
+culture; we must place our emphasis on moral value, on kindliness and
+justice."(267) This Pan-Asian doctrine had been the topic of frequent
+discussion by Japanese and Russians. The former naturally saw it as a
+great resurgency of Asia under the glorious leadership of the Japanese
+Throne. The Russians found pan-Asianism to be a convenient instrument in
+the national and colonial struggle against imperialism for communism.
+
+Sun Yat-sen joined neither of these particular pan-Asiatic outlooks. The
+foreign policy of the Chinese race-nation was to fight oppressors, and to
+join the rest of Asia in a struggle against white imperialist domination.
+But--here is the distinction--how was China to do these things? Sun Yat-sen
+never urged the Chinese to accept the leadership of the Western or
+Japanese states, however friendly they might be. China was to follow a
+policy of friendship and cooeperation with those powers which were friendly
+to her and to the cause of justice throughout the world. Sun praised the
+old system of Eastern Asia, by which the peripheral states stood in
+vassalage to China, a vassalage which he regarded as mutually voluntary
+and not imperialistic in the unpleasant sense of the word.
+
+In the end, he believed Chinese society should resume the duty which it
+had held for so many centuries in relation to its barbarian neighbors.
+China should be rightly governed and should set a constant instance of
+political propriety. Sun even advocated ultimate intervention by the
+Chinese, a policy of helping the weak and lifting up the fallen. He
+concluded his sixth lecture on nationalism by saying: "If we want to
+'govern the country rightly and pacify the world,' we must, first of all,
+restore our nationalism together with our national standing, and unify the
+world on the basis of the morality and peach which are proper (to us), in
+order to achieve an ideal government."(268)
+
+We may conclude that his racial sub-principle in a program of nationalism
+involved: 1) orientation of Chinese foreign policy on the basis of blood
+kinship as well as on the basis of class war of the nations; 2) advocacy
+of a pan-Asiatic movement; and 3) use of China's resurgence of national
+power to restore the benevolent hegemony which the Chinese had exercised
+over Eastern Asia, and possibly to extend it over the whole world.
+
+
+
+
+The General Program of Nationalism.
+
+
+It may be worthwhile to attempt a view of the nationalist program of Sun
+Yat-sen as a whole. The variety of materials covered, and the intricate
+system of cross-reference employed by Sun, make it difficult to summarize
+this part of his doctrines on a simple temporal basis. The plans for the
+advancement of the Chinese race-nation do not succeed each other in an
+orderly pattern of future years, one stage following another. They mirror,
+rather, the deep conflict of forces in the mind of Sun, and bring to the
+surface of his teachings some of the almost irreconcilable attitudes and
+projects which he had to put together. In the ideological part of his
+doctrines we do not find such contrasts; his ideology, a readjustment of
+the ideology of old China, before the impact of the new world, to
+conditions developing after that impact, is fairly homogeneous and
+consistent. It does not possess the rigid and iron-bound consistency
+required to meet the logic of the West; but, in a country not given to the
+following of absolutes, it was as stable as it needed to be. His programs
+do not display the same high level of consistency. They were derived from
+his ideology, but, in being derived from it, they had to conform with the
+realities of the revolutionary situation in words addressed to men in that
+situation. As Wittfogel has said, the contradictions of the actual
+situation in China were reflected in the words of Sun Yat-sen; Marxians,
+however, would suppose that these contradictions ran through the whole of
+the ideology and plans. It may be found that in the old security
+transmitted by Sun from the Confucian ideology to his own, there is little
+contradiction; in his programs we shall find much more.
+
+This does not mean, of course, that Sun Yat-sen planned things which were
+inherently incompatible with one another. What he did do was to advocate
+courses of action which might possibly have all been carried out at the
+same time, but which might much more probably present themselves as
+alternatives. His ardor in the cause of revolution, and his profound
+sincerity, frequently led him to over-assess the genuineness of the
+cordial protestations of others; he found it possible to praise Japan,
+Turkey, and the Soviet Union in the same speech, and to predict the
+harmonious combination, not only of the various Asiatic nationalisms with
+each other, but of all the nations of Asia with Western international
+communism. The advantage, therefore, of the present treatment, which seeks
+to dissever the ideology of Sun Yat-sen from his plans, may rest in large
+part upon the fact that the ideology, based in the almost timeless scheme
+of things in China, depended little upon the political situations of the
+moment, while his plans, inextricably associated with the main currents of
+the contemporary political situation, may have been invalidated as plans
+by the great political changes that occurred after his death. That is not
+to say, however, that his plans are no longer of importance. The Chinese
+nationalists may still refer to them for suggestions as to their general
+course of action, should they wish to remain orthodox to the teachings of
+Sun. The plans also show how the ideology may be developed with reference
+to prevailing conditions.
+
+Clearly, some changes in the plans will have to be made; some of the
+changes which have been made are undoubtedly justified. Now that war
+between the Soviet Union and Japan has ceased to be improbable, it is
+difficult to think of the cooerdination of a pan-Asiatic crusade with a
+world struggle against imperialism. Chinese nationalists, no longer on
+good terms with the Japanese--and on worse terms with the Communists--must
+depend upon themselves and upon their own nation much more than Sun
+expected. At the time of his death in 1925 the Japanese hostility to the
+Kuomintang, which became so strikingly evident at Tsinanfu in 1928-9, and
+the fundamental incompatibility of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party
+of China, had not manifested themselves. On the other hand, he could not
+have foreseen that the imperialist nations, by no means cordial to the
+Chinese Nationalists, would become as friendly to the Chinese nationalism
+as they have. The United States, for instance, while not acting positively
+against the political restrictions of Western imperialism (including its
+own) in China, has been friendly to the Nanking government, and as far as
+a rigid policy of neutrality permitted it, took the side of China against
+Japan in the Manchurian conflict in and after 1931. Such developments
+cannot easily be reconciled to the letter of the plans of Sun Yat-sen,
+and, unless infallibility is expected of him, there is no reason why they
+should.
+
+His plans possess an interest far more than academic. It is not the
+province of this work to judge the degree to which the Nationalists
+carried out the doctrines of Sun, nor to assess the relative positions of
+such leaders as Chiang Chieh-shih and Wang Ching-wei with respect to
+orthodoxy. The plans may be presented simply as a part of the theory of
+Sun Yat-sen, and where there is possibility of disagreement, of his theory
+in its final and most authoritative stage: the sixteen lectures of 1924,
+and the other significant writings of the last years of his life.
+
+The first part of his plans for China--those dealing with the applications
+of nationalism--may be more easily digested in outline form:
+
+
+    1. The Kuomintang was to be the instrument of the revolution.
+    Re-formed under the influence of the Communist advisers, it had
+    become a powerful weapon of agitation. It was, as will be seen in
+    the discussion of the plans for democracy, to become a governing
+    system as well. Its primary purpose was to carry out the
+    advancement of nationalism by the elimination of the _tuchuns_ and
+    other anti-national groups in China, and by an application of the
+    three principles, one by one, of the nationalist program.
+
+    2. The Kuomintang should foster the ideology of nationalism and
+    arouse the Chinese people to the precarious position of their
+    country. In order to make nationalism politically effective, state
+    allegiance had to supplant the old personal allegiance to the
+    Dragon Throne, or the personal allegiance to the neo-feudal
+    militarists.
+
+    3. Nationalism should be exerted economically, to develop the
+    country in accord with the ideology of _min sheng_ and to clear
+    away imperialist economic oppression which interfered with both
+    nationalism and _min sheng_.
+
+    4. Nationalism had to be exerted politically, for two ends:
+    Chinese democracy, and Chinese autonomy, which Sun often spoke of
+    as one. This had to be done by active political resistance to
+    aggression and by the advancement of a China state-ized and
+    democratic.
+
+    5. Nationalism had also to be exercised politically, in another
+    manner: in the class war of the nations. China should fight the
+    racial and economic oppression of the ruling white powers, in
+    common with the other oppressed nations and the one benevolent
+    white nation (Soviet Russia).
+
+    6. Nationalism had to reinforce itself through its racial
+    kinships. China had to help her fellow Asiatic nations, in a
+    pan-Asia movement, and restore justice to Asia and to the world.
+
+
+This recapitulation serves to show the curious developments of Sun
+Yat-sen's nationalist program. Originally based upon his ideology, then
+influenced by the race-orientation of a good deal of his political
+thought, and finally reconciled to the programmatic necessities of his
+Communist allies, it is surprising not in its diversity but in its
+homogeneity under the circumstances. This mixture of elements, which
+appears much more distinctly in Sun's own words than it does in a
+rephrasing, led some Western students who dealt with Sun to believe that
+his mind was a cauldron filled with a political witch-brew. If it is
+remembered that the points discussed were programmatic points, which
+changed with the various political developments encountered by Sun and his
+followers, and not the fundamental premises of his thought and action
+(which remained surprisingly constant, as far as one can judge, throughout
+his life), the inner consistency of Sun Yat-sen will appear. These plans
+could not have endured under any circumstances, since they were set in a
+particular time. The ideology may.
+
+In turning from the nationalist to the democratic plans of Sun Yat-sen, we
+encounter a distinct change in the type of material. Orderly and precise
+instead of chaotic and near-contradictory, the democratic plans of Sun
+Yat-sen present a detailed scheme of government based squarely on his
+democratic ideology, and make no concessions to the politics of the
+moment. Here his nationalism finds its clearest expression. The respective
+autonomies of the individual, the clan, the _hsien_ and the nation are
+accounted for; the nature of the democratic nationalist state becomes
+clear. Programmatically, it is the clearest, and, perhaps, the soundest,
+part of Sun's work.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI. THE PROGRAMS OF DEMOCRACY.
+
+
+
+
+The Three Stages of Revolution.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the three stages of revolution attracted a
+considerable degree of attention. By the three stages of the revolution he
+meant (1) the acquisition of political power by the teachers of the new
+ideology (the revolution), (2) the teaching of the new ideology
+(tutelage), and (3) the practice of government by the people in accord
+with the new ideology (constitutional democracy). Enough of Sun Yat-sen's
+teaching concerning the new ideology has been shown to make clear that
+this proposal is merely a logical extension of his doctrine of the three
+classes of men.
+
+Western writers who have acquainted themselves with the theory seem, in
+some instances, inclined to identify it with the Marxist theory of the
+dictatorship of the proletariat, into which the proletarian revolution is
+to be divided into three stages--the conquest of political power by the
+masses; the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the inauguration (in the
+remote future) of the non-governmental class-less society.(269) It
+scarcely seems necessary to go so far afield to discover the origin of the
+theory. As a matter of record, Sun Yat-sen made his earliest recorded
+announcement of this theory in 1905, when he was not at all under the
+influence of Marxism, although he was acquainted with it.(270) Finally,
+the theory forms so necessary a link between his theory of Kuomintang
+control of the revolution, and his equally insistent demand for ultimate
+democracy, that it may be regarded as a logically necessary part of his
+complete plan. The coincidence between his and the Marxian theories would
+consequently appear as a tribute to his acumen; this was the view that the
+Communists took when they discovered that Sun Yat-sen was afraid of the
+weaknesses of immediate democracy in a country not fit for it.
+
+One might also observe that, once the premise of revolution for a purpose
+is accepted, the three stages fit well into the scheme of age-old
+traditional political thought advocated by the Confucians. Confucius did
+not see the value of revolution, although he condoned it in specific
+instances. He did, however, believe in tutelage and looked forward to an
+age when the ideology would have so impregnated the minds of men that _ta
+t'ung_ (the Confucian Utopia) would be reached, and, presumably,
+government would become superfluous. That which Sun sought to achieve by
+revolution--the placing of political power in the hands of the ideological
+reformers (or, in the case of the Marxist theory, the proletariat,
+actually the Communist party, its trustee)--Confucius sought, not by
+advocating a general conspiracy of scholars for an oligarchy of the
+intellectuals, but the more peaceful method of urging princes to take the
+advice of scholars in government, so that the ideology could be
+established (by the introduction of "correct names," _cheng ming_) and
+ideological control introduced.
+
+The three stages of revolution may resemble Communist doctrine; they may
+have been influenced by Confucian teaching; whatever their origin, they
+play an extremely important part in the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, and in
+the politics springing from his principles. If the Kuomintang is the
+instrument of the revolution, the three stages are its process. The
+clearest exposition of this theory of the three stages is found in _The
+Fundamentals of National Reconstruction_, a manifesto which Sun Yat-sen
+issued in 1924:
+
+
+    3. The next element of reconstruction is democracy. To enable the
+    people to be competent in their knowledge of politics, the
+    government should undertake to train and guide them so that they
+    may know how to exercise their rights of election, recall,
+    initiative, and referendum....
+
+    5. The order of reconstruction is divided into three periods, viz.
+
+    (_a_) Period of Military Operations;
+    (_b_) Period of Political Tutelage;
+    (_c_) Period of Constitutional Government.
+
+    6. During the period of military operations the entire country
+    should be subject to military rule. To hasten the unification of
+    the country, the Government to be controlled by the Kuomintang
+    should employ military force to conquer all opposition in the
+    country and propagate the principles of the Party so that the
+    people may be enlightened.
+
+    7. The period of political tutelage in a province should begin and
+    military rule should cease as soon as order within the province is
+    completely restored....
+
+
+He then goes on to describe the method by which tutelage shall be applied,
+and when it should end. It should end, Sun declares, in each _hsien_
+(district; township) as the people of the _hsien_ become self-governing,
+through learning and practice in the democratic techniques. As soon as all
+the _hsien_ within a province are self-governing, the provincial
+government shall be released to democratic control.
+
+
+    23. When more than one half of the provinces in the country have
+    reached the constitutional government stage, _i. e._ more than one
+    half of the provinces have local self-government full established
+    in all their districts, there shall be a National Congress to
+    decide on the adoption and promulgation of the Constitution....
+
+    (_Signed_) SUN WEN
+
+    12th day, 4th month, 13th year of the Republic (April 12,
+    1924).(271)
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen was emphatic about the necessity of a period of tutelage. The
+dismal farce of the first Republic in 1912, when the inexperience and
+apathy of the people, coupled with the venality of the militarists and
+politicians, very nearly discredited Chinese democracy, convinced Sun
+Yat-sen that effective self-government could be built up only as the
+citizens became ready for it. A considerable number of the disputes
+concerning the theory of self-government to be employed by the
+policy-making groups of the National (Kuomintang-controlled) Government
+have centered on the point of criteria for self-government. Even with the
+insertion of a transition stage, and with a certain amount of tutelage,
+difficulties are being encountered in the application of this theory of
+the introduction of constitutional government as soon as the people in a
+_hsien_ are prepared for it. Other considerations, military or political,
+may make any venture beyond the secure confines of a benevolent Party
+despotism dangerous; and the efficacy of tutelage can always be
+questioned. The period of tutelage was set for 1930-1935; it is possible,
+however, that the three stages cannot be gone through as quickly as
+possible, since the Japanese invasions and the world economic depression
+exercised a thoroughly disturbing influence throughout the country.
+
+A final point may be made with regard to the three stages of the
+revolution as Sun Yat-sen planned them. Always impetuous and optimistic in
+revolutionary endeavor, Sun Yat-sen expected that the military conquest
+would be rapid, the period of tutelage continue a few years, and
+constitutional democracy endure for ages, until in the end _ta t'ung_
+should reign upon earth. The transition period was not, as in the theory
+of the Confucians and the Marxians, an indefinite period beginning with
+the present and leading on down to the age of the near-perfection of
+humanity. It was to Sun Yat-sen, in his more concrete plans, an interval
+between the anarchy and tyranny of the warlord dictatorships and the
+coming of Nationalist democracy. It was not a scheme of government in
+itself.
+
+To recapitulate: Sun Yat-sen believed that revolution proceeded or should
+proceed by three stages--the (military) revolution proper; the period of
+tutelage; and the period of constitutional democracy. His theory resembles
+the Communist, although it provides for a dictatorship of the patriotic
+elite (Kuomintang) and not of any one class such as the proletariat; it
+also resembles the Confucian with respect to the concepts of tutelage and
+eventual harmony. Military conquest was to yield swiftly to tutelage;
+tutelage was to lead, _hsien_ by _hsien_, into democracy. With the
+establishment of democracy in more than one-half of the provinces,
+constitutional government was to be inaugurated and the expedient of Party
+dictatorship dispensed with.
+
+This theory, announced as early as 1905, Sun did not insist upon when the
+first Republic was proclaimed in 1912, with the tragic results which the
+history of that unfortunate experiment shows. In the experience derived
+from that great enthusiasm, Sun appreciated the necessity of knowledge
+before action. He was willing to defer the enjoyment of democracy until
+the stability of the democratic idea in the minds of the people was such
+that they could be entrusted with the familiar devices of Western
+self-government.
+
+What kind of a democratic organization did Sun Yat-sen propose to develop
+in China on the basis of his Nationalist and democratic ideology? Having
+established the fundamental ideas of national unity, and the national
+self-control, and having allowed for the necessity of an instrument of
+revolution--the Kuomintang--and a process of revolution--the three stages,
+what mechanisms of government did Sun advocate to permit the people of
+China to govern themselves in accord with the Three Principles?
+
+
+
+
+The Adjustment of Democracy to China.
+
+
+It is apparent that, even with tutelage, the democratic techniques of the
+West could impair the attainment of democracy in China were they applied
+in an unmodified form, and without concession to the ideological and
+institutional backgrounds of the Chinese. The Westerner need only
+contemplate the political structure of the Roman Republic to realize how
+much this modern democracy is the peculiar institution of his race, bred
+in his bone and running, sacred and ancient, deep within his mind. The
+particular methods of democracy, so peculiarly European, which the
+modern--that is, Western or Westernized--world employs, is no less alien to
+the imperial anarchy of traditional China than is the Papacy. Sun Yat-sen,
+beholding the accomplishments of the West in practical matters, had few
+illusions about the excellence of democratic shibboleths, such as
+parliamentarism or liberty, and was profoundly concerned with effecting
+the self-rule of the Chinese people without leading them into the
+labyrinth of a strange and uncongenial political system.
+
+In advocating democracy he did not necessarily advocate the adoption of
+strange devices from the West. While believing, as we have seen, in the
+necessity of the self-rule of the Chinese race-nation, he by no means
+desired to take over the particular parliamentary forms which the West had
+developed.(272) He criticised the weakness of Western political and social
+science as contrasted with the strength of Western technology: "It would
+be a gross error to believe that just as we imitate the material sciences
+of the foreigners, so we ought likewise to copy their politics. The
+material civilization of the foreigners changes from day to day; we
+attempt to imitate it, and we find it difficult to keep step with it. But
+there is a vast difference between the progress of foreign politics and
+the progress of material civilization; the speed of (the first) is very
+slow."(273) And he said later, in speaking of the democracy of the first
+Republic: "China wanted to be in line with foreign countries and to
+practice democracy; accordingly she set up her representative government.
+But China has not learned anything about the good sides of representative
+governments in Europe and in America, and as to the bad sides of these
+governments, they have increased tenfold, a hundredfold in China, even to
+the point of making swine, filthy and corrupt, out of government
+representatives, a thing which has not been witnessed in other countries
+since the days of antiquity. This is truly a peculiar phenomenon of
+representative government. Hence, China not only failed to learn well
+anything from the democratic governments of other countries, but she
+learned evil practices from them."(274) This farce-democracy was as bad as
+no government at all. Sun Yat-sen had to reject any suggestion that China
+imitate the example of some of the South American nations in borrowing the
+American Constitution and proclaiming a "United States of China." The
+problem was not to be solved so easily.
+
+In approaching Sun Yat-sen's solution the Western student must again
+remember two quite important distinctions between the democracy of Sun
+Yat-sen and the democracy of the West. Sun Yat-sen's principle of _min
+ch'uean_ was the self-control of the whole people first, and a government
+by the mass of individuals making up the people secondarily. The Chinese
+social system was well enough organized to permit the question of
+democracy to be a question of the nation as a whole, rather than a
+question of the reconciliation of particular interests within the nation.
+Special interests already found their outlet in the recognized social
+patterns--so reminiscent of the institutions envisaged by the pluralists--of
+the ancient order. In the second place, China was already a society which
+was highly organized socially, although politically in ruins; the
+democratic government that Sun Yat-sen planned had infinitely less
+governing to do than did Western governments. The new Nationalist
+government had to fit into rather than supplant the old order. As a
+consequence of these distinctions, one may expect to find much less
+emphasis on the exact methods of popular control of the government than
+one would in a similar Western plan; and one must anticipate meeting the
+ancient devices and offices which the usage of centuries had hallowed and
+made true to the Chinese.
+
+One may find that democracy in China is not so radical a novelty as it
+might at first thought be esteemed. A figure of speech, which somewhat
+anticipates the exposition, may serve to prepare one for some of the
+seeming omissions of Sun Yat-sen's plan for a democracy. The suggestion is
+this: that the democracy of Sun Yat-sen is, roughly, a modernization of
+the old Imperial system, with the Emperor (as the head of the academic
+civil service) removed, and the majority placed in his stead. Neither in
+the old system nor in the new were the minorities the object of profound
+concern, for, to the Chinese, the notion of a minority (as against the
+greater mass of the tradition-following people) is an odd one. The rule of
+the Son of Heaven (so far as it was government at all) was to be replaced
+by the rule of the whole people (_min_, which is more similar to the
+German _Volk_ than the English _people_). The first Sun Yat-sen called
+monarchy; the second, democracy.
+
+The old ideology was to yield to the new, but even the new as a review of
+it has shown, was not broad enough completely to supplant the old. The
+essential continuity of Chinese civilization was not to be broken.
+Democracy as a Western institution could be nothing more than a sham, as
+the parliaments at Peking had showed; democracy in China had to be not
+only democracy, but Chinese as well.
+
+It is not, therefore, extraordinarily strange to find the ancient
+institutions of the Empire surviving by the side of the most extreme
+methods of popular government. The censorate and the referendum, the
+examination system and the recall, all could work together in the
+democracy planned by Sun Yat-sen. Even with the idea of popular rule
+adopted in the formal Western manner, Sun Yat-sen proposed to continue the
+idea of natural and ineradicable class differences between men. The
+Chinese democracy was not to be any mere imitation of the West; it was to
+be the fundamentally new fusion of Chinese and Western methods, and
+offered as the solution for the political readjustment of the Chinese
+society in a world no longer safe for it.
+
+
+
+
+The Four Powers.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen divided all men into three categories: the geniuses, the
+followers, and the unthinking. To reconcile this theory of natural
+inequality with democracy, he distinguished between _ch'uean_, the right to
+rule as sovereign, and _neng_, the right to administer as an official. He
+furthermore considered the state similar to a machine. How should the
+unthinking, who would possess _ch'uean_, the right to rule, be granted that
+right without attempting to usurp _neng_?
+
+This was to be accomplished by two means. The Four Powers were to be given
+to the people, in order to assure their possession of _ch'uean_. The Five
+Rights were to assure that the government might be protected in its right
+to _neng_, in its right to have only the most competent officials.
+Together the Four Powers and the Five Rights implement a scheme of
+government so novel that Sun Yat-sen himself believed it to be a definite
+contribution to political method. The learned Jesuit translator of the
+_San Min Chin I_ does not even term it democracy, but neo-democracy
+instead.(275)
+
+The Four Powers represent an almost extreme limit of popular control. Sun
+Yat-sen divided the four into two groups: the first two are powers of the
+people over the administrators--the power of election and the power of
+recall; the second two are powers of the people over the laws--the power of
+initiative and the power of referendum. Having secured the government from
+undue interference, Sun Yat-sen had no reluctance in giving these powers
+to the people. He said: "As for our China, since she had no old democratic
+system, she ought to be able to make very good use of this most recent and
+excellent invention."(276)
+
+These four powers are perhaps the most Western element in the whole theory
+of Sun. History does not record the technique by which the Chinese chose
+Yao to be their Emperor, and even where actions comparable to elections
+were performed, it was not by use of the ballot-box or the voting machine,
+or drilling on an appointed field. The Chinese way of getting things done
+never tended that much to formality. A man who wanted to be a village head
+might be quietly chosen head by a cabal of the most influential persons,
+or at a meeting of many of the villagers. He might even decide to be head,
+and act as head, in the hope that people would pay attention to him and
+think that he was head. The Four Powers represent a distinct innovation in
+Chinese politics for, apart from a few ridiculous comic-opera performances
+under the first Republic, and the spurious plebiscite on the attempted
+usurpation of Yuean Shih-k'ai, the voting method has been a technique
+unknown in China. It is distinctly Western.
+
+Another distinction may be made with a certain degree of reservation and
+hesitancy. It is this: the Chinese, without the elaborate system of
+expedient fictions which the West terms juristic law, were and are unable
+to conceive of corporate action. A law passed by the Peking parliament was
+not passed by the dictator in parliament, or the people in parliament; it
+was simply passed by parliament, and was parliament's responsibility. The
+only kind of law that the people could pass would be one upon which they
+themselves had voted.
+
+Seen in this light, the Four Powers assume a further significance greater
+than the Western political scientist might attribute to them. In America
+there is little difference between a law which the people of Oregon pass
+in the legislature, and one which they pass in a referendum. To the
+Chinese there is all the difference in the world. The one is an act of the
+government, and not of the people; the other, the act of the people, and
+not of the government. The people may have powers over the government, but
+never, by the wildest swing of imagination, can they discover themselves
+personified in it. A Chinese democracy is almost a dyarchy of majority and
+officialdom, the one revising and checking the other.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not comment on the frequency with which he expected these
+powers to be exercised, nor has the political development of democratic
+China gone far enough to afford any test of experience; it is consequently
+impossible to state whether these powers were to be, or shall be,
+exercised constantly as a matter of course, or whether they shall be
+employed by the people only as courses for emergency action, when the
+government arouses their displeasure. The latter seems the more probable,
+in view of the background of Chinese tradition, and the strong
+propensities of the Chinese to avoid getting involved in anything which
+does not concern them immediately and personally. This probability is made
+the more plausible by the self-corrective devices in the governmental
+system, which may seem to imply that an extensive use of the popular
+corrective power was not contemplated by Sun Yat-sen.
+
+Sun Yat-sen said:
+
+
+    Now we separate power from capacity and we say _that the people
+    are the engineers and the government is the machine_. On the one
+    hand, we want the machinery of the government to be all-powerful,
+    able to do anything, and on the other hand we want the engineer,
+    the people, to have great power so as to be able to control that
+    all-powerful machine.
+
+    But what must be the mutual rights of the people and of the
+    government in order that they might balance? We have just
+    explained that. On the people's side there should be the four
+    rights of _election_, _recall_, _initiative_, and _referendum_. On
+    the government's side there must be five powers.... If the four
+    governing powers of the people control the five administrative
+    powers of the government, then we shall have _a perfect
+    political-democratic machine_....(277)
+
+
+
+
+The Five Rights.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen implemented his theory of democracy by assigning Four Powers
+to the people and Five Rights to the government. This latter doctrine is
+one of the most disputed points in his proposal. Some writers see in it
+nothing more than a crass conjunction of the theory of Montesquieu and the
+practices of the Chinese Imperial system.(278) His followers are disposed
+to regard the doctrine of the Five Rights as the product of intrepid
+imagination, which succeeded in reconciling the traditional scheme of
+Chinese things with the requirements of modern self-government.
+
+Sun made the point that both Chinese and Western governments had in the
+past had tripartite governments. He illustrated this by a diagram:(279)
+
+
+    CONSTITUTION OF CHINA
+
+    The Examining Power (_Kao Shih ch'uean_)
+    The Imperial Power (_Chun ch'uean_)
+      The Legislative Power
+      The Executive Power
+      The Judicial Power
+    The Power to Impeach (_Tan k'e ch'uean_)
+
+    FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONS
+
+    The Legislative Power combined with the Power to Impeach
+    The Executive Power combined with the Examining Power
+    The Judicial Power
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen believed that in separating the Five Rights from one another
+he would make clear certain differentiations of function which had led to
+numberless disputes in the past, and would present to the world a model
+government.
+
+Thus far, the Five Rights seem the complement of the Four Powers. The two
+sets of controls, of people over the government, and of the government
+over the people, assure China that a neo-democratic administration will
+have no less continuity and power than did its Imperial predecessor, and
+nevertheless be subject to the will of the majority of the four hundred
+odd million sovereigns. Contemplated in this manner, the Five Rights are
+an amalgamation of the Western theory upon the Chinese, and significant as
+a novelty in democratic administrative theory rather than as institutions
+altering the fundamental premises and methods of democracy.
+
+If, however, a further step is taken, and the Five Powers are associated
+with Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the three naturally unequal classes of men,
+they assume a somewhat less superficial significance. If the rule of the
+people is placed over the administration by the geniuses, the geniuses
+must be assured a method of entering the government service. The oligarchy
+of the intellectuals is to be reconciled with the dictatorship of the
+majority. The old Chinese system of a trained class of scholars, entrance
+to which was open on a competitive system to members of almost all classes
+of society, had to be preserved in the new China, and at the same time
+disciplined and purified of unworthy or unsuitable elements, while
+simultaneously subject to the policy-making authority of the majority.
+
+The preservation of a leader class was to be assured by an examination
+division in the new democratic government, and its purification and
+discipline continued by a supervisory or censoring division. The
+administrative setup of the nationalist democracy would appear as follows,
+when the present official translations of the Chinese names for the
+divisions (_Yuan_) are adopted:
+
+   1. The division of the executive (Executive Yuan).
+   2. The division of the legislative (Legislative Yuan).
+   3. The division of the judicial (Judicial Yuan).
+   4. The division of censorship, impeachment and accounting (Control
+      Yuan).
+   5. And the division of the examination system (Examination Yuan).
+
+It is an illustration of the further difference between the democracy of
+Sun Yat-sen and Western democracy, that each of the divisions, even the
+legislative, was to have a single head. The whole government was to be
+departmentally, not camerally, organized.
+
+The system of Five Powers emphasizes the implied dyarchy of government and
+people in the _San Min Chu I_ by assigning to the government itself
+functions which, in the usual course of events, are supposed to be
+exercised by the people themselves in Western democracies. The people are
+supposed to eliminate unfit officials and decide on the merits and
+trustworthiness of incumbents. By the expedient of non-reelection, the
+people are supposed to remove officials, who are incapable or unsuitable
+for public office. The two functions have been taken over by the
+Examination and Control Yuans, respectively; the Four Powers of the people
+are not, in all probability, instruments for continual popular intrigue
+and meddling in government, but almost revolutionary implements for
+shifting the course or composition of the government.
+
+The Five Rights are instruments for the self-government of the official
+class (Examination and Control), and for the government of the people by
+the official class (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). The Four Powers
+are the instruments for the government of the official class by the
+people. Out of the checks and balances of government and people the
+integrity, efficacy, and stability of Sun Yat-sen's democracy was to be
+assured.
+
+The exercise of the Four Rights of the people could, in the theory of Sun
+Yat-sen, be used to check the development of an arrogant, inefficient or
+irresponsible bureaucracy, in that the people would assist in the
+selection of officials and would be able to remove incompetents at any
+time. The civil service mechanism of the government would, on the other
+hand, resist the too free play of popular caprice. No incompetent person
+would be elected to office, since the civil service would extend even to
+elective offices. The voters could remove a bad official but they could
+not replace him with an untrained person; they would have to select their
+candidate from the roster of scholar-officials eligible for the rank of
+the office in question. The people were to supervise the operations of the
+age-old Chinese civil service, as revivified by the nationalists; they
+were to appoint and remove officers, to repeal and enact laws; but in no
+case were they to tear down the structure of the civil service and
+inaugurate a spoils democracy such as that found in the United States.
+This blending of extreme democracy and traditional administrative
+hierarchy would result, said Sun Yat-sen, in perfect government.
+
+The democratic nationalist government was to supersede the Empire. In
+between there was no central government, since the various military
+leaders paid scant respect to the unfortunate clique of diplomats and
+officials who carried on the few functions left to the powerless Peking
+government.(280) The new government was not, therefore, so much a new
+political order to be set up in place of the old as a political order to
+be built up out of military chaos. The social system, although shaken and
+affected by Western ideas, continued much as usual, and was to be woven
+into the new socio-political patterns that Sun Yat-sen projected.
+
+The Nationalist government was to be the nation's answer to the foreign
+aggression. The White Peril, which had flooded Asia, could only be held
+back by the dykes of a militant nationalist movement, expressing itself in
+a formal state such as the Westerners themselves had developed, and which
+fitted them to undertake the conquest of the world. This government was to
+be the agent of the whole Chinese people who, casting off the oppression
+of the militarists and the imperialists, was to rise again with its
+ancient power, formidable and ready to fight if necessary, more ready to
+bring about world-cooeperation and peace if possible. It was to be a
+government made up of a trained officialdom such as ancient China had
+possessed for centuries, which had led to the integration of control and
+culture (in the narrowest sense of the word), and of a people ruling by
+checking that officialdom: an all-powerful state-machine ruled by an
+all-powerful people.(281) A state was to appear in the world of states and
+enclose the Chinese people, by political power, more effectively than
+could the Great Wall.
+
+This aspect of democracy, the self-rule of the Chinese society _vis-a-vis_
+the linked despotism of militarists, renegades and imperialists, was,
+although the most important facet of democracy, not the whole story. In
+order to systematize the loose democracy of old China, in order to lead
+all force to the top, where it could be exerted outwards, the democratic
+plan had to plan links with the traditional system. The government could
+not be democratic if it were not tied to the people. The people could not
+govern themselves, as apart from governing the officialdom making up the
+National government, unless they had mechanisms with which to do so.
+Although the family, the _hui_ and the _hsien_ provided self-government,
+this self-government had to be associated with the scheme of nationalist
+and national self-government in order to guarantee the latter's
+effectiveness. Beyond or beneath the national democracy of China there was
+to be a system of democracy (the politicalization, as it were, of the old
+social organs) running through society. What these separate or subordinate
+organs were to be, what relations they were to have with the national
+government, and what other intermediate institutions were to facilitate
+those relations must be studied to gain a complete picture of the
+democracy of Sun Yat-sen.
+
+
+
+
+Confederacy Versus Centralism.
+
+
+One of the most involved questions in the political thought of the Chinese
+revolution has been the problem of provincial autonomy. The Chinese
+provinces differ considerably more from one another in economic
+conditions, language and race than do the American states; it has been
+said that one of the causes of the overthrow of the Manchu monarchy was
+the encroachment of the Imperial central power, in its last desperate
+attempts to modernize itself and cope with the last crisis, upon the old
+autonomy of the provinces.(282) Institutionally, the provinces were
+relatively independent; this degree of independence was, however,
+minimized by the general unimportance of government in Chinese society.
+The Chinese, toward each other, feel conscious of family, village and
+provincial ties; face to face with the foreigners, they are beginning to
+know themselves as Chinese. Until the wave of nationalism swept the
+country, provincial rivalry was a live issue; even today, it cannot be
+called forgotten.
+
+Sun Yat-sen's opinions on many points of government remained stable
+through his life. The fundamental ideas and ideals seem to have been
+expanded, rather than changed, as his theory met the test of his growing
+experience and the lessons of the revolution; but even with expansion,
+they remain, for the most part, consistent. Sun Yat-sen was steadfast in
+his beliefs.
+
+This cannot be said of his and his successors' opinions on the problem of
+province versus nation. There is no one doctrine dealing with the question
+of provincial autonomy. There may be a trend, however, which can be
+described as a swing from definite emphasis upon the province toward
+neglect of that unit of administration. This trend may be illustrated by
+several points.
+
+At the time of the first Republic the provinces were treated much as are
+states in the United States. The members of the Senate of the Republic
+(_Ts'an Yi Yuan_) were to be elected by the Assemblies of the provinces,
+and, when representing persons not under the jurisdiction of a provincial
+Assembly, by Electoral Colleges. The House of Representatives was to be
+elected directly by the people, in the proportion of one member to each
+eight hundred thousand of population, with the reservation--again in
+propitiation of provincial vanity--that no province should have less than
+ten representatives.(283) The first Republic was distinctly federal
+although by no means confederate.
+
+Sun Yat-sen did not immediately shift from this position. As late as
+1919-1922, when he was preparing his official biography, he spoke
+enthusiastically to his biographer of the potentialities of democratic
+provincial home rule.(284) He still believed in the importance of the
+provinces as units of a future democracy in China.
+
+From the time that Sun went South, and the Kuomintang was reorganized, to
+the present, the tendency in the Sun-Kuomintang theory seems to have been
+toward minimization of the importance of the provinces in the democracy to
+be set up. The Party Declaration of the Kuomintang at its First National
+Convention in 1924 in Canton criticised several political viewpoints
+prevalent; among these was that of the Confederalists, so called. The
+Declaration states, in part: "Undoubtedly regional self-government is in
+entire accord with the spirit of democracy and is a great need of our
+nation. But a true regional self-government can be realized only when our
+national independence is won, for without national freedom, local freedom
+is impossible.... Many social, economic and political problems facing the
+individual provinces can be solved only by the nation as a whole. So the
+success of the peoples' revolution is a prerequisite to the realization of
+provincial autonomy."(285)
+
+Sun Yat-sen himself stated, a few months earlier, a point of view which
+may seem inconsistent with the Party Declaration:
+
+
+    18. The _Hsien_ is the unit of self-government. The province links
+    up and provides means of co-operation between the Central
+    Government and the local governments of the districts.(286)
+
+
+Whatever the occasion for the slight difference of opinion, it has been
+the policy of the Kuomintang to emphasize _hsien_ rather than provinces as
+units of self-government. The Party itself is quite centralized. The
+Resume of the Kuomintang Third National Congress Resolutions Concerning
+Political Matters, adopted March 27, 1929, states unequivocally: "The
+traditional policy of attaching greater importance to provincial
+government than to _Hsien_ or district government must be corrected or
+even reversed." It adds, "The provincial government, on the other hand,
+shall act only as a supervisor of local self-government, standing in
+between the _Hsien_ or district government on the one hand, and the
+Central Government on the other."(287)
+
+The province is thus reduced to the lowest possible level. It is not
+probable that this tendency was influenced by Marxism, but it certainly
+resembled the Marxian idea of a vast confederation of self-governing
+communes, acting, by some proletarian metempsychosis, as a highly
+centralized instrument of revolution.(288) The doctrine of the
+_hsien_-province-nation relationship which places emphasis upon the first
+and the last is the authoritative one, and is quite harmonious with the
+earlier picture of Imperial China which, apart from the strictly
+governmental, was a vast confederacy of largely autonomous communities. In
+the picture of the new democratic national government which emerges from
+this doctrine, the central government may be regarded as a centralism
+versus the provinces, and a super-government in relation to the _hsien_;
+that is, while the people govern themselves as groups in the _hsien_, they
+will govern themselves as one people in the National Government. The
+province will remain as a convenient intermediary between the two.
+
+This is one of the few doctrines of Sun Yat-sen upon which no one
+definitive and final pronouncement is to be found and concerning which,
+consequently, recourse must be had to the history of the development of
+the Sun Yat-sen political philosophy.
+
+
+
+
+The _Hsien_ in a Democracy.
+
+
+The _hsien_, or district, was one of the most important social
+institutions in old China. The lowest official, the _hsien_ Magistrate,
+represented the Empire to the people of the _hsien_, while within the
+villages or the _hsien_ the people enjoyed a very high degree of autonomy.
+The _hsien_ was the meeting point of the political system and the
+extra-legal government, generally of a very vaguely organized nature, by
+which the Chinese managed their own affairs in accord with tradition. An
+estimate of the position of the _hsien_ may be gleaned from the fact that
+China has approximately four hundred eighty million inhabitants; apart
+from the cities and towns, there are about half a million villages; and
+the whole country, with the exception of certain Special Municipalities,
+such as Shanghai, is divided into nineteen hundred and forty-three
+_hsien_.(289)
+
+The _hsien_, however significant they may be in the social system of
+China, both past and present, cannot be described in a work such as this.
+It is not inappropriate, however, to reiterate that they form what is
+perhaps the most important grouping within China, and that much of Chinese
+life is centred in _hsien_ affairs. It is by reason of _hsien_ autonomy
+that the Chinese social system has been so elastic as to permit the shocks
+of invasion, insurrection, conquest, famine and flood to pass through and
+over China without disrupting Chinese social organization.
+
+Sun once quoted the old Chinese proverb about the Lu Shan (mountains): "We
+cannot find the real shape of the Lu Shan--for we ourselves are on it."
+From the viewpoint of the Western reader this proverb could be turned
+against Sun in his treatment of the _hsien_. He was passionately emphatic
+in discussing the importance of the _hsien_ with his foreign friends;(290)
+in his writings, addressed to his countrymen, he, as they, simply assumed
+the importance of the _hsien_ without troubling to make any cardinal point
+of it.
+
+The _hsien_ is in the unit of the most direct self-government of the
+people, without the interference of any elaborate set-up from officialdom.
+Apart from its age-old importance, it will gain further significance in
+the democracy of Sun Yat-sen.
+
+Some of the functions to be assigned to the people in a _hsien_ are
+assessment, registration, taxation, and/or purchase of all lands in the
+_hsien_; the collection of all unearned increment on lands within the
+_hsien_; land profits to be subjected to collection by the _hsien_, and
+disbursement for public improvements, charitable work, or other public
+service. Add this to the fact that the _hsien_ have been the chief
+agencies for police, health, charity, religious activity and the
+regulative control of custom--sometimes with the assistance of
+persons--through the centuries, and the great importance of the _hsien_ in
+the nationalist democracy becomes more clear.
+
+
+
+
+The Family System.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen's democracy differs further from the parliamentary, mechanical
+democracy of the West in that it incorporates the family system.(291) Of
+course Sun understood the extraordinary part that the family plays in
+China--a part more conspicuous, perhaps, than in any other country. He
+pointed out that the family required in China much of the loyalty which in
+the West is given to the state. "Among the Chinese people the family and
+kinship ties are very strong. Not infrequently the people sacrifice their
+lives and homes for some affair of kinship; for instance, in Kuangtung,
+two clans may fight regardless of life and property. On the other hand,
+our people hesitate to sacrifice themselves for a national cause. The
+spirit of unity has not extended beyond the family and clan
+relationships."(292)
+
+Speaking of the early Emperors and the revolution, he said: "You see,
+gentlemen, the methodology of Yao, like that of ours, was to begin his
+moral and political teachings with the family, then the nation-group, then
+the world."(293) How did Sun Yat-sen propose to join the strength of the
+family spirit and of nationalism, to the common advantage?
+
+He planned to reorganize the already existing clan organizations in each
+district. These organizations have existed from time immemorial for the
+purposes of preserving clan unity, commemorating clan ancestry, performing
+charitable functions, and acting as a focus--although this last was not an
+avowed purpose--for clan defense. The reorganization which Sun proposed
+would probably have involved some systematizing of the organization for
+the purposes of uniformity and official record, as well as effectiveness.
+
+Once the district headquarters were reorganized, they could be combined
+throughout a province into a provincial clan organization. Such
+organizations already exist, but they are neither systematic nor general.
+After the clan was organized on a provincial basis throughout the
+provinces, the various provincial organizations could be gathered together
+in a national clan organization.
+
+It is only when one contemplates the strength of the family system in
+China that the boldness of this plan becomes apparent. A series of vast
+national clan organizations would include practically every Chinese. Not
+content with this, Sun proposed inter-clan organizations, certain clans
+being more related to one another. A further series of national inter-clan
+organizations would draw together the allegiance of numberless
+individuals. There was always the possibility that a convention of all the
+clans might be called--although Sun was not sanguine about this last.(294)
+
+This methodology, according to Sun Yat-sen, would automatically bring
+about nationalism. The Chinese people were already vigorously attached to
+their families and clans. A union of all the families and clans would lead
+the Chinese to realize that they were one people--one enormous family, as
+it were--and cause them to join together as a nation. Since there are only
+about four hundred surnames in China, the alliance of the clans was not so
+far-fetched a suggestion as it might seem. Some clans have a membership
+running into the millions, and clan spirit is so great that, in spite of
+the absence of legislation, the Chinese marriage system is still largely
+exogamic on this clan basis.
+
+The suggestion of clan organization is relevant to Sun Yat-sen's
+democracy, in that the clan was one of the democratizing influences in old
+China. An individual who failed to exert appreciable pressure on the
+government, or on some other group, might appeal to his clan for
+assistance. The Chinese record of relationships was kept so extensively
+that there were few men of wealth or power who did not have their kinsmen
+commanding their assistance. The non-political authority of the family
+system controlled many things which have been within the scope of the
+police power in the West, and the adjustments of society and the
+individual were frequently mitigated in their harshness by the entrance of
+the clan upon the scene. A stable Chinese democracy with a clan system
+would be remarkably like the traditional system. The recourse of political
+democracy would have been added, but the familiar methods of political
+pressure upwards through the clan to the government might, not
+inconceivably, prove the more efficacious.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII. THE PROGRAMS OF _MIN SHENG_.
+
+
+
+
+The Three Programs of _Min Sheng_.
+
+
+The new ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as has been shown, demanded three
+fulfilments of the doctrine of _min sheng_: a nationalistic economic
+revolution, a deliberate industrial revolution, and a social revolution.
+The last was to be accomplished negatively rather than positively. It was
+to aim at the reconstruction of the Chinese economy in such a manner as to
+avoid the necessity of class war. Since Chinese society was to be
+revolutionized by the development of a nation and a state, with all that
+that implied, and was to be changed by a transition from a handicraft
+economy to an industrial one, Sun Yat-sen hoped that these changes would
+permit the social revolution to develop at the same time as the others,
+and did not plan for it separately and distinctly. The three revolutions,
+all of them economic, were to develop simultaneously, and all together
+were to form a third of the process of readjustment.
+
+In considering the actual plans for carrying out the _min sheng_
+principle, the student encounters difficulties. The general philosophical
+position of the _min sheng_ ideology in relation to the ideologies of
+nationalism and democracy, and in connection with such foreign
+philosophies as capitalism and Marxism, has already been set forth. The
+direct plans that Sun Yat-sen had for the industrial revolution in China
+are also clear, since he outlined them, laboriously although tentatively,
+in _The International Development of China_;(295) but whereas the ideology
+and the actual physical blueprints can be understood clearly enough, the
+general lines of practical governmental policy with regard to economic
+matters have not been formulated in such a way as to make them
+indisputable.
+
+Sun Yat-sen was averse to tying the hands of his followers and successors
+with respect to economic policy. He said: "While there are many
+undertakings which can be conducted by the State with advantage, others
+cannot be conducted effectively except under competition. I have no
+hard-and-fast dogma. Much must be left to the lessons of experience."(296)
+
+It would be inexpedient to go into details about railway lines and other
+modern industrial enterprises by means of which Sun sought to modernize
+China. On the other hand, it would be a waste of time merely to repeat the
+main economic theses of the new ideology. Accordingly, the examination of
+the program of _min sheng_ will be restricted to the consideration of
+those features that affected the state, either directly or indirectly, or
+which had an important bearing upon the proposed future social
+organization of the Chinese. Among the topics to be discussed are the
+political nature of the national economic revolution, the political effect
+of the industrial revolution upon the Chinese, and the expediency of Sun's
+plans for that revolution; the nature of the social revolution which was
+to accompany these two first, especially with reference to the problem of
+land, the problem of capital, and the problem of the class struggle; the
+sphere of state action in the new economy; and the nature of that ideal
+economy which would be realized when the Chinese should have carried to
+completion the programs of _min sheng_. Railway maps and other designs of
+Sun, which have proved such an inspiration in the modernization of China
+and which represent a pioneer attempt in state planning, will have to be
+left to the consideration of the economists and the geographers.(297)
+
+The program of _min sheng_ was vitally important to the realization of the
+Nationalist revolution as a whole, so important, indeed, that Sun Yat-sen
+put it first in one of his plans:
+
+
+    The first step in reconstruction is to promote the economic
+    well-being of the people by providing for their four necessities
+    of life, namely, food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. For
+    this purpose, the Government will, with the people's co-operation,
+    develop agriculture to give the people an adequate food supply,
+    promote textile industries to solve their clothing problem,
+    institute gigantic housing schemes to provide for them decent
+    living quarters, and build roads and canals so that they may have
+    convenient means of travel.
+
+    Next is the promotion of democracy....
+
+    The third step is the development of nationalism....(298)
+
+
+The plans for realizing _min sheng_ were to be the most necessary and the
+most difficult. In the change from a world-society to a race-nation, the
+Chinese had their own social solidarity and the experience of the Western
+nations to guide them. There was little in the development of a nation
+that had not already been tried elsewhere. The only real obstacles were
+the ignorance of the people, in relation to the new social environment in
+which their whole society was involved, and the possibility of opposition
+from the politically oppressing powers.
+
+In the development of democracy the Chinese could rely in part upon the
+experience of the West. The Kuomintang could observe the machinery of
+democratic states in regular operation abroad. Although the new democracy
+of the five powers and the four rights was differed from the democratic
+methods of the West, still, as in mechanics, certain fundamental rules of
+political organization in its technical details could be relied upon. The
+Chinese people had a democratic background in the autonomy of the various
+extra-political units.
+
+In _min sheng_ neither the experience of the West nor the old Chinese
+background would be of much value. More than the other two principles and
+programs, _min sheng_ sought to alter the constitution and nature of
+Chinese society. Yet in _min sheng_ the Chinese were to be guided only
+negatively by Western experience. Into their society, passing through a
+great economic upheaval, they must introduce, by a trial-and-error method,
+the requirements for economic unity, efficiency, and justice.
+
+
+
+
+The National Economic Revolution.
+
+
+After the pitiable failure of the 1912 Republic, Sun Yat-sen began to
+place an especially heavy emphasis on the necessity of a national economic
+revolution which would carry on the achievements of the national political
+revolution. He placed an even greater stress upon the necessity of _min
+sheng_ in the revolutionary ideology, and became more and more clearly
+conscious of the danger imperialism constituted to the Chinese
+race-nation. He believed that, as the 1912 revolution had been created by
+the sword, the new economic revolution might be furthered by the pen, and
+with this in mind he wrote _The International Development of China_. At
+the time that he wrote this work, he seems to have been convinced of the
+fruitlessness of purely military effort, and the superior value of pacific
+economic organization.(299)
+
+This organization was to be effected through capital brought in from the
+outside. As it developed that capital would not come in, that instead of
+continuing the terrific pace of production which the World War had
+demanded, the nations returned to comparative laissez faire, and let their
+economies slump, Sun was persuaded that the whole revolution would have to
+be carried on by the Chinese themselves, with the possible help of the
+Communist Russians, and of Japan. He found the reorganized Kuomintang to
+be the instrument of this last revolution, both politically and
+democratically, and began to emphasize Chinese resistance to the outside,
+rather than appeal for help from the barbarian nations.
+
+It is this last attitude which one finds expressed in the acts of the last
+years of his life. The national revolution was to be made a reality by
+being intimately associated with the economic life and development of the
+country. The plans made for economic development should be pushed as far
+as possible without waiting for foreign help. The Chinese should use the
+instrument of the boycott as a sanction with which to give weight to their
+national policy.(300) They had to practise economic nationalism in order
+to rid themselves of the incubus of imperialism which was sucking the
+life-blood of their country. In this connection between nationalism and
+_min sheng_, the economic aspect of the nationalist program was to be the
+means, and the national aspect of the _min sheng_ program the consequence.
+Unless Chinese, both as members of a state and as individuals stirred by
+national sentiment, were moved to action against Western economic
+aggression, they might consider themselves already doomed.
+
+How did Sun propose to promote the national economic revolution,(301) as
+distinguished from the industrial revolution and the social revolution? He
+gave, in the first place, as earlier stated, the economic part of his
+theories a greater weight than they had hitherto enjoyed, and placed them
+first in his practical program. Secondly, he tended to associate the
+national political revolution more and more with the real seat of economic
+power: the working class. In this introduction of the working class into
+the labors for the fulfilment of _min sheng_ as a national economic
+revolution, he was doing two things. He was hoping to bring the standards
+of Chinese labor up to those of the West, and he was making use of the
+political power of labor in China as an added instrument of the national
+economic revolution.
+
+The Chinese nation could and should not continue, as a nation, on a scale
+of living lower than that of the Western nations. He urged the Chinese
+workers, as the class most affected, to fight for the economic advancement
+of themselves and of their nation. "Comrades, the people meeting here are
+all workers and represent a part of the nation. A great responsibility
+rests on Chinese labor, and if you are equal to the task, China will
+become a great nation and you a mighty working class."(302) The Chinese
+workers were performing not only a duty that they owed to themselves--they
+were also acting patriotically.
+
+In advancing the national economic revolution by advancing themselves,
+they could not afford to lose sight of the political part of the
+revolution. "Beyond the economic struggle for the shortening of the
+working day and the increase of wages, there are before you other much
+more important questions of a political character. For our political
+objectives you must follow the three principles and support the
+revolution."(303) The two parts of the revolution could not be separated
+from one another.
+
+Besides the economic part of the national revolution, there was another
+readjustment of which Sun did not often speak, because it was not an open
+problem which could be served by immediate political action. This was the
+problem of the transition of China from an autarchic to a trading economy.
+The old Chinese world had been self-sustaining, so self-sustaining that
+the Emperor Tao Kuang wrote to George III of England that he did not
+desire anything that the barbarians might have, but, out of the mercy and
+the bounty of his heart, would permit them to come to China in order to
+purchase the excellent things that the Chinese possessed in such
+abundance.(304) The impact of the West had had serious economic
+consequences,(305) and the Chinese were in the unpleasant position of
+having their old economic system disrupted without gaining the advantages
+of a nationally organized economy in return. They had the actual privilege
+of consuming a greater variety of goods than before, but this was offset
+by the fact that the presence of these goods threw their domestic markets
+and old native commercial system out of balance, without offering a
+correspondingly large potentiality of foreign export. Furthermore, the
+political position of the Western powers in China was such, as Sun Yat-sen
+complained, that trade was conducted on a somewhat inequitable basis.
+
+The consequences of a national economic revolution could not but be
+far-reaching. The political changes in the economic situation demanded by
+Sun Yat-sen in his program of economic nationalism--the return of tariff
+autonomy, the retrocession of the occupied concessions, etc.--would have a
+great positive and immediate effect; but there would be a long system of
+development, not to be so easily predicted or foreseen, which would
+inevitably appear as a result of Chinese nationhood. If China were to have
+a state strong enough to perform the economic functions which Sun wished
+to have imposed upon it, and were to take her place as one of the great
+importing and exporting nations of the world, it is obvious that a real
+economic revolution would have to be gone through.
+
+Here again the liberal-national character of Sun's ideology and programs
+with respect to relations with the West appears. The Fascist states of the
+present time exhibit a definite drift from free trade to autarchy. In
+China the change from an autarchic world-society to a trading nation
+constituted the reverse. Sun Yat-sen did not leave a large legacy of
+programs in this connection, but he foresaw the development and was much
+concerned about it.
+
+
+
+
+The Industrial Revolution.
+
+
+The program of industrial revolution was planned by Sun Yat-sen with great
+care. The same belief which led him to urge the social revolution also
+guided him in his plans for the industrial revolutionizing of the Chinese
+economy, namely, his belief that China could profit by the example of the
+West, that what the West had done wastefully and circuitously could be
+done by the Chinese deliberately and straightforwardly. He proposed that
+the change from the old economy to the new be according to a well thought
+out plan. "However, China must develop her industries by all means. Shall
+we follow the old path of western civilization? This old path resembles
+the sea route of Columbus' first trip to America. He set out from Europe
+by a southwesterly direction through the Canary Islands to San Salvador,
+in the Bahama group. But nowadays navigators take a different direction to
+America and find that the destination can be reached by a distance many
+times shorter. The path of Western civilization was an unknown one and
+those who went before groped in the dark as Columbus did on his first
+voyage to America. As a late comer, China can greatly profit in covering
+the space by following the direction already charted by western
+pioneers."(306) By calling in the help of friends who were familiar with
+engineering and by using his own very extensive knowledge of Chinese
+economic potentialities, Sun Yat-sen drafted a broad long-range plan by
+means of which China would be able to set forth on such a charted course
+in her industrial revolution. This plan, offered tentatively, was called
+_The International Development of China_ in the English and _The Outline
+of Material Reconstruction_ in the Chinese version, both of which Sun
+himself wrote.
+
+This outline was originally prepared as a vast plan which could be
+financed by the great powers, who would thereby find markets for their
+glut of goods left over by the war. The loan was to be made on terms not
+unprofitable to the financial powers, but nevertheless equitable to the
+Chinese. Sun Yat-sen hoped that with these funds the Chinese state could
+make a venture into state socialism. It was possible, in his opinion, to
+launch a cooeperative modern economy in China with the assistance of
+international capitalism, if the capital employed were to be remunerated
+with attractive rates of interest, and if the plan were so designed as to
+allow for its being financially worthwhile. He stated:
+
+
+    Before entering into the details of this International development
+    scheme four principles have to be considered:
+
+       1. The most remunerative field must be selected in order to
+          attract foreign capital.
+       2. The most urgent needs of the nation must be met.
+       3. The lines of least resistance must be followed.
+       4. The most suitable positions must be chosen.(307)
+
+
+He was not oblivious to the necessity of making each detail of his plan
+one which would not involve the tying-up of unproductive capital, and did
+not propose to use capital advanced for the purposes of the industrial
+revolution for the sake of military or political advantage.
+
+This may be shown in a concrete instance. He spoke of his Great
+Northeastern railway system as a scheme which might not seem economically
+attractive, and then pointed out that, as between a railway system running
+between densely-populated areas, the latter would be infinitely the more
+preferable. But, said he, "... a railway between a densely populated
+country and a sparsely settled country will pay far better than one that
+runs end to end in a densely populated land."(308)
+
+Even though he came to despair of having this scheme for the development
+of China carried out by international financial action, the expediency of
+his plans remained. He sought the fulfillment of this outline throughout
+his life; it has remained as a part of his legacy, challenging the Chinese
+people by the grandeur of its conception and the precision of its details.
+
+It is a work which cannot easily be summarized in a discussion of
+political doctrines. Fully comparable in grandeur to the Russian
+_Piatiletka_, it provides for a complete communication system including
+all types of transport, the development of great ports, colonization and
+reclamation projects, and the growth of vast industrial areas comparable
+to the Donbas or the Kuzbas. The plan, while sound as a whole and not
+inexpedient in detail, is not marked by that irregularity of proportion
+which marks planning under capitalism; although not as fully worked out as
+the later Russian projects, Sun's plan, in 1922, was considerably more
+advanced than any Russian plan of that time. Sun shared with Lenin a
+passionate conviction of the inevitable necessity of industrialization;
+but while Lenin saw in industrialism the strengthening of that
+revolutionary bulwark, the proletariat, Sun believed in industrialism as a
+benefit to the whole nation.
+
+This plan is the obvious fruit of Sun's advocacy of the adoption of the
+Western physical sciences. Here there is little trace of his ideological
+consistency with the old premises of Chinese society. He does not
+challenge them, but he does present a concrete plan which refers only
+incidentally to the political or the ideological. It is heavy with the
+details of industrial revolution. Sun Yat-sen's enthusiasm shows clearly
+through the pages of this work; he wrote it at a time when his health was
+still comparatively good, and when he was not harassed by the almost
+explosive dynamics of the situation such as that in which he delivered the
+sixteen lectures on the _San Min Chu I_. Here the practical aspects of his
+thinking show forth, his willingness to consider and debate, the profound
+and quiet enthusiasm for concrete projects which animated him and which
+was so infectious among his followers.
+
+It were, of course, unfeasable to attempt any detailed description and
+assessment of the plan.(309) The great amount of point by point
+elaboration worked over by Sun Yat-sen in order to make his plan appealing
+precludes the consideration of any one project in detail as a sample.
+Failing this, the magnitude of the plan may be gauged by a recapitulation
+of the chief points in each of his programs. It must be remembered,
+however, that each one of these subheads might necessitate hundreds of
+millions of dollars for execution, involving the building of several
+industrial cities or the reconstruction of a whole industry throughout the
+country. The printing industry, for example, not even mentioned in the
+general outline given below, was discussed as follows:
+
+
+    This industry provides man with intellectual food. It is a
+    necessity of modern society, without which mankind cannot
+    progress. All human activities are recorded, and all human
+    knowledge is stored in printing. It is a great factor of
+    civilization. The progress and civilization of different nations
+    of the world are measured largely by the quantity of printed
+    matter they turned out annually. China, though the nation that
+    invented printing, is very backward in the development of its
+    printing industry. In our international Development Scheme, the
+    printing industry must also be given a place. If China is
+    developed industrially according to the lines which I suggested,
+    the demand for printed matter will be exceedingly great. In order
+    to meet this demand efficiently, a system of large printing houses
+    must be established in all large cities in the country, to
+    undertake printing of all kinds, from newspapers to encyclopedia
+    [sic!]. The best modern books on various subjects in different
+    countries should be translated into Chinese and published in cheap
+    edition form for the general public in China. All the publishing
+    houses should be organized under one common management, so as to
+    secure the best economic results.
+
+    In order to make printed matter cheap, other subsidiary industries
+    must be developed at the same time. The most important of these is
+    the paper industry. At present all the paper used by newspapers in
+    China is imported. And the demand for paper is increasing every
+    day. China has plenty of raw materials for making paper, such as
+    the vast virgin forests of the northwestern part of the country,
+    and the wild reeds of the Yangtze and its neighboring swamps which
+    would furnish the best pulps. So, large plants for manufacturing
+    paper should be put up in suitable locations. Besides the paper
+    factories, ink factories, type foundries, printing machine
+    factories, etc., should be established under a central management
+    to produce everything that is needed in the printing
+    industry.(310)
+
+
+With this comment on printing as a small sample of the extent of each
+minor project in the plans, let us observe Sun's own summary:
+
+I.
+      The Development of a Communications System.
+
+      (a)
+            100,000 miles of Railways.
+      (b)
+            1,000,000 miles of Macadam Roads.
+      (c)
+            Improvement of Existing Canals.
+
+            (1)
+                  Hangchow-Tientsin Canals.
+            (2)
+                  Sikiang-Yangtze Canals.
+
+      (d)
+            Construction of New Canals.
+
+            (1)
+                  Liaoho-Sunghwakiang Canal.
+            (2)
+                  Others to be projected.
+
+      (e)
+            River Conservancy.
+
+            (1)
+                  To regulate the Embankments and Channel of the Yangtze
+                  River from Hankow to the Sea thus facilitating
+                  Ocean-going ships to reach that Port at all seasons.
+            (2)
+                  To regulate the Hoangho Embankments and Channel to
+                  prevent floods.
+            (3)
+                  To regulate the Sikiang.
+            (4)
+                  To regulate the Hwaiho.
+            (5)
+                  To regulate various other rivers.
+
+      (f)
+            The Construction of more Telegraph Lines and Telephones and
+            Wireless Systems all over the Country.
+
+II.
+      The Development of Commercial Harbors.
+
+      (a)
+            Three largest Ocean Ports with future capacity equalling New
+            York Harbor to be constructed in North, Central and South
+            China.
+      (b)
+            Various small Commercial and Fishing Harbors to be constructed
+            along the Coast.
+      (c)
+            Commercial Docks to be constructed along all navigable rivers.
+
+III.
+      Modern Cities with public utilities to be constructed in all Railway
+      Centers, Termini, and alongside Harbors.
+IV.
+      Water Power Development.
+V.
+      Iron and Steel Works and Cement Works on the largest scale in order
+      to supply the above needs.
+VI.
+      Mineral Development.
+VII.
+      Agricultural Development.
+VIII.
+      Irrigational Work on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang.
+IX.
+      Reforestation in Central and North China.
+X.
+      Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and
+      Thibet.(311)
+
+The industrial revolution is to _min sheng_ what the present program of
+socialist construction is to the Marxians of the Soviet Union, what
+prosperity is to American democracy. Without industrialization _min sheng_
+must remain an academic theory. Sun's program gives a definite physical
+gauge by means of which the success of his followers can be told, and the
+extent of China's progress estimated. It provides a material foundation to
+the social and political changes in China.
+
+The theory of Sun Yat-sen in connection with the continuation of the old
+system is a significant one. His political doctrines, both ideological and
+programmatic, are original and not without great meaning in the
+development of an adequate and just state system in modern China. But this
+work might have been done, although perhaps not as well, by other leaders.
+The significance of Sun in his own lifetime lay in his deliberate
+championing of the cause of industrial revolution as the _sine qua non_ of
+development in China. In the epoch of the first Republic he relinquished
+the Presidency in favor of Yuean Shih-k'ai in order to be able to devote
+his whole time to the advancement of the railway program of the Republic.
+In the years that he had to spend in exile, he constantly studied and
+preached the necessity of modernizing China. Of his slogan, "Modernization
+without Westernization!" modernization is the industrial revolution, and
+non-Westernization the rest of his programs and ideology. The unity of Sun
+Yat-sen's doctrines is apparent; they are inseparable; but if one part
+were to be plucked forth as his greatest contribution to the working
+politics of his own time, it might conceivably be his activities and plans
+for the industrial revolution.
+
+He spoke feelingly and bitterly of the miserable lives which the vast
+majority of his countrymen had to lead, of the expensiveness and
+insecurity of their material existences, of the vast, tragic waste of
+human effort in the form of man-power in a world where machine-power had
+rendered muscular work unnecessary. "This miserable condition among the
+Chinese proletariat [he apparently means the whole working class] is due
+to the non-development of the country, the crude methods of production,
+and the wastefulness of labor. The radical cure for all this is industrial
+development by foreign capital and experts for the benefit of the whole
+nation.... If foreign capital cannot be gotten, we will have to get at
+least their experts and inventors to make for us our own
+machinery...."(312) Howsoever the work was to be done, it had to be done.
+In bringing China into the modern world, in modernizing her economy, in
+assuring the justice of the new economy which was to emerge, Sun found the
+key in the physical advancement of China, in the building of vast railway
+systems, in creating ports "with future capacity equalling New York
+harbor," in re-making the whole face of Eastern Asia as a better home for
+his beloved race-nation.
+
+
+
+
+The Social Revolution.
+
+
+In considering the social revolution which was to form the third part of
+the program of _min sheng_, four questions appear, each requiring
+examination. It is in this field of Sun's programs that the terms of the
+Western ideology are most relevant, since the ideological distinctions to
+be found in old China as contrasted with the West do not apply so
+positively in problems that are to appear in a society which is to be
+industrially modern. Even in this, however, some of the old Chinese ideas
+may continue in use and give relevance to the terms with which Sun
+discusses the social revolution. Private property, that mysterious
+relation between an individual and certain goods and services, has been
+almost a fetish in the West; the Chinese, already subject to the
+collectivisms of the family, the village and the _hui_, does not have the
+deep attachment to this notion that Westerners--especially those who do
+have property--are apt to develop. Consequently, even though the discussion
+of Sun's programs with regard to distributive justice are remarkably like
+the discussions of the same problem to be found in the West, the
+possibility, at least, of certain minor though thoroughgoing differences
+must be allowed for, and not overlooked altogether. The four aspects to
+this problem which one may distinguish in Sun's program for _min sheng_
+are: what is to be the sphere of state action? what is to be the treatment
+accorded private ownership of land? what is to be the position of private
+capital? and, what of the class struggle?
+
+Sun Yat-sen said: "In modern civilization, the material essentials of life
+are five, namely: food, clothing, shelter, means of locomotion, and the
+printed page."(313) At other times he may have made slightly different
+arrangements of these fundamental necessities, but the essential content
+of the demands remained the same.
+
+Behind his demand for a program to carry out _min sheng_ there was the
+fundamental belief that a government which does not assure and promote the
+material welfare of the masses of its citizens does not deserve to exist.
+To him the problem of livelihood, the concrete aspect of _min sheng_, was
+one which had to be faced by every government, and was a means of judging
+the righteousness of a government. He could not tolerate a state which did
+not assure the people a fair subsistence. There was no political or
+ethical value higher than life itself. A government which did not see that
+its subjects were fed, sheltered, clothed, transported, and lettered to
+the degree which the economic level of its time permitted, was a
+government deserving of destruction. Sun Yat-sen was not a doctrinaire on
+the subject of classes; he would tolerate inequality, so long as it could
+be shown not to militate against the welfare of the people. He was
+completely intolerant of any government, Eastern or Western, which
+permitted its subjects to starve or to be degraded into a nightmare
+existence of semi-starvation. Whatever the means, this end of popular
+livelihood, of a reasonable minimum on the scale of living for each and
+every citizen, had to prevail above all others.(314)
+
+Within the limits of this supreme criterion, Sun Yat-sen left the
+government to its own choice in the matter of the sphere of state action.
+If the system of private initiative could develop more efficiently than
+could the government in certain fields, then leave those fields to private
+effort. If and when private initiative failed to meet rigid requirements
+to be established by the government it was not merely the privilege, it
+was the obligation of the government to intervene. Sun Yat-sen seems to
+have believed that government action would in the long run be desirable
+anyhow, but to have been enough of a political realist at the same time to
+be willing to allow the government a considerable length of time in
+expanding its activities. In a developing country like China it seemed to
+him probable that the ends of _ming sheng_ could best be served in many
+fields by private enterprise. "All matters that can be and are better
+carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which
+should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws...."(315)
+
+From the outset, Sun Yat-sen's plan of empirical collectivism demanded a
+fairly broad range of state action. "All matters that cannot be taken up
+by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should
+be taken up as national undertakings."(316) This view of his may be
+traced, among others, to three suppositions he entertained concerning
+Bismarck, concerning "war socialism," and concerning the industrial
+revolution in China. Sun shows a certain grudging admiration for Bismarck,
+whom he believed to have offset the rising tide of democratic socialism in
+Germany by introducing state socialism, in government control of
+railroads, etc. "By this preventive method he imperceptibly did away with
+the controversial issues, and since the people had no reason to fight, a
+social revolution was naturally averted. This was the very great
+anti-democratic move of Bismarck."(317) Secondly, he believed that the
+"... unification and nationalization of all the industries, which I might
+call the Second Industrial Revolution ..." on account of the world war
+would be even more significant than the first.(318) It intensified the
+four elements of recent economic progress, which tended to prove the
+falsity of the Marxian predictions of the future of capitalism, namely:
+"a. Social and industrial improvements (i. e. labor and welfare
+legislation); b. State ownership of the means of transportation and of
+communication; c. Direct taxes; d. Socialized distribution (the
+cooeperative movement)."(319) Finally, Sun believed that the magnitude of
+the Chinese industrial revolution was such that no private capital could
+establish its foundations, and that the state had perforce to initiate the
+great undertakings of industrialism.
+
+Concerning Sun's beliefs regarding the sphere of state action in economic
+matters, one may say that his ideology of empirical collectivism required
+a program calling for: 1) the protection of private enterprise and the
+simultaneous launching of great state enterprises at the beginning; 2) the
+intermediate pursuance of a policy by means of which the state would be
+the guarantor of the livelihood of the people, and establish the sphere of
+its own action according to whether or not private enterprise was
+sufficient to meet the needs of the people; and 3) a long range trend
+toward complete collectivism.
+
+With respect to the question of land, Sun Yat-sen believed in his own
+version of the "single tax," which was not, in his programs, the single
+tax, since he foresaw other sources of revenue for the state (tariffs,
+revenue from state enterprises, etc.). According to the land-control
+system of Sun Yat-sen the land-owner would himself assess the value of his
+land. He would be prevented from over-assessing it by his own desire to
+avoid paying too high a tax; and under-assessment would be avoided by a
+provision that the state could at any time purchase the land at the price
+set by the owner. If the land were to go up in value the owner would have
+to pay the difference between the amount which he formerly assessed and
+the amount which he believed it to be worth at the later time. The money
+so paid would become "... a public fund as a reward, to all those who had
+improved the community and who had advanced industry and commerce around
+the land. The proposal that all future increment shall be given to the
+community is the 'equalization of land ownership' advocated by the
+Kuomintang; it is the _Min-sheng_ Principle. This form of the _Min-sheng_
+Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang support
+the _San Min_ Principles they should not oppose communism." Continuing
+directly, Sun makes clear the nature of the empirical collectivism of his
+_min sheng_ program, which he calls communism. "The great aim of the
+Principle of Livelihood in our Three Principles is communism--a share in
+property by all. But the communism which we propose is a communism of the
+future, not of the present. This communism of the future is a very just
+proposal, and those who have had property in the past will not suffer at
+all by it. It is a very different thing from what is called in the West
+'nationalization of property,' confiscation for the government's use of
+private property which the people already possess."(320) Sun Yat-sen
+declared that the solution to the land problem would be half of the
+solution of the problem of _min sheng_.(321)
+
+Sun Yat-sen believed in the restriction of private capital in such a way
+as to assure its not becoming a socially disruptive force. That is a part
+of his ideology which we have already examined. In the matter of an actual
+program, he believed in the use of "harnessed capital."(322) He had no
+real fear of capital; imperialist foreign capital was one thing--the small
+native capital another. The former was a political enemy. The latter was
+not formidable. In a speech on Red Labor Day, 1924, when his sympathies
+were about as far Left as they ever were, in consideration for the
+kindliness of the Communist assistance to Canton, he said: "Chinese
+capitalists are not so strong that they could oppress the Chinese
+workers,"(323) and added that, the struggle being one with imperialism,
+the destruction of the Chinese capitalists would not solve the question.
+
+The restriction of private capital to the point of keeping it harmless,
+and thus avoiding the evils which would lead to the class war and a
+violent social revolution, was only half the story of capitalism in China
+which Sun Yat-sen wanted told in history. The other half was the
+advancement of the industrial revolution by the state, which was the only
+instrumentality capable of doing this great work. "China cannot be
+compared to foreign countries. It is not sufficient (for her) to impose
+restrictions upon capital. Foreign countries are rich, while China is
+poor.... For that reason China must not only restrict private capital, but
+she must also develop the capital of the State."(324) The restrictions to
+be placed upon private capital and upon private land speculation were
+negative; the development of state-owned capital and of capital which the
+state could trust politically were positive, as was the revenue which
+should be gained from the governmental seizure of unearned increment. In
+some cases the state would not even have to trouble itself to confiscate
+the unearned increment; it could itself develop the land and profit by its
+rise in value, applying the funds thus derived to the paying-off of
+foreign loans or some socially constructive enterprise.(325)
+
+Ideologically, Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the intra-national class war.
+Class war could, nevertheless, be justified in the programs of Sun in two
+ways: 1) if it were international class war, of the oppressed against the
+oppressing nations; and 2) if it were the class war of the nationalist
+Chinese workers against foreign imperialism. In these two cases Sun
+Yat-sen thought class-war a good idea. He did not think class war
+necessary in contemporary China, and hoped, by means of _min sheng_, to
+develop an economy so healthy that the pathological phenomena of the class
+struggle would never appear. On the other hand, in justice to Sun, and to
+those Marxians who would apologize for him to their fellow-Marxians, there
+can be little doubt that Sun Yat-sen would have approved of the class war,
+even in China, if he had thought that Chinese capitalism had risen to such
+power that it obstructed the way of the Chinese nation to freedom and
+economic health. Even in this he might not have set any particular virtue
+upon the proletariat as such; the capitalists would be the enemies of the
+nation, and it would be the whole nation which would have to dispose of
+them.
+
+A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun Yat-sen's programs
+for _min sheng_ is intellectually unremunerative, since it has been
+established that _min sheng_ may be called empirical collectivism;
+collectivism which is empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it
+loses its empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of
+historical materialism, and following the traditionally Chinese pragmatic
+way of thinking, could not orient his revolution in a world of economic
+predestinations. With the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather
+than on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China were ruled by
+the right sort of men, his programs would be carried through in accordance
+with the expediency of the moment. He does not appear to have considered,
+as do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary
+movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy persons. Even had he
+foreseen such a possible state of affairs, he would not, in all
+probability, have settled his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the
+most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it is in China to
+pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. The first Republic had
+taught him that.
+
+One must consequently regard the programs of national economic revolution,
+of industrial revolution, and of social revolution as tentative and
+general outlines of the course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang
+and state to follow in carrying out _min sheng_. Of these programs, the
+one least likely to be affected by political or personal changes was that
+of the industrial revolution, and it is this which is most detailed.(326)
+His great desire was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to
+subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so that it could
+restore the ancient morality and wisdom of China, as well as become
+proficient in the Western sciences.
+
+A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs of Sun Yat-sen,
+before consideration of the Utopia which lay at the end of the road of
+_min sheng_. His plans may continue to go on in _min sheng_ because they
+are so empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by the new
+situation in world politics. His optimism concerning the rapidity of
+democratic developments may not be justified by actual developments. The
+programs of _min sheng_ are so general that they can be followed to some
+degree by governments of almost any orientation along the Right-Left
+scale. The really important criterion in the programs of _min sheng_ is
+this: the people must live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a
+great force in the continued development of his programs, to the last
+stage of _min sheng_.
+
+
+
+
+The Utopia of _Min Sheng_.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen differs from the empirical collectivists of the West in that
+he has an end to his program, which is to be achieved over a considerable
+period of time. The means are such that he can be classified with those
+Western thinkers; his goal is one which he took from the ideals in the old
+ideology and which he identified with those of the communists, although
+not necessarily with the Marxists. He said, at the end of his second
+lecture on _min sheng_:
+
+
+    Our way is community of industrial and social profits. We cannot
+    say, then, that the doctrine of _min sheng_ is different from
+    communism. The _San Min Chu I_ means a government "of the people,
+    by the people, and for the people"--that is, the state is the
+    common property of all the people, its politics are participated
+    in by all, and its profits are shared by all. Then there will be
+    not only communism in property, but communism in everything else.
+    Such will be the ultimate end of _min sheng_, a state which
+    Confucius calls _ta t'ung_ or the age of "great similarity."(327)
+
+
+Perhaps no other passage from the works of Sun Yat-sen in relation to _min
+sheng_ could illustrate his position so aptly. He describes his doctrine.
+He labels it "communism," although, as we have seen, it is quite another
+thing than Marxism. He cites Lincoln. In the end he calls upon the
+authority of Confucius.
+
+To a Westerner, the ideal commonwealth of Sun Yat-sen bears a remarkable
+resemblance to the world projected in the ideals of the ancient Chinese.
+Here again there is "great similarity," complete ideological harmony, and
+the presumable disappearance of state and law. Property, the fount of war,
+has been set aside, and men--animated by a profound and sincere
+appreciation of _jen_--work together, all for the common good. The Chinese
+will, in this Utopia, have struck down _might_ from the high places of the
+world, and inaugurated an era of _the kingly way_ throughout the earth.
+Their ancient doctrines of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in
+bringing about cosmospolitanism.
+
+There are, however, differences from the old order of ideals. According to
+the Marxists, nationality, after it has served its purpose as an
+instrument in the long class struggle, may be set aside. Speculation of
+this sort is rare among them, however, and it is difficult to envision
+their final system. To Sun Yat-sen, however, there was the definite ideal
+that the Chinese live on forever. This was an obligation imposed upon him
+and his ideology by the teleological element in the old ideology which
+required that humanity be immortal in the flesh and that it be immortal
+through clearly traceable lines of descent. The individual was settled in
+a genealogical web, reaching through time and space, which gave him a
+sense of certainty that otherwise he might lack. This is inconsistent with
+the Marxian ideal, where the family system, a relic of brutal days, shall
+have vanished.
+
+The physical immortality of the Chinese race was not the only sort of
+immortality Sun Yat-sen wished China to have. His stress on the peculiar
+virtues of the Chinese intellectual culture has been noted. The Chinese
+literati had sought an immortality of integrity and intellect, a
+continuity of civilization without which mere physical survival might seem
+brutish. In the teleology of Sun's ideal society, there would no doubt be
+these two factors: filial piety, emphasizing the survival of the flesh;
+and _jen_, emphasizing the continuity of wisdom and honor. Neither could
+aptly continue unless China remained Chinese, unless the particular
+virtues of the Chinese were brought once again to their full potency.(328)
+
+The family system was to continue to the _min sheng_ Utopia. So too were
+the three natural orders of men. Sun Yat-sen never advocated that the
+false inequality of the present world be thrown down for the purpose of
+putting in its place a false equality which made no distinction between
+the geniuses, the apostles, and the unthinking. The Chinese world was to
+be Chinese to the end of time. In this the narrowness of Sun Yat-sen's
+ideals is apparent; it is, perhaps, a narrowness which limits his
+aspirations and gives them strength.
+
+The Chinese Utopia which was to be at the end of _min sheng_ was to be
+established in a world, moreover, which might not have made a complete
+return to ideological control, in which the state might still survive. The
+requirements of an industrial economy certainly presupposes an enormous
+length of time before the ideology and the society shall have been
+completely adjusted to the peculiarities of life in a world not only of
+working men but of working machines. The state must continue until all men
+are disciplined to labor: "When all these vagrants will be done away with
+and when all will contribute to production, then clothing will be abundant
+and food sufficient; families will enjoy prosperity, and individuals will
+be satisfied.
+
+"Then the question of the 'people's life' will be solved."(329)
+
+Thus Sun Yat-sen concluded his last lecture on _min sheng_.
+
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY.
+
+
+The bibliography of works in Western languages dealing with Sun Yat-sen is
+short. The author has made no attempt to gather various fugitive pieces,
+such as newspaper clippings. He believes, however, that the following
+bibliography of Western works on Sun is the most nearly complete which has
+yet appeared, and has listed, for the sake of completeness, two Russian
+items as yet unavailable in the United States.
+
+The first half of the bibliography presents these Western materials,
+arranged according to their subject. Within each category, the individual
+items are presented in chronological order; this has been done in order to
+make clear the position of the works in point of time of publication--a
+factor occasionally of some importance in the study of these materials.
+
+The second half of the bibliography lists further works which have been
+referred to or cited. The first group of these consists of a small
+collection of some of the more important Chinese editions of, and Chinese
+and Japanese treatises upon, Sun Yat-sen's writings. The second group
+represents various Western works on China or on political science which
+have been of assistance to the author in this study.
+
+Chinese names have been left in their natural order, with the patronymic
+first. Where Chinese names have been Westernized and inverted, they have
+been returned to their original Chinese order, but with a comma inserted
+to indicate the change.
+
+
+
+
+A. Major Sources on Sun Yat-sen Which are Available in Western Languages.
+
+
+
+I. Biographies of Sun Yat-sen.
+
+
+    Ponce, Mariano, _Sun Yat-sen, El fundador de la Republica de
+    China_, Manila, 1912.
+
+
+A popular biography. Valuable for the period just before 1912.
+
+
+    Cantlie, James and Sheridan-Jones, C., _Sun Yat-sen and the
+    Awakening of China_, New York, 1912.
+
+
+Also a popular work. Valuable for the description of Sun Yat-sen's
+education.
+
+
+    Linebarger, Paul (and Sun Yat-sen), _Sun Yat-sen and The Chinese
+    Republic_, New York, 1925.
+
+
+The only biography authorized by Sun Yat-sen, who wrote parts of it
+himself. A propaganda work, it presents the most complete record of Sun's
+early life. Does not go beyond 1922.
+
+
+    Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., _Sun' Iat-Sen--otets kitaiskoe
+    revoliutsii_, Moscow, 1925. The same, Moscow, 1926.
+
+
+Not available.
+
+
+    Lee, Edward Bing-shuey, _Dr. Sun Yat-sen, His Life and
+    Achievements_ (English and French), Nanking, n. d.
+
+
+A synopsis, by a spokesman for the Nationalist Party.
+
+
+    Wou, Saofong, _Sun Yat-sen, Sa Vie et Sa Doctrine_, Paris, 1929.
+
+
+An excellent outline, largely from Chinese sources.
+
+
+    Restarick, Henry Bond, _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China_, New
+    Haven, 1931.
+
+
+Useful for a description of Sun Yat-sen's life in Honolulu, and of some of
+his overseas connections.
+
+
+    ---- (R.-Ch. Duval, translator), _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator de la
+    Chine_, Paris, 1932.
+
+    de Morant, George Soulie, _Soun Iat-senn_, Paris, 1932.
+
+
+A romantic work based upon Chinese sources, and the Chinese translation of
+Linebarger's work.
+
+
+    Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor), _The Gospel of
+    Sun Chung-shan_, Paris, 1932.
+
+    Sharman, (Mrs.) Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning, A
+    Criticall Biography_, New York, 1934.
+
+
+The most complete biography of Sun Yat-sen. Well documented and prepared.
+Mrs. Sharman's work will remain authoritative for many years to come. Its
+main fault is its somewhat hyper-sensitive criticism of Sun Yat-sen's
+personality, with which the author never comes in contact.
+
+
+    Linebarger, Paul, _The Life of Sun Chung-san_, Shanghai, 1932.
+    Fragmentary proofsheets. See note in Preface.
+
+    Reissig, Paul, _Sun Yat Sen und die Kuomintang_, Berlin, n. d. A
+    Lutheran missionary tract.
+
+
+
+II. Translations of the Sixteen Lectures on the _San Min Chu I_.
+
+
+    Anonymous, _The Three Principles_, Shanghai 1927.
+
+
+Of no value.
+
+
+    Tsan Wan, _Die Drei Nationalen Grundlehren, Die Grundlehren von
+    dem Volkstum_, Berlin, 1927.
+
+
+A translation of the lectures on Nationalism; excellent as far as it goes.
+
+
+    d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J. (translator and editor); _Le Triple
+    Demisme de Suen Wen_, Shanghai, 1929.
+
+
+The only annotated translation. The style is simple and direct, and the
+notes accurate, for the most part, and informative. The uninitiated reader
+must make allowances for Father d'Elia's religious viewpoints. This is
+probably the most useful translation.
+
+
+    Price, Frank W. (translator), Chen, L. T. (editor); _San Min Chu
+    I, The Three Principles of the People_, Shanghai, 1930.
+
+
+The translation most widely known and quoted.
+
+
+    d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_,
+    Wuchang, 1931.
+
+
+A translation of the French version.
+
+
+    Hsue, Leonard Shihlien; _Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social
+    Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933.
+
+
+The most complete selection of the documents of Sun Yat-senism available
+in English. Dr. Hsue has assembled his materials remarkably well. His
+chapter "The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism" is the best of its kind in
+English.
+
+
+
+III. Other Translations of the Chinese Works of Sun Yat-sen.
+
+
+    Anonymous; _Zapiski kitaiskogo revoliutsionera_, Moscow, 1926.
+
+
+Not available.
+
+
+    ---- _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d.
+
+
+Not documented and apparently unreliable. English version of the above.
+
+
+    Wittfogel, Karl; _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen
+    Revolutionaers_, Vienna and Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927).
+
+
+The most complete Marxist critique, containing also an excellent short
+biography.
+
+
+    Tsan Wan; _30 Jahre Chinesische Revolution_, Berlin, 1927.
+
+
+An excellent translation of one of the short autobiographies of Sun
+Yat-sen.
+
+
+    Wei Yung (translator); _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wen Hsueeh She_,
+    Shanghai, 1931.
+
+
+Also referred to as _The Outline of Psychological Reconstruction_. It
+comprises a series of popular essays discussing the problems involved in
+modernization of the Chinese outlook, and presenting Sun Yat-sen's theory
+of knowledge versus action.
+
+
+
+IV. Works in English by Sun Yat-sen.
+
+
+    Sun Yat-sen; _Kidnapped in London_, Bristol, 1897.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen's first book in English. Expresses his Christian, modernist,
+anti-Manchu attitude of the time.
+
+
+    ---- _How China was Made a Republic_, Shanghai, 1919.
+
+
+A short autobiography of Sun Yat-sen; see note in Preface.
+
+
+    ---- _The International Development of China_, New York and London,
+    1929.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen's bold project for the industrialization of China. First
+proposed in 1919, the work calls for a cooerdinated effort of world
+capitalism and Chinese nationalism for the modernization of China. Also
+called the _Outline of Material Reconstruction_.
+
+
+
+V. Commentaries on the Principles of Sun Yat-sen.
+
+
+    Li Ti tsun; _The Politico-Economic Theories of Sun Yat-sen_.
+
+
+This work has not been published, but portions of it appeared in the
+_Chinese Students' Monthly_, XXIV, New York, 1928-1929, as follows: "The
+Life of Sun Yat-sen," no. 1, p. 14, November, 1928; "The Theoretical
+System of Dr. Sun Yat-sen," no. 2, p. 92, December 1928, and no. 3, p.
+130, January 1929; and "The Sunyatsenian Principle of Livelihood," no. 5,
+p. 219, March 1929. It is most regrettable that the whole work could not
+be published as a unit, for Li's work is extensive in scope and uses the
+major Chinese and foreign sources quite skilfully.
+
+
+    Tai Chi-tao (Richard Wilhelm, translator); _Die Geistigen
+    Grundlagen des Sunyatsenismus_, Berlin, 1931.
+
+
+An informative commentary on the ethical system of Sun Yat-sen. Tai
+Chi-tao is an eminent Party leader.
+
+
+    Antonov, K.: _Sun'iatsenizm i kitaiskaia revoliutsiia_, Moscow,
+    1931.
+
+
+Not available to the author.
+
+
+    William, Maurice; _Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism_, Baltimore, 1932.
+
+
+A presentation, by the author of _The Social Interpretation of History_,
+of the influence which that work had on Sun; useful only in this
+connection.
+
+
+    Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor); _Conversations
+    With Sun Yat-sen_, 1919-1922.
+
+
+For comment on this and the following manuscript, see Preface.
+
+
+    Linebarger, Paul; _A Commentary on the San Min Chu I_. Four
+    volumes, unpublished, 1933.
+
+    Tsui, Shu-Chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon
+    Sun Yat-sen's political Philosophy_, in _The Chinese Social and
+    Political Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934.
+
+
+A dissertation presented to Harvard University. Dr. Tsui covers the ground
+very thoroughly; his conclusions challenge the general belief that the
+Communists influenced Sun Yat-sen's philosophy. Ranks with the works of
+Tai Chi-tao, Hsue Shih-lien, and Father d'Elia as an aid to the
+understanding of the Three Principles.
+
+
+    Jair Hung: _Les Idees Economiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934.
+
+
+A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Toulouse, treating,
+chiefly, the programmatic parts of the principle of _min sheng_.
+
+
+    Tsiang Kuen; _Les origines economiques et politiques du socialisme
+    de Sun Yat Sen_, Paris, 1933.
+
+
+A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Paris, which deals with
+the institutional and historical background of min sheng.
+
+
+    Li Chao-wei; _La souverainete nationale d'apres la doctrine
+    politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934.
+
+
+A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Dijon, concerning the
+four popular powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum.
+
+
+
+
+B. Chinese Sources and Further Western Works Used as Auxiliary Sources.
+
+
+
+I. Chinese and Japanese Works by or Concerning Sun Yat-sen.
+
+
+    Anonymous; _Tsung-li Feng An Shih Lu (A True Record of the
+    Obsequies of the Leader)_, Nanking, n. d.
+
+    Bai-ko-nan (Mei Sung-nan); _San-min-shu-gi To Kai-kyu To-so (The
+    San Min Chu I and the Struggle between Capitalism and Labor)_,
+    Tokyo, 1929.
+
+    Chung Kung-jen; _San Min Chu I Li Lun Ti Lien Chiu (A Study of the
+    Theory of the San Min Chu I)_, Shanghai, 1931.
+
+    Huang Huan-wen; _Sun Wen Chu I Chen Ch'uean (The Real
+    Interpretation of the Principles of Sun Wen)_, Nanking, 1933.
+
+    Lin Pai-k'e (Linebarger, Paul M. W.), Hsue Chih-jen (translator);
+    _Sun I-hsien Chuean Chi (The Life of Sun Yat-sen)_, 4th ed.,
+    Shanghai, 1927.
+
+
+The Chinese translator has appended an excellent chronology of Sun's life.
+
+
+    Sun Fu-hao; _San Min Chu I Piao Chieh (An Elementary Explanation
+    of the Sun Min Chu I)_, Shanghai, 1933.
+
+    Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, ed.; _Tsung-li Ch'uean Chi (The Complete
+    Works of the Leader)_, 4 vol. in 1; 2nd ed., Shanghai, 1930.
+
+
+The best collection, but by no means complete.
+
+
+    Sun Yat-sen; _Sun Chung-shan Yen Chiang Chi (A Collection of the
+    Lectures of Sun Chung-shan)_, 3rd ed., Shanghai, 1927.
+
+    Sun Yat-sen; _Tsung-li Yue Mo (The Posthumous Papers of the
+    Leader)_, Nanking, n. d.
+
+    Teng Hsi; _Chung Shan Jen Sheng Shih Hsia Tan Yuean, (An Inquiry
+    into the Origin of Chung Shan's Philosophy of Life)_, Shanghai,
+    1933.
+
+    Tsao Ke-jen; _Sun Chung Shan Hsien-sheng Ching Chi Hsueeh She (The
+    Economic Theory of Mr. Sun Chung-shan)_, Nanking, 1935.
+
+
+
+II. Works on China or the Revolution.
+
+
+    Amann, Gustav; _Sun Yatsens Vermaechtnis_, Berlin, 1928.
+
+    Bland, J. O. and Backhouse, E.; _China Under the Empress Dowager_,
+    Philadelphia, 1910.
+
+    Beresford, Lord Charles; _The Break-up of China_, London, 1899.
+
+    Bonnard, Abel; _En Chine (1920-1921)_, Paris, 1924.
+
+    Burgess, J. S.; _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928.
+
+    Buxton, L. H. Dudley; _China, The Land and the People_, Oxford,
+    1929.
+
+    Chen Tsung-hsi, Wang An-tsiang, and Wang I-ting; _General Chiang
+    Kai-shek: The Builder of New China_, Shanghai, 1929.
+
+    _Chinese Social and Political Science Review, The_, Peking
+    (Peiping), 1916-. The foremost journal of its kind in the Far
+    East.
+
+    _China Today_, New York, 1934-. Communist Monthly.
+
+    _China Weekly Review, The_, Shanghai, 1917-.
+
+    The leading English-language weekly in China, Liberal in outlook.
+
+    _China Year Book, The_, Shanghai, 1919-?
+
+
+A necessary reference work for government personnel, trade statistics, and
+chronology. Perhaps inferior to the corresponding volumes in other
+countries.
+
+
+    Close, Upton, _pseud._ (Hall, Josef Washington); _Challenge:
+    Behind the Face of Japan_, New York, 1934.
+
+    ----; _Eminent Asians_, New York, 1929.
+
+    Coker, Francis; _Recent Political Thought_, New York, 1934.
+
+    Creel, H. G.; Sinism, _A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese
+    World-view_, Chicago, 1929.
+
+    Cressey, George Babcock; _China's Geographic Foundations_, New
+    York, 1934.
+
+    de Groot, J. J. M.; _Religion in China_, New York and London,
+    1912.
+
+    Djang, Chu (Chang Tso); _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins
+    University doctoral dissertation, 1935.
+
+    Douglas, Sir Robert K.; _Europe and the Far East 1506-1912_, New
+    York, 1913.
+
+    Ellis, Henry; _Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to
+    China..._, Philadelphia, 1818.
+
+    _Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences_, New York, 1930-.
+
+
+Articles on "Kuomintang" and "Sun Yat-sen."
+
+
+    Erdberg, Oskar; _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932.
+
+    Erkes, Eduard; _Chinesische Literatur_, Breslau, 1922.
+
+    Foreign Office of Japan, The (?); _The Present Condition of
+    China_, Tokyo (?), 1932.
+
+
+No author nor place of publication is given in this work, which presents a
+description of those features of Chinese political and economic life that
+might be construed as excusing Japanese intervention.
+
+
+    _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, The, New York,
+    1934.
+
+    Goodnow, Frank Johnson; _China: An Analysis_, Baltimore, 1926.
+
+    Granet, Marcel; _Chinese Civilization_, New York, 1930.
+
+    Harvey, E. D.; _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933.
+
+    Holcombe, Arthur N.; _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge
+    (Massachusetts), 1930.
+
+    ----; _The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution_, New York, 1930.
+
+    Hsia Ching-lin; Chow, James L. E.; and Chang, Yukon (translators);
+    _The Civil Code of The Republic of China_, Shanghai, 1930.
+
+    Hsieh, Pao Chao; _The Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore,
+    1925.
+
+    Hsue, Leonard Shih-lien; _The Political Philosophy of
+    Confucianism_, New York, 1932.
+
+    Hsue, Pao-chien; _Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian Thought_,
+    Dissertation, Columbia University, n. d.
+
+
+Suggests the position of Sun Yat-sen in the history of Chinese philosophy.
+
+
+    Hu Shih; and Lin Yu-tang; _China's Own Critics_, Peiping, 1931.
+
+    Isaacs, Harold (editor); _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_,
+    Shanghai, 1931.
+
+    Johnston, Reginald; _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, London,
+    1934.
+
+    Koo, V. K. Wellington; _Memoranda Presented to the Lytton
+    Commission_, New York, n. d.
+
+    Kotenev, Anatol M.; _New Lamps for Old_, Shanghai, 1931.
+
+    Kulp, D. H.; _Family Life in South China: The Sociology of
+    Familism_, New York, 1925.
+
+    Latourette, Kenneth; _The Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New
+    York, 1934.
+
+    Lea, Homer; _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909.
+
+    Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; _History of Chinese Political Thought_, New York
+    and London, 1930.
+
+    Li Chi; _The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge
+    (Massachusetts), 1928.
+
+    Lin Yutang; _My Country and My People_, New York, 1936.
+
+    Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth; _Deutschlands Gegenwaertige
+    Gelegenheiten in China_, Brussels, 1936.
+
+    Lou Kan-jou; _Histoire Sociale de l'Epoque Tcheou_, Paris, 1935.
+
+    MacNair, Harley Farnsworth; _China in Revolution_, Chicago, 1931.
+
+    ----; _Modern Chinese History--Selected Readings_, Shanghai, 1923.
+
+    Maenchen-Helfen, Otto; _China_, Dresden, 1931.
+
+    Maybon, Albert; _La Politique Chinoise_, Paris, 1908.
+
+
+Sun Yat-sen presented a copy of this book to Judge Linebarger, and
+enthusiastically recommended it.
+
+
+    Maybon, Albert; _La Republique Chinoise_, Paris, 1914.
+
+    Mayers, William Frederick; _The Chinese Government, A Manual of
+    Chinese Titles, Categorically Explained and Arranged, with an
+    Appendix_, Shanghai, 1897.
+
+    McGovern, William Montgomery; _Modern Japan, Its Political,
+    Military, and Industrial Organization_, London, 1920.
+
+    Myron, Paul, pseud. (Linebarger, Paul M. W.); _Our Chinese Chances
+    Through Europe's War_, Chicago, 1915.
+
+    Meadows, Thomas Taylor; _The Chinese and Their Rebellions_,
+    London, 1856.
+
+
+One of the permanently outstanding books on China; dealing primarily with
+the T'ai P'ing rebellion, it presents an extraordinarily keen analysis of
+the politics of the old Chinese social system.
+
+
+    Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A.; _The Meaning of Meaning_, New
+    York and London, 1927.
+
+
+It is largely upon this work that the present author has sought to base
+his technique of ideological analysis.
+
+
+    Peffer, Nathaniel; _The Collapse of a Civilization_, New York,
+    1930.
+
+    Price, Ernest Batson; _The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916
+    Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia_, Baltimore, 1933.
+
+
+Pages 1-13 present stimulating suggestions as to the nature of "China."
+
+
+    Reichwein, Adolf; _China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic
+    Contacts in the Eighteenth Century_, New York, 1925.
+
+    Roffe, Jean; _La Chine Nationaliste 1912-1930_, Paris, 1931.
+
+    Roy, Manabendra Nath; _Revolution und Konterrevolution in China_,
+    Berlin, 1930.
+
+    Ruffe, R. d'Auxion de; _Is China Mad?_ Shanghai, 1928.
+
+
+The author, violently hostile to Sun Yat-sen, presents some details of
+Sun's life not published elsewhere.
+
+
+    Smith, Arthur; _Village Life in China_, New York, 1899.
+
+    Sheean, Vincent; _Personal History_, New York, 1935.
+
+    Shryock, John Knight; _The Origin and Development of the State
+    Cult of Confucius_, New York, 1932.
+
+    Starr, Frederick; _Confucianism_, New York, 1930.
+
+    Stoddard, Lothrop; _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World
+    Supremacy_, New York, 1930.
+
+    T'ang Leang-li; _The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution_, New
+    York, 1930.
+
+    ----; _Wang ching-wei_, Peiping, 1931.
+
+    Tawney, Richard Henry; _Land and Labour in China_, London, 1932.
+
+    Thomas, Elbert Duncan; _Chinese Political Thought_, New York,
+    1927.
+
+    Treat, Payson J.; _The Far East_, New York and London, 1928.
+
+    Trotsky, Leon; _Problems of the Chinese Revolution_, New York,
+    1932.
+
+    Tyau Min-ch'ien T. Z.; _Two Years of Nationalist China_, Shanghai,
+    1930.
+
+    van Dorn, Harold Archer; _Twenty Years of The Chinese Republic_,
+    New York, 1932.
+
+    Vinacke, Harold Monk; _Modern Constitutional Development in
+    China_, Princeton, 1920.
+
+    Wang Ch'ing-wei et al.; _The Chinese National Revolution_,
+    Peiping, 1930.
+
+    Weale, E. L. Putnam, _pseud._ (Simpson, Bertram Lennox); _The
+    Vanished Empire_, London, 1926.
+
+    Weber, Max; _Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie_,
+    Tuebingen, 1922.
+
+    Wieger, Leon, S. J.; _Chine Moderne_, 10 volumes, Hsien-hsien,
+    1921-32.
+
+
+An enormous scrapbook of translations from the Chinese illustrating
+political and religious trends. Catholic point of view.
+
+
+    ----; _Textes Historiques: Histoire Politique de la Chine_,
+    Hsien-hsien, 1929.
+
+    ---- and Davrout, L., S. J.; _Chinese Characters_, Hsien-hsien,
+    1927.
+
+    Wilhelm, Richard (Danton, G. H. and Danton, A. P., translators);
+    _Confucius and Confucianism_, New York, 1931.
+
+    ----; _Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie_, Breslau, 1929.
+
+    ----; _Ostasien, Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises_,
+    Potsdam and Zuerich, 1928.
+
+
+Perhaps the best of all works introductory to Chinese civilization.
+
+
+    Williams, S. Wells; _The Middle Kingdom_, New York, 1895.
+
+    ----; _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language_, Tungchou,
+    1909.
+
+    Wu Ch'ao-ch'u, _The Nationalist Program for China_, New Haven,
+    1930.
+
+    Wu Kuo-cheng; _Ancient Chinese Political Theories_, Shanghai,
+    1928.
+
+    Ziah, C. F.; _Philosophie Politique de la Chine Ancienne (700-221
+    AV. J.-C.)_, Paris, 1934.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHINESE-ENGLISH GLOSSARY.
+
+
+The author has not sought to prepare a lexicon of modern Chinese political
+terms. He presents, however, a list of those Chinese words which have
+frequently been left untranslated in the text, together with the
+ideographs by which they are written in China, and brief definitions.
+Variant meanings, however significant, have been omitted. Peculiar
+definitions, to be found only in the present work, have been enclosed in
+brackets. To locate the phrases, and discussions of them, consult the
+index.
+
+      {~UNKNOWN~}  _cheng_; right; rectified
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _chu_; used as a compound with _i_, below, to make _chu-i_:
+      principle, -ism
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _ch'uean_; power
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _hui_; society; guild
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _hsien_; district (a political subdivision)
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _i_; propriety
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _jen_; humanity; fellow-feeling; benevolence, etc. [consciousness
+      of social orientation]
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _li_; rites; ceremonies [ideological conformity]
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _min_; people; _Volk_
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _ming_; name [terminology, or, a part of ideology]
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _neng_; capacity
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _pa_; violence; violent; tyrant; tyrannous
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _san_; three
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _sheng_;  life; regeneration; livelihood
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _ta_; great
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _tao_; path; way; principle
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _teh_; virtue
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _tsu_; unity; kinship
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _t'ung_; harmony; concord
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _wang_; king; kingly
+      {~UNKNOWN~} _yueeh_; rhythm
+
+
+
+
+
+INDEX.
+
+
+PROPER NAMES AND SPECIAL TERMS
+
+America (_see also_ United States), 62, 220
+
+American Indians, 124
+
+Anglo-Saxons, 62
+
+Annam, 127
+
+Austria, 62
+
+Beresford, Lord Charles, 187
+
+Bismarck, 254 ff.
+
+Bolsheviks (_see_ Russians, Marxian philosophy)
+
+Borodin, 5, 7, 161
+
+Boxer Rebellion, 78
+
+British Empire, 71, 199
+
+Burgess, J. S., 41..
+
+Cantlie, Sir James, 84
+
+Canton, 7, 66, 126, 233
+
+Catherine I of Russia, 243
+
+Catholic Church, 54n., 122
+
+Chang Tso (Djang Chu), 186n.
+
+Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, 6
+
+Chen, Eugene, 159n.
+
+Cheng, state of, 27
+
+_cheng ming_, 31ff., 83ff., 104, 114, 210
+
+_ch'i_, 110
+
+Chiang Chieh-shih (Chiang Kai-shek), 102n., 158n., 163n., 206
+
+_Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (see _The Program of National Reconstruction_)
+
+_Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (see _see The Outline of National Reconstruction_)
+
+Ch'ien Lung, the Emperor, 168
+
+Ch'in dynasty, 47
+
+Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, the, 26n., 37
+
+Chinese Eastern Railway, the, 201
+
+Ch'ing dynasty (_see_ Manchu dynasty)
+
+Chou dynasty, 25, 28
+
+Christianity, 49, 67, 133n., 155n.
+
+_ch'uean_, 107ff., 141, 218
+
+_chun ch'uean_, 100n.
+
+Chung Hua, The Republic of, 190
+
+Cohen, Morris, 8n.
+
+Coker, Francis W., 147ff.
+
+Communists, 10, 64ff., 66, 106, 122, 160, 161, 163ff., 189, 205, 246ff.
+
+Confucianism, 23ff., 60, 66ff., 82ff., 90ff., 106, 109, 113ff., 210
+
+Confucius (K'ung Ch'iu), 25ff., 60, 76, 97, 105, 261
+
+Creel, H. G., 23n.
+
+Cressey, George B., 127n.
+
+Davrout, L., 32n.
+
+d'Elia, Paschal M., 4n.
+
+Donbas region, 246
+
+Douglas, Sir Robert K., 243n.
+
+Dutch, the, 44n.
+
+Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, the, 131
+
+England, 62, 150n., 188
+
+Erdberg, Oskar, 161n.
+
+Fascism, 54, 146ff., 244
+
+Ford, Henry, 132
+
+_Four Books, The_, 75
+
+France, 188
+
+Gandhi, M. K., 156n., 180
+
+Genro, the, 131
+
+George III of England, 243
+
+George, Henry, 72, 136ff., 144, 256
+
+Germany, 62, 100, 196, 254ff.
+
+Goodnow, Frank J., 97
+
+Granet, Marcel, 23n.
+
+Great Britain (_see_ British Empire, England)
+
+_Great Learning, The_, 74
+
+Greeks, the, 133
+
+Hai Ching Kung, the, 44n.
+
+Hamilton, Alexander, 77
+
+Han Fei-tzu, 29, 93
+
+Harvey, E. D., 154n.
+
+Hawaii, 61n.
+
+Hitler, Adolf, 56
+
+Holcombe, Arthur N., 11n.
+
+Hongkong, 51n.
+
+Honolulu, 126
+
+_hou chih hou chou_, the, 105
+
+Hsieh, Pao-chao, 45n.
+
+_hsien_, 45, 211ff., 230ff.
+
+_hsien chih hsien chou_, the, 104, 106
+
+Hsin dynasty, 58
+
+Hsue, Leonard Shih-lien, 4n.
+
+Hu Han-min, 4n., 186
+
+_hui_, 38, 41, 95, 165
+
+Hulutao port, 260
+
+_hung fang_, 100n.
+
+Hung Hsiu-ch'uean, 58
+
+Hung Jair, 236n.
+
+"ideology," 18ff.
+
+India, 90, 181
+
+_International Development of China, The_, 4
+
+Isaacs, Harold, 161n.
+
+Japan, 28, 40, 47, 48, 51, 59, 63, 90, 170, 184, 188, 199ff., 240, 260
+
+_jen_, 14, 30ff., 72ff., 141, 142, 144ff., 154, 263
+
+Jen T'ai, 31n.
+
+Jews, the, 168
+
+Joffe, Adolf, 64
+
+Johnston, Sir Reginald, 119
+
+Kailan Mining Administration, The, 179
+
+K'ang Hsi, the Emperor, 168
+
+"Kang Teh" (_see_ P'u Yi)
+
+Koo, V. K. Wellington, 122n.
+
+Korea (Chosen), 48, 59, 70, 127, 200
+
+Kulp, D. H., 38n.
+
+Ku Hung-ming, 77
+
+K'ung family, 90
+
+Kung, H. H., 122n.
+
+Kuo Hsing-hua, 44n.
+
+Kuomintang, the, 104, 158ff., 205
+
+Kwangtung Province (_see_ Canton)
+
+Kuzbas region, 246
+
+Lao Tzu, 25
+
+Latins, the, 62
+
+Latourette, Kenneth Scott, 91n.
+
+Lea, Homer, 195
+
+Lee, Frank C., 122n.
+
+Legge translations, the, 23n., 75n.
+
+Lenin, V. I., 132, 230n., 247
+
+_li_, 31ff., 104, 115
+
+Li Chao-wei, 219n.
+
+Li Chi, 86n.
+
+Li Ti-tsun, 137n.
+
+Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 30, 31n.
+
+Lin Shen, President, 122n.
+
+Lincoln, Abraham, 262
+
+Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth, 8n., 84
+
+Lotus society, the, 41
+
+Lovejoy, Arthur O., 18n.
+
+Lynn, Jermyn Chi-hung, 221n.
+
+Macao, 49
+
+Machiavelli, Niccolo, 26
+
+"machine state," 54
+
+MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, 11n.
+
+Malaysia, 186
+
+Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, 22, 43, 44n., 47, 58ff., 96, 111, 119, 124, 131,
+159ff., 167ff., 172ff., 182, 190, 227
+
+"Manchukuo" ("Manchoukuo"), 71
+
+Manchuria, 2, 51, 201, 205, 260
+
+Mandarins, 104ff.
+
+_Manifesto_ of the first Party congress, 4
+
+Mannheim, Karl, 18n.
+
+Marx, Karl, 72n., 163
+
+Marxian philosophy, 14ff., 52, 55, 70, 72, 81n., 106, 125, 134n., 137ff.,
+144, 192ff., 209ff., 236, 257ff.
+
+Marxism-Leninism, 81, 136, 182, 189, 192ff.
+
+Mayers, William Frederick, 45n.
+
+Meiji Emperor, the, 82, 131
+
+Mencius (Meng Tzu), 76, 93, 97
+
+Miao tribes, 168
+
+Mill, John Stuart, 98n.
+
+Millar, John, 98
+
+_min_, 217
+
+_min ch'uean_, 99, 100n., 209ff.
+
+_Min Ch'uean Ts'u Pu_ (see _The Primer of Democracy_)
+
+_min sheng_, 12, 101, 121, 122ff., 141, 180, 193, 236ff.
+
+_min tsu_, 36, 99, 120
+
+Ming dynasty, 96, 124
+
+Ming T'ai Tsung, the Emperor, 124
+
+Mo Ti, 93
+
+Mohammedans, 190
+
+Mongol (Yuean) dynasty, 47
+
+Mongolia, 2, 87, 190
+
+Montesquieu, Charles de S., Baron, 112, 221
+
+Mussolini, Benito, 56
+
+National Government of China, The, 3
+
+_neng_, 107ff., 141, 218
+
+New Deal, the, 238n.
+
+New Life Movement, the, 102n.
+
+_Outline of National Reconstruction, The_, 4
+
+_pa tao_, 71, 200
+
+Pan-Asia, 197ff.
+
+Pareto, Vilfredo, 15ff.
+
+Peffer, Nathaniel, 10n.
+
+Peru, 165
+
+Philippines, 186, 187n., 200
+
+_Philosophy of Sun Wen, The_ (see _Sun Wen Hsueeh She_)
+
+Piatiletka (The Five-Year Plan), 132, 238n., 246
+
+Plato, 79
+
+Poland, 168
+
+_Political Testament, The_, 2
+
+Ponce, Mariano, 97
+
+Portuguese, the, 49
+
+Presidency of ancient states, the, 28
+
+Price, Frank W., 4n.
+
+_Primer of Democracy, The_, 4
+
+_Program of National Reconstruction, The_, 4
+
+_pu chih pu chou_, the, 105
+
+P'u Yi, 119n.
+
+Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 91
+
+Rea, George Bronson, 183
+
+Reichwein, Adolf, 50n.
+
+_Republic, The_, 79
+
+Rome, 215
+
+Roy, Manabendra Nath, 52n.
+
+Russians (_see also_ Soviet Union), 49, 51, 100, 103n., 137, 194ff., 240
+
+_San Min Chu I_, 4ff.
+
+Sharman, Lyon, 1n.
+
+Sheean, Vincent, 161n.
+
+_shen ch'uean_, 100n.
+
+_Shih Yeh Chi Hua_, 4
+
+Shryock, John K., 36n.
+
+Shun, the Emperor, 97, 168
+
+Siam, 187
+
+Smith, Adam, 237
+
+Smith, Arthur, 40n.
+
+South Manchuria Railway, The, 179
+
+Soviets in China, 2, 212
+
+Soviet Union (U. S. S. R.), 64, 147, 155n., 184ff., 189, 199, 201
+
+Spring and Autumn Period, 27
+
+Stalin, Joseph, 56, 158n.
+
+Starr, Frederick, 23n.
+
+Stoddard, Lothrop, 197
+
+Sun-Joffe Manifesto, The, 64
+
+_Sun Wen Hsueeh She_, 4
+
+Sun Yat-sen, Mme. (nee Soong Ching-ling), 122n., 158n., 159n., 253n.
+
+Sung Chiao-jen, 138
+
+Sung dynasty, 58
+
+_ta chia_, 141
+
+_ta t'ung_, 120, 210, 261
+
+Tagore, Sir Rabindranath, 132, 156n.
+
+Tai Chi-tao, 69
+
+Tai-p'ing Rebellion, the, 50, 58, 172
+
+Taiwan (Formosa), 44n., 51n.
+
+T'ang Liang-li (T'ang Leang-li), 5n., 56n.
+
+_tang pu_, 164
+
+Taoism, 25
+
+Tao Kuang, the Emperor, 243
+
+Tawney, R. H., 45n.
+
+_teh_ (_te_), 31ff.
+
+Thomas, Elbert Duncan, 25n.
+
+Tibet, 2, 190
+
+Triad Society, the, 41
+
+_Triple Demism, The_ (see _San Min Chu I_)
+
+_Ts'an Yi Yuean_, the, 228
+
+Tsao Kun, 119n.
+
+Tsiang Kuen, 236n.
+
+Tsinanfu, 205
+
+Tsui Shu-chin 10n.
+
+_Tsung Li_, 162
+
+Tung Meng Hui, 136ff.
+
+Turkey, 199, 201
+
+Tyau, Minch'ien T. Z., 5n.
+
+United States of America, The, 79, 97, 112, 130, 187n., 188, 199, 205
+
+Versailles Conference, the, 190
+
+Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., 4n.
+
+Vinacke, Harold Monk, 227n.
+
+Vladislavich, 243
+
+Wang An-shih, 58
+
+Wang Ch'ing-wei, 5, 164, 206
+
+Wang Mang, 58
+
+_wang tao_, 71
+
+Wang Yang-ming, 80n., 84
+
+Warring States, the Age of, 27
+
+Washington Conference, the, 188
+
+Weale, Putnam (B. L. Simpson), 50, 225
+
+Weber, Max, 15
+
+Wei Yung, 4n.
+
+Wen Wang, the, 168
+
+Wieger, Leon, 32n.
+
+Wilhelm, Richard, 23n., 68
+
+William, Maurice, 10, 72, 142ff.
+
+Williams, S. Wells, 44, 122n.
+
+Wilson, Woodrow, 6, 190
+
+Wittfogel, Karl, 4n.
+
+Wou Saofong, 111n.
+
+Wu Pei-fu, 222n.
+
+Yangtze river (the _Ch'ang Chiang_), 100
+
+Yao, the Emperor, 76, 97, 219, 233
+
+Yellow river (the _Huang Ho_), 100
+
+Yen Shing Kung, the, 44n.
+
+_yi_ (_i_), 31ff.
+
+Yoshemitsu, the Ashikaga Shogun, 183
+
+Yuan, the Five, 224
+
+Yuean dynasty (_see_ Mongol dynasty)
+
+Yuean Shih-k'ai, 159, 166, 173, 183, 220, 251
+
+_yueeh_, 91ff.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+
+_    1 China Today_ (March, 1935), I, No. 6, p. 112. This is the leading
+      English-language journal of the Chinese Communists. Mme. Sun's
+      letter to the paper is characteristic of the attitude toward Nanking
+      adopted throughout the magazine.
+
+    2 These manuscripts consist of the following chief items: Linebarger,
+      Paul Myron Wentworth, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen 1919-1922_
+      (written in 1933-1935); the same, _A Commentary on the San Min Chu
+      I_ (four volumes, 1932-1933); and Sun Yat-sen, _How China Was Made a
+      Republic_ (Shanghai, 1919). These are all typescripts, with
+      autograph corrections by their respective authors. The manuscripts
+      of Judge Linebarger represent his attempts to replace, from memory,
+      books which were destroyed at the time of the bombardment of the
+      Commercial Press in Shanghai by the Japanese. He had prepared a
+      two-volume work on the life and principles of Sun Yat-sen and had
+      left his manuscripts and other papers in the vaults of the Press.
+      When the Press was bombed the manuscripts, documents, plates and
+      Chinese translations were all destroyed; the only things remaining
+      were a few pages of proof sheets for _The Life and Principles of Sun
+      Chung-san_, which remain in the possession of the present author.
+      Judge Linebarger attempted to replace these volumes. He had a few
+      notebooks in which he had kept the outlines of his own speeches; he
+      had not used these, because of the secondary value. When, however,
+      the major volumes were lost, he returned to these notebooks and
+      reconstructed his speeches. They were issued in Paris in 1932 under
+      the title of _The Gospel of Sun Chung-shan_. He also prepared the
+      _Commentary_ and the _Conversations_ from memory. These manuscripts
+      possess a certain somewhat questionable value. Judge Linebarger
+      himself suggested that they be allowed the same weight that
+      testimony, based upon memory but delivered under oath, upon a
+      subject ten years past would receive in a court of justice. The
+      seven volumes described are in the possession of the present author.
+      Other materials to which the author has had access are his father's
+      diaries and various other private papers; but since he has not cited
+      them for references, he does not believe any description of them
+      necessary. Finally, there are the manuscripts of _Sun Yat-sen and
+      the Chinese Republic_, which contain a considerable amount of
+      material deleted from the published version of that work, which
+      appeared in New York in 1925. For comments on other source material
+      for Sun Yat-sen which is not generally used, see Bibliography.
+
+    3 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning_, New York,
+      1934, p. 405.
+
+    4 He did this in his _Political Testament_, which is given in almost
+      every work on Sun Yat-sen or on modern Chinese politics. It was
+      written in February and signed in March 1925, shortly before his
+      death.
+
+    5 The Chinese text of these is given in Hu Han-min, _ed._, _Tsung-li
+      Ch'uean Chi_ (_The Complete Works of the Leader_), 4 vol. in 1,
+      Shanghai, 1930. This collection comprises the most important works
+      of Sun which were published in his lifetime. Edited by one of the
+      two scholars closest to Sun, it is the standard edition of his
+      works. English versions of varying amounts of this material are
+      given in Paschal M. d'Elia, _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_,
+      Wuchang, 1931; Frank W. Price, _San Min Chu I, The Three Principles
+      of the People_, Shanghai, 1930; and Leonard Shih-lien Hsue, _Sun
+      Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933. Each
+      of these works will henceforth be cited by the name of its editor;
+      for brief descriptions and appraisals, see the bibliography.
+
+    6 The only English version of this work is one prepared by Wei Yung,
+      under the title of _The Cult of Dr. Sun_, Shanghai, 1931. Fragments
+      of this work are also to be found in Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V.,
+      _Sun' Iat-sen, Otets Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii_, (_Sun Yat-sen, Father
+      of the Chinese Revolution_), Moscow, 1925; _Zapiski Kitaiskogo
+      Revoliutsionera_, (_Notes of a Chinese Revolutionary_), Moscow,
+      1926; _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d.; and
+      Karl Wittfogel, _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen
+      Revolutionaers_, Vienna & Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927).
+
+    7 This work has not been translated into any Western language.
+
+    8 Sun Yat-sen, _The International Development of China_, New York and
+      London, 1929.
+
+    9 This is given in Hsue, cited above, and in Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau,
+      _Two Years of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, pp. 439-442. Dr.
+      Tyau substitutes the word "Fundamentals" for "Outline," a rather
+      happy choice.
+
+   10 See bibliography for a complete list of the translations. d'Elia
+      translation, cited, pp. 36-49, dedicates a whole chapter to the
+      problem of an adequate translation of the Chinese phrase _San Min
+      Chu I_. He concludes that it can only be rendered by a nelogism
+      based upon Greek roots: _the triple demism_, "demism" including the
+      meaning of "principle concerning and for the people" and "popular
+      principle."
+
+   11 T'ang Leang-li, _The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution_, New
+      York, 1930, p. 166.
+
+   12 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 58.
+
+   13 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 58.
+
+   14 See Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning_, New York,
+      1934, p. 292, for a stimulating discussion of the parts that the
+      various documents played in the so-called "cult of Sun Yat-sen."
+
+   15 Sharman, cited, p. 270.
+
+   16 A typical instance of this sort of criticism is to be found in the
+      annotations to the anonymous translation of the _San Min Chu I_
+      which was published by a British newspaper in 1927 (_The Three
+      Principles_, Shanghai, 1927). The translator and annotator both
+      remained anonymous; the translation was wholly inadequate; and the
+      annotations a marvel of invective. Almost every page of the
+      translation was studded with notes pointing out and gloating over
+      the most trivial errors and inconsistencies. The inflamed opinion of
+      the time was not confined to the Chinese.
+
+   17 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Deutschlands Gegenwaertige Gelegenheiten in
+      China_, Brussels, 1936, p. 53. Judge Linebarger repeats the story
+      told him by General Morris Cohen, the Canadian who was Sun's
+      bodyguard throughout this period.
+
+   18 Nathaniel Peffer, _China: The Collapse of a Civilization_, New York,
+      1930, p. 155.
+
+   19 d'Elia, cited; Hsue, cited; and Wittfogel, cited.
+
+   20 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932;
+      and Tsui Shu-chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon
+      Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy_, in _The Social and Political
+      Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934; and other works
+      listed in bibliography, pp. 268-269.
+
+   21 Two such are the chapters on Sun Yat-sen's thought to be found in
+      Harley Farnsworth MacNair, _China in Revolution_, Chicago, 1931, pp.
+      78-91 (Chapter VI, "The Ideology and Plans of Sun Yat-sen") and
+      Arthur N. Holcombe, _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge
+      (Massachusetts), 1930, pp. 120-155 (Chapter V, "The Revolutionary
+      Politics of Sun Yat-sen"). The former is the shorter of the two, and
+      is a summary of the various documents involved. The distinction
+      between the ideology and the plans is so convenient and illuminating
+      that the present writer has adopted it. Except for the comments on
+      the influence of William upon Sun Yat-sen, it is completely
+      reliable. The latter is a discussion, rather than an outline, and
+      admirably presents the gist of Sun's thought.
+
+   22 Holcombe, cited, p. 136 ff.
+
+   23 The word "ideology" is one of the catchwords of the hour. The author
+      regrets having to use it, but dares not coin a neologism to replace
+      it. He does not desire that "ideology" be opposed to "truth," but
+      uses the word in its broadest possible sense, referring to the whole
+      socio-psychological conditioning of a group of people. He does not,
+      therefore, speak of ideologies as a collection of Paretian
+      derivations, fictions which mask some "truth." He considers his own
+      background--or Pareto's, for that matter--as ideological, and--in the
+      sense of the word here employed--cannot conceive of any human belief
+      or utterance _not_ ideological. The task he has set himself is the
+      transposition of a pattern of Chinese ideas concerning government
+      from the Chinese ideology to the Western-traditionalist ideology of
+      the twentieth century. Whether one, the other, neither, or both, is
+      "right," is quite beside the point, so far as the present enterprise
+      is concerned. In calling the whole non-physical background of a
+      society the ideology of that society, the author can excuse his
+      novel use of the term only if he admits that he establishes the new
+      meaning by definition, without any necessary reference to the
+      previous use of the term. He has no intention of following, in the
+      present work, any "theory of ideology" or definition of "ideology"
+      established by political philosophers, such as Marx, or sociologists
+      such as Weber, Mannheim, or Pareto. (Professor A. O. Lovejoy
+      suggested the following definition of the term, "ideology," after
+      having seen the way it was employed in this work: "_Ideology_ means
+      a complex of ideas, in part ethical, in part political, in part
+      often religious, which is current in a society, or which the
+      proponents of it desire to make current, as an effective means of
+      controlling behavior.")
+
+   24 Confucianism may be read in the Legge translations, a popular
+      abridged edition of which was issued in 1930 in Shanghai under the
+      title of _The Four Books_. Commentaries on Confucius which present
+      him in a well-rounded setting are Richard Wilhelm, _Confucius and
+      Confucianism_, New York, 1931; the same, _Ostasien, Werden und
+      Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises_, Potsdam, 1928, for a very
+      concise account and the celebrated _Geschichte der chinesischen
+      Kultur_, Munich, 1928, for a longer account in a complete historical
+      setting; Frederick Starr, _Confucianism_, New York, 1930; H. G.
+      Creel, _Sinism_, Chicago, 1929; and Marcel Granet, _La Civilization
+      Chinoise_, Paris, 1929. Bibliographies are found in several of these
+      works. They deal with Confucius either in his historical setting or
+      as the main object of study, and are under no necessity of
+      distorting Confucius' historical role for the purpose of showing his
+      connection with some other topic. The reader may gauge the amount of
+      distortion necessary when he imagines a work on Lenin, written for
+      the information and edification of Soviet Eskimos, which--for the
+      sake of clarity--was forced to summarize all Western thought, from
+      Plato and Jesus Christ down to Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, in a few
+      pages providing a background to Lenin.
+
+   25 There is a work on Confucianism upon which the author has leaned
+      quite heavily: Leonard Shih-lien Hsue, _The Political Philosophy of
+      Confucianism_, New York, 1932. Dr. Hsue is interested in sociological
+      political theory. The novelty of his work has aroused a great amount
+      of criticism among Chinese scholars of the older disciplines,
+      whether the relatively conservative and established Western
+      disciplines or the ultra-conservative schools of the truly classical
+      literati. His work cannot be recommended for any purposes other than
+      those which Dr. Hsue himself had in mind; there are several other
+      works, the product of philosophers, historians, and literary
+      historians, which will present a portrait of Confucius and
+      Confucianism more conventionally exact. In its own narrow but
+      definite field Dr. Hsue's work is an impressive accomplishment; he
+      transposes the Confucian terms into those of the most advanced
+      schools of social thought. A reader not forewarned might suffer by
+      this, and read into Confucius an unwarranted modernity of outlook;
+      if, however, the up-to-dateness is recognized as Dr. Hsue's and not
+      Confucius', the work is valuable. It puts Confucius on common ground
+      with modern social theory, ground on which he does not belong, but
+      where his ideas are still relevant and interesting. The present
+      author follows Dr. Hsue in this transposition of Confucius, but begs
+      the reader to remember that this is one made for purposes of
+      comparison only, and not intended as valid for all purposes. (He
+      must acknowledge the stimulating criticism of Mr. Jan Tai, of the
+      Library of Congress, who made it clear that this distortion of
+      Confucius was one which could be excused only if it were
+      admitted.)--An interesting presentation of Confucius as transposed
+      into the older political theory, untouched by sociology, is to be
+      found in Senator Elbert Duncan Thomas, _Chinese Political Thought_,
+      New York, 1927.
+
+   26 Granet, _Chinese Civilization_, cited, p. 84. Granet's work, while
+      challenged by many sinologues as well as by anthropologists, is the
+      most brilliant portrayal of Chinese civilization to the time of Shih
+      Huang Ti. His interpretations make the language of the _Odes_
+      (collected by Confucius) intelligible, and clear up the somewhat
+      obscure transition from the oldest feudal society to the epoch of
+      the proto-nations and then to the inauguration of the world order.
+
+   27 Granet, cited, pp. 87-88.
+
+   28 Richard Wilhelm, _Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie_, Breslau,
+      1929, p. 19.
+
+   29 One could therefore say that membership in a society is determined
+      by the outlook of the individual concerned.
+
+   30 In modern Western political thought, this doctrine is most clearly
+      demonstrated in the Marxian thesis of the withering-away of the
+      state. The Marxists hold that, as the relics of the class struggle
+      are eliminated from the new society, and classlessness and uniform
+      indoctrination come to prevail, the necessity for a state--which
+      they, however, consider an instrument of class domination--will
+      decline and the state will atrophy and disappear.
+
+   31 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, _History of Chinese Political Thought during the
+      early Tsin Period_, translated by L. T. Chen, New York, 1930, p. 38.
+
+   32 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (cited, p. 48 and following) discusses these
+      points.--The author is indebted to Mr. Jen Tai for the explanation of
+      the relation of these various factors in the Confucian ideology.
+
+   33 Leon Wieger and L. Davrout, _Chinese Characters_, Hsien-hsien, 1927,
+      p. 6.
+
+   34 Hsue, cited above, chapter three, contains an excellent discussion of
+      the doctrine of rectification.
+
+   35 A stimulating discussion of the pragmatism of early Chinese thought
+      is to be found in Creel, cited.
+
+   36 It must be pointed out in this connection that Confucius advocated
+      an ideology which would not only be socially useful but
+      scientifically and morally exact. He did not consider, as have some
+      Western thinkers of the past century, that the ideology might be a
+      quite amoral instrument of control, and might contain deliberate or
+      unconscious deception. Hsue writes, in his _Confucianism_, cited, p.
+      93, of the various translations of the word _li_ into English: "The
+      word _li_ has no English equivalent. It has been erroneously
+      translated as 'rites' or 'propriety'. It has been suggested that the
+      term civilization is its nearest English equivalent; but
+      'civilization' is a broader term, without necessarily implying
+      ethical values, while _li_ is essentially a term implying such
+      values." _Li_ is civilized behavior; that is, behavior which is
+      civilized in being in conformance with the ideology and the values
+      it contains.
+
+   37 Hsue, cited, p. 103.
+
+   38 Confucius the individual was quite nationalistically devoted to his
+      native state of Lu, and, more philosophically, hostile to the
+      barbarians. Hsue, cited, p. 118.
+
+   39 John K. Shryock, _The Origin and Development of The State Cult of
+      Confucius_, New York, 1932, traces this growth with great clarity
+      and superlative scholarship. The work is invaluable as a means to
+      the understanding of the political and educational structure
+      commonly called "Confucian civilization."
+
+   40 This expansion took place in China in the reign of Ch'in Shih Huang
+      Ti, who used the state of Ch'in as an instrument by means of which
+      to destroy the multiple state-system and replace it with a powerful
+      unitary state for all China. He sought to wipe out the past, raising
+      the imperial office to a position of real power, and destroying the
+      whole feudal organization. He abolished tenantry and supplanted it
+      with a system of small freeholds. Although his immediate successors
+      did much to restore the forms and appearances of the past, his work
+      was not altogether undone. Himself hostile to Confucius, his actions
+      implemented the teachings to an enormous degree. See Granet, cited,
+      pp. 96-104.
+
+   41 D. H. Kulp, _Family Life in South China_, New York, 1925, p. xxiv.
+
+   42 H. G. Creel, cited, p. 10. Creole writes as follows of the
+      significance of the village: "The village life is very important,
+      for it appears to be the archetype from which the entire Chinese
+      conception of the world and even of the cosmos grew. The village
+      was, as has been said, small. It was based on agriculture. It was
+      apparently a community of a peaceful regularity and a social
+      solidarity beyond anything which we of the present can imagine."
+
+   43 Arthur Smith, one of the few Westerners to live in a Chinese village
+      for any length of years, wrote: "It is a noteworthy fact that the
+      government of China, while in theory more or less despotic, places
+      no practical restrictions upon the right of free assemblage by the
+      people for the consideration of their own affairs. The people of any
+      village can, if they choose, meet every day of the year. There is no
+      government censor present, and no restriction upon the liberty of
+      debate. The people can say what they like, and the local Magistrate
+      neither knows nor cares what is said.... But should insurrection
+      break out, these popular rights might be extinguished in a moment, a
+      fact of which all the people are perfectly well aware." _Village
+      Life in China_, New York, 1899, p. 228. This was written thirteen
+      years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty.
+
+   44 J. S. Burgess, _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928. This is
+      perhaps the best work on the subject of the guilds which has yet
+      appeared. The information was gathered by the students of the
+      author, who as a teacher had excellent facilities for developing
+      contacts. The students, as Chinese, were able to gather data from
+      the conservative guild leaders in a manner and to a degree that no
+      Westerner could have done. The classification here given is a
+      modification of Burgess'.
+
+   45 S. Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, New York, 1895, p. 405. Dr.
+      Williams, whose work is perhaps the most celebrated single work on
+      China in the English language, wrote as follows concerning the
+      nobility under the Ch'ing:
+
+      "The titular nobility of the Empire, as a whole, is a body whose
+      members are without power, land, wealth, office, or influence, in
+      virtue of their honors; some of them are more or less hereditary,
+      but the whole system has been so devised, and the designations so
+      conferred, as to tickle the vanity of those who receive them,
+      without granting them any real power. The titles are not derived
+      from landed estates, but the rank is simply designated in addition
+      to the name...." He also pointed out that, under the Ch'ing, the
+      only hereditary titles of any significance were _Yen Shing Kung_
+      (for the descendant of Confucius) and _Hai Ching Kung_ (for the
+      descendant of Kuo Hsing-hua, the formidable sea adventurer who drove
+      the Dutch out of Taiwan and made himself master of that island).
+
+   46 William Frederick Mayers, _The Chinese Government, A Manual of
+      Chinese Titles ..._, Shanghai, 1897, devotes one hundred and
+      ninety-five pages to the enumeration of the Ch'ing titles. His work,
+      intended to be used as an office manual for foreigners having
+      relations with Chinese officials, remains extremely useful as a
+      presentation of the administrative outline of the Chinese government
+      in its last days before the appearance of Sun Yat-sen and the
+      Kuomintang. Pao Chao Hsieh, _The Government of China (1644-1911)_,
+      Baltimore, 1925, is a more descriptive work dealing with the whole
+      administration of the Ch'ing dynasty. No work has as yet appeared in
+      the West, to the knowledge of the present author, which describes
+      the historical development of government in China in any detail.
+
+   47 The figures given are those of the present day, which may be more or
+      less exact for the past century. For earlier times, the number will
+      have to be reduced in proportion with the remoteness in time. See
+      Richard Henry Tawney, _Land and Labour in China_, London, 1932.
+
+   48 Richard Wilhelm, _Confucius and Confucianism_, cited, pp. 130-132.
+      The connection between the naming of names and the operation of the
+      popular check of revolution is made evident by Wilhelm in a
+      brilliant passage. If a righteous ruler died a violent death at the
+      hands of one of his subjects, he was murdered; were he unrighteous,
+      he was only killed. Confucius himself used such terms in his annals.
+      His use of varying terms, terms carrying condemnation or
+      condonement, even of such a subject as regicide, electrified the
+      scholars of his day.
+
+   49 An exception must be made in the case of the first Russian colony in
+      Peking, which was lost in two centuries and became virtually
+      indistinguishable from the mass of the population. The Portuguese,
+      at Macao, displayed that tendency to compromise and miscegenate
+      which marked their whole progress along the coasts of Asia, but they
+      maintained their political supremacy in that city; today the
+      Macanese are largely of Chinese blood, but Portuguese-speaking, and
+      proud of their separateness.
+
+   50 Too many works have been written on the relations of the Chinese and
+      Westerners to permit any citations, with one exception. Putnam
+      Weale's _The Vanished Empire_, New York, 1925, is an extraordinarily
+      vivid history of the collision of the civilizations. It is not
+      particularly commendable as a factual record, but as a brilliant and
+      moving piece of literature presenting the Chinese viewpoint, it is
+      unexcelled.
+
+   51 See Adolf Reichwein, _China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic
+      Contacts in the Eighteenth Century_, New York, 1925, which makes
+      apparent the full extent to which modern Europe is indebted to China
+      for the luxuries of its culture.
+
+   52 In this connection, it might be pointed out that the attractive
+      strength of the two civilizations has not, as yet, been adequately
+      studied, although there is an enormous amount of loose
+      generalization on the subject: "The Chinese are becoming completely
+      Westernized," or "The Chinese, in spite of their veneer, are always
+      Chinese; they will, in the end, absorb their conquerors." But will
+      they? In the face of a modern educational and propaganda system,
+      there is at least room for doubt; it is not beyond all conjecture
+      that the Chinese of Manchuria might be Japanized as easily as the
+      fiercely chauvinistic Japanese might be sinicized. The only adequate
+      answer to the question would be through detailed studies of the
+      social conditioning and preferences of Chinese under foreign
+      influence (as in Hongkong, Taiwan, Manchuria), and of foreigners
+      under Chinese influence (the White Russians in China, the few other
+      Westerners in preeminently Chinese milieux).
+
+   53 An example of this is to be found in Manabendra Nath Roy,
+      _Revolution und Konterrevolution in China_, Berlin, 1930. Roy was
+      one of the emissaries of the Third International to the
+      Nationalists, and his ineptness in practical politics assisted
+      materially in the weakening of the Communist position. His work
+      quite seriously employs all the familiar cliches of Western class
+      dispute, and analyzes the Chinese situation in terms that ignore the
+      fact that China is Chinese.
+
+   54 This same line of attack seems, in the West, to be employed only by
+      the Catholic church which, while opposing any avowedly
+      collectivistic totalitarian state, seeks to maintain control on an
+      ideological and not a political basis, over almost all aspects of
+      the life of its members. No political party or governing group seems
+      to share this attitude.
+
+   55 Karl A. Wittfogel, in his _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, as well as Roy, in
+      the work cited, thinks very little of the justice of Confucianism.
+      The extreme mobility of Chinese society, which largely precluded the
+      development of any permanent class rule, is either unknown to them
+      or ignored. If the ideologue-officials of old China composed a
+      class, they were a class like no other known, for they provided for
+      the continuous purging of their own class, and its continuous
+      recruitment from all levels of society--excepting that of prostitutes
+      and soldiers.
+
+   56 T'ang Leang-li writes, in _The Inner History of the Chinese
+      Revolution_, New York, 1930, p. 168, as follows concerning Sun
+      Yat-sen's early teaching of nationalism:
+
+      "Previous to the Republican Revolution of 1911, the principle of
+      nationality was known as the principle of racial struggle, and was
+      in effect little more than _a primitive tribalism rationalized to
+      serve as a weapon_ in the struggle against the Manchu oppressors. It
+      was the corner-stone of revolutionary theory, and by emphasizing the
+      racial distinction between the ruling and the oppressed classes,
+      succeeded in uniting the entire Chinese people against the Manchu
+      dynasty." (Italics mine.) In speaking of _min ts'u_ as a primitive
+      tribalism which had been rationalized as a weapon, Dr. T'ang might
+      lead some of his readers to infer that Sun Yat-sen did not believe
+      what he taught, and that--as a master-stroke of practical politics--he
+      had devised an ideological weapon which, regardless of its
+      truthfulness, would serve him in his struggles. But, it may be
+      asked, what was Sun Yat-sen struggling for, if not the union and
+      preservation of the Chinese people?
+
+   57 See sections, below, on the programs of nationalism.
+
+   58 d'Elia translation, p. 131. Sun Yat-sen said: "Formerly China too
+      entertained the ambition of becoming mistress of the whole world and
+      of rising above all other countries; so she (too) advocated
+      cosmopolitanism.... When the Manchus entered the Great Wall, they
+      were very few; they numbered 100,000 men. How were those 100,000 men
+      able to subject hundreds of millions of others? Because the majority
+      of Chinese at that time favored cosmopolitanism and said nothing
+      about nationalism."
+
+   59 d'Elia translation, pp. 126 ff.
+
+   60 It seems to the present writer that, whatever criteria are selected
+      for the determination of the nationhood of a given society,
+      _uniqueness_ certainly is _not_ one of the qualities attributed to a
+      "nation." It is not appropriate for the author to venture upon any
+      extended search for a "true nation"; he might observe, however, that
+      in his own use--in contrast to Sun Yat-sen's--he employs the term in a
+      consciously relative sense, contrasting it with the old Chinese
+      cosmopolitan society, which thought itself unique except for certain
+      imitations of itself on the part of half-civilized barbarians. A
+      "nation" must signify, among other things, for the purposes of this
+      work, a society calling itself such and recognizing the existence of
+      other societies of more or less the same nature. Sun Yat-sen, on the
+      other hand, regarded a nation as a group of persons as real as a
+      family group, and consistently spoke of the Chinese nation as having
+      existed throughout the ages--even in those times when the Chinese
+      themselves regarded their own society as the civilized world, and
+      did so with some show of exactness, if their own viewpoint is taken
+      into account.
+
+   61 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 130-131. d'Elia's italics, covering
+      the last two sentences in the quotation, have been omitted as
+      superfluous. As an illustration of the difference between the
+      translation of d'Elia and that of Hsue, the same paragraph might also
+      be cited from the latter translation. "The ethical value of
+      everything is relative and so nothing in the world is innately good
+      or innately bad. It is determined by circumstances. A thing that is
+      useful to us is a good thing; otherwise, a bad thing. Also, a thing
+      that is useful and advantageous to the world is a good thing;
+      otherwise, a bad thing." Hsue translation, cited, pp. 210-211.
+      Excepting for occasional purposes of comparison, the translation of
+      Father d'Elia will be referred to in citing the sixteen lectures on
+      the _San Min Chu I_.
+
+   62 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 70. The curiously significant use of
+      the word "forever" is reminiscent of the teleology of the Chinese
+      family system, according to which the flesh-and-blood immortality of
+      man, and the preservation of identity through the survival of
+      descendants, is a true immortality.
+
+_   63 Wo-men Chung-kuo jen_ and _ni-men wai-kuo jen_.
+
+   64 Paul M. Linebarger, _The Life and Principles of Sun Chung-shan_, p.
+      102. There is here told the anecdote of Sun Yat-sen's first
+      encounter with race-hatred. At Ewa, Hawaii, in 1880, Sun, then a
+      young lad just arrived from China, met a Westerner on the road. The
+      Westerner threatened him, and called him "Damn Chinaman!" and
+      various other epithets. When Sun Yat-sen discovered that the man was
+      neither deranged nor intoxicated, but simply venting his general
+      hatred of all Chinese, he was so much impressed with the incident
+      that he never forgot it.
+
+   65 Hsue translation, cited, p. 168; d'Elia translation, cited, p. 68.
+
+   66 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 70.
+
+   67 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 71.
+
+   68 Sun Yat-sen said: "A scrap of paper, a pen, and a mutual agreement
+      will be enough for the ruin of China ... in order to wipe her out by
+      common agreement, it suffices that the diplomats of the different
+      countries meet somewhere and affix their signatures.... One morning
+      will suffice to annihilate a nation." d'Elia translation, cited, p.
+      170.
+
+   69 The danger of relying too much on foreign aid can be illustrated by
+      a reference to Sun-Joffe Manifesto issued in Shanghai, January 26,
+      1922. Sun Yat-sen, as the leader of the Chinese Nationalist
+      movement, and Adolf Joffe, as the Soviet Special Envoy, signed a
+      joint statement, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:
+
+      "Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet
+      System cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do
+      not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of
+      either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr.
+      Joffe who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most
+      pressing problem is to achieve unification and attain full national
+      independence, and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun
+      Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people
+      and can count on the support of Russia."
+
+      See T'ang Leang-li, cited, p. 156.
+
+      In view of the subsequent Communist attempt, in 1927, to convert the
+      Nationalist movement into a mere stage in the proletarian conquest
+      of power in China, in violation of the terms of the understanding
+      upon which the Communists and the Chinese Nationalists had worked
+      together, the leaders of the Kuomintang are today as mistrustful of
+      what they term Communist politico-cultural imperialism as they are
+      of capitalist politico-economic imperialism. It is curious that the
+      APRA leaders in Peru have adopted practically the same attitude.
+
+   70 It is necessary to remember that in the four decades before 1925,
+      during which Sun Yat-sen advocated _nationalism_, the word had not
+      acquired the ugly connotations that recent events have given it. The
+      nationalism of Sun Yat-sen was conceived of by him as a pacific and
+      defensive instrument, for the perpetuation of an independent Chinese
+      race and civilization. See Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations
+      with Sun Yat-sen, 1919-1922_, Book I, ch. 5, "Defensive
+      Nationalism," and ch. 6, "Pacific Nationalism," for a further
+      discussion of this phase of Sun Yat-sen's thought.
+
+_   71 tien sha wei kung._
+
+   72 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 184. A reference to clan organization,
+      to be discussed later, has been deleted.
+
+   73 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 181 (summary of the sixth lecture on
+      nationalism).
+
+   74 Richard Wilhelm's preface to _Die Geistigen Grundlagen des Sun Yat
+      Senismus_ of Tai Chi-tao (The Intellectual Foundations of
+      Sun-Yat-senism), Berlin, 1931 (henceforth cited as "Tai Chi-tao"),
+      pp. 8-9; "Die Groesse Sun Yat Sens beruht nun darauf, dass er eine
+      lebendige Synthese gefunden hat zwischen den Grundprinzipien des
+      Konfuzianismus and den Anforderungen der neuen Zeit, eine Synthese,
+      die ueber die Grenzen Chinas hinaus fuer die ganze Menschheit noch
+      einmal von Bedeutung werden kann. Sun Yat Sen vereinigt in sich die
+      eherne Konsequenz des Revolutionaers und die grosse Menschenliebe des
+      Erneuerers. Sun Yat Sen ist der guetigste von allen Revolutionaeren
+      der Menschheit gewesen. Und diese Guete hat er dem Erbe des Konfuzius
+      entnommen. So steht sein geistiges Werk da als eine verbindende
+      Bruecke swischen der alten und der neuen Zeit. Und es wird das Heil
+      Chinas sein, wenn es entschlossen diese Bruecke beschreitet."
+
+   75 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 65.
+
+   76 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 186.
+
+   77 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 187-8. Sun Yat-sen's discussion of
+      the old morality forms the first part of his lecture on nationalism,
+      pp. 184-194 of the d'Elia translation.
+
+   78 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 66. The translation employs the words.
+
+   79 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 129. In connection with the doctrine
+      of _wang tao_, it may be mentioned that this doctrine has been made
+      the state philosophy of "Manchukuo." See the coronation issue of the
+      _Manchuria Daily News_, Dairen, March 1, 1934, pp. 71-80, and the
+      _Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book_, Tokyo, 1934, pp. 634-635. The advocacy
+      of _wang tao_ in a state which is a consequence of one of the
+      perfect illustrations of _pa tao_ in the modern Far East, is
+      astonishing. Its use does possess significance, in demonstrating
+      that the shibboleths of ancient virtue are believed by the Japanese
+      and by "Emperor Kang Teh" to possess value in contemporary politics.
+
+   80 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 528, 529.
+
+   81 See below, for discussion of the influence that Henry George, Karl
+      Marx, and Maurice William had upon the social interpretation of
+      history so far as economic matters were concerned.
+
+   82 See "The Theory of the Confucian World Society," above.
+
+   83 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341.
+
+   84 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 199.
+
+   85 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 194.
+
+   86 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 194. The original quotation, in
+      Chinese and in English, may be found in James Legge, translator,
+      _The Four Books_, Shanghai, 1930, p. 313.
+
+   87 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 194-195.
+
+   88 Judge Paul Linebarger, in _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_
+      (unpublished), states that Sun said to him: "China will go down in
+      history as the greatest literary civilization the world has ever
+      known, or ever will know, but what good does this deep literary
+      knowledge do us if we cannot combine it with the modernity of
+      Western science?" p. 64, Book Four.
+
+   89 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 62. The passage reads in full: "Sun Yat-sen
+      umfasst vollkommen die wahren Gedanken Chinas, wie sie bei Yau und
+      Schun und auch bei Kung Dsi und Mong Dsi wiederfinden. Dadurch wird
+      uns klar, dass Sun Yat Sen der Erneuerer der seit 2000 Jahre
+      ununterbrochenen chinesischen sittlichen Kultur ist. Im vergangenen
+      Jahr hat ein russischer Revolutionaer an Sun Yat Sen die folgende
+      Frage gerichtet: 'Welche Grundlage haben Ihre Revolutionsgedanken?'
+      Sun Yat Sen hat darauf geantwortet: 'In China hat es ein sittlichen
+      Gedanken gegeben, der von Yau, Schun, Yue, Tang, Wen Wang, Wu Wang,
+      Dschou Gung his zu Kung Dsi getragen worden ist; seither ist er
+      ununterbrochen, ich habe wieder an ihn angeknuepft und versacht, ihn
+      weiter zu entwickeln.' Der Fragende hat dies nicht verstehen koennen
+      und sich weiter erkundigt; Sun Yat Sen hat noch mehrmals versucht,
+      ihm seine Antwort zu erklaeren. Aus dieser Unterredung koennen wir
+      ersehen, dass Sun Yat Sen von seine Gedanken ueberzeugt war,
+      gleichzeitig koennen wir ersehen, dass seine Nationalrevolution auf
+      dem Widererwachen der chinesischen Kultur beruht. Er hat die
+      schoepferische Kraft Chinas wieder ins Leben rufen und den Wert der
+      chinesischen Kultur fur die ganze Welt nutzbar machen wollen, um
+      somit den Universalismus verwirklichen zu koennen." Allowance will
+      have to be made, as it should always in the case of Tai Chi-tao, for
+      the author's deep appreciation of and consequent devotion to the
+      virtues of Chinese culture. Other disciples of Sun Yat-sen wrote in
+      a quite different vein. The present author inclines to the opinion,
+      however, that Tai Chi-tao's summary is a just rendition of Sun
+      Yat-sen's attitude. Sun Yat-sen loved and fought for the struggling
+      masses of China, whose misery was always before his pitying eyes; he
+      also fought for the accomplishments of Chinese civilization. In
+      modern China, many leaders have fought for the culture, and
+      forgotten the masses (men such as Ku Hung-ming were typical); others
+      loved the populace and forgot the culture. It was one of the
+      elements of Sun Yat-sen's greatness that he was able to remember
+      both.
+
+   90 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 199-202.
+
+   91 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 259.
+
+   92 This idea, of wealth as national capacity to produce, is of course
+      not a new one. It is found in the writings of Alexander Hamilton,
+      among others.
+
+   93 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 337.
+
+   94 Wei Yung, translator, _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wen Hsueeh She_,
+      cited. See the discussion on dietetics, pp. 3-9.
+
+   95 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 337.
+
+   96 Wei Yung's translation, cited, is an English version of _The Outline
+      of Psychological Reconstruction_ of Sun Yat-sen. This work is
+      devoted to a refutation of the thesis, first propounded by Wang
+      Yang-ming (ca. 1472-1528), that knowledge is easy and action
+      difficult. In a society where the ideology had been stabilized for
+      almost two millenia, this was undoubtedly quite true. In modern
+      China, however, faced with the terrific problem of again settling
+      the problem of an adequate ideology, the reverse was true: knowledge
+      was difficult, and action easy. This was one of the favorite
+      aphorisms of Sun Yat-sen, and he devoted much time, effort, and
+      thought to making it plain to his countrymen. The comparative points
+      of view of Wang Yang-ming and Sun Yat-sen afford a quite clear-cut
+      example of the contrast between an established and unsettled
+      ideology.
+
+   97 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 336-345. This discussion occurs in
+      the fifth lecture on democracy, incidental to Sun Yat-sen's
+      explaining the failure of the parliamentary Republic in Peking, and
+      the general inapplicability of Western ideas of democracy to China.
+
+   98 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344.
+
+   99 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344.
+
+  100 It might again be pointed out that Sun Yat-sen differed with Marxism
+      which, while it, of course, does not hold that all knowledge is
+      already found, certainly keeps its own first premises beyond all
+      dispute, and its own interpretations sacrosanct. The dialectics of
+      Marx and Hegel would certainly appear peculiar in the Chinese
+      environment. Without going out of his way to point out the
+      difference between Sun's Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, the
+      author cannot refrain--in view of the quite popular misconception
+      that Sun Yat-sen was at one time almost a Marxist convert--from
+      pointing out the extreme difference between the premises, the
+      methods, and the conclusions of the two philosophies.
+
+  101 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344.
+
+  102 Hsue, _Confucianism_, cited, contains two chapters relevant to the
+      consideration of this problem. Ch. III, "The Doctrine of
+      Rectification" (pp. 43-61), and Ch. XI, "Social Evolution" (pp.
+      219-232), discuss rectification and ideological development within
+      the Confucian ideology.
+
+  103 As an illustration of Dr. Sun's continued activity as a medical man,
+      the author begs the reader's tolerance of a short anecdote. In 1920
+      or 1921, when both Judge Linebarger and Sun Yat-sen were in
+      Shanghai, and were working together on the book that was to appear
+      as _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, the younger son of Judge
+      Linebarger--the brother of the present author--fell ill with a rather
+      obscure stomach disorder. The Western physicians having made little
+      or no progress in the case, Sun Yat-sen intervened with an old
+      Chinese herbal prescription, which he, a Western-trained physician,
+      was willing to endorse. The remedy was relatively efficacious--more
+      so than the suggestions of the European doctors. Even though Sun
+      Yat-sen very early abandoned his career of professional medical man
+      for that of revolutionist, he appears to have practised medicine
+      intermittently throughout his life.
+
+  104 Sun Yat-sen wrote, in Wei Yung translation, cited, p. 115: "In our
+      age of scientific progress the undertaker [sic!], seeks to know
+      first before undertaking. This is due to the desire to forestall
+      blunders and accidents so as to ensure efficiency and economy of
+      labor. He who is able to develop ideas from knowledge, plans from
+      ideas, and action from plans can be crowned with success in any
+      undertaking irrespective of its profoundness or the magnitude of
+      labor involved."
+
+  105 Tai, cited, p. 66: "Wir sind Chinesen, und was wir zunaechst zu
+      aendern haben liegt in China. Aber wenn alle Dinge in China wertlos
+      gewerden sind, wenn die chinesische Kultur in der Kulturgeschichte
+      der Welt keine Bedeutung mehr hat, und wenn das chinesische Volk die
+      Kraft, seine Kultur hochzuhalten, verloren hat, dann koennen wir
+      gleich mit gebundenen Haenden den Tod abwarten; zu welchem Zweck
+      brauchen wir dann noch Revolution zu treiben!"
+
+  106 An interesting discussion of this attitude is to be found in Li Chi,
+      _The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge (Massachusetts),
+      1928.
+
+  107 See Tsui Shu-chin, cited, pp. 96-146. The work of Tsui is good for
+      the field covered; his discussion of the contrasting policy of the
+      Communists and of Sun Yat-sen with respect to nationalities may be
+      regarded as reliable.
+
+  108 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 67 and following.
+
+  109 See above, "The Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity."
+
+  110 The present state of Western knowledge of the sociology of China is
+      not sufficient to warrant reference to any authorities for the
+      description of egalitarianism and mobility. These matters are still
+      on that level of unspecialized knowledge where every visitor to
+      China may observe for himself. The bibliography on the social life
+      of the Chinese on pp. 240-242 of Kenneth Scott Latourette, _The
+      Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New York, 1934, contains some
+      of the leading titles that touch on the subject. Prof. A. R.
+      Radcliffe-Brown of the University of Chicago informed the present
+      author that he contemplates the planning of an extensive program of
+      socio-anthropological field work in Chinese villages which will
+      assist considerably in the understanding of the sociology of old
+      China.
+
+  111 Hsue, _Confucianism_, cited, p. 49, states the function of the
+      Confucian leaders quite succinctly: "... the Confucian school
+      advocates political and social reorganization by changing the social
+      mind through political action."
+
+  112 Hsue, cited, p. 104.
+
+  113 Hsue, cited, pp. 195-196.
+
+  114 Mariano Ponce, _Sun Yat Sen, El fundador de la Republica de China_,
+      Manila, 1912, p. 23.
+
+      "Y tampoco era posible sustituirla por otra dinastia nacional. Solo
+      existen al presente dos familias en China, de donde podian salir los
+      soberanos: uno es la descendencia de la dinastia Ming, de que
+      usurparon los mandchues el trone, hace mas de dos siglos y medio, y
+      la otra es la del filosofo Confucio, cuyo descendiente lineal
+      reconocido es el actual duque Kung. Ni en una, ni en otra existen
+      vastagos acondicionados para regir un Estado conforme a los
+      requerimientos de los tiempos actuales. Hubo de descartarse, pues,
+      de la plataforma de la 'Joven China' el pensamiento de instalar en
+      el trono a una dinastia nacional. Y sin dinastia holgaba el trono.
+
+      "No sabemos si aun habiendo en las dos familias mencionados miembros
+      con condiciones suficientes para ser el Jefe supremo de un Estado
+      moderno, hubiese prosperado el programa monarquico.
+
+      "Lo que si pueda decir es que desde los primeros momentos
+      evolucionayon las ideas de Sun Yat Sen hacia el republicanismo...."
+
+      Ponce then goes on to point out Sun Yat-sen's having said that the
+      decentralized system of old government and the comparative autonomy
+      of the vice-regencies presented a background of "a sort of
+      aristocratic republic" ("une especie de republica aristocratica").
+
+  115 Ponce, cited, p. 24. "... la unica garantia posible, el unico medio
+      por excelencia para obtener los mejores gobernantes...."
+
+  116 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 234.
+
+  117 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 235.
+
+  118 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 255.
+
+  119 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 266, note 1. Father d'Elia discusses
+      the reasons which made it seem more probable that Sun was
+      transliterating the name Millar into Chinese rather than (John
+      Stuart) Mill.
+
+  120 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 256 and following.
+
+  121 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 271.
+
+  122 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 273.
+
+  123 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 242-243.
+
+  124 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 223 and following. Dr. Hsue (cited, p.
+      263 and following) translates these four epochs as following: _hung
+      fang_, "the stage of the great wilderness"; _shen ch'uean_, "the
+      state of theocracy"; _chun ch'uean_, "the stage of monarchy"; and
+      _min ch'uean_, "the stage of democracy."
+
+  125 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 241-242.
+
+  126 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book II, ch. 2.
+
+  127 It is of interest to note that the "New Life Movement" inaugurated
+      by Chiang Chieh-shih is concerned with many such petty matters such
+      as those enumerated above. Each of these small problems is in itself
+      of little consequence; in the aggregate they loom large.
+
+  128 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 331.
+
+  129 Hsue translation, cited, p. 352. It is interesting to note that the
+      translation by Father d'Elia gives a more literal translation of the
+      names that Sun Yat-sen applied to these categories. He translates
+      the Chinese terms as _pre-seeing_, _post-seeing_, and _non-seeing_.
+
+  130 Hsue translation, cited, p. 352.
+
+  131 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 348.
+
+  132 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 352. Sun Yat-sen defined democracy
+      thus: "... under a republican government, the people is sovereign."
+
+  133 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 25, refers to this distinction as being
+      between force (_Gewalt_) and power (_Macht_). To the people
+      belonged, and rightfully, the force which could sanction or refuse
+      to sanction the existence of the government and the confirmation of
+      its policies. The government had the power (_Macht_), which the
+      people did not have, of formulating intelligent policies and
+      carrying them out in an organized manner.
+
+  134 Liang Chi-ch'ao, cited, pp. 50-52.
+
+  135 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 279 and following.
+
+  136 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 368.
+
+  137 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 368-9. Dr. Wou Saofong, in his _Sun
+      Yat-sen_ (Paris, 1929), summarizes his thesis of Sun Yat-sen in
+      somewhat different terms: "... Sun Yat-sen compare, le gouvernement
+      a un appareil mecanique, dont le moteur est constitue _par les lois_
+      ou les ministres, tandis que l'ingenieur que dirige la machine etait
+      autrefois le roi et aujourd'hui le peuple," p. 124. (Italics mine.)
+      This suggestion that the state-machine, in the theory of Sun
+      Yat-sen, is composed of laws as well as men is quite interesting;
+      Sun Yat-sen himself does not seem to have used this figure of speech
+      and it may be Dr. Wou's applying the juristic interpretation on his
+      own initiative. Sun Yat-sen, in his sixth lecture on democracy,
+      says, "Statesmen and lawyers of Europe and America say that
+      government is a machine of which law is a tool." (d'Elia
+      translation, cited, p. 368.)
+
+  138 It must always remain one of those conjectures upon which scholars
+      may expend their fantasy what Sun Yat-sen would have thought of the
+      necessity of the juristic state, which involved a quite radical
+      change throughout the Chinese social organism, had he lived to see
+      the ebb of juristic polity and, for all that, of voting democracy.
+      It is not unlikely that his early impressions of the United States
+      and his reading of Montesquieu would have led him to retain his
+      belief in a juristic-democratic state in spite of the fact that such
+      a state would no longer represent the acme of ultra-modernism.
+
+  139 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 378 and following.
+
+  140 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 369.
+
+  141 Reginald Johnston, _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited above,
+      presents an apparently true account of the conspiracies of the
+      various Northern generals which centered around the person of P'u
+      Yi. According to Johnston Tsao Kun was defeated in his attempt to
+      restore the Manchu Emperor only by the jealousies of his
+      fellow-militarists.
+
+  142 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 406.
+
+  143 Father d'Elia devotes the whole second chapter of his introduction
+      to the consideration of a suitable rendition of _San Min Chu I_,
+      which he calls the Triple Demism. (Work cited, pp. 36-49.) Again on
+      p. 402, he explains that, while he had translated _min sheng_ as
+      _socialism_ in the first French edition of his work, he now renders
+      it as _the economic Demism_ or _sociology_. The most current
+      translation, that of Frank Price, cited, gives _the principle of
+      livelihood_. Paul Linebarger gave it as _socialism_ as far back as
+      1917 (_The Chinese Nationalist Monthly_, December, 1917, Chicago) in
+      Chicago, at the time when Lin Shen, Frank C. Lee and he were all
+      working for Sun in that city. Dr. H. H. Kung, a high government
+      official related by marriage to Mme. Sun Yat-sen, speaks of the
+      three principles of _liberty_, _democracy_, and _economic
+      well-being_ (preface to Hsue, _Sun_, cited, p. xvi). Dr. V. K.
+      Wellington Koo, one of China's most eminent diplomats, speaks of
+      _social organization_ (_Memoranda Presented to the Lytton
+      Commission_, New York City, n. d.). Citations could be presented
+      almost indefinitely. _Min_ means "people," and _sheng_ means "life;
+      vitality, the living, birth, means of living" according to the
+      dictionary (S. Wells Williams, _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese
+      Language_, Tungchou, 1909). The mere terms are of very little help
+      in solving the riddle of _min sheng_. Laborious examination is
+      needed, and even this will not, perhaps, lead us to anything more
+      than probability. Sun Yat-sen, in his lectures, called it by several
+      different names, which seem at first sight to contradict each other.
+
+  144 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 91-92.
+
+  145 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Bk. IV, p. 62: "I must confess
+      that the idea of using the sacred cult of ancestor worship as a
+      political machine is very abhorrent to me. In fact, I think that
+      even the rashest fool would never attempt to use this intimate cult
+      with its exclusively domestic privacy as a revolutionary
+      instrument."
+
+  146 Linebarger, _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, New York, 1925,
+      pp. 68-9.
+
+  147 The same, pp. 135-139.
+
+  148 The same, pp. 104-105.
+
+  149 The same, pp. 122-123.
+
+  150 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472.
+
+  151 Karl A. Wittfogel, _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig,
+      1931. The author, the German Marxian who wrote the best Marxist
+      critique of Sun Yat-sen, is the only scholar to seek a really
+      complete picture of the old Chinese economy by the technique of
+      modern Western economic analysis. Described by the author as an
+      "attempt," the first volume of this work runs to 737 pages. It is
+      valuable for the large amount of statistical material which it
+      contains, and for its systematic method; its Marxian bias narrows
+      its interest considerably.
+
+  152 Both works of Wittfogel, cited above, are useful for the
+      understanding of the transition from the old economy to the new. For
+      a general view of the economic situation and potentialities of
+      China, see George B. Cressey, _China's Geographic Foundations_, New
+      York, 1934. The bibliography on Chinese economy to be found in
+      Latourette, cited above, vol. II, pp. 116-119, is useful.
+
+  153 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 97.
+
+  154 See below, section on the national economic revolution.
+
+  155 Hsue translation, cited, pp. 186-187. The d'Elia translation gives a
+      more exact rendering of Sun Yat-sen's words (p. 97), but, by
+      following Sun Yat-sen in calling China a hypo-colony, is less
+      immediately plain to the Western reader than is the translation of
+      Dr. Hsue, who in this instance uses "sub" and "hypo" interchangeably.
+
+  156 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 443.
+
+  157 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 452.
+
+  158 His _International Development of China_, New York, 1922
+      (republished 1929), is a colossal plan which could only be compared
+      with the _Piatiletka_ or with the New Deal in the United States,
+      since Sun Yat-sen suggested that--in order to avoid the consequences
+      of a post-war depression--the nations of the world might cooperate in
+      the equal exploitation of Chinese national resources with the
+      Chinese. He proposed the modernization of China by a vast
+      international loan which could permit the Western nations to
+      maintain their war-time peak production, supplying China (1929 ed.,
+      p. 8). He concludes the work: "In a nutshell, it is my idea to make
+      capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic
+      forces of human civilization will work side by side in future
+      civilization" (p. 237). The work is, however, generally regarded as
+      a transportation plan, since Sun Yat-sen sketched out a railway map
+      of China which would require decades to realize, and which
+      overshadowed, by its very magnitude, the other aspects of his
+      proposals.
+
+  159 At the risk of digression, one might comment on an interesting
+      element of the Euramerican ideology which is in sharp contrast to
+      the Chinese. The West has, apparently, always been devoted to
+      dichotomies of morality. The Greeks had reason and unenlightenment,
+      and whole series of ideals that could be fought for and against, but
+      the real division of good and bad in the West came, of course, with
+      Christianity, which accustomed Westerners to think for centuries in
+      terms of holiness versus evil--they being, geographically, holy, and
+      the outsiders (heathen), evil. Now that the supernatural foundations
+      of Christianity have been shaken by the progress of scientific and
+      intellectual uncertainty, many Westerners find an emotional and an
+      intellectual satisfaction in dividing the world into pure and
+      unclean along lines of sometimes rather abstruse economic questions.
+      This new morality seems to be based on distributive economics rather
+      than on deity. It is employed, of course, by the Marxians, but their
+      adversaries, in opposing them with equal passion, fall into the same
+      habit. It is shocking and unbelievable to such persons to discover
+      that there is a society whose ideology does not center around the
+      all-meaningful point of the ownership of the means of production.
+      Their only reaction is a negation of the possibility of such
+      thought, or, at least, of its realism. The intellectual position of
+      Sun Yat-sen in the modern world would be more clearly appreciated if
+      the intellectuals of the West were not adjusting their ideological
+      and emotional habits from religion to economics, and meanwhile
+      judging all men and events in economic terms. The present discussion
+      of Sun Yat-sen's economic ideology is a quite subordinate one in
+      comparison to the examination of his ideology as a whole, but some
+      persons will regard it as the only really important point that could
+      be raised concerning him.
+
+  160 Tsui, cited, p. 345, quotes Nathaniel Peffer: "... Peffer said that
+      Dr. Sun never 'attained intellectual maturity, and he was completely
+      devoid of the faculty of reason. He functioned mentally in sporadic
+      hunches. It was typical of him that he met Joffe, read the Communist
+      Manifesto, and turned Communist, and then read one book by an
+      American of whom he knew nothing, and rejected communism all in a
+      few months.' " Sun Yat-sen knew Marxism, years before the Russian
+      Revolution. The Communist Manifesto was not new to him. He was
+      extraordinarily well read in Western political and economic thought.
+      Sun Yat-sen never turned Communist, nor did he subsequently reject
+      communism any more than he had done for years.
+
+  161 The author hopes, at some future time, to be able to fill in the
+      intellectual background of Sun Yat-sen much more thoroughly than he
+      is able to at the present, for lack of materials. One interesting
+      method would involve the listing of every Western book with which
+      Sun Yat-sen can be shown to have been acquainted. It might be a
+      fairly accurate gauge of the breadth of his information.
+
+  162 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 461-468. Father d'Elia's note on the
+      relative positions of Henry George and Sun (p. 466) is interesting.
+      For a discussion of the actual program proposed by Sun, see below,
+      "The Program of _Min Sheng_" section on land policy.
+
+  163 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 58.
+
+  164 The same, pp. 98-99. There is an inconsistency of wording here,
+      which may or may not be the fault of the translator. The oath refers
+      to the "equitable redistribution of the land" (p. 98); the platform
+      speaks of "the nationalization of land" (p. 98); and one of the
+      slogans is "Equalize land-ownership!"
+
+  165 See also the discussion in Tsui, _Canton-Moscow Entente_, cited, pp.
+      371-376; and in Li Ti-tsun, "The Sunyatsenian principle of
+      Livelihood," _The Chinese Students' Monthly_, XXIV (March 1929), pp.
+      230. Li declares that Sun envisioned immediate redistribution but
+      ultimate socialization, but does not cite his source for this. Li's
+      discussion of sources is good otherwise.
+
+  166 Sharman, p. 58; the same authority for the statement as to the 1905
+      manifesto.
+
+  167 Sharman, p. 94.
+
+  168 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 61.
+
+  169 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 66: "Dieses sehr unpraezise
+      Programm, das die Frage der Klasseninteressen und des Klassenkampfes
+      als des Mittels zur Brechung privilegierter Klasseninteressen nicht
+      aufwirft, war objektiv gar nicht Sozialismus, sondern etwas durchaus
+      anderes: Lenin hat die Formel '_Subjektiver Sozialismus_' dafuer
+      gepraegt."
+
+  170 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 67: "So bedeutete denn Suns
+      'Sozialismus' im Munde der Chinesischen Bourgeoisie nichts als ein
+      Art Bekenntness zu einer 'sozialen,' d.h. massenfreundlichen
+      Wirtschaftspolitik."
+
+  171 T'ang, cited, p. 46.
+
+  172 T'ang, cited, p. 172.
+
+  173 T'ang, cited, p. 172.
+
+  174 T'ang, cited, pp. 171-172.
+
+  175 Wittfogel, cited, pp. 117-118.
+
+  176 Wittfogel, cited, p. 140: "... Seine Drei Prinzipien verkoerpern in
+      ihrer _Entwicklung_ den objektiven Wandel der oekonomisch-sozialen
+      Situation Chinas, in ihren _Widerspruechen_ die realen Widersprueche
+      der chinesischen Revolution, in ihren _juengsten Tendenzen_ die
+      Verlagerung des sozialen Schwerpunktes der Revolution, die Klassen
+      in Aktion setzt, deren Ziel nicht mehr ein
+      buergerlich-kapitalistisches, sondern ein
+      proletarisch-sozialistisches und ein bauerlich-agrar-revolutionaeres
+      ist.
+
+      "Sun Yat-sen ist demnach nicht nur der bisher maechtigste
+      Repraesentant der buergerlich-nationalen, antiimperialistischen
+      Revolutionen des erwach-enden Asiens ueberhaupt, er weist zugleich
+      ueber die buergerliche Klassen-schranke dieser ersten Etappe der
+      asiatischen Befreiungsbewegung hinaus. Dies zu verkennen, waere
+      verhaengnisvoll, gerade auch fuer die proletarisch-kommunistische
+      Bewegung Ostasiens selbst."
+
+  177 Statement of Judge Linebarger to the author. See also Linebarger,
+      _Conversations_, references to Communism which occur throughout the
+      whole book.
+
+  178 Tsui, cited, p. 144. It would involve a duplication of effort for
+      the present author to repeat the material of Dr. Tsui's excellent
+      monograph on Sun Yat-sen and the Bolsheviks. Since the purpose of
+      the present work is to undertake an exposition of the Nationalist
+      political ideology and programs against the background of the old
+      Chinese ideology, such an emphasis upon one comparatively small
+      point in Sun Yat-sen's doctrines would be entirely disproportionate
+      as well as superfluous. The reader is referred to the work of Dr.
+      Tsui for any details of these relations that he may wish to examine.
+
+  179 See Tsui, cited, and section below, on the class struggle of the
+      nations.
+
+  180 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 450. See also Tsui, cited, pp.
+      353-354; and Li, cited, pp. 229 and following.
+
+  181 Sun, _Development of China_, cited, p. 237.
+
+  182 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932, p.
+      4.
+
+  183 William, in his _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, cited, proves beyond
+      doubt that Sun Yat-sen was strongly indebted to him for many
+      anti-Marxian arguments.
+
+  184 See above, Chapter One, second, third, and fourth sections.
+
+  185 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 423.
+
+  186 Tsui, cited, pp. 121-123, n. 72.
+
+  187 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472.
+
+  188 Hsue translation, cited, p. 422. The Hsue version will be cited from
+      time to time, whenever Father d'Elia's interesting neologisms might
+      make the citation too disharmonious, in wording, with the comment.
+
+  189 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 294.
+
+  190 Francis W. Coker, _Recent Political Thought_, New York--London, 1934,
+      pp. 545-562, Ch. XX, "Empirical Collectivism."
+
+  191 Coker, cited, pp. 546-547.
+
+  192 Coker, cited, pp. 548-549. Throughout the discussion of empirical
+      collectivism the present author will cite, by and large, the
+      categories given by Coker. Any special exceptions will be noted, but
+      otherwise the discussion will be based on Coker's chapter on
+      "Empirical Collectivism," cited above.
+
+  193 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 31.
+
+  194 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 30.
+
+  195 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 475.
+
+  196 See, however, the d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 298-301, for a
+      reference to labor unions and a statement for their need of
+      competent and honest leadership.
+
+  197 See Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, "Die Arbeiter," pp. 97-99.
+      T'ang, Hsue, and the various biographies of Sun almost all contain
+      references from time to time to Sun's friendliness toward and
+      approval of organized labor.
+
+  198 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, pp. 325-329. The next speech of Sun
+      Yat-sen given in Wittfogel's work is Sun's indignant attack on "the
+      so-called Labor Government" of England, which permitted the old
+      methods of British Far Eastern imperialism to continue.
+
+  199 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 18. This work,
+      while it cannot be given the weight of direct quotations from Sun's
+      own writings or speeches, does contain a good deal about the
+      policies of _min sheng_ which does not appear elsewhere. The author
+      has sought to avoid citation of it where direct sources are
+      available, since the nature of the material makes it by no means so
+      authoritative as others might be.
+
+  200 Coker, cited, p. 551.
+
+  201 E. D. Harvey, _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933, deals
+      extensively with these supernatural elements. The reader who turns
+      to it should keep in mind the fact that the supernatural plays a
+      role in China distinctly less important than that which it did, say,
+      in medieval Europe, and that a strong agnostic, rather than a
+      skeptical, spirit among the Chinese has preserved them from the
+      grossest errors of superstition.
+
+  202 Latourette, cited, p. 129. Dr. Latourette's sketch of Chinese
+      religious thought is especially good, as indeed it might be, since
+      he is one of the most celebrated American scholars in the field of
+      Western religion in China.
+
+  203 H. G. Creel, work cited, p. 127.
+
+  204 The author cannot give a documentary citation for this observation.
+      It was communicated to him many times by his father, Judge Paul
+      Linebarger, who stated that Sun Yat-sen was most apt to talk in
+      terms of morality and morale by preference. The fact that Sun
+      Yat-sen came from a Chinese Confucian background into a Western
+      Christian one cannot be ignored. He did not permit his Christianity
+      to sway him from what he considered his necessary lines of behavior
+      in politics; it did not, for example, prevent him from being
+      extremely cordial to the Soviet Union at the time that that state
+      was still more or less outcaste. And yet, speaking of the Christian
+      God, he is reputably reported to have said: "God sent me to China to
+      free her from bondage and oppression, and I have not been
+      disobedient to the Heavenly mission"; and, again, to have said on
+      the day before his death: "I am a Christian; God sent me to fight
+      evil for my people. Jesus was a revolutionist; so am I." (Both
+      quotations from appendix to the d'Elia translation, p. 718.)
+
+  205 Sun Yat-sen authorized the biography, cited, which Judge Linebarger
+      wrote of him. It was a propaganda work, and neither he nor the
+      author had any particular expectation that it would ever be regarded
+      as a source, or as an academically prepared document. The last
+      chapter of this authorized biography bears the title, "Conclusion:
+      Sun the Moral Force." This, perhaps, is significant as to Sun's own
+      attitude.
+
+  206 Note the contrast between the thought of Sun in this respect and
+      that of Tagore or Gandhi. This has been pointed out by many Western
+      writers on China.
+
+  207 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 20.
+
+  208 Sharman, cited, p. 282.
+
+  209 The reader must bear in mind the fact that what is presented here is
+      Sun Yat-sen's political program for China. In many instances the
+      course of affairs has deviated quite definitely from that program,
+      and it can be only a matter of conjecture as to what Sun Yat-sen
+      would do were he to return and observe the Nationalist movement as
+      it now is. It is manifestly impossible to trace all the changes in
+      this program. The actual developments have conformed only in part
+      with Sun Yat-sen's plans, although the leaders seek to have it
+      appear as though they are following as close to Sun Yat-sen's
+      democratic politics as they can. Many persons who were close to Sun
+      Yat-sen, such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, believe that the National
+      Government has betrayed the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and that
+      Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih has made himself the autocrat of the
+      National Government. It is, of course, impossible within the scope
+      of this thesis to enter into this dispute. Who rules the
+      Soviet--Stalin, or the Communist Party? Who rules China--Chiang
+      Chieh-shih, or the Kuomintang? In each case there is the question of
+      whether the leader could get along without the party, and whether
+      the party could get along without the leader, as well as the
+      question of the leader's sincerity. These issues, however burning
+      they might be in real life, could not be adequately treated in a
+      work such as this. The author has sought to present Sun Yat-sen's
+      theory of applied politics. Where events which Sun Yat-sen foresaw
+      have come to pass, the author has referred to them. He does not wish
+      to be understood as presenting a description of the whole course of
+      events in China.
+
+  210 Here, again, one must remember that Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen,
+      and others charge that the Party no longer rules, that it has been
+      prostituted by Chiang Chieh-shih, and now serves only to cloak a
+      military despotism. It may be noted, so far as the other side of the
+      question is concerned, that a greater number of the persons who were
+      eminent in the Party before Sun Yat-sen died have remained in it
+      than have left it.
+
+  211 See T'ang, work cited for an excellent description of the mutations
+      of the revolutionary party. T'ang criticizes the present personnel
+      of the Kuomintang severely, but the reader must keep in mind the
+      fact that he has since become reconciled with the present
+      leadership, and make allowances for the somewhat emphatic
+      indignation voiced at the time of writing the book. The brilliance
+      of the author guarantees that the story is well told, but it is not
+      told for the last time. See also, Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau, _Two Years
+      of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, for a summary that is as
+      excellent as it is short. Various changes have occurred in party
+      function, organization, and personnel since that time, but they have
+      not--to the knowledge of the author--been completely and adequately
+      covered by any one work.
+
+  212 For a history of this period, see T'ang, Sharman, or Tsui Shu-chin,
+      all cited above. The Communist side of the story is told by Harold
+      Isaacs (editor), _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_, Shanghai,
+      1932, and in the various works of the Stalinist and Trotskyist
+      groups concerning the intervention of the Third Internationale in
+      China. Two graphic personal accounts cast in semi-fictional form,
+      are Oscar Erdberg, _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932, and
+      Vincent Sheean, _Personal History_, New York, 1935; these present
+      the Communist and the left-liberal viewpoints, respectively. The
+      dramatic story of the Entente, the separation, and the ensuing
+      conflict are not yet remote enough to have cooled into material
+      ready for the historian.
+
+  213 The Kuomintang, in accepting the Communist administrative structure,
+      was not violating traditional Chinese patterns altogether. It has
+      been pointed out that the revised structure of the Kuomintang
+      resembled older Chinese guild patterns as well as the new Russian
+      style (Sharman, work cited, p. 262).
+
+  214 Here, again, one might refer to the disputes as to the orthodoxy and
+      integrity of the present leadership. The preeminence of
+      Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih, which cannot be doubted, is seen by
+      persons friendly to him as a strong and beneficent influence upon
+      the C. E. C. Persons hostile to him charge that he has packed the C.
+      E. C. with his adherents, and controls it as he chooses.
+
+  215 An interesting piece of research could deal with the method of
+      recruitment and registration in the Kuomintang before the coming of
+      the Communist advisers. There was rarely any doubt as to who was, or
+      was not, a member, but there was constant trouble as to the good
+      standing of members. Recruitment seems to have been on a basis of
+      oath-taking, initiation, etc.; what Party discipline there was seems
+      to have been applied only in the most extreme cases, and then
+      crudely.
+
+  216 It is interesting to note that the Kuomintang is to a certain degree
+      democratic in representing the various occupational groups in China.
+      Tyau, cited above, p. 25 and following, lists the percentages in the
+      membership in the Kuomintang according to occupation, as they stood
+      in 1930: Party work, 5.84%; government service, 6.61%; army and
+      navy, 3.26%; police, 4.09%; labor (in general), 7.32%; agriculture,
+      10.43%; navigation, 1.20%; railway, 1.14%; commerce, 10.47%;
+      students, 10.47%; teaching, 21.31%; independent professions, 1.66%;
+      social work, 1.68%; unemployed, O.54%; unclassified, 3.13%;
+      incomplete returns, 15.09%.
+
+  217 See above, pp. 59 and following.
+
+  218 Sun Yat-sen, _Kidnapped in London_, cited, _passim_.
+
+  219 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 122-123.
+
+  220 The present instances are all taken from the third lecture on
+      nationalism, d'Elia translation, cited pp. 127-128. The Hsue
+      translation, in spite of its many merits, is not strong on
+      geography. Thus, in the translation referring to Poland which has
+      just been cited, the Hsue reading runs: "Although Persia was
+      partitioned by foreigners over a century ago, Persian nationalism
+      was not lost; consequently the Persians have been able to restore
+      their country to independence; and now Persia has the status of a
+      second or third class power in Europe" (p. 208), this in spite of
+      the fact that Persia is translated correctly further on (p. 327).
+      Another misreading is: "After the war, two new Slavic states were
+      born, namely Czechoslovakia and Jugoslovakia" (p. 217). These minor
+      errors are, however, among the very few which can be discovered in
+      the whole book, and do not mar the text to any appreciable extent.
+
+  221 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 132.
+
+  222 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 63.
+
+  223 T'ang, cited, pp. 168 and following, gives the various documents of
+      the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, which place the
+      application of nationalism first in their programs. "The Manifesto
+      On Going to Peking," issued by Sun November 10, 1924, refers to
+      various points to be achieved; the first is, "National freedom from
+      external restriction will enable China to develop her national
+      economy and to increase her productivity." (Hsue translation, p.
+      148.) This might imply that the execution of _min sheng_ was to be
+      coincidental with or anterior to the fulfillment of nationalism; it
+      probably does not.
+
+  224 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187.
+
+  225 Discussions of this are to be found in Sir Reginald Johnston's
+      _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited.
+
+  226 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 244.
+
+  227 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 245-247.
+
+  228 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187. Numerals have been written out by
+      the present author.
+
+  229 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 365. Italics are omitted.
+
+  230 This is not due to any mystical veneration of numbers, or religious
+      influence. In spreading doctrines which would have to be followed by
+      the unlettered as well as by the scholars, Sun Yat-sen found it
+      necessary to develop the general outline of his principles in such a
+      way as to give them a considerable mnemonic appeal. Thus, the three
+      principles--and the three French (liberty, equality, fraternity) and
+      American (of, by, for the people) principles--and the triple foreign
+      aggression, the four popular powers, the five governmental rights.
+      The use of the number three permitted Sun Yat-sen to weave together
+      the various strands of his teaching, and to attain a considerable
+      degree of cross-reference. It cannot be shown to have induced any
+      actual distortion of his theories.
+
+  231 Hsue translation, cited, p. 213. See also d'Elia translation, p. 134.
+
+  232 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 114.
+
+  233 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 101.
+
+  234 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. The whole present discussion of
+      economic oppression is drawn from the latter part of the second
+      lecture. Except in the case of direct quotation, no further
+      reference will be given to this section, which occurs at pp. 97-115
+      of the d'Elia translation.
+
+  235 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 106.
+
+  236 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113.
+
+  237 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113.
+
+  238 In referring to a sub-principle, the author is following Sun
+      Yat-sen's arrangement of his ideas, even though the exact term,
+      "sub-principle," is not to be found in Sun's works. Each of the
+      three principles can be considered with respect to national unity,
+      national autonomy, and national survival. The correlation of the
+      three principles, each with itself and then the two others,
+      logically leads to the appearance of nine sub-principles. The writer
+      has not followed any artificial compulsion of numbers, merely for
+      the sake of producing a pretty outline, but has followed Sun Yat-sen
+      in seeking to make clear the specific relations of each of the three
+      principles to the three cardinal points which they embody.
+
+  239 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 179-180.
+
+  240 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180.
+
+  241 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180.
+
+  242 Tsui, cited, pp. 113-114.
+
+  243 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, pp. 21 and following, Book I.
+
+  244 Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking foreign
+      capital for the just and honorable national development of China
+      through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul
+      Linebarger. Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure
+      loans for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never
+      used the document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr.
+      Rea to the author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that
+      the former was "Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign
+      Affairs of Manchoukuo," despite his former Chinese connections.)
+      Judge Linebarger was also unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more
+      interested in having Judge Linebarger stop any assistance offered by
+      the Consortium to the Northern "Republic of China" than in having
+      him procure any actual funds.
+
+  245 It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to
+      Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power
+      and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world
+      hegemony; they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think
+      of restoring the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which
+      they had enjoyed in the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga
+      Shogun.
+
+  246 Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116.
+
+  247 Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63.
+
+  248 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this
+      curious relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang
+      Chu (Chang Tso), _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins University
+      doctoral dissertation, 1935. The submission to China was, among
+      other things, a means by which the rulers of the peripheral states
+      could get themselves recognized by an authority higher than
+      themselves, thus legitimizing their position.
+
+  249 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 153. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had a
+      high opinion of the American administration of the Philippines,
+      saying: The United States "... even allows the Filipinos to send
+      delegations to Congress in Washington. Not only does the United
+      States require no annual tribute in money from them, but, on the
+      contrary, she gives the Filipinos considerable subsidies to build
+      and maintain their roads and to promote education. It seems as
+      though so humanitarian a treatment would be regarded as the utmost
+      benevolence. Still, until the present day, the Filipinos do not
+      boast of being 'Americanized'; they are daily clamoring for
+      independence" (d'Elia translation, p. 153). This statement is
+      interesting in two connections. In the first place, although Sun
+      Yat-sen had once thought of sending men, money, or munitions to help
+      the Filipino nationalists in their struggles against the Americans,
+      he seems to have conceived a warm admiration for the American
+      administration in those islands. Secondly, the reader may consider
+      that Sun Yat-sen, at the time that he made this comment, was in the
+      course of attacking imperialism. If Sun Yat-sen could offer so
+      enthusiastic an apology for the Americans in the Philippines, it
+      shows that he must have let the abstract principle ride, and judged
+      only on the basis of his own observation. To the orthodox Communist
+      the American rule of the Philippines is peculiarly wicked because of
+      the American denial of imperialist practises.
+
+  250 Some of the older books on China give interesting maps of that
+      country divided up into spheres of influence between the various
+      powers. It was quite fashionable among journalists to sketch the
+      various Chinese possessions of the great powers; the powers never
+      got around to the partition. The American declaration of the "Open
+      Door" may have had something to do with this, and the British
+      enunciation of the same doctrine probably carried weight. For a
+      time, however, the Europeans seemed quite convinced of the almost
+      immediate break-up of China into three or four big colonies. Lord
+      Charles Beresford, a prominent English peer, wrote a work which was
+      extremely popular; its title was _The Break-Up of China_ (London,
+      1899).
+
+  251 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 93.
+
+  252 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 165.
+
+  253 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 165-170.
+
+  254 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 170.
+
+  255 The Communists envision three types of conflict to be produced by
+      the contradictions of imperialism: intra-national class war,
+      international class war, and inter-imperialist war. The first is the
+      struggle of the proletariat of the whole world against the various
+      national bourgeois governments; the second, the struggle of the
+      oppressed peoples, under revolutionary bourgeois or proletarian
+      leadership, against the oppressions of Western imperialism; and the
+      last, the conflict of the various imperialist powers with one
+      another. Sun Yat-sen's theory agreed definitely with the second
+      point, the international class war; he seems to have admitted the
+      probability of class war within the nations of the West, and of
+      inter-imperialist war, but he did not draw the three types of
+      conflict together and because of them predicate an Armageddon and a
+      millenium. His flexible, pragmatic thought never ran to extremes;
+      although he agreed, more or less distinctly, with the Bolshevik
+      premises of the three conflicts of the imperialist epoch, he did not
+      follow them to their conclusion.
+
+  256 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 75.
+
+  257 d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 148-149.
+
+  258 Such works as Lea's _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909, and
+      Stoddard's _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy_,
+      New York, 1920, make precisely the same sort of statements,
+      although, of course, they regard the "Saxon" or "Teutonic" race as
+      the logical master-race of the world. Since Lea was associated for
+      some time with Sun Yat-sen, accompanying him from Europe to Nanking
+      in 1911, and undoubtedly had plenty of time to talk with him, it may
+      be that some of the particular terms used by Sun in this discussion
+      are those which he may have developed in his probable conversations
+      with Lea. Nothing more definite than this can be stated.
+
+  259 Quoted by Sun in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 138. The remark does
+      not sound like Lenin. A Communist would not invoke nature, nor would
+      he count the whole membership of an imperialist nation as
+      imperialist. The world, to him, is misguided by a tiny handful of
+      capitalists and traditional ideologues and their hangers-on, not by
+      the masses of any nation.
+
+  260 Note, however, the reference in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 76, or
+      the Price translation, p. 18. Sun Yat-sen speaks of _international
+      wars, within_ races, on the lines of social _classes_. He may have
+      meant international wars within the races and across race lines on
+      the basis of the oppressed nations of the world fighting the
+      oppressing nations. He may, however, have meant intra-national class
+      wars. Since he recognized the presence of the class conflict in the
+      developed capitalistic states of the West, this would not
+      necessarily imply his expectation of an intra-national class war in
+      China.
+
+  261 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 331-337, gives the whole text of the
+      speech. Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 304, refers to it.
+
+  262 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335. "Es ist gegen Gerechtigkeit und
+      Menschlichkeit, dass eine Minderheit von vierhundert Millionen eine
+      Mehrheit von neunhundert Millionen unterdrueckt...."
+
+  263 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 333. "Die Europaeer halten uns Asiaten
+      durch die Macht ihrer materiellen Errungenschaften zu Boden."
+
+  264 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 333. "Wenn wir
+      zweitausendfuenf-hundert Jahre zurueckdenken, so war China damals das
+      maechtigste Volk der Welt. Es nahm damals eine Stellung ein wie heute
+      Grossbritannien und Amerika. Doch waehrend Grossbritannien und die
+      Vereinigten Staaten heute zur zwei unter einer Reihe von Weltmaechten
+      sind, war China damals die einzige grosse Macht."
+
+  265 Ponce, work cited, p. xiv: "_Conozcamonos y nos amaremos mas_--decia
+      el gran Sun Yat-sen a sus amigos orientales." This work is, by the
+      way, the most extensive for its account of Sun's associations with
+      Koreans, Filipinos, and Japanese. It has been completely overlooked
+      by the various biographers of and commentators on Sun, with the
+      exception of Judge Linebarger, to whom Sun Yat-sen presented a copy
+      of the work.
+
+  266 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 337: "In England und Amerika gibt es
+      immerhin eine kleine Zahl von Menschen, die diese unsere Ideale im
+      Einklang mit einer allgemeinen Weltbewegung verteidigen. Was die
+      anderen Barbarennationen anbelangt, so duerfte es auch in ihren
+      Reihen Menschen geben, die von der gleichen Ueberzeugung beseelt
+      sind."
+
+  267 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335: "Wenn wir Asiaten nach der
+      Herstellung einer panasiatischen Einheitsfront streben, muessen wir
+      selbst in unserer Zeit daran denken, auf welcher grundlegenden
+      Auffassung wir diese Einheitsfront errichten wollen. Wir sollen
+      dasjenige zugrunde legen, was die besondere Eigentuemlichkeit unserer
+      oestlichen Kultur gewesen ist, wir sollten unseren Nachdruck legen
+      auf die moralischen Werte, auf Guete und Gerechtigkeit. Sie sollen
+      das Fundament der Einheit ganz Asiens werden."
+
+  268 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 207. Italics omitted.
+
+  269 The article by Tsui, cited, p. 177 and following, goes into a quite
+      detailed comparison of the Chinese Nationalist and the Marxian
+      Communist theories of the three stages of revolution. He draws
+      attention to the fact that, while the Communists do not speak of
+      "three stages" and prefer to emphasize the transitional stage of the
+      dictatorship of the proletariat, the two theories are similar almost
+      to the point of being identical.
+
+  270 Tsui, cited, p. 181.
+
+  271 Tyau, cited, p. 439 and following. It is also available in Hsue, _Sun
+      Yat-sen_, cited above, p. 85 and following. The Tyau translation was
+      preferred since it was written by an official of the Ministry of
+      Foreign Affairs, and may be regarded as the work of a Government
+      spokesman. It is interesting, by way of contrast, to quote a passage
+      from the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, so-called:
+      "The Chinese Soviet Government is building up a state of the
+      democratic dictatorship [sic!] of the workers and peasants. All
+      power shall be vested in the Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Red
+      Army men." _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New
+      York, 1934, p. 18. The absence of an acknowledged period of
+      tutelage, in view of the unfamiliarity of the Chinese people with
+      democratic forms, is significant. The constitutional jurisprudence
+      of the Chinese Communists is, however, primarily a matter of
+      academic interest, since the Soviets, where they have existed, have
+      existed in a state of perpetual emergency, shielded by the Red
+      Terror and other devices of revolutionary control. The contrast
+      between a pronouncement of Sun Yat-sen and a constitution is a fair
+      one, since the writings of Sun Yat-sen form the final authority in
+      the Nationalist movement and government; in a dispute as to the
+      higher validity of a governmental provision or a flat contrary
+      statement of Sun Yat-sen, there can be little question as to which
+      would--or, in the eyes of the Nationalists, should--prevail.
+
+  272 It is interesting to note that the institution which most Western
+      writers would incline to regard as the very key-stone of democracy,
+      parliament, has a quite inferior place in the Sun Yat-sen system. In
+      the National Government of China, the Legislative Yuan is more like
+      a department than like a chamber. This question, however, will be
+      discussed under the heading of the Five Rights.
+
+  273 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341.
+
+  274 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 342.
+
+  275 A discussion of the four powers and the five rights is to be found
+      in Li Chao-wei, _La Souverainete Nationale d'apres la Doctrine
+      Politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934. This work, a doctoral thesis
+      submitted to the University of Dijon, treats the Western theory of
+      democracy and Sun's theory comparatively. It is excellent in
+      portraying the legal outline of the Chinese governmental structure,
+      and points out many significant analogies between the two theories.
+
+  276 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 391.
+
+  277 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 395.
+
+  278 The unfavorable view of the Five Powers is taken by Dr. Jermyn
+      Chi-hung Lynn in his excellent little book, _Political Parties in
+      China_, Peiping, 1930. Since Dr. Lynn speaks kindly and hopefully of
+      the plans of Wu Pei-fu, one of the war-lords hostile to Sun Yat-sen
+      and the whole Nationalist movement, his criticism of Sun Yat-sen
+      need not be taken as completely impartial. It represents a point
+      that has been made time and time again by persons antagonistic to
+      the _San Min Chu I_.
+
+      "The Wu Chuan Hsien Fa is also no discovery of Dr. Sun's. As is
+      known, the three power constitution, consisting of the legislative,
+      judiciary [sic!] and executive functions, was originally developed,
+      more or less unconsciously, by the English, whose constitution was
+      critically examined by Montesquieu, and its working elaborately
+      described by him for the benefit of his fellow-countrymen. And the
+      unwritten constitution of Old China contained the civil service
+      examination and an independent Board of Censors. Now the
+      much-advertised Wu Chuan Hsien Fa or Five-Power constitution only
+      added the systems of state examination and public censure to the
+      traditional form of constitution first advocated by the French
+      jurist." P. 66, work cited.
+
+  279 Hsue translation, cited, p. 104.
+
+  280 For an intensively vivid description of this government, which Sun
+      Yat-sen's planned democracy was to relegate to limbo, see B. L.
+      Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926. Putnam Weale was
+      the pseudonym of Bertram Lennox Simpson, an Englishman born and
+      reared in China, who understood and participated in Chinese life and
+      policies as have few since the days of Marco Polo; he was an advisor
+      to the insurrectionary Peking "Nationalist" Government of 1931 when
+      he was shot to death in his home at Tientsin. Few other Westerners
+      have left such a wealth of accurate and sympathetic material about
+      modern China.
+
+  281 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 399.
+
+  282 Harold Monk Vinacke, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_,
+      Princeton, 1920, p. 100.
+
+  283 Vinacke, cited, p. 141 and following. While Dr. Vinacke's book is
+      now out of date, it contains excellent material for the period
+      covered, roughly 1898 to 1919. He quotes Morse's comment on the
+      provinces with approval: "The Provinces are satrapies to the extent
+      that so long as the tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and
+      the general policy of the central administration followed, they are
+      free to administer their own affairs in detail as may seem best to
+      their own provincial authorities." (Hosea Ballou Morse, _The Trade
+      and Administration of China_, London, 1913, p. 46, quoted in
+      Vinacke, work cited, p. 5.)
+
+  284 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_, mss., 1934;
+      Book two, Chapter Five, "Democratic Provincial Home Rule."
+
+  285 Hsue, cited, p. 124.
+
+  286 Tyau, cited, p. 441. From "The Outline of National Reconstruction."
+
+  287 Tyau, cited, p. 450.
+
+  288 V. I. Lenin, _State and Revolution_, New York, 1932. Lenin's
+      discussion of Marx's point, p. 39 and following, is stimulating
+      although inclining to the ingenious.
+
+  289 The number of the villages is taken from Tawney, Richard Henry,
+      _Land and Labor in China_, London, 1932; and the number of _hsien_
+      from Tyau, cited, p. 85.
+
+  290 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited above; throughout this volume,
+      Judge Linebarger recalls references made by Sun Yat-sen to him
+      concerning the _hsien_.
+
+  291 It is but fair to state, at the beginning, that this point of the
+      family system as one of the institutions of the democratic nation
+      has been very largely neglected by the Kuomintang and the National
+      Government. To the knowledge of the author, no plan has ever been
+      drafted either by Party or by Government which would erect the
+      system that Sun Yat-sen proposed. It is not beyond all conjecture
+      that Sun's suggestion may at a later date seem more practicable to
+      the leaders than now appears, and be put into operation in some
+      manner.
+
+  292 Hsue, cited, p. 164.
+
+  293 Hsue, cited, p. 243.
+
+  294 The material concerning the clans has been taken from the fifth
+      lecture on Nationalism (Hsue, cited, p. 240 and following; d'Elia,
+      cited, p. 174 and following). Judge Linebarger recorded Sun
+      Yat-sen's mention of a convention of the clans in _Conversations_,
+      cited above, Book One, Chapter Eight, "The Clans in the Nation."
+
+  295 There are three excellent discussions of the _min sheng_ programs.
+      Wou, cited, gives a clear precis of the doctrine. Hung Jair, _Les
+      idees economiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934, and Tsiang Kuen,
+      _Les origines economiques et politiques du socialisme de Sun Yat
+      Sen_, Paris, 1933, cover essentially the same ground, although they
+      are both doctoral dissertations submitted to French universities.
+      The former deals primarily with the theory of Sun's economic ideas,
+      contrasting them with the economic thought of Adam Smith and of the
+      Marxians. The latter gives a rather extensive historical and
+      statistical background to Sun's _min sheng_, and traces the Chinese
+      economic system, whence _min sheng_ was derived in part, quite
+      fully. These authors have covered the field so widely that the
+      present work need not enter into the discussion of the precise
+      immediate policies to be advocated under _min sheng_. Enough will be
+      given to describe the relations of _min sheng_ with the more
+      formally political principles of nationalism and democracy, and to
+      afford the reader an opportunity to assess its scope and
+      significance for himself. The works of Hung Jair, Tsiang Kuen, Wou
+      Saofong, and Li Ti-tsun all measure _min sheng_ in terms of
+      classical Western _laissez-faire_ economics and then in terms of
+      Marxism; they all proceed in considerable detail to recapitulate the
+      various concrete plans that Sun projected. The present author will
+      not enter into the minutiae of the problems of clothing, of
+      transport, of communications, etc., inasmuch as they have already
+      been dealt with and because they are not directly relevant to the
+      political or ideological features of Sun's thought.
+
+  296 Tsui, cited, p. 378, n. 125.
+
+_  297 The International Development of China_ was welcomed as an
+      interesting fantasy in a world which had not yet heard of the Five
+      Year Plans and the programs of the New Deal. The fact that Sun
+      Yat-sen was a few years ahead of his contemporaries gave him the air
+      of a dreamer, which was scarcely deserved.
+
+  298 Hsue translation, "The Outline of National Reconstruction," p. 85.
+      Two points of detail may be noted here. In the first place, _min
+      sheng_ has been emphasized by being placed first, although Sun
+      Yat-sen generally arranged his principles in their logical order:
+      nationalism, democracy, _min sheng_. Secondly, _min sheng_, although
+      emphasized, is dealt with in one single paragraph in this vitally
+      important document. The question of the _hsien_ is given eight
+      paragraphs to the one on _min sheng_. This is indicative of the
+      point stressed above, namely, that Sun Yat-sen, while he was sure of
+      the importance of _min sheng_, did not believe in hard and fast
+      rules concerning its development.
+
+  299 Work cited, p. 232.
+
+  300 See above, p. 180 ff.
+
+  301 The author uses the term "national economic revolution" to
+      distinguish those parts of the _ming sheng chu i_ which treat the
+      transformation of the Chinese economy in relation to the development
+      of a nation-state. Obviously, there is a great difference between
+      the economy of a society regarding itself as ecumenical, and one
+      faced with the problem of dealing with other equal societies. The
+      presence of a state implies a certain minimum of state interference
+      with economic matters; the national economic revolution of Sun
+      Yat-sen was to give the Chinese economy a national character,
+      coordinating the economic with the other programs of nationalism.
+      Hence, the significant stress in the phrase "national economic
+      revolution" should rest upon the word "national."
+
+  302 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 329. "Genossen, die hier
+      Versammelten sind alle Arbeiter und stellen eine Teil der Nation
+      dar. Auf den chinesischen Arbeitern lastet eine grosse Verantwortung
+      und wenn ihr dieser Aufgabe entsprechen werdet, so wird China eine
+      grosse Nation und ihr eine maechtige Arbeiterklasse."
+
+  303 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 329. "Ausser dem wirtschaftlichen Kampf
+      fuer die Kuerzung des Arbeitstages und die Erhoehung der Loehne stehen
+      vor Euch noch viel wichtigere Fragen von politischem Charakter. Fuer
+      die politischen Ziele muesst ihr meine Drei Prinzipien befolgen und
+      die Revolution unterstuetzen."
+
+  304 Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926, pp. 145-147. The
+      same observation had been made to the Russian ambassador,
+      Vladislavich, sent by Catherine I to Peking in 1727. The Chinese
+      said at that time, " ... that foreign trade had no attraction for
+      the people, who were amply supplied with all the necessaries of life
+      from the products of their own country." Sir Robert K. Douglas,
+      _Europe and the Far East 1506-1912_, New York, 1913, pp. 28-29.
+
+  305 See above, p. 47 ff.
+
+_  306 International Development_, cited, p. 237.
+
+_  307 International Development_, p. 12.
+
+_  308 International Development_, p. 21.
+
+  309 Wou Saofong, cited, gives an excellent summary of the plan, pp.
+      184-202. There is no particular reason, however, why the work by
+      Sun, which he wrote in fluent and simple English, should not be
+      consulted. The American edition is so well put together with maps
+      and outlines that a layman will find it comprehensible and
+      stimulating.
+
+_  310 International Development_, pp. 220-221.
+
+_  311 International Development_, pp. 6-8.
+
+_  312 International Development_, p. 198.
+
+_  313 International Development_, p. 199. Sun Yat-sen discussed only two
+      of these essentials (food, clothing) in his lectures on the _San Min
+      Chu I_. According to Tai Chi-tao, he was to have continued to speak
+      on the topics of "Housing," "Health," "Death," "Conclusions on
+      Livelihood," and "Conclusions on the San Min Doctrine," but the only
+      person who may know what he intended to say on these subjects is
+      Mme. Sun Yat-sen. (See Hsue translation, "The Basic Literature of
+      Sunyatsenism," pp. 39-40.)
+
+  314 This is based upon statements made by Judge Linebarger to the
+      author. According to him, Sun Yat-sen had few of the prejudices of
+      class, one way or the other, that affect the outlook of so many
+      Western leaders. He did not believe that the only possible solution
+      to the problem of livelihood was the Marxian one, and was confident
+      that the Chinese Nationalists would be able to solve the problem.
+      This question was to him paramount above all others; the life of the
+      masses of Chinese citizens was the life of China itself.
+
+_  315 International Development_, p. 11.
+
+  316 The same, p. 11.
+
+  317 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 326. The discussion of Bismarck runs
+      from p. 322 to 326; the length of the discussion shows what Sun
+      thinks of Bismarck's acuteness, although he disapproved of
+      Bismarck's anti-democratic stand.
+
+_  318 International Development_, p. 4.
+
+  319 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 426.
+
+  320 Price translation, pp. 434-435. In the d'Elia translation, pp.
+      465-466. The Price translation has been quoted in this instance
+      because Father d'Elia translates _min sheng_ as "the economic
+      Demism," which--although interesting when used consistently--might not
+      be clear in its present context. Sun Yat-sen's courteous use of the
+      word "communism," in view of the Canton-Moscow entente then
+      existing, has caused a great deal of confusion. The reader may judge
+      for himself how much Sun's policy constitutes communism.
+
+  321 One or two further points concerning the land policy may be
+      mentioned. In the first place, it is the land which is to be taxed.
+      A tax will be applied, according to this theory, on the land, and
+      the increment will also be confiscated. These are two separate forms
+      of revenue. Furthermore, lest all land-holders simply surrender
+      their land to the government, Sun makes clear that his taxation
+      program applies only to land. It would consequently be quite
+      advantageous for the owner to keep the land; the buildings on it
+      would not be affected by the increment-seizure program, and the land
+      would be worth keeping. "The value of the land as declared at
+      present by the landowner will still remain the property of each
+      individual landowner." (d'Elia translation, p. 466; Father d'Elia's
+      note on this page is informing.) The landowner might conceivably put
+      a mortgage on the land to pay the government the amount of the
+      unearned increment, and still make a handsome enough profit from the
+      use of the land to amortize the mortgage.
+
+  322 Linebarger, _Conversations_, Book III, p. 25.
+
+  323 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 328. "Die chinesischen Kapitalisten
+      sind nicht so stark, dass sie die chinesischen Arbeiter unterdruecken
+      koennten."
+
+  324 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 469. Italics omitted. For the
+      discussion of the relation of the program of _min sheng_ to
+      capitalism, see d'Elia's various footnotes and appendices dealing
+      with the subject. Father d'Elia, as a devout Catholic, does a
+      thorough piece of work in demonstrating that Sun Yat-sen was not a
+      Bolshevik and not hostile to the Roman Catholic Church, and had a
+      warm although infrequently expressed admiration for that
+      organization. Li Ti-tsun, in "The Sunyatsenian Principle of
+      Livelihood," cited, tries to find the exact shade of left
+      orientation in _min sheng_, and digests the main policies. Wou and
+      Tsui, both cited, also discuss this point.
+
+_  325 International Development_, pp. 36-39.
+
+  326 By an irony of fate, the most conspicuous example of the realization
+      of any one of these plans was the beginning of the port of Hulutao,
+      which was to be "The Great Northern Port" of Sun's vision. The
+      National Government had already started work on this port when the
+      Japanese, invading Manchuria, took it. There is so much pathos in
+      Sun's own life that this frustation of his plans after his death
+      seems disappointing beyond words to his followers. In his own trust
+      in mankind, in the eagerness and the sincerity of his enthusiasms,
+      in the grandeur of his vision--here are to be found the most vital
+      clues to the tragedy of Sun Yat-sen. Like the other great founders
+      of the earth's ideals, he charted worlds within the vision but,
+      perhaps, beyond the accomplishment of ordinary men.
+
+  327 Hsue translation, cited, p. 440; Price translation, p. 444; d'Elia
+      translation, cited, p. 476. The first has been preferred purely as a
+      matter of style. The Chinese words _min sheng_ and _San Min Chu I_
+      have been used instead of the English renderings which Hsue gives,
+      again as a pure matter of form and consistency with the text.
+
+  328 The author is indebted to Mr. Jen Tai for the clarification of this
+      ideal of dual continuity--of the family system, preserving the flesh,
+      and the intellectual tradition, preserving the cultural heritages.
+
+  329 d'Elia translation, cited, p. 538.
+
+
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF SUN YAT-SEN: AN EXPOSITION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I***
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