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diff --git a/39356-tei/39356-tei.tei b/39356-tei/39356-tei.tei new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fa9e27 --- /dev/null +++ b/39356-tei/39356-tei.tei @@ -0,0 +1,14100 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> + +<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "http://www.gutenberg.org/tei/marcello/0.4/dtd/pgtei.dtd" [ + +<!ENTITY u5 "http://www.tei-c.org/Lite/"> + +]> + +<TEI.2 lang="en"> +<teiHeader> + <fileDesc> + <titleStmt> + <title>The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I</title> + <author><name reg="Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony">Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger</name></author> + </titleStmt> + <editionStmt> + <edition n="1">Edition 1</edition> + </editionStmt> + <publicationStmt> + <publisher>Project Gutenberg</publisher> + <date>April 2, 2012</date> + <idno type="etext-no">39356</idno> + <availability> + <p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and + with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it + away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg + License online at www.gutenberg.org/license</p> + </availability> + </publicationStmt> + <sourceDesc> + <bibl> + Created electronically. + </bibl> + </sourceDesc> + </fileDesc> + <encodingDesc> + </encodingDesc> + <profileDesc> + <langUsage> + <language id="en"></language> + <language id="zh"></language> + <language id="fr"></language> + <language id="de"></language> + <language id="la"></language> + </langUsage> + </profileDesc> + <revisionDesc> + <change> + <date value="2012-03-02">April 2, 2012</date> + <respStmt> + <name> + Produced by Adam Buchbinder, David King, and the Online + Distributed Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + </name> + </respStmt> + <item>Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1</item> + </change> + </revisionDesc> +</teiHeader> + +<pgExtensions> + <pgStyleSheet> + .boxed { x-class: boxed } + .shaded { x-class: shaded } + .rules { x-class: rules; rules: all } + .indent { margin-left: 2 } + .bold { font-weight: bold } + .italic { font-style: italic } + .smallcaps { font-variant: small-caps } + </pgStyleSheet> + + <pgCharMap formats="txt.iso-8859-1"> + <char id="U0x2014"> + <charName>mdash</charName> + <desc>EM DASH</desc> + <mapping>--</mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2003"> + <charName>emsp</charName> + <desc>EM SPACE</desc> + <mapping> </mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2026"> + <charName>hellip</charName> + <desc>HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS</desc> + <mapping>...</mapping> + </char> + </pgCharMap> +</pgExtensions> + +<text lang="en"> + <front> + <div> + <divGen type="pgheader" /> + </div> + <div> + <divGen type="encodingDesc" /> + </div> + + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">An Exposition of the <hi rend='italic'>Sun Min Chu I</hi></p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">By</p> + <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Ph.D.</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">The Department of Government, Harvard University</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Greenwood Press, Publishers</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Westport, Connecticut</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Copyright 1937, The Johns Hopkins Press</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">First Greenwood Reprinting 1973</p> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <head>Contents</head> + <divGen type="toc" /> + </div> + + </front> +<body> + +<pb n='v'/><anchor id='Pgv'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Foreword.</head> + +<p> +The importance of introducing Western political thought +to the Far East has long been emphasized in the West. +The Chinese conception of a rational world order was +manifestly incompatible with the Western system of independent +sovereign states and the Chinese code of political +ethics was difficult to reconcile with the Western preference +for a reign of law. No argument has been necessary +to persuade Westerners that Chinese political philosophy +would be improved by the influence of Western political +science. +</p> + +<p> +The superior qualifications of Sun Yat-sen for the interpretation +of Western political science to the Chinese have +also been widely recognized in the West, particularly in +the United States. Dr. Sun received a modern education +in medicine and surgery and presumably grasped the spirit +of Western science. He read widely, more widely perhaps +than any contemporary political leader of the first rank +except Woodrow Wilson, in the literature of Western +political science. He was thoroughly familiar with the +development of American political thought and full of +sympathy for American political ideals. His aspiration to +build a modern democratic republic amidst the ruins of +the medieval Manchu Empire, Americans at least can +readily understand. +</p> + +<p> +What is only beginning to be understood, however, in +the West is, that it is equally important to interpret +Chinese political philosophy to the rest of the world. +Western political science has contributed a great deal to +the development of political power. But it has failed lamentably +to illuminate the ends for which such power +should be used. Political ethics is by no means superfluous +in lands where a government of law is supposed to be +established in lieu of a government of men. The limitation +<pb n='vi'/><anchor id='Pgvi'/> +of the authority of sovereign states in the interest of a +better world order is an enterprise to which at last, it may +be hoped not too late, Westerners are beginning to dedicate +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +As an interpreter of Chinese political philosophy to the +West Dr. Sun has no peer. Better than any other Chinese +revolutionary leader he appreciated the durable values in +the classical political philosophy of the Far East. He understood +the necessity for preserving those values, while +introducing the Western political ideas deemed most +proper for adapting the Chinese political system to its +new place in the modern world. His system of political +thought, therefore, forms a blend of Far Eastern political +philosophy and Western political science. It suggests at +the same time both what is suitable in Western political +science for the use of the Far East and what is desirable +in Far Eastern political philosophy for the improvement +of the West. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Linebarger has analyzed Dr. Sun's political ideas, +and also his plans for the political rehabilitation of China, +with a view to the interests of Western students of politics. +For this task his training and experience have given him +exceptional competence. The result is a book, which not +only renders obsolete all previous volumes in Western +languages on modern Chinese political philosophy, but +also makes available for the political scientists and politicians +of the West the best political thought of the Far +East on the fundamental problems of Western politics. +</p> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='smallcaps'>Arthur N. Holcombe</hi></l> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Harvard University</hi></l> +</lg> + +</div> + +<pb n='vii'/><anchor id='Pgvii'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Preface.</head> + +<p> +This book represents an exploration into a field of political +thought which is still more or less unknown. The +Chinese revolution has received much attention from +publicists and historians, and a vast number of works +dealing with almost every phase of Chinese life and events +appears every year in the West. The extraordinary difficulty +of the language, the obscurity—to Westerners—of +the Chinese cultural background, and the greater vividness +of events as compared with theories have led Western +scholars to devote their attention, for the most part, to +descriptions of Chinese politics rather than to venture into +the more difficult field of Chinese political thought, without +which, however, the political events are scarcely +intelligible. +</p> + +<p> +The author has sought to examine one small part of +modern Chinese political thought, partly as a sample of +the whole body of thought, and partly because the selection, +although small, is an important one. Sun Yat-sen +is by far the most conspicuous figure in recent Chinese +history, and his doctrines, irrespective of the effectiveness +or permanence of the consequences of their propagation, +have a certain distinct position in history. The <hi rend='italic'>San Min +Chu I</hi>, his chief work, not only represents an important +phase in the revolution of Chinese social and political +thought, but solely and simply as doctrine, may be regarded +as a Chinese expression of tendencies of political +thought current in the Western world. +</p> + +<p> +The personal motives, arising out of an early and +rather intimate family relationship with the Chinese nationalist +movement centering around the person of Sun +Yat-sen, that led the author to undertake this subject, +have their advantages and disadvantages. The chief disadvantage +lies in the fact that the thesis must of necessity +<pb n='viii'/><anchor id='Pgviii'/> +treat of many matters which are the objects of hot controversy, +and that the author, friendly to the movement as a +whole but neutral as between its factions, may seem at +times to deal unjustly or over-generously with certain persons +and groups. The younger widow of Sun Yat-sen +(née Soong Ching-ling) may regard the mention of her +husband and the Nanking government in the same breath +as an act of treachery. Devoted to the memory of her +husband, she has turned, nevertheless, to the Left, and +works on cordial terms with the Communists. She said: +<q>... the Nanking Government has crushed every open +liberal, democratic, or humanitarian movement in our +country. It has destroyed all trade unions, smashed every +strike of the workers for the right to existence, has thrown +hordes of criminal gangsters who are simultaneously Fascist +<q>Blue Shirts</q> against every labor, cultural, or national +revolutionary movement in the country.</q><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>China Today</hi> (March, 1935), I, No. 6, p. 112. This is the leading +English-language journal of the Chinese Communists. Mme. Sun's letter +to the paper is characteristic of the attitude toward Nanking adopted +throughout the magazine.</note> The author, +from what he himself has seen of the National Government, +is positive that it is not merely dictatorial, ruthless, +cruel, treacherous, or historically unnecessary; nor would +he, contrarily, assert that the National Government lives +up to or surpasses the brilliant ideals of Sun Yat-sen. He +seeks to deal charitably with all factions, to follow a +middle course whenever he can, and in any case to state +fairly the positions of both sides. +</p> + +<p> +The advantages may serve to offset the disadvantages. +In the first place, the author's acquaintance with the Nationalist +movement has given him something of a background +from which to present his exposition. This background +cannot, of course, be documented, but it may serve +to make the presentation more assured and more vivid. +In the second place, the author has had access to certain +<pb n='ix'/><anchor id='Pgix'/> +private manuscripts and papers, and has had the benefit +of his father's counsel on several points in this work.<note place='foot'>These manuscripts consist of the following chief items: Linebarger, +Paul Myron Wentworth, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations with Sun Yat-sen 1919-1922</hi> +(written in 1933-1935); the same, <hi rend='italic'>A Commentary on the San Min Chu I</hi> +(four volumes, 1932-1933); and Sun Yat-sen, <hi rend='italic'>How China Was Made a +Republic</hi> (Shanghai, 1919). These are all typescripts, with autograph +corrections by their respective authors. The manuscripts of Judge Linebarger +represent his attempts to replace, from memory, books which were +destroyed at the time of the bombardment of the Commercial Press in +Shanghai by the Japanese. He had prepared a two-volume work on the +life and principles of Sun Yat-sen and had left his manuscripts and other +papers in the vaults of the Press. When the Press was bombed the +manuscripts, documents, plates and Chinese translations were all destroyed; +the only things remaining were a few pages of proof sheets for <hi rend='italic'>The Life +and Principles of Sun Chung-san</hi>, which remain in the possession of the +present author. Judge Linebarger attempted to replace these volumes. He +had a few notebooks in which he had kept the outlines of his own +speeches; he had not used these, because of the secondary value. When, +however, the major volumes were lost, he returned to these notebooks and +reconstructed his speeches. They were issued in Paris in 1932 under the +title of <hi rend='italic'>The Gospel of Sun Chung-shan</hi>. He also prepared the <hi rend='italic'>Commentary</hi> +and the <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi> from memory. These manuscripts possess a +certain somewhat questionable value. Judge Linebarger himself suggested +that they be allowed the same weight that testimony, based upon +memory but delivered under oath, upon a subject ten years past would +receive in a court of justice. The seven volumes described are in the +possession of the present author. Other materials to which the author +has had access are his father's diaries and various other private papers; +but since he has not cited them for references, he does not believe any +description of them necessary. Finally, there are the manuscripts of <hi rend='italic'>Sun +Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic</hi>, which contain a considerable amount of +material deleted from the published version of that work, which appeared +in New York in 1925. For comments on other source material +for Sun Yat-sen which is not generally used, see Bibliography.</note> +The author believes that on the basis of this material and +background he is justified in venturing into this comparatively +unknown field. +</p> + +<p> +The primary sources for this work have been Sun Yat-sen's +own works. A considerable number of these were +written originally in the English language. Translations +of his major Chinese works are more or less fully available +in English, German, French, or Spanish. The author's +highly inadequate knowledge of the Chinese written language +has led him to depend almost altogether upon +translations, but he has sought—in some cases, perhaps, +unsuccessfully—to minimize the possibility of misunderstanding +or error by checking the translations against one +another. Through the assistance of his Chinese friends, +<pb n='x'/><anchor id='Pgx'/> +he has been able to refer to Sun's complete works in Chinese +and to Chinese books on Sun wherever such reference +was imperatively necessary. A list of the Chinese titles +thus made available is included in the bibliography. The +language difficulty, while an annoyance and a handicap, +has not been so considerable as to give the author reason +to suppose that his conclusions would have been different +in any significant respect had he been able to make free +and continuous use of Chinese and Russian sources. +</p> + +<p> +The author has thought of the present work as a contribution +to political theory rather than to sinology, and +has tried to keep the discussion of sinological questions at +a minimum. In the transliteration of Chinese words and +names he has adhered more or less closely to the Wade +system, and has rendered most terms in the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>kuo yü</foreign>, or national +language. Despite this rule, he gives the name of +President Sun in its more commonly known Cantonese +form, Sun Yat-sen, rather than in the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>kuo yü</foreign>, Sun I-hsien. +</p> + +<p> +In acknowledging assistance and encouragement received, +the author must first of all turn to his father, Judge +Paul Myron Wentworth Linebarger, Legal Advisor to +The National Government of China, counsellor to and +biographer of Sun Yat-sen during the latter's lifetime. +Without his patient encouragement and his concrete assistance, +this book could neither have been begun nor brought +to a conclusion after it was started. The author desires, +however, to make it perfectly clear that this work has no +relation to the connections of Judge Linebarger with the +Chinese Government or with the Nationalist Party. No +<pb n='xi'/><anchor id='Pgxi'/> +information coming to the knowledge of Judge Linebarger +in the course of his official duties has been here incorporated. +Anxiously scrupulous to maintain a completely +detached point of view, the author has refrained from +communicating with or submitting the book to Chinese +Government or Party officials, and writes purely as an +American student of China. +</p> + +<p> +Professor James Hart, formerly at The Johns Hopkins +University and now at The University of Virginia, Professor +Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Johns Hopkins University, +Professor Harley Farnsworth MacNair and Dr. Ernest +Price, both of The University of Chicago, have rendered +inestimable assistance by reading the manuscript and giving +the author the benefit of their advice. Professor Hart +has criticized the work as an enterprise in political science. +Professor Lovejoy assisted the author by reading the first +third of the work, and selections of the later parts, and +applying his thorough and stimulating criticism; the +author regrets that he was unable to adopt all of Professor +Lovejoy's suggestions in full, and is deeply grateful for +the help. Professor MacNair read the book as a referee +for a dissertation, and made a great number of comments +which have made the book clearer and more accurate; the +author would not have ventured to present this work to +the public had it not been for the reassurances and encouragement +given him by Professor MacNair. Dr. Ernest +Price, while at The Hopkins, supervised the composition +of the first drafts; his judicious and balanced criticism, +based upon sixteen years' intimacy with the public and +private life of the Chinese, and a sensitive appreciation +of Chinese values, were of great value to the author in +establishing his perspective and lines of study. The author +takes this opportunity to thank these four gentlemen for +their great kindness and invaluable assistance. +</p> + +<p> +It is with deep regret that the author abbreviates his +acknowledgments and thanks for the inspiration and the +<pb n='xii'/><anchor id='Pgxii'/> +favors he received in his study of Chinese politics from +Dr. C. Walter Young; Professor Frederic Ogg, of The +University of Wisconsin; Professors Kenneth Colegrove, +William McGovern, and Ikuo Oyama, of The Northwestern +University; Dr. Arthur Hummel, of The Library +of Congress; Professor Frederick Dunn, of Yale University; +Professor Arthur Holcombe, of Harvard University; +Professor Quincy Wright, of The University of Chicago; +and Dr. Wallace McClure, of The Department of State. +Many of the author's Chinese friends assisted by reading +the manuscript and criticizing it from their more intimate +knowledge of their own country, among them being +Messrs. Miao Chung-yi and Djang Chu, at The Johns +Hopkins University; Professor Jên T'ai, of Nankai University; +and Messrs. Wang Kung-shou, Ch'ing Ju-chi, and +Lin Mou-sheng, of The University of Chicago, made many +helpful suggestions. The author must thank his teachers +at The Johns Hopkins University, to whom he is indebted +for three years of the most patient assistance and stimulating +instruction, in respect of both the present work and +other fields in the study of government: Dr. Johannes +Mattern; Dr. Albert Weinberg; Mr. Leon Sachs; and Professor +W. W. Willoughby. Finally, he must acknowledge +his indebtedness to his wife, Margaret Snow Linebarger, +for her patient assistance in preparing this volume for +the press. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Paul M. A. Linebarger.</hi> +</p> + +<p> +December, 1936. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='001'/><anchor id='Pg001'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Introduction.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Problem of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</foreign>.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Materials.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen played many rôles in the history of his +times. He was one of those dramatic and somewhat formidable +figures who engage the world's attention at the +very outset of their careers. In the late years of the nineteenth +century, he was already winning some renown in +the West; it was picturesque that a Cantonese, a Christian +physician, should engage in desperate conspiracies +against the Manchu throne. Sun became known as a +political adventurer, a forerunner, as it were, of such mutually +dissimilar personages as Trotsky, Lawrence, and +Major-General Doihara. With the illusory success of the +revolution of 1911, and his Presidency of the first Republic, +Sun ceased being a conspirator in the eyes of the +world's press, and became the George Washington of +China. It is in this rôle that he is most commonly known, +and his name most generally recalled. After the world +war, in the atmosphere of extreme tension developed, perhaps, +by the Bolshevik revolution, Sun was regarded as +an enigmatic leader, especially significant in the struggle +between Asiatic nationalisms allied with the Soviets +against the traditional capitalist state-system. It was +through him that the Red anti-imperialist policy was +pushed to its greatest success, and he was hated and admired, +ridiculed and feared, down to the last moments of +his life. When he died, American reporters in Latvia +cabled New York their reports of Russian comments on +the event.<note place='foot'>Lyon Sharman, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning</hi>, New York, +1934, p. 405.</note> More, perhaps, than any other Chinese of +modern times, Sun symbolized the entrance of China into +<pb n='002'/><anchor id='Pg002'/> +world affairs, and the inevitable confluence of Western +and Far Eastern history. +</p> + +<p> +It is characteristic of Sun that he should have appeared +in another and final rôle after his death. He had been +thought of as conspirator, statesman, and mass leader; +but with the advent of his party to power it became publicly +apparent that he had also been a political philosopher. +The tremendous prestige enjoyed by him as state-founder +and party leader was enhanced by his importance +as prophet and law-giver. His doctrines became the state +philosophy of China, and for a while his most zealous +followers sought to have him canonized in a quite literal +fashion, and at one stroke to make him replace Confucius +and the Sons of Heaven. After the extreme enthusiasms +of the Sun Yat-sen cult subsided, Sun remained the great +national hero-sage of modern China. Even in those territories +where the authority of his political heirs was not +completely effective, his flag was flown and his doctrines +taught. +</p> + +<p> +His doctrines have provided the theories upon which +the Nationalist revolution was based; they form the extra-juridical +constitution of the National Government of +China. When the forces hostile to Sun Yat-sen and his +followers are considered, it is amazing that his ideas and +ideals should have survived. An empire established with +the aid of Japanese arms, and still under Japanese hegemony, +controls Manchuria; parts of north China are ruled +by a bastard government, born of a compromise between +enemies; a largely unrecognized but powerful Soviet Republic +exists in outer Mongolia; the lamaist oligarchy goes +on in Tibet; and somewhere, in central and western China, +a Soviet group, not quite a government but more than a +conspiracy, is fighting for existence. It is quite probable +that nowhere else in the world can there be found a +greater variety of principles, each scheme of principles +fostered by an armed organization struggling with its +<pb n='003'/><anchor id='Pg003'/> +rivals. In this chaos the National Government has made +the most effective bid for authority and the greatest effort +for the reëstablishment of order; through it the principles +of Sun Yat-sen rule the political life of a population +greater than that of the United States or of the Soviet +Union. +</p> + +<p> +It is difficult to evaluate the importance of political +doctrines. Even if <hi rend='italic'>The Three Principles</hi> is judged by +the extent of the population which its followers control, +it has achieved greater results in practical politics in +fifteen years than has Marxism in ninety. Such a criterion +may well be disputed, but, whatever the test, it cannot be +denied that the thought of Sun Yat-sen has played a major +part in the political development of his native land. It +may continue into the indefinitely remote future, or may +succumb to the perils that surround its advocates; in any +case, these doctrines have been taught long enough and +broadly enough to make an impress on the age, and have +been so significant in political and cultural history that +they can never sink into complete obscurity. +</p> + +<p> +What are these doctrines? Sun Yat-sen was so voluminous +a writer that it would be impossible for his followers +to digest and codify all his writings into one neat and +coherent handbook; he himself did not provide one. Before +printing became common, there was a certain automatic +process of condensation which preserved the important +utterances of great men, and let their trivial sayings +perish. Sun, however, must have realized that he was +leaving a vast legacy of materials which are not altogether +coherent or consistent with one another. Certain of his +works were naturally more important than others, but, to +make the choice definitive, he himself indicated four +sources which his followers might draw upon for a definitive +statement of his views.<note place='foot'>He did this in his <hi rend='italic'>Political Testament</hi>, which is given in almost every +work on Sun Yat-sen or on modern Chinese politics. It was written in +February and signed in March 1925, shortly before his death.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='004'/><anchor id='Pg004'/> + +<p> +His <hi rend='italic'>Political Testament</hi> cites the <hi rend='italic'>Chien Kuo Fang Lo</hi> +(<hi rend='italic'>The Program of National Reconstruction</hi>), the <hi rend='italic'>Chien +Kuo Ta Kang</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>The Outline of National Reconstruction</hi>), +the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>The Triple Demism</hi>, also translated +as <hi rend='italic'>The Three Principles of the People</hi>), and the <hi rend='italic'>Manifesto</hi> +issued by the first national congress of the Party.<note place='foot'>The Chinese text of these is given in Hu Han-min, <hi rend='italic'>ed.</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>Tsung-li +Ch'üan Chi</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>The Complete Works of the Leader</hi>), 4 vol. in 1, Shanghai, +1930. This collection comprises the most important works of Sun which +were published in his lifetime. Edited by one of the two scholars closest +to Sun, it is the standard edition of his works. English versions of varying +amounts of this material are given in Paschal M. d'Elia, <hi rend='italic'>The Triple +Demism of Sun Yat-sen</hi>, Wuchang, 1931; Frank W. Price, <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu +I, The Three Principles of the People</hi>, Shanghai, 1930; and Leonard +Shih-lien Hsü, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals</hi>, Los Angeles, +1933. Each of these works will henceforth be cited by the name of its +editor; for brief descriptions and appraisals, see the bibliography.</note> +These four items differ quite sharply from one another +in form. No one of them can be relied upon to give the +whole of Sun's doctrines. +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Chien Kuo Fang Lo</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>The Program of National +Reconstruction</hi>) is in reality three works, only remotely +related to one another. The first item in the trilogy is +the <hi rend='italic'>Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>The Philosophy of Sun Wên</hi>); +it is a series of familiar essays on the Chinese way of +thought.<note place='foot'>The only English version of this work is one prepared by Wei Yung, +under the title of <hi rend='italic'>The Cult of Dr. Sun</hi>, Shanghai, 1931. Fragments of +this work are also to be found in Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., <hi rend='italic'>Sun' Iat-sen, +Otets Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii</hi>, (<hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, Father of the Chinese Revolution</hi>), +Moscow, 1925; <hi rend='italic'>Zapiski Kitaiskogo Revoliutsionera</hi>, (<hi rend='italic'>Notes of a +Chinese Revolutionary</hi>), Moscow, 1926; <hi rend='italic'>Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary</hi>, +Philadelphia, n. d.; and Karl Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen +eines chinesischen Revolutionärs</hi>, Vienna & Berlin, n. d. (ca. +1927).</note> The second is the <hi rend='italic'>Min Ch'üan Ts'u Pu</hi>, <hi rend='italic'>The +Primer of Democracy</hi>, which is little more than a text +on parliamentary law.<note place='foot'>This work has not been translated into any Western language.</note> The third is the <hi rend='italic'>Shih Yeh Chi +Hua</hi>, known in English as <hi rend='italic'>The International Development +<pb n='005'/><anchor id='Pg005'/> +of China</hi>, which Sun wrote in both English and Chinese.<note place='foot'>Sun Yat-sen, <hi rend='italic'>The International Development of China</hi>, New York and +London, 1929.</note> +These three works, under the alternate titles of <q>The +Program of Psychological Reconstruction,</q> <q>The Program +of Social Reconstruction,</q> and <q>The Program of +Material Reconstruction</q> form <hi rend='italic'>The Program of National +Reconstruction</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>Chien Kuo Ta Kang, The Outline of National +Reconstruction</hi>, is an outline of twenty-five points, giving +the necessary steps towards the national reconstruction +in their most concise form.<note place='foot'>This is given in Hsü, cited above, and in Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau, +<hi rend='italic'>Two Years of Nationalist China</hi>, Shanghai, 1930, pp. 439-442. Dr. +Tyau substitutes the word <q>Fundamentals</q> for <q>Outline,</q> a rather +happy choice.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> is Sun's most important work. It +comprises sixteen lectures setting forth his socio-political +theories and his programs. The title most commonly used +in Western versions is <hi rend='italic'>The Three Principles of the +People</hi>.<note place='foot'>See bibliography for a complete list of the translations. d'Elia translation, +cited, pp. 36-49, dedicates a whole chapter to the problem of an +adequate translation of the Chinese phrase <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. He concludes +that it can only be rendered by a nelogism based upon Greek +roots: <hi rend='italic'>the triple demism</hi>, <q>demism</q> including the meaning of <q>principle +concerning and for the people</q> and <q>popular principle.</q></note> +</p> + +<p> +The last document mentioned in Sun Yat-sen's will was +the <hi rend='italic'>Manifesto</hi> of the first national congress of the Kuomintang. +This was not written by himself, but was drafted +by Wang Ch'ing-wei, one of his closest followers, and +embodies essentially the same ideas as do the other three +items, even though Borodin—the emissary of the Third +International—had been consulted in its preparation.<note place='foot'>T'ang Leang-li, <hi rend='italic'>The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution</hi>, New +York, 1930, p. 166.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun undoubtedly regretted leaving such a heterogeneous +and ill-assembled group of works as his literary bequest. +<pb n='006'/><anchor id='Pg006'/> +Throughout the latter years of his life he was studying +political science in the hope that he might be able to +complete a great treatise which he had projected, an +analysis and statement of the programs of the Chinese +nationalists. One attempt toward actualization of this +work was frustrated when Sun's manuscripts and a great +part of his library were burned in the attack launched +against him by Ch'en Ch'iung-ming in 1922. His apology +for the makeshift volume on the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> is pathetic: +<q>As I had neither time to prepare nor books to +use as references, I could do nothing else in these lectures +but improvise after I ascended the platform. Thus +I have omitted and forgotten many things which were in +my original manuscript. Although before having them +printed, I revised them, added (passages) and eliminated +(others), yet, those lectures are far from coming +up to my original manuscripts, either in the subject matter +itself, or in the concatenations of the discussion, or in +the facts adduced as proofs.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 58.</note> Sun was in all probability +a more assiduous and widely read student of political +science than any other world leader of his day except +Wilson; he studied innumerable treatises on government, +and was surprisingly familiar with the general +background of Western politics, in theory and practice. +He was aware of the shabby appearance that these undigested +occasional pieces would present when put forth as +the bible of a new China, and earnestly enjoined his followers +to carry on his labors and bring them to fruition.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 58.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The various works included in the <hi rend='italic'>Chien Kuo Fang Lo</hi>, +while satisfactory for the purposes Sun had in mind +when he wrote them, are not enough to outline the fundamentals +both of political theory and a governmental +plan. The familiar essays have an important bearing on +the formation of the ideology of a new China; the primer +<pb n='007'/><anchor id='Pg007'/> +of democracy, less; the industrial plan is one of those +magnificent dreams which, in the turn of a decade, may +inspire an equally great reality. The outline and the +manifesto are no more suited to the rôle of classics; they +are decalogues rather than bibles.<note place='foot'>See Lyon Sharman, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning</hi>, New +York, 1934, p. 292, for a stimulating discussion of the parts that the +various documents played in the so-called "cult of Sun Yat-sen."</note> There remains the +<hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> is a collection of sixteen lectures +delivered in Canton in 1924. There were to have been +eighteen, but Sun was unable to give the last two. Legend +has it that Borodin persuaded Sun to give the series.<note place='foot'>Sharman, cited, p. 270.</note> +Whatever the cause of their being offered, they attracted +immediate attention. Interest in Sun and in his ideas was +at a fever heat; his friends turned to the printed lectures +for guidance; his enemies, for statements which could be +turned against him. Both friends and enemies found what +they wanted. To the friends, the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> presented +a fairly complete outline of Sun's political and +social thought in such a form that it could be preserved +and broadcast readily. There was danger, before the book +appeared, that the intrinsic unity in Sun's thinking would +be lost sight of by posterity, that his ideas would appear +as a disconnected jumble of brilliant inspirations. The +sixteen lectures incorporated a great part of the doctrines +which he had been preaching for more than a generation. +To the enemies of Sun, the work was welcome. They +pointed out the numerous simplifications and inconsistencies, +the frequent contradictions in matters of detail, the +then outrageous denunciations of the economic and political +system predominant in the Far East. They ridiculed +Sun because he was Chinese, and because he was +not Chinese enough, and backed up their criticisms with +passages from the book.<note place='foot'>A typical instance of this sort of criticism is to be found in +the annotations to the anonymous translation of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> +which was published by a British newspaper in 1927 (<hi rend='italic'>The Three +Principles</hi>, Shanghai, 1927). The translator and annotator both remained +anonymous; the translation was wholly inadequate; and the annotations a +marvel of invective. Almost every page of the translation was studded +with notes pointing out and gloating over the most trivial errors and +inconsistencies. The inflamed opinion of the time was not confined to +the Chinese.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='008'/><anchor id='Pg008'/> + +<p> +When Sun gave the lectures, he was a sick man. He +carried an ivory-headed sword cane with him on the platform; +occasionally, holding it behind him and locking his +arms through it, he would press it against his back to +relieve the intolerable pain.<note place='foot'>Paul M. W. Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Deutschlands Gegenwärtige Gelegenheiten +in China</hi>, Brussels, 1936, p. 53. Judge Linebarger repeats the story told +him by General Morris Cohen, the Canadian who was Sun's bodyguard +throughout this period.</note> The business awaiting him +after each lecture was vitally important; the revolution +was proceeding by leaps and bounds. The lectures are the +lectures of a sick man, given to a popular audience in the +uproar of revolution, without adequate preparation, improvised +in large part, and offered as one side of a crucial +and bitterly disputed question. The secretaries who took +down the lectures may not have succeeded in following +them completely; Sun had no leisure to do more than +skim through the book before releasing it to the press. +</p> + +<p> +These improvised lectures have had to serve as the +fundamental document of Nationalist China. Sun Yat-sen +died without writing the treatise he had planned. +The materials he left behind were a challenge to scholars +and to his followers. Many persons set to work interpreting +them, each with a conscious or unconscious end +in view. A German Marxian showed Sun to be a forerunner +of bolshevism; an American liberal showed Sun +to be a bulwark against bolshevism. A Chinese classicist +demonstrated Sun's reverence for the past; a Jesuit father +explained much by Sun's modern and Christian background. +His works have been translated into Western +<pb n='009'/><anchor id='Pg009'/> +languages without notes; the improvised lectures, torn +from their context of a revolutionary crisis, have served +poorly to explain the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, and his +long range political, social, and economic plans. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Necessity of an Exposition.</head> + +<p> +Followers of Sun who knew him personally, or were +members of that circle in which his ideas and opinions +were well known, have found the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> and +other literary remains helpful; they have been able to +turn to the documents to refresh their memories of Sun +on some particular point, or to experience the encouraging +force of his faith and enthusiasm again. They need not +be reminded of the main tenets of his thought, or of the +fundamental values upon which he based his life and +his political activities. His sense of leadership, which +strangers have at times thought fantastic, is one which +they admire in him, since they, too, have felt the power +of his personality and have experienced that leadership +in the course of their own lives. His voice is ringing in +their consciences; they feel no need of a guide to his mind. +At the present day many members of Sun's own family, +and a considerable number of his veteran disciples are +still living; the control of the National Government is +in their hands. They are people who need no commentary +on Sun Yat-sen; to them, he died only yesterday. +</p> + +<p> +Others, who met Sun only casually, or who could know +him only through his writings, have a quite different impression +of his thought. They perforce assume that he +thought as he wrote, and fail to realize that virtually all +his writings and speeches were occasional pieces, improvisations +designed as propaganda. One of the most respected +American authorities on China says that in the +<hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> <q>... there is a combination of sound +social analysis, keen comment on comparative political +<pb n='010'/><anchor id='Pg010'/> +science, and bombast, journalistic inaccuracy, jejune philosophizing +and sophomoric economics.</q><note place='foot'>Nathaniel Peffer, <hi rend='italic'>China: The Collapse of a Civilization</hi>, New York, +1930, p. 155.</note> This view is +one which can scarcely be attacked, if one considers only +the printed lectures, and overlooks the other utterances +and the personality of Sun. To apply this, or any similar +estimate (and there are many of them), to all of Sun +Yat-sen's thought would be woefully inaccurate. It is not +the critic's fault that Sun never found time to write a +sober, definitive political treatise expressing his ideas; it +is, nevertheless, the critic's responsibility to weigh the +value of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>, and consider the importance +which Sun himself attached to it, before judging Sun's +whole philosophy by a hastily-composed and poorly written +book. +</p> + +<p> +Yet, if the Western student of modern Chinese history +were to look elsewhere for some general exposition of +Sun Yat-sen's political ideas, he would find none. He +could discover several excellent translations of the sixteen +lectures, and parts of the other work of Sun. He +would be helped by the prefatory notes to some of these +translations.<note place='foot'>d'Elia, cited; Hsü, cited; and Wittfogel, cited.</note> A few treatises would be available to him +on special phases of Sun's thought: the influence of +Maurice William, and the influence of the Russian Communists.<note place='foot'>Maurice William, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism</hi>, Baltimore, 1932; +and Tsui Shu-chin, <hi rend='italic'>The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon +Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy</hi>, in <hi rend='italic'>The Social and Political Science +Review</hi>, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934; and other works listed in +bibliography, pp. 268-269.</note> +In addition, there would be the biographies, +of which there are more than a dozen, and a few other +useful although not general works. None of these sifts +Sun's thought, seeking to separate the transitory from the +permanent in his ideas. For this the searcher would have +to rely on brief outlines of Sun's ideas, to be found in +<pb n='011'/><anchor id='Pg011'/> +works dealing with modern China or the Chinese revolution.<note place='foot'>Two such are the chapters on Sun Yat-sen's thought to be found in +Harley Farnsworth MacNair, <hi rend='italic'>China in Revolution</hi>, Chicago, 1931, +pp. 78-91 (Chapter VI, <q>The Ideology and Plans of Sun Yat-sen</q>) +and Arthur N. Holcombe, <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Revolution</hi>, Cambridge (Massachusetts), +1930, pp. 120-155 (Chapter V, <q>The Revolutionary Politics +of Sun Yat-sen</q>). The former is the shorter of the two, and is a +summary of the various documents involved. The distinction between +the ideology and the plans is so convenient and illuminating that the +present writer has adopted it. Except for the comments on the influence +of William upon Sun Yat-sen, it is completely reliable. The latter is a +discussion, rather than an outline, and admirably presents the gist of +Sun's thought.</note> +</p> + +<p> +This relative scarcity of exegetic material concerning +the ideology and programs of Sun is not the result of any +inadequacy on the part of those persons, both Chinese +and Western, who have devoted thought and time to his +life or to the translation of his works. It is one thing +to point out a task that has yet to be done; and quite +another, actually to perform it. An interpretation or exposition +of Sun's thought, to be worthy of the great significance +of the original, must be very thorough; but +scarcely enough time has elapsed to allow a perspective +of all the materials, let alone an orientation of Sun in +the Far Eastern scene. Yet the importance of Sun demands +that something be done to bring his thought to +the attention of the world, so that the usual distortion of +his personality—arising from the lack of commentaries—may +be avoided in present day works. In a sense, the time +is not ripe for a definitive treatment of Sun, either as a +figure in history or as a contributor to the significant and +enduring political thought of modern times; any work +now done will, as time passes, fall grotesquely far short +of adequacy. On the other hand, there is so much material +of a perishable nature—anecdotes and legends not +yet committed to print, and the memories of living men—now +available, that a present-day work on Sun may gain +<pb n='012'/><anchor id='Pg012'/> +in color and intimacy what it loses in judgment and objectivity, +may gain in proximity what it has to forgo in +detachment. And, lastly, the complete absence of any +systematic presentation of Sun's ideas in any Western language +is so great a deficiency in the fields of Far Eastern +history and world political thought, that even a relatively +inadequate exposition of the thought of Sun Yat-sen may +prove to be not without value. Sun himself never explained +his philosophy, whether theoretical or applied, +in any broad, systematic fashion; nor has anyone else +done so. +</p> + +<p> +If the permissibility of an exposition of Sun Yat-sen's +thought be conceded, there still remains the vexing problem +of a choice of method. While the far-flung peripheries +of Sun's thought touch almost every field of knowledge +and opinion, a systematic condensation of his views +cannot hope to survey the same broad ranges. The problem +of proportion, of just emphasis, involves the nice +appraisal of the degree of importance which each of Sun's +minor rôles had in his intellectual career as a whole. Nor +do the difficulties concerning method end with the consideration +of proportion; they merely begin, for there remains +the far more important and perplexing problem of +a technique of interpretation. +</p> + +<p> +Interpretation obviously relates to the problem of language. +The translation of theoretical terms from Chinese +into English constitutes a formidable difficulty which +proves, in several instances, to be insuperable. No satisfactory +equivalent for <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> (usually rendered <q>livelihood</q>) +can be found in English; even simpler and less +specialized terms are extremely difficult to render. Sometimes +it would be convenient to employ four or five alternative +translations for one Chinese term. Sun uses the +word <q>nationalism</q> in the sense that a Westerner would, +in advocating national consciousness in a China hitherto +unfamiliar with the conception of nation-states; but, in +<pb n='013'/><anchor id='Pg013'/> +a different context, he uses it in the sense of <q>patriotism.</q><note place='foot'>Holcombe, cited, p. 136 ff.</note> +These difficulties must be faced and, somehow +or other, overcome. When the Western reader encounters +a familiar term in an unexpected place, he must be +prepared to meet a shift of meaning. No amount of definition +can make a Chinese term, which has no exact Western +equivalent, completely clear. It is simpler to grow +accustomed to the term, to gather together its connotations, +to understand something of the frame of reference +wherein it is set, and thereby to learn it as a child learns +a word. A dictionary is no help to a baby; in a realm of +unfamiliar ideas even scholars must learn terms step by +step. +</p> + +<p> +Less obviously than language, the translation of ideas +and of values is also involved in interpretation. In dealing +with the intellectual content of a civilization as alien +as that of China, the Westerner must be wary of the easy +analogy. The full, forceful application of Western ideas +and values in a world to which they are completely irrelevant +produced strange results during the nineteenth century. +Western notions of goodness and reasonableness did +not fit the Chinese scheme of things. Under such a test +a wildly distorted image of China was obtained. China +seemed peculiar, topsy-turvy, fantastic. To themselves the +Chinese still seemed quite matter-of-fact, and the Westerners +thought even this odd and ridiculous: not only +was China upside-down, but the Chinese did not know +it! In any case, the present-day scholar, to whom so much +material concerning the Chinese is available and China so +near, has little justification for applying Western tests of +virtue and rationality to things Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +If the application of Western values to China is +avoided, there is still the danger that the Chinese scheme +of things may not be interpreted at all. The literal translation +<pb n='014'/><anchor id='Pg014'/> +of Chinese terms strips them of their contexts. The +result may be unintelligibility. The Chinese term <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> is +frequently rendered <q>benevolence,</q> a Western word +which, while at times an approximate equivalent, fails to +carry the full burden of meaning. Sun speaks of an interpretation +of history antagonistic to dialectical materialism—the +interpretation of history by <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>. A <q>benevolent</q> +interpretation of history means nothing whatever to a +Westerner. If <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> is translated into a different configuration +of words, and given as <q>group-consciousness</q> or +<q>social fellow-feeling,</q> the result, while still not an exact +equivalent of the Chinese, is distinctly more intelligible. +</p> + +<p> +To effect this translation of ideas and values, several +methods are available. The issue cannot be dodged by a +denial of its existence; the mere act of explanation involves +some process, whether deliberate or unconscious, +of translation and transvaluation. If the interpreter refuses +to deal with the problem consciously, he will nevertheless +be guided by his unrevealed assumptions. To give +an accounting for what he has done, he must, first, admit +that he is interpreting, and second, seek to make plain +what he is doing, so that his readers may allow for the +process. The demonstration of the consequences of interpretation +minimizes their possible adverse effects. The +simplest way to allow for the alterations (beyond mere +reproduction) arising from interpretation would be to +adopt a technique so widely known that others could, in +their own minds, try to re-trace the steps of the process +and negate the changes. Among such widely known +techniques are the Marxian and the sociological. +</p> + +<p> +Both these scarcely seem adapted to the problems presented +by an interpretation of Sun Yat-sen. The Marxian +terminology is so peculiarly suited to the ulterior purposes +the Marxians keep in mind, and is so esoteric when +applied to matters not related to the general fields in +which the Marxians are interested, that it could scarcely +<pb n='015'/><anchor id='Pg015'/> +be applied in the present instance. A non-Marxian would +find it a hazardous task. The interpreter of Sun Yat-sen +must interpret <emph>into</emph> something; what, depends on the audience. +Dialectical materialism, in the abstract excellent as +a technique, would scarcely make Sun understandable to +most Americans of the present day. Sun himself rejected +the Marxian method of interpretation; an American audience +would also reject it; these two factors outweigh all +the conceivable advantages. +</p> + +<p> +The sociological technique of interpretation is quite +another question. The various methods of analysis developed +by each of the schools of sociologists are still the +objects rather than the tools of study. Such men as Max +Weber and Vilfredo Pareto have made contributions to +Western social thought which enrich the scope and method +of the social studies. Their methods of analysis are not +weighted down by a body of extraneous considerations, +as is the Marxian, and they promise an objectivity not +otherwise attainable. On the other hand, they are still at +that stage of development where the technique obtrudes +itself; it has not, as has the inductive method in general, +become so much taken for granted as to be invisible. +</p> + +<p> +The sociological approach need not, however, be carried +to the full extent thought necessary by its advocates. +In the study of law, the consideration of extra-juridical +materials is called sociological in contrast to the strictly +juristic. If the legal scholar goes beyond the strict framework +of the law, and considers other elements in man's +behavior and knowledge while dealing with legal problems, +he is apt to be called a sociological jurist. In doing +so he is not committed, however, to belief in or use of +any particular form of what is known as the science of +society or sociology. He may adopt almost any sort of +social outlook, or may be committed to any one of many +doctrines of social value and to any one of widely varying +methods of social study. +</p> + +<pb n='016'/><anchor id='Pg016'/> + +<p> +This negative, broad sense of the sociological, when +applied to the study of politics, has commonly meant that +the scholars employing it began with the notion of the +political, but, finding it too narrow, touched upon related +fields. An interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's politics might +be based on this method. It would still be a political +work, in that it sought to associate his ideas with the ideas +concerning government to be found in the West, but +would be free, nevertheless, to touch upon non-political +materials relevant to Sun's politics. The Chinese have +had notions of authority and control radically different +from those developed in the West; a purely juristic interpretation +of the various Chinese politics would simply +scrape the lacquer off the screen. +</p> + +<p> +The Chinese have not had the sharp distinction of +disciplines which runs through all Western learning. +Since one of the most conspicuous ingredients in their +thought—conspicuous, that is, to Westerners looking in +from outside—has been the ethical, many Westerners +have dismissed Chinese historical, political and more +strictly philosophical thought as being loosely and amiably +ethical but never getting anywhere. The Chinese did not +departmentalize their learning to any considerable degree. +Politics was not the special activity of a definite group of +men, or the study of a select body of scholars. Politics +ran through and across most of the activities in society, +and was largely the interest of that intellectual élite by +which China has been so distinguished on the roster of +civilizations. In becoming everything, politics ceased being +politics; that is, those elements in man's thought and +behavior which Westerners have termed political were not +separated and labelled. The Westerner must say that +politics was everything in China, or that it was nothing. +</p> + +<p> +An interpretation of Sun Yat-sen must keep in mind +these differences between Chinese and Western categories. +In doing so it will pass beyond the limits of what is commonly +<pb n='017'/><anchor id='Pg017'/> +known as politics, since no sharp boundaries of +<q>politics</q> are to be found in China. Yet, as an interpretation +designed to serve Western readers, it must return +again and again to Western politics, making comparisons +when they are justified, pointing out differences +between China and the West as they become relevant and +clear. The interpretation will thus weave back and forth +between conventional Western political science, with its +state-mindedness, and the wholly different material of +traditions and customs out of which Sun sought to construct +an ideology and a system of working politics for +China in the modern world. +</p> + +<p> +How can this interpretation seek to avoid the misfortunes +and errors into which so many similar attempts have +fallen? It must proceed without the aid of such specialized +techniques as dialectical-materialistic or Paretian +analysis, and yet aim at the scientific, the rationally defensible, +the objective. In seeking to apply a method in +the interpretation of Sun Yat-sen, the work must face +criticism of its method, must make the method explicit +and simple enough to allow criticism. If the thought of +Sun really is to emerge from the exposition, the exposition +must allow itself to be judged, so that it can be appraised, +and so that, one way or another, it may not interfere +with the just evaluation of the materials which it +seeks to present. Sun Yat-sen should not be judged poor +because of a poor interpretation; nor, on the other hand, +should his thought be adjudged more excellent or more +exact than it seems to the Chinese, merely because the +expositor has suggested an interpretation possibly more +precise. +</p> + +<p> +The technique adopted in the present work is a relatively +simple one. It is an attempt to start <foreign rend='italic'>de novo</foreign> with +certain concepts of society and government. Several simple +although novel terms are introduced, to provide a +foundation upon which the procedure may rest. One of +<pb n='018'/><anchor id='Pg018'/> +these, for instance, is <q>ideology,</q> which in the present +work refers to the whole psychological conditioning of a +group of persons.<note place='foot'>The word <q>ideology</q> is one of the catchwords of the hour. The +author regrets having to use it, but dares not coin a neologism to replace +it. He does not desire that <q>ideology</q> be opposed to <q>truth,</q> but uses +the word in its broadest possible sense, referring to the whole socio-psychological +conditioning of a group of people. He does not, therefore, +speak of ideologies as a collection of Paretian derivations, fictions which +mask some <q>truth.</q> He considers his own background—or Pareto's, +for that matter—as ideological, and—in the sense of the word here employed—cannot +conceive of any human belief or utterance <emph>not</emph> ideological. +The task he has set himself is the transposition of a pattern of Chinese +ideas concerning government from the Chinese ideology to the Western-traditionalist +ideology of the twentieth century. Whether one, the other, +neither, or both, is <q>right,</q> is quite beside the point, so far as the +present enterprise is concerned. In calling the whole non-physical background +of a society the ideology of that society, the author can excuse his +novel use of the term only if he admits that he establishes the new +meaning by definition, without any necessary reference to the previous use +of the term. He has no intention of following, in the present work, any +<q>theory of ideology</q> or definition of <q>ideology</q> established by political +philosophers, such as Marx, or sociologists such as Weber, Mannheim, or +Pareto. (Professor A. O. Lovejoy suggested the following definition of +the term, <q>ideology,</q> after having seen the way it was employed in this +work: <q><emph>Ideology</emph> means a complex of ideas, in part ethical, in part +political, in part often religious, which is current in a society, or which +the proponents of it desire to make current, as an effective means of controlling +behavior.</q>)</note> No attempt is made, at the beginning +or at any later phase of the exposition, to distinguish +between the ideology as belief and the ideology as +truth. Whether the Chinese were and are right, or the +Westerners, are questions, not for the student of comparative +political science, but for the philosopher and +the psychologist. The interpretation seeks, as far as possible, +to transpose certain parts of the traditional Chinese +ideology, as they were, and as Sun Yat-sen re-shaped them, +into one frame of reference provided by the ideology of +twentieth-century America. What the <q>real truth</q> is, +does not matter; the Marxians would say that both ideologies +were inexact; so might the Roman Catholics. If the +<pb n='019'/><anchor id='Pg019'/> +ideology of old China, and the ideology that Sun wished +to see developed in the minds of the Chinese people of +the future, can be made comprehensible in terms of contemporary +American beliefs, of fact or of value, this +venture will have been successful. +</p> + +<p> +The Chinese ideology cannot be explained in its own +terms; these exist only in the Chinese language. If Sun +Yat-sen's own arrangement of his works is inadequate for +the Chinese, rearrangement is a task for the Chinese and +not for the Western scholars to perform. The Westerners +who deal with Sun can contribute substantially only if +they give what the Chinese cannot—enough of a reference +to their own ideology to permit a broader scale for +the analysis and the appreciation of Sun's thought. Their +knowledge of their own world of ideas is the special tool +which justifies their intervention in this Chinese field of +knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +In avoiding the unjustifiable imposition of Western +ideas and values upon the Chinese, and yet orienting +Sun's thought with respect to the West, the interpretation +will have to resort to several fairly evident means. +In the first place, it will have to transpose Chinese ideas +into the Western ideology, and yet avoid distortions of +meaning. This can be partly done by the use of neutral +terms, of terms which are simple and clear enough to +reproduce the Chinese, and nevertheless not so heavily +burdened with connotations that they will cause a reading-in +of Western ideas not relevant to the point in question. +More simply, the Chinese ideas must be represented +by terms which approximate the same set of values in +the West that their originals have in China. This will +sometimes require the use of unfamiliar periphrases: the +words <q>music</q> and <q>rites</q> may be given as <q>the +rhythm of life</q> and <q>conformity to the ideology.</q> Secondly, +the Chinese ideology need not be given as a whole; +it is improbable that it could, without a terrific expansion +<pb n='020'/><anchor id='Pg020'/> +of the Western ideology to accommodate it; but enough +of the Chinese ideology must be given to explain the significant +differences between the Chinese system of controlling +the behavior of men, and the Western. This latter +involves the choice of material, and is therefore by its +nature challengeable. +</p> + +<p> +Again, in demonstrating significant differences instead +of merely seeking analogous (and probably misleading) +examples, the interpretation might turn to certain aspects +of Chinese philosophy which appear as strikingly illustrative +of the point of view of the Chinese. Confucius +the political thinker is only a small part of Confucius the +man and the philosopher; Chinese political thought, although +a vast field, is only a small part of the social +thought of the Chinese. Only an infinitesimal part of +this comparatively minor area of Chinese study will suffice +to make clear some, at least, of the sharp differences +of outlook between China and the West. +</p> + +<p> +A recapitulation of this declaration of technique may +be found helpful, for an understanding of Sun Yat-sen +by Westerners is necessary because of the vastly different +background of his thought. Even apart from the strangeness +of his thought to the West, it is scattered in the +original, and must be pieced together. An exposition of +his ideas which would, at one and the same time, present +a systematic outline of his ideas, and transpose them into +a frame of reference where Western scholars might grasp +them, might be a labor meriting performance. His terms +would have to be rendered by neutral words (not overladen +with particular Western contexts) or by neologisms, +or simply left in the original, to develop meaning as a +configuration of related ideas is built up about them. The +problem of interpretation cannot, however, be solved by +settling the difficulty of language: there still remains the +question of a technique which can pretend to the scientific, +the exact, the rationally defensible. Despite their great +<pb n='021'/><anchor id='Pg021'/> +merits, the Marxian and Paretian techniques are not suited +to the present task. The point of view and means of +study of political science may be kept, if a few necessary +borrowings from sociological thought (not necessarily sociology) +are introduced. Such borrowing includes the use +of notions such as non-political society, patterns of authority, +and ideology, none of which are to be found in +the more law-minded part of political science. By seeking +to point out the Chinese, then the Western, ideas involved, +without confusing the two, the presentation may +succeed in transposing the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as +well as his beliefs concerning working politics, into the +English language and into an explanatory but not distorting +background. To do this, a small sampling of certain +aspects of old Chinese social thought and behavior +will be a required preliminary. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='022'/><anchor id='Pg022'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter I. The Ideological, Social, and Political Background.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Rationale of the Readjustment.</head> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> and related works of Sun Yat-sen +represent in their entirety one of the most ambitious +bodies of doctrine ever set forth by a political leader. +They differ from such a document as the Communist +Manifesto in that they comprehend a much greater range +of subject matter and deal with it in much greater detail. +They pertain not merely to the reconstitution of an economic +or political system; they propose a plan for the +reconstruction of a whole civilization, the reformation of +a way of thought customary among a great part of the +human race, and a consequent transformation of men's +behavior. Conceived in the bold flights of a penetrating, +pioneering mind, avowedly experimental at the time of +their first utterance, these works of Sun have already +played a most significant rôle in the Far East and may +continue to affect history for a long time to come. They +may quite legitimately be called the bible of new China. +</p> + +<p> +Social change is a consequence of maladjustment. The +thought of Sun Yat-sen is a program of change—change +which, if it is to be understood, must be seen at its beginning +and its end. The background from which Sun +emerged and which was an implicit condition of all his +utterances must be mentioned, so that the problems he +faced may be understood. Only then will it be possible +to turn to the plans he devised for the rethinking of Chinese +tradition and the reorganization of Chinese polity. +A vast maladjustment between the Chinese and the world +outside led to the downfall of the Manchu Empire in +China and has threatened the stability of every government +<pb n='023'/><anchor id='Pg023'/> +erected since that time; Chinese society is in a state +of profound unrest and recurrent turmoil. Sun Yat-sen +contributed to the change, and sought a new order, to be +developed from the disorder which, voluntarily or not, he +helped in part to bring about. +</p> + +<p> +The old order that failed, the <emph>interregnum</emph> (in the etymological +sense of the word), and the new order proposed +by Sun must be taken all together in order to obtain +a just understanding of Sun's thought. No vast history +need be written, no <hi rend='italic'>Decline and Fall of the Chinese Empire</hi> +is necessary, but some indication of the age-old foundations +and proximate conditions of Sun's thought must +be obtained. +</p> + +<p> +These may, perhaps, be found in a sampling of certain +data from the thought and behavior of the Chinese as a +group under the old system, and the selection of a few +important facts from the history of China since the first +stages of the maladjustment. An exposition of Sun's +thought must not slur the great importance of the past, +yet it dare not linger too long on this theme lest the +present—in which, after all, uncounted millions of Chinese +are desperately struggling for life—come to seem +insignificant. +</p> + +<p> +Confucianism is a philosophy so broad and so highly +developed that any selection does violence to its balance +and proportion, which are among its chief merits.<note place='foot'>Confucianism may be read in the Legge translations, a popular +abridged edition of which was issued in 1930 in Shanghai under the title +of <hi rend='italic'>The Four Books</hi>. Commentaries on Confucius which present him in a +well-rounded setting are Richard Wilhelm, <hi rend='italic'>Confucius and Confucianism</hi>, +New York, 1931; the same, <hi rend='italic'>Ostasien, Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen +Kulturkreises</hi>, Potsdam, 1928, for a very concise account and the +celebrated <hi rend='italic'>Geschichte der chinesischen Kultur</hi>, Munich, 1928, for a longer +account in a complete historical setting; Frederick Starr, <hi rend='italic'>Confucianism</hi>, +New York, 1930; H. G. Creel, <hi rend='italic'>Sinism</hi>, Chicago, 1929; and Marcel +Granet, <hi rend='italic'>La Civilization Chinoise</hi>, Paris, 1929. Bibliographies are found in +several of these works. They deal with Confucius either in his historical +setting or as the main object of study, and are under no necessity of +distorting Confucius' historical rôle for the purpose of showing his +connection with some other topic. The reader may gauge the amount of +distortion necessary when he imagines a work on Lenin, written for the +information and edification of Soviet Eskimos, which—for the sake of +clarity—was forced to summarize all Western thought, from Plato and +Jesus Christ down to Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, in a few pages providing +a background to Lenin.</note> Yet +<pb n='024'/><anchor id='Pg024'/> +only those few facts can be taken from the history and +thought of the Chinese which may assist the Westerner +in becoming familiar with a few terms which recur again +and again in the works of Sun Yat-sen. If the present +work purported to be a study of Chinese history, or a +complete analysis of the Chinese social system, such an +extreme selectivity could not be condoned; since it, however, +tries only to outline Sun's thought, the selection of +a few Confucian doctrines and the complete ignoring of +others, may be forgiven. All the schools of the past, and +the literary traditions which developed from them, and +social tendencies that were bound up with these have to +be omitted, and those few ideas and customs described +which bear directly on one single point—the most significant +ideological differences between the Chinese and +the West with respect to the political order, i. e. the control +of men in society in the name of all society.<note place='foot'>There is a work on Confucianism upon which the author has leaned +quite heavily: Leonard Shih-lien Hsü, <hi rend='italic'>The Political Philosophy of Confucianism</hi>, +New York, 1932. Dr. Hsü is interested in sociological political +theory. The novelty of his work has aroused a great amount of +criticism among Chinese scholars of the older disciplines, whether the +relatively conservative and established Western disciplines or the ultra-conservative +schools of the truly classical literati. His work cannot be +recommended for any purposes other than those which Dr. Hsü himself +had in mind; there are several other works, the product of philosophers, +historians, and literary historians, which will present a portrait of Confucius +and Confucianism more conventionally exact. In its own narrow +but definite field Dr. Hsü's work is an impressive accomplishment; he +transposes the Confucian terms into those of the most advanced schools of +social thought. A reader not forewarned might suffer by this, and read +into Confucius an unwarranted modernity of outlook; if, however, the +up-to-dateness is recognized as Dr. Hsü's and not Confucius', the work +is valuable. It puts Confucius on common ground with modern social +theory, ground on which he does not belong, but where his ideas are +still relevant and interesting. The present author follows Dr. Hsü in +this transposition of Confucius, but begs the reader to remember that +this is one made for purposes of comparison only, and not intended +as valid for all purposes. (He must acknowledge the stimulating criticism +of Mr. Jan Tai, of the Library of Congress, who made it clear that this +distortion of Confucius was one which could be excused only if it were +admitted.)—An interesting presentation of Confucius as transposed into +the older political theory, untouched by sociology, is to be found in +Senator Elbert Duncan Thomas, <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Political Thought</hi>, New York, +1927.</note> +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='025'/><anchor id='Pg025'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<anchor id='Section_Nation_and_State'/> +<head>Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity.</head> + +<p> +The Confucian system, against which Sun Yat-sen reacted +in part and in part sought to preserve, was a set of +ideas and institutions developed as a reaction against certain +conditions in ancient China. These conditions may +be roughly described as having arisen from a system of +proto-nationalisms, at a time when the old—perhaps prehistorically +ancient—Chinese feudal system was rapidly +declining and an early form of capitalism and of states +was taking its place. The Chou dynasty (ca. 1150-221 +B.C.) was in power at the time of this transition; under +its rule the golden age of Chinese philosophy appeared—Confucius +(552-479 B.C.) and Lao Tzŭ (ca. 570-ca. 490 +B.C.) lived and taught. +</p> + +<p> +Their philosophies, contrary to the popular Western +beliefs concerning Chinese philosophies, were protests +against a world which seemed to them well-nigh intolerable. +The old Chinese system, which may seem to Westerners +a highly mystical feudal organization, was in its +century-long death-agonies; the virtues it had taught were +not the virtues of the hour; the loyalties it had set up +were loyalties which could scarcely be maintained in a +time when rising states, acting more and more as states +have acted in the West, were disrupting the earlier organization +<pb n='026'/><anchor id='Pg026'/> +of society, waging struggles—in the manner +that, centuries later, Machiavelli was to portray—of intrigue +and warfare for the eventual hegemony over that +whole area of eastern Asia which the Chinese of that time +regarded as the civilized world. +</p> + +<p> +The political aspects of the transition from the feudal +to the proto-national system is described by one of the +most eminent of the Western authorities on China in the +following terms: <q>The aim of all the Leaders was to +control western Ho-nan. There is the heart of ancient +China.... All around about, in vaster regions occupied +no doubt by less dense and more shifting populations, +great States formed, increasing first towards the exterior, +seeking (as we have seen in the case of China) to cut +the communication of their rivals with the Barbarians, +mutually forcing each other to change the directions of +the expansion, exercising on each other a pressure from +behind, and a converging pressure on the central overlordships. +All schemed to conquer them. Thus an amalgamation +was achieved. Whilst in the centre the Chinese +nation was coming into being, on the outer borders States +were being formed which, aiming at annexing the centre +of China, ended by themselves also becoming Chinese.</q><note place='foot'>Granet, <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Civilization</hi>, cited, p. 84. Granet's work, while challenged +by many sinologues as well as by anthropologists, is the most +brilliant portrayal of Chinese civilization to the time of Shih Huang Ti. +His interpretations make the language of the <hi rend='italic'>Odes</hi> (collected by Confucius) +intelligible, and clear up the somewhat obscure transition from +the oldest feudal society to the epoch of the proto-nations and then to +the inauguration of the world order.</note> +Not only did the newer, political organization of society +begin to make itself distinct from the family, feudal, and +religious organization; it began to engage in activities +which increased its resemblance to the Western system +of nations. Tributes of textiles, horses, and compulsory +labor were demanded. A non-feudal economy was encouraged; +<pb n='027'/><anchor id='Pg027'/> +the state of Ch'i encouraged artisans and merchants, +and favored the trade in fish and salt. Mining, +metallurgy and currency were studied. State monopolies +were created out of the products of forests, lakes, marshes, +shell-fish beds, and salt pans. Mines also became <q>treasures +of the state.</q><note place='foot'>Granet, cited, pp. 87-88.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The history of these states reads like a page torn out +of the history of early modern Europe. The struggle was +half diplomatic and half military. From the beginning of +the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.) to the +end of the Age of Warring States (491-221 B.C.), China +was subject to frequent war and unstable peace. The +character of war itself changed, from a chivalrous exercise +almost ritualistic in nature, to a struggle of unrestricted +force. The units of government which were to +develop into states, and almost into nations, began as +feudal overlordships; traditional hatreds and sentiments +were developed; diplomatic and military policies crystallized +and became consistent; and activities of a state nature +became increasingly prominent. +</p> + +<p> +Concurrently, other factors operated to prevent an indefinite +continuance of these struggles of proto-national +states and to avoid the appearance of a permanent system +of armed nations such as that which has appeared +in modern Europe. The feudal system of China left a +strong ethnical, linguistic and intellectual heritage of +unity, which was stronger than the cultural disunities and +particularities appearing in certain of the states. (The +state of Chêng was particularly conspicuous in developing +a peculiar state culture.)<note place='foot'>Richard Wilhelm, <hi rend='italic'>Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie</hi>, Breslau, +1929, p. 19.</note> As the states became larger +and larger with the passing of time, they tended not only +to develop certain large differences between themselves, +but to eradicate the minute local peculiarities of the old +<pb n='028'/><anchor id='Pg028'/> +system, and in so doing to increase the general homogeneity +which was also a heritage of the past ages. This +general homogeneity found a living symbol in the persons +of the Chou Emperors who, possessed of no more +power than the Tennos under the Shogunate, acted, as +did their Japanese analogues two thousand years later, as +the quasi-religious personifications of the whole general +community. It thus occurred that the old feudal system +was destroyed by the growth of a general non-feudal +economy and political order, which, in its turn, led to +the development of the great imperial system under which +China continued for many centuries. The period of the +transition, during which the traditional feudal unity had +been shaken and the new imperial unity not yet established, +was a tumultuous and bloody one. The presence +of a confederation under the hegemony of some one state—the +so-called Presidency—provided a suitable framework +for rivalries toward power, without particularly increasing +the general peace. +</p> + +<p> +The transition, as it took place, was neither apparent +nor agreeable. The political turmoil was but slightly less +than the intellectual unrest and disturbance. Everywhere +faith and acceptance seemed to have been lost to humanity; +licentiousness and impiety fed discord. The lack +of harmony, made doubly vivid by the presence of a strong +tradition of primeval Arcadian peace and unity under the +mythological Emperors, was bitter to the scholars and men +of virtue of the time. It was quite inevitable that protests +should be raised which would hasten the advent, or return, +of unity and peace. These protests form the subject +of the work of Confucius and the other great philosophers, +and schools of thinkers, of the Chou dynasty. It +was, in later ages, upon these philosophies that the great +structure of Chinese society developed and continued +down until modern times. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='029'/><anchor id='Pg029'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Theory of the Confucian World-Society.</head> + +<p> +The various types of protest against the development +of states and the consequent anarchy of the Chinese society +considered as a whole cannot be considered in this +work; many were primarily religious; Taoism, while ranking +as one of the most conspicuous religions of the world, +has little bearing on politics. Even Confucianism, which +merits careful study, must be summarized and re-stated +as briefly as possible. Confucianism has suffered from an +ambiguity and exoticism of terms, when presented to the +West; its full significance as a political philosophy can +become fully apparent only when it is rendered in the +words of the hour. +</p> + +<p> +What was it that Confucius did in protest against the +established discord of the world he knew? He struck +directly at the foundations of politics. His criticisms and +remedies can be fully appreciated only by reference to a +theory of ideology. +</p> + +<p> +Confucius perceived that the underlying problem of +society was that of ideology; he seems to have realized +that the character of a society itself essentially depends +upon the character of the moral ideas generally prevalent +among the individuals composing it, and that where there +is no common body of ideas a society can scarcely be +said to exist.<note place='foot'>One could therefore say that membership in a society is determined +by the outlook of the individual concerned.</note> He did not consider, as did Han Fei-tzŭ +and the legalist school of philosophers, questions of law +the preëminent social problem. He realized that state +and law were remedies, and that the prime questions of +organization were those anterior to the political, and that +the state existed for the purpose of filling out the shortcomings +of social harmony.<note place='foot'>In modern Western political thought, this doctrine is most clearly +demonstrated in the Marxian thesis of the withering-away of the state. +The Marxists hold that, as the relics of the class struggle are eliminated +from the new society, and classlessness and uniform indoctrination come +to prevail, the necessity for a state—which they, however, consider an +instrument of class domination—will decline and the state will atrophy +and disappear.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='030'/><anchor id='Pg030'/> + +<p> +In a society—such as Confucius dreamed of—where +there was no disagreement in outlook, policy would not +be a governmental question; if there were no disharmony +of thought and of behavior, there would be no necessity +of enforcing conformance to the generally accepted criteria +of conduct. From this standpoint, government itself +is socially pathological, a remedy for a poorly ordered +society. Men are controlled indirectly by the examples of +virtue; they do good because they have learned to do +good and do it unquestioningly and simply. Whatever +control is exercised over men is exercised by their ideology, +and if other men desire control they must seek it +through shaping the ideas of others. At its full expression, +such a doctrine would not lead to mere anarchy; +but it would eliminate the political altogether from the +culture of man, replacing it with an educational process. +Ideological control would need to be supplemented by +political only if it failed to cover the total range of social +behavior, and left loopholes for conflict and dispute. +</p> + +<p> +This doctrine is framed in quite different terms by +Confucius, who spoke and wrote in an age when the +mystical elements of the old feudal ideology still exercised +powerful and persuasive influence, and when there +was no other society than his own which he might make +the object of his study. The central point of his teachings +is the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the most +brilliant modern exponents of ancient Chinese philosophy, +wrote of this: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +In the simplest terms, <q>Jen</q> means fellow-feeling for one's +kind. Once Fan Chih, one of his disciples, asked Confucius what +<pb n='031'/><anchor id='Pg031'/> +<q>Jen</q> meant. Confucius replied, <q>To love fellow-men</q>; in other +words this means to have a feeling of sympathy toward mankind.... +</p> + +<p> +Intellectually the relationship becomes common purpose; emotionally +it takes the form of fellow-feeling.<note place='foot'>Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, <hi rend='italic'>History of Chinese Political Thought during the +early Tsin Period</hi>, translated by L. T. Chen, New York, 1930, p. 38.</note> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +This doctrine appears more specific in its application +when it is realized that Confucius regarded his own society +and mankind as coterminous. Barbarians, haunting +the fringes of the world, were unconscious of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>; not +being in sympathy with mankind, they were not as yet +fully human. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Jên</foreign> is a word which cannot be exactly translated into +English. It is laden with a burden of connotations which +it has acquired through the centuries; its variability of +translation may be shown by the fact that, in the standard +translations of the Chinese classics, it is written <q>Benevolence.</q> +It might equally well be given as <q>consciousness +of one's place and function in society.</q> The man who +followed <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> was one who was aware of his place in +society, and of his participation in the common endeavors +of mankind. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Jên</foreign>, or society-mindedness, leads to an awareness of +virtue and propriety (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>têh</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yi</foreign>). When virtue and propriety +exist, it is obligatory that men follow them. Behavior +in accordance with virtue and propriety is <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>. Commonly +translated <q>ethics,</q> this is seen as the fruition of +the force of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> in human society. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Jên</foreign> underlies and +establishes society, from the existence of which spring +virtue and propriety; these prescribe principles for human +conduct, the formulation of which rules is <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>.<note place='foot'>Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (cited, p. 48 and following) discusses these points.—The +author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the explanation of the relation +of these various factors in the Confucian ideology.</note> Auxiliary +to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> is <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Chêng ming</foreign> is the rightness of names: +<pb n='032'/><anchor id='Pg032'/> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>, the appropriateness of relationships. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Li</foreign>, it may be +noted, is also translated <q>rites</q> or <q>ceremonies</q>; a rendering +which, while not inexact, fails to convey the full +import of the term. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Chêng ming</foreign>, the rectification of names, may be regarded +as a protest against the discords in language that +had developed during the transitional period from feudalism +to eventual unity. Confucius, of course, did not have +as sharp an issue confronting him as do the modern +Western innovators in social and political ideology. +Nevertheless, the linguistic difficulty was clear to him. +The expansion of the Chinese written language was so +great at that time that it led to the indiscriminate coining +of neologisms, and there was a tendency towards a sophisticated +hypocrisy in the use of words.<note place='foot'>Leon Wieger and L. Davrout, <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Characters</hi>, Hsien-hsien, +1927, p. 6.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Confucius saw that, in obtaining harmony, language +needed to be exact; otherwise long and fruitless disputes +over empty words might be engaged in or, what was even +worse, words might not conform to the realities of social +life, and might be used as instruments of ill-doing. Confucius +did not, however, present a scheme of word-worship. +He wanted communication to cement society, to be +an instrument of concord. He wanted, in modern terms, +a terminology which by its exactness and suitability would +of itself lead to harmony.<note place='foot'>Hsü, cited above, chapter three, contains an excellent discussion of +the doctrine of rectification.</note> In advocating the rectification +of names, Confucius differed from many other +founders of philosophies and religions; they, too, wanted +names rectified—terminology reorganized—to suit their +particular doctrines; but there they stopped short. Confucius +regarded the rectification of names as a continuous +process, one which had to be carried on unceasingly if +communication, for the sake of social harmony, was to +remain just and exact. +</p> + +<pb n='033'/><anchor id='Pg033'/> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Chêng ming</foreign> is highly significant in Confucian thought, +and exhibits the striking difference between the Chinese +and the older Western political study. If the terms by +means of which the communication within a society is +effected, and in which the group beliefs of fact or of +value are to be found, can be the subject of control, there +is opened up a great field of social engineering. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Chêng +ming</foreign> states, in recognizable although archaic terms, the +existence of ideology, and proposes the strengthening of +ideology. In recognizing the group (in his case, mankind) +as dependent upon ideology for group existence, +Confucius delivered Chinese political thought from any +search for an ontology of the <emph>real state</emph>. It became possible +to continue, in the traditional pragmatic manner,<note place='foot'>A stimulating discussion of the pragmatism of early Chinese thought +is to be found in Creel, cited.</note> +thinking of men in simple terms referring only to individual +men, avoiding the hypostatizations common in the +West. In pointing out the necessity for the control of +ideology by men, Confucius anticipated theories of the +<q>pedagogical state</q> by some twenty centuries. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Li</foreign>, in the terminology of the present work, is the conformity +of the individual to the moral ideology, or, stated +in another manner, the control of men by the ideology.<note place='foot'>It must be pointed out in this connection that Confucius advocated +an ideology which would not only be socially useful but scientifically and +morally exact. He did not consider, as have some Western thinkers of +the past century, that the ideology might be a quite amoral instrument of +control, and might contain deliberate or unconscious deception. Hsü +writes, in his <hi rend='italic'>Confucianism</hi>, cited, p. 93, of the various translations of the +word <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> into English: <q>The word <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> has no English equivalent. It has +been erroneously translated as <q>rites</q> or <q>propriety</q>. It has been suggested +that the term civilization is its nearest English equivalent; but +<q>civilization</q> is a broader term, without necessarily implying ethical +values, while <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> is essentially a term implying such values.</q> <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Li</foreign> is civilized +behavior; that is, behavior which is civilized in being in conformance with +the ideology and the values it contains.</note> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Li</foreign>, conformity to the ideology, implies, of course, conformity +to those parts of it which determine value. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Li</foreign> +<pb n='034'/><anchor id='Pg034'/> +prescribes the do-able, the thinkable. In so far as the +ideology consists of valuations, so far do those valuations +determine <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>. Hsü lists the operations of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> in six +specific categories: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +(1) it furnishes the principles of political organization; (2) it +furnishes details for the application of the doctrine of ratification; +(3) it discusses the functions of government; (4) it prescribes +the limitations of governmental authority; (5) it advances principles +of social administration; and (6) it provides a foundation +for crime and lawsuits. These are only the political functions +of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>. Its force is to be regarded as equally effective in every other +type of human behavior.<note place='foot'>Hsü, cited, p. 103.</note> +</quote> + +<p> +The approach to society contained in the doctrines of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>, and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> is, therefore, one which largely +eliminates the necessity for politics. Its influence may be +estimated from three points of view: (1) to what degree +was government different from what it might have been +had it followed the line of development that government +did in the West? (2) what was the range of governmental +action in such a system? and (3) what was the +relation of government to the other institutions of a Confucian +society? +</p> + +<p> +In regard to the first point, it will be seen immediately +that government, once <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign> has been set in motion, +is not a policy-making body. There is no question of +policy, no room for disagreement, no alternative. What +is right is apparent. Politics, in the narrow sense of the +word, ceases to be a function of government; only administration +remains. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, government needs to administer only for two +purposes. The chief of these is the maintenance of the +ideology. Once right views are established, no individual +is entitled to think otherwise. Government must treat the +heterodox as malefactors. Their crime is greater than +ordinary crime, which is a mere violation of right behavior; +<pb n='035'/><anchor id='Pg035'/> +they pollute right thought, set in motion the forces +of discord, and initiate evils which may work on and on +through the society, even after the evil-thinkers themselves +are dead. To protect the society actively against +discord, the government must encourage the utterance +of the accepted truth. The scholar is thus the highest +of all the social classes; it is he who maintains agreement +and order. The government becomes, in maintaining the +ideology, the educational system. The whole political life +is education, formal or informal. Every act of the leader +is a precept and an example. The ruler does not compel +virtue by law; he spreads it by his conspicuous example. +</p> + +<p> +The other function of the government in maintaining +the ideology lies in the necessity of dealing with persons +not affected by the ideology. Barbarians are especially +formidable, since both heretics and criminals may be restored +to the use of their reason, while barbarians may +not, so long as they remain barbarians. Accordingly, the +government is also a defense system. It is a defense +against open and physical disruption from within—as in +the case of insurrectionaries or bandits—and a defense +against forces from without which, as veritable powers of +darkness, cannot be taught and are amenable only to brute +force. +</p> + +<p> +In connection with the third point, government itself +appears as subject to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>. It has no right to do wrong. The +truth is apparent to everyone, and especially to the +scholars. In this wise the Chinese governments were at +the mercy of their subjects. No divine right shielded them +when public opinion condemned them; ill-doing governments +were twice guilty and contemptible, because of the +great force of their examples. An evil emperor was not +only a criminal; he was a heresiarch, leading many astray, +and corrupting the virtue upon which society rested—virtue +being the maintenance of a true and moral ideology, +and conformity to it. +</p> + +<pb n='036'/><anchor id='Pg036'/> + +<p> +The consequence of these teachings was such that we +may say, without sacrificing truth to paradox, that the aim +of Chinese government was anarchy—not in the sense of +disorder, but in the sense of an order so just and so complete +that it needed no governing. The <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>laissez-faire</foreign> of +the Chinese was not only economic; it was political. The +Great Harmony of Confucius, which was his Utopia, was +conceived of as a society where the excellence of ideology +and the thoroughness of conformity to ideology had +brought perfect virtue, perfect happiness. +</p> + +<p> +The other doctrines of Confucius, his practical teachings +on statesmanship, his discourses on the family—these +cannot be entered into here. Enough has, perhaps, +been shown to demonstrate the thoroughness of Confucius' +reaction against state and nation.<note place='foot'>Confucius the individual was quite nationalistically devoted to his +native state of Lu, and, more philosophically, hostile to the barbarians. +Hsü, cited, p. 118.</note> This reaction +was to continue, and to become so typical that the whole +Chinese system of subsequent centuries was called Confucian,<note place='foot'>John K. Shryock, <hi rend='italic'>The Origin and Development of The State Cult of +Confucius</hi>, New York, 1932, traces this growth with great clarity and +superlative scholarship. The work is invaluable as a means to the understanding +of the political and educational structure commonly called +<q>Confucian civilization.</q></note> +until the exigencies of a newer, larger, and more +perilous world led to Sun Yat-sen's teaching of modern +Chinese nationalism. Before taking up the doctrine of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min tsu</foreign>, it may be worthwhile to summarize the manner +in which Chinese society, deliberately and accidentally, +each in part, followed out the doctrines of Confucius in +its practical organization. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Chinese World-Society of Eastern Asia.</head> + +<p> +It would be, of course, absurd to pretend to analyze +the social system of China in a few paragraphs; and yet +<pb n='037'/><anchor id='Pg037'/> +it is necessary to the study of Sun Yat-sen that certain +characteristics be at least mentioned. Several problems +appear which are quite outstanding. What was the social +position and function of each individual? How were refractory +individuals to be disciplined in accordance with +the requirements that the general opinion of society imposed? +What were the ultimate ends which the organization +of Chinese society was to realize? How were the +educational system and the frontier defenses to be maintained? +What was to be the position and power of the +political organization? +</p> + +<p> +At the outset it is necessary that a working demarcation +of the political be established. Accepting, by definition, +those coercive controls as political which are operated +for the preservation of society as a whole, and are +recognized within the society as so doing, we see immediately +that the range of the political must have been +much less in old China than it has been in the West. +Western societies tend, at least in law, to emphasize the +relationship between the individual and the society as a +whole; free and unassociated individuals tend to become +extraordinarily unstable. In the old Chinese society the +control of the individual was so much an ideological one, +that political control was infinitely narrower than in the +West. But, in order to effectuate ideological control, there +must be an organization which will permit pressure to be +exercised on the individual in such a compelling manner +that the exercise of external coercion becomes unnecessary. +In a society in which the state has withered away, +after an enormous expansion in the subject-matter of its +control,<note place='foot'>This expansion took place in China in the reign of Ch'in Shih +Huang Ti, who used the state of Ch'in as an instrument by means of +which to destroy the multiple state-system and replace it with a powerful +unitary state for all China. He sought to wipe out the past, raising the +imperial office to a position of real power, and destroying the whole +feudal organization. He abolished tenantry and supplanted it with a +system of small freeholds. Although his immediate successors did much +to restore the forms and appearances of the past, his work was not +altogether undone. Himself hostile to Confucius, his actions implemented +the teachings to an enormous degree. See Granet, cited, pp. 96-104.</note> the totalitarian state is succeeded by the totalitarian +<pb n='038'/><anchor id='Pg038'/> +tradition, if—and the qualification is an important +one—the indoctrination has been so effective that the +ideology can maintain itself in the minds of men without +the continuing coercive power of the state to uphold it. +If the ideology is secure, then control of the individual +will devolve upon those persons making up his immediate +social environment, who—in view of the uniform and secure +notions of right and justice prevailing—can be relied +upon to attend to him in a manner which will be approved +by the society in general. +</p> + +<p> +In China the groups most conspicuous within the society +were the family system, the village and district, and the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign> (association; league; society, in the everyday sense of +the word). +</p> + +<p> +The family was an intricate structure. A fairly typical +instance of family organization within a specific village +has been described in the following terms: <q>The village is +occupied by one sib, a uni-lateral kinship group, exogamous, +monogamous but polygynous, composed of a plurality +of kin alignments into four families: the natural family, +the economic-family, the religious-family, and the sib.</q><note place='foot'>D. H. Kulp, <hi rend='italic'>Family Life in South China</hi>, New York, 1925, p. xxiv.</note> +The natural family corresponded to the family of the West. +The economic family may have had a natural family as its +core, but commonly extended through several degrees of +kinship, and may have included from thirty to one hundred +persons, who formed a single economic unit, living +and consuming collectively. The religious family was an +aggregate of economic families, of which it would be very +difficult to give any specified number as an average. It +<pb n='039'/><anchor id='Pg039'/> +was religious in that it provided the organization for the +proper commemoration and reverence of ancestors, and +maintained an ancestral shrine where the proper genealogical +records could be kept; the cult feature has largely +disappeared in modern times. The sib corresponded +roughly to the clan, found in some Western communities; +its rôle was determined by the immediate environment. +In some cases—as especially in the south—the sib was +powerful enough to engage in feuds; at times one or more +sibs dominated whole communities; in the greater part of +China it was a loose organization, holding meetings from +time to time to unite the various local religious families +which constituted it. +</p> + +<p> +Family consciousness played its part in sustaining certain +elements of the Confucian ideology. It stressed the +idea of the carnal immortality of the human race; it +oriented the individual, not only philosophically, but +socially as well. The size of each family determined his +position spatially, and family continuity fixed a definite +location in time for him. With its many-handed grasp +upon the individual, the family system held him securely +in place and prevented his aspiring to the arrogant heights +of nobility or falling to the degradation of a slavery in +which he might become a mere commodity. A Chinese +surrounded by his kinsmen was shielded against humiliations +inflicted upon him by outsiders or the menace of his +own potential follies. It was largely through the family +system, with its religious as well as economic and social +foundation, that the Chinese solved the problem of adequate +mobility of individuals in a society stable as a whole, +and gave to that stability a clear and undeniable purpose—the +continued generation of the human race through the +continuity of a multitude of families, each determined +upon survival. +</p> + +<p> +The family was the most obviously significant of the +<pb n='040'/><anchor id='Pg040'/> +groupings within the society, but it was equalled if not +excelled in importance by the village.<note place='foot'>H. G. Creel, cited, p. 10. Creole writes as follows of the significance +of the village: <q>The village life is very important, for it appears to be +the archetype from which the entire Chinese conception of the world and +even of the cosmos grew. The village was, as has been said, small. It +was based on agriculture. It was apparently a community of a peaceful +regularity and a social solidarity beyond anything which we of the +present can imagine.</q></note> +</p> + +<p> +Had the family been the only important social grouping, +it might have been impossible for any democracy to develop +in China. It so occurred that the family pattern provided, +indeed, the model for the government, but the importance +of villages in Chinese life negated the too sharp +influence of a familistic government. It would have been +the most awful heresy, as it is in Japan today, to revolt +against and depose an unrighteous father; there was +nothing to prevent the deposition or destruction of an evil +village elder. In times of concord, the Emperor was the +father of the society; at other times, when his rule was +less successful, he was a fellow-villager subject to the +criticism of the people. +</p> + +<p> +The village was the largest working unit of non-political +administration; that is to say, groups within and up to the +village were almost completely autonomous and not subject +to interference, except in very rare cases, from outside. +The village was the smallest unit of the political. The +District Magistrate, as the lowest officer in the political-educational +system, was in control of a district containing +from one to twenty villages, and negotiated, in performing +the duties imposed upon him, with the village leaders. The +villages acted as self-ruling communes, at times very +democratic.<note place='foot'>Arthur Smith, one of the few Westerners to live in a Chinese village +for any length of years, wrote: <q>It is a noteworthy fact that the government +of China, while in theory more or less despotic, places no practical +restrictions upon the right of free assemblage by the people for the +consideration of their own affairs. The people of any village can, if they +choose, meet every day of the year. There is no government censor +present, and no restriction upon the liberty of debate. The people can say +what they like, and the local Magistrate neither knows nor cares what +is said.... But should insurrection break out, these popular rights +might be extinguished in a moment, a fact of which all the people are +perfectly well aware.</q> <hi rend='italic'>Village Life in China</hi>, New York, 1899, p. 228. +This was written thirteen years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='041'/><anchor id='Pg041'/> + +<p> +Next in importance, among Chinese social groups, after +the family and the village was the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>. It was in all +probability the last to appear. Neither ordained, as the +family seemed to be, by the eternal physical and biological +order of things, nor made to seem natural, as was the +village, by the geographic and economic environment, the +association found its justification in the deeply ingrained +propensities of the Chinese to coöperate. Paralleling and +supplementing the former two, the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign> won for itself a +definite and unchallenged place in the Chinese social +structure. The kinds of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign> may be classified into six +categories:<note place='foot'>J. S. Burgess, <hi rend='italic'>The Guilds of Peking</hi>, New York, 1928. This is +perhaps the best work on the subject of the guilds which has yet appeared. +The information was gathered by the students of the author, who as a +teacher had excellent facilities for developing contacts. The students, as +Chinese, were able to gather data from the conservative guild leaders in +a manner and to a degree that no Westerner could have done. The +classification here given is a modification of Burgess'.</note> 1) the fraternal societies; 2) insurance +groups; 3) economic guilds; 4) religious societies; 5) +political societies; and 6) organizations of militia and +vigilantes. The <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign> made up, in their economic form, the +greater part of the economic organization of old China, +and provided the system of vocational education for persons +not destined to literature and administration. Politically, +it was the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>—under such names as the Triad and +the Lotus—that provided the party organizations of old +China and challenged the dynasties whenever objectionable +social or economic conditions developed. +</p> + +<p> +The old Chinese society, made up of innumerable families, +<pb n='042'/><anchor id='Pg042'/> +villages, and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>, comprised a whole <q>known world.</q> +Its strength was like that of a dinosaur in modern fable; +having no one nerve-centre, the world-society could not be +destroyed by inroads of barbarians, or the ravages of +famine, pestilence, and insurrection. The ideology which +has been called Confucian continued. At no one time were +conditions so bad as to break the many threads of Chinese +culture and to release a new generation of persons emancipated +from the tradition. Throughout the centuries education +and government went forward, even though dynasties +fell and the whole country was occasionally over-run +by conquerors. The absence of any juristically rigid +organization permitted the Chinese to maintain a certain +minimum of order, even in the absence of an emperor, or, +as more commonly occurred, in the presence of several. +</p> + +<p> +The governmental superstructure cemented the whole +Chinese world together in a formal manner; it did not +create it. The family, the village, and the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign> were fit subjects +for imperial comment, but there was nothing in their +organization to persuade the student that the Emperor—by +virtue of some Western-type <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Kompetenz Kompetenz</foreign>—could +remove his sanction from their existence and thereby +annihilate them. There was no precarious legal personality +behind the family, the village, and the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>, which +could be destroyed by a stroke of law. It was possible for +the English kings to destroy the Highland clan of the MacGregor—<q>the +proscribed name</q>—without liquidating the +members of the clan <foreign rend='italic'>in toto</foreign>. In China the Emperor beheld +a family as a quasi-individual, and when enraged at them +was prone to wipe them out with massacre. Only in a very +few cases was it possible for him to destroy an organization +without destroying the persons composing it; he +could, for example, remove the privilege of a scholarship +system from a district, prefecture, or province without +necessarily disposing of all the scholars involved in the +<pb n='043'/><anchor id='Pg043'/> +move. The government of China—which, in the normal +run of affairs, had no questions of policy, because policy +was traditional and inviolable—continued to be an administration +dedicated to three main ends—the maintenance +of the ideology (education), the defense of the +society as a whole against barbarians (military affairs) +and against the adverse forces of nature (public works +on the most extensive—and not intensive—scale), and +the collection of funds for the fulfillment of the first two +ends (revenue). The Emperor was also the titular family +head of the Chinese world. +</p> + +<p> +The educational system was identical with the administrative, +except in the case of the foreign dynasties. +(Under the Manchus, for example, a certain quota of +Manchu officials were assigned throughout the government, +irrespective of their scholastic rank in contrast to +the Chinese.) It was a civil service, an educational structure, +and a ritualist organization. Selected from the people +at large, scholars could—at least in theory—proceed +on the basis of sheer merit to any office in the Empire +excepting the Throne. Their advancement was graduated +on a very elaborate scale of degrees, which could be attained +only by the passing of examinations involving an +almost perfect knowledge of the literature of antiquity +and the ability to think in harmony with and reproduce +that literature. The Chinese scholar-official had to learn +to do his own thinking by means of the clichés which +he could learn from the classics; he had to make every +thought and act of his life conform to the pattern of the +ideology. Resourceful men may have found in this a +proper fortification for their originality, as soon as they +were able to cloak it with the expressions of respect; +mediocre persons were helpless beyond the bounds of +what they had learned. +</p> + +<p> +The combination of education and administration had +one particular very stabilizing effect upon Chinese society. +<pb n='044'/><anchor id='Pg044'/> +It made literacy and rulership identical. Every educated +man was either a government official or expected to become +one. There was no hostile scholar class, no break +with the tradition. Struggle between scholars generally +took the form of conflicts between cliques and were not +founded—except in rare instances—on any cleavage of +ideas. The Throne secured its own position and the continuity +of the ideology through establishing intellectuality +as a government monopoly. The consequences of the educational-administrative +system fostered democratic tendencies +quite as much as they tended to maintain the status +quo. The scholars were all men, and Chinese, owing +allegiance to families and to native districts. In this manner +a form of representation was assured the government +which kept it from losing touch with the people, and +which permitted the people to exercise influence upon the +government in the advancement of any special interests +that could profit by government assistance. The educational +system also served as the substitute for a nobility. +Hereditary class distinctions existed in China on so small +a scale that they amounted to nothing. The way to power +was through the educational hierarchy.<note place='foot'><p>S. Wells Williams, <hi rend='italic'>The Middle Kingdom</hi>, New York, 1895, p. 405. +Dr. Williams, whose work is perhaps the most celebrated single work +on China in the English language, wrote as follows concerning the +nobility under the Ch'ing: +</p> +<p> +<q>The titular nobility of the Empire, as a whole, is a body whose +members are without power, land, wealth, office, or influence, in virtue +of their honors; some of them are more or less hereditary, but the whole +system has been so devised, and the designations so conferred, as to +tickle the vanity of those who receive them, without granting them any +real power. The titles are not derived from landed estates, but the rank +is simply designated in addition to the name....</q> He also pointed out +that, under the Ch'ing, the only hereditary titles of any significance were +<hi rend='italic'>Yen Shing Kung</hi> (for the descendant of Confucius) and <hi rend='italic'>Hai Ching Kung</hi> +(for the descendant of Kuo Hsing-hua, the formidable sea adventurer +who drove the Dutch out of Taiwan and made himself master of that +island).</p></note> In a society +<pb n='045'/><anchor id='Pg045'/> +which offered no financial or military short cuts to power, +and which had no powerful nobility to block the way +upward, the educational system provided an upward channel +of social mobility which was highly important in the +organization of the Chinese world order. +</p> + +<p> +The scholars, once they had passed the examinations, +were given either subsistence allowances or posts, according +to the rank which they had secured in the tests. (This +was, of course, the theory; in actuality bribery and nepotism +played rôles varying with the time and the locality.) +They made up the administration of the civilized world. +They were not only the officials but the literati. +</p> + +<p> +It would be impossible even to enumerate the many +posts and types of organization in the administration of +imperial China.<note place='foot'>William Frederick Mayers, <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Government, A Manual of +Chinese Titles ...</hi>, Shanghai, 1897, devotes one hundred and ninety-five +pages to the enumeration of the Ch'ing titles. His work, intended to be +used as an office manual for foreigners having relations with Chinese +officials, remains extremely useful as a presentation of the administrative +outline of the Chinese government in its last days before the appearance +of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. Pao Chao Hsieh, <hi rend='italic'>The Government +of China (1644-1911)</hi>, Baltimore, 1925, is a more descriptive work +dealing with the whole administration of the Ch'ing dynasty. No work +has as yet appeared in the West, to the knowledge of the present author, +which describes the historical development of government in China in any +detail.</note> Its most conspicuous features may be +enumerated as follows: China consisted of half a million +cities, towns, villages, and hamlets, each to a large extent +autonomous.<note place='foot'>The figures given are those of the present day, which may be more +or less exact for the past century. For earlier times, the number will +have to be reduced in proportion with the remoteness in time. See +Richard Henry Tawney, <hi rend='italic'>Land and Labour in China</hi>, London, 1932.</note> These were divided among, roughly, two +thousand <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, in each of which an over-burdened District +Magistrate sought to carry out all the recognized +functions of government in so far as they applied to his +locality. He did this largely by negotiation with the +<pb n='046'/><anchor id='Pg046'/> +leaders of the social groups in his bailiwick, the heads of +families, the elders of villages, the functionaries of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>. +He was supervised by a variety of travelling prefects and +superintendents, but the next officer above him who possessed +a high degree of independence was the viceroy or +governor—whichever type happened to rule the province +or group of provinces. Except for their non-hereditability, +these last offices were to all intents and purposes satrapies. +The enormous extent of the Chinese civilized world, the +difficulty of communicating with the capital, the cumbersomeness +of the administrative organization, the rivalry +and unfriendliness between the inhabitants of various +provinces—all these encouraged independence of a high +degree. If Chinese society was divided into largely autonomous +communes, the Chinese political system was made +up of largely autonomous provinces. Everywhere there +was elasticity. +</p> + +<p> +At the top of the whole structure stood the Emperor. +In the mystical doctrines which Confucianism transmitted +from the animism of the feudal ages of China, the Emperor +was the intermediary between the forces of nature +and mankind. The Son of Heaven became the chief +ritualist; in more sophisticated times he was the patron +of civilization to the scholars, and the object of supernatural +veneration to the uneducated. His function was +to provide a constant pattern of propriety. He was to act +as chief of the scholars. To the scholars the ideology was +recognized as an ideology, albeit the most exact one; to +the common people it was an objective reality of thought +and value. As the dictates of reason were not subject to +change, the power and the functions of the Emperor were +delimited; he was not, therefore, responsible to himself +alone. He was responsible to reason, which the people +could enforce when the Emperor failed. Popular intervention +was regarded as <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>de jure</foreign> in proportion to its effectiveness +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>de facto</foreign>. The Imperial structure might be called, +<pb n='047'/><anchor id='Pg047'/> +in Western terms, the constitutionalism of common +sense.<note place='foot'>Richard Wilhelm, <hi rend='italic'>Confucius and Confucianism</hi>, cited, pp. 130-132. +The connection between the naming of names and the operation of the +popular check of revolution is made evident by Wilhelm in a brilliant +passage. If a righteous ruler died a violent death at the hands of one +of his subjects, he was murdered; were he unrighteous, he was only +killed. Confucius himself used such terms in his annals. His use of +varying terms, terms carrying condemnation or condonement, even of +such a subject as regicide, electrified the scholars of his day.</note> The Dragon Throne did not enjoy the mysterious +and awful prestige which surrounds the modern Tenno +of Nippon; although sublime in the Confucian theory, it +was, even in the theory, at the mercy of its subjects, who +were themselves the arbiters of reason. There was no +authority higher than reason; and no reason beyond the +reason discovered and made manifest in the ages of +antiquity. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Impact of the West.</head> + +<p> +Mere physical shock could not derange the old Chinese +society as easily as it might some other, dependent for its +stability upon complex, fragile political mechanisms. +China was over-run many times by barbarians; the continuity +of its civilization was undisturbed. Each group of +conquerors added to the racial composition of the Chinese, +but contributed little to the culture. The Ch'in, the +Mongols, the Manchus—all ruled China as Chinese rulers. +</p> + +<p> +This strength of the Chinese society—in contrast to the +Roman—must not, however, lead us to suppose that there +were any extraordinary virtues in the Chinese social organization +that made Chinese civilization indestructible. +On the contrary, the continued life of the Chinese society +may be ascribed, among others, to four conditions acting +definitely and overwhelmingly in its favor: China's greater +physical extent, homogeneity, wealth, and culture. +</p> + +<p> +No barbarian conqueror, with the possible exception of +the Mongol, would have been a match for an orderly and +<pb n='048'/><anchor id='Pg048'/> +united China. Without exception, the barbarian incursions +occurred in times of social and political disorder and +weakness. That this is no freakish coincidence, may be +shown by the contrast between China and any of the +peripheral realms. None approached China in extent, in +heaviness of population. Conquest of China was always +conquest by sufferance of the Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +Second, China's neighbors were divided among themselves. +There was never any coalition extensive enough +to present a genuine threat to a thriving China. The +Chinese, in spite of diversities of spoken language, were +united—so far as they were literate—by a common writing +and literature; the common ideology had, moreover, fostered +an extreme sympathy of thought and behavior +among the Chinese. Persons speaking mutually unintelligible +dialects, of different racial composition, and in completely +different economic and geographical environments +displayed—and, for all that, still display in modern times—an +uncanny uniformity of social conditioning. China +faced barbarians on many fronts; China was coördinated, +homogeneous; the barbarians of North and South did not, +in all probability, know anything of each other's existence, +except what they heard from the Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +Third, China's wealth was a socially fortifying factor. +In all Eastern Asia, no other society or form of social +organization appeared which could produce a higher scale +of living. The Chinese were always materially better off +than their neighbors, with the possible exception of the +Koreans and Japanese. +</p> + +<p> +Fourth, Eastern Asia was Chinese just as Europe was +Graeco-Roman. The peripheral societies all owed a great +part, if not all, of their culture to the Chinese. China's +conquerors were already under the spell of Chinese civilization +when they swept down upon it. None of them +were anxious to destroy the heritage of science, arts, and +invention which the Chinese had developed. +</p> + +<pb n='049'/><anchor id='Pg049'/> + +<p> +With these advantages in mind, it is easy to understand +the peculiarity of the Westerners, as contrasted with the +other peoples whom the Chinese met and fought. The +formidable physical power of the Chinese was, after the +first few decades of intercourse, seen to be quite unequal +to the superior military technique of the West. The +Westerners, although different from one another at home, +tended to appear as united in the Far East. In any case, +Chinese unity availed little in the face of greater military +power. The economic factor, while a great attraction to +the Westerners, was no inducement to them to become +Chinese; they were willing to gain Chinese wealth, and +dreamed of conquering it, but not of making wealth in +the Chinese manner. And lastly, and most importantly, +the Westerners presented a culture of their own which—after +the first beginnings of regular intercourse—was quite +well able to hold its own against the Chinese.<note place='foot'>An exception must be made in the case of the first Russian colony +in Peking, which was lost in two centuries and became virtually indistinguishable +from the mass of the population. The Portuguese, at Macao, +displayed that tendency to compromise and miscegenate which marked +their whole progress along the coasts of Asia, but they maintained +their political supremacy in that city; today the Macanese are largely of +Chinese blood, but Portuguese-speaking, and proud of their separateness.</note> +</p> + +<p> +To the utter certainty of the Chinese way of life, the +Westerners presented the equally unshakable dogma of +Christianity. They regarded the Chinese—as did the +Chinese them—as outlanders on the edge of the known +world. They exhibited, in short, almost the same attitude +toward the Chinese that the Chinese had toward barbarians. +Consequently, each group regarded the other as +perverse. The chief distinction between the Chinese and +the Westerners lay in the fact that the Chinese would in +all probability have been satisfied if the West had minded +its own business, while the West, feverish with expansionism, +cajoled and fought for the right to come, trade, +and teach.<note place='foot'>Too many works have been written on the relations of the Chinese +and Westerners to permit any citations, with one exception. Putnam +Weale's <hi rend='italic'>The Vanished Empire</hi>, New York, 1925, is an extraordinarily +vivid history of the collision of the civilizations. It is not particularly +commendable as a factual record, but as a brilliant and moving piece of +literature presenting the Chinese viewpoint, it is unexcelled.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='050'/><anchor id='Pg050'/> + +<p> +At times, the two races met on agreeable and equal +terms. The Jesuit missionaries ingratiated themselves with +the Chinese and, by respecting Chinese culture, won a certain +admiration for their own. The eighteenth century in +Europe was the century of <foreign rend='italic'>chinoiserie</foreign>, when Chinese +models exercised a profound influence on the fine and +domestic arts of Europe.<note place='foot'>See Adolf Reichwein, <hi rend='italic'>China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic +Contacts in the Eighteenth Century</hi>, New York, 1925, which makes +apparent the full extent to which modern Europe is indebted to China for +the luxuries of its culture.</note> The great upsurge of economic +power in the period of the European industrial revolution +led to increased self-assurance on the part of the Europeans. +The new standards of value alienated them from +those features of Chinese culture which the eighteenth +century had begun to appreciate, and placed them in a +position to sell to the Chinese as well as buy. More and +more the economic position of the two societies changed +about; the Westerners had come to purchase the superior +artizan-made goods of China, giving in exchange metals +or raw materials. A tendency now developed for them to +sell their own more cheaply, and, in some cases, better +manufactured products to the Chinese. The era of good +feeling and mutual appreciation, which had never been +very strong, now drew to a close. +</p> + +<p> +The vassal states of China were conquered. The British +fought the Chinese on several occasions, and conquered +each time. The full extent of Western military superiority +was revealed in the capture of Peking in 1860, and in the +effectiveness—entirely disproportionate to their numbers—that +Western-trained Imperial troops had in suppressing +the Chinese T'ai-p'ing rebels. +</p> + +<pb n='051'/><anchor id='Pg051'/> + +<p> +When Sun Yat-sen was a boy, the country was afire with +fear and uncertainty. Barbarians who could neither be +absorbed nor defeated had appeared. Instead of adopting +Chinese thought and manners, they were vigorously teaching +their own to the Chinese. The traditional Chinese +mechanisms of defense against barbarians were not working.<note place='foot'>In this connection, it might be pointed out that the attractive strength +of the two civilizations has not, as yet, been adequately studied, although +there is an enormous amount of loose generalization on the subject: <q>The +Chinese are becoming completely Westernized,</q> or <q>The Chinese, in +spite of their veneer, are always Chinese; they will, in the end, absorb +their conquerors.</q> But will they? In the face of a modern educational +and propaganda system, there is at least room for doubt; it is not beyond +all conjecture that the Chinese of Manchuria might be Japanized as +easily as the fiercely chauvinistic Japanese might be sinicized. The only +adequate answer to the question would be through detailed studies of the +social conditioning and preferences of Chinese under foreign influence +(as in Hongkong, Taiwan, Manchuria), and of foreigners under Chinese +influence (the White Russians in China, the few other Westerners in +preëminently Chinese milieux).</note> +Something was vitally wrong. The Chinese could +not be persuaded, as some other non-European peoples +conquered in the age of Western world-dominion seem to +have been, that all error lay with themselves, and that +their own ideology was not worth the saving; nor could +they, in face of the unfortunate facts, still believe that +they themselves were completely right, or, at least, that +their own notions of rightness were completely expedient. +In view of the pragmatic foundations of the whole +Chinese ideology and way of life, the seriousness of these +consequences cannot be over-estimated. Little wonder that +China was disturbed! The pragmatic, realistic method of +organization that the Chinese had had, no longer worked +in a new environment rising, as it were, from the sea. +</p> + +<p> +The Western impact, consequently, affected China in +two ways. In the first place, the amorphous Chinese +society was threatened and dictated to by the strong, +clearly organized states of the West. In the second place, +<pb n='052'/><anchor id='Pg052'/> +the introduction of disharmonious values from the West +destroyed, in large part, that appearance of universality, +upon which the effectiveness of the Chinese ideology depended, +and shocked Chinese thought and action until +even their first premises seemed doubtful. +</p> + +<p> +This, in short, was the dilemma of the Chinese at the +advent of Sun Yat-sen. His life was to be dedicated to its +solution; it is his analyses that are to be studied in the +explanation of the Chinese society in the modern world. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Continuing Significance of the Background.</head> + +<p> +Before proceeding to the exposition of Sun Yat-sen's +theories and programs, it is necessary that a superlatively +important consideration be emphasized: namely, that Sun +Yat-sen was a Chinese, that the nation he worked for was +China, and that the intellectual and social background of +his labors was one completely different from that of the +Euramerican world. A great part of the vaporous disputation +which has hidden Chinese politics in a cloud of +words has been the consequence of the ignoring, by Westernized +Chinese as well as by Westerners, of the monumental +fact that China is in only a few respects comparable +to the West, and that the ideas and methods of +the West lose the greater part of their relevance when +applied to the Chinese milieu. Political dialecticians in +China split Marxian hairs as passionately and sincerely as +though they were in nineteenth-century Germany.<note place='foot'>An example of this is to be found in Manabendra Nath Roy, <hi rend='italic'>Revolution +und Konterrevolution in China</hi>, Berlin, 1930. Roy was one of the +emissaries of the Third International to the Nationalists, and his ineptness +in practical politics assisted materially in the weakening of the Communist +position. His work quite seriously employs all the familiar +clichés of Western class dispute, and analyzes the Chinese situation in +terms that ignore the fact that China is Chinese.</note> Sun +Yat-sen, though accused of this fantastic fault by some of +<pb n='053'/><anchor id='Pg053'/> +his adversaries, was—as his theories show upon close examination—much +less influenced by Western thought +than is commonly supposed to be the case, and in applying +Western doctrines to Chinese affairs was apt to look +upon this as a fortunate coincidence, instead of assuming +the universal exactness of recent Western social and +political thought. +</p> + +<p> +What are the features of the Chinese background that +must be remembered in order to throw a just light upon +the beliefs of Sun Yat-sen? Primarily, it must have become +apparent, from the foregoing discussion of Confucianism +and the old social order, that China, under the +leadership of Sun Yat-sen, was beginning to draw away +from an order of things which the West—or at least a +part of the West—aspires to achieve: a world-society in +which the state had withered away. This ideal, while +never completely realized in China, was perhaps more +closely attained than it has ever been in any other society. +Modern actualities led away from this ideal. The West, +dreaming of world unity, was divided and armed; China +too had to abandon the old notions of universal peace, +and arm. The West, seeking social stability, was mobile; +China too had to move. +</p> + +<p> +The old society was in its controls totalitarian. Diffuse +and extensive controls operated fairly evenly throughout +the system. The West possessed a state system which +was fundamentally different. By limiting the range of +law to the reinforcement of certain particular <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>mores</foreign>, the +Westerners were able to obtain a terrific concentration of +political power within the sphere of what they conceived +to be legitimate state control. On the other hand the presence +of a large number of activities not subject to state +control led individuals to cherish their freedom—a freedom +which in most cases did not impair the military and +political effectiveness of the state in external action. +</p> + +<pb n='054'/><anchor id='Pg054'/> + +<p> +Since Fascism seeks to reëstablish order and certainty, +as does Communism (although an order and certainty of +a different kind), by the extension of state activities; and +since Sun Yat-sen proposed to improve the political position +of China by developing a modern state (of narrow, +but intense activities in contrast to the loose general controls +of the old society), the drift in China may be regarded, +in this respect, as Fascism in reverse. Beginning +with the same premises—the regeneration of the nation—Mussolini +was led to a course of policy diametrically +opposite to that plotted by Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +Even, however, with his plans for developing a <q>machine +state</q> in a society where states had long since +perished, Sun Yat-sen did not propose to destroy Chinese +morality and non-political discipline for the sake of instituting +a sharp juristic law-and-order organization. He +was anxious that the old Chinese morality and social +knowledge be applied. In this, he differed from most of +the other modern leaders of China, who were for veneering +China with a Parliament and police without delay. +Sun Yat-sen realized that a state was necessary in China, +and hoped to establish one; he also hoped that, beyond +the limits of the new state activity, individualism and disorder +would not come to prevail, but that the old controls +would continue to operate. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen's thought cannot be studied +as a mere offshoot of recent Western thought. It must +be realized that he proposed two ends which, of all the +countries of the world, would be mutually compatible +only in China: the development of a state, and the full +continuation of non-political controls.<note place='foot'>This same line of attack seems, in the West, to be employed only +by the Catholic church which, while opposing any avowedly collectivistic +totalitarian state, seeks to maintain control on an ideological and not a +political basis, over almost all aspects of the life of its members. No +political party or governing group seems to share this attitude.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='055'/><anchor id='Pg055'/> + +<p> +In fostering the continuation of ideological control, Sun +Yat-sen hoped to modify the old ideology so that it would +become applicable to the new situations. As will be made +clear later, he was redefining the old world-view so that, +without disturbing the consequences to which it would +lead, it might apply in a novel and unprecedentedly disturbed +world. He was, in short, switching the premises +and trying to preserve the conclusions, modifying the +actual behavior of the Chinese only in so far as it was +necessary for the purpose of strengthening and invigorating +the whole body politic of China. +</p> + +<p> +Another strain of the ancient thought penetrates Sun +Yat-sen's theories. Ideological control was not to the +Confucians, as some Marxian critics aver,<note place='foot'>Karl A. Wittfogel, in his <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, as well as Roy, in the +work cited, thinks very little of the justice of Confucianism. The extreme +mobility of Chinese society, which largely precluded the development of +any permanent class rule, is either unknown to them or ignored. If the +ideologue-officials of old China composed a class, they were a class like +no other known, for they provided for the continuous purging of their +own class, and its continuous recruitment from all levels of society—excepting +that of prostitutes and soldiers.</note> a rather naïve +duplicity by which the gentry of China could maintain +themselves in power indefinitely. Confucius can not be +accused, save on the basis of unwarrantable reading-in, of +insincerity in his teaching of order. He was conservative, +and knew what he was doing, in seeking for the general +self-discipline of men, and the rule of precept and virtue; +but to believe that he desired one public philosophy and +another private one goes beyond the realm of historically +justifiable interpretation. An ideology may, of course, be +deceptive to its promulgators, but the absence of any +genuine class-society—as known in the West—must serve +as a testimonial to the sincerity of Confucian teachings. +The Confucian ideology was to the ancients not only an +instrument for good; it was common sense. +</p> + +<pb n='056'/><anchor id='Pg056'/> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not, as a Western leader in his position +might have done, seek to befuddle the masses for their +own good. Since he proposed to entrust China's destinies +to the votes of the masses, he could scarcely have believed +them liable to fall victims to deceit over a great length of +time. In teaching of the race-nation, and of the nature of +Chinese society, Sun Yat-sen was telling the people what +it would be good for them to believe; it was good for +them because it was the truth—that is, most in accord +with the actual situation of China in the general society +of the world. +</p> + +<p> +Few today would dare say what is really in the minds +of European leaders such as Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler. +These men may themselves believe what they say; or, not +believing it, say it nevertheless because they think it the +right thing for the masses, in the masses' own interests, to +believe. Their respective enemies accuse them of saying +what they do in order to mislead the masses and to dominate +the masses for hidden purposes of their own. No +such accusation has been levelled against Sun Yat-sen. +Apart from his personal sincerity, his belief in the qualities +of the common people was such that he did not consider +it necessary to deceive them, even for their own +good. +</p> + +<p> +Consequently, in dealing with the various doctrines that +Sun preached, it must be remembered that he himself believed +what he was saying. He did not merely think that +the people should regard the Chinese society as a race-nation; +he thought that China <emph>was</emph> a race-nation. The +modifications of the Confucian philosophy were to be contemplated, +as was the original philosophy, as pragmatically +true.<note place='foot'><p>T'ang Leang-li writes, in <hi rend='italic'>The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution</hi>, +New York, 1930, p. 168, as follows concerning Sun Yat-sen's early +teaching of nationalism: +</p> +<p> +<q>Previous to the Republican Revolution of 1911, the principle of +nationality was known as the principle of racial struggle, and was in +effect little more than <emph>a primitive tribalism rationalized to serve as a +weapon</emph> in the struggle against the Manchu oppressors. It was the +corner-stone of revolutionary theory, and by emphasizing the racial distinction +between the ruling and the oppressed classes, succeeded in uniting +the entire Chinese people against the Manchu dynasty.</q> (Italics mine.) +In speaking of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ts'u</foreign> as a primitive tribalism which had been rationalized +as a weapon, Dr. T'ang might lead some of his readers to infer that +Sun Yat-sen did not believe what he taught, and that—as a master-stroke +of practical politics—he had devised an ideological weapon which, regardless +of its truthfulness, would serve him in his struggles. But, it may +be asked, what was Sun Yat-sen struggling for, if not the union and +preservation of the Chinese people?</p></note> +</p> + +<pb n='057'/><anchor id='Pg057'/> + +<p> +These two factors must be reckoned with—that Sun +Yat-sen was teaching and working in the Chinese milieu, +and that his ideology was an ideology not in the older +pejorative sense of the word, which connoted duplicity, +but an ideology in the sense of a scheme of exact knowledge +which, by its very truthfulness, was a political and +social instrument. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='058'/><anchor id='Pg058'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter II The Theory of Nationalism.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Emergence of the Chinese Race-Nation.</head> + +<p> +It could, at first thought, be supposed that the reconstruction +of Chinese society might have been necessitated +by internal weakness just as much as by a changed environment. +The process of organizing and developing a +tight, clear scheme of political control organizations +within the society (stateification), and delimiting the +extent and aims of the society (nationalism) were the +chief characteristics of this reconstruction. +</p> + +<p> +It is only by means of a disregard of actual conditions +that the supposition of an internal weakness so great as +to require radical change can be maintained. While the +latter days of the Manchu Empire represented a decline, +it was a decline no more serious than others through +which Chinese culture had passed and resurged many +times in its history. It is still a debatable matter as to +whether China had actually become intellectually and +artistically sterile during this period. In any event, it is +questionable whether the completely revolutionary reorganization +of Chinese society—of the type that Sun Yat-sen +found it necessary to support—would have been either +worth-while or probable in the absence of Euramerican +aggression, and the appearance, all about China, of a new, +hostile, and unstable environment. If it had not been for +the impact of the West it is conceivable—although all +comment on this must remain mere speculation—that a +social revolution such as those which occurred under +Wang Mang (usurper-founder of the unrecognized Hsin +Dynasty, 9-25 A.D.), Wang An-shih (prime minister, +1069-1076 A.D., under the Sung dynasty), or Hung Hsiu-ch'üan +(founder of the rebel T'ai P'ing dynasty, 1849-1865), +<pb n='059'/><anchor id='Pg059'/> +might have adjusted matters by a general redistribution +of wealth and administrative reorganization. +</p> + +<p> +In his earliest agitations Sun Yat-sen was opposed to +the Manchus.<note place='foot'>See sections, below, on the programs of nationalism.</note> In this connection he developed a peculiar +and interesting theory concerning nationalism. He held, +briefly, that the Chinese had, at the noon-day glory of their +Empire, fallen under the lure of a cosmopolitanism which +was not in accord with the realities of political existence. +It was this lack of distinction between themselves and outsiders +which had permitted hundreds of millions of Chinese +to fall prey to one hundred thousand Manchus in the +early seventeenth century,<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, p. 131. Sun Yat-sen said: <q>Formerly China too +entertained the ambition of becoming mistress of the whole world and of +rising above all other countries; so she (too) advocated cosmopolitanism.... +When the Manchus entered the Great Wall, they were very few; +they numbered 100,000 men. How were those 100,000 men able to subject +hundreds of millions of others? Because the majority of Chinese at +that time favored cosmopolitanism and said nothing about nationalism.</q></note> with the consequence that the +Manchus, once on the throne of China, made every effort +to erase their barbarian origin from the minds of the +Chinese, and, with this end in view, did everything possible, +as modern Japan is doing in Korea, to destroy the +national consciousness of the Chinese.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, pp. 126 ff.</note> China, to Sun Yat-sen, +had always been a nation, but its inhabitants did not +believe it a nation. They had lost the precious treasure of +nationalism. Without contradicting Sun Yat-sen, but differing +from him only in the use of words, Westerners +might say that the Chinese had once known nationalism +as members of the antique Chinese states, but had later +formed—in the place of a nation—a cosmopolitan society +which comprehended the civilized world of Eastern Asia.<note place='foot'>It seems to the present writer that, whatever criteria are selected for +the determination of the nationhood of a given society, <emph>uniqueness</emph> certainly +is <emph>not</emph> one of the qualities attributed to a <q>nation.</q> It is not +appropriate for the author to venture upon any extended search for a +<q>true nation</q>; he might observe, however, that in his own use—in +contrast to Sun Yat-sen's—he employs the term in a consciously relative +sense, contrasting it with the old Chinese cosmopolitan society, which +thought itself unique except for certain imitations of itself on the part of +half-civilized barbarians. A <q>nation</q> must signify, among other things, +for the purposes of this work, a society calling itself such and recognizing +the existence of other societies of more or less the same nature. Sun +Yat-sen, on the other hand, regarded a nation as a group of persons as +real as a family group, and consistently spoke of the Chinese nation as +having existed throughout the ages—even in those times when the Chinese +themselves regarded their own society as the civilized world, and did so +with some show of exactness, if their own viewpoint is taken into +account.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='060'/><anchor id='Pg060'/> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not blame Confucius for cosmopolitanism. +There is, indeed, nowhere in his works the +implication that Confucianism was an evil in itself, deserving +destruction; why then did Sun Yat-sen believe +that, even though the old ideology was not invalid for the +organization of China internally, the old world-view had +broken down as an effective instrument for the preservation +of China? +</p> + +<p> +First of all, Sun stated, in terms more general than did +the ancients, the necessity of establishing the ideology on +the basis of pragmatism. He stated: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +We cannot say in general that ideas, as ideas, are good or bad. +We must judge whether, when put into practice, they prove useful +to us or not. If they are of practical value to us, they are +good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful +to the world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, +they are not good.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 130-131. d'Elia's italics, covering the last +two sentences in the quotation, have been omitted as superfluous. As +an illustration of the difference between the translation of d'Elia and +that of Hsü, the same paragraph might also be cited from the latter +translation. <q>The ethical value of everything is relative and so nothing +in the world is innately good or innately bad. It is determined by circumstances. +A thing that is useful to us is a good thing; otherwise, a bad +thing. Also, a thing that is useful and advantageous to the world is a +good thing; otherwise, a bad thing.</q> Hsü translation, cited, pp. 210-211. +Excepting for occasional purposes of comparison, the translation of +Father d'Elia will be referred to in citing the sixteen lectures on the +<hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>.</note> +</quote> + +<pb n='061'/><anchor id='Pg061'/> + +<p> +He states, also, that if the Chinese race is to survive, +it must adopt nationalism. <q>... if we now want to save +China, if we wish to see the Chinese race survive forever, +we must preach Nationalism.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 70. The curiously significant use of the +word <q>forever</q> is reminiscent of the teleology of the Chinese family +system, according to which the flesh-and-blood immortality of man, and +the preservation of identity through the survival of descendants, is a true +immortality.</note> Hitherto they had been +no more conscious of race than were the Europeans of the +middle ages. To be sure, they were barbarians, whose +features were strange; but the Chinese were not conscious +of themselves as a racial unity in competition and conflict +with other equal or superior racial unities. The self-consciousness +of the Chinese was a cultural rather than a +racial one, and the juxtaposition that presented itself to +the Chinese mind was between <q>Ourselves of the Central +Realm</q> and <q>You the Outsiders.</q><note place='foot'><foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Wo-men Chung-kuo jen</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ni-men wai-kuo jen</foreign>.</note> Sun Yat-sen became +intensely conscious of being a Chinese by race,<note place='foot'>Paul M. Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>The Life and Principles of Sun Chung-shan</hi>, +p. 102. There is here told the anecdote of Sun Yat-sen's first encounter +with race-hatred. At Ewa, Hawaii, in 1880, Sun, then a young lad just +arrived from China, met a Westerner on the road. The Westerner +threatened him, and called him <q>Damn Chinaman!</q> and various other +epithets. When Sun Yat-sen discovered that the man was neither deranged +nor intoxicated, but simply venting his general hatred of all Chinese, he +was so much impressed with the incident that he never forgot it.</note> and so +did many other of his compatriots, by the extraordinary +race-pride of the <emph>White Men</emph> in China. In common with +many others of his generation, Sun Yat-sen turned to race-consciousness +as the name for Chinese solidarity. +</p> + +<p> +There is nowhere in his works, so far as the writer +knows, any attempt to find a value higher than the necessity +of perpetuating the Chinese race. Sun Yat-sen was a +Chinese; his followers were Chinese; whatever benefits +they contemplated bestowing upon the world as a whole +were incidental to their work for a powerful and continued +<pb n='062'/><anchor id='Pg062'/> +China. At various times Sun Yat-sen and his followers +expressed sympathy with the whole world, with +the oppressed of the earth, or with all Asia, but the paramount +drive behind the new movement has been the +defense and reconstruction of China, no longer conceived +of as a core-society maintaining the flower of human +civilization, but regarded as a race abruptly plunged into +the chaos of hostile and greedy nations. +</p> + +<p> +Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen called China a nation. +We may suppose that he never thought that Chinese +society need not necessarily be called a nation, even +in the modern world. What he did do, though, was to +conceive of China as a unique type of nation: a race-nation. +He stated that races could be distinguished by a +study of physical characteristics, occupation, language, +religion and folkways or customs.<note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 168; d'Elia translation, cited, p. 68.</note> Dividing the world +first into the usual old-style five primary races (white, +black, yellow, brown, and red), he divides these races +into sub-races in the narrow sense of the term. The Chinese +race, in the narrow sense of the term, is both a race +and a nation. The Anglo-Saxons are divided between +England and America, the Germans between Germany +and Austria, the Latins among the Mediterranean nations, +and so forth; but China is at the same time both the +Chinese race and the Chinese nation. If the Chinese wish +their race to perpetuate itself forever, they must adopt +and follow the doctrine of Nationalism.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 70.</note> Otherwise +China faces the tragedy of being "despoiled as a nation +and extinct as a race."<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 71.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen felt that China was menaced and oppressed +ethnically, politically and economically. Ethnically, he believed +that the extraordinary population increase of the +<pb n='063'/><anchor id='Pg063'/> +white race within the past few centuries represented a +trend which, if not counterbalanced, would simply result +in the Chinese race being crowded off the earth. Politically +he observed that the Chinese dependencies had been +alienated by the Western powers and Japan; that China +was at the mercy of any military nation that chose to +attack; that it was a temporary deadlock between the conquering +powers rather than any strength of China that +prevented, at least for the time being, the partition of +China and that a diplomatic attack, which could break +the deadlock of the covetous states, would be even more +deadly and drastic than simple military attack.<note place='foot'>Sun Yat-sen said: <q>A scrap of paper, a pen, and a mutual agreement +will be enough for the ruin of China ... in order to wipe her out by +common agreement, it suffices that the diplomats of the different countries +meet somewhere and affix their signatures.... One morning will +suffice to annihilate a nation.</q> d'Elia translation, cited, p. 170.</note> +</p> + +<p> +It must be remembered that Sun Yat-sen saw a nation +while the majority of his compatriots still envisioned the +serene, indestructible society of the Confucians. Others +may have realized that the Western impact was more than +a frontier squabble on a grand scale; they may have +thought it to have assumed epic proportions. But Sun +Yat-sen, oppressed by his superior knowledge of the +Western nations, obtained at the cost of considerable sympathy +with them, struggled desperately to make his countrymen +aware of the fact, irrefutable to him, that China +was engaged in a conflict different not only in degree but +in kind from any other in Chinese history. The Great +Central Realm had become simply China. Endangered +and yet supine, it faced the imperative necessity of complete +reconstitution, with the bitter alternative of decay +and extinction—a race tragedy to be compounded of millions +of individual tragedies. And yet reconstitution could +not be of a kind that would itself be a surrender and +treason to the past; China must fit itself for the modern +<pb n='064'/><anchor id='Pg064'/> +world, and nevertheless be China. This was the dilemma +of the Chinese world-society, suddenly become a nation. +Sun Yat-sen's life and thought were devoted to solving it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Necessity of Nationalism.</head> + +<p> +An abstract theorist might observe that the Chinese, +finding their loose-knit but stable society surrounded by +compact and aggressive nations, might have solved the +question of the perpetuation of Chinese society in the +new environment by one of two expedients: first, by nationalizing, +as it were, their non-national civilization; or +second, by launching themselves into a campaign against +the system of nations as such. The second alternative +does not seem to have occurred to Sun Yat-sen. Though +he never ventured upon any complete race-war theory, he +was nevertheless anxious to maintain the self-sufficient +power of China as it had been until the advent of the +West. In his negotiations with the Communists, for example, +neither he nor they suggested—as might have +been done in harmony with communist theory—the fusion +of China and the Soviet Union under a nuclear world +government. We may assume with a fair degree of certainty +that, had a suggestion been made, Sun Yat-sen +would have rejected it with mistrust if not indignation. +He had spent a great part of his life in the West. He +knew, therefore, the incalculable gulf between the civilizations, +and was unwilling to entrust the destinies of China +to persons other than Chinese.<note place='foot'><p>The danger of relying too much on foreign aid can be illustrated by +a reference to Sun-Joffe Manifesto issued in Shanghai, January 26, 1922. +Sun Yat-sen, as the leader of the Chinese Nationalist movement, and Adolf +Joffe, as the Soviet Special Envoy, signed a joint statement, the first +paragraph of which reads as follows: +</p> +<p> +<q>Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet +System cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not +exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either +Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe who +is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing +problem is to achieve unification and attain full national independence, +and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China +has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the +support of Russia.</q> +</p> +<p> +See T'ang Leang-li, cited, p. 156. +</p> +<p> +In view of the subsequent Communist attempt, in 1927, to convert +the Nationalist movement into a mere stage in the proletarian conquest +of power in China, in violation of the terms of the understanding upon +which the Communists and the Chinese Nationalists had worked together, +the leaders of the Kuomintang are today as mistrustful of what they +term Communist politico-cultural imperialism as they are of capitalist +politico-economic imperialism. It is curious that the APRA leaders in +Peru have adopted practically the same attitude.</p></note> +</p> + +<pb n='065'/><anchor id='Pg065'/> + +<p> +Once the possibility of a successful counter-attack upon +the system of nations is discounted, nationalism is seen +as the sole solution to China's difficulties. It must, however, +be understood that, whereas nationalism in the West +implies an intensification of the already definite national +consciousness of the peoples, nationalism in China might +mean only as little as the introduction of such an awareness +of nationality. Nationalism in China might, as a +matter of logic, include the possibility of improved personal +relations between the Chinese and the nationals of +other states since, on the one hand, the Chinese would be +relieved of an intolerable sense of humiliation in the face +of Western power, and, on the other, be disabused of +any archaic notions they might retain concerning themselves +as the sole civilized people of the earth.<note place='foot'>It is necessary to remember that in the four decades before 1925, +during which Sun Yat-sen advocated <emph>nationalism</emph>, the word had not +acquired the ugly connotations that recent events have given it. The +nationalism of Sun Yat-sen was conceived of by him as a pacific and +defensive instrument, for the perpetuation of an independent Chinese +race and civilization. See Paul M. W. Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations with +Sun Yat-sen, 1919-1922</hi>, Book I, ch. 5, <q>Defensive Nationalism,</q> and +ch. 6, <q>Pacific Nationalism,</q> for a further discussion of this phase of +Sun Yat-sen's thought.</note> +</p> + +<p> +A brief historical reference may explain the apparent +necessity of nationalism in China. In the nineteenth century +<pb n='066'/><anchor id='Pg066'/> +foreigners in China generally suffered reverses when +they came into conflict with a village, a family, or a guild. +But when they met the government, they were almost +always in a position to bully it. It was commonly of little +or no concern to the people what their government did +to the barbarians; the whole affair was too remote to be +much thought about. We find, for example, that the +British had no trouble in obtaining labor auxiliaries in +Canton to fight with the British troops against the Imperial +government at Peking in 1860; it is quite probable +that these Cantonese, who certainly did not think that +they were renegades, had no anti-dynastic intentions. Chinese +served the foreign enemies of China at various times +as quasi-military constabulary, and served faithfully. Before +the rise of Chinese nationalism it was not beyond possibility +that China would be partitioned into four or five +colonies appurtenant to the various great powers and that +the Chinese in each separate colony, if considerately and +tactfully treated, would have become quite loyal to their +respective foreign masters. The menace of such possibilities +made the need of Chinese nationalism very real to +Sun Yat-sen; the passing of time may serve further to +vindicate his judgment. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's nationalism, though most vividly clear +when considered as a practical expedient of social engineering, +may also be regarded more philosophically as a +derivation of, or at least having an affinity with, certain +older ideas of the Chinese. Confucian thinking, as re-expressed +in Western terms, implants in the individual a +sense of his responsibility to all humanity, united in space +and time. Confucianism stressed the solidarity of humanity, +continuous, immortal, bound together by the +closest conceivable ties—blood relationships. Sun Yat-sen's +nationalism may represent a narrowing of this conception, +and the substitution of the modern Chinese race +<pb n='067'/><anchor id='Pg067'/> +for Confucian humanity. In fairness to Sun Yat-sen it +must, however, be admitted that he liked to think, in +Christian and Confucian terms, of the brotherhood of +man; one of his favorite expressions was <q>under heaven +all men shall work for the common good.</q><note place='foot'><foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tien sha wei kung.</foreign></note> +</p> + +<p> +Nationalism was to Sun Yat-sen the prime condition +of his movement and of his other principles. The Communists +of the West regard every aspect of their lives +significant only in so far as it is instrumental in the class +struggle. Sun Yat-sen, meeting them, was willing to use +the term <q>class struggle</q> as an instrument for Chinese +nationalism. He thought of China, of the vital and immediate +necessity of defending and strengthening China, and +sacrificed everything to the effectuation of a genuine nationalism. +To him only nationalism could tighten, organize, +and clarify the Chinese social system so that +China, whatever it was to be, might not be lost. +</p> + +<p> +The early philosophers of China, looking upon a unicultural +world, saw social organization as the supreme +criterion of civilization and humanity. Sun Yat-sen, in a +world of many mutually incomprehensible and hostile +cultures saw nationalism (in the sense of race solidarity) +as the supreme condition for the survival of the race-nation +China. Democracy and social welfare were necessary +to the stability and effectiveness of this nationalism, but +the preservation and continuation of the race-nation was +always to remain the prime desideratum. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Return to the Old Morality.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen quite unequivocally stated the necessity for +establishing a new Nationalist ideology in order to effectuate +the purposes of China's regeneration. He spoke of the +two steps of ideological reconstitution and political reconstitution +<pb n='068'/><anchor id='Pg068'/> +as follows: <q>In order today to restore our +national standing we must, first of all, revive the national +spirit. But in order to revive the national spirit, we must +fulfill two conditions. First, we must realize that we are +at present in a very critical situation. Second ... we must +unite ... and form a large national association.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 184. A reference to clan organization, +to be discussed later, has been deleted.</note> He +evidently regarded the ideological reconstitution as anterior +to the political, although he adjusted the common +development of the two quite detailedly in his doctrine of +tutelage. +</p> + +<p> +He proposed three ideological methods for the regeneration +of China, which might again make the Chinese the +leading society (nation) of the world. There were: first, +the return to the ancient Chinese morality; second, the +return to the ancient Chinese learning; and third, the +adoption of Western science.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 181 (summary of the sixth lecture on +nationalism).</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's never-shaken belief in the applicability of +the ancient Chinese ethical system, and in the wisdom of +old China in social organization, is such that of itself it +prevents his being regarded as a mere imitator of the +West, a barbarized Chinese returning to barbarize his +countrymen. His devotion to Confucianism was so great +that Richard Wilhelm, the greatest of German sinologues, +wrote of him: <q>The greatness of Sun Yat-sen rests, therefore, +upon the fact that he has found a living synthesis +between the fundamental principles of Confucianism and +the demands of modern times, a synthesis which, beyond +the borders of China, can again become significant to all +humanity. Sun Yat-sen combined in himself the brazen +consistency of a revolutionary and the great love of +humanity of a renewer. Sun Yat-sen has been the kindest +of all the revolutionaries of mankind. And this kindness +<pb n='069'/><anchor id='Pg069'/> +was taken by him from the heritage of Confucius. Hence +his intellectual work stands as a connecting bridge between +the old and the modern ages. And it will be the salvation +of China, if it determinedly treads that bridge.</q><note place='foot'>Richard Wilhelm's preface to <hi rend='italic'>Die Geistigen Grundlagen des Sun +Yat Senismus</hi> of Tai Chi-tao (The Intellectual Foundations of Sun-Yat-senism), +Berlin, 1931 (henceforth cited as <q>Tai Chi-tao</q>), pp. 8-9; +<q>Die Grösse Sun Yat Sens beruht nun darauf, dass er eine lebendige +Synthese gefunden hat zwischen den Grundprinzipien des Konfuzianismus +and den Anforderungen der neuen Zeit, eine Synthese, die über +die Grenzen Chinas hinaus für die ganze Menschheit noch einmal von +Bedeutung werden kann. Sun Yat Sen vereinigt in sich die eherne +Konsequenz des Revolutionärs und die grosse Menschenliebe des Erneuerers. +Sun Yat Sen ist der gütigste von allen Revolutionären der Menschheit +gewesen. Und diese Güte hat er dem Erbe des Konfuzius entnommen. +So steht sein geistiges Werk da als eine verbindende Brücke swischen der +alten und der neuen Zeit. Und es wird das Heil Chinas sein, wenn es +entschlossen diese Brücke beschreitet.</q></note> And +Tai Chi-tao, one of Sun Yat-sen's most respected followers, +had said: <q>Sun Yat-sen was the only one among all +the revolutionaries who was not an enemy to Confucius; +Sun Yat-sen himself said that his ideas embodied China, +and that they were derived from the ideas of Confucius.</q><note place='foot'>Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 65.</note> +The invocation of authorities need not be relied upon to +demonstrate the importance of Sun Yat-sen's demand for +ideological reconstruction upon the basis of a return to the +traditional morality; he himself stated his position in his +sixth lecture on nationalism: <q>If we now wish to restore +to our nation its former position, besides uniting all of us +into a national body, we must also first revive our own +ancient morality; when we have achieved that, we can +hope to give back to our nation the position which she +once held.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 186.</note> +</p> + +<p> +What are the chief elements of the old morality? These +are: 1) loyalty and filial piety, 2) humanity and charity, +3) faithfulness and justice, and 4) peace. These four, +however, are all expressions of <emph>humanity</emph>, to which <emph>knowledge</emph> +<pb n='070'/><anchor id='Pg070'/> +and <emph>valor</emph> must be joined, and <emph>sincerity</emph> employed in +expressing them. +</p> + +<p> +The problem of loyalty was one very difficult to solve. +Under the Empire it was easy enough to consider the +Emperor as the father of the great society, and to teach +loyalty to him. This was easy to grasp, even for the +simplest mind. Sun Yat-sen urged loyalty to the people, +and loyalty to duty, as successors to the loyalty once owed +to the sovereign. He deplored the tendency, which appeared +in Republican times, for the masses to assume that +since there was no more Emperor, there was no more +loyalty; and it has, since the passing of Sun Yat-sen, been +one of the efforts of the Nationalists to build up a tradition +of loyalty to the spirit of Sun Yat-sen as the timeless +and undying leader of modern China. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen was also deeply devoted to filial piety in +China, which was—in the old philosophy—simply a manifestation, +in another direction, of the same virtue as +loyalty. He called filial piety indispensable, and was +proud that none of the Western nations had ever approached +the excellence of the Chinese in this virtue.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 187-8. Sun Yat-sen's discussion of the +old morality forms the first part of his lecture on nationalism, pp. 184-194 +of the d'Elia translation.</note> +At the time that he said this, Sun Yat-sen was accused of +being a virtual Communist, and of having succumbed to +the lure of Soviet doctrines. It is at least a little strange +that a man supposedly infatuated with Marxism should +praise that most conservative of all virtues: filial piety! +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen then commented on each of the other virtues, +pointing out their excellence in old China, and their +necessity to modern China. In the case of faithfulness, for +example, he cited the traditional reliability of the Chinese +in commercial honor. Concerning justice, he pointed out +that the Chinese political technique was one fundamentally +just; an instance of the application of this was Korea, +<pb n='071'/><anchor id='Pg071'/> +which was-allowed to enjoy peace and autonomy as a +Chinese vassal state for centuries, and then was destroyed +shortly after becoming a Japanese protectorate. Chinese +faithfulness and justice were obviously superior to that of +the Japanese. +</p> + +<p> +In politics the two most important contributions of the +old morality to the Nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen +were (1) the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign>, and (2) the social +interpretation of history. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Wang tao</foreign> is the way of kings—the way of right as opposed +to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa tao</foreign>, the way of might. It consisted, in the old +ideology, of the course of action of the kingly man, who +ruled in harmony with nature and did not violate the +established proprieties of mankind. Sun Yat-sen's teachings +afford us several applications of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign>. In the +first place, a group which has been formed by the forces +of nature is a race; it has been formed according to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang +tao</foreign>. A group which has been organized by brute force is +a state, and is formed by <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa tao</foreign>. The Chinese Empire +was built according to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign>; the British Empire by +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa tao</foreign>. The former was a natural organization of a +homogeneous race; the latter, a military outrage against +the natural order of mankind.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 66. The translation employs the words.</note> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Wang tao</foreign> is also seen in the relation between China +and her vassal states, a benevolent relationship which +stood in sharp contrast, at times, though not always, to +the methods later to be used by the Europeans in Asia.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 129. In connection with the doctrine of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign>, it may be mentioned that this doctrine has been made the state +philosophy of <q>Manchukuo.</q> See the coronation issue of the <hi rend='italic'>Manchuria +Daily News</hi>, Dairen, March 1, 1934, pp. 71-80, and the <hi rend='italic'>Japan-Manchoukuo +Year Book</hi>, Tokyo, 1934, pp. 634-635. The advocacy of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign> in a +state which is a consequence of one of the perfect illustrations of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa tao</foreign> +in the modern Far East, is astonishing. Its use does possess significance, +in demonstrating that the shibboleths of ancient virtue are believed by the +Japanese and by <q>Emperor Kang Teh</q> to possess value in contemporary +politics.</note> +<pb n='072'/><anchor id='Pg072'/> +Again, economic development on a basis of the free play +of economic forces was regarded as <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign> by Sun Yat-sen, +even though its consequences might be adverse. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Pa +tao</foreign> appeared only when the political was employed to do +violence to the economic.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 528, 529.</note> This doctrine of good and bad +aspects of economic relationships stands in distinct contrast +to the Communist theory. He believed that the +political was frequently employed to bring about unjust +international economic relationships, and extenuated adverse +economic conditions simply because they were the +free result of the operations of a <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>laissez-faire</foreign> economy. +</p> + +<p> +Economically, the interpretation of history was, according +to Sun Yat-sen, to be performed through the study of +consumption, and not of the means of production. In +this he was indebted to Maurice William—at least in +part.<note place='foot'>See below, for discussion of the influence that Henry George, Karl +Marx, and Maurice William had upon the social interpretation of history +so far as economic matters were concerned.</note> The social interpretation of history is, however, +associated not only with economic matters, but with the +ancient Chinese moral system as well. Tai Chi-tao, whose +work has most clearly demonstrated the relationship between +Confucianism and Sunyatsenism, points out in his +diagram of Sun Yat-sen's ethical system that <emph>humanity</emph> +(<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>) was to Sun Yat-sen the key to the interpretation of +history. We have already seen that <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> is the doctrine of +social consciousness, of awareness of membership in society.<note place='foot'>See <q>The Theory of the Confucian World Society,</q> above.</note> +Sun Yat-sen, according to Tai Chi-tao, regarded +man's development as a social animal, the development +of his humanity, as the key to history. This would include, +of course, among other things, his methods of production +<pb n='073'/><anchor id='Pg073'/> +and of consumption. The distinction between +Sun Yat-sen and the Western Marxian thinkers lies in +the fact that the latter trace their philosophical genealogy +back through the main currents of Western philosophy, +while Sun Yat-sen derives his from Confucius. Nothing +could be further from dialectical materialism than the +socio-ethical interpretation that Sun Yat-sen developed +from the Confucian theories. +</p> + +<p> +The rôle played by the old Chinese morality in the +ideology of Sun Yat-sen is, it is apparent, an important +one. First, Sun Yat-sen believed that Chinese nationalism +and the regeneration of the Chinese people had to be +based on the old morality of China, which was superior +to any other morality that the world had known, and +which was among the treasures of the Chinese people. +Second, he believed that, in practical politics as well as +national ideology, the application of the old virtues would +be fruitful in bringing about the development of a strong +China. Third, he derived the idea of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign>, the right, +the royal, the natural way, from antiquity. He pointed out +that violence to the established order—of race, as in the +case of the British Empire, of economics, as in the case of +the political methods of imperialism—was directly antithetical +to the natural, peaceful way of doing things that +had led to the supreme greatness of China in past ages. +Fourth, he employed the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>, of social-consciousness, +which had already been used, by the Confucians, +and formed the cornerstone of their teaching, as +the key to his interpretation. In regard to the individual, +this was, as we have seen, consciousness of social orientation; +with regard to the group, it was the development of +strength and harmony. It has also been translated <hi rend='italic'>humanity</hi>, +which broadly and ethically, carries the value +scheme with which <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> is connected. +</p> + +<p> +Even this heavy indebtedness to Chinese antiquity in +adopting and adapting the morality of the ancients for +<pb n='074'/><anchor id='Pg074'/> +the salvation of their children in the modern world, was +not the total of Sun Yat-sen's political traditionalism. He +also wished to renew the ancient Chinese knowledge, +especially in the fields of social and political science. +Only after these did he desire that Western technics be +introduced. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Return to the Ancient Knowledge.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the return to the ancient +Chinese knowledge may be divided into three parts. First, +he praised the ancient Chinese superiority in the field +of social science, but distinctly stressed the necessity of +Western knowledge in the field of the physical and applied +sciences alone.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341.</note> Second, he pointed out the many +practical accomplishments of the ancient Chinese knowledge, +and the excellence and versatility of Chinese invention.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 199.</note> +Third, his emphasis upon the development of +talents in the material sciences hints at, although it does +not state, a theory of national wealth based upon labor +capacity. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen said, <q>Besides reviving our ancient Chinese +morality, we must also revive our wisdom and +ability.... If today we want to revive our national spirit, +we must revive not only the morality which is proper to +us, but we must revive also our own knowledge.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 194.</note> He +goes on to say that the peculiar excellence of the ancient +Chinese knowledge lay in the field of political philosophy, +and states that the Chinese political philosophy surpassed +the Western, at least in clearness. +</p> + +<p> +He quotes <hi rend='italic'>The Great Learning</hi> for the summation, in +a few words, of the highlights of this ancient Chinese +social knowledge: <q>Investigate into things, attain the +<pb n='075'/><anchor id='Pg075'/> +utmost knowledge, make the thoughts sincere, rectify the +heart, cultivate the person, regulate the family, govern +the country rightly, pacify the world.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 194. The original quotation, in Chinese +and in English, may be found in James Legge, translator, <hi rend='italic'>The Four Books</hi>, +Shanghai, 1930, p. 313.</note> This is, as we +have seen, what may be called the Confucian doctrine of +ideological control. Sun Yat-sen lavished praise upon it. +<q>Such a theory, so detailed, minute, and progressive, was +neither discovered nor spoken of by any foreign political +philosopher. It is a peculiar intellectual treasure pertaining +to our political philosophy, which we must preserve.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 194-195.</note> +The endorsement is doubly significant. In the +first place, it demonstrates the fact that Sun Yat-sen +thought of himself as a rebuilder and not as a destroyer +of the ancient Chinese culture, and the traditional +methods of organization and control. In the second place, +it points out that his Chinese background was most clear +to him, and that he was in his own mind the transmitter +of the Chinese heritage. +</p> + +<p> +In speaking of Chinese excellence in the field of the +social science, Sun Yat-sen did not confine his discussion +to any one time. Whenever he referred to a political +theory, he mentioned its Chinese origin if it were one of +those known to Chinese antiquity: anarchism, communism, +democracy. He never attacked Chinese intellectual +knowledge for being what it was, but only for what it +omitted: physical science.<note place='foot'>Judge Paul Linebarger, in <hi rend='italic'>Conversations with Sun Yat-sen</hi> (unpublished), +states that Sun said to him: <q>China will go down in history +as the greatest literary civilization the world has ever known, or ever +will know, but what good does this deep literary knowledge do us if +we cannot combine it with the modernity of Western science?</q> p. 64, +Book Four.</note> He was undoubtedly more +conservative than many of his contemporaries, who were +actually hostile to the inheritance. +</p> + +<pb n='076'/><anchor id='Pg076'/> + +<p> +The summary of Sun Yat-sen's beliefs and position in +respect to the ancient intellectual knowledge is so well +given by Tai Chi-tao that any other statement would +almost have to verge on paraphrase. Tai Chi-tao wrote: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Sun Yat-sen (in his teachings) completely includes the true +ideas of China as they recur again and again from Yao and +Shun, Confucius and Mencius. It will be clear to us, therefore, +that Sun Yat-sen is the renewal of Chinese moral culture, unbroken +for two thousand years ... we can see that Sun Yat-sen +was convinced of the truth of his own words, and at the same +time we can also recognize that his national revolution was based +upon the re-awakening of Chinese culture. He wanted to call +the creative power of China to life again, and to make the value +of Chinese culture useful to the whole world, and in that way +to realize cosmopolitanism.<note place='foot'>Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 62. The passage reads in full: <q>Sun Yat-sen +umfasst vollkommen die wahren Gedanken Chinas, wie sie bei Yau und +Schun und auch bei Kung Dsï und Mong Dsï wiederfinden. Dadurch +wird uns klar, dass Sun Yat Sen der Erneuerer der seit 2000 Jahre +ununterbrochenen chinesischen sittlichen Kultur ist. Im vergangenen Jahr +hat ein russischer Revolutionär an Sun Yat Sen die folgende Frage +gerichtet: <q>Welche Grundlage haben Ihre Revolutionsgedanken?</q> Sun +Yat Sen hat darauf geantwortet: <q>In China hat es ein sittlichen +Gedanken gegeben, der von Yau, Schun, Yü, Tang, Wen Wang, Wu +Wang, Dschou Gung his zu Kung Dsï getragen worden ist; seither ist +er ununterbrochen, ich habe wieder an ihn angeknüpft und versacht, ihn +weiter zu entwickeln.</q> Der Fragende hat dies nicht verstehen können und +sich weiter erkundigt; Sun Yat Sen hat noch mehrmals versucht, ihm +seine Antwort zu erklären. Aus dieser Unterredung können wir ersehen, +dass Sun Yat Sen von seine Gedanken überzeugt war, gleichzeitig können +wir ersehen, dass seine Nationalrevolution auf dem Widererwachen der +chinesischen Kultur beruht. Er hat die schöpferische Kraft Chinas wieder +ins Leben rufen und den Wert der chinesischen Kultur fur die ganze +Welt nutzbar machen wollen, um somit den Universalismus verwirklichen +zu können.</q> Allowance will have to be made, as it should always in the +case of Tai Chi-tao, for the author's deep appreciation of and consequent +devotion to the virtues of Chinese culture. Other disciples of Sun Yat-sen +wrote in a quite different vein. The present author inclines to the +opinion, however, that Tai Chi-tao's summary is a just rendition of Sun +Yat-sen's attitude. Sun Yat-sen loved and fought for the struggling +masses of China, whose misery was always before his pitying eyes; he +also fought for the accomplishments of Chinese civilization. In modern +China, many leaders have fought for the culture, and forgotten the masses +(men such as Ku Hung-ming were typical); others loved the populace +and forgot the culture. It was one of the elements of Sun Yat-sen's greatness +that he was able to remember both.</note> +</quote> + +<pb n='077'/><anchor id='Pg077'/> + +<p> +Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen's doctrines may not only be regarded +as having been based upon the tacit premises of +the Chinese intellectual milieu, but as having been incorporated +in them as supports. Sun Yat-sen's theories were, +therefore, consciously as well as unconsciously Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen was proud of the accomplishment of the +Chinese in physical and applied knowledge. He praised +Chinese craftsmanship and skill, and extolled the talents +of the people which had invented the mariner's compass, +printing, porcelain, gunpowder, tea, silks, arches, and +suspension bridges.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 199-202.</note> He urged the revival of the talents +of the Chinese, and the return of material development. +This teaching, in conjunction with his advocacy of Western +knowledge, leads to another suggestive point. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen pointed out that <emph>wealth</emph> was to the modern +Chinese what <emph>liberty</emph> was to the Europeans of the +eighteenth century—the supreme condition of further +progress.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 259.</note> The way to progress and wealth was through +social reorganization, and through the use of the capacities +of the people. It may be inferred, although it cannot be +stated positively, that Sun Yat-sen measured wealth not +merely in metals or commodities, but in the productive +capacities of the country, which, as they depend upon the +labor skill of the workers, are in the last analysis cultural +and psychological rather than exclusively physical in +nature.<note place='foot'>This idea, of wealth as national capacity to produce, is of course not +a new one. It is found in the writings of Alexander Hamilton, among +others.</note> +</p> + +<p> +China, following the ancient morality, conscious of its +<pb n='078'/><anchor id='Pg078'/> +intellectual and social heritage, and of its latent practical +talents, needed only one more lesson to learn: the need +of Western science. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Western Physical Science in the New Ideology.</head> + +<p> +The third element of the nationalist ideology proposed +by Sun Yat-sen was the introduction of Western science. +It is upon this that his break with the past arose; it is this +that gives his ideology its partially revolutionary character, +for the ideology was, as we have seen, strongly reconstitutional +in two of its elements. Sun Yat-sen was, however, +willing to tear down if he could rebuild, and rebuild +with the addition of Western science. These questions immediately +arise: why did he wish to add Western science +to the intellectual background of modern China? what, +in Western science, did he wish to add? to what degree +did he wish Western science to play its rôle in the development +of a new ideology for China? +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not have to teach the addition of Western +science to the Chinese ideology. In his own lifetime +the terrific swing from arrogant self-assurance to abject +imitativeness had taken place. Sun Yat-sen said that the +Boxer Rebellion was the last surge of the old Chinese nationalism, +<q>But the war of 1900 was the last manifestation +of self-confidence thoughts and self-confidence power +on the part of the Chinese to oppose the new civilization +of Europe and of America.... They understood that +the civilization of Europe and of America was really much +superior to the ancient civilization of China.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 337.</note> He added +that this superiority was naturally evident in the matter of +armaments. This illustrates both consequences of the impact +of the West—the endangered position of the Chinese +society, and the consequent instability of the Chinese +ideology. +</p> + +<pb n='079'/><anchor id='Pg079'/> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not regard the introduction of Western +science into Chinese life as merely remedial in nature, but, +on the contrary, saw much benefit in it. This was especially +clear to him as a physician; his training led him to +see the abominable practices of many of the Chinese in +matters of diet and hygiene.<note place='foot'>Wei Yung, translator, <hi rend='italic'>The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê</hi>, +cited. See the discussion on dietetics, pp. 3-9.</note> He made a sweeping claim +of Western superiority, which is at the same time a sharp +limitation of it in fields which the conservative European +would be likely to think of as foremost—politics, ethics, +religion. <q>Besides the matter of armaments, the means of +communication ... are far superior.... Moreover, in +everything else that relates to machinery or daily human +labor, in methods of agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, +all (foreign) methods by far surpass those of +China.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 337.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen pointed out the fact that while manuals of +warfare become obsolete in a very few years in the West, +political ideas and institutions do not. He cited the continuance +of the same pattern of government in the United +States, and the lasting authority of the <hi rend='italic'>Republic</hi> of Plato, +as examples of the stagnation of the Western social +sciences as contrasted with physical sciences. Already prepossessed +in favor of the Chinese knowledge and morality +in non-technical matters, he did not demand the introduction +of Western social methods as well. He had lived +long enough in the West to lose some of the West-worship +that characterized so many Chinese and Japanese of +his generation. He was willing, even anxious, that the +experimental method, by itself, be introduced into Chinese +thought in all fields,<note place='foot'>Wei Yung's translation, cited, is an English version of <hi rend='italic'>The Outline +of Psychological Reconstruction</hi> of Sun Yat-sen. This work is devoted to +a refutation of the thesis, first propounded by Wang Yang-ming (ca. +1472-1528), that knowledge is easy and action difficult. In a society +where the ideology had been stabilized for almost two millenia, this +was undoubtedly quite true. In modern China, however, faced with the +terrific problem of again settling the problem of an adequate ideology, the +reverse was true: knowledge was difficult, and action easy. This was one +of the favorite aphorisms of Sun Yat-sen, and he devoted much time, +effort, and thought to making it plain to his countrymen. The comparative +points of view of Wang Yang-ming and Sun Yat-sen afford +a quite clear-cut example of the contrast between an established and +unsettled ideology.</note> but not particularly impressed with +the general superiority of Western social thought. +</p> + +<pb n='080'/><anchor id='Pg080'/> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's own exposition of the reasons for his desiring +to limit the rôle played by Western science in China +is quite clear.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 336-345. This discussion occurs in the +fifth lecture on democracy, incidental to Sun Yat-sen's explaining the +failure of the parliamentary Republic in Peking, and the general inapplicability +of Western ideas of democracy to China.</note> In the first place, Sun Yat-sen was vigorously +in favor of adopting the experimental method in attaining +knowledge. He stood firmly for the pragmatic +foundation of knowledge, and for the exercise of the +greatest care and most strenuous effort in discovering it. +Secondly, he believed in taking over the physical knowledge +of the Westerners, although—in his emphasis on +Chinese talent—he by no means believed that Western +physical knowledge would displace that of the Chinese +altogether. <q>We can safely imitate the material civilization +of Europe and of America; we may follow it blindly, +and if we introduce it in China, it will make good headway.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344.</note> +Thirdly, he believed that the social science of the +West, and especially its political philosophy, might lead +the Chinese into gross error, since it was derived from a +quite different ideology, and not relevant to Chinese conditions. +<q>It would be a gross error on our part, if, disregarding +our own Chinese customs and human sentiments, +we were to try to force upon (our people) a foreign type +of social government just as we copy a foreign make of +<pb n='081'/><anchor id='Pg081'/> +machinery.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344.</note> Fourthly, even apart from the difference +between China and the West which invalidated Western +social science in China, he did not believe that the West +had attained to anything like the same certainty in social +science that it had in physical science.<note place='foot'>It might again be pointed out that Sun Yat-sen differed with +Marxism which, while it, of course, does not hold that all knowledge is +already found, certainly keeps its own first premises beyond all dispute, +and its own interpretations sacrosanct. The dialectics of Marx and Hegel +would certainly appear peculiar in the Chinese environment. Without +going out of his way to point out the difference between Sun's Nationalism +and Marxism-Leninism, the author cannot refrain—in view of the +quite popular misconception that Sun Yat-sen was at one time almost a +Marxist convert—from pointing out the extreme difference between the +premises, the methods, and the conclusions of the two philosophies.</note> Fifthly, Sun Yat-sen +believed that the Chinese should profit by observing +the experiments and theories of the West in regard to +social organization, without necessarily following them. +</p> + +<p> +The great break between Sun Yat-sen's acceptance of +Western physical science and his rejection of Western +social science is demonstrated by his belief that government +is psychological in its foundations. <q>Laws of human +government also constitute an abstract piece of machinery—for +that reason we speak of the machinery of +an organized government—but a material piece of machinery +is based on nature, whereas the immaterial machinery +of government is based on psychology.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 344.</note> Sun +Yat-sen pointed out, although in different words, that +government was based upon the ideology and that the +ideology of a society was an element in the last analysis +psychological, however much it might be conditioned by +the material environment. +</p> + +<p> +Of these three elements—Chinese morality, Chinese +social and political knowledge, and Western physical +science—the new ideology for the modern Chinese society +<pb n='082'/><anchor id='Pg082'/> +was to be formed. What the immediate and the +ultimate forms of that society were to be, remains to be +studied. +</p> + +</div> + + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Consequences of the Nationalist Ideology.</head> + +<p> +What are the consequences of this Nationalistic ideology? +What sort of society did Sun Yat-sen envision? +How much of it was to be Chinese, and how much Western? +Were the Chinese, like some modern Japanese, to +take pride in being simultaneously the most Eastern of +Eastern nations and the most Western of Western or +were they to seek to remain fundamentally what their ancestors +had been for uncounted centuries? +</p> + +<p> +In the first place, Sun Yat-sen's proposed ideology was, +as we have seen, to be composed of four elements. First, +the essential core of the old ideology, to which the three +necessary revivifying elements were to be added. This +vast unmentioned foundation is highly significant to the +assessment of the nature of the new Chinese ideology. +(It is quite apparent that Sun Yat-sen never dreamed, as +did the Russians, of overthrowing the <emph>entire</emph> traditional +order of things. His three modifications were to be added +to the existing Chinese civilization.) Second, he wished +to revive the old morality. Third, he desired to restore the +ancient knowledge and skill of the Chinese to their full +creative energy. Fourth, he desired to add Western +science. The full significance of this must be realized in a +consideration of Chinese nationalism. Sun Yat-sen did +not, like the Meiji Emperor, desire to add the whole front +of Western culture; he was even further from emulating +the Russians in a destruction of the existing order and the +development of an entirely new system. His energies were +directed to the purification and reconstitution of the Chinese +ideology by the strengthening of its own latent moral +and intellectual values, and by the innovation of Western +<pb n='083'/><anchor id='Pg083'/> +physical science and the experimental method. Of the +range of the ideology, of the indescribably complex intellectual +conditionings in which the many activities of the +Chinese in their own civilization were carried on, Sun Yat-sen +proposed to modify only those which could be improved +by a reaction to the excellencies of Chinese antiquity, +or benefited by the influence of Western science. +Sun Yat-sen was, as Wilhelm states, both a revolutionary +and a reconstitutionary. He was reconstitutionary in the +ideology which he proposed, and a revolutionary by virtue +of the political methods which he was willing to sanction +and employ in carrying the ideology into the minds +of the Chinese populace. +</p> + +<p> +In the second place, Sun Yat-sen proposed to modify +the old ideology not only with respect to content but also +with regard to method of development. The Confucians +had, as we have seen, provided for the continual modification +and rectification of the ideology by means of the +doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>. It is a matter of dispute as to +what degree that doctrine constituted a scientific method +for propagating knowledge.<note place='foot'>Hsü, <hi rend='italic'>Confucianism</hi>, cited, contains two chapters relevant to the consideration +of this problem. Ch. III, <q>The Doctrine of Rectification</q> +(pp. 43-61), and Ch. XI, <q>Social Evolution</q> (pp. 219-232), discuss +rectification and ideological development within the Confucian ideology.</note> Whatever the method of +the ancients, Sun Yat-sen proposed to modify it in three +steps: the acknowledgment of the pragmatic foundations +of social ideas, the recognition of the necessity for knowledge +before action, and the introduction of the experimental +method. His pragmatic position shows no particular indication +of having been derived from any specific source; +it was a common enough tendency in old Chinese thought, +from the beginning; in advocating it, Sun Yat-sen may +have been revolutionary only in his championing of an +idea which he may well have had since early childhood. +His stress upon the necessity of ideological clarity as antecedent +<pb n='084'/><anchor id='Pg084'/> +to revolutionary or any other kind of action is +negatively derived from Wang Yang-ming, whose statement +of the converse Sun Yat-sen was wont to attack. +The belief in the experimental method is clearly enough +the result of his Western scientific training—possibly in +so direct a fashion as the personal influence of one of his +instructors, Dr. James Cantlie, later Sir James Cantlie, of +Queen's College, Hongkong. Sun Yat-sen was a physician; +his degree <emph>Dr.</emph> was a medical and not an academic +one; and there is no reason to overlook the influence of +his vocation, a Western one, in estimating the influence +of the Western experimental method.<note place='foot'>As an illustration of Dr. Sun's continued activity as a medical man, +the author begs the reader's tolerance of a short anecdote. In 1920 or +1921, when both Judge Linebarger and Sun Yat-sen were in Shanghai, +and were working together on the book that was to appear as <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen +and the Chinese Republic</hi>, the younger son of Judge Linebarger—the +brother of the present author—fell ill with a rather obscure stomach +disorder. The Western physicians having made little or no progress in +the case, Sun Yat-sen intervened with an old Chinese herbal prescription, +which he, a Western-trained physician, was willing to endorse. The +remedy was relatively efficacious—more so than the suggestions of the +European doctors. Even though Sun Yat-sen very early abandoned his +career of professional medical man for that of revolutionist, he appears +to have practised medicine intermittently throughout his life.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The overwhelming preponderance of Chinese elements +in the new ideology proposed by Sun Yat-sen must not +hide the fact that, in so stable an ideology as that of old +China, the modifications which Sun advocated were highly +significant. In method, experimentalism;<note place='foot'>Sun Yat-sen wrote, in Wei Yung translation, cited, p. 115: <q>In +our age of scientific progress the undertaker [sic!], seeks to know first +before undertaking. This is due to the desire to forestall blunders and +accidents so as to ensure efficiency and economy of labor. He who is able +to develop ideas from knowledge, plans from ideas, and action from +plans can be crowned with success in any undertaking irrespective of its +profoundness or the magnitude of labor involved.</q></note> in background, +the whole present body of Western science—these +were to move China deeply, albeit a China that remained +<pb n='085'/><anchor id='Pg085'/> +Chinese. There is a fundamental difference between +Sun's doctrine of ideological extension (<q>the need +for knowledge</q>) and Confucius' doctrine of ideological +rectification (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>). Confucius advocated the establishment +of a powerful ideology for the purpose of +extending ideological control and thereby of minimizing +the then pernicious effects of the politically active proto-nations +of his time. Sun Yat-sen, reared in a world subject +to ideological control, saw no real necessity for +strengthening it; what he desired was to prepare China +psychologically for the development of a clear-cut conscious +nation and a powerful government as the political +instrument of that nation. In spite of the great Chinese +emphasis which Sun pronounced in his ideology, and in +spite of his many close associations with old Chinese +thought, his governmental principles are in a sense diametrically +opposed to Confucianism. Confucius sought to +establish a totalitarian system of traditional controls which +would perpetuate society and civilization regardless of the +misadventures or inadequacies of government. Sun Yat-sen +was seeking to build a strong liberal protective state +within the framework of an immemorial society which +was largely non-political; his doctrine, which we may call +totalitarianism in reverse, tended to encourage intellectual +freedom rather than any rigid ideological coördination. +The mere fact that Sun Yat-sen trusted the old Chinese +ideology to the ordeal of free criticism is, of course, further +testimony to his belief in the fundamental soundness +of the old intellectual order—an order which needed revision +and supplementation to guide modern China +through the perils of its destiny. +</p> + +<p> +Before passing to a brief consideration of the nature +of the society to be developed through this nationalist +ideology, it may be interesting to note the value-scheme +in the ideology. There was but one value—the survival +of the Chinese people with their own civilization. All +<pb n='086'/><anchor id='Pg086'/> +other considerations were secondary; all other reforms +were means and not ends. Nationalism, democracy, and +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> were each indispensable, but none was superior +to the supreme desideratum, Chinese survival. That +this survival was a vivid problem to Sun, almost any of +his lectures will testify. Tai Chi-tao, one of the inner circle +of Sun Yat-sen's disciples, summarized the spirit of +this nationalism when he wrote; <q>We are Chinese, and +those things that we have to change first lie in China. +But if all things in China have become worthless, if Chinese +culture no longer has any significance in the cultural +history of the world, if the Chinese people has lost its +power of holding its culture high, we might as well wait +for death with bound hands—what would be the use of +going on with revolution?</q><note place='foot'>Tai, cited, p. 66: <q>Wir sind Chinesen, und was wir zunächst zu +ändern haben liegt in China. Aber wenn alle Dinge in China wertlos +gewerden sind, wenn die chinesische Kultur in der Kulturgeschichte der +Welt keine Bedeutung mehr hat, und wenn das chinesische Volk die +Kraft, seine Kultur hochzuhalten, verloren hat, dann können wir gleich +mit gebundenen Händen den Tod abwarten; zu welchem Zweck brauchen +wir dann noch Revolution zu treiben!</q></note> Sun Yat-sen made concessions +to cosmopolitanism, which he saw as ideal to be +realized in the remote future. First and last, however, he +was concerned with his own people, the Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +What was to be the nature of the society which would +arise from the knowledge and application of the new +ideology? Sun planned to introduce the idea of a race-nation +into the Chinese ideology, to replace the definite +but formless we-you outlook which the Chinese of old +China had had toward outsiders almost indiscriminately.<note place='foot'>An interesting discussion of this attitude is to be found in Li Chi, +<hi rend='italic'>The Formation of the Chinese People</hi>, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1928.</note> +The old anti-barbarian sentiment had from time to time +in the past been very powerful; Sun Yat-sen called this +nationalism also, not distinguishing it from the new kind +of nationalism which he advocated—a modern nationalism +<pb n='087'/><anchor id='Pg087'/> +necessarily connoting a plurality of equal nations. +The self-consciousness of the Chinese he wished to restore, +although on a basis of justice and the mutual recognition +by the nations of each other's right to exist. But +this nationalism was not to be a complete break with the +past, for the new China was to continue the traditional +function of old China—of being the teacher and protectress +of Eastern Asia. It was the duty of China to defend +the oppressed among the nations, and to smite down the +Great Powers in their oppressiveness. We may suppose +that this benevolence of the Chinese race-nation would +benefit the neighbors of China only so long as those neighbors, +quickened themselves by nationalist resurgences, did +not see something sinister in the benevolent manifest destiny +of the Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +It was a matter of policy, rather than of ideology, as +to what the Chinese nation was to include. There were +possibilities of a conflict with the Communists over the +question of Outer Mongolia. Physically, Sun saw the +Mongols as one of the five component peoples of the +Great Chung-hua Republic. At another time he suggested +that they might become assimilated. He never urged the +Mongols to separate from China and join the Soviet +Union, or even continue as a completely independent +state.<note place='foot'>See Tsui Shu-chin, cited, pp. 96-146. The work of Tsui is good +for the field covered; his discussion of the contrasting policy of the +Communists and of Sun Yat-sen with respect to nationalities may be +regarded as reliable.</note> There was always the possibility of uncertainty in +the case of persons who were—by the five principle elements +of race (according to Sun Yat-sen, blood, livelihood, +language, religion, and mores)<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 67 and following.</note>—members of the +Chinese race-nation but did not consider themselves such. +</p> + +<p> +Chinese nationalism was to lead to cosmopolitanism. +Any attempt to foster cosmopolitanism before solving the +<pb n='088'/><anchor id='Pg088'/> +national problem was not only Utopian but perverse. The +weakness of the Chinese had in great part been derived +from their delusions of world-order in a world that was +greater than they imagined, and the true solution to the +Chinese question was to be found, not in any vain theory +for the immediate salvation of the world as a whole, but +in the diligent and patriotic activities of the Chinese in +their own country. China was to help the oppressed nations +of the earth, not the oppressed classes. China was +to help all Asia, and especially the countries which had +depended upon China for protection, and had been failed +in their hour of need by the impotent Manchu Dynasty. +China was, indeed, to seek the coöperation of the whole +world, and the promotion of universal peace. But China +was to do all this only when she was in a position to be +able to do so, and not in the meantime venture forth on +any splendid fantasies which would profit no people. +</p> + +<p> +The survival of China was the supreme aim of Sun +Yat-sen. How did he propose that China, once conscious +of itself, should control itself to survive and go onwards +to the liberation and enrichment of mankind? These are +questions that he answered in his ideology of democracy +and of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='089'/><anchor id='Pg089'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter III. The Theory of Democracy.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Democracy in the Old World-Society.</head> + +<p> +In describing a few of the characteristics of the old +ideology and the old society which may assist the clarification +of the principle of democracy, it may prove useful +to enter into a brief examination of what the word +may mean in the West, to refer to some of the ideas +and institutions of old China that were or were not in +accord with the Western notion of democracy, and, +finally, to see what connection Sun Yat-sen's theory of democracy +may have either with the Western term or with +elements in the Chinese background. Did Sun Yat-sen +propound an entirely new theory as the foundation of his +theory of democracy for the Chinese race-nation, or did he +associate several hitherto unrelated ideas and systems to +make a new whole? +</p> + +<p> +The European word <emph>democracy</emph> may, for the purposes +of this examination, be taken to have two parts to its +meaning; first, with regard to the status of individuals in +society; second, with respect to the allocation of political +power in society. In the former sense, democracy may +refer to an equalitarianism of status, or to a social mobility +so easy and so general as to encourage the impression that +position is a consequence of the behavior of the individual, +and a fair gauge to his merit. In the latter part of the +meaning, democracy may refer to the identification of the +governed and the governors, or to the coincidence of the +actions of the governors with the wishes of the governed. +Each of these ideas—equalitarianism, free mobility, popular +government, and representative government—has been +referred to as the essence of democracy. One of them +<pb n='090'/><anchor id='Pg090'/> +may lead to the discovery of a significance for democracy +relevant to the scheme of things in the old Chinese +society. +</p> + +<p> +Egalitarianism and mobility were both present in old +Chinese society. The Chinese have had neither an hereditary +aristocracy equivalent to the Western, nor a caste-system +resembling that of India or Japan, since the breakdown +of the feudal system twenty-three centuries ago.<note place='foot'>See above, <ref target='Section_Nation_and_State'><q>The Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity.</q></ref></note> +The extra-legal egalitarianism of the Chinese has been so +generally remarked upon by persons familiar with that +nation, that further discussion of it here is superfluous. +Birth has probably counted less in China than it has in +any other country in the world. +</p> + +<p> +The egalitarianism of intercourse was a powerful aid +to social mobility. The Chinese never pretended to economic, +political, or intellectual equality; the mere statement +of such a doctrine would have been sufficient refutation +of it to the members of the old society. Yet there +were no gradations of weight beyond educational, political, +and economic distinctions, and the organization of the +old society was such that mobility in these was relatively +free. Movement of an individual either upwards or downwards +in the economic, political, or academic scale was +retarded by the influence of the family, which acted as a +drag either way. Movement was nevertheless continuous +and conspicuous; a proof of this movement is to be found +in the fact that there are really no supremely great families +in China, comparable to the great names of Japan or +of the Euramerican nations. (The closest approximation +to this is the <hi rend='italic'>K'ung</hi> family, the family of Confucius; since +the family is large, its eminence is scarcely more than +nominal and it has no political power.). +</p> + +<p> +Mobility in China was fostered by the political arrangements. +The educational-administrative system provided a +<pb n='091'/><anchor id='Pg091'/> +channel upwards and downwards. The government +tended, for the most part, to be the way up, while the +economic system was the way down for prominent official +families. Few families managed to remain eminent for +more than a few generations, and—with the great size of +families—there was always room at the top. If a man +were not advancing himself, there was always the possibility +that a kinsman might win preferment, to the economic +and political advantage of the whole family group. +</p> + +<p> +Social relations—in the narrowest sense of the word—were +characterized by an extreme attention to form as +such, and great contempt for it otherwise. Ritualism never +became a chivalry or a cult of honor. There was always +the emphasis upon propriety and courtesy but, once the +formalities were done with, there was little social distinction +between members of different economic, political, +or academic classes.<note place='foot'>The present state of Western knowledge of the sociology of China +is not sufficient to warrant reference to any authorities for the description +of egalitarianism and mobility. These matters are still on that level of +unspecialized knowledge where every visitor to China may observe for +himself. The bibliography on the social life of the Chinese on pp. 240-242 +of Kenneth Scott Latourette, <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese: Their History and Culture</hi>, +New York, 1934, contains some of the leading titles that touch on the +subject. Prof. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown of the University of Chicago informed +the present author that he contemplates the planning of an +extensive program of socio-anthropological field work in Chinese villages +which will assist considerably in the understanding of the sociology of +old China.</note> +</p> + +<p> +In connection with control and representation, a great +deal more can be said. In the first place, the relations +between the governing ideologue in the Confucian teachings,<note place='foot'>Hsü, <hi rend='italic'>Confucianism</hi>, cited, p. 49, states the function of the Confucian +leaders quite succinctly: <q>... the Confucian school advocates political +and social reorganization by changing the social mind through political +action.</q></note> +and the governed accepters of the ideology in the +Confucian system were to be discovered through <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign>. +</p> + +<pb n='092'/><anchor id='Pg092'/> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Yüeh</foreign>, commonly translated <q>music</q> or <q>harmony,</q> +plays a peculiar rôle in the Confucian teachings. It is +the mass and individual emotional pattern, as <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> is the +behavior pattern. If the people follow the proper behavior +pattern, their emotional pattern must also be good. +Consequently, the function of a truly excellent ruler was +the scrutiny of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign>. If he were a man of superior penetration, +he should be able to feel the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign> about him, and +thus discover the temper of the populace, without reference +to electoral machinery or any other government instrumentality. +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Yüeh</foreign> is to be seen in the tone of voices, in +the rhythm of behavior. If it is good, it will act with +increasing effect upon itself. If bad, it serves as a warning +to the authorities. As Prof. Hsü says, <q>For rulers and +administrators <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign> has two uses; first, it enables them +to ascertain the general sentiment of the people toward +the government and political life; and second, it cultivates +a type of individual attitude that is most harmonious +with the environment. The joint work of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign> +would produce social harmony and social happiness—which +is the ultimate aim of the State.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü, cited, p. 104.</note> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Yüeh</foreign> is, however, a peculiar phenomenon, which can +scarcely be called either representation or control. It is an +idea rooted in the curiously pragmatic-mystical world-view +of the Confucians, that same world-view which elevated +virtue almost to the level of a physical substance, subject +to the same sort of laws of disruption or transmission. +Nothing like <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign> can be found in Western political +thought; however significant it may have been in China, +any attempt to deal with it in a Western language would +have more than a touch of futility, because of the great +chasm of strangeness that separates the two intellectual +worlds at so many places. +</p> + +<p> +A more concrete illustration of the old Chinese ideas of +<pb n='093'/><anchor id='Pg093'/> +popular control may be found in the implications of political +Confucianism, as Hsü renders them: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +From the Confucian doctrine of stewardship, namely, that the +king is an ordinary person selected by God upon his merit to +serve as the steward of God in the control of the affairs of the +people for the welfare of the people, there are deduced five +theories of political democracy. In the first place, the government +must respect public opinion. The will of the people is the +will of God, and thus the king should obey both the will of the +people and the will of God.... +</p> + +<p> +In the second place, government should be based upon the +consent of the governed.... +</p> + +<p> +In the third place, the people have a duty as well as a right +to carry on revolution as the last resort in stopping tyranny.... +Revolution is regarded as a natural blessing; it guards against +tyranny and promotes the vitality of the people. It is in complete +harmony with natural law. +</p> + +<p> +In the fourth place, the government exists for the welfare of +the people. +</p> + +<p> +In the fifth place, liberty, equality and equity should be preserved. +The State belong equally to all; and so hereditary +nobility, hereditary monarchy, and despotism are deplored. Confucius +and his disciples seem to advocate a democracy under the +form of an elective monarchy or a constitutional monarchy.... +</p> + +<p> +Local self-government is recognized in the Confucian system +of government.... The Confucian theory of educational election +suggests the distinctly new idea of representation.<note place='foot'>Hsü, cited, pp. 195-196.</note> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +This summary could scarcely be improved upon although +it represents a considerable latitude of interpretation +in the subject-matter of the classics. The voice of the +people was the voice of God. From other political writers +of antiquity—Mêng Tzŭ, Mo Ti, Han Fei Tzŭ and the +Legalists, and others—the Chinese received a variety of +political interpretations, none of which fostered the development +of autocracy as it developed in Europe. +</p> + +<pb n='094'/><anchor id='Pg094'/> + +<p> +The reason for this is simple. In addition to the eventual +popular control of government, and the necessity for +the close attention of the government to the wishes of the +people, the classical writers, for the most part, did not +emphasize the position of government. With the increasing +ideological solidarity of the Chinese world, the increasing +antiquity and authority of tradition, and the stability +of the social system, the Chinese states withered +away—never completely, but definitely more so than their +analogues in the West. There appeared, consequently, in +China a form of laissez-faire that surpassed that of Europe +completely in thoroughness. Not only were the economic +functions of the state reduced to a minimum—so was its +police activity. Old China operated with a government in +reserve, as it were; a government which was nowhere +nearly so important to its subjects as Western governments +commonly are. The government system was one democratic +in that it was rooted in a society without intransigeant +class lines, with a considerable degree of social +mobility for the individual, with the total number of +individuals exercising a terrific and occasionally overwhelming +pressure against the political system. And yet +it was not the governmental system upon which old China +might have based its claim to be a democracy. It could +have, had it so wished, claimed that name because of the +weakness or the absence of government, and the presence +of other social organizations permitting the individual a +considerable amount of latent pressure to exercise upon +his social environment. +</p> + +<p> +This arose from the nature of the large non-political +organizations which sustained Chinese civilization even +more than did the educational-administrative authorities. +It is obvious that, in theory, a free and unassociated individual +in a laissez-faire polity would be defenseless +against extra-politically organized persons. The equities +<pb n='095'/><anchor id='Pg095'/> +of modern democracy lie largely in the development of a +check and balance system of pressure groups, affording +each individual adequate means of exercising pressure on +behalf of his various interests. It was this function—the +development of a just statement of pressure-groups—which +the old Chinese world-society developed for the +sufficient representation of the individual. +</p> + +<p> +There was no illusion of complete personal liberty. +Such a notion was scarcely thinkable. Every individual +had his family, his village, and—although this was by no +means universally true—his <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>, whether one or, less commonly, +several. He was never left solitary and defenseless +against powerfully organized interests. No more intimate +community of interests could be discovered than that of a +family, since the community of interests there would verge +on the total. Ancient Chinese society provided the individual +with mechanisms to make his interests felt and effective, +through the family, the village, and the association. +</p> + +<p> +In the West the line of influence runs from the individual, +who feels a want, to the group which assists him +in expressing it, to the government, upon which the group +exercises pressure, in order that the government may use +its power to secure what the first group wants from some +other group. The line runs, as it were, in the following +manner: individual-group-government-group. In China +the group exercised its pressure for the most part directly. +The individual need not incorporate himself in a group to +secure the recognition and fulfillment of his interests; he +was by birth a member of the group, and with the group +was mobile. In a sense old Chinese society was thoroughly +democratic. +</p> + +<p> +On the basis of such a background, Sun Yat-sen did not +believe that the Chinese had too much government, but, +rather, too little. He did not cry for liberty; he denounced +its excess instead. On the basis of the old social organization, +which was fluid and yet stable, he sought to create a +<pb n='096'/><anchor id='Pg096'/> +democracy which would pertain to the interests of the +nation as a whole, not to the interests of individuals or +groups. These could go on in the traditional manner. The +qualifications implicit in Sun Yat-sen's championship of +democracy must be kept in mind, and his acquaintance +with the democratic techniques of the old society be allowed +for. Otherwise his advocacy of the recognition of +nationalist rights and his neglect or denunciation of individual +liberties might be taken for the dogma of a lover +of tyranny or dictatorship. +</p> + +<p> +Old China possessed a considerable degree of egalitarianism, +of social mobility, of popular control, and of +popular participation, through the civil service, in what +little government there was. In addition, ideological +control ensured a minimum of conflicts of interests and +consequently a maximum facility for self-expression +without conflict with other individuals, groups, or society +as a whole. Finally, the protection and advancement of +individuals' rights and interests were fostered by a system +of group relationships which bound virtually every +individual into a group and left none to fall, solitary, at +the mercy of others who were organized. +</p> + +<p> +Why then did Sun Yat-sen advocate democracy? What +were his justifications for it, in a society already so +democratic? +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Five Justifications of a Democratic Ideology.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen, realizing the inescapable necessity of +nationalism, did not immediately turn to democracy as a +necessary instrument for its promotion. He hated the +Manchus on the Dragon Throne—human symbols of +China's subjugation—but at first considered replacing +them with a new Chinese dynasty. It was only after he +had found the heirs of the Ming dynasty and the descendants +<pb n='097'/><anchor id='Pg097'/> +of Confucius to be unworthy that he turned to republicanism +and found democracy, with its many virtues.<note place='foot'><p>Mariano Ponce, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat Sen, El fundador de la Republica de China</hi>, +Manila, 1912, p. 23. +</p> +<p> +<q rend='pre'>Y tampoco era posible sustituirla por otra dinastía nacional. Sólo +existen al presente dos familias en China, de donde podían salir los +soberanos: uno es la descendencia de la dinastía Ming, de que usurparon +los mandchüs el trone, hace más de dos siglos y medio, y la otra es la +del filósofo Confucio, cuyo descendiente lineal reconocido es el actual +duque Kung. Ni en una, ni en otra existen vástagos acondicionados +para regir un Estado conforme á los requerimientos de los tiempos +actuales. Hubo de descartarse, pues, de la plataforma de la <q>Joven +China</q> el pensamiento de instalar en el trono á una dinastía nacional. +Y sin dinastía holgaba el trono.</q> +</p> +<p> +<q rend='pre'>No sabemos si aún habiendo en las dos familias mencionados miembros +con condiciones suficientes para ser el Jefe supremo de un Estado +moderno, hubiese prosperado el programa monarquico.</q> +</p> +<p> +<q>Lo que sí pueda decir es que desde los primeros momentos evolucionayon +las ideas de Sun Yat Sen hacia el republicanismo....</q> +</p> +<p> +Ponce then goes on to point out Sun Yat-sen's having said that the +decentralized system of old government and the comparative autonomy of +the vice-regencies presented a background of <q>a sort of aristocratic republic</q> +(<q>une especie de república aristocrática</q>).</p></note> +He early became enamored of the elective system, as +found in the United States, as the only means of obtaining +the best governors.<note place='foot'>Ponce, cited, p. 24. <q>... la única garantía posible, el único medio +por excelencia para obtener los mejores gobernantes....</q></note> In the final stage he had departed +so far from his earlier way of thinking that he criticized +Dr. Goodnow severely for recommending the re-introduction +of a monarchy in China. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen, as a good nationalist, made earnest efforts +to associate his doctrines with those of the sages and to +avoid appearing as a proponent of Western civilization. It +is, consequently, not unusual to discover him citing Confucius +and Mencius on <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vox populi vox dei</foreign>, and saying, +</p> + +<p> +<q>The government of Yao and Shun was monarchical +in name but democratic in practice, and for that reason +Confucius honored these men.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 234.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='098'/><anchor id='Pg098'/> + +<p> +He considered that democracy was to the sages an +<q>ideal that could not be immediately realized,</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 235.</note> and +therefore implied that modern China, in realizing democracy, +was attaining an ideal cherished by the past. Democracy, +other things apart, was a filial duty. This argument, +while persuasive in Chinese, can scarcely be considered +Sun Yat-sen's most important one in favor of democracy. +</p> + +<p> +His most cogent and perhaps most necessary argument +was based on his conception of national liberty as opposed +to the liberty of the individual. He delivered a spirited +denunciation of those foreigners who criticized the Chinese +for being without liberty, and in the next breath +complained that the Chinese had no government, that they +were <q>loose sand.</q> (Another fashionable way of expressing +this idea is by saying that <q>China is a geographical +expression.</q>) He said: <q>If, for instance, the foreigners +say that China is <q>loose sand,</q> what do they finally +mean by that expression? They mean to say that each +individual is free, that everybody is free, that each one +takes the maximum of liberty, and that, as a result, they +are <q>loose sand</q>.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 255.</note> He pointed out that the Chinese had +not suffered from the loose autocracy in the Empire, and +that they had no historical justification for parroting the +cry <q>Liberty!</q> simply because the Westerners, who had +really lacked it, had cried and fought for it. He cited +John Millar's definition of liberty, given in <hi rend='italic'>The Progress +of Science Relative to Law and Government</hi>, 1787: <q>True +liberty consists in this: that the liberty of each individual +is limited by the non-infringement on the liberty of others; +when it invades the liberty of others, it is no longer +liberty.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 266, note 1. Father d'Elia discusses the +reasons which made it seem more probable that Sun was transliterating the +name Millar into Chinese rather than (John Stuart) Mill.</note> Sun Yat-sen had himself defined liberty as +<pb n='099'/><anchor id='Pg099'/> +follows: <q>Liberty consists in being able to move, in +having freedom of action within an organized group.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 256 and following.</note> +China, disorganized, had no problem of individual liberty. +There was, as a matter of fact, too much liberty.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 271.</note> What +the Chinese had to do was to sacrifice some of their individual +liberty for the sake of the organized nation. Here +we find a curious turn of thought of which several other +examples may be found in the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>: Sun Yat-sen +has taken a doctrine which in the West applies to +the individual, and has applied it to the nation. He believes +in liberty; but it is not the liberty of the individual +which is endangered in China. It is the liberty of the +nation—which has been lost before foreign oppression +and exploitation. Consequently he preaches national and +not individual liberty. Individual liberty must be sacrificed +for the sake of a free nation.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 273.</note> Without discipline +there is no order; without order the nation is weak and +oppressed. The first step to China's redemption is <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +tsu</foreign>, the union (nationalism) of the people. Then comes +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign>, the power of the people. The liberty of the +nation is expressed through the power of the people. +</p> + +<p> +How is the power of the people to be exercised? It +is to be exercised by democratic means. To Sun Yat-sen, +the liberty of the nation and the power of the people were +virtually identical. If the Chinese race gained its freedom, +that freedom, exercised in an orderly manner, could mean +only democracy. It is this close association of nationalism +(<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min tsu</foreign>) and democracy (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign>), this consideration +of democracy as the expression of nationalism, that +forms, within the framework of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>, what +is probably the best nationalist argument for democracy—best, +that is, in being most coherent with the Three Principles +as a whole. +</p> + +<pb n='100'/><anchor id='Pg100'/> + +<p> +If the view of democracy just expressed be considered +an exposition of the fundamental necessity of democracy, +the third argument may be termed the dialectical or historical +championship of democracy. Sun Yat-sen believed +in the existence of progress, and considered that there was +an inevitable tendency toward democracy: the overthrow +of the Manchus was a result of the <q>... world tide. That +world current can be compared to the course of the +Yangtze or the Yellow River. The flow of the stream +turns perhaps in many directions, now toward the north, +now toward the south, but in the end flows toward the +east in spite of all obstacles; nothing can stem it. In the +same way the world-tide passes ...; now it has arrived +at democracy, and there is no way to stem it.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 242-243.</note> This +belief in the inevitability as well as the justice of his cause +encouraged Sun, and has lent to his movement—as his +followers see it—something of the impressive sweep that +the Communists see in their movement. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not devise any elaborate scheme of +dialectical materialism or economic determinism to bolster +his belief in the irreversibility of the flow to democracy. +With infinite simplicity, he presented an exposition +of democracy in space and time. In time, he saw a change +from the rule of force to theocracy, then to monarchy, +and then to democracy; this change was a part of the +progress of mankind, which to him was self-evident and +inevitable.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 223 and following. Dr. Hsü (cited, +p. 263 and following) translates these four epochs as following: <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hung +fang</foreign>, <q>the stage of the great wilderness</q>; <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>shen ch'üan</foreign>, <q>the state of +theocracy</q>; <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chun ch'üan</foreign>, <q>the stage of monarchy</q>; and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign>, +<q>the stage of democracy.</q></note> In space he perceived that increasingly great +numbers of people threw off monarchical rule and turned +to democracy. He hailed the breakdown of the great empires, +Germany and Russia, as evidence of the power of +<pb n='101'/><anchor id='Pg101'/> +democracy. <q>... if we observe (things) from all angles, +we see that the world progresses daily, and we realize that +the present tide has already swept into the age of democracy; +and that no matter how great drawbacks and +failures may be, <emph>democracy will maintain itself in the +world for a long time</emph> (<emph>to come</emph>). For that reason, thirty +years ago, we promoters of the revolution, <emph>resolved that +it was impossible to speak of the greatness of China or to +carry out the revolution without advocating democracy</emph>.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 241-242.</note> +</p> + +<p> +A fourth argument in favor of democracy, and one +which cannot be expanded here, since it involves reference +to Sun Yat-sen's practical plans for the political regeneration +of China, was his assertion that democracy was an +adjunct to appropriate and effective public administration. +Sun Yat-sen's plans concerning the selection of officials in +a democratic state showed that he believed the merging +of the Chinese academic-civil service technique with +Western democracy would produce a paragon among +practicable governments. +</p> + +<p> +Fifthly and finally, Sun regarded democracy as an essential +modernizing force.<note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, Book II, ch. 2.</note> In the introduction of Western +material civilization, which was always an important +consideration to his mind, he felt that a certain ideological +and political change had to accompany the economic and +technological revolution that—in part natural and in part +to be stimulated by nationalist political interference—was +to revolutionize the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> of China, the economic and +social welfare of the Chinese people. While this argument +in favor of democracy is similar to the historical +argument, it differs from the latter in that Sun Yat-sen +saw the technique of democracy influencing not only the +political, but the economic and social, life of the people as +well. The growth of corporate responsibility, the development +<pb n='102'/><anchor id='Pg102'/> +of a more rigid ethical system in matters of finance, +the disappearance of too strict an emphasis upon the +personal element in politics (which has clouded Chinese +politics with a fog of conspiracy and intrigue for centuries), +a trust in mathematics (as shown in reliance upon +the voting technique for ascertaining public opinion), and +the development of a new kind of individual aggressiveness +and uprightness were among the changes which, +necessary if China was to compete in the modern world, +democracy might assist in effecting. While these desiderata +do not seem large when set down in the vast field +of political philosophy, they are of irritating importance +in the inevitable trivalities upon which so much of day-to-day +life depends, and would undoubtedly improve the +personal tone of Sino-Western relations. Sun never divorced +the theoretical aspects of his thought from the +practical, as has been done here for purposes of exposition, +and even the tiniest details of everyday existence +were the objects of his consideration and criticism. In +itself, therefore, the modernizing force of democracy, as +seen in Sun's theory, may not amount to much; nevertheless, +it must not be forgotten.<note place='foot'>It is of interest to note that the <q>New Life Movement</q> inaugurated +by Chiang Chieh-shih is concerned with many such petty matters such as +those enumerated above. Each of these small problems is in itself of little +consequence; in the aggregate they loom large.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Democracy, although secondary in point of time to his +theory, is of great importance in Sun's plans for the political +nature of the new China. He justified democracy +because it was (1) an obligation laid upon modern China +by the sages of antiquity; (2) a necessary consequence of +nationalism, since nationalism was the self-rule of a free +people, and democracy the effectuation of that self-rule, +and democracy the effectuation of that self-rule; (3) the +government of the modern age; China, along with the rest +of the world, was drawn by the tide of progress into the +<pb n='103'/><anchor id='Pg103'/> +age of democratic achievement; (4) the political form +best calculated for the obtaining of good administration; +and (5) a modernizing force that would stir and change +the Chinese people so as to equip them for the competitions +of the modern world. +</p> + +<p> +In the lecture in which he criticized the inadequacies +of democracy as applied in the West, Sun Yat-sen made +an interesting comment on the proletarian dictatorship +which had recently been established in Russia. <q>Recently +Russia invented another form of government. That +government is not representative; it is <emph>absolute popular +government</emph>. In what does that absolute popular government +really consist? As we know very little about it, we +cannot judge it aright, but we believe that this (absolute +popular government) is <emph>evidently much better than a +representative government</emph>.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 331.</note> He went on immediately +to say that the Three Principles were what China needed, +and that the Chinese should not imitate the political +systems advocated in Europe and America, but should +adapt democracy in their own way. In view of his objection +to a permanent class dictatorship, as opposed to a +provisional party dictatorship, and the very enthusiastic +advocacy of democracy represented by the arguments described +above, it appears unlikely in the extreme that Sun +Yat-sen, had he lived beyond 1925, would have abandoned +his own plan of democracy for China in favor of <q>absolute +popular government.</q> The phrase was, at the time, +since Sun Yat-sen was seeking Russian assistance, expedient +for a popular lecture. Its importance might easily +be exaggerated. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Three Natural Classes of Men.</head> + +<p> +Having in mind the extreme peril in which the Chinese +race-nation stood, its importance in a world of Western or +<pb n='104'/><anchor id='Pg104'/> +Western-type states, and seeing nationalism as the sole +means of defending and preserving China, Sun Yat-sen +demanded that the Chinese ideology be extended by the +acquisition of knowledge. If this modernizing and, if a +neologism be permitted, stateizing process were to succeed, +it must needs be fostered by a well-prepared group of +persons within the society. +</p> + +<p> +In the case of the Confucian social theory, it was the +scholars who took the ideology from the beliefs and +traditions of the agrarian masses or whole people, rectified +it, and gave it back to them. This continuous process of +ideological maintenance by means of conformity (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>) and, +when found necessary, rectification (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>) was carried +on by an educational-political system based upon a +non-hereditary caste of academician-officials called <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Mandarins</foreign> +by the early Western travellers. In the case of those +modern Western states which base their power upon +peculiar ideologies, the philosophy-imposing caste has +been a more or less permanent party- or class-dictatorship. +Superficially, the party-dictatorship planned by Sun Yat-sen +would seem to resemble these. His theory, however, +presents two bases for a class of ideologues: one theoretical, +and presumably based upon the Chinese; and one +applied, which is either of his own invention or derived +from Western sources. The class of ideological reformers +proposed in what may be called the applied aspect of his +theory was to be organized by means of the party-dictatorship +of the Kuomintang. His other basis for finding a +class of persons whose influence over the ideology was to +be paramount was more theoretical, and deserves consideration +among the more abstract aspects of his doctrines. +</p> + +<p> +He hypothecated a tripartite division of men: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Men may be divided into three classes according to their innate +ability or intelligence. The first class of men may be called <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien +chih hsien cho</foreign> or the <q>geniuses.</q> The geniuses are endowed with +<pb n='105'/><anchor id='Pg105'/> +unusual intelligence and ability. They are the creators of new +ideas, fathers of invention, and originators of new achievements. +They think in terms of group welfare and so they are the promoters +of progress. Next are the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hou chih hou cho</foreign> or the <q>followers.</q> +Being less intelligent and capable than the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien chih +hsien cho</foreign>, they do not create or invent or originate, but they are +good imitators and followers of the first class of men. The last +are the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pu chih pu cho</foreign>, or the <q>unthinking,</q> whose intelligence +is inferior to that of the other two classes of men. These people +do what the others instruct them to do, but they do not think +about it. In every sphere of activity all three classes of men are +present. In politics, for example, there are the creators or inventors +of new ideas and movements, then the propagators of +these ideas and movements, and lastly the mass of men who are +taught to practice these ideas.<note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. It is interesting to note that the +translation by Father d'Elia gives a more literal translation of the names +that Sun Yat-sen applied to these categories. He translates the Chinese +terms as <emph>pre-seeing</emph>, <emph>post-seeing</emph>, and <emph>non-seeing</emph>.</note> +</quote> + +<p> +The harmony of this conception with the views of Confucius +is evident. Presbyter is Priest writ large; genius is +another name for scholar. Sun, although bitterly opposed +to the mandarinate of the Empire and the pseudo-Republic, +could not rid himself of the age-old Chinese idea of +a class organization on a basis of intellect rather than of +property. He could not champion a revolutionary creed +based upon an economic class-war which he did not think +existed, and which he did not wish to foster, in his own +country. He continued instead the consistent theory of an +aristocracy of intellect, such as had controlled China +before his coming. +</p> + +<p> +The aristocracy of intellect is not to be judged, however, +by the old criteria. Under the old regime, a scholar-ruler +was one who deferred to the wisdom of the ancients, who +was fit to perpetuate the mysteries of the written language +and culture for the benefit of future ages, and who was +<pb n='106'/><anchor id='Pg106'/> +meanwhile qualified by his training to assume the rôle of +counsellor and authority in society. In the theory of Sun +Yat-sen, the genius leader is not the perpetuator but the +discoverer. He is the social engineer. His work is similar +to that of the architect who devises plans for a building +which is to be built by workers (the unthinking) under +the guidance of foremen (the followers).<note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 352.</note> In this guise, +the new intellectual aristocrat is a figure more akin to the +romantic Western pioneers and inventors than to the +serene, conservative scholars of China in the past. +</p> + +<p> +The break with Western thought comes in Sun's distinguishing +three permanent, natural classes of men. +Though in their aptitudes the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien chih hsien cho</foreign> are +more like modern engineers than like archaic literary +historians, they form a class that is inevitably the ruling +class. To Marxism this is anathema; it would imply that +the Communist party is merely the successor of the bourgeoisie +in leading the unthinking masses about—a more +benevolent successor, to be sure, but still a class distinct +from the led proletariat of the intellect. To Western +democratic thought, this distinction would seem at first +glance to invalidate any future advocacy of democracy. +To the student interested in contrasting ideological control +and political government, the tripartite division of Sun +Yat-sen is significant of the redefinition in modern terms, +and in an even more clear-cut manner, of the Confucian +theory of scholarly leadership. +</p> + +<p> +How were the geniuses of the Chinese resurgence to +make their knowledge useful to the race-nation? How +could democracy be recognized with the leadership and +ideological control of an intellectual class? To what +<pb n='107'/><anchor id='Pg107'/> +degree would such a reconciliation, if effected, represent +a continuation, in different terms, of the traditions and +institutions of the old Chinese world? Questions such as +these arise from the fusion of the old traditions and new +necessities. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="Ch'uan and Neng"/> +<head>Ch'üan and Nêng.</head> + +<p> +The contrast between <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign> is one of the few +aspects of Sun Yat-sen's theory of democracy which persons +not interested in China may, conceivably, regard as +a contribution to political science. There is an extraordinarily +large number of possible translations for each +of these words.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 348.</note> A version which may prove convenient +and not inaccurate, can be obtained by translating each +Chinese term according to its context. Thus, a fairly +clear idea of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign> may be obtained if one says that, +applied to the individual, it means <q>power,</q> or <q>right,</q> +and when applied to the exercise of political functions, +it means <q>sovereignty</q> or <q>political proprietorship.</q> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Nêng</foreign>, applied to the individual, may mean <q>competency</q> +(in the everyday sense of the word), <q>capacity</q> or +<q>ability to administer.</q> Applied to the individual, the +contrast is between the ability to have political rights in a +democracy, and the ability to administer public affairs. +Applied to the nation, the contrast is between sovereignty +and administration.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 352. Sun Yat-sen defined democracy +thus: <q>... under a republican government, the people is sovereign.</q></note> +</p> + +<p> +Without this contrast, the doctrine of the tripartite +classification of men might destroy all possibilities of a +practical democracy. If the Unthinking are the majority, +how can democracy be trusted? This contrast, furthermore, +serves to illuminate a further problem: the paradoxical +necessity of an all-powerful government which the +people are able to control. +</p> + +<pb n='108'/><anchor id='Pg108'/> + +<p> +If this distinction is accepted in the establishment of +a democracy, what will the consequences be?<note place='foot'>Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 25, refers to this distinction as being between +force (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gewalt</foreign>) and power (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Macht</foreign>). To the people belonged, and +rightfully, the force which could sanction or refuse to sanction the +existence of the government and the confirmation of its policies. The +government had the power (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Macht</foreign>), which the people did not have, of +formulating intelligent policies and carrying them out in an organized +manner.</note> +</p> + +<p> +In the first place, the masses who rule will not necessarily +govern. Within the framework of a democratic constitution, +they will be able to express their wishes, and +make those wishes effective; but it will be impossible for +them to interfere in the personnel of government, whether +merely administrative or in the highest positions. It will +be forever impossible that a <q>swine-representative</q> should +be elected, or that one of those transient epochs of carpet-baggery, +which appear from time to time in most Western +democracies, should corrupt the government. By means of +the popular rights of initiative, referendum, election and +recall, the people will be able to control their government +in the broad sweep of policy. The government will be +beyond their reach insofar as petty political interference, +leading to inferiority or corruption, is concerned. +</p> + +<p> +In the second place, the benefits of aristocracy will be +obtained without its cost. The government will be made +up of men especially fit and trained to govern. There will, +hence, be no difficulty in permitting the government to +become extraordinarily powerful in contrast with Western +governments. Since the masses will be able to choose between +a wide selection of able leaders, the democracy will +be safeguarded. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen regarded this as one of the cardinal points +in his doctrines. In retaining the old Chinese idea of a +scholar class and simultaneously admitting Western elective +and other democratic techniques, he believed that he +<pb n='109'/><anchor id='Pg109'/> +had found a scheme which surpassed all others. He saw +the people as stockholders in a company, and the administrators +as directors; he saw the people as the owner +of an automobile, and the administrators as the chauffeur. +</p> + +<p> +A further consequence of this difference between the +right of voting and the right of being voted for, but one +to which Sun Yat-sen did not refer, necessarily arises from +his postulation of a class of geniuses leading their followers, +who control the unthinking masses. That is the +continuity which such a group of ideological controllers +would impart to a democracy. Sun Yat-sen, addressing +Chinese, took the Chinese world for granted. A Westerner, +unmindful of the background, might well overlook +some comparatively simple points. The old system, +under which the Empire was a sort of educational system, +was a familiar feature in the politics which Sun Yat-sen +criticized. In arguing for the political acceptance of inequality +and the guarantee of government by a select +group, Sun was continuing the old idea of leadership, +modifying it only so far as to make it consistent with +democracy. Under the system he proposed, the two great +defects of democracy, untrustworthiness and lack of continuity +of policy, would be largely eliminated. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Democratic Machine State.</head> + +<p> +Throughout pre-modern Chinese thought there runs the +idea of personal behavior and personal controls. The +Chinese could not hypostatize in the manner of the West. +Looking at men they saw men and nothing more. Considering +the problems and difficulties which men encountered, +they sought solutions in terms of men and the +conditioning intimacies of each individual's life. The Confucian +Prince was not so much an administrator as a moral +leader; his influence, extending itself through imitation +on the part of others, was personal and social rather than +<pb n='110'/><anchor id='Pg110'/> +political.<note place='foot'>Liang Chi-ch'ao, cited, pp. 50-52.</note> In succeeding ages, the scholars thought of +themselves as the leaven of virtue in society. They stressed +deportment and sought, only too frequently by means of +petty formalities, to impress their own excellence and pre-eminence +upon the people. Rarely, if ever, did the scholar-official +appeal to formal political law. He was more likely +to invoke propriety and proceed to exercise his authority +theoretically in accordance with it. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not feel that further appeal to the +intellectual leaders was necessary. In an environment still +dominated by the past, an exhortation for the traditional +personal aspect of leadership would probably have appeared +as a centuries-old triteness. The far-seeing men, +the geniuses that Sun saw in all society, owed their +superiority not to artificial inequality but to natural inequality;<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 279 and following.</note> +by their ability they were outstanding. Laws +and customs could outrage this natural inequality, or +conceal it behind a legal facade of artificial inequality or +equally artificial equality. Laws and customs do not +change the facts. The superior man was innately the +superior man. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, the geniuses of the Chinese revolution +could not rely upon the loose and personal system of +influence hitherto trusted. To organize Chinese nationalism, +to give it direction as well as force, the power of the +people must be run through a machine—the State. +</p> + +<p> +A distinction must be made here. The term <q>machine,</q> +applied to government, was itself a neologism introduced +from the Japanese.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 368.</note> Not only was the word but the thing +itself was alien to the Chinese, since the same term (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'i</foreign>) +meant machinery, tool, or instrument. The introduction +of the view of the state as a machine does not imply that +<pb n='111'/><anchor id='Pg111'/> +Sun Yat-sen wished to introduce a specific form of +Western state-machine into China—as will be later explained +(in the pages which concern themselves with the +applied political science of Sun Yat-sen). +</p> + +<p> +Sun was careful, moreover, to explain that his analogy +between industrial machinery and political machinery was +merely an analogy. He said, <q>The machinery of the +government is entirely composed of human beings. All its +motions are brought about by men and not by material +objects. Therefore, there is a very great difference between +the machinery of the government and the manufacturing +machine ... the machinery of the government is +moved by human agency whereas the manufacturing +machine is set in motion by material forces.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 368-9. Dr. Wou Saofong, in his <hi rend='italic'>Sun +Yat-sen</hi> (Paris, 1929), summarizes his thesis of Sun Yat-sen in somewhat +different terms: <q>... Sun Yat-sen compare, le gouvernement à un +appareil mécanique, dont le moteur est constitué <emph>par les lois</emph> ou les +ministres, tandis que l'ingénieur que dirige la machine était autrefois le +roi et aujourd'hui le peuple,</q> p. 124. (Italics mine.) This suggestion +that the state-machine, in the theory of Sun Yat-sen, is composed of laws +as well as men is quite interesting; Sun Yat-sen himself does not seem to +have used this figure of speech and it may be Dr. Wou's applying the +juristic interpretation on his own initiative. Sun Yat-sen, in his sixth +lecture on democracy, says, <q>Statesmen and lawyers of Europe and America +say that government is a machine of which law is a tool.</q> (d'Elia translation, +cited, p. 368.)</note> +</p> + +<p> +Even after allowance has been made for the fact that +Sun Yat-sen did not desire to import Western governmental +machinery, nor even to stress the machine and +state analogy too far, it still remains extraordinarily significant +that he should have impressed upon his followers +the necessity of what may be called a mechanical rather +than an organic type of government. The administrative +machine of the Ch'ing dynasty, insofar as it was a machine +at all, was a chaotic mass of political authorities melting +vaguely into the social system. Sun's desire to have a +clear-cut machine of government, while not of supreme +<pb n='112'/><anchor id='Pg112'/> +importance in his ideological projects, was of great significance +in his practical proposal. In his theory the +state machine bears the same resemblance to the old government +that the Chinese race-nation bears to the now +somewhat ambiguous civilized humanity of the Confucians. +In both instances he was seeking sharper and more +distinct lines of demarcation. +</p> + +<p> +In putting forth his proposals for the reconstitution of +the Chinese government he was thinking, in speaking +of a state-machine, of the more or less clearly understood +juristic states of the West.<note place='foot'>It must always remain one of those conjectures upon which scholars +may expend their fantasy what Sun Yat-sen would have thought of the +necessity of the juristic state, which involved a quite radical change +throughout the Chinese social organism, had he lived to see the ebb of +juristic polity and, for all that, of voting democracy. It is not unlikely +that his early impressions of the United States and his reading of Montesquieu +would have led him to retain his belief in a juristic-democratic +state in spite of the fact that such a state would no longer represent the +acme of ultra-modernism.</note> His concrete proposals dealing +with the minutiae of administrative organization, his +emphasis on constitution and law, and his interest in the +exact allocation of control all testify to his complete acceptance +of a sharply delimited state. On the other hand, +he was extraordinary for his time in demanding an unusual +extent, both qualitative and quantitative, of power +for the state which he wished to hammer out on the forges +of the nationalist social and political revolution. +</p> + +<p> +In summarizing this description of the instrument with +which Sun Yat-sen hoped to organize the intellectual +leaders of China so as to implement the force of the +revolution, it may be said that it was to be a state-machine, +as opposed to a totalitarian state, based upon Western +juristic theory in general but organized out of the materials +of old Chinese political philosophy and the Imperial experience +in government.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 378 and following.</note> The state machine was to be +<pb n='113'/><anchor id='Pg113'/> +built along lines which Sun Yat-sen laid out in some +detail. Yet, even with his elaborate plans already prepared, +and in the midst of a revolution, he pointed out the +difficulty of political experimentation, in the following +words: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +... the progress of human machinery, as government organizations +and the like, has been very slow. What is the reason? +It is that once a manufacturing machine has been constructed, it +can easily be tested, and after it has been tried out, it can easily +be put aside if it is not good, and if it is not perfect, it can easily +be perfected. But it is very difficult to try out a human machine +and more difficult still to perfect it after it has been tried out. It +is impossible to perfect it without bringing about a revolution. +The only other way would be to regard it as a useless material +machine which can easily be turned into scrap iron. But this is +not workable.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 369.</note> +</quote> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Democratic-Political Versus Ideological Control.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen accepted an organization of society based +upon intellectual differences, despite his belief in the justifiability +and necessity of formal democracy, and his reconciliation +of the two at first contradictory theses in a plan +for a machine state to be based upon a distinction between +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign>. It may now be asked, why did Sun Yat-sen, +familiar with the old method of ideological control, +and himself proposing a new ideology which would not +only restore internal harmony but also put China into +harmony with the actual political condition of the world, +desire to add formal popular control to ideological +control? +</p> + +<p> +The answer is not difficult, although it must be based +for the most part on inference rather than on direct citation +of Sun Yat-sen's own words. In the consideration of +the system of ideological control fostered by the Confucians, +<pb n='114'/><anchor id='Pg114'/> +ideological control presented two distinct aspects: +the formation of the ideology by men, and control of men +by the ideology. The ideology controlled men; some men +sought to control the ideology; the whole ideological control +system was based upon the continuous interaction of +cause and effect, wherein tradition influenced the men +who sought to use the system as a means of mastery, while +the same men succeeded in a greater or less degree in directing +the development of the ideology. +</p> + +<p> +In the old Chinese world-society the control of the +ideology was normally vested in the <hi rend='italic'>literati</hi> who were +either government officials or hoped to become such. The +populace, however, acting in conformity with the ideology, +could overthrow the government, and, to that extent, +consciously control the content and the development +of the ideology. Moreover, as the efficacy of an ideology +depends upon its greater acceptance, the populace had the +last word in control of the ideology both consciously and +unconsciously. Politics, however, rarely comes to the last +word. In the normal and ordinary conduct of social +affairs, the populace was willing to let the <hi rend='italic'>literati</hi> uphold +the classics and modify their teachings in accordance with +the development of the ideology—in the name of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng +ming</foreign>. The old ideology was so skilfully put together out +of traditional elements that are indissociable from the +main traits of Chinese culture, together with the revisions +made by Confucius and his successors, that it was well-nigh +unchallengeable. The whole Confucian method of +government was based, as previously stated, on the control +of men through the control of their ideas by men—and +these latter men, the ideologues, were the scholar administrators +of successive dynasties. The identification of +the <hi rend='italic'>literati</hi> and officials, the respect in which learning was +held, the general distribution of a leaven of scholars +through all the families of the Empire, and the completeness—almost +<pb n='115'/><anchor id='Pg115'/> +incredible to a Westerner—of traditional +orthodoxy, permitted the interpreters of the tradition also +to mould and transform it to a considerable degree. As +a means of adjusting the mores through the course of +centuries, interpretation succeeded in gradually changing +popular ideas, where open and revolutionary heterodoxy +would have failed. +</p> + +<p> +Now, in modern times, even though men might still +remain largely under the control of the ideology (learn to +behave rightly instead of being governed), the ideology +was necessarily weakened in two ways: by the appearance +of men who were recalcitrant to the ideology, and by the +emergence of conceptions and ideas which could not find +a place in the ideology, and which consequently opened +up extra-ideological fields of individual behavior. In +other words, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign> was no longer all-inclusive, either as to +men or as to realms of thought. Its control had never, +of course, been complete, for in that case all institutions +of government would have become superfluous in China +and would have vanished; but its deficiencies in past ages +had never been so great; either with reference to insubordinate +individuals or in regard to unassimilable ideas, +as they were in modern times. +</p> + +<p> +Hence the province of government had to be greatly +extended. The control of men by the ideology was incomplete +wherever the foreign culture had really struck the +Chinese—as, for instance, in the case of the newly-developed +Chinese proletariat, which could not follow the +Confucian precepts in the slums of twentieth-century industry. +The family system, the village, and the guild were +to the Chinese proletarians mere shadows of a past; they +were faced individually with the problems of a foreign +social life suddenly interjected into that of the Chinese. +True instances of the interpenetration of opposites, they +were Chinese from the still existing old society of China +<pb n='116'/><anchor id='Pg116'/> +suddenly transposed into an industrial world in which the +old ideology was of little relevance. If they were to remain +Chinese they had to be brought again into the fold +of the Chinese ideology; and, meanwhile, instead of being +controlled ideologically, they must be controlled by the +sharp, clear action of government possessing a monopoly +of the power of coercion. The proletarians were not, indeed, +the only group of Chinese over whom the old +ideology had lost control. There were the overseas Chinese, +the new Chinese finance-capitalists, and others who +had adjusted their personal lives to the Western world. +These had done so incompletely, and needed the action +of government to shield them not only from themselves +and from one another, but from their precarious position +in their relations with the Westerners. +</p> + +<p> +Other groups had not completely fallen away from +the ideology, but had found major sections of it to be +unsuitable to the regulation of their own lives. Virtue +could not be found in a family system which was slowly +losing its polygynous character and also slowly giving +place to a sort of social atomism; the intervention of the +machine state was required to serve as a substitute for +ideological regulation until such a time as the new +ideology should have developed sufficiently to restore +relevance to traditions. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed, throughout all China, there were few people +who were not touched to a greater or less degree by the +consequences of the collision of the two intellectual +worlds, the nationalistic West and the old Chinese world-society. +However much Chinese might desire to continue +in their traditional modes of behavior, it was impossible +for them to live happy and progressive lives by virtue of +having memorized the classics and paid respect to the +precepts of tradition, as had their forefathers. In all cases +where the old ideas failed, state and law suddenly acquired +<pb n='117'/><anchor id='Pg117'/> +a new importance—almost overwhelming to some +Chinese—as the establishers of the new order of life. +Even etiquette was established by decree, in the days of +the parliamentary Republic at Peking; the age-old assurance +of Chinese dress and manners was suddenly swept +away, and the government found itself forced to decree +frock-coats. +</p> + +<p> +Successive governments in the new China had fallen, +not because they did too much, but because they did too +little. The sphere of state activity had become enormous +in contrast to what it had been under more than a score +of dynasties, and the state had perforce to intervene in +almost every walk of life, and every detail of behavior. +Yet this intervention, although imperative, was met by the +age-old Chinese contempt for government, by the determined +adherence to traditional methods of control in +the face of situations to which now they were no longer +relevant. It was this paradox, the ever-broadening necessity +of state activity in the face of traditional and unrealistic +opposition to state activity, which caused a great part +of the turmoil in the new China. Officials made concessions +to the necessity for state action by drafting elaborate +codes on almost every subject, and then, turning about, +also made concessions to the traditional non-political +habits of their countrymen by failing to enforce the codes +which they had just promulgated. The leaders of the +Republic, and their followers in the provinces, found +themselves with laws which could not possibly be introduced +in a nation unaccustomed to law and especially +unaccustomed to law dealing with life in a Western way; +thus baffled, but perhaps not disappointed, the pseudo-republican +government officials were content with developing +a shadow state, a shadow body of law, and then +ignoring it except as a tool in the vast pandemonium of +the tuchunates—where state and law were valued only in +<pb n='118'/><anchor id='Pg118'/> +so far as they served to aggrandize or enrich military +rulers and their hangers-on. +</p> + +<p> +This tragic dilemma led Sun Yat-sen to call for a new +kind of state, a state which was to be democratic and yet +to lead back to ideological control. The emergency of +imperialism and internal impotence made it imperative +that the state limit its activities to those provinces of human +behavior in which it could actually effectuate its +decrees, and that, after having so limited the field of its +action, it be well-nigh authoritarian within that field. +Yet throughout the whole scheme, Sun Yat-sen's deep +faith in the common people required him to demand that +the state be democratic in principle and practice. +</p> + +<p> +It may begin to be apparent that, at least for Sun Yat-sen, +the control of the race-nation by the ideology was not +inconsistent with the political control of the race-nation by +itself. In the interval between the old certainty and the +new, political authority had to prevail. This authority was +to be directed by the people but actually wielded by the +geniuses of the revolution. The new ideology was to +emerge from the progress of knowledge not, as before, +among a special class of literary persons, but through all +the people. It was to be an ideology based on practical +experience and on the experimental method, and consequently, +perhaps, less certain then the old Confucian +ideology, which was in its foundations religious. To fill +in the gaps where uniformity of thought and behavior, +on the basis of truth, had not been established, the state +was to act, and the state had to be responsible to the +people. +</p> + +<p> +At this point it may be remembered that Sun Yat-sen +was among the very few Chinese leaders of his day who +could give the historians of the future any valid reasons +for supposing that they believed in republican principles. +Too many of the militarists and scholar-politicians of the +<pb n='119'/><anchor id='Pg119'/> +North and South paid a half-contemptuous lip-service to +the republic, primarily because they could not agree as to +which one of them should have the Dragon Throne, or, +at the least, the honor of restoring the Manchu Emperor—who +stayed on in the Forbidden City until 1924.<note place='foot'>Reginald Johnston, <hi rend='italic'>Twilight in the Forbidden City</hi>, cited above, presents +an apparently true account of the conspiracies of the various +Northern generals which centered around the person of P'u Yi. According +to Johnston Tsao Kun was defeated in his attempt to restore the +Manchu Emperor only by the jealousies of his fellow-militarists.</note> Sun +Yat-sen had a deep faith in the judgment and trustworthiness +of the uncounted swarms of coolies and +farmers whom most Chinese leaders ignored. He was +perhaps the only man of his day really loved by the +illiterate classes that knew of him, and was always faithful +to their love. Other leaders, both Chinese and Western, +have praised the masses but refused to trust them for their +own good. Sun's implicit belief in the political abilities +of the common people in all matters which their knowledge +equipped them to judge, was little short of ludicrous +to many of his contemporaries, and positively irritating to +some persons who wished him well personally but did +not—at least privately—follow all of his ideas. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the consideration of the parts played by +ideology and popular government in social control: there +was another point of great difference between the old +ideology and the new. The old was the creation, largely, +of a special class of scholars, who for that purpose ranked +highest in the social hierarchy of old China. Now even +though the three natural classes might continue to be +recognized in China, the higher standard of living and the +increased literacy of the populace was to enlarge the +number of persons participating in the life of ideas. The +people were to form the ideology in part, and in part +control the government under whose control the revolutionary +geniuses were to form the rest of the ideology, +<pb n='120'/><anchor id='Pg120'/> +and propagate it through a national educational program. +In all respects the eventual control was to rest with the +people of the Chinese race-nation, united, self-ruling, and +determined to survive. +</p> + +<p> +How, then, does the pattern of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign> fit into the +larger scheme of the continuation of Confucian civilization +and ideological control? First, the old was to continue +undisturbed where it might. Second, those persons completely +lost to the discipline of the old ideology must be +controlled by the state. Third, those areas of behavior +which were disturbed by the Western impact required +state guidance. Fourth, the machine state was to control +both these fields, of men, and of ideas, and within this +limited field was to be authoritarian (<q>an all-powerful +state</q>) and yet democratic (<q>nevertheless subject to +the control of the people</q>). Fifth, the ideology was to +arise in part from the general body of the people. Sixth, +the other parts of it were to be developed by the intellectuals, +assisted by the government, which was to be also +under the control of the people. Seventh, since the world +was generally in an unstable condition, and since many +wrongs remained to be righted, it was not immediately +probable that the Chinese would settle down to ideological +serenity and certainty, and consequently State policy +would still remain as a governmental question, to be +decided by the will of the whole race-nation. +</p> + +<p> +To recapitulate, then the people was to rule itself until +the reappearance of perfect tranquility—<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta t'ung</foreign>—or its +nearest mundane equivalent. The government was to +serve as a canalization of the power of the Chinese race-nation +in fighting against the oppressor-nations of the +world for survival. +</p> + +<p> +The last principle of the nationalist ideology remains +to be studied. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min tsu</foreign>, nationalism, was to provide an +instrumentality for self-control and for external defense +<pb n='121'/><anchor id='Pg121'/> +in a world of armed states. But these two would remain +ineffectual in a starved and backward country, if they were +not supplemented by a third principle designed to relieve +the physical impotence of the nation, to promote the material +happiness of its individual members and to guarantee +the continued survival of the Chinese society as a +whole. Union and self-rule could be frustrated by starvation. +China needed not only to become united and free +as a nation; it had also to become physically healthy and +wealthy. This was to be effected through <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +the third of the three principles. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='122'/><anchor id='Pg122'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="Chapter IV. The Theory of Min Sheng."/> +<head>Chapter IV. The Theory of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign>.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="Min Sheng in the Ideology."/> +<head><foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign> in the Ideology.</head> + +<p> +The principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> has been the one most disputed. +Sun Yat-sen made his greatest break with the old +ideology in promulgating this last element in his triune +doctrine; the original Chinese term carried little meaning +that could be used in an approach to the new meaning +that Sun Yat-sen gave it. He himself stated that the two +words had become rather meaningless in their old usage, +and that he intended to use them with reference to special +conditions in the modern world.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 406.</note> He then went on to +state the principle in terms so broad, so seemingly contradictory, +that at times it appears possible for each man to +read in it what he will, as he may in the Bible. The Communists +and the Catholics each approve of the third principle, +but translate it differently; the liberals render it by +a term which is not only innocuous but colorless.<note place='foot'>Father d'Elia devotes the whole second chapter of his introduction to +the consideration of a suitable rendition of <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>, which he calls +the Triple Demism. (Work cited, pp. 36-49.) Again on p. 402, he +explains that, while he had translated <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> as <emph>socialism</emph> in the first +French edition of his work, he now renders it as <emph>the economic Demism</emph> +or <emph>sociology</emph>. The most current translation, that of Frank Price, cited, +gives <emph>the principle of livelihood</emph>. Paul Linebarger gave it as <emph>socialism</emph> as +far back as 1917 (<hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Nationalist Monthly</hi>, December, 1917, +Chicago) in Chicago, at the time when Lin Shen, Frank C. Lee and he +were all working for Sun in that city. Dr. H. H. Kung, a high government +official related by marriage to Mme. Sun Yat-sen, speaks of the three +principles of <emph>liberty</emph>, <emph>democracy</emph>, and <emph>economic well-being</emph> (preface to Hsü, +<hi rend='italic'>Sun</hi>, cited, p. xvi). Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, one of China's most +eminent diplomats, speaks of <emph>social organization</emph> (<hi rend='italic'>Memoranda Presented +to the Lytton Commission</hi>, New York City, n. d.). Citations could be +presented almost indefinitely. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min</foreign> means <q>people,</q> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>shêng</foreign> means +<q>life; vitality, the living, birth, means of living</q> according to the dictionary +(S. Wells Williams, <hi rend='italic'>A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language</hi>, +Tungchou, 1909). The mere terms are of very little help in +solving the riddle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. Laborious examination is needed, and +even this will not, perhaps, lead us to anything more than probability. +Sun Yat-sen, in his lectures, called it by several different names, which +seem at first sight to contradict each other.</note> Had +<pb n='123'/><anchor id='Pg123'/> +Sun Yat-sen lived to finish the lectures on <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, he +might have succeeded in rounding off his discussion of the +principle. +</p> + +<p> +There are two methods by means of which the principle +of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> may be examined. It might be described +on the basis of the various definitions which Sun Yat-sen +gave it in his four lectures and in other speeches and +papers, and outlined, point by point, by means of the +various functions and limits that he set for it. This would +also permit some consideration of the relation of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> to various other theories of political economy. The +other approach may be a less academic one, but perhaps +not altogether unprofitable. By means of a reconsideration +of the first two principles, and of the structure and +meaning of the three principles as a whole, it is possible +to surmise, if not to establish, the meaning of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +that is, to discover it through a sort of political triangulation: +the first two principles being given, to what third +principle do they lead? +</p> + +<p> +This latter method may be taken first, since it will +afford a general view of the three principles which will +permit the orientation of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> with reference to the +nationalist ideology as a whole, and prepare the student +for a solution of some of the apparent contradictions +which are to be found in the various specific definitions +of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +Accepting the elementary thesis of the necessary awakening +of the race-nation, and its equally necessary self-rule, +both as a nation <foreign rend='italic'>vis-à-vis</foreign> other nations, and as a +world by itself, one may see that these are each social +problems of organization which do not necessarily involve +<pb n='124'/><anchor id='Pg124'/> +the physical conditions of the country, although, as a matter +of application, they would be ineffectual in a country +which did not have the adequate means of self-support. +Sun Yat-sen was interested in seeing the Chinese people +and Chinese civilization survive, and by survival he meant +not only the continuation of social organization and moral +and intellectual excellence, but, more than these, the actual +continued existence of the great bulk of the population. +The most vital problem was that of the continued +existence of the Chinese as a people, which was threatened +by the constant expansion of the West and might +conceivably share the fate of the American Indians—a +remnant of a once great race living on the charity of their +conquerors. Sun Yat-sen expressly recognized this problem +as the supreme one, requiring immediate attention.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 91-92.</note> +Nationalism and democracy would have no effect if the +race did not survive to practise them. +</p> + +<p> +The old Chinese society may be conceived as a vast system +of living men, who survived by eating and breeding, +and who were connected with one another in time by the +proper attention to the ancestral cults, and in space by a +common consciousness of themselves as the standard-bearers +of the civilization of the world. Sun Yat-sen, although +a Christian, was not unmindful of this outlook; he too was +sensible of the meaning of the living race through the +centuries. He dutifully informed the Emperor T'ai Tsung +of Ming that the Manchus had been driven from the +throne, and some years later he expressed the deepest +reverence for the ancestral cult.<note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, Bk. IV, p. 62: <q>I must confess that +the idea of using the sacred cult of ancestor worship as a political +machine is very abhorrent to me. In fact, I think that even the rashest +fool would never attempt to use this intimate cult with its exclusively +domestic privacy as a revolutionary instrument.</q></note> But in facing the emergency +with which his race was confronted, Sun Yat-sen +could not overlook the practical question of physical +survival. +</p> + +<pb n='125'/><anchor id='Pg125'/> + +<p> +He was, therefore, materialistic in so far as his recognition +of the importance of the material well-being of the +race-nation made him so. At this point he may be found +sympathetic with the Marxians, though his ideology as a +whole is profoundly Chinese. The destitution, the economic +weakness, the slow progress of his native land were +a torture to his conscience. In a world of the most grinding +poverty, where war, pestilence, and famine made even +mere existence uncertain, he could not possibly overlook +the problem of the adequate material care of the vast +populace that constituted the race-nation. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign>, accordingly, meant primarily the survival +of the race-nation, as nationalism was its awakening, and +democracy its self-control. No one of these could be effective +without the two others. In the fundamentals of +Sun Yat-sen's ideology, the necessity for survival and prosperity +is superlative and self-evident. All other features +of the doctrine are, as it were, optional. The first two +principles definitely required a third that would give them +a body of persons upon which to operate; they did not +necessarily require that the third principle advance any +specific doctrine. If this be the case, it is evident that the +question of the content of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, while important, is +secondary to the first premises of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. +The need for a third principle—one of popular subsistence—in +the ideology is vital; the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> would +be crippled without it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="The Economic Background of Min Sheng."/> +<head>The Economic Background of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign>.</head> + +<p> +What was the nature of the background which decided +Sun Yat-sen to draw an economic program into the total +of his nationalist ideology for the regeneration of China +through a nationalist revolution? Was Sun Yat-sen dissatisfied +<pb n='126'/><anchor id='Pg126'/> +with the economic order of the old society? Was +he interested in a reconstitution of the economic system +for the sake of defense against Western powers? +</p> + +<p> +He was unquestionably dissatisfied with the economic +order of things in the old society, but it was a dissatisfaction +with what the old order had failed to achieve rather +than a feeling of the injustice of the Chinese distributive +system. He was bitter against a taxation system which +worked out unevenly,<note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic</hi>, New York, 1925, +pp. 68-9.</note> and against the extortions of the +internal-transit revenue officials under the Empire.<note place='foot'>The same, pp. 135-139.</note> He +was deeply impressed by his first encounter with Western +mechanical achievement—the S. S. <hi rend='italic'>Grannoch</hi>, which took +him from Kwangtung to Honolulu.<note place='foot'>The same, pp. 104-105.</note> But he had served +in the shop of his brother as a young boy,<note place='foot'>The same, pp. 122-123.</note> and knew the +small farm life of South China intimately. On the basis +of this first-hand knowledge, and his many years of association +with the working people of China, he was not +likely to attack the old economic system for its injustice +so much as for its inadequacy.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472.</note> +</p> + +<p> +That there were injustices in the old system of Chinese +economy, no one can deny, but these injustices were +scarcely sufficient to provoke, of themselves alone, the +complete alteration of economic outlook that Sun Yat-sen +proposed. Chinese capitalism had not reached the state +of industrial capitalism until after its contact with the +West; at the most it was a primitive sort of usury-capitalism +practised by the three economically dominant groups +of old China—landholders, officials, and merchant-usurers.<note place='foot'>Karl A. Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas</hi>, Leipzig, 1931. +The author, the German Marxian who wrote the best Marxist critique of +Sun Yat-sen, is the only scholar to seek a really complete picture of the +old Chinese economy by the technique of modern Western economic +analysis. Described by the author as an <q>attempt,</q> the first volume of +this work runs to 737 pages. It is valuable for the large amount of statistical +material which it contains, and for its systematic method; its +Marxian bias narrows its interest considerably.</note> +The disturbances which hurt the economic condition +<pb n='127'/><anchor id='Pg127'/> +of the country, and thereby led to greater disturbances, +had involved China in a vicious cycle of decline +which could scarcely be blamed on any one feature or any +one group in the old economy. The essential fault lay +with the condition of the country as a whole, directly affected +by the economic consequences of Western trade and +partial industrialization.<note place='foot'>Both works of Wittfogel, cited above, are useful for the understanding +of the transition from the old economy to the new. For a general +view of the economic situation and potentialities of China, see George B. +Cressey, <hi rend='italic'>China's Geographic Foundations</hi>, New York, 1934. The bibliography +on Chinese economy to be found in Latourette, cited above, vol. II, +pp. 116-119, is useful.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's positive dissatisfaction with the economy +of his time arose from the position which he felt China +had in the modern business world. He believed that, by +virtue of the economic oppression of the Chinese by the +Western powers, China had been degraded to the position +of the lowest nation on earth—that the Chinese were +even more unfortunate than <q>slaves without a country,</q> +such as the Koreans and the Annamites.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 97.</note> The particular +forms of this oppression, and Sun Yat-sen's plans for +meeting it, may be more aptly described in the consideration +of his program of economic national regeneration.<note place='foot'>See below, section on the national economic revolution.</note> +The Chinese nation occupied the ignominious position of +a sub-colony or—as Sun himself termed it—<q>a hypo-colony</q>; +<q>Our people are realizing that to be a semi-colony +is a national disgrace; but our case is worse than +that; our country is in the position of a sub-colony (since +it is the colony of all the Great Powers and not merely +subject to one of them), a position which is inferior to an +ordinary colony such as Korea and Annam.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, pp. 186-187. The d'Elia translation gives a +more exact rendering of Sun Yat-sen's words (p. 97), but, by following +Sun Yat-sen in calling China a hypo-colony, is less immediately plain to +the Western reader than is the translation of Dr. Hsü, who in this +instance uses <q>sub</q> and <q>hypo</q> interchangeably.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='128'/><anchor id='Pg128'/> + +<p> +What, then, were the positive implications of the principle +of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> in the nationalist ideology? +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="The Three Meanings of Min Sheng."/> +<head>The Three Meanings of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign>.</head> + +<p> +First, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> is the doctrine leading the nationalist +democracy on its road to a high position among the nations +of the earth; only through the material strength to +be found in <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> can the Chinese attain a position +by which they can exert the full force of their new-formed +state against the invaders and oppressors, and be able to +lift up the populace so that democracy will possess some +actual operative meaning. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> is <q>... the center +of politics, of economics, of all kinds of historical movements; +it is similar to the center of gravity in space.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 443.</note> +It provides the implementation of nationalism and democracy. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> means national enrichment. The +problem of China is primarily one of poverty. Sun wanted +consideration of the problem of the livelihood of the people +to begin with the supreme economic reality in China. +What was this reality? <q>It is the poverty from which we +all suffer. The Chinese in general are poor; among them +there is no privileged wealthy class, but only a generality +of ordinary poor people.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 452.</note> However this enrichment +was to be brought about, it was imperative. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, as the doctrine of enrichment, was +also the doctrine of economic justice. If the nation was to +become economically healthy, it could only do so on the +basis of the proper distribution of property among its citizens. +Its wealth would not bring about well-being unless +it were properly distributed. +</p> + +<pb n='129'/><anchor id='Pg129'/> + +<p> +More briefly, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> may be said to be the thesis of +the indispensability of: 1) a national economic revolution +against imperialism and for democracy; 2) an industrial +revolution for the enrichment of China; and 3) a prophylactic +against social revolution. +</p> + +<p> +The significance of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> as the economic implementation +of nationalism and democracy is clear enough +to require no further discussion. Its significance as a doctrine +for the promotion of the industrial revolution is considerable, +and worth attention. +</p> + +<p> +Western science was to sow the seed. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> +economy was to reap the harvest. By means of the details +in Sun Yat-sen's programs which he believed sufficient for +the purposes, the modernization of China, which was to +be a consequence of Western science in the ideology, was +to lead at the same time to the actual physical enrichment +of the economic goods and services of the country. The +advocacy of industrial development is, of course, a commonplace +in the Western world, but in China it was +strikingly novel. Sun Yat-sen did not regard industrialism +as a necessary evil; he considered it a positive blessing, +as the means of increasing the material welfare of +the Chinese people. +</p> + +<p> +Time and time again, Sun Yat-sen emphasized the necessity +of modernization. His theory of nationalism led +him to urge the introduction of Western physical science +into the ideology. His theory of democracy was justified +in part by the fact that democracy was to be regarded as +a modernizing force. Now his principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +was also to lead to that great end—the modernization of +China to a degree to permit the race-nation to regain in +the modern world, which encompassed the whole planet, +the position it had once had in the smaller world of Eastern +Asia. +</p> + +<p> +The wealth of old China had been one of the factors +enabling it to resist destruction at the spear-points of its +<pb n='130'/><anchor id='Pg130'/> +barbarian conquerors. Sun Yat-sen knew this, and knew +also that the position of the United States—which had +probably the greatest concentration of social and physical +wealth and power under one political system that the +world had ever known—made that nation impregnable in +the modern world. Seeing that wealth was not only a +blessing to individuals, but to nations as well, he was anxious +that his beloved China should be guarded and assisted +by the strength that the ideology of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +once accepted and effectuated, could give it. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> is more than a vague aspiration for national +welfare. The general theory of nationalism and democracy +required an additional point to make them effective +in the realities of international politics, and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +was to supply the hygienic and economic strength that +the Chinese race-nation needed for competition and survival; +but it was to do more. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> is at the same time the last step of Chinese +resistance and the first of Chinese submission to Western +culture. In seeking an economic policy and an ideology +which would lead to increased wealth of the nation, the +Chinese were preparing to resist the West with its own +weapons. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> is a submission in that it is a deliberate +declaration of industrial revolution. +</p> + +<p> +It is beside the point to consider the ideological bases +of the Western industrial revolution. It was perhaps +neither a voluntary nor a deliberate process at all; no man +in the first few decades of the nineteenth century could +have foretold what the end of a process of mechanization +would bring, or was likely to advocate the intentional following +of a policy which would transform the orientation +and organization of man more thoroughly than had any +previous religious, political, and economic transition. The +industrial revolution of Euramerica, when viewed from +the outside, presents the appearance of a colossal accident, +whether for good or for bad, which was but half-perceived +<pb n='131'/><anchor id='Pg131'/> +by the participants in it. Even today, when the +ideology and the institutional outline of the agrarian-handicraft +past is fading swiftly away in the new brilliance +of Western machine-culture, the new certainty, the +new order have not yet appeared. The great transition +works its way beyond the knowledge or the intervention +of individual men. +</p> + +<p> +This was decidedly not the case in China. Industrialism +was something which could be studied from the outside, +which could be appraised, and then acclaimed or resisted. +Emperor Meiji and his Genro, with a flash of +intuition or an intellectual penetration almost unparalleled +in the political history of the world, guided Japan +into the swift current of mechanical progress; the island +empire swept ahead of Asia, abreast of the most powerful +states of the world. The Chinese court, under the resolute, +but blind, guidance of the Empress Dowager, made +a few feeble gestures in favor of modernization, but vigorously +opposed any change which might seriously modify +the order of Chinese society or the position of the Manchus. +In the shadow of the foreign guns, industrialism +crept into China, along the coasts and up the banks of +the navigable rivers. One might suppose that the Chinese +were in a position to choose, deliberately, for or against +industrialism. They were not; in China, as in the West, +the machine age first appeared largely as an accident. +</p> + +<p> +It is here that the significance of Sun Yat-sen's <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> becomes apparent. Above all other subsidiary +meanings, it is a deliberate declaration of the industrial +revolution. Modernism had been an accident; Sun Yat-sen +wished to transform it into a program. What would +be the ideological consequences of such an attitude? +</p> + +<p> +In the first place, a plan was indicated for almost every +type of human behavior. Sun Yat-sen himself drafted a +<pb n='132'/><anchor id='Pg132'/> +preliminary scheme for a modern manufacturing and communications +system.<note place='foot'>His <hi rend='italic'>International Development of China</hi>, New York, 1922 (republished +1929), is a colossal plan which could only be compared with the +<hi rend='italic'>Piatiletka</hi> or with the New Deal in the United States, since Sun Yat-sen +suggested that—in order to avoid the consequences of a post-war depression—the +nations of the world might cooperate in the equal exploitation +of Chinese national resources with the Chinese. He proposed the modernization +of China by a vast international loan which could permit the +Western nations to maintain their war-time peak production, supplying +China (1929 ed., p. 8). He concludes the work: <q>In a nutshell, it is +my idea to make capitalism create socialism in China so that these two +economic forces of human civilization will work side by side in future +civilization</q> (p. 237). The work is, however, generally regarded as a +transportation plan, since Sun Yat-sen sketched out a railway map of +China which would require decades to realize, and which overshadowed, +by its very magnitude, the other aspects of his proposals.</note> The road that China was to take +would not be the miserable, halting progress of industrialism, +complicated by delays and wars, which the West had +known in the painful centuries of readjustment from the +medieval to modern civilization; China would not stumble +forward, but would deliberately select the swiftest and +easiest way to a sound industrialism, and then take it. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> thus not only provides the Chinese with a +way to make their nationalism, their democracy, and their +stateification felt in the hour of their ultimate triumph; +it gives them something to do to bring about that triumph. +</p> + +<p> +On the basis of the outlines of the ideology and the +social system that Sun Yat-sen proposed, viewed from the +perspective of the old Confucian world-society, the reader +will realize that this declaration of the industrial revolution +is the boldest of Sun Yat-sen's acts, and that the +meaning of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> as a program of complete modernization +and reconstruction is superior to other possible +meanings it may have, in regard to theoretical national or +social revolution. There is nothing remote or philosophical +about the significance of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> when so viewed; +it is a plan to which a Lenin or a Henry Ford might subscribe +with equal fervor—although a Tagore would deplore +<pb n='133'/><anchor id='Pg133'/> +it. It is here that Sun Yat-sen appears as the champion +of the West against the traditional technological +stagnation of China. Yet just there, at the supreme point +of his Westernism, we must remember what he was fighting +for: the life of a race-nation and a civilization that +was contradictory to the West. The stability of Confucianism +could not serve as a cloak for reaction and stagnant +thought. For its own good, nay, its own life, Chinese +civilization had to modernize (i. e., Westernize economically) +in order to compete in a West-ruled world. +But what, more specifically, was the socio-economic position +of Sun Yat-sen? Was he a Marxian? Was he a liberal? +Was he neither? +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Western Influences: Henry George, Marxism and +Maurice William.</head> + +<p> +As previously stated there are three parts which may be +distinguished in the ideology of the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign>. <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> is, first, the economic aspect of the +national revolution—the creation of an active race-nation +of China implementing its power by, second, technological +revolution. Third, it connotes also the necessity of a social +revolution of some kind. Western commentators have +been prone to ignore the significance of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> in the +first two of these meanings, and have concentrated on disputation +concerning the third part. The question of the +right system of distribution has become so prominent in +much Western revolutionary thought that, to many, it +sums up the whole moral issue concerning what is good +and bad in society.<note place='foot'>At the risk of digression, one might comment on an interesting element +of the Euramerican ideology which is in sharp contrast to the +Chinese. The West has, apparently, always been devoted to dichotomies +of morality. The Greeks had reason and unenlightenment, and whole +series of ideals that could be fought for and against, but the real division +of good and bad in the West came, of course, with Christianity, which +accustomed Westerners to think for centuries in terms of holiness versus +evil—they being, geographically, holy, and the outsiders (heathen), evil. +Now that the supernatural foundations of Christianity have been shaken +by the progress of scientific and intellectual uncertainty, many Westerners +find an emotional and an intellectual satisfaction in dividing the world into +pure and unclean along lines of sometimes rather abstruse economic questions. +This new morality seems to be based on distributive economics +rather than on deity. It is employed, of course, by the Marxians, but their +adversaries, in opposing them with equal passion, fall into the same habit. +It is shocking and unbelievable to such persons to discover that there is a +society whose ideology does not center around the all-meaningful point of +the ownership of the means of production. Their only reaction is a negation +of the possibility of such thought, or, at least, of its realism. The +intellectual position of Sun Yat-sen in the modern world would be more +clearly appreciated if the intellectuals of the West were not adjusting +their ideological and emotional habits from religion to economics, and +meanwhile judging all men and events in economic terms. The present +discussion of Sun Yat-sen's economic ideology is a quite subordinate one +in comparison to the examination of his ideology as a whole, but some +persons will regard it as the only really important point that could be +raised concerning him.</note> They are uninterested in or ignorant +<pb n='134'/><anchor id='Pg134'/> +of the great importance that the first two aspects of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> possess for the Chinese mind. The third part, the +application of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> to the problems that are in the +West the cause of social revolution, and to the possible +application of social revolution to China, is important, but +is by no means the complete picture. +</p> + +<p> +In attempting to state the definitive position of Sun +Yat-sen on this question several points must be kept in +mind. The first is that Sun Yat-sen, born a Chinese of the +nineteenth century, had the intellectual orientation of a +member of the world-society, and an accepter of the Confucian +ideology. Enough has been shown of the background +of his theories to demonstrate their harmony with +and relevance to society which had endured in China for +centuries before the coming of the West. The second +point to be remembered is that Westerners are prone to +overlook this background and see only the Western influences +which they are in such a good position to detect. +Sun Yat-sen's mind grew and changed. His preferences in +<pb n='135'/><anchor id='Pg135'/> +Western beliefs changed frequently. A few Westerners, +seeing only this, are apt to call Sun unstable and devoid +of reason.<note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, p. 345, quotes Nathaniel Peffer: <q>... Peffer said that +Dr. Sun never <q>attained intellectual maturity, and he was completely +devoid of the faculty of reason. He functioned mentally in sporadic +hunches. It was typical of him that he met Joffe, read the Communist +Manifesto, and turned Communist, and then read one book by an American +of whom he knew nothing, and rejected communism all in a few +months.</q></q> Sun Yat-sen knew Marxism, years before the Russian Revolution. +The Communist Manifesto was not new to him. He was extraordinarily +well read in Western political and economic thought. Sun Yat-sen +never turned Communist, nor did he subsequently reject communism +any more than he had done for years.</note> +</p> + +<p> +It would, indeed, be strange to find any Western political +or ideological leader who thought in precisely the +same terms after the world war and the Russian revolution +as before. Sun Yat-sen was, like many other receptive-minded +leaders, sensitive to the new doctrines of +Wilson and Lenin as they were shouted through the +world. He was, perhaps, less affected by them than Western +leaders, because his ideology was so largely rooted in +the ideology of old China. +</p> + +<p> +Apart from the winds of doctrine that blew through the +world during Sun's life-period, and the generally known +Western influences to which he was exposed,<note place='foot'>The author hopes, at some future time, to be able to fill in the +intellectual background of Sun Yat-sen much more thoroughly than he is +able to at the present, for lack of materials. One interesting method would +involve the listing of every Western book with which Sun Yat-sen can be +shown to have been acquainted. It might be a fairly accurate gauge of the +breadth of his information.</note> there were +three writers whose influence has been supposed to have +been critical in the development of his thinking. These +three were Henry George, Karl Marx, and Maurice William +of New York. A much greater amount of material +is needed for a detailed study of the influences of various +individual theories on Sun Yat-sen than for a general exposition +of his political doctrines as a whole. At the present +<pb n='136'/><anchor id='Pg136'/> +time scarcely enough has been written to permit any +really authoritative description of the relations between +the ideology of Sun Yat-sen and the thought of these three +men. It is possible, nevertheless, to trace certain general +outlines which may serve to clarify the possible influence +that was exercised on Sun, and to correct some current +misapprehensions as to the nature and extent of that +influence. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's opposition to the <q>unearned increment</q> +shows the influence of the thought of Henry George. +Sun proposed an ingenious scheme for the government +confiscation of unearned increment in an economy which +would nevertheless permit private ownership of land. +(Incidentally, he terms this, in his second lecture on <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign>, <q>communism,</q> which indicates a use of the word +different, in this respect at least, from the conventional +Western use.)<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 461-468. Father d'Elia's note on the +relative positions of Henry George and Sun (p. 466) is interesting. For +a discussion of the actual program proposed by Sun, see below, <q>The +Program of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign></q> section on land policy.</note> The land problem was of course a very +old one in China, although accentuated in the disorders +resulting from the impact of the West. There can be little +question that Sun's particular method of solving the problem +was influenced by the idea of unearned increment. +</p> + +<p> +He knew of Henry George in 1897, the year the latter +died,<note place='foot'>Lyon Sharman, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, p. 58.</note> and advocated redistribution of the land in the +party oath, the platform, and the slogans of the <hi rend='italic'>Tung +Meng Hui</hi> of 1905.<note place='foot'>The same, pp. 98-99. There is an inconsistency of wording here, which +may or may not be the fault of the translator. The oath refers to the +<q>equitable redistribution of the land</q> (p. 98); the platform speaks of +<q>the nationalization of land</q> (p. 98); and one of the slogans is +<q>Equalize land-ownership!</q></note> Since, even at the time of the +Canton-Moscow Entente, his land policy never approached +the Marxist-Leninist program of nationalization or collectivization +of land, but remained one of redistribution +<pb n='137'/><anchor id='Pg137'/> +and confiscation of unearned increment, it is safe to say +that Sun kept the theory of George in mind, although he +by no means followed George to the latter's ultimate conclusions.<note place='foot'>See also the discussion in Tsui, <hi rend='italic'>Canton-Moscow Entente</hi>, cited, pp. +371-376; and in Li Ti-tsun, <q>The Sunyatsenian principle of Livelihood,</q> +<hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Students' Monthly</hi>, XXIV (March 1929), pp. 230. Li declares +that Sun envisioned immediate redistribution but ultimate socialization, +but does not cite his source for this. Li's discussion of sources is +good otherwise.</note> +It may thus be inferred that the influence of +Henry George upon the nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen +was slight, but permanent. An idea was borrowed; +the scheme of things was not. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen encountered Marxism for the first recorded +time in London in 1897, when he met a group of Russian +revolutionaries and also read in the subject. The fact that +Sun was exposed to Marxism proves little except that he +had had the opportunity of taking up Marxism and did +not do so.<note place='foot'>Sharman, p. 58; the same authority for the statement as to the 1905 +manifesto.</note> Again, the <hi rend='italic'>Tung Meng Hui</hi> manifesto of +1905 may have been influenced by Marxism. It was not, +however, until the development of his <hi rend='italic'>Three Principles</hi> +that the question of Marxian influence was raised. Sun +Yat-sen made his first speech on the <hi rend='italic'>Principles</hi> in Brussels +in the spring of 1905.<note place='foot'>Sharman, p. 94.</note> By 1907 the three principles +had taken on a clear form: nationalism, democracy, and +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, which the Chinese of that time seem to have +translated <hi rend='italic'>socialism</hi> when referring to it in Western +languages.<note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, p. 61.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The most careful Marxian critic of Sun Yat-sen, writing +of the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> and its two main planks, +land reform and state capitalism, says: <q>This very vague +program, which does not refer to class interests nor to the +class struggle as the means of breaking privileged class interests, +was objectively not socialism at all, but something +<pb n='138'/><anchor id='Pg138'/> +else altogether: Lenin coined the formula, <q>subjective +socialism,</q> for it.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, p. 66: <q>Dieses sehr unpräzise Programm, +das die Frage der Klasseninteressen und des Klassenkampfes als +des Mittels zur Brechung privilegierter Klasseninteressen nicht aufwirft, +war objektiv gar nicht Sozialismus, sondern etwas durchaus anderes: +Lenin hat die Formel <q><emph>Subjektiver Sozialismus</emph></q> dafür geprägt.</q></note> He adds, later: <q>Hence Sun's socialism +meant, on the lips of the Chinese bourgeoisie, +nothing but a sort of declaration for a <q>social</q> economic +policy, that is, a policy friendly to the masses.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, p. 67: <q>So bedeutete denn Suns +<q>Sozialismus</q> im Munde der Chinesischen Bourgeoisie nichts als ein Art +Bekenntness zu einer <q>sozialen,</q> d.h. massenfreundlichen Wirtschaftspolitik.</q></note> T'ang +Liang-li declares that the third principle at this time +adopted <q>a frankly socialistic attitude,</q><note place='foot'>T'ang, cited, p. 46.</note> but implies +elsewhere that its inadequacy was seen by a Chinese Marxist, +Chu Chih-hsin.<note place='foot'>T'ang, cited, p. 172.</note> This evidence, as far as it goes, +shows that Sun Yat-sen had had the opportunity to become +acquainted with Marxism, and that even on the occasion +of the first formulation of the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> he used none of its tenets. The revolutionary critic, +T'ang Liang-li, who, a devoted and brilliant Nationalist +in action, writes with a sort of European left-liberal +orientation, suggests that the Third Principle grew with +the growth of capitalist industrialism in China.<note place='foot'>T'ang, cited, p. 172.</note> This is +true: economic maladjustment would emphasize the need +for ideological reconstruction with reference to the +economy. There is no need to resort to Marxian analysis. +</p> + +<p> +That the third principle meant something to Sun Yat-sen +is shown by the fact that when Sung Chiao-jen, who a +few years later was to become one of the most celebrated +martyrs of the revolution, suggested in the period of the +first provisional Republic at Nanking that the Third Principle +had better be omitted altogether, Sun was enraged, +<pb n='139'/><anchor id='Pg139'/> +and declared that if <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> were to be given up, the +whole revolution might as well be abandoned.<note place='foot'>T'ang, cited, pp. 171-172.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Since <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, in its third significance, that of the +development of a socially just distributive system, was +not Marxian nor yet unimportant, it may be contrasted +once again with the communist doctrines, and then studied +for its actual content. In contrasting it with Marxism, it +might be of value to observe, first, the criticism that the +Marxians levy against it, and second, the distinctions that +nationalist and European critics make between <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +and communism. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Karl Wittfogel, the German Marxist whose work +on Sun Yat-sen is the most satisfactory of its kind, points +out the apparent contradictions in the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>: +on the one hand, statements which are not only objectively +but subjectively friendly to capitalism (on the excellence +of the Ford plant; on the necessity for the coöperation of +capital and labor)—on the other, the unmerciful condemnation +of capitalism; on the one hand, the declaration that +there is no capitalism in China—on the other, that capitalism +must be destroyed as it appears; on the right, the +statement that communism and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> are opposed—on +the left, that the communist doctrines are a subsidiary +part of the ideology of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>.<note place='foot'>Wittfogel, cited, pp. 117-118.</note> How, asks Wittfogel, +does this all fit together? He answers by pointing out the +significance of Sun's theses when considered in relation to +the dialectical-materialist interpretation of recent Far +Eastern history: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +His three principles incorporate +</p> + +<lg> +<l>in their <emph>development</emph> the objective change in the socio-economic +situation of China,</l> +<l>in their <emph>contradictions</emph> the real contradictions of the Chinese revolution,</l> +<l>in their <emph>latest tendencies</emph> the transposition of the social center of +gravity of the revolution, which sets the classes in action, +<pb n='140'/><anchor id='Pg140'/> +and whose aim is no longer a bourgeois capitalist one, but +proletarian-socialist and peasant agrarian-revolutionary.</l> +</lg> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen is according to this not only the hitherto most +powerful representative of the bourgeois-national, anti-imperialist +revolutions of awakening Asia; he points at the same time +outwards over the bourgeois class limitations of the first step of +the Asiatic movement for liberation. To deny this were portentuous, +even for the proletarian communist movement of +Eastern Asia.<note place='foot'><p>Wittfogel, cited, p. 140: <q rend='pre'>... Seine Drei Prinzipien verkörpern in +ihrer <hi rend='italic'>Entwicklung</hi> den objektiven Wandel der ökonomisch-sozialen Situation +Chinas, in ihren <hi rend='italic'>Widersprüchen</hi> die realen Widersprüche der chinesischen +Revolution, in ihren <hi rend='italic'>jüngsten Tendenzen</hi> die Verlagerung des +sozialen Schwerpunktes der Revolution, die Klassen in Aktion setzt, deren +Ziel nicht mehr ein bürgerlich-kapitalistisches, sondern ein proletarisch-sozialistisches +und ein bauerlich-agrar-revolutionäres ist.</q> +</p> +<p> +<q>Sun Yat-sen ist demnach nicht nur der bisher mächtigste Repräsentant +der bürgerlich-nationalen, antiimperialistischen Revolutionen des erwach-enden +Asiens überhaupt, er weist zugleich über die bürgerliche Klassen-schranke +dieser ersten Etappe der asiatischen Befreiungsbewegung hinaus. +Dies zu verkennen, wäre verhängnisvoll, gerade auch für die proletarisch-kommunistische +Bewegung Ostasiens selbst.</q></p></note> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +The modifications which the Marxians have introduced +into their programs with respect to the class struggle in +colonial countries do not imply a corresponding modification +of their ideology. The determinism adopted from +Hegel, the economic interpretation of history—these and +other dogmas are held by the Marxians to be universally +valid despite their Western origin. +</p> + +<p> +We have seen what Sun's chief Marxian exegete thinks +of him. Now it may be worth while to consider the actual +relations of Sun's doctrines with some of those in Marxism. +In the first place, Sun Yat-sen, during his stay in +Shanghai, 1919-1922 (with interruptions), was very much +interested in Communism and friendly to the Russian +people, but not at all inclined to adopt its ideology.<note place='foot'>Statement of Judge Linebarger to the author. See also Linebarger, +<hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, references to Communism which occur throughout the +whole book.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='141'/><anchor id='Pg141'/> + +<p> +In reference to specific points of the Communist ideology, +Sun Yat-sen was indebted to the Communists for +the application of the principle of nationalism, as a means +of propaganda, as anti-imperialism, although, as we have +seen, it was fundamentally a thesis for the readjustment +of the Chinese society from the ideological basis of a +world-society over to a national state among national +states.<note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, p. 144. It would involve a duplication of effort for the +present author to repeat the material of Dr. Tsui's excellent monograph +on Sun Yat-sen and the Bolsheviks. Since the purpose of the present work +is to undertake an exposition of the Nationalist political ideology and +programs against the background of the old Chinese ideology, such an +emphasis upon one comparatively small point in Sun Yat-sen's doctrines +would be entirely disproportionate as well as superfluous. The reader is +referred to the work of Dr. Tsui for any details of these relations that he +may wish to examine.</note> Second, his habit of taking Western doctrines +and applying them to the Chinese nation instead of to +Chinese individuals, led him to apply nationalism to the +class war of the oppressed nations against the oppressing +nations. There was no justification of intra-national class +war in the nationalist ideology of Sun Yat-sen.<note place='foot'>See Tsui, cited, and section below, on the class struggle of the nations.</note> In his +doctrine of democracy, his application of a class-system +based on intellect was a flat denial of the superior significance +of the Marxian economic-class ideology, as was his +favoring of the development of a five-power liberal government +through <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign> in place of a dictatorship +of the proletariat operating through soviets. Finally, +in relation to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, his use of the Confucian philosophy—the +interpretation of history through <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>—was a +contradiction of the materialist interpretation of history +by the Marxians. It also contradicted the class struggle; +the loyalty of the Chinese to the race-nation was to be the +supreme loyalty; it was to develop from the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta chia</foreign>, the +great family of all Chinese; and class lines within it could +not transcend its significance. Furthermore, purely as a +matter of economic development, Sun Yat-sen regarded +<pb n='142'/><anchor id='Pg142'/> +the class struggle as <emph>pathological</emph> in society. He said, +<q>Out of his studies of the social question, Marx gained +no other advantage than a knowledge of the diseases of +social evolution; he failed to see the principle of social +evolution. Hence we can say that Marx was a pathologist +rather than a physiologist of society.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 450. See also Tsui, cited, pp. 353-354; +and Li, cited, pp. 229 and following.</note> Finally, he did +not accept the Marxian theory of surplus value or of the +inevitable collapse of capitalism. He even spoke of capitalism +and socialism as <q>two economic forces of human +civilization</q> which might <q>work side by side in future +civilization.</q><note place='foot'>Sun, <hi rend='italic'>Development of China</hi>, cited, p. 237.</note> +</p> + +<p> +All in all, it may safely be said that Sun Yat-sen's ideology, +as an adjustment of the old Chinese ideology to +the modern world, was not inspired by the Marxist; that +through the greater part of his life, he was acquainted +with Marxism, and did not avail himself of the opportunities +he had for adopting it, but consistently rejected it; +and that while the Communists were of great use to him +in the formulation and implementation of his program, +they affected his ideology, either generally or with reference +to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, imperceptibly if at all. +</p> + +<p> +This conclusion is of significance in the estimation of +the influence of Maurice William upon the thought of +Sun Yat-sen. It is, briefly, the thesis of Dr. William that +it was his own book which saved China from Bolshevism +by making an anti-Marxian out of Sun after he had fallen +prey to the Bolshevist philosophy. Dr. William writes of +the lectures on Nationalism and Democracy; <q>In these +lectures Dr. Sun makes clear that his position is strongly +pro-Russian and pro-Marxian, that he endorses the class +struggle, repudiates Western democracy, and advocates +China's coöperation with Bolshevist Russia against capitalist +<pb n='143'/><anchor id='Pg143'/> +nations.</q><note place='foot'>Maurice William, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism</hi>, Baltimore, 1932, +p. 4.</note> Dr. William then goes on to show, +quite convincingly, that Sun Yat-sen, with very slight +acknowledgments, quoted William's <hi rend='italic'>The Social Interpretation +of History</hi> almost verbatim for paragraph after +paragraph in the lectures on <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +It would be unjust and untruthful to deny the great +value that William's book had for Sun Yat-sen, who did +quote it and use its arguments.<note place='foot'>William, in his <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism</hi>, cited, proves beyond +doubt that Sun Yat-sen was strongly indebted to him for many anti-Marxian +arguments.</note> On the other hand, it is +a manifest absurdity to assume that Sun Yat-sen, having +once been a communist, suddenly reversed his position +after reading one book by an American of whom he knew +nothing. Even Dr. William writes with a tone of mild +surprise when he speaks of the terrific <foreign rend='italic'>volte-face</foreign> which +he thinks Sun Yat-sen performed. +</p> + +<p> +There are two necessary comments to be made on the +question of the influence of Maurice William. In the +first place, Sun Yat-sen had never swerved from the interpretation +of history by <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>, which may be interpreted as +the humane or social interpretation of history. Enough +of the old Chinese ideology has been outlined above to +make clear what this outlook was.<note place='foot'>See above, Chapter One, second, third, and fourth sections.</note> Sun Yat-sen, in short, +never having been a Marxian, was not converted to the +social interpretation of history as put forth by Dr. William. +He found in the latter's book, perhaps more clearly +than in any other Western work an analysis of society +that coincided with his own, which he had developed from +the old Chinese philosophy and morality as rendered by +Confucius. Consequently he said of William's rejection +of the materialistic interpretation of history, <q>That +sounds perfectly reasonable ... the greatest discovery +of the American scholar <emph>fits in perfectly</emph> with the (third) +<pb n='144'/><anchor id='Pg144'/> +principle of our Party.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 423.</note> The accomplishment of Maurice +William, therefore, was a great one, but one which +has been misunderstood. He formulated a doctrine of +social evolution which tallied perfectly with Chinese ideology, +and did this without being informed on Chinese +thought. He did not change the main currents of Sun's +thought, which were consistent through the years. He did +present Sun with several telling supplementary arguments +in Western economic terms, by means of which he could +reconcile his interpretation of social history not only with +Confucian <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> but also with modern Western economics. +</p> + +<p> +The other point to be considered in relation to Maurice +William is a matter of dates. The thesis of Maurice William, +that Sun Yat-sen, after having turned Marxian or +near-Marxian, was returned to democratic liberal thought +by William's book, is based on contrast of the first twelve +lectures in the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> and the last four on <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign>. Dr. William believes that Sun read his book in +the meantime and changed his mind. A Chinese commentator +points out that Sun Yat-sen referred to <hi rend='italic'>The Social +Interpretation of History</hi> in a speech on January 21, +1924; his first lecture on the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> was given +January 24, 1924.<note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, pp. 121-123, n. 72.</note> Hence, in the twelve lectures that Dr. +William interprets as Marxian, Sun Yat-sen was speaking +from a background which included not only Marxism, but +<hi rend='italic'>The Social Interpretation of History</hi>, as well. +</p> + +<p> +Only on the third part does the influence of the Western +thinkers appear unmistakably. Henry George gave +Sun Yat-sen the idea of the unearned increment, but Sun +Yat-sen, instead of accepting the whole body of doctrine +that George put forth, simply kept this one idea, and built +a novel land-policy of his own on it. Marxism may have +influenced the verbal tone of Sun Yat-sen's lectures, but +it did not affect his ideology, although it shows a definite +<pb n='145'/><anchor id='Pg145'/> +imprint upon his programs. Maurice William gave Sun +Yat-sen a set of arguments in modern economic terms +which he attached to his ideological thesis of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign> interpretation +of history, which he based upon Confucianism. +There is no evidence to show that at any time in his +life Sun Yat-sen abandoned his Chinese ideological +orientation and fell under the sway of any Western +thinker. The strong consistency in the ideology of Sun +Yat-sen is a consistency rooted in the old Chinese ideology. +On minor points of doctrine he showed the influence +of the West; this influence cannot be considered +solely by itself. The present discussion of Western influences +may, by its length, imply a disproportionate emphasis +of Western thought in the political doctrines of +Sun Yat-sen, but in a work written primarily for Westerners, +this may be found excusable. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="Min Sheng as a Socio-Economic Doctrine."/> +<head><foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign> as a Socio-Economic Doctrine.</head> + +<p> +If one were to attempt to define the relations of the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> ideology to the various types of Western economic +doctrines at present current, certain misapprehensions +may be eliminated at the outset. First: Capitalism +in its Western form was opposed by Sun Yat-sen; <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> was to put through the national economic revolution +of enrichment through a deliberately-planned industrialization, +but in doing so was to prevent China from +going through all the painful stages which attended the +growth of capitalism in the West. <q>We want,</q> said Sun +Yat-sen, <q>a preventive remedy; a remedy which will +thwart the accumulation of large private capitals and so +preserve future society from the great inconvenience of +the inequality between rich and poor.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472.</note> And yet he +looked forward to a society which would ultimately be +communistic, although never in its strict Marxian sense. +<pb n='146'/><anchor id='Pg146'/> +<q>We may say that communism is the ideal of livelihood, +and that the doctrine of livelihood is the practical application +of communism; such is the difference between the +doctrine of Marx and the doctrine of the Kuomintang. In +the last analysis, there is no real difference in the principles +of the two; where they differ is in method.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 422. The Hsü version will be cited from +time to time, whenever Father d'Elia's interesting neologisms might make +the citation too disharmonious, in wording, with the comment.</note> This +is sufficient to show that Sun Yat-sen was not an orthodox +Western apologist for capitalism; as a Chinese, it would +have been hard for him to be one, for the logically consistent +capitalist ideology is one which minimizes all human +relationships excepting those individual-contractual +ones based on money bargains. The marketing of goods +and services in such a way as to disturb the traditional +forms of Chinese society would have been repugnant to +Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +Second: if Sun Yat-sen's <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> ideology cannot be +associated with capitalism, it can as little be affiliated +with Marxism or the single-tax. What, then, in relation +to Western socio-economic thought, is it? We have seen +that the state it proposed was liberal-protective, and that +the society from which it was derived and to which it was +to lead back was one of extreme laissez-faire, bordering +almost on anarchism. These political features are enough +to distinguish it from the Western varieties of socialism, +anarchism and syndicalism, since the ingredients of these +ideologies of the West and that of Sun Yat-sen, while +coincident on some points, cannot be fitted together. +</p> + +<p> +Superficially, there is a certain resemblance between the +ideology of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> and that of Fascism. The +resemblances may be found in the emphasis on the nation, +the rejection of the class war and of Marxism, the +upholding of tradition, and the inclusion of a doctrine of +intellectual inequality. But Sun Yat-sen seeks to reconcile +<pb n='147'/><anchor id='Pg147'/> +all this with democracy in a form even more republican +than that of the United States. The scheme of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +ch'üan</foreign>, with its election, recall, initiative and referendum, +and with its definite demands of intellectual freedom, is +in contradiction to the teachings of Fascism. His condemnation +of Caesarism is unequivocal: <q>Therefore, if the +Chinese Revolution has not until now been crowned with +success, it is because the ambitions for the throne have not +been completely rooted out nor suppressed altogether.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 294.</note> +With these fundamental and irreconcilable distinctions, it +is hard to find any possibility of agreement between the +<hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> and the Fascist ideologies, although the +transitional program of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>—in its advocacy +of provisional party dictatorship, etc.—has something +in common with Fascism as well as with Communism as +applied in the Soviet Union. +</p> + +<p> +A recent well-received work on modern political +thought describes a category of Western thinkers whose +ideas are much in accord with those contained in the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> ideology.<note place='foot'>Francis W. Coker, <hi rend='italic'>Recent Political Thought</hi>, New York—London, +1934, pp. 545-562, Ch. XX, <q>Empirical Collectivism.</q></note> Professor Francis W. Coker of +Yale, after reviewing the leading types of socialist and +liberal thought, describes a group who might be called +<q>empirical collectivists.</q> The men to whom he applies +this term reject socialist doctrines of economic determinism, +labor-created value, and class war. They oppose, on +the other hand, the making of a fetish of private ownership, +and recognize that the vast mass of ordinary men in +modern society do not always receive their just share of +the produce of industry. They offer no single panacea for +all economic troubles, and lay down no absolute and unchallengeable +dogma concerning the rightness or wrongness +of public or private ownership.<note place='foot'>Coker, cited, pp. 546-547.</note> Professor Coker +<pb n='148'/><anchor id='Pg148'/> +outlines their general point of view by examining their +ideas with reference to several conspicuous economic problems +of the present day: public ownership; labor legislation; +regulation of prices; taxation; and land policies.<note place='foot'>Coker, cited, pp. 548-549. Throughout the discussion of empirical +collectivism the present author will cite, by and large, the categories given +by Coker. Any special exceptions will be noted, but otherwise the discussion +will be based on Coker's chapter on <q>Empirical Collectivism,</q> +cited above.</note> +</p> + +<p> +According to Coker, the empirical collectivist is not +willing to forgo the profit motive except where necessary. +He is anxious to see a great part of the ruthlessness of +private competition eliminated, and capital generally subjected +to a regulation which will prevent its use as an instrument +of harm to the community as a whole. While +not committed to public ownership of large enterprises +as a matter of theory, he has little objection to the governmental +operation of those which could, as a matter of +practical expediency, be managed by the state on a nonprofit +basis. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's position greatly resembles this, with respect +to his more immediate objectives. Speaking of public +utilities, he said to Judge Linebarger: <q>There are so +many public utilities needed in China at the present time, +that the government can't monopolize all of them for the +advantage of the masses. Moreover, public utilities involve +risks which a government cannot afford to take. +Although the risks are comparatively small in single cases, +the entire aggregate of such risks, if assumed by the government, +would be of crushing proportions. Private initiative +and capital can best perform the public utility development +of China. We should, however, be very careful +to limit the control of these public utilities enterprises, +while at the same time encouraging private development +as much as possible.</q><note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, Book III, p. 31.</note> Sun had, however, already spoken +of nationalization: <q>I think that when I hold power +<pb n='149'/><anchor id='Pg149'/> +again, we should institute a nationalization program +through a cautious and experimental evolution of (1) +public utilities; (2) public domains; (3) industrial combines, +syndicates, and cartels; (4) coöperative department +stores and other merchandising agencies.</q><note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, Book III, p. 30.</note> It must be +remembered that there were two considerations back of +anything that Sun Yat-sen said concerning national ownership: +first, China had already ventured into broad national +ownership of communications and transport, even though +these were in bad condition and heavily indebted; second, +there was no question of expropriation of capital, but +rather the free alternative of public and private industry. +An incidental problem that arises in connection with the +joint development of the country by public and by private +capital is the use of foreign capital. Sun Yat-sen was opposed +to imperialism, but he did not believe that the use +of foreign capital at fair rates of interest constituted submission +to imperialism. He said, in Canton, <q> ... we +shall certainly have to borrow foreign capital in order to +develop means of communication and transportation, and +we cannot do otherwise than have recourse to those foreigners +who are men of knowledge and of experience to +manage these industries.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 475.</note> It may thus be said that Sun +Yat-sen had no fixed prejudice against private capital or +against foreign capital, when properly and justly regulated, +although in general he favored the ownership of +large enterprises by the state. +</p> + +<p> +Second—to follow again Professor Coker—the Western +empirical collectivists favor labor legislation, and government +intervention for the protection of the living standards +of the working classes. This, while it did not figure +<pb n='150'/><anchor id='Pg150'/> +conspicuously in the theories of Sun Yat-sen,<note place='foot'>See, however, the d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 298-301, for a reference +to labor unions and a statement for their need of competent and +honest leadership.</note> was a +striking feature of all his practical programs.<note place='foot'>See Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, <q>Die Arbeiter,</q> pp. 97-99. T'ang, +Hsü, and the various biographies of Sun almost all contain references +from time to time to Sun's friendliness toward and approval of organized +labor.</note> In his +address to Chinese labor, on the international Labor Day, +1924, he urged that Chinese labor organize in order to +fight for its own cause and that of national liberation. +It had nothing to fear from Chinese capitalism, but everything +from foreign imperialistic capitalism.<note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, pp. 325-329. The next speech of Sun +Yat-sen given in Wittfogel's work is Sun's indignant attack on <q>the so-called +Labor Government</q> of England, which permitted the old methods +of British Far Eastern imperialism to continue.</note> Sun did not +make a special hero class out of the workers; he did, however, +advocate their organization for the purpose of getting +their just share of the national wealth, and for +resistance to the West and Japan. +</p> + +<p> +Third, the empirical collectivist tends to advocate price-control +by the state, if not over the whole range of commodities, +at least in certain designated fields. Sun was, +has been stated, in favor of the regulation of capital at +all points, and of public ownership in some. This naturally +implies an approval of price-control. He more specifically +objected to undue profits by middlemen, when, in +discussing salesmen, he said: <q>Under ideal conditions, +society does not need salesmen or any inducement to buy. +If a thing is good, and the price reasonable, it should +sell itself on its own merits without any salesmanship. +This vast army of middlemen should hence be made to +remember that they should expect no more from the nonproductive +calling in which they are engaged than any +other citizen obtains through harder labor.</q><note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, Book III, p. 18. This work, while +it cannot be given the weight of direct quotations from Sun's own writings +or speeches, does contain a good deal about the policies of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +which does not appear elsewhere. The author has sought to avoid citation +of it where direct sources are available, since the nature of the material +makes it by no means so authoritative as others might be.</note> In this, too, +<pb n='151'/><anchor id='Pg151'/> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> coincides with empirical collectivism; the coincidence +is made easy by the relative vagueness of the +latter. +</p> + +<p> +Fourth, in the words of Mr. Coker, <q>many collectivists +look upon taxation as a rational and practical means for +reducing extreme differences in wealth and for achieving +other desired economic changes.</q><note place='foot'>Coker, cited, p. 551.</note> Sun Yat-sen agrees +with this definitely; his land policy is one based upon +taxation and confiscation of the amount of the unearned +increment (which, not involving the confiscation of the +land itself, is perhaps also taxation), and proposes to +apply taxes extensively. Quite apart from the question of +distributive justice, a heavy tax burden would be necessary +in a country which was being rigorously developed. +</p> + +<p> +Fifth, empirical collectivists believe in land control, +not only in the cities, but in the open country as well, as a +matter of agrarian reform. We have seen that the land +figured extensively in the ideology of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, and +shall observe that Sun Yat-sen, in his plans for <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +stressed the importance of proper control of land. +</p> + +<p> +In summing up the theory of distributive justice which +forms a third part of the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, one +may say that, as far as any comparison between a Chinese +and a Western idea is valid, the positive social-revolutionary +content of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> coincides with the doctrines +of that group of Western politico-economic writers whom +Coker calls empirical collectivists. The correspondence +between the two may not be a mere coincidence of names, +for in considering Sun Yat-sen's <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, one is struck +by the empirical, almost opportunistic, nature of the +<pb n='152'/><anchor id='Pg152'/> +theory. A great part of the activity of the Chinese, +whether material or intellectual, has been characterized +by a sort of opportunism; not necessarily an opportunism +of insincerity, it may be more aptly described as a tendency +to seek the golden mean, the reasonable in any situation. +It is this habit of compromise with circumstance, this +bland and happy disregard of absolutes in theory, which +has preserved—with rare exceptions—the Chinese social +mind from the torment of any really bitter and profound +religious conflict, and which may, in these troubled times, +keep even the most irreconcilable enemies from becoming +insane with intolerance. This fashion of muddling through, +of adhering to certain traditional general rules of reasonableness, +while rendering lip-service to the doctrines of +the moment, has been the despair of many Western students +of China, who, embittered at the end, accuse the +Chinese of complete insincerity. They do not realize that +it is the moderateness of the Confucian ideology, the humane +and conciliatory outlook that centuries of cramped +civilized life have given the Chinese, that is the basis of +this, and that this indisposition to adopt hard and fast +systems has been one of the ameliorating influences in the +present period of serious intellectual antagonisms. Generalizations +concerning China are rarely worth much. It +may be, however, that the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, with +respect to its positive socio-economic content, may appear +vague to the Western student, and that he may surmise it +to be a mere cloak for demagogues. It could easily do +that in the West, or in the hands of insincere and unscrupulous +leaders. In China, however, it need not necessarily +have been formulated more positively than it was, +because, as we have seen, the intellectual temper of the +Chinese makes any strict adherence to a schedule or a plan +impossible. It is easy, always, to render the courtesies; it +is hard to follow the specific content. Sun Yat-sen apparently +<pb n='153'/><anchor id='Pg153'/> +realized this, and wished to leave a general body of +doctrine which could be followed and which would not be +likely to be violated. In any case, the theses of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +both ideologically and programmatically, can scarcely be +contrasted with the detailed schedules of social revolution +to be found in the West. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's frequent expressions of sympathy with +communism and socialism, and his occasional identification +of the large principles of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> with them, are +an indication of his desire for ultimate collectivism. (It +may be remarked, in passing, that Sun Yat-sen used the +word <emph>collectivist</emph> in a much more rigid sense than that +employed by Coker.) His concessions to the economic +situation of his time, the pragmatic, practical method in +which he conceived and advocated his plans, are a manifestation +of the empirical element in his collectivism. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Ming shêng</foreign> cannot, however, be thought of as another +Western doctrine for national economic strength, national +economic reconstitution, and national distributive +justice; it is also a program for the improvement of the +morale of the people. +</p> + +<p> +How is the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> doctrine to fit in with the essentially +conservative spirit of the nationalist ideology? If, +as Sun proposed, the new ideology is to be compounded +of the old morality, the old knowledge, and modern +physical science, how is <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, referring to social as +well as material programs, to be developed in harmony +with the old knowledge? In the terminology of ultramodern +Western political science, the ethical, the moral, +and the emotional are likely to appear as words of derision. +In a milieu characterized by the curiously warmblooded +social outlook of the Confucians, such terms are +still relevant to reality, still significant in the lives of +men. The sentimental is intangible in politics; for that +reason it is hard to fit into contemporary thought, but +<pb n='154'/><anchor id='Pg154'/> +though it cannot be measured and fully understood, its +potency cannot be disregarded; and for Sun Yat-sen it +was of the utmost importance. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="Min Sheng as an Ethical Doctrine."/> +<head><foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign> as an Ethical Doctrine.</head> + +<p> +Reference has been made to the Confucian doctrine of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>, the fellow-feeling of all mankind—each man's consciousness +of membership in society. This doctrine was +formulated in a society unacquainted with Greek logic, +nor did it have the strange European emphasis upon sheer +intellectuality which has played its way through Western +thought. Not, of course, as profoundly introspective as +Christianity, nor appealing so distinctly to the mystical in +man's nature, it was nevertheless concerned with man's +inner life, as well as with the ethics of his outward behavior. +The Confucian was suffused throughout with the +idea of virtue; the moral and the physical were inextricably +intertwined. Its non-logical content scarcely approached +the form of a religion; commentators on the old +ideology have not called it religious, despite the prominence +of beliefs in the supernatural.<note place='foot'>E. D. Harvey, <hi rend='italic'>The Mind of China</hi>, New Haven, 1933, deals extensively +with these supernatural elements. The reader who turns to it should +keep in mind the fact that the supernatural plays a rôle in China distinctly +less important than that which it did, say, in medieval Europe, and +that a strong agnostic, rather than a skeptical, spirit among the Chinese +has preserved them from the grossest errors of superstition.</note> The religion of the +Chinese has been this-worldly,<note place='foot'>Latourette, cited, p. 129. Dr. Latourette's sketch of Chinese religious +thought is especially good, as indeed it might be, since he is one of the +most celebrated American scholars in the field of Western religion in +China.</note> but it has not on that +account been indifferent to the subjective aspects of the +moral life.<note place='foot'>H. G. Creel, work cited, p. 127.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The nationalist ideology was designed as the inheritor +of and successor to, the old ideology of China. The doctrine +<pb n='155'/><anchor id='Pg155'/> +of nationalism narrowed the field of the application +of Confucianism from the whole civilized world to the +state-ized society of the Chinese race-nation. The doctrine +of democracy implemented the old teachings of popular +power and intellectual leadership with a political mechanism +designed to bring forth the full strength of both. +And the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> was the economic application +of the old social ethos. +</p> + +<p> +It is in this last significance, rather than in any of its +practical meanings of recovery, development, and reform, +that Sun Yat-sen spoke most of it to one of his followers.<note place='foot'>The author cannot give a documentary citation for this observation. +It was communicated to him many times by his father, Judge Paul Linebarger, +who stated that Sun Yat-sen was most apt to talk in terms of +morality and morale by preference. The fact that Sun Yat-sen came from +a Chinese Confucian background into a Western Christian one cannot be +ignored. He did not permit his Christianity to sway him from what he +considered his necessary lines of behavior in politics; it did not, for +example, prevent him from being extremely cordial to the Soviet Union +at the time that that state was still more or less outcaste. And yet, speaking +of the Christian God, he is reputably reported to have said: <q>God +sent me to China to free her from bondage and oppression, and I have +not been disobedient to the Heavenly mission</q>; and, again, to have said +on the day before his death: <q>I am a Christian; God sent me to fight +evil for my people. Jesus was a revolutionist; so am I.</q> (Both quotations +from appendix to the d'Elia translation, p. 718.)</note> +He was concerned with it as a moral force. His work +was, among other things, a work of moral transformation +of individual motives.<note place='foot'>Sun Yat-sen authorized the biography, cited, which Judge Linebarger +wrote of him. It was a propaganda work, and neither he nor the author +had any particular expectation that it would ever be regarded as a source, +or as an academically prepared document. The last chapter of this +authorized biography bears the title, <q>Conclusion: Sun the Moral Force.</q> +This, perhaps, is significant as to Sun's own attitude.</note> <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> must, in addition to +its other meanings be regarded as an attempt to extend +the Chinese ideology to economic matters, to lead the +Chinese to follow their old ethics. Sun Yat-sen had ample +time in his visits to the West to observe the ravages that +modern civilization had inflicted upon the older Western +<pb n='156'/><anchor id='Pg156'/> +moral life, and did not desire that China should also +follow the same course. The humanity of the old tradition +must be kept by the Chinese in their venture into the +elaborate and dangerous economy of modern life; the +machine civilization was needed, and was itself desirable,<note place='foot'>Note the contrast between the thought of Sun in this respect and that +of Tagore or Gandhi. This has been pointed out by many Western +writers on China.</note> +but it could not overthrow the humane civilization +that preceded it and was to continue on beneath and +throughout it. +</p> + +<p> +In this manner a follower of Sun Yat-sen seeks to recall +his words: <q>I should say that <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> focuses +our ethical tradition even more than the other two principles; +after a Chinese has become nationalistic and democratic, +he will become socialized through the idea of his +own personality as an instrument of good for human welfare. +In this proud feeling of importance to and for the +world, egotism gives way to altruism.... So, I say +again that <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> is an ethical endeavor ... this, +the final principle (and yet, the first principle which I +discovered, in the bitterness and poverty of my boyhood +days), will come imperceptibly into our lives.</q><note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, Book III, p. 20.</note> +</p> + +<p> +In a philosophy for intellectuals such attitudes need +not, perhaps, be reckoned with; in an ideology for revolution +and reconstitution, perhaps they should. Sun Yat-sen +conceived of his own work and his ideology not only +as political acts but as moral forces; <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> was at +once to invigorate the national economy, to industrialize +the material civilization, and to institute distributive justice, +and in addition to this, it was to open a new, humane +epoch in economic relations. That is why the term, +instead of being translated, is left in the Chinese: <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='157'/><anchor id='Pg157'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter V. The Programs of Nationalism.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Kuomintang.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen was a political leader as well as a political +philosopher. His growth as a thinker was intimately associated +with the development of his political activities. It +would be difficult to say which came first, either in time +or in importance, in his life—his teachings or his work. +At times the line between the two becomes vague. Sun +made vital commitments concerning his ideology in furthering +his revolutionary work. These have to be sifted +out from other utterances bearing only upon the immediate +situation. This is not easy, but neither is it impossible. +Lyon Sharman wrote, <q>It might be cogently argued +that, in dealing with an easily absorbent, propagandist +mind like Sun Yat-sen's one should not look to the shifting +ideas for his real opinions, but to those formulations +which he clung to tenaciously all his life.</q><note place='foot'>Sharman, cited, p. 282.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The ideology of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> provides a broad +scheme of terms and values by means of which the Chinese +of the twentieth century could orient themselves simultaneously +in the modern world and in the continuing +world of Confucian civilization. Between this philosophy +and the necessity of immediate practical action there +stands an intermediate step—that of the plans. The plans +provide a theory of means leading to the establishment of +the ends set up in the ideology. The ideology, left on +paper by itself, could not bring about China's salvation; +it had to be spread and implemented with political action. +Sun Yat-sen planned the programs and activities of the +Chinese revolutionaries in some detail; he proposed policies +<pb n='158'/><anchor id='Pg158'/> +reaching far out into the future. While, since his +death, these plans have been modified to a greater or less +degree,<note place='foot'>The reader must bear in mind the fact that what is presented here is +Sun Yat-sen's political program for China. In many instances the course +of affairs has deviated quite definitely from that program, and it can be +only a matter of conjecture as to what Sun Yat-sen would do were he to +return and observe the Nationalist movement as it now is. It is manifestly +impossible to trace all the changes in this program. The actual +developments have conformed only in part with Sun Yat-sen's plans, +although the leaders seek to have it appear as though they are following +as close to Sun Yat-sen's democratic politics as they can. Many persons +who were close to Sun Yat-sen, such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, believe that +the National Government has betrayed the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and that +Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih has made himself the autocrat of the +National Government. It is, of course, impossible within the scope of this +thesis to enter into this dispute. Who rules the Soviet—Stalin, or the +Communist Party? Who rules China—Chiang Chieh-shih, or the Kuomintang? +In each case there is the question of whether the leader could +get along without the party, and whether the party could get along without +the leader, as well as the question of the leader's sincerity. These +issues, however burning they might be in real life, could not be adequately +treated in a work such as this. The author has sought to present Sun +Yat-sen's theory of applied politics. Where events which Sun Yat-sen +foresaw have come to pass, the author has referred to them. He does not +wish to be understood as presenting a description of the whole course of +events in China.</note> they have not lost all relevance to the course of +affairs in China, and, in any case, possess an interest of +their own in the history of political thought, as illustrating +the political doctrines to which Sun Yat-sen's ideology +led him. The first problem the plans had to include was +that of providing a tool by which they could be set in +motion. +</p> + +<p> +What instrument could preach nationalism to the Chinese +people and awaken them, and, having awakened +them, lead them on to a victorious defense of their race +and civilization? Sun's answer was: <q>The Kuomintang.</q> +The nationalist revolutionary party was the designated +heir to the leadership of the people, and even in his life-time +Sun Yat-sen worked through the party that was +almost entirely his own creation. +</p> + +<pb n='159'/><anchor id='Pg159'/> + +<p> +This party had begun as a small group of the personal +followers of Sun Yat-sen in the days when he was struggling +against the Manchu monarchy almost singlehanded. +Gradually this group increased and became a federation +of the great secret orders which had resisted the Manchus +for centuries. It developed into a modern parliamentary +party under the name <hi rend='italic'>Kuomintang</hi>—literally <emph>nation people +party</emph>—with the inauguration of the first republic, but +was soon driven underground by the would-be emperor +Yüan Shih-k'ai. It emerged again in South China at the +end of the World War, was reorganized after the Communist +model (so far as intra-party organization was concerned) +before the death of Sun Yat-sen, led the revolution +to the North, and, now, though somewhat less united +than before, rules the greater part of China in the name +of the Three Principles.<note place='foot'>Here, again, one must remember that Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene +Chen, and others charge that the Party no longer rules, that it has been +prostituted by Chiang Chieh-shih, and now serves only to cloak a military +despotism. It may be noted, so far as the other side of the question is +concerned, that a greater number of the persons who were eminent in the +Party before Sun Yat-sen died have remained in it than have left it.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Confucius preached the slow transformation of society +by means of an intellectual leaven, scholar class, which, +by re-forming and clarifying the ideology, could gradually +minimize conflict among men and bring about an epoch +of concord in which all men would live by reason as +found in tradition. The function of the Kuomintang was, +in Sun's mind, only remotely similar. The Kuomintang +was designed to intervene in a chaos of wars and corrupt +politics, to propagate the nationalist ideology, and avert +a tragic fate which would otherwise be inevitable—the +disappearance of China from the map of the world, and +the extinction not only of Chinese civilization but—as +Sun Yat-sen thought—of the Chinese race as well. +</p> + +<p> +In the days before the downfall of the monarchy, and +<pb n='160'/><anchor id='Pg160'/> +for the few years of defeat under the first republic, the +Kuomintang was not highly organized. Sun Yat-sen's +genius for leadership, and the fervor of his adherents—which +can be understood only at first-hand, and cannot +be explained in rational terms—were sufficient to hold +the party together. But there was far too much discord +as to final principles as well as to points of immediate +action, and party activities were not so specialized as to +permit maximum efficiency.<note place='foot'>See T'ang, work cited for an excellent description of the mutations +of the revolutionary party. T'ang criticizes the present personnel of the +Kuomintang severely, but the reader must keep in mind the fact that he +has since become reconciled with the present leadership, and make allowances +for the somewhat emphatic indignation voiced at the time of writing +the book. The brilliance of the author guarantees that the story is well +told, but it is not told for the last time. See also, Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau, +<hi rend='italic'>Two Years of Nationalist China</hi>, Shanghai, 1930, for a summary that is +as excellent as it is short. Various changes have occurred in party function, +organization, and personnel since that time, but they have not—to the +knowledge of the author—been completely and adequately covered by any +one work.</note> Furthermore, there was the +question of the relations of the party and the state. It was +somewhat absurd for the partizans of Sun Yat-sen, having +brought about the revolution, to stand back and let whomever +would walk away with it. The party's power had +ebbed with its success in 1911. There had to be some way +of keeping the party in power after it had achieved the +overthrow of its enemies, and won the revolutionary control +of the country. Reorganization was definitely necessary +if party effectiveness were to be raised to the point of +guaranteeing the success of the next revolution—which +Sun did not live to see—and party supremacy to the point +of assuring the Nationalists control of the government +after the revolution had been accomplished. +</p> + +<p> +Reorganization was effected through the assistance of +the Communists during the period of the Canton-Moscow +entente (1923-1927).<note place='foot'>For a history of this period, see T'ang, Sharman, or Tsui Shu-chin, +all cited above. The Communist side of the story is told by Harold Isaacs +(editor), <hi rend='italic'>Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction</hi>, Shanghai, 1932, and in the +various works of the Stalinist and Trotskyist groups concerning the intervention +of the Third Internationale in China. Two graphic personal +accounts cast in semi-fictional form, are Oscar Erdberg, <hi rend='italic'>Tales of Modern +China</hi>, Moscow, 1932, and Vincent Sheean, <hi rend='italic'>Personal History</hi>, New York, +1935; these present the Communist and the left-liberal viewpoints, respectively. +The dramatic story of the Entente, the separation, and the ensuing +conflict are not yet remote enough to have cooled into material ready for +the historian.</note> Under the leadership of the +<pb n='161'/><anchor id='Pg161'/> +extraordinarily able Michael Borodin, the Soviet advisers +sent from Russia completely re-shaped the internal structure +of the Kuomintang and won for themselves positions +of considerable confidence and influence, which they lost +only when they attempted to transform the principles and +objectives of the Party as thoroughly as they had the +organization. +</p> + +<p> +The Kuomintang of today, which is irreconcilably opposed +to Marxism, still bears the imprint of Communist +design.<note place='foot'>The Kuomintang, in accepting the Communist administrative structure, +was not violating traditional Chinese patterns altogether. It has been +pointed out that the revised structure of the Kuomintang resembled older +Chinese guild patterns as well as the new Russian style (Sharman, work +cited, p. 262).</note> Though the working details of the Party organization +do not, for the most part, appear directly relevant +to the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign> of Sun Yat-sen, the arrangements +for Party control illustrate the curious compromise +between Chinese and Western democratic patterns, +on the one hand, and the revolutionary requirements +of absolutism, on the other, which have made Chinese +republicanism seem a sham, if not a farce, to Western +scholars who expect to find in China the same openness +and freedom in democratic government to which +they are accustomed at home. +</p> + +<p> +During the life-time of Sun there was no question of +an elective headship for the Party. In spite of the fact +that the party stood for democracy, it seemed impossible +<pb n='162'/><anchor id='Pg162'/> +that any alternative to Sun Yat-sen himself should be +considered. Sun Yat-sen's complete willingness to continue +as head of the Party without troubling to have himself +elected from time to time has been variously interpreted: +his friends term it the humble and natural recognition +of a celebrated fact; his enemies regard it as the +hallucination of an egotism as distorted as it was colossal. +The truth would appear to be that Sun regarded the initiation +and the guidance of the Nationalist revolution as his +particular mission in life. He was, in a sense, the intellectual +proprietor of the Three Principles. Unselfish in +all personal matters, he had few doubts of his own capacity +when he had discovered what he believed to be his +duty, and unquestioningly set out to perform it. In the +lawlessness and tumult of the revolution, it would have +seemed absurd for Sun Yat-sen to submit to the periodical +formula of reëlection for the sake of any merely theoretical +harmony of action and theory. +</p> + +<p> +Not only was Sun Yat-sen the leader of the Party; he +was not even to have a successor. The first revised constitution +of the Kuomintang provided for his life-time +headship; the second stipulated that the post of <hi rend='italic'>Tsung Li</hi> +should never be filled by any other person. As <hi rend='italic'>Tsung Li</hi>—the +Party Leader, it is still customary to refer to Sun Yat-sen +in China today. This, again, was not the display of a +superhuman vanity so much as a practical requirement +designed to offset the possibility of conflict and intrigue +among the most conspicuous party chiefs, which would +quite probably arise should the question of a succession +to Sun Yat-sen ever be mentioned. There was, of course, +the element of respect in this gesture—the implication +that the magistral chair of Sun Yat-sen was too high a +place for any common man to sit. +</p> + +<p> +So far as leadership was concerned the Kuomintang +was an autocracy until the death of Sun Yat-sen. In all +<pb n='163'/><anchor id='Pg163'/> +other party matters attempts were made to cultivate democratic +form and instil democratic morale. The prudence +of this choice may seem to have been borne out by the +course of history, since the Communists did not become +ambitious, nor the Nationalists jealous, to the point of +open conflict until after the death of Sun Yat-sen. Western +thought will have to make extensive allowances before +it can comprehend a democratic Party which operated +under the unquestioned authority of a single man, +without recourse to the formula of a plebiscite or election +to a boss-ship in the form of a nominal post made significant +only by the personal conspicuousness of the incumbent. +</p> + +<p> +Had Karl Marx lived to work in the Russian Revolution, +he might have occupied a position analogous to that +which Sun Yat-sen did in the Chinese. In other respects +the new Kuomintang organization was remarkably like +the Communist. There was the extraordinarily complex, +but somehow effective, mechanism of a Party Congress, a +Central Executive Committee, and a Standing Committee. +There was a Political Bureau and an agency for overseas +agitation. There were also the wide ramifications of an +extensive net work of auxiliary organizations designed to +draw strength from every popular enthusiasm, and deflect +it to the cause of the Nationalist revolution. In due time +these agencies were turned about and swung into action +against the Communists who had attempted to master +them. +</p> + +<p> +The precise details of Kuomintang organization need +not be described. In general the pattern of authority proceeded +from the whole membership, by a sequence of indirect +elections, to the inner group of the Central Executive +Committee, a body which possesses as much power in +China as does its Soviet prototype.<note place='foot'>Here, again, one might refer to the disputes as to the orthodoxy and +integrity of the present leadership. The preëminence of Generalissimo +Chiang Chieh-shih, which cannot be doubted, is seen by persons friendly +to him as a strong and beneficent influence upon the C. E. C. Persons +hostile to him charge that he has packed the C. E. C. with his adherents, +and controls it as he chooses.</note> An instance of its +<pb n='164'/><anchor id='Pg164'/> +power may be given: representatives are sent by the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tang +pu</foreign> (Party Branches) to the Party Congress; in the event +that delegates do not or cannot come, the C. E. C. has the +power of appointing persons to serve <foreign rend='italic'>pro tempore</foreign> as the +representatives of the otherwise unrepresented branches. +Since the same committee examines delegates' credentials, +it is apparent that the trustworthiness of the Party Congress +can be assured in the same manner that, to the +understanding of the present author, the earlier All-Union +Congresses of Soviets and the C. P. were assured in the +Russian Revolution. The pattern given the Kuomintang +by the Russians gave the Party a strong central control +able to assure orthodoxy within the Party; for some years, +as a matter of history, differences of opinion within the +Party could only be expressed by schism (as in the case of +the <q>Kuomintang</q> of Wang Ch'ing-wei). While the +aim of the Party was democracy, it cannot be said truthfully +that democracy worked in a militant Party engaged +in turning an anarchy into a revolution. The requirements +of revolutionary endeavor, among other things, +seem to include an iron-handed leadership of the right +sort. Such leadership could, in the Sun Yat-sen ideology, +be justified by reference to the three stages of the revolution. +</p> + +<p> +The Kuomintang remained, so far as leadership was +concerned, the creature of Sun Yat-sen. In structure it +was extensively reorganized to resemble the Communist +hierarchy found in Russia, with the administrative and +legislative systems united into grades of conferences and +committees. The Kuomintang also took over the Communist +system of a registered and disciplined membership. +To the time of the reorganization in 1923-1924, the +<pb n='165'/><anchor id='Pg165'/> +Party had apparently admitted and expelled members in +the informal, but effective, manner employed by the old +Chinese <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>—associations; guilds; or <q>tongs</q>—for centuries.<note place='foot'>An interesting piece of research could deal with the method of recruitment +and registration in the Kuomintang before the coming of the Communist +advisers. There was rarely any doubt as to who was, or was not, +a member, but there was constant trouble as to the good standing of +members. Recruitment seems to have been on a basis of oath-taking, +initiation, etc.; what Party discipline there was seems to have been applied +only in the most extreme cases, and then crudely.</note> +Without a complete system of personnel book-keeping, +it was impossible to keep adequate records of +the performance of each member and comb through the +membership for the purpose of eliminating undesirables +and inactives. At the time of the reorganization the membership +was required to be reënrolled; in many cases certificates +of membership were granted (in physical appearance +resembling a European passport) which, in view of +the Party power, entailed a considerable grant of privileges +with the more or less corresponding burden of +duties. Party finances notably improved. In time this systematic +method of recording membership was applied for +the purposes of ousting persons with Communist or pro-Communist +views, or eliminating individuals too friendly +with foreign interests believed antagonistic to the Party +or its purposes. <q>Party purges</q> have been frequent and +drastic since the organization of a complete membership +record. +</p> + +<p> +The Kuomintang, as it was re-formed just before its +swift rise to power and as it has essentially remained since, +was a well-organized body of persons, subject to varying +degrees of Party discipline, and trained in the methods of +propaganda. The leadership was in the hands of Sun +Yat-sen and, after his death, in the hands of his most +trusted military and political aides. The membership, +drawn from all parts of China and the world, was made +<pb n='166'/><anchor id='Pg166'/> +up of persons from almost every class in society; representation +was on the Russian plan, tending to centralize +power in the C. E. C.<note place='foot'>It is interesting to note that the Kuomintang is to a certain degree +democratic in representing the various occupational groups in China. +Tyau, cited above, p. 25 and following, lists the percentages in the membership +in the Kuomintang according to occupation, as they stood in 1930: +Party work, 5.84%; government service, 6.61%; army and navy, 3.26%; +police, 4.09%; labor (in general), 7.32%; agriculture, 10.43%; navigation, +1.20%; railway, 1.14%; commerce, 10.47%; students, 10.47%; +teaching, 21.31%; independent professions, 1.66%; social work, 1.68%; +unemployed, O.54%; unclassified, 3.13%; incomplete returns, 15.09%.</note> Intra-party democracy was not, +for the most part, put into practice because of the disturbed +political and economic conditions. The Party and +its predecessors have, in the forty-odd years of their +combined existence, been facing what amounted to a state +of perpetual emergency. Sometimes badly, but more often +effectively, they have struggled to establish a state which +in turn can found the democratic ideology of Sun upon +which the democracy of the future must, they believe, be +based. +</p> + +<p> +Sun did not state definitely that the Party was to be +dissolved after the task of its dictatorship was completed, +and China had won a stable democratic government. That +decision, of perpetuating the Party as one of many competing +parties in the new democracy, or of abolishing it +altogether, was presumably to be left to the Party leaders +of the time. A precedent may be found in the behavior of +Sun himself after the establishment of the Republic in +1912; he continued the Nationalist Party as one of the +chief parties in the parliamentary republic. Yüan Shih-k'ai +soon drove it underground again. From this it might be +possible to conclude that the Party having done with its +trusteeship, need not commit suicide as a party, but could +continue in some form or another. +</p> + +<p> +The Kuomintang forms the link between the theories +of Sun and the realities of the revolutionary struggle; +<pb n='167'/><anchor id='Pg167'/> +it ties together his plans for a new democracy in China and +his strategies in the conflicts of the moment. First instrument +of the ideology, it bears the burden of bringing about +the revolution, and bringing the country to the stage of +testing the administrative and political theories of the +founder, and simultaneously inculcating the democratic +principle in the minds of those who are to bear the heritage +of Chinese organization and culture on to the future. +</p> + +<p> +The genius of Sun Yat-sen, the Communist gift of +organization, and the fervor of the membership brought +about the defeat or submission—however nominal the +latter may have been—of the warlords. By what stages, +according to the theory of Sun Yat-sen, could national +unity be realized? What, given power, should the Kuomintang +do to guarantee the success of the revolution? +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Dragon Throne and State Allegiance.</head> + +<p> +The first task which the Kuomintang, once established, +had to perform was a necessary preliminary to the other +portions of its work—such as the leading of the first steps +against the Western inroads, the opening up of the democratic +technique of government, and the initiation of the +first phases of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. That task was to awaken the +Chinese to the fact that they were a nation, and not only +a nation, but an abused and endangered one as well. +</p> + +<p> +We have seen that Sun Yat-sen regarded nationalism +as a precious treasure which the Chinese had lost.<note place='foot'>See above, pp. <ref target='Pg059'>59</ref> and following.</note> He +had said, many years before, in his <hi rend='italic'>Kidnapped in London</hi>, +that the Manchus had followed a deliberate policy of +intellectual suppression designed to extinguish or divert +Chinese nationalism, and to make the great masses of +Chinese on whom the Manchu power depended oblivious +to the fact that they were the humiliated slaves of alien +<pb n='168'/><anchor id='Pg168'/> +conquerors.<note place='foot'>Sun Yat-sen, <hi rend='italic'>Kidnapped in London</hi>, cited, <hi rend='italic'>passim</hi>.</note> Again, in the third lecture on nationalism, +he said that while the Emperors Kang Hsi and Ch'ien +Lung were at least honest in acknowledging themselves to +be Manchus, extenuating their presence on the Dragon +Throne by claiming the imperial hero-sages, Shun and +Wen Wang, of antiquity as fellow-barbarians, the Manchu +Emperors after Ch'ien Lung did everything they could to +suppress Chinese nationalist ideas. They even did not +hesitate to revise the classics of history in order to obliterate +whatever historical consciousness the Chinese may have +had of themselves.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 122-123.</note> Sun Yat-sen pointed out that the +strong group-consciousness of the Jews has kept Judea +living through the centuries, even though the Jewish state +was obliterated and the Jews themselves scattered to the +four winds. He also praised the Poles,<note place='foot'>The present instances are all taken from the third lecture on nationalism, +d'Elia translation, cited pp. 127-128. The Hsü translation, in spite +of its many merits, is not strong on geography. Thus, in the translation +referring to Poland which has just been cited, the Hsü reading runs: +<q>Although Persia was partitioned by foreigners over a century ago, Persian +nationalism was not lost; consequently the Persians have been able to +restore their country to independence; and now Persia has the status of a +second or third class power in Europe</q> (p. 208), this in spite of the fact +that Persia is translated correctly further on (p. 327). Another misreading +is: <q>After the war, two new Slavic states were born, namely Czechoslovakia +and Jugoslovakia</q> (p. 217). These minor errors are, however, +among the very few which can be discovered in the whole book, and do +not mar the text to any appreciable extent.</note> who were subjugated +by aliens as were the Chinese, but kept their +nationalist ideas and were consequently restored as an +honored nation after the world war. Hence, the first step +in the program of Chinese nationalism was to be the creation +of a consciousness of that nationalism. If the Chinese +did not regain their nationalism, <q>that precious treasure +which makes possible the subsistence of humanity,</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 132.</note> they +might meet the fate of the Miao tribes whom the Chinese +<pb n='169'/><anchor id='Pg169'/> +had pushed back into desolate lands and who faced an +ignominious extinction. +</p> + +<p> +This consciousness of themselves as a race-national +unity was not of itself enough. The Chinese had lost the +favored position that they had held since before the +beginning of recorded history, and were no longer in a +position to view the frailties of outside nations with the +charity to which their once impregnable position had entitled +them. It was no longer a mere question of pushing +through a recognition that China, hitherto regarded by the +Chinese as the ecumene of civilization, was a nation, and +not even an equal to the other nations. This idea had to +be developed into a force. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen wrote, of the significance of philosophy in +action: <q>What is a principle? A principle is an idea, a +belief, a force. As a rule, when men search for the truth +of a thesis, they first reflect upon it, then their reflections +grow into a belief, and that belief becomes a force. Hence +in order to be firmly established, a principle must pass +through the different stages of idea, belief, and force.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 63.</note> +No more definite statement of the ideological consequences +of thought could be found. Sun Yat-sen appreciated +this, and realized that, in the carrying out of his +ideology, the first necessity was the adoption of the ideology +itself. All other steps must be secondary. The +grouping of the important steps in the fulfillment of the +program of nationalism may have differed from time to +time,<note place='foot'>T'ang, cited, pp. 168 and following, gives the various documents of +the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, which place the application +of nationalism first in their programs. <q>The Manifesto On Going +to Peking,</q> issued by Sun November 10, 1924, refers to various points +to be achieved; the first is, <q>National freedom from external restriction +will enable China to develop her national economy and to increase her +productivity.</q> (Hsü translation, p. 148.) This might imply that the +execution of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> was to be coincidental with or anterior to the +fulfillment of nationalism; it probably does not.</note> but the actual work of Sun Yat-sen was based +<pb n='170'/><anchor id='Pg170'/> +upon the method indicated: the establishment of at least +the preliminary notions of the ideology as a prerequisite to +effective social action. (In this connection, and in anticipation +of further discussion, it might be pointed out +that the advantage of the Moscow-Canton entente was not +one gained from the superior appeal of the Communist +ideology, but from the superior agitation techniques which +the Nationalists learned from the Communists, and which +enabled them to bring into play the full latent social force +in Sun Yat-sen's ideas.) But if mere national-consciousness +were insufficient of itself, what else was needed? +</p> + +<p> +Loyalty was necessary. Being aware of themselves as +Chinese would not help them, unless they united and +were loyal to that union. <q>To say that what the ancients +understood by loyalty was loyalty toward the emperor, and +that, since we no longer have an emperor, we (need no +longer) speak of loyalty, and to believe that we can act +as we please—that is a grave error.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187.</note> Sun Yat-sen thus +points out one of the most tragically perplexing of the +problems of the new China. +</p> + +<p> +He was urging return to the ancient morality. The ancient +code of loyalty was one built up to the emperor. +Although the emperor did not have much power, in comparison +with some despots who have changed history, he +was nevertheless the man at the apex of society. The +Confucian society was one built in general upon the grand +design of an enormous family; a design which was, nevertheless, +flexible enough to permit the deposition of a +wicked or mad emperor—something which the Japanese +order of things could not in theory, although it did in fact, +tolerate. Filial piety was piety toward one's own family +head; loyalty was piety toward the family head of all +civilized society. +</p> + +<p> +Many writers have pointed out the discord and unhappiness +<pb n='171'/><anchor id='Pg171'/> +which the abolition of the Empire brought to many +Chinese. Their code of honor was outraged; the embodiment +of their social stability was gone.<note place='foot'>Discussions of this are to be found in Sir Reginald Johnston's +<hi rend='italic'>Twilight in the Forbidden City</hi>, cited.</note> The critics who +made the comment could not, of course, deny the general +trend away of political organization throughout the world +from monarchy. They did question the competence of the +Chinese to make the readjustment at the present stage of +their history, or believed that the Chinese could not preserve +their traditional civilization under a governmental +system which was alien to the form if not to the spirit of +the Chinese tradition. Although their criticisms may be +influenced too heavily by an antiquarian appreciation of +the excellencies of the Chinese Imperial system, or a desire +to preserve China as a sort of vast museum with all +its quaintnesses of yesteryear, there is some point to what +they say, since the transition to national-state allegiance +was not an easy one. There were two factors involved in +it, besides the tremendousness of the educational task of +convincing almost half a billion people that they were no +longer ruled by a properly deputized agent of the universe, +but were quite free to manage their world as they collectively +saw fit. These factors were, first, the necessity of +preventing any possible resurrection of the Dragon +Throne, and second, the inculcation of allegiance to an +intangible state. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen pointed out the enormous waste of blood +and wealth involved in the change from one dynasty to +another, when the highest post in the whole world was +suddenly left open for the strongest man to seize. Republicanism +would consequently tend to prevent civil wars +in the future;<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 244.</note> the cumbersome, murderous old method +of expressing the popular will, as the Confucian ideology +provided, was to be done away with, and peaceful changes +<pb n='172'/><anchor id='Pg172'/> +of political personnel developed. He asserted that the +T'ai P'ing rebels, of whose memory he was fond, had +failed in their fierce attempt to establish a fantastic pseudo-Christian, +proletarian, collectivistic dynasty in the sixth +and seventh decade of the nineteenth century because of +the dispute that arose within their ranks as to leadership.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 245-247.</note> +He also pointed out that many of the militarists under +the Republic knew well that the Dragon Throne was +empty, but did not know that it was gone. +</p> + +<p> +The story of the eradication of monarchy from Chinese +society is an interesting one, relevant to the question of +the old and the new loyalty. Sun Yat-sen's full force was +thrown at first against the Manchus. He taught the other +two principles of democracy and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, but in his +earlier years he attracted most attention by his anti-Manchu +activities. Now, in allowing the principle of +nationalism to do the work of the principle of democracy, +Sun Yat-sen was using the anti-dynastic revolutionary +potentialities of the situation to push along an anti-monarchical +movement. The Chinese constitutional arrangement +was such, under the Manchus, that a foreign monarch, +who was a sovereign in his own right, quite apart from +China, sat on the Chinese throne. The Manchu Emperor +occupied the Dragon Throne. Many were willing to rebel +against a Manchu; they might have hesitated had an indigenous +prince occupied that position. +</p> + +<p> +On the occasion of the establishment of the first Republic, +in 1912, the Manchu Emperor was allowed to +continue residence in Peking. Retaining his dynastic title +and the use of the Forbidden City, he was to receive a +stipend from the Chinese Republic and to be entitled to +all the privileges normally accorded a foreign emperor by +international law. There is a remote possibility, although +the truth of this surmise cannot be substantiated, that he +<pb n='173'/><anchor id='Pg173'/> +was left there as a sort of scarecrow, to prevent anyone +from seizing the throne. Constitutional difficulties would +have arisen if a pensioned Manchu Emperor and a native +caesarian Emperor were to attempt to occupy the same +throne. +</p> + +<p> +This peculiar arrangement does not seem to have helped +matters much. There was not enough pro-Manchu sentiment +to support any restoration movement on a large scale, +such as a reactionary insurrection, and the personal unpopularity +of the one man, Yüan Shih-k'ai, who, as dictator +of the first Republic (1912-1916), sought the throne, +was enough to keep any active monarchical movement +from succeeding. The one attempt of the Manchu partizans, +in 1917, failed utterly. +</p> + +<p> +That is not to say that the Dragon Throne was not +missed. A general relaxation of political ethics was observable. +The old tradition could not easily be reconciled +to a juristic notion from outside. Sun Yat-sen sought +most eagerly to impress upon the Chinese the necessity +for state allegiance in place of monarchical devotion: +<q>At present everybody says that morality was overthrown +with the advent of the republic. The main reason is right +here. Reasonably speaking we must practice loyalty even +under a republican regime, not loyalty to a sovereign, +but loyalty toward the nation, loyalty toward the people, +loyalty toward our four hundred million men. Of course, +loyalty toward four hundred million men is something +much more exalted than loyalty toward one single man. +Hence we must preserve the excellent virtue of loyalty.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187. Numerals have been written out by +the present author.</note> +A curious emphasis on the physical object of loyalty is +present here. The Chinese, having no background of +Western juristic hypostatizations, were unable to be faithful +to a legal fiction; expressing state allegiance, Sun +<pb n='174'/><anchor id='Pg174'/> +Yat-sen had to put it in its most tangible form, that of a +concord of human beings. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, under the republic, the old virtue of +personal loyalty should not interfere with state allegiance. +Sun Yat-sen was willing and anxious that the Chinese +should consider their loyalty as being directed to the +nation; he did not wish that the officials of the nation, as +men, should get it. In that case the very purpose of democracy +would be defeated, and a monarchy or an oligarchy +set up with the formulae of a democracy. Sun Yat-sen was +as radically republican as any early American. <q>In regard +to the government of the nation, fundamentally, it is the +people who have the power, but the administration of +the government must be entrusted to experts who have the +capacity. We need not regard those experts as stately and +honorable presidents and ministers, but merely as chauffeurs +of automobiles, as sentinels who guard the gate, as +cooks who prepare the food, as doctors who attend to +sicknesses, as carpenters who build houses, as tailors who +make clothes.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 365. Italics are omitted.</note> State allegiance had to be directed between +the Scylla of a monarchical restoration and the +Charybdis of nominally republican personal government. +The old form had to be discarded, and the old habits +turned in a new direction, but not in the easiest direction +that they might take. +</p> + +<p> +The problem of the supplanting of the Dragon Throne +by a state was not an easy one. In the preparation of the +Chinese people for the initiation of an active program of +nationalism, the first elements of the nationalist ideology +had to be inculcated. This involved race-consciousness. +But the idea of race-consciousness and national-consciousness +could not be exerted as a force unless the conscious +union of the Chinese race-nation was accompanied by the +erection of a powerful democratic state, and unless this +<pb n='175'/><anchor id='Pg175'/> +state fell heir to the loyalty which had once been shown +the Throne, or even a higher loyalty. This loyalty had to +be based on the two suppositions that the Empire was +gone forever, and that personal loyalty, even under the +forms of a republic, should not be allowed to take its +place. Only with a genuine state-allegiance could the +Chinese advance to their national salvation. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Economic Nationalism.</head> + +<p> +The ideological establishment of a race-national outlook +would have far-reaching consequences that might +well continue working themselves out for centuries. The +immediate exercise of this sense of unity was to be developed +through a loyalty to state allegiance, which would +also of itself be significant. These two new patterns—the +one ideological, and the other institutional—running +through the Chinese society and social mind were vitally +necessary. But after the institutional habit of state-allegiance +had been developed, what was the new democratic +state, the instrument of the awakened race-nation, to do +in the way of practical policies to give effect to the new +consciousness and strength of Chinese nationalism? +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen, whose principles tended to develop themselves +in terms of threes,<note place='foot'>This is not due to any mystical veneration of numbers, or religious +influence. In spreading doctrines which would have to be followed by +the unlettered as well as by the scholars, Sun Yat-sen found it necessary +to develop the general outline of his principles in such a way as to give +them a considerable mnemonic appeal. Thus, the three principles—and +the three French (liberty, equality, fraternity) and American (of, by, for +the people) principles—and the triple foreign aggression, the four popular +powers, the five governmental rights. The use of the number three permitted +Sun Yat-sen to weave together the various strands of his teaching, +and to attain a considerable degree of cross-reference. It cannot be shown +to have induced any actual distortion of his theories.</note> cited three perils constituting a +threat to the Chinese society. The first was the peril to +the Chinese race, which was faced with the possibility +<pb n='176'/><anchor id='Pg176'/> +of decline in an expanding Western World and might +even become vestigial or extinct. This peril was to be +fought with race-nationalism. The second was the peril to +the Chinese polity, the danger that China might become +politically appurtenant to some foreign power of group of +powers. This was to be fought with democratic race-nationalism. +And the last, and most insidious, was the +peril to the Chinese economy, the looting of China by the +unfair economic measures of the great powers, to be met +by a nationalist economic program. Sun Yat-sen was +most apprehensive of the combined strength of these three +pressures: <q>... I fear that our people are in a very +difficult position; and I fear that we may perish in the +near future. We are threatened by the three forces I +have mentioned: namely, the increase of foreign population, +the political force, and the economic force of the +foreigners.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 213. See also d'Elia translation, p. 134.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Of the three forms of the foreign oppression of China, +the economic, because it did not show itself so readily, +and was already working full force, was the most dangerous. +It was from this oppression that China had sunk to +the degraded position of a sub-colony. <q>This economic +oppression, this immense tribute is a thing which we did +not dream of; it is something which cannot be easily detected, +and hence we do not feel the awful shame of it.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 114.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen, as stated above, was not hostile to the +development of that portion of foreign capital which he +regarded as fairly employed in China, and spent a great +part of his life in seeking to introduce capital from outside. +He did, however, make a distinction between the +just operation of economic forces, and the unjust combination +of the economic with the politically oppressive. +Foreign capital in China was not oppressive because it +<pb n='177'/><anchor id='Pg177'/> +was capital; it was oppressive because it held a privileged +position, and because it was reinforced by political and +military sanctions. There is no implication in Sun Yat-sen's +works that the operations of finance, when not unjustly +interfered with by political action, could, even when +adverse to China, be regarded as wrong of themselves. +</p> + +<p> +In what ways, then, did foreign capital so invest its +position with unjust non-economic advantages that it constituted +a burden and an oppression? There were, according +to Sun Yat-sen, six headings under which the various +types of economic incursion could be classified, with the +consequence that a total of one billion two hundred million +Chinese dollars were unjustly exacted from the +Chinese economy every year by the foreigners. +</p> + +<p> +First, the control of the Customs services having, by +treaty, been surrendered by China, and a standard <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad +valorem</foreign> tariff having also been set by treaty, the Chinese +had to leave their markets open to whatever foreign commerce +might choose to come. They were not in a position +to foster their new modern industries by erecting a protective +tariff, as had the United States in the days of its +great industrial development.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 101.</note> China's adverse balance +in trade constituted a heavy loss to the already inadequate +capital of the impoverished nation. Furthermore, the +amount of the possible revenue which could be collected +under an autonomous tariff system was lost. Again, +foreign goods were not required, by treaty stipulation, to +pay the internal transit taxes which Chinese goods had to +pay. As a result, the customs situation really amounted to +the development of a protective system for foreign goods +in China, to the direct financial loss of the Chinese, and +to the detriment of their industrial development. He +estimated that half a billion dollars, Chinese, was lost +yearly, through this politically established economic +<pb n='178'/><anchor id='Pg178'/> +oppression.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. The whole present discussion of +economic oppression is drawn from the latter part of the second lecture. +Except in the case of direct quotation, no further reference will be given +to this section, which occurs at pp. 97-115 of the d'Elia translation.</note> Obviously, one of the first steps of Chinese economic +nationalism had to be tariff autonomy. +</p> + +<p> +Second, the foreign banks occupied an unfair position +in China. They had won a virtual monopoly of banking, +with the consequence that the Chinese banks had to appear +as marginal competitors, weak and unsound because the +people were <q>poisoned by economic oppression.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 106.</note> The +foreign banks issued paper money, which gave them cost-free +capital; they discounted Chinese paper too heavily; +and they paid either no or very little interest on deposits. +In some cases they actually charged interest on deposits. +A second step of economic nationalism had to be the +elimination of the privileged position of the foreign banks, +which were not subject to Chinese jurisdiction, and were +thus able to compete unfairly with the native banks. +</p> + +<p> +Third, economic oppression manifested itself in transportation, +chiefly by water. The economic impotence of +the Chinese made them use foreign bottoms almost altogether; +the possible revenue which could be saved or perhaps +actually gained from the use of native shipping was +lost. +</p> + +<p> +Fourth, the Western territorial concessions constituted +an economic disadvantage to the Chinese. Wrested from +the old Manchu government, they gave the foreigners a +strangle-hold on the Chinese economy. Besides, they +represented a direct loss to the Chinese by means of the +following items: taxes paid to the foreign authorities in +the conceded ports, which was paid by the Chinese and +lost to China; land rents paid by Chinese to foreign individuals, +who adopted this means of supplementing the +tribute levied from the Chinese in the form of taxes; +<pb n='179'/><anchor id='Pg179'/> +finally, the unearned increment paid out by Chinese to +foreign land speculators, which amounted to an actual loss +to China. Under a nationalist economic program, not +only would the favorable position of the foreign banks be +reduced to one comparable with that of the Chinese banks, +but the concessions would be abolished. Taxes would +go to the Chinese state, the land rent system would be +corrected, and unearned increment would be confiscated +under a somewhat novel tax scheme proposed by Sun +Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +Fifth, the Chinese lost by reason of various foreign +monopolies or special concessions. Such enterprises as the +Kailan Mining Administration and the South Manchuria +Railway were wholly foreign, and were, by privileges +politically obtained, in a position to prevent Chinese competition. +This too had to be corrected under a system of +economic nationalism. The new state, initiated by the +Kuomintang and carried on by the people, had to be able +to assure the Chinese an equality of economic privilege in +their own country. +</p> + +<p> +Sixth, the foreigners introduced <q>speculation and various +other sorts of swindle</q> into China.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113.</note> They had exchanges +and lotteries by which the Chinese lost tens of +millions of dollars yearly. +</p> + +<p> +Under these six headings Sun Yat-sen estimated the +Chinese tribute to Western imperialism to be not less than +one billion two hundred millions a year, silver. There +were, of course, other forms of exaction which the Westerners +practised on the Chinese, such as the requirement of +war indemnities for the various wars which they had +fought with China. Furthermore, the possible wealth +which China might have gained from continued relations +with her lost vassal states was diverted to the Western +powers and Japan. Sun Yat-sen also referred to the +<pb n='180'/><anchor id='Pg180'/> +possible losses of Chinese overseas, which they suffered +because China was not powerful enough to watch their +rights and to assure them equality of opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not expect that forces other than those +which political nationalism exerted upon the economic +situation could save the Chinese. <q>If we do not find +remedies to that big leakage of $1,200,000,000.00 per +year, that sum will increase every year; there is no reason +why it should naturally decrease of its own accord.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113.</note> +The danger was great, and the Chinese had to use their +nationalism to offset the imperialist economic oppression +which was not only impoverishing the nation from year to +year, but which was actually preventing the development +of a new, strong, modern national economy. +</p> + +<p> +What is the relation of the sub-principle of economic +nationalism to the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>?<note place='foot'>In referring to a sub-principle, the author is following Sun Yat-sen's +arrangement of his ideas, even though the exact term, <q>sub-principle,</q> +is not to be found in Sun's works. Each of the three principles can be +considered with respect to national unity, national autonomy, and national +survival. The correlation of the three principles, each with itself and then +the two others, logically leads to the appearance of nine sub-principles. +The writer has not followed any artificial compulsion of numbers, merely +for the sake of producing a pretty outline, but has followed Sun Yat-sen +in seeking to make clear the specific relations of each of the three principles +to the three cardinal points which they embody.</note> Economic +nationalism was the preliminary remedy. The program of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> was positive. It was the means of creating a +wealthy state, a modern, just economic society. But the +old oppressions of imperialism, lingering on, had to be +cleared away before China could really initiate such a +program. Not only was it the duty of the Chinese national +and nationalist state to fight the political methods of +Western imperialism; the Chinese people could help by +using that old Asiatic weapon—the boycott. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen was pleased and impressed with the consequences +of Gandhi's policy of non-coöperation. He +<pb n='181'/><anchor id='Pg181'/> +pointed out that even India, which was a subject country, +could practise non-coöperation to the extreme discomfort +of the British. The creation of race-nationalism, and of +allegiance to a strong Chinese state, might take time. Non-coöperation +did not. It was a tool at hand. <q>The reason +why India gained results from the non-coöperation policy +was that it could be practised by all the citizens.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 179-180.</note> The +Chinese could begin their economic nationalist program +immediately. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen pointed out that the basis for the weakness +of China, and its exploitation by the foreigners, was the +inadequacy of the Chinese ideology. <q>The reason why +we suffer from foreign oppression is our ignorance; we +<q>are born in a stupor and die in a dream</q>.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180.</note> Conscious +of the peril of the foreign economic oppression, the Chinese +had to exert economic nationalism to clear the way +for the positive initiation of a program of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +In practising economic nationalism, there were two ways +that the Chinese could make the force of their national +union and national spirit felt: first, through the actual +advancement of the programs of the whole of nationalism +and the progress of the political and economic condition +of the country; second, through non-coöperation, <q>... a +negative boycott which weakens the action of imperialism, +protects national standing, and preserves from destruction.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180.</note> +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Political Nationalism for National Autonomy.</head> + +<p> +After the first steps of resistance to economic oppression, +the Chinese nationalists would have to launch a +counter-attack on the political oppression practised upon +China by the Western powers. In his discussion of this, +<pb n='182'/><anchor id='Pg182'/> +Sun Yat-sen described, though briefly, the past, the contemporary, +and the future of that oppression, and referred +to its methods. His theory also contained three answers +to this oppression which need to be examined in a consideration +of his theoretical program of Chinese nationalism: +first, the question of China's nationalist program of +political anti-imperialism; second, the nature of the ultimate +development of nationalism and a national state; +and third, the theory of the class war of the nations. In +view of the fact that this last is a theory in itself, and one +quite significant in the distinction between the doctrines +of Sun Yat-sen and those of Marxism-Leninism, it will be +considered separately. The first two questions of the +program of nationalism are, then: what is to be the negative +action for the advancement of China's national political +strength, in opposing the political power of the West? +and what is to be the positive, internal program of Chinese +nationalism? +</p> + +<p> +As has been stated Sun Yat-sen used the anti-dynastic +sentiment current in the last years of the Manchus as an +instrument by means of which he could foster an anti-monarchical +movement. The great significance of his +nationalism as a nationalism of Chinese <foreign rend='italic'>vis-à-vis</foreign> their +Oriental-barbarian rulers quite overshadowed its importance +as a teaching designed to protect China against its +Western-barbarian exploiters. The triumph of the Republicans +was so startling that, for a time, Sun Yat-sen +seems to have believed that nationalism could develop of +itself, that the Chinese, free from their Manchu overlords, +would develop a strong race-national consciousness +without the necessity of any political or party fostering of +such an element in their ideology. Afire with all the +idealism of the false dawn of the first Republic, Sun Yat-sen +dropped the principle of nationalism from his program, +and converted his fierce conspiratorial league into +<pb n='183'/><anchor id='Pg183'/> +a parliamentary party designed to enter into amicable +competition with the other parties of the new era.<note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, pp. 113-114.</note> This +pleasant possibility did not develop. The work of nationalism +was by no means done. The concept of state-allegiance +had not entered into the Chinese ideology as +yet, and the usurper-President Yüan Shih-k'ai was able to +gather his henchmen about him and plan for a powerful +modern Empire of which he should be forced by apparently +popular acclamation to assume control. +</p> + +<p> +The further necessity for nationalism appeared in several +ways. First, the Chinese had not become nationalistic +enough in their attitude toward the powers. Sun Yat-sen, +with his reluctance to enter into violent disagreement with +the old ideology, was most unwilling that chauvinism +should be allowed in China.<note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited, pp. 21 and following, Book I.</note> He hoped that the Western +powers, seeing a fair bargain, would be willing to invest +in China sufficient capital to advance Chinese industrial +conditions. Instead, he saw Japanese capital pouring into +Peking for illegitimate purposes, and accepted by a prostituted +government of politicians. With the continuation +of the unfavorable financial policy of the powers, and the +continuing remoteness of any really helpful loans, he +began to think that the Chinese had to rely on their own +strength for their salvation.<note place='foot'>Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking +foreign capital for the just and honorable national development of China +through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul Linebarger. +Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure loans +for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never used the +document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr. Rea to the +author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that the former was +<q>Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Manchoukuo,</q> +despite his former Chinese connections.) Judge Linebarger was also +unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more interested in having Judge Linebarger +stop any assistance offered by the Consortium to the Northern <q>Republic +of China</q> than in having him procure any actual funds.</note> Second, he realized that the +<pb n='184'/><anchor id='Pg184'/> +foreigners in China were not generally interested in a +strong, modern Chinese state if that state were to be +developed by Chinese and not by themselves. Sun had +understood from the beginning that the great aim of nationalism +was to readjust the old world-society to nationhood +in the modern world; he had not, perhaps, realized +that the appearance of this nationhood was going to be +opposed by foreigners.<note place='foot'>It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to +Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power +and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world hegemony; +they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think of restoring +the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which they had enjoyed in +the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga Shogun.</note> When he came to power in 1912, +he thought that the immediate end of nationalism—liberation +of China from Manchu overlordship—had been +achieved. He was preoccupied with the domestic problems +of democracy and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. When, however, the foreign +powers refused to let his government at Canton exercise +even the limited authority permitted the Chinese by the +treaties over their own customs service, and did not let +Sun take the surplus funds allowed the Chinese (after +payment of interest due on the money they had lent various +Chinese governments), his appreciation of the active +propagation of nationalism was heightened. He realized +that the Chinese had to fight their own battles, and that, +while they might find individual friends among the Westerners, +they could scarcely hope for a policy of the great +powers which would actually foster the growth of the +new national China.<note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116.</note> Simultaneously, he found his advocacy +of a nationalist program receiving unexpected +support from the Soviet Union. His early contacts with +the Russians, who were the only foreigners actually willing +to intervene in his behalf with shipments of arms and +money, made him interested in the doctrines lying behind +their actions, so inconsistent with those of the other +<pb n='185'/><anchor id='Pg185'/> +Western powers. In the Communist support of his nationalism +as a stage in the struggle against imperialism, +he found his third justification of a return, with full +emphasis, to the program of nationalism. +</p> + +<p> +Hence, at the time that he delivered his sixteen lectures, +which represent the final and most authoritative stage of +his principles, and the one with which the present work is +most concerned, he had returned to an advocacy of nationalism +after a temporary hope that enough work had been +done along that line. In expelling the alien Manchu +rulers of China, he had hoped that the old Chinese nationalism +might revive, as soon as it was free of the police +restrictions had placed on race-national propaganda by +the Empire. He had found that this suspension of a +nationalist campaign was premature because nationalism +had not firmly entrenched itself in the Chinese social +mind. In the first place, state allegiance was weak; +usurpers, dictators and military commandants strode about +the Chinese countryside with personal armies at their heels. +Secondly, the foreign powers, out of respect to whom, +perhaps, a vigorous patriotic campaign had not been carried +out, did not show themselves anxious to assist China—at +least, not as anxious as Sun Yat-sen expected them +to be. Third, the inspiration offered by a power which, +although temporarily submerged, had recently been counted +among the great powers of the world, and which had +rejected the aggressive policy which the rest of the Western +nations, to a greater or less degree, pursued in the Far +East, was sufficient to convince Sun Yat-sen of the justice +of the doctrines of that power. Soviet Russia did not stop +with words; it offered to associate with China as an equal, +and the Soviet representative in Peking was the first diplomat +to be given the title of ambassador to China. +</p> + +<p> +The sharpening of the nationalist policy into a program +of anti-imperialism seems to have been the direct result of +<pb n='186'/><anchor id='Pg186'/> +the Communist teachings, one of the conspicuous contributions +of the Marxians to the programmatic part of the +theories of Sun Yat-sen. As earlier stated, their ideology +influenced his almost not all. Their programs, on the +other hand, were such an inspiration to the Chinese nationalists +that the latter had no hesitation in accepting +them. Hu Han-min, one of the moderate Kuomintang +leaders, who would certainly not go out of his way to give +the Communists credit which they did not deserve, stated +unequivocally that the Chinese did not have the slogan, +<q>Down with Imperialism!</q> in the 1911 revolution, and +gave much credit to the Bolsheviks for their anti-imperialist +lesson to the Chinese.<note place='foot'>Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63.</note> +</p> + +<p> +In describing the political aggression of the Western +states upon the Chinese society, Sun Yat-sen began by +contrasting the nature of the inter-state vassalage which +the peripheral Far Eastern states had once owed to the +Chinese core-society. He stated that the Chinese did not +practise aggression on their neighbors, and that the submission +of the neighboring realms was a submission based +on respect and not on compulsion. <q>If at that time all +small states of Malaysia wanted to pay tribute and adopt +Chinese customs, it was because they admired Chinese +civilization and spontaneously wished to submit themselves; +it was not because China oppressed them through +military force.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this curious +relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang Chu (Chang +Tso), <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Suzerainty</hi>, Johns Hopkins University doctoral dissertation, +1935. The submission to China was, among other things, a means +by which the rulers of the peripheral states could get themselves recognized +by an authority higher than themselves, thus legitimizing their +position.</note> Even the position of the Philippines, +which Sun Yat-sen thought a very profitable and pleasant +one under American rule, was not satisfactory to the Filipinos +of modern times, who, unlike the citizens of the +<pb n='187'/><anchor id='Pg187'/> +vassal states of old China, were dissatisfied with their +subordinate positions.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 153. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had a +high opinion of the American administration of the Philippines, saying: +The United States <q>... even allows the Filipinos to send delegations to +Congress in Washington. Not only does the United States require no +annual tribute in money from them, but, on the contrary, she gives the +Filipinos considerable subsidies to build and maintain their roads and to +promote education. It seems as though so humanitarian a treatment would +be regarded as the utmost benevolence. Still, until the present day, the +Filipinos do not boast of being <q>Americanized</q>; they are daily clamoring +for independence</q> (d'Elia translation, p. 153). This statement is interesting +in two connections. In the first place, although Sun Yat-sen had +once thought of sending men, money, or munitions to help the Filipino +nationalists in their struggles against the Americans, he seems to have +conceived a warm admiration for the American administration in those +islands. Secondly, the reader may consider that Sun Yat-sen, at the time +that he made this comment, was in the course of attacking imperialism. +If Sun Yat-sen could offer so enthusiastic an apology for the Americans +in the Philippines, it shows that he must have let the abstract principle +ride, and judged only on the basis of his own observation. To the orthodox +Communist the American rule of the Philippines is peculiarly wicked +because of the American denial of imperialist practises.</note> +</p> + +<p> +He pointed out that this benevolent Chinese position +was destroyed as the West appeared and annexed these +various states, with the exception of Siam. He then emphasized +that this may have been done in the past with a view +to the division of China between the various great powers.<note place='foot'>Some of the older books on China give interesting maps of that +country divided up into spheres of influence between the various powers. +It was quite fashionable among journalists to sketch the various Chinese +possessions of the great powers; the powers never got around to the partition. +The American declaration of the <q>Open Door</q> may have had +something to do with this, and the British enunciation of the same doctrine +probably carried weight. For a time, however, the Europeans seemed +quite convinced of the almost immediate break-up of China into three +or four big colonies. Lord Charles Beresford, a prominent English peer, +wrote a work which was extremely popular; its title was <hi rend='italic'>The Break-Up +of China</hi> (London, 1899).</note> +</p> + +<p> +This partitioning had been retarded, but the danger was +still present. The Chinese revolution of 1911 may have +shown the powers that there was some nationalism still +left in China.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 93.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='188'/><anchor id='Pg188'/> + +<p> +The military danger was tremendous. <q>Political power +can exterminate a nation in a morning's time. China who +is now suffering through the political oppression of the +powers is in danger of perishing at any moment. She is +not safe from one day to the other.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 165.</note> Japan could conquer +China in ten days. The United States could do it in +one month. England would take two months at the most, +as would France. The reason why the powers did not +settle the Chinese question by taking the country was +because of their mutual distrust; it was not due to any +fear of China. No one country would start forth on such +an adventure, lest it become involved with the others and +start a new world war.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 165-170.</note> +</p> + +<p> +If this were the case, the danger from diplomacy would +be greater even than that of war. A nation could be +extinguished by the stroke of a pen. The Chinese had no +reason to pride themselves on their possible military power, +their diplomacy, or their present independence. Their military +power was practically nil. Their diplomacy amounted +to nothing. It was not the Chinese but the aggressors +themselves that had brought about the long-enduring stalemate +with respect to the Chinese question. The Washington +Conference was an attempt on the part of the foreigners +to apportion their rights and interests in China +without fighting. This made possible the reduction of +armaments.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 170.</note> The present position of China was not one +in which the Chinese could take pride. It was humiliating. +China, because it was not the colony of one great power, +was the sub-colony of all. The Chinese were not even on +a par with the colonial subjects of other countries. +</p> + +<p> +The shameful and dangerous position thus outlined by +Sun could be remedied only by the development of +<pb n='189'/><anchor id='Pg189'/> +nationalism and the carrying-on of the struggle against +imperialism. +</p> + +<p> +Anti-imperialism was the fruit of his contact with the +Bolsheviks. His nationalism had approached their programs +of national liberation, but the precise verbal formulation +had not been adopted until he came in contact with +the Marxian dialecticians of the Third International. His +anti-imperialism differed from theirs in several important +respects. He was opposed to political intervention for +economic purposes; this was imperialism, and unjust. The +economic consequences of political intervention were no +better than the intervention itself. Nevertheless, at no +time did he offer an unqualified rejection of capitalism. +He sought loans for China, and distinguished between +capital which came to China in such a manner as to profit +the Chinese as well as its owners, and that which came +solely to profit the capitalists advancing it, to the economic +disadvantage of the Chinese. In his ideology, Sun Yat-sen +never appears to have accepted the Marxian thesis of the +inevitable fall of capitalism, nor does he seem to have +thought that imperialism was a necessary and final stage +in the history of capitalism. +</p> + +<p> +In short, his program of anti-imperialism and the foreign +policy of Chinese political nationalism, seem to be +quite comparable to the policy held by the Soviets, apart +from those attitudes and activities which their peculiar +ideology imposed. In practical matters, in affairs and +actions which he could observe with his own eyes, Sun +Yat-sen was in accord with the anti-imperialism of Soviet +Russia and of his Communist advisers. In the deeper implications +of anti-imperialism and in the pattern of the +Marxian-Leninist ideology underlying it in the U.S.S.R., +he showed little interest. Ideologically he remained Chinese; +programmatically he was willing to learn from the +Russians. +</p> + +<pb n='190'/><anchor id='Pg190'/> + +<p> +The internal program of his nationalism was one which +seems to have been influenced by the outlook developed +by himself. His vigorous denunciation of Utopian cosmopolitanism +prevents his being considered an internationalist. +He had, on the occasion of the institution of the +first Republic, been in favor of the freedom of nations +even when that freedom might be exercised at the expense +of the Chinese. The Republic might conceivably have +taken the attitude that it had fallen heir to the overlordship +enjoyed by the Manchu Empire, and consequently +refused representation to the Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, +and Mohammedans. It was, however, called the Republic +of Chung Hua (instead of the Republic of Han), and a +five-striped flag, representing its five constituent <q>races,</q> +was adopted. Sun Yat-sen later gave a graphic description +of the world-wide appeal of Woodrow Wilson's principle +of national self-determination. He did not think that the +principle, once enunciated, could be recalled; and stated +that the defeat of the minor and colonial nations at the +Versailles Conference, which drafted a very unjust treaty, +was an instance of the deceitfulness of the great powers. +</p> + +<p> +His nationalism did not go so far as to permit his +endorsing the entrance of the People's Republic of Outer +Mongolia into the Soviet Union. This doctrine of nationalism +as a correlative of democratic national autonomy was +his second principle, that of democracy; his first principle, +that of race-nationalism, had other implications for the +destiny of Mongolia. His positive program of nationalism +was dedicated, in its <q>political</q> exercise, to the throwing-off +of the imperialist bondage and the exercise of the +self-rule of the Chinese people. +</p> + +<p> +It is only if one realizes that these three sub-principles +of nationalism were re-emphases of the three principles +that their position in the theory of the nationalist program +becomes clear. Nationalism was to clear the way for +<pb n='191'/><anchor id='Pg191'/> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> by resisting the Western economic oppression +of the Chinese, and thus allowing the Chinese to enrich +themselves. Nationalism was to strike down the political +oppression of imperialism by eradicating the political holds +of the West upon China, and thus allowing the Chinese +people to rule itself. So long as China was at the mercy +of Western power, any self-government that the Chinese +might attempt would have to be essayed at the sufferance +of the aggressors. Finally, nationalism was to reinforce +itself by the application of race-nationalism to race-kinship; +China was not only to be self-ruling—it was to help +the other nations of Asia restore their autonomy and shield +them with its tutelary benevolence. +</p> + +<p> +When one considers that to Sun Yat-sen democracy and +autonomy are inextricably associated, the full significance +of his stressing nationalism as a means to democracy appears. +The Chinese people could not rule themselves if +they were to be intimidated by the Western powers and +Japan. They could not rule themselves completely if +large portions of them were under alien jurisdiction in the +treaty ports. These forms of political oppression were +wounds in the body of Chinese society. Chinese nationalism, +associated with democracy, required that the whole +Chinese people be associated in one race-nation and that +this race-nation rule itself through the mechanism of a +democratic state. +</p> + +<p> +Here the code of values imposed by Sun Yat-sen's +thinking in terms of the old ideology becomes apparent. +The development of nationalism in China, while it threatened +no one outside and sought only for the justification +of China's interests at home, was an accentuation of the +existence of the race-nation. The race-nation, freeing itself +(political nationalism) and ruling itself (democracy), +was to become more conscious of itself. Sun implicitly +denied the immediate necessity for a general world-authority; +<pb n='192'/><anchor id='Pg192'/> +perhaps he did so because he realized that in +the present world, any supreme authority would be predominantly +Western. The Chinese race-nation, once +politically free, had a definite duty to perform on behalf +of its peripheral states and on behalf of the suppressed +states of the whole world. The first demand, however, +was for the freedom of China; others could not be helped +by China until China herself was free. +</p> + +<p> +The political application of nationalism envisaged (1) +the elimination of existing foreign political control (imperialism) +in China; (2) the strengthening of the country +to such a degree that it would no longer be a hypo-colony +or sub-colony, and would not have to live under the +constant threat of invasion or partition; and (3) the resulting +free exercise of self-rule by the Chinese people, +through a nationalist democracy, so arranged that self-rule +of China did not conflict with the equal right of self-rule +of other peoples but, on the contrary, helped them. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Class War of the Nations.</head> + +<p> +Now come to a consideration of the second part of +the sub-principle of political nationalism. This is the theory +held by Sun concerning the class war of the nations. It +serves to illustrate three points in Sun Yat-sen's thought: +first, that Sun never permitted a Western theory to disturb +the fundamentals of Chinese ideology as he wished to +re-orient it; second, that Sun frequently took Western +political theories which had been developed in connection +with the relations of individuals and applied them to the +relations of nations; and third, that Sun was so much +impressed with the cordiality and friendship proffered him +by the Communists that he sought to coöperate with them +so far as his Chinese ideology permitted him.<note place='foot'>The Communists envision three types of conflict to be produced by +the contradictions of imperialism: intra-national class war, international +class war, and inter-imperialist war. The first is the struggle of the proletariat +of the whole world against the various national bourgeois governments; +the second, the struggle of the oppressed peoples, under revolutionary +bourgeois or proletarian leadership, against the oppressions of +Western imperialism; and the last, the conflict of the various imperialist +powers with one another. Sun Yat-sen's theory agreed definitely with the +second point, the international class war; he seems to have admitted the +probability of class war within the nations of the West, and of inter-imperialist +war, but he did not draw the three types of conflict together +and because of them predicate an Armageddon and a millenium. His +flexible, pragmatic thought never ran to extremes; although he agreed, +more or less distinctly, with the Bolshevik premises of the three conflicts +of the imperialist epoch, he did not follow them to their conclusion.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='193'/><anchor id='Pg193'/> + +<p> +One notes that the question of distributive justice is +not as pressing in China as it is in the modern West. One +also observes that the old Chinese ideology was an ideology +of the totalitarian society, which rejected any higher +allegiance of states or of classes. And one sees that Sun +Yat-sen, in proposing a democracy, suggested an ideology +which would continue the old Chinese thesis of eventual +popular sovereignty as reconciled with administration by +an intellectually disciplined elite. Each of these three +points prevented Sun from endorsing the intra-national +class struggle. +</p> + +<p> +He regarded the class struggle, not—as do the Marxians—as +a feature of every kind of economically unequal +social organization, but as a pathological development to +be found in disordered societies. He considered the +Marxian teachings in this respect to be as different from +really adequate social doctrines as pathology is from physiology +in medical science. The mobility of the old Chinese +society, combined with the drags imposed by family, village, +and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>, had resulted in a social order which by and +large was remarkably just. By presenting the principle of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> as a cardinal point in an ideology to be made +up of old Chinese morality, old Chinese knowledge, and +Western science, he hoped to avoid the evils of capitalism +in the course of ethically sound enrichment, development +and arrangement of China's economy. +</p> + +<pb n='194'/><anchor id='Pg194'/> + +<p> +At the same time Sun was faced with the spectre of +imperialism, and had to recognize that this unjust but +effective alliance of economic exploitation and political +subjection was an irreconcilable enemy to Chinese national +freedom. He saw in Russia an ally, and did not see it +figuratively. Years of disappointment had taught him that +altruism is rare in the international financial relations of +the modern world. After seeking everywhere else, he +found the Russians, as it were, on his door-step offering +him help. This convinced him as no theory could have. +He regarded Russia as a new kind of power, and ascribed +the general hatred for the Soviet to their stand against +capitalism and imperialism: <q>Then all the countries of +the world grew afraid of Russia. This fear of Russia, +which the different countries entertain at present, is more +terrible than the fear they formerly held, because this +policy of peace not only overthrew the Russian imperialism, +but (purposed) to overthrow also imperialism in +the (whole world).</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 75.</note> This fight against imperialism +was a good work in the mind of Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +In considering the principles of Sun more than a decade +after they were pronounced, one cannot permit one's own +knowledge of the events of the last eleven years to make +one demand of Sun Yat-sen a similar background. That +would amount to requiring that he be a prophet. At the +time when he spoke of the excellence of Russia he had no +reason to question the good faith of the Communists who +were helping him. It is conceivable that even the Bolsheviks +who were aiding and advising the Nationalists did +not realize how soon the parting of the ways would +come, how much the two ideologies differed from one +another, how much each of the two parties endangered +the other's position. At the time Sun spoke, the Communists +were his allies in the struggle against imperialism; +<pb n='195'/><anchor id='Pg195'/> +they had agreed from the beginning that China was a +country not suited to communism; and Sun Yat-sen, relying +on them not to use him in some wider policy of theirs, +had no cause to mistrust or fear them. What has happened +since is history. Sun Yat-sen can scarcely be required +to have predicted it. His comments on imperialism, +therefore, must be accepted at face value in a consideration +of the nationalist program in his theories. +</p> + +<p> +The method by means of which Sun reconciled his +denial of the superiority of class to nation is an interesting +one, profoundly significant as a clue to the understanding +of his thought. He estimates the population of the world +at 1500 million. Now, of this total 400 million are members +of the white race, who constitute the most powerful +and prosperous people in the modern world. <q>This white +race regards (its 400,000,000 representatives) as the unit +which must swallow up the other, colored races. Thus the +Red tribes of America have already been exterminated.... +The Yellow Asiatic race is now oppressed by the Whites, +and it is possible that it will be exterminated before +long.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 148-149.</note> Thus, as Sun viewed it, imperialism before the +war was racial as well as economic. The White Peril was +a reality. This emphasis on the doctrine of race shows the +emphasis that Sun put upon race once he had narrowed +down the old world-society to the Chinese race-nation. +The most vigorous <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Rassenpolitiker</foreign>, such as Homer Lea or +Lothrop Stoddard,<note place='foot'>Such works as Lea's <hi rend='italic'>The Valor of Ignorance</hi>, New York, 1909, and +Stoddard's <hi rend='italic'>The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy</hi>, +New York, 1920, make precisely the same sort of statements, although, +of course, they regard the <q>Saxon</q> or <q>Teutonic</q> race as the logical +master-race of the world. Since Lea was associated for some time with +Sun Yat-sen, accompanying him from Europe to Nanking in 1911, and +undoubtedly had plenty of time to talk with him, it may be that some of +the particular terms used by Sun in this discussion are those which he may +have developed in his probable conversations with Lea. Nothing more +definite than this can be stated.</note> would approve heartily of such a +<pb n='196'/><anchor id='Pg196'/> +system of calculation in politics. Sun Yat-sen differed with +them, as he differed with the Marxians, and with the race-theorists +in general, by not following any one Western +absolute to the bitter end, whether it was the class war +or the race struggle. +</p> + +<p> +Russia fitted into this picture of race struggle. One +hundred and fifty million Russians left the camp of the +400 million white oppressors, and came over to the just +side of the 1100 million members of oppressed nations. +Consequently the figures came out somewhat more favorably +for the oppressed, in spite of the fact that the imperialist +powers were still economically and militarily +supreme. Sun Yat-sen quoted an apocryphal remark of +Lenin's: <q>There are in the world two categories of people; +one is composed of 1,250,000,000 men and the other of +250,000,000 men. These 1,250,000,000 men are oppressed +by the 250,000,000 men. The oppressors act against +nature, and in defiance of her. We who oppose <emph>might</emph> +are following her.</q><note place='foot'>Quoted by Sun in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 138. The remark does +not sound like Lenin. A Communist would not invoke nature, nor would +he count the whole membership of an imperialist nation as imperialist. +The world, to him, is misguided by a tiny handful of capitalists and +traditional ideologues and their hangers-on, not by the masses of any +nation.</note> Sun regarded the Russian Revolution +as a shift in the race-struggle, in which Russia had +come over to the side of the oppressed nations. (He did, +of course, refer to Germany as an oppressed nation at +another time, but did not include, so far as we can tell, +the German population in the thesis under consideration.) +</p> + +<p> +On this basis China was to join Russia in the class +struggle of the nations. The struggle was to be between +the oppressed and the oppressors among the nations, and +not between the races, as it might have been had not +Russia come over to the cause of international equality.<note place='foot'>Note, however, the reference in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 76, or +the Price translation, p. 18. Sun Yat-sen speaks of <emph>international wars, +within</emph> races, on the lines of social <emph>classes</emph>. He may have meant international +wars within the races and across race lines on the basis of the +oppressed nations of the world fighting the oppressing nations. He may, +however, have meant intra-national class wars. Since he recognized the +presence of the class conflict in the developed capitalistic states of the +West, this would not necessarily imply his expectation of an intra-national +class war in China.</note> +<pb n='197'/><anchor id='Pg197'/> +After the class struggle of the nations had been done +with, the time for the consideration of cosmopolitanism +would have arrived. +</p> + +<p> +In taking class lines in a scheme of nations, Sun was +reconciling the requirements of the old ideology and the +international struggle against imperialism. It is characteristic +of his deep adherence to what he believed to be the +scheme of realities in political affairs that he did not violate +his own well-knit ideology in adopting the Marxian ideology +for the anti-imperialist struggle, but sought to preserve +the marvellous unity of his own society—a society +which he believed to have been the most nearly perfect +of its time. The race-interpretation of the international +class struggle is at one and the same time an assertion +of the natural and indestructible unity of Chinese society, +and the recognition of the fact that China and Russia, +together with the smaller nations, had a common cause +against the great advances of modern imperialism. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Racial Nationalism and Pan-Asia.</head> + +<p> +The dual orientation of Sun Yat-sen's anti-imperialist +programs has already been made partly evident in the +examination of this belief in a class war of the nations. +A much more nearly complete exposition of this doctrine, +although with the emphasis on its racial rather than on +its economic aspects, is to be found in the third sub-principle +of the nationalist program: the race-national +aspect of the national revolution. Each of the three principles +was to contribute to this implementation of nationalism. +<pb n='198'/><anchor id='Pg198'/> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min shêng</foreign> was to provide the foundation for +economic nationalism. Democracy was to follow and reinforce +political nationalism, which would clear away the +political imperialism and let the Chinese, inculcated with +state-allegiance, really rule themselves. +</p> + +<p> +At the end of his life, even after he had delivered the +sixteen lectures on the three principles, Sun Yat-sen issued +another call for the fulfillment in action of his principle +of nationalism. This, too, praised Russia and stressed the +significance of the defection of Russia from the band of +the white oppressing powers; but it is important as showing +the wider implications of Sun Yat-sen's race-national +doctrines. During the greater part of his life, Sun spoke of +the Chinese race-nation alone. His racial theory led him +into no wider implications, such as the political reality of +race kinship. In this last pronouncement, he recognized +the wide sweep of consequences to which his premises of +race-reality had led him. This call was issued in his celebrated +Pan-Asiatic Speech of November 28, 1924, given +in Kobe, Japan.<note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, pp. 331-337, gives the whole text of the +speech. Sharman, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 304, refers to it.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The content of the speech is narrower than the configuration +of auxiliary doctrines which may be discussed in +connection with it. These are: the race orientation of the +Chinese race-nation; the possibility of Pan-Asia; and the +necessary function of the future Chinese society as the +protector and teacher of Asia, and of the whole world. +These points in his theoretical program were still far in +the future when he spoke of them, and consequently did +not receive much attention. In the light of the developments +of the last several years, and the continued references +to Sun's Pan-Asia which Japanese officials and propagandists +have been making, this part of his program requires +new attention. +</p> + +<pb n='199'/><anchor id='Pg199'/> + +<p> +The speech itself is a re-statement of the race-class war +of the nations. He points out that <q>It is contrary to justice +and humanity that a minority of four hundred million +should oppress a majority of nine hundred million....</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 335. <q>Es ist gegen Gerechtigkeit und +Menschlichkeit, dass eine Minderheit von vierhundert Millionen eine +Mehrheit von neunhundert Millionen unterdrückt....</q></note> +<q>The Europeans hold us Asiatics down through the power +of their material accomplishments.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 333. <q>Die Europäer halten uns Asiaten +durch die Macht ihrer materiellen Errungenschaften zu Boden.</q></note> He then goes on to +stress the necessity of emulating the material development +of the West not in order to copy the West in politics +and imperialism as well, but solely for the purpose of +national defense. He praises Japan, Turkey, and the Soviet +Union as leaders of the oppressed class of nations and +predicts that the time will come when China will resume +the position she once had of a great and benevolent power. +He distinguishes, however, between the position of China +in the past and Great Britain and the United States in the +present. <q>If we look back two thousand five hundred +years, we see that China was the most powerful people of +the world. It then occupied the position which Great +Britain and the United States do today. But while Great +Britain and the United States today are only two of a +series of world powers, China was then the only world +power.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, p. 333. <q>Wenn wir zweitausendfünf-hundert +Jahre zurückdenken, so war China damals das mächtigste Volk +der Welt. Es nahm damals eine Stellung ein wie heute Grossbritannien +und Amerika. Doch während Grossbritannien und die Vereinigten +Staaten heute zur zwei unter einer Reihe von Weltmächten sind, war +China damals die einzige grosse Macht.</q></note> Sun also refers to the significant position of +Turkey and Japan as the two bulwarks of Asia, and +emphasizes the strangely just position of Russia. +</p> + +<p> +In his earlier days Sun Yat-sen had been preoccupied +with Chinese problems, but not so much so as to prevent +<pb n='200'/><anchor id='Pg200'/> +his taking a friendly interest in the nationalist revolutions +of the Koreans against the Japanese, and the Filipinos +against the Americans. This interest seems to have been +a personally political one, rather than a preliminary to a +definition of policy. He said to the Filipinos: <q>Let us +know one another and we shall love each other more.</q><note place='foot'>Ponce, work cited, p. xiv: <q><emph>Conozcámonos y nos amaremos más</emph>—decía +el gran Sun Yat-sen á sus amigos orientales.</q> This work is, by the +way, the most extensive for its account of Sun's associations with Koreans, +Filipinos, and Japanese. It has been completely overlooked by the various +biographers of and commentators on Sun, with the exception of Judge +Linebarger, to whom Sun Yat-sen presented a copy of the work.</note> +The transformation of the ideology in China did not necessarily +lead to the development of outside affiliations. The +Confucian world-society, becoming the Chinese race-nation, +was to be independent. +</p> + +<p> +In the development of his emphasis upon race kinship +on the achievement of race-nationalism, Sun Yat-sen initiated +a program which may not be without great meaning +in the furthering of the nationalist program. He showed +that the Chinese race-nation, having racial affinities with +the other Asiatic nations, was bound to them nationally in +policy in two ways: racially, and—as noted—anti-imperialistically. +This theory would permit the Chinese to be +drawn into a Pan-Asiatic movement as well as into an +anti-imperialist struggle. This theory may now be used +as a justification for either alternative in the event of +China's having to choose aides in Russo-Japanese conflict. +China is bound to Russia by the theory of the class war of +the nations, but could declare that Russia had merely devised +a new form for imperialism. China is bound to +Japan by the common heritage of Asiatic blood and civilization, +but could declare that Japan had gone over to the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa tao</foreign> side of Western imperialism, and prostituted herself +to the status of another Westernized-imperialized +aggressive power. Whatever the interpretations of this +<pb n='201'/><anchor id='Pg201'/> +doctrine may be, it will afford the Chinese a basis for their +foreign policy based on the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +When Sun Yat-sen spoke, Russia and China had not +fought over the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Chinese +Communist problem, nor had Japan and China entered +into the Manchurian conflict. He was therefore in no +position to see that his expressions of approval for Pan-Asianism +and for pro-Soviet foreign policy might conflict. +In one breath he praised Japan as the leader and +inspirer of modern Asia, and lauded Russia as the pioneer +in a new, just policy on the part of the Western powers. +He saw little hope that the example of the Soviet Union +would be followed by any other Western power, although +he did state that there was <q> ... in England and America +a small number of people, who defend these our ideals in +harmony with a general world movement. As far as the +other barbarian nations are concerned, there might be +among them people who are inspired by the same convictions.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 337: <q>In England und Amerika gibt es +immerhin eine kleine Zahl von Menschen, die diese unsere Ideale im +Einklang mit einer allgemeinen Weltbewegung verteidigen. Was die +anderen Barbarennationen anbelangt, so dürfte es auch in ihren Reihen +Menschen geben, die von der gleichen Überzeugung beseelt sind.</q></note> +The possibility of finding allies in the West +did not appear to be a great one to Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +Sun did something in this speech which he had rarely +hitherto done. He generalized about the whole character +of the East, and included in that everything which the +Westerners regarded as Eastern, from Turkey to Japan. +We have seen that the Chinese world of Eastern Asia +had little in common with the middle or near East. In this +speech Sun accepted the Western idea of a related Orient +and speaks of Asiatic ideals of kindliness and justice. This +is most strange. <q>If we Asiatics struggle for the creation +of a pan-Asiatic united front, we must consider ... on +what fundamental constitution we wish to erect this united +<pb n='202'/><anchor id='Pg202'/> +front. We must lay at the foundations whatever has been +the special peculiarity of our Eastern culture; we must +place our emphasis on moral value, on kindliness and +justice.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 335: <q>Wenn wir Asiaten nach der +Herstellung einer panasiatischen Einheitsfront streben, müssen wir selbst +in unserer Zeit daran denken, auf welcher grundlegenden Auffassung wir +diese Einheitsfront errichten wollen. Wir sollen dasjenige zugrunde legen, +was die besondere Eigentümlichkeit unserer östlichen Kultur gewesen ist, +wir sollten unseren Nachdruck legen auf die moralischen Werte, auf Güte +und Gerechtigkeit. Sie sollen das Fundament der Einheit ganz Asiens +werden.</q></note> This Pan-Asian doctrine had been the topic of +frequent discussion by Japanese and Russians. The former +naturally saw it as a great resurgency of Asia under the +glorious leadership of the Japanese Throne. The Russians +found pan-Asianism to be a convenient instrument in the +national and colonial struggle against imperialism for +communism. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen joined neither of these particular pan-Asiatic +outlooks. The foreign policy of the Chinese race-nation +was to fight oppressors, and to join the rest of Asia +in a struggle against white imperialist domination. But—here +is the distinction—how was China to do these things? +Sun Yat-sen never urged the Chinese to accept the leadership +of the Western or Japanese states, however friendly +they might be. China was to follow a policy of friendship +and coöperation with those powers which were friendly +to her and to the cause of justice throughout the world. +Sun praised the old system of Eastern Asia, by which the +peripheral states stood in vassalage to China, a vassalage +which he regarded as mutually voluntary and not imperialistic +in the unpleasant sense of the word. +</p> + +<p> +In the end, he believed Chinese society should resume +the duty which it had held for so many centuries in relation +to its barbarian neighbors. China should be rightly +governed and should set a constant instance of political +propriety. Sun even advocated ultimate intervention by +<pb n='203'/><anchor id='Pg203'/> +the Chinese, a policy of helping the weak and lifting up +the fallen. He concluded his sixth lecture on nationalism +by saying: <q>If we want to <q>govern the country rightly +and pacify the world,</q> we must, first of all, restore our +nationalism together with our national standing, and unify +the world on the basis of the morality and peach which are +proper (to us), in order to achieve an ideal government.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 207. Italics omitted.</note> +</p> + +<p> +We may conclude that his racial sub-principle in a program +of nationalism involved: 1) orientation of Chinese +foreign policy on the basis of blood kinship as well as on +the basis of class war of the nations; 2) advocacy of a +pan-Asiatic movement; and 3) use of China's resurgence +of national power to restore the benevolent hegemony +which the Chinese had exercised over Eastern Asia, and +possibly to extend it over the whole world. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The General Program of Nationalism.</head> + +<p> +It may be worthwhile to attempt a view of the nationalist +program of Sun Yat-sen as a whole. The variety of +materials covered, and the intricate system of cross-reference +employed by Sun, make it difficult to summarize +this part of his doctrines on a simple temporal basis. The +plans for the advancement of the Chinese race-nation do +not succeed each other in an orderly pattern of future +years, one stage following another. They mirror, rather, +the deep conflict of forces in the mind of Sun, and bring +to the surface of his teachings some of the almost irreconcilable +attitudes and projects which he had to put +together. In the ideological part of his doctrines we do +not find such contrasts; his ideology, a readjustment of +the ideology of old China, before the impact of the new +world, to conditions developing after that impact, is fairly +homogeneous and consistent. It does not possess the rigid +and iron-bound consistency required to meet the logic of +<pb n='204'/><anchor id='Pg204'/> +the West; but, in a country not given to the following of +absolutes, it was as stable as it needed to be. His programs +do not display the same high level of consistency. +They were derived from his ideology, but, in being derived +from it, they had to conform with the realities of +the revolutionary situation in words addressed to men in +that situation. As Wittfogel has said, the contradictions +of the actual situation in China were reflected in the +words of Sun Yat-sen; Marxians, however, would suppose +that these contradictions ran through the whole of +the ideology and plans. It may be found that in the old +security transmitted by Sun from the Confucian ideology +to his own, there is little contradiction; in his programs +we shall find much more. +</p> + +<p> +This does not mean, of course, that Sun Yat-sen +planned things which were inherently incompatible with +one another. What he did do was to advocate courses of +action which might possibly have all been carried out at +the same time, but which might much more probably present +themselves as alternatives. His ardor in the cause of +revolution, and his profound sincerity, frequently led him +to over-assess the genuineness of the cordial protestations +of others; he found it possible to praise Japan, Turkey, +and the Soviet Union in the same speech, and to predict +the harmonious combination, not only of the various +Asiatic nationalisms with each other, but of all the nations +of Asia with Western international communism. +The advantage, therefore, of the present treatment, which +seeks to dissever the ideology of Sun Yat-sen from his +plans, may rest in large part upon the fact that the ideology, +based in the almost timeless scheme of things in +China, depended little upon the political situations of the +moment, while his plans, inextricably associated with the +main currents of the contemporary political situation, may +have been invalidated as plans by the great political +changes that occurred after his death. That is not to say, +<pb n='205'/><anchor id='Pg205'/> +however, that his plans are no longer of importance. The +Chinese nationalists may still refer to them for suggestions +as to their general course of action, should they +wish to remain orthodox to the teachings of Sun. The +plans also show how the ideology may be developed with +reference to prevailing conditions. +</p> + +<p> +Clearly, some changes in the plans will have to be +made; some of the changes which have been made are +undoubtedly justified. Now that war between the Soviet +Union and Japan has ceased to be improbable, it is difficult +to think of the coördination of a pan-Asiatic crusade +with a world struggle against imperialism. Chinese nationalists, +no longer on good terms with the Japanese—and +on worse terms with the Communists—must depend +upon themselves and upon their own nation much more +than Sun expected. At the time of his death in 1925 the +Japanese hostility to the Kuomintang, which became so +strikingly evident at Tsinanfu in 1928-9, and the fundamental +incompatibility of the Kuomintang and the Communist +Party of China, had not manifested themselves. +On the other hand, he could not have foreseen that the +imperialist nations, by no means cordial to the Chinese +Nationalists, would become as friendly to the Chinese +nationalism as they have. The United States, for instance, +while not acting positively against the political restrictions +of Western imperialism (including its own) in +China, has been friendly to the Nanking government, +and as far as a rigid policy of neutrality permitted it, took +the side of China against Japan in the Manchurian conflict +in and after 1931. Such developments cannot easily +be reconciled to the letter of the plans of Sun Yat-sen, +and, unless infallibility is expected of him, there is no +reason why they should. +</p> + +<pb n='206'/><anchor id='Pg206'/> + +<p> +His plans possess an interest far more than academic. +It is not the province of this work to judge the degree to +which the Nationalists carried out the doctrines of Sun, +nor to assess the relative positions of such leaders as +Chiang Chieh-shih and Wang Ching-wei with respect to +orthodoxy. The plans may be presented simply as a part +of the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and where there is possibility +of disagreement, of his theory in its final and most +authoritative stage: the sixteen lectures of 1924, and the +other significant writings of the last years of his life. +</p> + +<p> +The first part of his plans for China—those dealing +with the applications of nationalism—may be more easily +digested in outline form: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +1. The Kuomintang was to be the instrument of the revolution. +Re-formed under the influence of the Communist advisers, +it had become a powerful weapon of agitation. It was, as +will be seen in the discussion of the plans for democracy, +to become a governing system as well. Its primary purpose +was to carry out the advancement of nationalism by +the elimination of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tuchuns</foreign> and other anti-national +groups in China, and by an application of the three principles, +one by one, of the nationalist program. +</p> + +<p> +2. The Kuomintang should foster the ideology of nationalism +and arouse the Chinese people to the precarious position of +their country. In order to make nationalism politically +effective, state allegiance had to supplant the old personal +allegiance to the Dragon Throne, or the personal allegiance +to the neo-feudal militarists. +</p> + +<p> +3. Nationalism should be exerted economically, to develop the +country in accord with the ideology of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> and to +clear away imperialist economic oppression which interfered +with both nationalism and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +4. Nationalism had to be exerted politically, for two ends: Chinese +democracy, and Chinese autonomy, which Sun often +spoke of as one. This had to be done by active political +<pb n='207'/><anchor id='Pg207'/> +resistance to aggression and by the advancement of a China +state-ized and democratic. +</p> + +<p> +5. Nationalism had also to be exercised politically, in another +manner: in the class war of the nations. China should +fight the racial and economic oppression of the ruling +white powers, in common with the other oppressed nations +and the one benevolent white nation (Soviet Russia). +</p> + +<p> +6. Nationalism had to reinforce itself through its racial kinships. +China had to help her fellow Asiatic nations, in a +pan-Asia movement, and restore justice to Asia and to the +world. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +This recapitulation serves to show the curious developments +of Sun Yat-sen's nationalist program. Originally +based upon his ideology, then influenced by the race-orientation +of a good deal of his political thought, and +finally reconciled to the programmatic necessities of his +Communist allies, it is surprising not in its diversity but +in its homogeneity under the circumstances. This mixture +of elements, which appears much more distinctly in +Sun's own words than it does in a rephrasing, led some +Western students who dealt with Sun to believe that his +mind was a cauldron filled with a political witch-brew. +If it is remembered that the points discussed were programmatic +points, which changed with the various political +developments encountered by Sun and his followers, +and not the fundamental premises of his thought and +action (which remained surprisingly constant, as far as +one can judge, throughout his life), the inner consistency +of Sun Yat-sen will appear. These plans could not have +endured under any circumstances, since they were set in a +particular time. The ideology may. +</p> + +<p> +In turning from the nationalist to the democratic plans +of Sun Yat-sen, we encounter a distinct change in the +type of material. Orderly and precise instead of chaotic +and near-contradictory, the democratic plans of Sun Yat-sen +<pb n='208'/><anchor id='Pg208'/> +present a detailed scheme of government based +squarely on his democratic ideology, and make no concessions +to the politics of the moment. Here his nationalism +finds its clearest expression. The respective autonomies +of the individual, the clan, the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> and the nation +are accounted for; the nature of the democratic nationalist +state becomes clear. Programmatically, it is the clearest, +and, perhaps, the soundest, part of Sun's work. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='209'/><anchor id='Pg209'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter VI. The Programs of Democracy.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Three Stages of Revolution.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the three stages of revolution +attracted a considerable degree of attention. By the three +stages of the revolution he meant (1) the acquisition of +political power by the teachers of the new ideology (the +revolution), (2) the teaching of the new ideology (tutelage), +and (3) the practice of government by the people +in accord with the new ideology (constitutional democracy). +Enough of Sun Yat-sen's teaching concerning the +new ideology has been shown to make clear that this proposal +is merely a logical extension of his doctrine of the +three classes of men. +</p> + +<p> +Western writers who have acquainted themselves with +the theory seem, in some instances, inclined to identify it +with the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, +into which the proletarian revolution is to be +divided into three stages—the conquest of political power +by the masses; the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the +inauguration (in the remote future) of the non-governmental +class-less society.<note place='foot'>The article by Tsui, cited, p. 177 and following, goes into a quite +detailed comparison of the Chinese Nationalist and the Marxian Communist +theories of the three stages of revolution. He draws attention to +the fact that, while the Communists do not speak of "three stages" +and prefer to emphasize the transitional stage of the dictatorship of the +proletariat, the two theories are similar almost to the point of being +identical.</note> It scarcely seems necessary to +go so far afield to discover the origin of the theory. As a +matter of record, Sun Yat-sen made his earliest recorded +announcement of this theory in 1905, when he was not at +all under the influence of Marxism, although he was acquainted +<pb n='210'/><anchor id='Pg210'/> +with it.<note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, p. 181.</note> Finally, the theory forms so necessary +a link between his theory of Kuomintang control of the +revolution, and his equally insistent demand for ultimate +democracy, that it may be regarded as a logically necessary +part of his complete plan. The coincidence between +his and the Marxian theories would consequently appear +as a tribute to his acumen; this was the view that the +Communists took when they discovered that Sun Yat-sen +was afraid of the weaknesses of immediate democracy in +a country not fit for it. +</p> + +<p> +One might also observe that, once the premise of revolution +for a purpose is accepted, the three stages fit well +into the scheme of age-old traditional political thought +advocated by the Confucians. Confucius did not see the +value of revolution, although he condoned it in specific +instances. He did, however, believe in tutelage and looked +forward to an age when the ideology would have so impregnated +the minds of men that <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta t'ung</foreign> (the Confucian +Utopia) would be reached, and, presumably, government +would become superfluous. That which Sun sought to +achieve by revolution—the placing of political power in +the hands of the ideological reformers (or, in the case of +the Marxist theory, the proletariat, actually the Communist +party, its trustee)—Confucius sought, not by advocating +a general conspiracy of scholars for an oligarchy +of the intellectuals, but the more peaceful method of +urging princes to take the advice of scholars in government, +so that the ideology could be established (by the +introduction of <q>correct names,</q> <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>) and ideological +control introduced. +</p> + +<p> +The three stages of revolution may resemble Communist +doctrine; they may have been influenced by Confucian +teaching; whatever their origin, they play an extremely +important part in the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, and in the +<pb n='211'/><anchor id='Pg211'/> +politics springing from his principles. If the Kuomintang +is the instrument of the revolution, the three stages are its +process. The clearest exposition of this theory of the +three stages is found in <hi rend='italic'>The Fundamentals of National +Reconstruction</hi>, a manifesto which Sun Yat-sen issued in +1924: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +3. The next element of reconstruction is democracy. To enable +the people to be competent in their knowledge of politics, +the government should undertake to train and guide them so +that they may know how to exercise their rights of election, recall, +initiative, and referendum.... +</p> + +<p> +5. The order of reconstruction is divided into three periods, +viz. +</p> + +<lg> +<l>(<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) Period of Military Operations;</l> +<l>(<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) Period of Political Tutelage;</l> +<l>(<hi rend='italic'>c</hi>) Period of Constitutional Government.</l> +</lg> + +<p> +6. During the period of military operations the entire country +should be subject to military rule. To hasten the unification +of the country, the Government to be controlled by the Kuomintang +should employ military force to conquer all opposition in +the country and propagate the principles of the Party so that the +people may be enlightened. +</p> + +<p> +7. The period of political tutelage in a province should begin +and military rule should cease as soon as order within the province +is completely restored.... +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +He then goes on to describe the method by which tutelage +shall be applied, and when it should end. It should +end, Sun declares, in each <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> (district; township) as the +people of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> become self-governing, through learning +and practice in the democratic techniques. As soon as +all the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> within a province are self-governing, the +provincial government shall be released to democratic +control. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +23. When more than one half of the provinces in the country +have reached the constitutional government stage, <hi rend='italic'>i. e.</hi> more +<pb n='212'/><anchor id='Pg212'/> +than one half of the provinces have local self-government full +established in all their districts, there shall be a National Congress +to decide on the adoption and promulgation of the Constitution.... +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>Signed</hi>) <hi rend='smallcaps'>Sun Wen</hi> +</p> + +<p> +12th day, 4th month, 13th year of the Republic +(April 12, 1924).<note place='foot'>Tyau, cited, p. 439 and following. It is also available in Hsü, <hi rend='italic'>Sun +Yat-sen</hi>, cited above, p. <ref target='Pg085'>85</ref> and following. The Tyau translation was preferred +since it was written by an official of the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs, and may be regarded as the work of a Government spokesman. +It is interesting, by way of contrast, to quote a passage from the Constitution +of the Chinese Soviet Republic, so-called: <q>The Chinese Soviet +Government is building up a state of the democratic dictatorship [sic!] +of the workers and peasants. All power shall be vested in the Soviets of +Workers, Peasants, and Red Army men.</q> <hi rend='italic'>Fundamental Laws of the +Chinese Soviet Republic</hi>, New York, 1934, p. 18. The absence of an +acknowledged period of tutelage, in view of the unfamiliarity of the +Chinese people with democratic forms, is significant. The constitutional +jurisprudence of the Chinese Communists is, however, primarily a matter +of academic interest, since the Soviets, where they have existed, have +existed in a state of perpetual emergency, shielded by the Red Terror and +other devices of revolutionary control. The contrast between a pronouncement +of Sun Yat-sen and a constitution is a fair one, since the writings +of Sun Yat-sen form the final authority in the Nationalist movement and +government; in a dispute as to the higher validity of a governmental +provision or a flat contrary statement of Sun Yat-sen, there can be little +question as to which would—or, in the eyes of the Nationalists, should—prevail.</note> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen was emphatic about the necessity of a +period of tutelage. The dismal farce of the first Republic +in 1912, when the inexperience and apathy of the people, +coupled with the venality of the militarists and politicians, +very nearly discredited Chinese democracy, convinced Sun +Yat-sen that effective self-government could be built up +only as the citizens became ready for it. A considerable +number of the disputes concerning the theory of self-government +to be employed by the policy-making groups of +the National (Kuomintang-controlled) Government have +centered on the point of criteria for self-government. +Even with the insertion of a transition stage, and with a +<pb n='213'/><anchor id='Pg213'/> +certain amount of tutelage, difficulties are being encountered +in the application of this theory of the introduction +of constitutional government as soon as the people in a +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> are prepared for it. Other considerations, military +or political, may make any venture beyond the secure confines +of a benevolent Party despotism dangerous; and the +efficacy of tutelage can always be questioned. The period +of tutelage was set for 1930-1935; it is possible, however, +that the three stages cannot be gone through as quickly +as possible, since the Japanese invasions and the world +economic depression exercised a thoroughly disturbing +influence throughout the country. +</p> + +<p> +A final point may be made with regard to the three +stages of the revolution as Sun Yat-sen planned them. +Always impetuous and optimistic in revolutionary endeavor, +Sun Yat-sen expected that the military conquest +would be rapid, the period of tutelage continue a few +years, and constitutional democracy endure for ages, until +in the end <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta t'ung</foreign> should reign upon earth. The transition +period was not, as in the theory of the Confucians and +the Marxians, an indefinite period beginning with the +present and leading on down to the age of the near-perfection +of humanity. It was to Sun Yat-sen, in his more +concrete plans, an interval between the anarchy and +tyranny of the warlord dictatorships and the coming of +Nationalist democracy. It was not a scheme of government +in itself. +</p> + +<p> +To recapitulate: Sun Yat-sen believed that revolution +proceeded or should proceed by three stages—the (military) +revolution proper; the period of tutelage; and the +period of constitutional democracy. His theory resembles +the Communist, although it provides for a dictatorship of +<pb n='214'/><anchor id='Pg214'/> +the patriotic elite (Kuomintang) and not of any one class +such as the proletariat; it also resembles the Confucian +with respect to the concepts of tutelage and eventual harmony. +Military conquest was to yield swiftly to tutelage; +tutelage was to lead, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> by <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, into democracy. +With the establishment of democracy in more than one-half +of the provinces, constitutional government was to +be inaugurated and the expedient of Party dictatorship +dispensed with. +</p> + +<p> +This theory, announced as early as 1905, Sun did not +insist upon when the first Republic was proclaimed in +1912, with the tragic results which the history of that unfortunate +experiment shows. In the experience derived +from that great enthusiasm, Sun appreciated the necessity +of knowledge before action. He was willing to defer the +enjoyment of democracy until the stability of the democratic +idea in the minds of the people was such that they +could be entrusted with the familiar devices of Western +self-government. +</p> + +<p> +What kind of a democratic organization did Sun Yat-sen +propose to develop in China on the basis of his Nationalist +and democratic ideology? Having established +the fundamental ideas of national unity, and the national +self-control, and having allowed for the necessity of an +instrument of revolution—the Kuomintang—and a process +of revolution—the three stages, what mechanisms of +government did Sun advocate to permit the people of +China to govern themselves in accord with the Three +Principles? +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Adjustment of Democracy to China.</head> + +<p> +It is apparent that, even with tutelage, the democratic +techniques of the West could impair the attainment of +democracy in China were they applied in an unmodified +form, and without concession to the ideological and institutional +<pb n='215'/><anchor id='Pg215'/> +backgrounds of the Chinese. The Westerner +need only contemplate the political structure of the +Roman Republic to realize how much this modern democracy +is the peculiar institution of his race, bred in his +bone and running, sacred and ancient, deep within his +mind. The particular methods of democracy, so peculiarly +European, which the modern—that is, Western or +Westernized—world employs, is no less alien to the imperial +anarchy of traditional China than is the Papacy. +Sun Yat-sen, beholding the accomplishments of the West +in practical matters, had few illusions about the excellence +of democratic shibboleths, such as parliamentarism +or liberty, and was profoundly concerned with effecting +the self-rule of the Chinese people without leading them +into the labyrinth of a strange and uncongenial political +system. +</p> + +<p> +In advocating democracy he did not necessarily advocate +the adoption of strange devices from the West. +While believing, as we have seen, in the necessity of the +self-rule of the Chinese race-nation, he by no means desired +to take over the particular parliamentary forms +which the West had developed.<note place='foot'>It is interesting to note that the institution which most Western +writers would incline to regard as the very key-stone of democracy, parliament, +has a quite inferior place in the Sun Yat-sen system. In the +National Government of China, the Legislative Yuan is more like a department +than like a chamber. This question, however, will be discussed +under the heading of the Five Rights.</note> He criticised the weakness +of Western political and social science as contrasted +with the strength of Western technology: <q>It would be +a gross error to believe that just as we imitate the material +sciences of the foreigners, so we ought likewise to +copy their politics. The material civilization of the foreigners +changes from day to day; we attempt to imitate +it, and we find it difficult to keep step with it. But there +is a vast difference between the progress of foreign politics +<pb n='216'/><anchor id='Pg216'/> +and the progress of material civilization; the speed of +(the first) is very slow.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341.</note> And he said later, in speaking +of the democracy of the first Republic: <q>China wanted to +be in line with foreign countries and to practice democracy; +accordingly she set up her representative government. +But China has not learned anything about the good +sides of representative governments in Europe and in +America, and as to the bad sides of these governments, +they have increased tenfold, a hundredfold in China, even +to the point of making swine, filthy and corrupt, out of +government representatives, a thing which has not been +witnessed in other countries since the days of antiquity. +This is truly a peculiar phenomenon of representative +government. Hence, China not only failed to learn well +anything from the democratic governments of other countries, +but she learned evil practices from them.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 342.</note> This +farce-democracy was as bad as no government at all. Sun +Yat-sen had to reject any suggestion that China imitate the +example of some of the South American nations in borrowing +the American Constitution and proclaiming a +<q>United States of China.</q> The problem was not to be +solved so easily. +</p> + +<p> +In approaching Sun Yat-sen's solution the Western +student must again remember two quite important distinctions +between the democracy of Sun Yat-sen and the democracy +of the West. Sun Yat-sen's principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign> +was the self-control of the whole people first, and a +government by the mass of individuals making up the +people secondarily. The Chinese social system was well +enough organized to permit the question of democracy to +be a question of the nation as a whole, rather than a +question of the reconciliation of particular interests within +the nation. Special interests already found their outlet in +<pb n='217'/><anchor id='Pg217'/> +the recognized social patterns—so reminiscent of the institutions +envisaged by the pluralists—of the ancient order. +In the second place, China was already a society which +was highly organized socially, although politically in +ruins; the democratic government that Sun Yat-sen planned +had infinitely less governing to do than did Western +governments. The new Nationalist government had to +fit into rather than supplant the old order. As a consequence +of these distinctions, one may expect to find much +less emphasis on the exact methods of popular control of +the government than one would in a similar Western plan; +and one must anticipate meeting the ancient devices and +offices which the usage of centuries had hallowed and +made true to the Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +One may find that democracy in China is not so radical +a novelty as it might at first thought be esteemed. A +figure of speech, which somewhat anticipates the exposition, +may serve to prepare one for some of the seeming +omissions of Sun Yat-sen's plan for a democracy. The +suggestion is this: that the democracy of Sun Yat-sen is, +roughly, a modernization of the old Imperial system, with +the Emperor (as the head of the academic civil service) +removed, and the majority placed in his stead. Neither +in the old system nor in the new were the minorities the +object of profound concern, for, to the Chinese, the notion +of a minority (as against the greater mass of the tradition-following +people) is an odd one. The rule of the Son of +Heaven (so far as it was government at all) was to be +replaced by the rule of the whole people (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min</foreign>, which is +more similar to the German <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Volk</foreign> than the English +<emph>people</emph>). The first Sun Yat-sen called monarchy; the +second, democracy. +</p> + +<p> +The old ideology was to yield to the new, but even +the new as a review of it has shown, was not broad enough +completely to supplant the old. The essential continuity +<pb n='218'/><anchor id='Pg218'/> +of Chinese civilization was not to be broken. Democracy +as a Western institution could be nothing more than a +sham, as the parliaments at Peking had showed; democracy +in China had to be not only democracy, but Chinese +as well. +</p> + +<p> +It is not, therefore, extraordinarily strange to find the +ancient institutions of the Empire surviving by the side of +the most extreme methods of popular government. The +censorate and the referendum, the examination system and +the recall, all could work together in the democracy +planned by Sun Yat-sen. Even with the idea of popular +rule adopted in the formal Western manner, Sun Yat-sen +proposed to continue the idea of natural and ineradicable +class differences between men. The Chinese democracy +was not to be any mere imitation of the West; it was to be +the fundamentally new fusion of Chinese and Western +methods, and offered as the solution for the political readjustment +of the Chinese society in a world no longer safe +for it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Four Powers.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen divided all men into three categories: +the geniuses, the followers, and the unthinking. To reconcile +this theory of natural inequality with democracy, he +distinguished between <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign>, the right to rule as sovereign, +and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign>, the right to administer as an official. He +furthermore considered the state similar to a machine. +How should the unthinking, who would possess <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign>, +the right to rule, be granted that right without attempting +to usurp <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign>? +</p> + +<p> +This was to be accomplished by two means. The Four +Powers were to be given to the people, in order to assure +their possession of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign>. The Five Rights were to assure +that the government might be protected in its right to +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign>, in its right to have only the most competent officials. +Together the Four Powers and the Five Rights implement +<pb n='219'/><anchor id='Pg219'/> +a scheme of government so novel that Sun Yat-sen himself +believed it to be a definite contribution to political method. +The learned Jesuit translator of the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chin I</hi> does +not even term it democracy, but neo-democracy instead.<note place='foot'>A discussion of the four powers and the five rights is to be found in +Li Chao-wei, <hi rend='italic'>La Souveraineté Nationale d'après la Doctrine Politique de +Sun-Yet-Sin</hi>, Dijon, 1934. This work, a doctoral thesis submitted to the +University of Dijon, treats the Western theory of democracy and Sun's +theory comparatively. It is excellent in portraying the legal outline of the +Chinese governmental structure, and points out many significant analogies +between the two theories.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The Four Powers represent an almost extreme limit of +popular control. Sun Yat-sen divided the four into two +groups: the first two are powers of the people over the +administrators—the power of election and the power of +recall; the second two are powers of the people over the +laws—the power of initiative and the power of referendum. +Having secured the government from undue interference, +Sun Yat-sen had no reluctance in giving these powers to +the people. He said: <q>As for our China, since she had +no old democratic system, she ought to be able to make +very good use of this most recent and excellent +invention.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 391.</note> +</p> + +<p> +These four powers are perhaps the most Western element +in the whole theory of Sun. History does not record +the technique by which the Chinese chose Yao to be their +Emperor, and even where actions comparable to elections +were performed, it was not by use of the ballot-box or +the voting machine, or drilling on an appointed field. +The Chinese way of getting things done never tended that +much to formality. A man who wanted to be a village +head might be quietly chosen head by a cabal of the most +influential persons, or at a meeting of many of the villagers. +He might even decide to be head, and act as +head, in the hope that people would pay attention to him +and think that he was head. The Four Powers represent +<pb n='220'/><anchor id='Pg220'/> +a distinct innovation in Chinese politics for, apart from a +few ridiculous comic-opera performances under the first +Republic, and the spurious plebiscite on the attempted +usurpation of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the voting method has been +a technique unknown in China. It is distinctly Western. +</p> + +<p> +Another distinction may be made with a certain degree +of reservation and hesitancy. It is this: the Chinese, without +the elaborate system of expedient fictions which the +West terms juristic law, were and are unable to conceive +of corporate action. A law passed by the Peking parliament +was not passed by the dictator in parliament, or the +people in parliament; it was simply passed by parliament, +and was parliament's responsibility. The only kind of law +that the people could pass would be one upon which they +themselves had voted. +</p> + +<p> +Seen in this light, the Four Powers assume a further +significance greater than the Western political scientist +might attribute to them. In America there is little difference +between a law which the people of Oregon pass in +the legislature, and one which they pass in a referendum. +To the Chinese there is all the difference in the world. +The one is an act of the government, and not of the +people; the other, the act of the people, and not of the +government. The people may have powers over the +government, but never, by the wildest swing of imagination, +can they discover themselves personified in it. A +Chinese democracy is almost a dyarchy of majority and +officialdom, the one revising and checking the other. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not comment on the frequency with +which he expected these powers to be exercised, nor has +the political development of democratic China gone far +enough to afford any test of experience; it is consequently +impossible to state whether these powers were to be, or +shall be, exercised constantly as a matter of course, or +whether they shall be employed by the people only as +<pb n='221'/><anchor id='Pg221'/> +courses for emergency action, when the government +arouses their displeasure. The latter seems the more +probable, in view of the background of Chinese tradition, +and the strong propensities of the Chinese to avoid getting +involved in anything which does not concern them immediately +and personally. This probability is made the more +plausible by the self-corrective devices in the governmental +system, which may seem to imply that an extensive use of +the popular corrective power was not contemplated by Sun +Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen said: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Now we separate power from capacity and we say <hi rend='italic'>that the +people are the engineers and the government is the machine</hi>. On +the one hand, we want the machinery of the government to be +all-powerful, able to do anything, and on the other hand we +want the engineer, the people, to have great power so as to be +able to control that all-powerful machine. +</p> + +<p> +But what must be the mutual rights of the people and of the +government in order that they might balance? We have just +explained that. On the people's side there should be the four +rights of <emph>election</emph>, <emph>recall</emph>, <emph>initiative</emph>, and <emph>referendum</emph>. On the +government's side there must be five powers.... If the four +governing powers of the people control the five administrative +powers of the government, then we shall have <emph>a perfect political-democratic +machine</emph>....<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 395.</note> +</p> + +</quote> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Five Rights.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen implemented his theory of democracy by +assigning Four Powers to the people and Five Rights to +the government. This latter doctrine is one of the most +disputed points in his proposal. Some writers see in it +nothing more than a crass conjunction of the theory of +Montesquieu and the practices of the Chinese Imperial +system.<note place='foot'><p>The unfavorable view of the Five Powers is taken by Dr. Jermyn +Chi-hung Lynn in his excellent little book, <hi rend='italic'>Political Parties in China</hi>, +Peiping, 1930. Since Dr. Lynn speaks kindly and hopefully of the plans +of Wu Pei-fu, one of the war-lords hostile to Sun Yat-sen and the whole +Nationalist movement, his criticism of Sun Yat-sen need not be taken as +completely impartial. It represents a point that has been made time and +time again by persons antagonistic to the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. +</p> +<p> +<q>The Wu Chuan Hsien Fa is also no discovery of Dr. Sun's. As is +known, the three power constitution, consisting of the legislative, judiciary +[sic!] and executive functions, was originally developed, more or less +unconsciously, by the English, whose constitution was critically examined +by Montesquieu, and its working elaborately described by him for the +benefit of his fellow-countrymen. And the unwritten constitution of Old +China contained the civil service examination and an independent Board +of Censors. Now the much-advertised Wu Chuan Hsien Fa or Five-Power +constitution only added the systems of state examination and public censure +to the traditional form of constitution first advocated by the French +jurist.</q> P. 66, work cited.</p></note> His followers are disposed to regard the doctrine +<pb n='222'/><anchor id='Pg222'/> +of the Five Rights as the product of intrepid imagination, +which succeeded in reconciling the traditional scheme of +Chinese things with the requirements of modern self-government. +</p> + +<p> +Sun made the point that both Chinese and Western +governments had in the past had tripartite governments. +He illustrated this by a diagram:<note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 104.</note> +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Constitution of China</hi> +</p> + +<lg> +<l>The Examining Power (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Kao Shih ch'üan</foreign>)</l> +<l>The Imperial Power (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Chun ch'üan</foreign>)</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>The Legislative Power</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>The Executive Power</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>The Judicial Power</l> +<l>The Power to Impeach (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Tan k'ê ch'üan</foreign>)</l> +</lg> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Foreign Constitutions</hi> +</p> + +<lg> +<l>The Legislative Power combined with the Power to Impeach</l> +<l>The Executive Power combined with the Examining Power</l> +<l>The Judicial Power</l> +</lg> + +</quote> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen believed that in separating the Five Rights +from one another he would make clear certain differentiations +<pb n='223'/><anchor id='Pg223'/> +of function which had led to numberless disputes in +the past, and would present to the world a model +government. +</p> + +<p> +Thus far, the Five Rights seem the complement of the +Four Powers. The two sets of controls, of people over the +government, and of the government over the people, +assure China that a neo-democratic administration will +have no less continuity and power than did its Imperial +predecessor, and nevertheless be subject to the will of +the majority of the four hundred odd million sovereigns. +Contemplated in this manner, the Five Rights are an +amalgamation of the Western theory upon the Chinese, +and significant as a novelty in democratic administrative +theory rather than as institutions altering the fundamental +premises and methods of democracy. +</p> + +<p> +If, however, a further step is taken, and the Five +Powers are associated with Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of the +three naturally unequal classes of men, they assume a +somewhat less superficial significance. If the rule of the +people is placed over the administration by the geniuses, +the geniuses must be assured a method of entering the +government service. The oligarchy of the intellectuals is +to be reconciled with the dictatorship of the majority. +The old Chinese system of a trained class of scholars, +entrance to which was open on a competitive system to +members of almost all classes of society, had to be preserved +in the new China, and at the same time disciplined +and purified of unworthy or unsuitable elements, while +simultaneously subject to the policy-making authority of +the majority. +</p> + +<p> +The preservation of a leader class was to be assured by +an examination division in the new democratic government, +and its purification and discipline continued by a +supervisory or censoring division. The administrative setup +of the nationalist democracy would appear as follows, +<pb n='224'/><anchor id='Pg224'/> +when the present official translations of the Chinese names +for the divisions (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Yuan</foreign>) are adopted: +</p> + +<list type='ordered'> +<item>The division of the executive (Executive Yuan).</item> +<item>The division of the legislative (Legislative Yuan).</item> +<item>The division of the judicial (Judicial Yuan).</item> +<item>The division of censorship, impeachment and accounting +(Control Yuan).</item> +<item>And the division of the examination system (Examination +Yuan).</item> +</list> + +<p> +It is an illustration of the further difference between the +democracy of Sun Yat-sen and Western democracy, that +each of the divisions, even the legislative, was to have +a single head. The whole government was to be departmentally, +not camerally, organized. +</p> + +<p> +The system of Five Powers emphasizes the implied +dyarchy of government and people in the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> +by assigning to the government itself functions which, in +the usual course of events, are supposed to be exercised +by the people themselves in Western democracies. The +people are supposed to eliminate unfit officials and decide +on the merits and trustworthiness of incumbents. By the +expedient of non-reëlection, the people are supposed to +remove officials, who are incapable or unsuitable for +public office. The two functions have been taken over by +the Examination and Control Yuans, respectively; the +Four Powers of the people are not, in all probability, +instruments for continual popular intrigue and meddling +in government, but almost revolutionary implements for +shifting the course or composition of the government. +</p> + +<p> +The Five Rights are instruments for the self-government +of the official class (Examination and Control), and +for the government of the people by the official class +(Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). The Four Powers +are the instruments for the government of the official class +<pb n='225'/><anchor id='Pg225'/> +by the people. Out of the checks and balances of government +and people the integrity, efficacy, and stability of +Sun Yat-sen's democracy was to be assured. +</p> + +<p> +The exercise of the Four Rights of the people could, in +the theory of Sun Yat-sen, be used to check the development +of an arrogant, inefficient or irresponsible bureaucracy, +in that the people would assist in the selection of +officials and would be able to remove incompetents at any +time. The civil service mechanism of the government +would, on the other hand, resist the too free play of +popular caprice. No incompetent person would be elected +to office, since the civil service would extend even to +elective offices. The voters could remove a bad official +but they could not replace him with an untrained person; +they would have to select their candidate from the roster +of scholar-officials eligible for the rank of the office in +question. The people were to supervise the operations of +the age-old Chinese civil service, as revivified by the +nationalists; they were to appoint and remove officers, to +repeal and enact laws; but in no case were they to tear +down the structure of the civil service and inaugurate a +spoils democracy such as that found in the United States. +This blending of extreme democracy and traditional administrative +hierarchy would result, said Sun Yat-sen, in +perfect government. +</p> + +<p> +The democratic nationalist government was to supersede +the Empire. In between there was no central government, +since the various military leaders paid scant respect +to the unfortunate clique of diplomats and officials who +carried on the few functions left to the powerless Peking +government.<note place='foot'>For an intensively vivid description of this government, which Sun +Yat-sen's planned democracy was to relegate to limbo, see B. L. Putnam +Weale, <hi rend='italic'>The Vanished Empire</hi>, London, 1926. Putnam Weale was the +pseudonym of Bertram Lennox Simpson, an Englishman born and reared +in China, who understood and participated in Chinese life and policies as +have few since the days of Marco Polo; he was an advisor to the insurrectionary +Peking <q>Nationalist</q> Government of 1931 when he was shot +to death in his home at Tientsin. Few other Westerners have left such a +wealth of accurate and sympathetic material about modern China.</note> The new government was not, therefore, +<pb n='226'/><anchor id='Pg226'/> +so much a new political order to be set up in place of the +old as a political order to be built up out of military +chaos. The social system, although shaken and affected by +Western ideas, continued much as usual, and was to be +woven into the new socio-political patterns that Sun Yat-sen +projected. +</p> + +<p> +The Nationalist government was to be the nation's +answer to the foreign aggression. The White Peril, which +had flooded Asia, could only be held back by the dykes of +a militant nationalist movement, expressing itself in a +formal state such as the Westerners themselves had developed, +and which fitted them to undertake the conquest +of the world. This government was to be the agent of the +whole Chinese people who, casting off the oppression of +the militarists and the imperialists, was to rise again with +its ancient power, formidable and ready to fight if necessary, +more ready to bring about world-coöperation and +peace if possible. It was to be a government made up of +a trained officialdom such as ancient China had possessed +for centuries, which had led to the integration of control +and culture (in the narrowest sense of the word), and +of a people ruling by checking that officialdom: an all-powerful +state-machine ruled by an all-powerful people.<note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 399.</note> +A state was to appear in the world of states and enclose +the Chinese people, by political power, more effectively +than could the Great Wall. +</p> + +<p> +This aspect of democracy, the self-rule of the Chinese +society <foreign rend='italic'>vis-à-vis</foreign> the linked despotism of militarists, renegades +and imperialists, was, although the most important +facet of democracy, not the whole story. In order to +systematize the loose democracy of old China, in order to +<pb n='227'/><anchor id='Pg227'/> +lead all force to the top, where it could be exerted outwards, +the democratic plan had to plan links with the +traditional system. The government could not be democratic +if it were not tied to the people. The people could +not govern themselves, as apart from governing the officialdom +making up the National government, unless they +had mechanisms with which to do so. Although the family, +the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign> and the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> provided self-government, this self-government +had to be associated with the scheme of +nationalist and national self-government in order to +guarantee the latter's effectiveness. Beyond or beneath the +national democracy of China there was to be a system of +democracy (the politicalization, as it were, of the old +social organs) running through society. What these +separate or subordinate organs were to be, what relations +they were to have with the national government, and what +other intermediate institutions were to facilitate those relations +must be studied to gain a complete picture of the +democracy of Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Confederacy Versus Centralism.</head> + +<p> +One of the most involved questions in the political +thought of the Chinese revolution has been the problem of +provincial autonomy. The Chinese provinces differ considerably +more from one another in economic conditions, +language and race than do the American states; it has +been said that one of the causes of the overthrow of the +Manchu monarchy was the encroachment of the Imperial +central power, in its last desperate attempts to modernize +itself and cope with the last crisis, upon the old autonomy +of the provinces.<note place='foot'>Harold Monk Vinacke, <hi rend='italic'>Modern Constitutional Development in China</hi>, +Princeton, 1920, p. 100.</note> Institutionally, the provinces were +relatively independent; this degree of independence was, +however, minimized by the general unimportance of government +<pb n='228'/><anchor id='Pg228'/> +in Chinese society. The Chinese, toward each +other, feel conscious of family, village and provincial +ties; face to face with the foreigners, they are beginning to +know themselves as Chinese. Until the wave of nationalism +swept the country, provincial rivalry was a live issue; +even today, it cannot be called forgotten. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's opinions on many points of government +remained stable through his life. The fundamental ideas +and ideals seem to have been expanded, rather than +changed, as his theory met the test of his growing experience +and the lessons of the revolution; but even with +expansion, they remain, for the most part, consistent. Sun +Yat-sen was steadfast in his beliefs. +</p> + +<p> +This cannot be said of his and his successors' opinions +on the problem of province versus nation. There is no one +doctrine dealing with the question of provincial autonomy. +There may be a trend, however, which can be described +as a swing from definite emphasis upon the province +toward neglect of that unit of administration. This trend +may be illustrated by several points. +</p> + +<p> +At the time of the first Republic the provinces were +treated much as are states in the United States. The +members of the Senate of the Republic (<hi rend='italic'>Ts'an Yi Yuan</hi>) +were to be elected by the Assemblies of the provinces, +and, when representing persons not under the jurisdiction +of a provincial Assembly, by Electoral Colleges. The +House of Representatives was to be elected directly by +the people, in the proportion of one member to each +eight hundred thousand of population, with the reservation—again +in propitiation of provincial vanity—that no +province should have less than ten representatives.<note place='foot'>Vinacke, cited, p. 141 and following. While Dr. Vinacke's book is +now out of date, it contains excellent material for the period covered, +roughly 1898 to 1919. He quotes Morse's comment on the provinces with +approval: <q>The Provinces are satrapies to the extent that so long as the +tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and the general policy of the +central administration followed, they are free to administer their own +affairs in detail as may seem best to their own provincial authorities.</q> +(Hosea Ballou Morse, <hi rend='italic'>The Trade and Administration of China</hi>, London, +1913, p. 46, quoted in Vinacke, work cited, p. 5.)</note> The +<pb n='229'/><anchor id='Pg229'/> +first Republic was distinctly federal although by no means +confederate. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen did not immediately shift from this position. +As late as 1919-1922, when he was preparing his +official biography, he spoke enthusiastically to his biographer +of the potentialities of democratic provincial home +rule.<note place='foot'>Paul M. W. Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations with Sun Yat-sen</hi>, mss., 1934; +Book two, Chapter Five, <q>Democratic Provincial Home Rule.</q></note> He still believed in the importance of the provinces +as units of a future democracy in China. +</p> + +<p> +From the time that Sun went South, and the Kuomintang +was reorganized, to the present, the tendency in the +Sun-Kuomintang theory seems to have been toward minimization +of the importance of the provinces in the democracy +to be set up. The Party Declaration of the Kuomintang +at its First National Convention in 1924 in Canton +criticised several political viewpoints prevalent; among +these was that of the Confederalists, so called. The +Declaration states, in part: <q>Undoubtedly regional self-government +is in entire accord with the spirit of democracy +and is a great need of our nation. But a true regional self-government +can be realized only when our national independence +is won, for without national freedom, local +freedom is impossible.... Many social, economic and +political problems facing the individual provinces can be +solved only by the nation as a whole. So the success of +the peoples' revolution is a prerequisite to the realization +of provincial autonomy.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü, cited, p. 124.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen himself stated, a few months earlier, a +point of view which may seem inconsistent with the Party +Declaration: +</p> + +<pb n='230'/><anchor id='Pg230'/> + +<quote rend='display'> +18. The <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Hsien</foreign> is the unit of self-government. The province +links up and provides means of co-operation between the Central +Government and the local governments of the districts.<note place='foot'>Tyau, cited, p. 441. From <q>The Outline of National Reconstruction.</q></note> +</quote> + +<p> +Whatever the occasion for the slight difference of opinion, +it has been the policy of the Kuomintang to emphasize +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> rather than provinces as units of self-government. +The Party itself is quite centralized. The Resumé of the +Kuomintang Third National Congress Resolutions Concerning +Political Matters, adopted March 27, 1929, states +unequivocally: <q>The traditional policy of attaching greater +importance to provincial government than to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Hsien</foreign> or +district government must be corrected or even reversed.</q> +It adds, <q>The provincial government, on the other hand, +shall act only as a supervisor of local self-government, +standing in between the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Hsien</foreign> or district government on +the one hand, and the Central Government on the other.</q><note place='foot'>Tyau, cited, p. 450.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The province is thus reduced to the lowest possible level. +It is not probable that this tendency was influenced by +Marxism, but it certainly resembled the Marxian idea of a +vast confederation of self-governing communes, acting, by +some proletarian metempsychosis, as a highly centralized +instrument of revolution.<note place='foot'>V. I. Lenin, <hi rend='italic'>State and Revolution</hi>, New York, 1932. Lenin's discussion +of Marx's point, p. 39 and following, is stimulating although +inclining to the ingenious.</note> The doctrine of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>-province-nation +relationship which places emphasis upon +the first and the last is the authoritative one, and is quite +harmonious with the earlier picture of Imperial China +which, apart from the strictly governmental, was a vast +confederacy of largely autonomous communities. In the +picture of the new democratic national government which +emerges from this doctrine, the central government may be +regarded as a centralism versus the provinces, and a super-government +in relation to the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>; that is, while the +<pb n='231'/><anchor id='Pg231'/> +people govern themselves as groups in the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, they will +govern themselves as one people in the National Government. +The province will remain as a convenient intermediary +between the two. +</p> + +<p> +This is one of the few doctrines of Sun Yat-sen upon +which no one definitive and final pronouncement is to be +found and concerning which, consequently, recourse must +be had to the history of the development of the Sun +Yat-sen political philosophy. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Hsien</foreign> in a Democracy.</head> + +<p> +The <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, or district, was one of the most important +social institutions in old China. The lowest official, the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> Magistrate, represented the Empire to the people +of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, while within the villages or the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> the +people enjoyed a very high degree of autonomy. The +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> was the meeting point of the political system and +the extra-legal government, generally of a very vaguely +organized nature, by which the Chinese managed their +own affairs in accord with tradition. An estimate of the +position of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> may be gleaned from the fact that +China has approximately four hundred eighty million inhabitants; +apart from the cities and towns, there are about +half a million villages; and the whole country, with the +exception of certain Special Municipalities, such as Shanghai, +is divided into nineteen hundred and forty-three +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>.<note place='foot'>The number of the villages is taken from Tawney, Richard Henry, +<hi rend='italic'>Land and Labor in China</hi>, London, 1932; and the number of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> from +Tyau, cited, p. 85.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, however significant they may be in the +social system of China, both past and present, cannot be +described in a work such as this. It is not inappropriate, +however, to reiterate that they form what is perhaps the +most important grouping within China, and that much of +<pb n='232'/><anchor id='Pg232'/> +Chinese life is centred in <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> affairs. It is by reason of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> autonomy that the Chinese social system has been +so elastic as to permit the shocks of invasion, insurrection, +conquest, famine and flood to pass through and +over China without disrupting Chinese social organization. +</p> + +<p> +Sun once quoted the old Chinese proverb about the +Lu Shan (mountains): <q>We cannot find the real shape +of the Lu Shan—for we ourselves are on it.</q> From the +viewpoint of the Western reader this proverb could be +turned against Sun in his treatment of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>. He was +passionately emphatic in discussing the importance of the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> with his foreign friends;<note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited above; throughout this volume, +Judge Linebarger recalls references made by Sun Yat-sen to him concerning +the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>.</note> in his writings, addressed +to his countrymen, he, as they, simply assumed the importance +of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> without troubling to make any +cardinal point of it. +</p> + +<p> +The <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> is in the unit of the most direct self-government +of the people, without the interference of any elaborate +set-up from officialdom. Apart from its age-old +importance, it will gain further significance in the democracy +of Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +<p> +Some of the functions to be assigned to the people in +a <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> are assessment, registration, taxation, and/or purchase +of all lands in the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>; the collection of all +unearned increment on lands within the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>; land profits +to be subjected to collection by the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, and disbursement +for public improvements, charitable work, or other public +service. Add this to the fact that the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> have been +the chief agencies for police, health, charity, religious +activity and the regulative control of custom—sometimes +with the assistance of persons—through the centuries, and +the great importance of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> in the nationalist democracy +becomes more clear. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='233'/><anchor id='Pg233'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Family System.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's democracy differs further from the parliamentary, +mechanical democracy of the West in that it +incorporates the family system.<note place='foot'>It is but fair to state, at the beginning, that this point of the family +system as one of the institutions of the democratic nation has been very +largely neglected by the Kuomintang and the National Government. To +the knowledge of the author, no plan has ever been drafted either by Party +or by Government which would erect the system that Sun Yat-sen proposed. +It is not beyond all conjecture that Sun's suggestion may at a later +date seem more practicable to the leaders than now appears, and be put +into operation in some manner.</note> Of course Sun understood +the extraordinary part that the family plays in China—a +part more conspicuous, perhaps, than in any other +country. He pointed out that the family required in China +much of the loyalty which in the West is given to the +state. <q>Among the Chinese people the family and kinship +ties are very strong. Not infrequently the people sacrifice +their lives and homes for some affair of kinship; for +instance, in Kuangtung, two clans may fight regardless of +life and property. On the other hand, our people hesitate +to sacrifice themselves for a national cause. The spirit of +unity has not extended beyond the family and clan +relationships.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü, cited, p. 164.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Speaking of the early Emperors and the revolution, +he said: <q>You see, gentlemen, the methodology of Yao, +like that of ours, was to begin his moral and political +teachings with the family, then the nation-group, then the +world.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü, cited, p. 243.</note> How did Sun Yat-sen propose to join the strength +of the family spirit and of nationalism, to the common +advantage? +</p> + +<p> +He planned to reorganize the already existing clan +organizations in each district. These organizations have +existed from time immemorial for the purposes of preserving +<pb n='234'/><anchor id='Pg234'/> +clan unity, commemorating clan ancestry, performing +charitable functions, and acting as a focus—although +this last was not an avowed purpose—for clan +defense. The reorganization which Sun proposed would +probably have involved some systematizing of the organization +for the purposes of uniformity and official +record, as well as effectiveness. +</p> + +<p> +Once the district headquarters were reorganized, they +could be combined throughout a province into a provincial +clan organization. Such organizations already exist, +but they are neither systematic nor general. After the +clan was organized on a provincial basis throughout the +provinces, the various provincial organizations could be +gathered together in a national clan organization. +</p> + +<p> +It is only when one contemplates the strength of the +family system in China that the boldness of this plan +becomes apparent. A series of vast national clan organizations +would include practically every Chinese. Not content +with this, Sun proposed inter-clan organizations, certain +clans being more related to one another. A further +series of national inter-clan organizations would draw +together the allegiance of numberless individuals. There +was always the possibility that a convention of all the +clans might be called—although Sun was not sanguine +about this last.<note place='foot'>The material concerning the clans has been taken from the fifth lecture +on Nationalism (Hsü, cited, p. 240 and following; d'Elia, cited, +p. 174 and following). Judge Linebarger recorded Sun Yat-sen's mention +of a convention of the clans in <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, cited above, Book One, +Chapter Eight, <q>The Clans in the Nation.</q></note> +</p> + +<p> +This methodology, according to Sun Yat-sen, would +automatically bring about nationalism. The Chinese +people were already vigorously attached to their families +and clans. A union of all the families and clans would +lead the Chinese to realize that they were one people—one +enormous family, as it were—and cause them to +<pb n='235'/><anchor id='Pg235'/> +join together as a nation. Since there are only about four +hundred surnames in China, the alliance of the clans was +not so far-fetched a suggestion as it might seem. Some +clans have a membership running into the millions, and +clan spirit is so great that, in spite of the absence of +legislation, the Chinese marriage system is still largely +exogamic on this clan basis. +</p> + +<p> +The suggestion of clan organization is relevant to Sun +Yat-sen's democracy, in that the clan was one of the +democratizing influences in old China. An individual who +failed to exert appreciable pressure on the government, or +on some other group, might appeal to his clan for assistance. +The Chinese record of relationships was kept so +extensively that there were few men of wealth or power +who did not have their kinsmen commanding their assistance. +The non-political authority of the family system +controlled many things which have been within the scope +of the police power in the West, and the adjustments of +society and the individual were frequently mitigated in +their harshness by the entrance of the clan upon the scene. +A stable Chinese democracy with a clan system would be +remarkably like the traditional system. The recourse of +political democracy would have been added, but the +familiar methods of political pressure upwards through +the clan to the government might, not inconceivably, prove +the more efficacious. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='236'/><anchor id='Pg236'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="Chapter VII. The Programs of Min Sheng."/> +<head>Chapter VII. The Programs of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign>.</head> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="The Three Programs of Min Sheng."/> +<head>The Three Programs of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign>.</head> + +<p> +The new ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as has been shown, +demanded three fulfilments of the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>: +a nationalistic economic revolution, a deliberate industrial +revolution, and a social revolution. The last was to be accomplished +negatively rather than positively. It was to aim +at the reconstruction of the Chinese economy in such a +manner as to avoid the necessity of class war. Since +Chinese society was to be revolutionized by the development +of a nation and a state, with all that that implied, +and was to be changed by a transition from a handicraft +economy to an industrial one, Sun Yat-sen hoped that +these changes would permit the social revolution to develop +at the same time as the others, and did not plan +for it separately and distinctly. The three revolutions, +all of them economic, were to develop simultaneously, +and all together were to form a third of the process of +readjustment. +</p> + +<p> +In considering the actual plans for carrying out the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> principle, the student encounters difficulties. The +general philosophical position of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> ideology +in relation to the ideologies of nationalism and democracy, +and in connection with such foreign philosophies as capitalism +and Marxism, has already been set forth. The +direct plans that Sun Yat-sen had for the industrial +revolution in China are also clear, since he outlined them, +laboriously although tentatively, in <hi rend='italic'>The International +Development of China</hi>;<note place='foot'>There are three excellent discussions of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> programs. +Wou, cited, gives a clear precis of the doctrine. Hung Jair, <hi rend='italic'>Les idées +économiques de Sun Yat Sen</hi>, Toulouse, 1934, and Tsiang Kuen, <hi rend='italic'>Les +origines économiques et politiques du socialisme de Sun Yat Sen</hi>, Paris, +1933, cover essentially the same ground, although they are both doctoral +dissertations submitted to French universities. The former deals primarily +with the theory of Sun's economic ideas, contrasting them with the economic +thought of Adam Smith and of the Marxians. The latter gives a +rather extensive historical and statistical background to Sun's <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +and traces the Chinese economic system, whence <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> was derived +in part, quite fully. These authors have covered the field so widely that +the present work need not enter into the discussion of the precise immediate +policies to be advocated under <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. Enough will be given to +describe the relations of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> with the more formally political principles +of nationalism and democracy, and to afford the reader an opportunity +to assess its scope and significance for himself. The works of Hung +Jair, Tsiang Kuen, Wou Saofong, and Li Ti-tsun all measure <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +in terms of classical Western <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>laissez-faire</foreign> economics and then in terms of +Marxism; they all proceed in considerable detail to recapitulate the various +concrete plans that Sun projected. The present author will not enter into +the minutiae of the problems of clothing, of transport, of communications, +etc., inasmuch as they have already been dealt with and because they are +not directly relevant to the political or ideological features of Sun's +thought.</note> but whereas the ideology and +<pb n='237'/><anchor id='Pg237'/> +the actual physical blueprints can be understood clearly +enough, the general lines of practical governmental policy +with regard to economic matters have not been formulated +in such a way as to make them indisputable. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen was averse to tying the hands of his +followers and successors with respect to economic policy. +He said: <q>While there are many undertakings which can +be conducted by the State with advantage, others cannot +be conducted effectively except under competition. I have +no hard-and-fast dogma. Much must be left to the lessons +of experience.</q><note place='foot'>Tsui, cited, p. 378, n. 125.</note> +</p> + +<p> +It would be inexpedient to go into details about railway +lines and other modern industrial enterprises by means of +which Sun sought to modernize China. On the other hand, +it would be a waste of time merely to repeat the main +economic theses of the new ideology. Accordingly, the +examination of the program of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> will be restricted +to the consideration of those features that affected +<pb n='238'/><anchor id='Pg238'/> +the state, either directly or indirectly, or which had an +important bearing upon the proposed future social organization +of the Chinese. Among the topics to be discussed +are the political nature of the national economic revolution, +the political effect of the industrial revolution upon the +Chinese, and the expediency of Sun's plans for that +revolution; the nature of the social revolution which was +to accompany these two first, especially with reference +to the problem of land, the problem of capital, and the +problem of the class struggle; the sphere of state action +in the new economy; and the nature of that ideal economy +which would be realized when the Chinese should have +carried to completion the programs of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. Railway +maps and other designs of Sun, which have proved +such an inspiration in the modernization of China and +which represent a pioneer attempt in state planning, will +have to be left to the consideration of the economists and +the geographers.<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>The International Development of China</hi> was welcomed as an interesting +fantasy in a world which had not yet heard of the Five Year Plans +and the programs of the New Deal. The fact that Sun Yat-sen was a few +years ahead of his contemporaries gave him the air of a dreamer, which +was scarcely deserved.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The program of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> was vitally important to the +realization of the Nationalist revolution as a whole, so +important, indeed, that Sun Yat-sen put it first in one of +his plans: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +The first step in reconstruction is to promote the economic +well-being of the people by providing for their four necessities +of life, namely, food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. For +this purpose, the Government will, with the people's co-operation, +develop agriculture to give the people an adequate food +supply, promote textile industries to solve their clothing problem, +institute gigantic housing schemes to provide for them +decent living quarters, and build roads and canals so that they +may have convenient means of travel. +</p> + +<pb n='239'/><anchor id='Pg239'/> + +<p> +Next is the promotion of democracy.... +</p> + +<p> +The third step is the development of nationalism....<note place='foot'>Hsü translation, <q>The Outline of National Reconstruction,</q> p. 85. +Two points of detail may be noted here. In the first place, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> has +been emphasized by being placed first, although Sun Yat-sen generally +arranged his principles in their logical order: nationalism, democracy, +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. Secondly, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, although emphasized, is dealt with in +one single paragraph in this vitally important document. The question of +the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign> is given eight paragraphs to the one on <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. This is +indicative of the point stressed above, namely, that Sun Yat-sen, while he +was sure of the importance of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, did not believe in hard and fast +rules concerning its development.</note> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +The plans for realizing <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> were to be the most +necessary and the most difficult. In the change from a +world-society to a race-nation, the Chinese had their own +social solidarity and the experience of the Western nations +to guide them. There was little in the development of a +nation that had not already been tried elsewhere. The +only real obstacles were the ignorance of the people, in +relation to the new social environment in which their +whole society was involved, and the possibility of opposition +from the politically oppressing powers. +</p> + +<p> +In the development of democracy the Chinese could +rely in part upon the experience of the West. The +Kuomintang could observe the machinery of democratic +states in regular operation abroad. Although the new +democracy of the five powers and the four rights was +differed from the democratic methods of the West, still, +as in mechanics, certain fundamental rules of political +organization in its technical details could be relied upon. +The Chinese people had a democratic background in the +autonomy of the various extra-political units. +</p> + +<p> +In <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> neither the experience of the West nor +the old Chinese background would be of much value. +More than the other two principles and programs, <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> sought to alter the constitution and nature of Chinese +society. Yet in <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> the Chinese were to be +<pb n='240'/><anchor id='Pg240'/> +guided only negatively by Western experience. Into their +society, passing through a great economic upheaval, they +must introduce, by a trial-and-error method, the requirements +for economic unity, efficiency, and justice. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The National Economic Revolution.</head> + +<p> +After the pitiable failure of the 1912 Republic, Sun +Yat-sen began to place an especially heavy emphasis on +the necessity of a national economic revolution which +would carry on the achievements of the national political +revolution. He placed an even greater stress upon the +necessity of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> in the revolutionary ideology, +and became more and more clearly conscious of the danger +imperialism constituted to the Chinese race-nation. He believed +that, as the 1912 revolution had been created by +the sword, the new economic revolution might be furthered +by the pen, and with this in mind he wrote <hi rend='italic'>The +International Development of China</hi>. At the time that he +wrote this work, he seems to have been convinced of the +fruitlessness of purely military effort, and the superior +value of pacific economic organization.<note place='foot'>Work cited, p. <ref target='Pg232'>232</ref>.</note> +</p> + +<p> +This organization was to be effected through capital +brought in from the outside. As it developed that capital +would not come in, that instead of continuing the terrific +pace of production which the World War had demanded, +the nations returned to comparative laissez faire, and let +their economies slump, Sun was persuaded that the whole +revolution would have to be carried on by the Chinese +themselves, with the possible help of the Communist +Russians, and of Japan. He found the reorganized +Kuomintang to be the instrument of this last revolution, +both politically and democratically, and began to emphasize +Chinese resistance to the outside, rather than appeal +for help from the barbarian nations. +</p> + +<pb n='241'/><anchor id='Pg241'/> + +<p> +It is this last attitude which one finds expressed in the +acts of the last years of his life. The national revolution +was to be made a reality by being intimately associated +with the economic life and development of the country. +The plans made for economic development should be +pushed as far as possible without waiting for foreign +help. The Chinese should use the instrument of the boycott +as a sanction with which to give weight to their +national policy.<note place='foot'>See above, p. <ref target='Pg180'>180</ref> ff.</note> They had to practise economic nationalism +in order to rid themselves of the incubus of imperialism +which was sucking the life-blood of their country. In this +connection between nationalism and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, the economic +aspect of the nationalist program was to be the +means, and the national aspect of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> program +the consequence. Unless Chinese, both as members of a +state and as individuals stirred by national sentiment, were +moved to action against Western economic aggression, +they might consider themselves already doomed. +</p> + +<p> +How did Sun propose to promote the national economic +revolution,<note place='foot'>The author uses the term <q>national economic revolution</q> to distinguish +those parts of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ming shêng chu i</foreign> which treat the transformation +of the Chinese economy in relation to the development of a nation-state. +Obviously, there is a great difference between the economy of a +society regarding itself as ecumenical, and one faced with the problem of +dealing with other equal societies. The presence of a state implies a certain +minimum of state interference with economic matters; the national +economic revolution of Sun Yat-sen was to give the Chinese economy a +national character, coordinating the economic with the other programs of +nationalism. Hence, the significant stress in the phrase <q>national economic +revolution</q> should rest upon the word <q>national.</q></note> as distinguished from the industrial revolution +and the social revolution? He gave, in the first place, +as earlier stated, the economic part of his theories a greater +weight than they had hitherto enjoyed, and placed them +first in his practical program. Secondly, he tended to +associate the national political revolution more and more +with the real seat of economic power: the working class. +<pb n='242'/><anchor id='Pg242'/> +In this introduction of the working class into the labors +for the fulfilment of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> as a national economic +revolution, he was doing two things. He was hoping to +bring the standards of Chinese labor up to those of the +West, and he was making use of the political power of +labor in China as an added instrument of the national +economic revolution. +</p> + +<p> +The Chinese nation could and should not continue, as +a nation, on a scale of living lower than that of the +Western nations. He urged the Chinese workers, as the +class most affected, to fight for the economic advancement +of themselves and of their nation. <q>Comrades, +the people meeting here are all workers and represent a +part of the nation. A great responsibility rests on Chinese +labor, and if you are equal to the task, China will become +a great nation and you a mighty working class.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, cited, p. 329. <q>Genossen, die hier Versammelten +sind alle Arbeiter und stellen eine Teil der Nation dar. Auf den +chinesischen Arbeitern lastet eine grosse Verantwortung und wenn ihr +dieser Aufgabe entsprechen werdet, so wird China eine grosse Nation und +ihr eine mächtige Arbeiterklasse.</q></note> The +Chinese workers were performing not only a duty that +they owed to themselves—they were also acting patriotically. +</p> + +<p> +In advancing the national economic revolution by advancing +themselves, they could not afford to lose sight +of the political part of the revolution. <q>Beyond the economic +struggle for the shortening of the working day and +the increase of wages, there are before you other much +more important questions of a political character. For +our political objectives you must follow the three principles +and support the revolution.</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 329. <q>Ausser dem wirtschaftlichen Kampf +für die Kürzung des Arbeitstages und die Erhöhung der Löhne stehen vor +Euch noch viel wichtigere Fragen von politischem Charakter. Für die politischen +Ziele müsst ihr meine Drei Prinzipien befolgen und die Revolution +unterstützen.</q></note> The two parts of the +revolution could not be separated from one another. +</p> + +<pb n='243'/><anchor id='Pg243'/> + +<p> +Besides the economic part of the national revolution, +there was another readjustment of which Sun did not often +speak, because it was not an open problem which could +be served by immediate political action. This was the +problem of the transition of China from an autarchic to a +trading economy. The old Chinese world had been self-sustaining, +so self-sustaining that the Emperor Tao Kuang +wrote to George III of England that he did not desire +anything that the barbarians might have, but, out of the +mercy and the bounty of his heart, would permit them to +come to China in order to purchase the excellent things +that the Chinese possessed in such abundance.<note place='foot'>Putnam Weale, <hi rend='italic'>The Vanished Empire</hi>, London, 1926, pp. 145-147. +The same observation had been made to the Russian ambassador, Vladislavich, +sent by Catherine I to Peking in 1727. The Chinese said at that +time, <q> ... that foreign trade had no attraction for the people, who +were amply supplied with all the necessaries of life from the products of +their own country.</q> Sir Robert K. Douglas, <hi rend='italic'>Europe and the Far East +1506-1912</hi>, New York, 1913, pp. 28-29.</note> The +impact of the West had had serious economic consequences,<note place='foot'>See above, p. <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref> ff.</note> +and the Chinese were in the unpleasant position +of having their old economic system disrupted without +gaining the advantages of a nationally organized economy +in return. They had the actual privilege of consuming a +greater variety of goods than before, but this was offset +by the fact that the presence of these goods threw their +domestic markets and old native commercial system out +of balance, without offering a correspondingly large potentiality +of foreign export. Furthermore, the political +position of the Western powers in China was such, as Sun +Yat-sen complained, that trade was conducted on a somewhat +inequitable basis. +</p> + +<p> +The consequences of a national economic revolution +could not but be far-reaching. The political changes in the +economic situation demanded by Sun Yat-sen in his program +of economic nationalism—the return of tariff autonomy, +<pb n='244'/><anchor id='Pg244'/> +the retrocession of the occupied concessions, +etc.—would have a great positive and immediate effect; +but there would be a long system of development, not to +be so easily predicted or foreseen, which would inevitably +appear as a result of Chinese nationhood. If China were +to have a state strong enough to perform the economic +functions which Sun wished to have imposed upon it, and +were to take her place as one of the great importing and +exporting nations of the world, it is obvious that a real +economic revolution would have to be gone through. +</p> + +<p> +Here again the liberal-national character of Sun's ideology +and programs with respect to relations with the +West appears. The Fascist states of the present time +exhibit a definite drift from free trade to autarchy. In +China the change from an autarchic world-society to a +trading nation constituted the reverse. Sun Yat-sen did +not leave a large legacy of programs in this connection, +but he foresaw the development and was much concerned +about it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Industrial Revolution.</head> + +<p> +The program of industrial revolution was planned by +Sun Yat-sen with great care. The same belief which led +him to urge the social revolution also guided him in his +plans for the industrial revolutionizing of the Chinese +economy, namely, his belief that China could profit by the +example of the West, that what the West had done wastefully +and circuitously could be done by the Chinese deliberately +and straightforwardly. He proposed that the +change from the old economy to the new be according to a +well thought out plan. <q>However, China must develop +her industries by all means. Shall we follow the old path +of western civilization? This old path resembles the sea +route of Columbus' first trip to America. He set out from +Europe by a southwesterly direction through the Canary +Islands to San Salvador, in the Bahama group. But nowadays +<pb n='245'/><anchor id='Pg245'/> +navigators take a different direction to America and +find that the destination can be reached by a distance +many times shorter. The path of Western civilization was +an unknown one and those who went before groped in +the dark as Columbus did on his first voyage to America. +As a late comer, China can greatly profit in covering the +space by following the direction already charted by western +pioneers.</q><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, cited, p. 237.</note> By calling in the help of friends who were +familiar with engineering and by using his own very extensive +knowledge of Chinese economic potentialities, Sun +Yat-sen drafted a broad long-range plan by means of +which China would be able to set forth on such a charted +course in her industrial revolution. This plan, offered +tentatively, was called <hi rend='italic'>The International Development of +China</hi> in the English and <hi rend='italic'>The Outline of Material Reconstruction</hi> +in the Chinese version, both of which Sun +himself wrote. +</p> + +<p> +This outline was originally prepared as a vast plan +which could be financed by the great powers, who would +thereby find markets for their glut of goods left over by +the war. The loan was to be made on terms not unprofitable +to the financial powers, but nevertheless equitable +to the Chinese. Sun Yat-sen hoped that with these +funds the Chinese state could make a venture into state +socialism. It was possible, in his opinion, to launch a +coöperative modern economy in China with the assistance +of international capitalism, if the capital employed were +to be remunerated with attractive rates of interest, and if +the plan were so designed as to allow for its being financially +worthwhile. He stated: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Before entering into the details of this International development +scheme four principles have to be considered: +</p> + +<list type='ordered'> +<item> The most remunerative field must be selected in order to +attract foreign capital.</item> +<pb n='246'/><anchor id='Pg246'/> +<item>The most urgent needs of the nation must be met.</item> +<item>The lines of least resistance must be followed.</item> +<item>The most suitable positions must be chosen.<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, p. 12.</note></item> +</list> + +</quote> + +<p> +He was not oblivious to the necessity of making each +detail of his plan one which would not involve the +tying-up of unproductive capital, and did not propose to +use capital advanced for the purposes of the industrial +revolution for the sake of military or political advantage. +</p> + +<p> +This may be shown in a concrete instance. He spoke of +his Great Northeastern railway system as a scheme which +might not seem economically attractive, and then pointed +out that, as between a railway system running between +densely-populated areas, the latter would be infinitely the +more preferable. But, said he, <q>... a railway between a +densely populated country and a sparsely settled country +will pay far better than one that runs end to end in a +densely populated land.</q><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, p. 21.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Even though he came to despair of having this scheme +for the development of China carried out by international +financial action, the expediency of his plans remained. He +sought the fulfillment of this outline throughout his life; +it has remained as a part of his legacy, challenging the +Chinese people by the grandeur of its conception and the +precision of its details. +</p> + +<p> +It is a work which cannot easily be summarized in a discussion +of political doctrines. Fully comparable in grandeur +to the Russian <hi rend='italic'>Piatiletka</hi>, it provides for a complete +communication system including all types of transport, +the development of great ports, colonization and reclamation +projects, and the growth of vast industrial areas comparable +to the Donbas or the Kuzbas. The plan, while +sound as a whole and not inexpedient in detail, is not +marked by that irregularity of proportion which marks +<pb n='247'/><anchor id='Pg247'/> +planning under capitalism; although not as fully worked +out as the later Russian projects, Sun's plan, in 1922, was +considerably more advanced than any Russian plan of that +time. Sun shared with Lenin a passionate conviction of +the inevitable necessity of industrialization; but while +Lenin saw in industrialism the strengthening of that revolutionary +bulwark, the proletariat, Sun believed in industrialism +as a benefit to the whole nation. +</p> + +<p> +This plan is the obvious fruit of Sun's advocacy of the +adoption of the Western physical sciences. Here there is +little trace of his ideological consistency with the old +premises of Chinese society. He does not challenge them, +but he does present a concrete plan which refers only +incidentally to the political or the ideological. It is heavy +with the details of industrial revolution. Sun Yat-sen's +enthusiasm shows clearly through the pages of this work; +he wrote it at a time when his health was still comparatively +good, and when he was not harassed by the almost +explosive dynamics of the situation such as that in which +he delivered the sixteen lectures on the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. +Here the practical aspects of his thinking show forth, +his willingness to consider and debate, the profound and +quiet enthusiasm for concrete projects which animated him +and which was so infectious among his followers. +</p> + +<p> +It were, of course, unfeasable to attempt any detailed +description and assessment of the plan.<note place='foot'>Wou Saofong, cited, gives an excellent summary of the plan, pp. 184-202. +There is no particular reason, however, why the work by Sun, which +he wrote in fluent and simple English, should not be consulted. The +American edition is so well put together with maps and outlines that a +layman will find it comprehensible and stimulating.</note> The great +amount of point by point elaboration worked over by Sun +Yat-sen in order to make his plan appealing precludes +the consideration of any one project in detail as a sample. +Failing this, the magnitude of the plan may be gauged by +a recapitulation of the chief points in each of his programs. +<pb n='248'/><anchor id='Pg248'/> +It must be remembered, however, that each one of these +subheads might necessitate hundreds of millions of dollars +for execution, involving the building of several industrial +cities or the reconstruction of a whole industry throughout +the country. The printing industry, for example, not +even mentioned in the general outline given below, was +discussed as follows: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +This industry provides man with intellectual food. It is a +necessity of modern society, without which mankind cannot progress. +All human activities are recorded, and all human knowledge +is stored in printing. It is a great factor of civilization. +The progress and civilization of different nations of the world +are measured largely by the quantity of printed matter they +turned out annually. China, though the nation that invented +printing, is very backward in the development of its printing +industry. In our international Development Scheme, the printing +industry must also be given a place. If China is developed +industrially according to the lines which I suggested, the demand +for printed matter will be exceedingly great. In order to meet +this demand efficiently, a system of large printing houses must +be established in all large cities in the country, to undertake +printing of all kinds, from newspapers to encyclopedia [sic!]. +The best modern books on various subjects in different countries +should be translated into Chinese and published in cheap edition +form for the general public in China. All the publishing houses +should be organized under one common management, so as to +secure the best economic results. +</p> + +<p> +In order to make printed matter cheap, other subsidiary industries +must be developed at the same time. The most important +of these is the paper industry. At present all the paper used by +newspapers in China is imported. And the demand for paper +is increasing every day. China has plenty of raw materials for +making paper, such as the vast virgin forests of the northwestern +part of the country, and the wild reeds of the Yangtze and its +neighboring swamps which would furnish the best pulps. So, +large plants for manufacturing paper should be put up in suitable +locations. Besides the paper factories, ink factories, type +<pb n='249'/><anchor id='Pg249'/> +foundries, printing machine factories, etc., should be established +under a central management to produce everything that is needed +in the printing industry.<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, pp. 220-221.</note> +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +With this comment on printing as a small sample of +the extent of each minor project in the plans, let us +observe Sun's own summary: +</p> + +<list type='gloss'> +<label>I.</label><item>The Development of a Communications System. +<list type='gloss'> +<label>(a)</label><item>100,000 miles of Railways.</item> +<label>(b)</label><item>1,000,000 miles of Macadam Roads.</item> +<label>(c)</label><item>Improvement of Existing Canals. +<list type='gloss'> +<label>(1)</label><item>Hangchow-Tientsin Canals.</item> +<label>(2)</label><item>Sikiang-Yangtze Canals.</item></list></item> +<label>(d)</label><item>Construction of New Canals. +<list type='gloss'> +<label>(1)</label><item>Liaoho-Sunghwakiang Canal.</item> +<label>(2)</label><item>Others to be projected.</item></list></item> +<label>(e)</label><item>River Conservancy. +<list type='gloss'> +<label>(1)</label><item>To regulate the Embankments and Channel +of the Yangtze River from Hankow +to the Sea thus facilitating Ocean-going +ships to reach that Port at all seasons.</item> +<label>(2)</label><item>To regulate the Hoangho Embankments +and Channel to prevent floods.</item> +<label>(3)</label><item>To regulate the Sikiang.</item> +<label>(4)</label><item>To regulate the Hwaiho.</item> +<label>(5)</label><item>To regulate various other rivers.</item></list></item> +<label>(f)</label><item>The Construction of more Telegraph Lines and +Telephones and Wireless Systems all over the +Country.</item></list></item> +<label>II.</label><item>The Development of Commercial Harbors. +<list type='gloss'> +<label>(a)</label><item>Three largest Ocean Ports with future capacity +equalling New York Harbor to be constructed +in North, Central and South China.</item> +<pb n='250'/><anchor id='Pg250'/> +<label>(b)</label><item>Various small Commercial and Fishing Harbors to +be constructed along the Coast.</item> +<label>(c)</label><item>Commercial Docks to be constructed along all navigable +rivers.</item></list></item> +<label>III.</label><item>Modern Cities with public utilities to be constructed in all +Railway Centers, Termini, and alongside Harbors.</item> +<label>IV.</label><item>Water Power Development.</item> +<label>V.</label><item>Iron and Steel Works and Cement Works on the largest +scale in order to supply the above needs.</item> +<label>VI.</label><item>Mineral Development.</item> +<label>VII.</label><item>Agricultural Development.</item> +<label>VIII.</label><item>Irrigational Work on the largest scale in Mongolia and +Sinkiang.</item> +<label>IX.</label><item>Reforestation in Central and North China.</item> +<label>X.</label><item>Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, +and Thibet.<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, pp. 6-8.</note></item> +</list> + +<p> +The industrial revolution is to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> what the +present program of socialist construction is to the +Marxians of the Soviet Union, what prosperity is to American +democracy. Without industrialization <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> must +remain an academic theory. Sun's program gives a definite +physical gauge by means of which the success of his +followers can be told, and the extent of China's progress +estimated. It provides a material foundation to the social +and political changes in China. +</p> + +<p> +The theory of Sun Yat-sen in connection with the continuation +of the old system is a significant one. His political +doctrines, both ideological and programmatic, are +original and not without great meaning in the development +of an adequate and just state system in modern +China. But this work might have been done, although +perhaps not as well, by other leaders. The significance of +Sun in his own lifetime lay in his deliberate championing +<pb n='251'/><anchor id='Pg251'/> +of the cause of industrial revolution as the <foreign rend='italic'>sine qua non</foreign> +of development in China. In the epoch of the first Republic +he relinquished the Presidency in favor of Yüan +Shih-k'ai in order to be able to devote his whole time to +the advancement of the railway program of the Republic. +In the years that he had to spend in exile, he constantly +studied and preached the necessity of modernizing China. +Of his slogan, <q>Modernization without Westernization!</q> +modernization is the industrial revolution, and non-Westernization +the rest of his programs and ideology. +The unity of Sun Yat-sen's doctrines is apparent; they are +inseparable; but if one part were to be plucked forth as +his greatest contribution to the working politics of his own +time, it might conceivably be his activities and plans for +the industrial revolution. +</p> + +<p> +He spoke feelingly and bitterly of the miserable lives +which the vast majority of his countrymen had to lead, of +the expensiveness and insecurity of their material existences, +of the vast, tragic waste of human effort in the +form of man-power in a world where machine-power had +rendered muscular work unnecessary. <q>This miserable +condition among the Chinese proletariat [he apparently +means the whole working class] is due to the non-development +of the country, the crude methods of production, +and the wastefulness of labor. The radical cure for all +this is industrial development by foreign capital and +experts for the benefit of the whole nation.... If +foreign capital cannot be gotten, we will have to get at +least their experts and inventors to make for us our own +machinery....</q><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, p. 198.</note> Howsoever the work was to be done, +it had to be done. In bringing China into the modern +world, in modernizing her economy, in assuring the justice +of the new economy which was to emerge, Sun found the +key in the physical advancement of China, in the building +<pb n='252'/><anchor id='Pg252'/> +of vast railway systems, in creating ports <q>with future +capacity equalling New York harbor,</q> in re-making the +whole face of Eastern Asia as a better home for his beloved +race-nation. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>The Social Revolution.</head> + +<p> +In considering the social revolution which was to form +the third part of the program of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, four questions +appear, each requiring examination. It is in this field of +Sun's programs that the terms of the Western ideology +are most relevant, since the ideological distinctions to be +found in old China as contrasted with the West do not +apply so positively in problems that are to appear in a +society which is to be industrially modern. Even in this, +however, some of the old Chinese ideas may continue in +use and give relevance to the terms with which Sun discusses +the social revolution. Private property, that mysterious +relation between an individual and certain goods +and services, has been almost a fetish in the West; the +Chinese, already subject to the collectivisms of the family, +the village and the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>, does not have the deep attachment +to this notion that Westerners—especially those who do +have property—are apt to develop. Consequently, even +though the discussion of Sun's programs with regard to +distributive justice are remarkably like the discussions of +the same problem to be found in the West, the possibility, +at least, of certain minor though thoroughgoing differences +must be allowed for, and not overlooked altogether. The +four aspects to this problem which one may distinguish +in Sun's program for <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> are: what is to be the +sphere of state action? what is to be the treatment accorded +private ownership of land? what is to be the +position of private capital? and, what of the class +struggle? +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen said: <q>In modern civilization, the material +essentials of life are five, namely: food, clothing, shelter, +<pb n='253'/><anchor id='Pg253'/> +means of locomotion, and the printed page.</q><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, p. 199. Sun Yat-sen discussed only two +of these essentials (food, clothing) in his lectures on the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>. +According to Tai Chi-tao, he was to have continued to speak on the topics +of <q>Housing,</q> <q>Health,</q> <q>Death,</q> <q>Conclusions on Livelihood,</q> and +<q>Conclusions on the San Min Doctrine,</q> but the only person who may +know what he intended to say on these subjects is Mme. Sun Yat-sen. +(See Hsü translation, <q>The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism,</q> pp. 39-40.)</note> At other +times he may have made slightly different arrangements +of these fundamental necessities, but the essential content +of the demands remained the same. +</p> + +<p> +Behind his demand for a program to carry out <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> there was the fundamental belief that a government +which does not assure and promote the material welfare +of the masses of its citizens does not deserve to exist. To +him the problem of livelihood, the concrete aspect of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign>, was one which had to be faced by every government, +and was a means of judging the righteousness of a government. +He could not tolerate a state which did not assure +the people a fair subsistence. There was no political or +ethical value higher than life itself. A government which +did not see that its subjects were fed, sheltered, clothed, +transported, and lettered to the degree which the economic +level of its time permitted, was a government deserving +of destruction. Sun Yat-sen was not a doctrinaire on the +subject of classes; he would tolerate inequality, so long +as it could be shown not to militate against the welfare +of the people. He was completely intolerant of any +government, Eastern or Western, which permitted its subjects +to starve or to be degraded into a nightmare existence +of semi-starvation. Whatever the means, this end of +popular livelihood, of a reasonable minimum on the scale +of living for each and every citizen, had to prevail above +all others.<note place='foot'>This is based upon statements made by Judge Linebarger to the +author. According to him, Sun Yat-sen had few of the prejudices of class, +one way or the other, that affect the outlook of so many Western leaders. +He did not believe that the only possible solution to the problem of livelihood +was the Marxian one, and was confident that the Chinese Nationalists +would be able to solve the problem. This question was to him paramount +above all others; the life of the masses of Chinese citizens was the life of +China itself.</note> +</p> + +<pb n='254'/><anchor id='Pg254'/> + +<p> +Within the limits of this supreme criterion, Sun Yat-sen +left the government to its own choice in the matter of the +sphere of state action. If the system of private initiative +could develop more efficiently than could the government +in certain fields, then leave those fields to private effort. +If and when private initiative failed to meet rigid requirements +to be established by the government it was not +merely the privilege, it was the obligation of the government +to intervene. Sun Yat-sen seems to have believed +that government action would in the long run be desirable +anyhow, but to have been enough of a political realist +at the same time to be willing to allow the government +a considerable length of time in expanding its activities. +In a developing country like China it seemed to him +probable that the ends of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ming shêng</foreign> could best be served +in many fields by private enterprise. <q>All matters that +can be and are better carried out by private enterprise +should be left to private hands which should be encouraged +and fully protected by liberal laws....</q><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, p. 11.</note> +</p> + +<p> +From the outset, Sun Yat-sen's plan of empirical collectivism +demanded a fairly broad range of state action. +<q>All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns +and those that possess monopolistic character should be +taken up as national undertakings.</q><note place='foot'>The same, p. 11.</note> This view of his +may be traced, among others, to three suppositions he +entertained concerning Bismarck, concerning "war socialism," +and concerning the industrial revolution in China. +Sun shows a certain grudging admiration for Bismarck, +whom he believed to have offset the rising tide of democratic +socialism in Germany by introducing state socialism, +<pb n='255'/><anchor id='Pg255'/> +in government control of railroads, etc. <q>By this preventive +method he imperceptibly did away with the controversial +issues, and since the people had no reason to fight, +a social revolution was naturally averted. This was the +very great anti-democratic move of Bismarck.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 326. The discussion of Bismarck runs +from p. 322 to 326; the length of the discussion shows what Sun thinks +of Bismarck's acuteness, although he disapproved of Bismarck's anti-democratic +stand.</note> Secondly, +he believed that the <q>... unification and nationalization +of all the industries, which I might call the Second Industrial +Revolution ...</q> on account of the world war +would be even more significant than the first.<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, p. 4.</note> It intensified +the four elements of recent economic progress, which +tended to prove the falsity of the Marxian predictions of +the future of capitalism, namely: <q>a. Social and industrial +improvements (i. e. labor and welfare legislation); b. +State ownership of the means of transportation and of +communication; c. Direct taxes; d. Socialized distribution +(the coöperative movement).</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 426.</note> Finally, Sun believed +that the magnitude of the Chinese industrial revolution +was such that no private capital could establish its foundations, +and that the state had perforce to initiate the great +undertakings of industrialism. +</p> + +<p> +Concerning Sun's beliefs regarding the sphere of state +action in economic matters, one may say that his ideology +of empirical collectivism required a program calling for: +1) the protection of private enterprise and the simultaneous +launching of great state enterprises at the beginning; +2) the intermediate pursuance of a policy by means +of which the state would be the guarantor of the livelihood +of the people, and establish the sphere of its own +action according to whether or not private enterprise was +sufficient to meet the needs of the people; and 3) a long +range trend toward complete collectivism. +</p> + +<pb n='256'/><anchor id='Pg256'/> + +<p> +With respect to the question of land, Sun Yat-sen believed +in his own version of the <q>single tax,</q> which was +not, in his programs, the single tax, since he foresaw +other sources of revenue for the state (tariffs, revenue +from state enterprises, etc.). According to the land-control +system of Sun Yat-sen the land-owner would himself +assess the value of his land. He would be prevented from +over-assessing it by his own desire to avoid paying too +high a tax; and under-assessment would be avoided by a +provision that the state could at any time purchase the +land at the price set by the owner. If the land were to +go up in value the owner would have to pay the difference +between the amount which he formerly assessed and +the amount which he believed it to be worth at the later +time. The money so paid would become <q>... a public +fund as a reward, to all those who had improved the +community and who had advanced industry and commerce +around the land. The proposal that all future increment +shall be given to the community is the <q>equalization of +land ownership</q> advocated by the Kuomintang; it is the +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min-sheng</foreign> Principle. This form of the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min-sheng</foreign> Principle +is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang +support the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>San Min</foreign> Principles they should not +oppose communism.</q> Continuing directly, Sun makes +clear the nature of the empirical collectivism of his <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> program, which he calls communism. <q>The great +aim of the Principle of Livelihood in our Three Principles +is communism—a share in property by all. But the communism +which we propose is a communism of the future, +not of the present. This communism of the future is a +very just proposal, and those who have had property in +the past will not suffer at all by it. It is a very different +thing from what is called in the West <q>nationalization of +<pb n='257'/><anchor id='Pg257'/> +property,</q> confiscation for the government's use of private +property which the people already possess.</q><note place='foot'>Price translation, pp. 434-435. In the d'Elia translation, pp. 465-466. +The Price translation has been quoted in this instance because Father +d'Elia translates <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> as <q>the economic Demism,</q> which—although +interesting when used consistently—might not be clear in its present context. +Sun Yat-sen's courteous use of the word <q>communism,</q> in view of +the Canton-Moscow entente then existing, has caused a great deal of confusion. +The reader may judge for himself how much Sun's policy constitutes +communism.</note> Sun Yat-sen +declared that the solution to the land problem would be +half of the solution of the problem of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>.<note place='foot'>One or two further points concerning the land policy may be mentioned. +In the first place, it is the land which is to be taxed. A tax will +be applied, according to this theory, on the land, and the increment will +also be confiscated. These are two separate forms of revenue. Furthermore, +lest all land-holders simply surrender their land to the government, +Sun makes clear that his taxation program applies only to land. It would +consequently be quite advantageous for the owner to keep the land; the +buildings on it would not be affected by the increment-seizure program, +and the land would be worth keeping. <q>The value of the land as declared +at present by the landowner will still remain the property of each individual +landowner.</q> (d'Elia translation, p. 466; Father d'Elia's note on +this page is informing.) The landowner might conceivably put a mortgage +on the land to pay the government the amount of the unearned increment, +and still make a handsome enough profit from the use of the land to +amortize the mortgage.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen believed in the restriction of private capital +in such a way as to assure its not becoming a socially +disruptive force. That is a part of his ideology which we +have already examined. In the matter of an actual program, +he believed in the use of <q>harnessed capital.</q><note place='foot'>Linebarger, <hi rend='italic'>Conversations</hi>, Book III, p. 25.</note> +He had no real fear of capital; imperialist foreign capital +was one thing—the small native capital another. The +former was a political enemy. The latter was not formidable. +In a speech on Red Labor Day, 1924, when his +sympathies were about as far Left as they ever were, in +consideration for the kindliness of the Communist assistance +to Canton, he said: <q>Chinese capitalists are not so +<pb n='258'/><anchor id='Pg258'/> +strong that they could oppress the Chinese workers,</q><note place='foot'>Wittfogel, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen</hi>, p. 328. <q>Die chinesischen Kapitalisten sind +nicht so stark, dass sie die chinesischen Arbeiter unterdrücken könnten.</q></note> +and added that, the struggle being one with imperialism, +the destruction of the Chinese capitalists would not solve +the question. +</p> + +<p> +The restriction of private capital to the point of keeping +it harmless, and thus avoiding the evils which would lead +to the class war and a violent social revolution, was only +half the story of capitalism in China which Sun Yat-sen +wanted told in history. The other half was the advancement +of the industrial revolution by the state, which was +the only instrumentality capable of doing this great work. +<q>China cannot be compared to foreign countries. It is +not sufficient (for her) to impose restrictions upon capital. +Foreign countries are rich, while China is poor.... For +that reason China must not only restrict private capital, +but she must also develop the capital of the State.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 469. Italics omitted. For the discussion +of the relation of the program of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> to capitalism, see d'Elia's +various footnotes and appendices dealing with the subject. Father d'Elia, +as a devout Catholic, does a thorough piece of work in demonstrating that +Sun Yat-sen was not a Bolshevik and not hostile to the Roman Catholic +Church, and had a warm although infrequently expressed admiration for +that organization. Li Ti-tsun, in <q>The Sunyatsenian Principle of Livelihood,</q> +cited, tries to find the exact shade of left orientation in <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, +and digests the main policies. Wou and Tsui, both cited, also discuss this +point.</note> +The restrictions to be placed upon private capital and +upon private land speculation were negative; the development +of state-owned capital and of capital which the state +could trust politically were positive, as was the revenue +which should be gained from the governmental seizure +of unearned increment. In some cases the state would not +even have to trouble itself to confiscate the unearned increment; +it could itself develop the land and profit by its +rise in value, applying the funds thus derived to the paying-off +<pb n='259'/><anchor id='Pg259'/> +of foreign loans or some socially constructive +enterprise.<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>International Development</hi>, pp. 36-39.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Ideologically, Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the intra-national +class war. Class war could, nevertheless, be +justified in the programs of Sun in two ways: 1) if it +were international class war, of the oppressed against the +oppressing nations; and 2) if it were the class war of the +nationalist Chinese workers against foreign imperialism. +In these two cases Sun Yat-sen thought class-war a good +idea. He did not think class war necessary in contemporary +China, and hoped, by means of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, to develop +an economy so healthy that the pathological phenomena +of the class struggle would never appear. On +the other hand, in justice to Sun, and to those Marxians +who would apologize for him to their fellow-Marxians, +there can be little doubt that Sun Yat-sen would have approved +of the class war, even in China, if he had thought +that Chinese capitalism had risen to such power that it +obstructed the way of the Chinese nation to freedom and +economic health. Even in this he might not have set any +particular virtue upon the proletariat as such; the capitalists +would be the enemies of the nation, and it would +be the whole nation which would have to dispose of them. +</p> + +<p> +A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun +Yat-sen's programs for <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> is intellectually unremunerative, +since it has been established that <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +may be called empirical collectivism; collectivism which is +empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it loses its +empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of +historical materialism, and following the traditionally +Chinese pragmatic way of thinking, could not orient his +revolution in a world of economic predestinations. With +the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather than +on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China +<pb n='260'/><anchor id='Pg260'/> +were ruled by the right sort of men, his programs would +be carried through in accordance with the expediency of +the moment. He does not appear to have considered, as +do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary +movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy +persons. Even had he foreseen such a possible +state of affairs, he would not, in all probability, have settled +his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the +most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it +is in China to pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. +The first Republic had taught him that. +</p> + +<p> +One must consequently regard the programs of national +economic revolution, of industrial revolution, and of social +revolution as tentative and general outlines of the +course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang and +state to follow in carrying out <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. Of these programs, +the one least likely to be affected by political or +personal changes was that of the industrial revolution, +and it is this which is most detailed.<note place='foot'>By an irony of fate, the most conspicuous example of the realization +of any one of these plans was the beginning of the port of Hulutao, which +was to be <q>The Great Northern Port</q> of Sun's vision. The National +Government had already started work on this port when the Japanese, +invading Manchuria, took it. There is so much pathos in Sun's own life +that this frustation of his plans after his death seems disappointing beyond +words to his followers. In his own trust in mankind, in the eagerness and +the sincerity of his enthusiasms, in the grandeur of his vision—here are to +be found the most vital clues to the tragedy of Sun Yat-sen. Like the +other great founders of the earth's ideals, he charted worlds within the +vision but, perhaps, beyond the accomplishment of ordinary men.</note> His great desire +was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to +subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so +that it could restore the ancient morality and wisdom of +China, as well as become proficient in the Western +sciences. +</p> + +<p> +A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs +of Sun Yat-sen, before consideration of the Utopia +<pb n='261'/><anchor id='Pg261'/> +which lay at the end of the road of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. His plans +may continue to go on in <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> because they are so +empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by +the new situation in world politics. His optimism concerning +the rapidity of democratic developments may not +be justified by actual developments. The programs of +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> are so general that they can be followed to +some degree by governments of almost any orientation +along the Right-Left scale. The really important criterion +in the programs of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> is this: the people must +live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a great +force in the continued development of his programs, to +the last stage of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf' level1="The Utopia of Min Shêng."/> +<head>The Utopia of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>Min Shêng</foreign>.</head> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen differs from the empirical collectivists of +the West in that he has an end to his program, which is +to be achieved over a considerable period of time. The +means are such that he can be classified with those Western +thinkers; his goal is one which he took from the ideals +in the old ideology and which he identified with those +of the communists, although not necessarily with the +Marxists. He said, at the end of his second lecture on +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Our way is community of industrial and social profits. We +cannot say, then, that the doctrine of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> is different from +communism. The <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi> means a government <q>of the +people, by the people, and for the people</q>—that is, the state is +the common property of all the people, its politics are participated +in by all, and its profits are shared by all. Then there will +be not only communism in property, but communism in everything +else. Such will be the ultimate end of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, a state +which Confucius calls <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta t'ung</foreign> or the age of <q>great similarity.</q><note place='foot'>Hsü translation, cited, p. 440; Price translation, p. 444; d'Elia translation, +cited, p. 476. The first has been preferred purely as a matter of +style. The Chinese words <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> and <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</foreign> have been used +instead of the English renderings which Hsü gives, again as a pure matter +of form and consistency with the text.</note> +</quote> + +<pb n='262'/><anchor id='Pg262'/> + +<p> +Perhaps no other passage from the works of Sun Yat-sen +in relation to <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> could illustrate his position +so aptly. He describes his doctrine. He labels it <q>communism,</q> +although, as we have seen, it is quite another +thing than Marxism. He cites Lincoln. In the end he +calls upon the authority of Confucius. +</p> + +<p> +To a Westerner, the ideal commonwealth of Sun Yat-sen +bears a remarkable resemblance to the world projected +in the ideals of the ancient Chinese. Here again +there is <q>great similarity,</q> complete ideological harmony, +and the presumable disappearance of state and law. Property, +the fount of war, has been set aside, and men—animated +by a profound and sincere appreciation of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>—work +together, all for the common good. The Chinese +will, in this Utopia, have struck down <emph>might</emph> from the +high places of the world, and inaugurated an era of <emph>the +kingly way</emph> throughout the earth. Their ancient doctrines +of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in bringing +about cosmospolitanism. +</p> + +<p> +There are, however, differences from the old order of +ideals. According to the Marxists, nationality, after it has +served its purpose as an instrument in the long class +struggle, may be set aside. Speculation of this sort is rare +among them, however, and it is difficult to envision their +final system. To Sun Yat-sen, however, there was the +definite ideal that the Chinese live on forever. This was +an obligation imposed upon him and his ideology by the +teleological element in the old ideology which required +that humanity be immortal in the flesh and that it be immortal +through clearly traceable lines of descent. The +individual was settled in a genealogical web, reaching +through time and space, which gave him a sense of certainty +that otherwise he might lack. This is inconsistent +<pb n='263'/><anchor id='Pg263'/> +with the Marxian ideal, where the family system, a relic +of brutal days, shall have vanished. +</p> + +<p> +The physical immortality of the Chinese race was not +the only sort of immortality Sun Yat-sen wished China to +have. His stress on the peculiar virtues of the Chinese +intellectual culture has been noted. The Chinese literati +had sought an immortality of integrity and intellect, a +continuity of civilization without which mere physical +survival might seem brutish. In the teleology of Sun's +ideal society, there would no doubt be these two factors: +filial piety, emphasizing the survival of the flesh; and +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>, emphasizing the continuity of wisdom and honor. +Neither could aptly continue unless China remained Chinese, +unless the particular virtues of the Chinese were +brought once again to their full potency.<note place='foot'>The author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the clarification of this +ideal of dual continuity—of the family system, preserving the flesh, and +the intellectual tradition, preserving the cultural heritages.</note> +</p> + +<p> +The family system was to continue to the <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign> +Utopia. So too were the three natural orders of men. +Sun Yat-sen never advocated that the false inequality of +the present world be thrown down for the purpose of putting +in its place a false equality which made no distinction +between the geniuses, the apostles, and the unthinking. +The Chinese world was to be Chinese to the end of time. +In this the narrowness of Sun Yat-sen's ideals is apparent; +it is, perhaps, a narrowness which limits his aspirations +and gives them strength. +</p> + +<p> +The Chinese Utopia which was to be at the end of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign> was to be established in a world, moreover, which +might not have made a complete return to ideological control, +in which the state might still survive. The requirements +of an industrial economy certainly presupposes an +enormous length of time before the ideology and the society +shall have been completely adjusted to the peculiarities +<pb n='264'/><anchor id='Pg264'/> +of life in a world not only of working men but of +working machines. The state must continue until all men +are disciplined to labor: "When all these vagrants will +be done away with and when all will contribute to production, +then clothing will be abundant and food sufficient; +families will enjoy prosperity, and individuals will +be satisfied. +</p> + +<p> +<q>Then the question of the <q>people's life</q> will be +solved.</q><note place='foot'>d'Elia translation, cited, p. 538.</note> +</p> + +<p> +Thus Sun Yat-sen concluded his last lecture on <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min +shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='265'/><anchor id='Pg265'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Bibliography.</head> + +<p> +The bibliography of works in Western languages dealing with +Sun Yat-sen is short. The author has made no attempt to gather +various fugitive pieces, such as newspaper clippings. He believes, +however, that the following bibliography of Western +works on Sun is the most nearly complete which has yet appeared, +and has listed, for the sake of completeness, two Russian +items as yet unavailable in the United States. +</p> + +<p> +The first half of the bibliography presents these Western materials, +arranged according to their subject. Within each category, +the individual items are presented in chronological order; +this has been done in order to make clear the position of the +works in point of time of publication—a factor occasionally of +some importance in the study of these materials. +</p> + +<p> +The second half of the bibliography lists further works which +have been referred to or cited. The first group of these consists +of a small collection of some of the more important Chinese editions +of, and Chinese and Japanese treatises upon, Sun Yat-sen's +writings. The second group represents various Western works on +China or on political science which have been of assistance to the +author in this study. +</p> + +<p> +Chinese names have been left in their natural order, with the +patronymic first. Where Chinese names have been Westernized +and inverted, they have been returned to their original Chinese +order, but with a comma inserted to indicate the change. +</p> + +<div> +<head>A. Major Sources on Sun Yat-sen Which are Available +in Western Languages.</head> + +<div> +<head>I. Biographies of Sun Yat-sen.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> +Ponce, Mariano, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, El fundador de la Republica de China</hi>, +Manila, 1912. +</quote> + +<p> +A popular biography. Valuable for the period just before 1912. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Cantlie, James and Sheridan-Jones, C., <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening +of China</hi>, New York, 1912. +</quote> + +<p> +Also a popular work. Valuable for the description of Sun Yat-sen's +education. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Linebarger, Paul (and Sun Yat-sen), <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen and The Chinese Republic</hi>, +New York, 1925. +</quote> + +<p> +The only biography authorized by Sun Yat-sen, who wrote parts +<pb n='266'/><anchor id='Pg266'/> +of it himself. A propaganda work, it presents the most complete +record of Sun's early life. Does not go beyond 1922. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., <hi rend='italic'>Sun' Iat-Sen—otets kitaiskoe revoliutsii</hi>, +Moscow, 1925. The same, Moscow, 1926. +</quote> + +<p> +Not available. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Lee, Edward Bing-shuey, <hi rend='italic'>Dr. Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Achievements</hi> +(English and French), Nanking, n. d. +</quote> + +<p> +A synopsis, by a spokesman for the Nationalist Party. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Wou, Saofong, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, Sa Vie et Sa Doctrine</hi>, Paris, 1929. +</quote> + +<p> +An excellent outline, largely from Chinese sources. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Restarick, Henry Bond, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China</hi>, New Haven, +1931. +</quote> + +<p> +Useful for a description of Sun Yat-sen's life in Honolulu, and +of some of his overseas connections. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<p> +—— (R.-Ch. Duval, translator), <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, Liberator de la Chine</hi>, +Paris, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +de Morant, George Soulie, <hi rend='italic'>Soun Iat-sènn</hi>, Paris, 1932. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +A romantic work based upon Chinese sources, and the Chinese +translation of Linebarger's work. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor), <hi rend='italic'>The Gospel of Sun +Chung-shan</hi>, Paris, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Sharman, (Mrs.) Lyon, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning, A Criticall +Biography</hi>, New York, 1934. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +The most complete biography of Sun Yat-sen. Well documented +and prepared. Mrs. Sharman's work will remain authoritative for +many years to come. Its main fault is its somewhat hyper-sensitive +criticism of Sun Yat-sen's personality, with which the author never +comes in contact. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Linebarger, Paul, <hi rend='italic'>The Life of Sun Chung-san</hi>, Shanghai, 1932. Fragmentary +proofsheets. See note in Preface. +</p> + +<p> +Reissig, Paul, <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat Sen und die Kuomintang</hi>, Berlin, n. d. +A Lutheran missionary tract. +</p> + +</quote> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>II. Translations of the Sixteen Lectures on the <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> +Anonymous, <hi rend='italic'>The Three Principles</hi>, Shanghai 1927. +</quote> + +<p> +Of no value. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Tsan Wan, <hi rend='italic'>Die Drei Nationalen Grundlehren, Die Grundlehren von dem +Volkstum</hi>, Berlin, 1927. +</quote> + +<p> +A translation of the lectures on Nationalism; excellent as far as +it goes. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J. (translator and editor); <hi rend='italic'>Le Triple Demisme de +Suen Wen</hi>, Shanghai, 1929. +</quote> + +<p> +The only annotated translation. The style is simple and direct, +and the notes accurate, for the most part, and informative. The +<pb n='267'/><anchor id='Pg267'/> +uninitiated reader must make allowances for Father d'Elia's religious +viewpoints. This is probably the most useful translation. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Price, Frank W. (translator), Chen, L. T. (editor); <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I, +The Three Principles of the People</hi>, Shanghai, 1930. +</quote> + +<p> +The translation most widely known and quoted. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., <hi rend='italic'>The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen</hi>, Wuchang, +1931. +</quote> + +<p> +A translation of the French version. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Hsü, Leonard Shihlien; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals</hi>, +Los Angeles, 1933. +</quote> + +<p> +The most complete selection of the documents of Sun Yat-senism +available in English. Dr. Hsü has assembled his materials remarkably +well. His chapter <q>The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism</q> is +the best of its kind in English. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>III. Other Translations of the Chinese Works of Sun Yat-sen.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> +Anonymous; <hi rend='italic'>Zapiski kitaiskogo revoliutsionera</hi>, Moscow, 1926. +</quote> + +<p> +Not available. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +—— <hi rend='italic'>Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary</hi>, Philadelphia, n. d. +</quote> + +<p> +Not documented and apparently unreliable. English version of +the above. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Wittfogel, Karl; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen Revolutionärs</hi>, +Vienna and Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927). +</quote> + +<p> +The most complete Marxist critique, containing also an excellent +short biography. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Tsan Wan; <hi rend='italic'>30 Jahre Chinesische Revolution</hi>, Berlin, 1927. +</quote> + +<p> +An excellent translation of one of the short autobiographies of +Sun Yat-sen. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Wei Yung (translator); <hi rend='italic'>The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê</hi>, +Shanghai, 1931. +</quote> + +<p> +Also referred to as <hi rend='italic'>The Outline of Psychological Reconstruction</hi>. +It comprises a series of popular essays discussing the problems involved +in modernization of the Chinese outlook, and presenting +Sun Yat-sen's theory of knowledge versus action. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>IV. Works in English by Sun Yat-sen.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> +Sun Yat-sen; <hi rend='italic'>Kidnapped in London</hi>, Bristol, 1897. +</quote> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's first book in English. Expresses his Christian, modernist, +anti-Manchu attitude of the time. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +—— <hi rend='italic'>How China was Made a Republic</hi>, Shanghai, 1919. +</quote> + +<p> +A short autobiography of Sun Yat-sen; see note in Preface. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +—— <hi rend='italic'>The International Development of China</hi>, New York and London, +1929. +</quote> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen's bold project for the industrialization of China. +<pb n='268'/><anchor id='Pg268'/> +First proposed in 1919, the work calls for a coördinated effort of +world capitalism and Chinese nationalism for the modernization of +China. Also called the <hi rend='italic'>Outline of Material Reconstruction</hi>. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>V. Commentaries on the Principles of Sun Yat-sen.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> +Li Ti tsun; <hi rend='italic'>The Politico-Economic Theories of Sun Yat-sen</hi>. +</quote> + +<p> +This work has not been published, but portions of it appeared in +the <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Students' Monthly</hi>, XXIV, New York, 1928-1929, as +follows: <q>The Life of Sun Yat-sen,</q> no. 1, p. 14, November, 1928; +<q>The Theoretical System of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,</q> no. 2, p. 92, December +1928, and no. 3, p. 130, January 1929; and <q>The Sunyatsenian +Principle of Livelihood,</q> no. 5, p. 219, March 1929. It is most +regrettable that the whole work could not be published as a unit, +for Li's work is extensive in scope and uses the major Chinese and +foreign sources quite skilfully. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Tai Chi-tao (Richard Wilhelm, translator); <hi rend='italic'>Die Geistigen Grundlagen +des Sunyatsenismus</hi>, Berlin, 1931. +</quote> + +<p> +An informative commentary on the ethical system of Sun Yat-sen. +Tai Chi-tao is an eminent Party leader. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Antonov, K.: <hi rend='italic'>Sun'iatsenizm i kitaiskaia revoliutsiia</hi>, Moscow, 1931. +</quote> + +<p> +Not available to the author. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +William, Maurice; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism</hi>, Baltimore, 1932. +</quote> + +<p> +A presentation, by the author of <hi rend='italic'>The Social Interpretation of History</hi>, +of the influence which that work had on Sun; useful only in +this connection. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor); <hi rend='italic'>Conversations With +Sun Yat-sen</hi>, 1919-1922. +</quote> + +<p> +For comment on this and the following manuscript, see Preface. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Linebarger, Paul; <hi rend='italic'>A Commentary on the San Min Chu I</hi>. Four volumes, +unpublished, 1933. +</p> + +<p> +Tsui, Shu-Chin, <hi rend='italic'>The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon Sun +Yat-sen's political Philosophy</hi>, in <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Social and Political +Science Review</hi>, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +A dissertation presented to Harvard University. Dr. Tsui covers +the ground very thoroughly; his conclusions challenge the general +belief that the Communists influenced Sun Yat-sen's philosophy. +Ranks with the works of Tai Chi-tao, Hsü Shih-lien, and Father +d'Elia as an aid to the understanding of the Three Principles. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Jair Hung: <hi rend='italic'>Les Idées Économiques de Sun Yat Sen</hi>, Toulouse, 1934. +</quote> + +<p> +A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Toulouse, treating, +chiefly, the programmatic parts of the principle of <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Tsiang Kuen; <hi rend='italic'>Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme de +Sun Yat Sen</hi>, Paris, 1933. +</quote> + +<pb n='269'/><anchor id='Pg269'/> + +<p> +A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Paris, which +deals with the institutional and historical background of min sheng. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Li Chao-wei; <hi rend='italic'>La souveraineté nationale d'après la doctrine politique de +Sun-Yet-Sin</hi>, Dijon, 1934. +</quote> + +<p> +A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Dijon, concerning +the four popular powers of election, recall, initiative, and +referendum. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>B. Chinese Sources and Further Western Works Used +as Auxiliary Sources.</head> + +<div> +<head>I. Chinese and Japanese Works by or Concerning Sun Yat-sen.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Anonymous; <hi rend='italic'>Tsung-li Fêng An Shih Lu (A True Record of the Obsequies +of the Leader)</hi>, Nanking, n. d. +</p> + +<p> +Bai-ko-nan (Mei Sung-nan); <hi rend='italic'>San-min-shu-gi To Kai-kyu To-so (The +San Min Chu I and the Struggle between Capitalism and Labor)</hi>, +Tokyo, 1929. +</p> + +<p> +Chung Kung-jên; <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I Li Lun Ti Lien Chiu (A Study of the +Theory of the San Min Chu I)</hi>, Shanghai, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +Huang Huan-wên; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Wên Chu I Chen Ch'üan (The Real Interpretation +of the Principles of Sun Wên)</hi>, Nanking, 1933. +</p> + +<p> +Lin Pai-k'ê (Linebarger, Paul M. W.), Hsü Chih-jên (translator); <hi rend='italic'>Sun +I-hsien Chüan Chi (The Life of Sun Yat-sen)</hi>, 4th ed., Shanghai, +1927. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +The Chinese translator has appended an excellent chronology of +Sun's life. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Sun Fu-hao; <hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I Piao Chieh (An Elementary Explanation of +the Sun Min Chu I)</hi>, Shanghai, 1933. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, ed.; <hi rend='italic'>Tsung-li Ch'üan Chi (The Complete +Works of the Leader)</hi>, 4 vol. in 1; 2nd ed., Shanghai, 1930. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +The best collection, but by no means complete. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Chung-shan Yen Chiang Chi (A Collection of the +Lectures of Sun Chung-shan)</hi>, 3rd ed., Shanghai, 1927. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen; <hi rend='italic'>Tsung-li Yü Mo (The Posthumous Papers of the Leader)</hi>, +Nanking, n. d. +</p> + +<p> +Têng Hsi; <hi rend='italic'>Chung Shan Jên Shêng Shih Hsia Tan Yüan, (An Inquiry +into the Origin of Chung Shan's Philosophy of Life)</hi>, Shanghai, +1933. +</p> + +<p> +Tsao Kê-jen; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Chung Shan Hsien-shêng Ching Chi Hsüeh Shê (The +Economic Theory of Mr. Sun Chung-shan)</hi>, Nanking, 1935. +</p> + +</quote> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>II. Works on China or the Revolution.</head> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Amann, Gustav; <hi rend='italic'>Sun Yatsens Vermächtnis</hi>, Berlin, 1928. +</p> + +<p> +Bland, J. O. and Backhouse, E.; <hi rend='italic'>China Under the Empress Dowager</hi>, +Philadelphia, 1910. +</p> + +<pb n='270'/><anchor id='Pg270'/> + +<p> +Beresford, Lord Charles; <hi rend='italic'>The Break-up of China</hi>, London, 1899. +</p> + +<p> +Bonnard, Abel; <hi rend='italic'>En Chine (1920-1921)</hi>, Paris, 1924. +</p> + +<p> +Burgess, J. S.; <hi rend='italic'>The Guilds of Peking</hi>, New York, 1928. +</p> + +<p> +Buxton, L. H. Dudley; <hi rend='italic'>China, The Land and the People</hi>, Oxford, 1929. +</p> + +<p> +Chen Tsung-hsi, Wang An-tsiang, and Wang I-ting; <hi rend='italic'>General Chiang +Kai-shek: The Builder of New China</hi>, Shanghai, 1929. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Chinese Social and Political Science Review, The</hi>, Peking (Peiping), +1916-. The foremost journal of its kind in the Far East. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>China Today</hi>, New York, 1934-. Communist Monthly. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>China Weekly Review, The</hi>, Shanghai, 1917-. +</p> + +<p> +The leading English-language weekly in China, Liberal in outlook. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>China Year Book, The</hi>, Shanghai, 1919-? +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +A necessary reference work for government personnel, trade statistics, +and chronology. Perhaps inferior to the corresponding volumes +in other countries. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Close, Upton, <hi rend='italic'>pseud.</hi> (Hall, Josef Washington); <hi rend='italic'>Challenge: Behind +the Face of Japan</hi>, New York, 1934. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>Eminent Asians</hi>, New York, 1929. +</p> + +<p> +Coker, Francis; <hi rend='italic'>Recent Political Thought</hi>, New York, 1934. +</p> + +<p> +Creel, H. G.; Sinism, <hi rend='italic'>A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese World-view</hi>, +Chicago, 1929. +</p> + +<p> +Cressey, George Babcock; <hi rend='italic'>China's Geographic Foundations</hi>, New York, +1934. +</p> + +<p> +de Groot, J. J. M.; <hi rend='italic'>Religion in China</hi>, New York and London, 1912. +</p> + +<p> +Djang, Chu (Chang Tso); <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Suzerainty</hi>, Johns Hopkins +University doctoral dissertation, 1935. +</p> + +<p> +Douglas, Sir Robert K.; <hi rend='italic'>Europe and the Far East 1506-1912</hi>, New York, +1913. +</p> + +<p> +Ellis, Henry; <hi rend='italic'>Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to China...</hi>, +Philadelphia, 1818. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences</hi>, New York, 1930-. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Articles on <q>Kuomintang</q> and <q>Sun Yat-sen.</q> +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Erdberg, Oskar; <hi rend='italic'>Tales of Modern China</hi>, Moscow, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Erkes, Eduard; <hi rend='italic'>Chinesische Literatur</hi>, Breslau, 1922. +</p> + +<p> +Foreign Office of Japan, The (?); <hi rend='italic'>The Present Condition of China</hi>, +Tokyo (?), 1932. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +No author nor place of publication is given in this work, which +presents a description of those features of Chinese political and economic +life that might be construed as excusing Japanese intervention. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic</hi>, The, New York, 1934. +</p> + +<p> +Goodnow, Frank Johnson; <hi rend='italic'>China: An Analysis</hi>, Baltimore, 1926. +</p> + +<p> +Granet, Marcel; <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Civilization</hi>, New York, 1930. +</p> + +<pb n='271'/><anchor id='Pg271'/> + +<p> +Harvey, E. D.; <hi rend='italic'>The Mind of China</hi>, New Haven, 1933. +</p> + +<p> +Holcombe, Arthur N.; <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Revolution</hi>, Cambridge (Massachusetts), +1930. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution</hi>, New York, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Hsia Ching-lin; Chow, James L. E.; and Chang, Yukon (translators); +<hi rend='italic'>The Civil Code of The Republic of China</hi>, Shanghai, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Hsieh, Pao Chao; <hi rend='italic'>The Government of China (1644-1911)</hi>, Baltimore, +1925. +</p> + +<p> +Hsü, Leonard Shih-lien; <hi rend='italic'>The Political Philosophy of Confucianism</hi>, New +York, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Hsü, Pao-chien; <hi rend='italic'>Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian Thought</hi>, Dissertation, +Columbia University, n. d. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Suggests the position of Sun Yat-sen in the history of Chinese +philosophy. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Hu Shih; and Lin Yu-tang; <hi rend='italic'>China's Own Critics</hi>, Peiping, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +Isaacs, Harold (editor); <hi rend='italic'>Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction</hi>, Shanghai, +1931. +</p> + +<p> +Johnston, Reginald; <hi rend='italic'>Twilight in the Forbidden City</hi>, London, 1934. +</p> + +<p> +Koo, V. K. Wellington; <hi rend='italic'>Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission</hi>, +New York, n. d. +</p> + +<p> +Kotenev, Anatol M.; <hi rend='italic'>New Lamps for Old</hi>, Shanghai, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +Kulp, D. H.; <hi rend='italic'>Family Life in South China: The Sociology of Familism</hi>, +New York, 1925. +</p> + +<p> +Latourette, Kenneth; <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese: Their History and Culture</hi>, New +York, 1934. +</p> + +<p> +Lea, Homer; <hi rend='italic'>The Valor of Ignorance</hi>, New York, 1909. +</p> + +<p> +Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; <hi rend='italic'>History of Chinese Political Thought</hi>, New York and +London, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Li Chi; <hi rend='italic'>The Formation of the Chinese People</hi>, Cambridge (Massachusetts), +1928. +</p> + +<p> +Lin Yutang; <hi rend='italic'>My Country and My People</hi>, New York, 1936. +</p> + +<p> +Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth; <hi rend='italic'>Deutschlands Gegenwärtige Gelegenheiten +in China</hi>, Brussels, 1936. +</p> + +<p> +Lou Kan-jou; <hi rend='italic'>Histoire Sociale de l'Epoque Tcheou</hi>, Paris, 1935. +</p> + +<p> +MacNair, Harley Farnsworth; <hi rend='italic'>China in Revolution</hi>, Chicago, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>Modern Chinese History—Selected Readings</hi>, Shanghai, 1923. +</p> + +<p> +Mänchen-Helfen, Otto; <hi rend='italic'>China</hi>, Dresden, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +Maybon, Albert; <hi rend='italic'>La Politique Chinoise</hi>, Paris, 1908. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen presented a copy of this book to Judge Linebarger, +and enthusiastically recommended it. +</p> + +<pb n='272'/><anchor id='Pg272'/> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Maybon, Albert; <hi rend='italic'>La Republique Chinoise</hi>, Paris, 1914. +</p> + +<p> +Mayers, William Frederick; <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese Government, A Manual of +Chinese Titles, Categorically Explained and Arranged, with an +Appendix</hi>, Shanghai, 1897. +</p> + +<p> +McGovern, William Montgomery; <hi rend='italic'>Modern Japan, Its Political, Military, +and Industrial Organization</hi>, London, 1920. +</p> + +<p> +Myron, Paul, pseud. (Linebarger, Paul M. W.); <hi rend='italic'>Our Chinese Chances +Through Europe's War</hi>, Chicago, 1915. +</p> + +<p> +Meadows, Thomas Taylor; <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese and Their Rebellions</hi>, London, +1856. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +One of the permanently outstanding books on China; dealing +primarily with the T'ai P'ing rebellion, it presents an extraordinarily +keen analysis of the politics of the old Chinese social system. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A.; <hi rend='italic'>The Meaning of Meaning</hi>, New York +and London, 1927. +</quote> + +<p> +It is largely upon this work that the present author has sought to +base his technique of ideological analysis. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Peffer, Nathaniel; <hi rend='italic'>The Collapse of a Civilization</hi>, New York, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Price, Ernest Batson; <hi rend='italic'>The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning +Manchuria and Mongolia</hi>, Baltimore, 1933. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Pages 1-13 present stimulating suggestions as to the nature of +<q>China.</q> +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Reichwein, Adolf; <hi rend='italic'>China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic Contacts +in the Eighteenth Century</hi>, New York, 1925. +</p> + +<p> +Roffe, Jean; <hi rend='italic'>La Chine Nationaliste 1912-1930</hi>, Paris, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +Roy, Manabendra Nath; <hi rend='italic'>Revolution und Konterrevolution in China</hi>, +Berlin, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Ruffé, R. d'Auxion de; <hi rend='italic'>Is China Mad?</hi> Shanghai, 1928. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +The author, violently hostile to Sun Yat-sen, presents some details +of Sun's life not published elsewhere. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Smith, Arthur; <hi rend='italic'>Village Life in China</hi>, New York, 1899. +</p> + +<p> +Sheean, Vincent; <hi rend='italic'>Personal History</hi>, New York, 1935. +</p> + +<p> +Shryock, John Knight; <hi rend='italic'>The Origin and Development of the State Cult +of Confucius</hi>, New York, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Starr, Frederick; <hi rend='italic'>Confucianism</hi>, New York, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Stoddard, Lothrop; <hi rend='italic'>The Rising Tide of Color Against White World +Supremacy</hi>, New York, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +T'ang Leang-li; <hi rend='italic'>The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution</hi>, New York, +1930. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>Wang ching-wei</hi>, Peiping, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +Tawney, Richard Henry; <hi rend='italic'>Land and Labour in China</hi>, London, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Thomas, Elbert Duncan; <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Political Thought</hi>, New York, 1927. +</p> + +<p> +Treat, Payson J.; <hi rend='italic'>The Far East</hi>, New York and London, 1928. +</p> + +<pb n='273'/><anchor id='Pg273'/> + +<p> +Trotsky, Leon; <hi rend='italic'>Problems of the Chinese Revolution</hi>, New York, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Tyau Min-ch'ien T. Z.; <hi rend='italic'>Two Years of Nationalist China</hi>, Shanghai, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +van Dorn, Harold Archer; <hi rend='italic'>Twenty Years of The Chinese Republic</hi>, +New York, 1932. +</p> + +<p> +Vinacke, Harold Monk; <hi rend='italic'>Modern Constitutional Development in China</hi>, +Princeton, 1920. +</p> + +<p> +Wang Ch'ing-wei et al.; <hi rend='italic'>The Chinese National Revolution</hi>, Peiping, +1930. +</p> + +<p> +Weale, E. L. Putnam, <hi rend='italic'>pseud.</hi> (Simpson, Bertram Lennox); <hi rend='italic'>The Vanished +Empire</hi>, London, 1926. +</p> + +<p> +Weber, Max; <hi rend='italic'>Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie</hi>, Tübingen, +1922. +</p> + +<p> +Wieger, Leon, S. J.; <hi rend='italic'>Chine Moderne</hi>, 10 volumes, Hsien-hsien, 1921-32. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +An enormous scrapbook of translations from the Chinese illustrating +political and religious trends. Catholic point of view. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>Textes Historiques: Histoire Politique de la Chine</hi>, Hsien-hsien, +1929. +</p> + +<p> +—— and Davrout, L., S. J.; <hi rend='italic'>Chinese Characters</hi>, Hsien-hsien, 1927. +</p> + +<p> +Wilhelm, Richard (Danton, G. H. and Danton, A. P., translators); +<hi rend='italic'>Confucius and Confucianism</hi>, New York, 1931. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie</hi>, Breslau, 1929. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>Ostasien, Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises</hi>, +Potsdam and Zürich, 1928. +</p> + +</quote> + +<p> +Perhaps the best of all works introductory to Chinese civilization. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> + +<p> +Williams, S. Wells; <hi rend='italic'>The Middle Kingdom</hi>, New York, 1895. +</p> + +<p> +——; <hi rend='italic'>A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language</hi>, Tungchou, 1909. +</p> + +<p> +Wu Ch'ao-ch'u, <hi rend='italic'>The Nationalist Program for China</hi>, New Haven, 1930. +</p> + +<p> +Wu Kuo-cheng; <hi rend='italic'>Ancient Chinese Political Theories</hi>, Shanghai, 1928. +</p> + +<p> +Ziah, C. F.; <hi rend='italic'>Philosophie Politique de la Chine Ancienne (700-221 AV. +J.-C.)</hi>, Paris, 1934. +</p> + +</quote> + +</div> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='274'/><anchor id='Pg274'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chinese-English Glossary.</head> + +<p> +The author has not sought to prepare a lexicon of +modern Chinese political terms. He presents, however, a +list of those Chinese words which have frequently been +left untranslated in the text, together with the ideographs +by which they are written in China, and brief definitions. +Variant meanings, however significant, have been omitted. +Peculiar definitions, to be found only in the present work, +have been enclosed in brackets. To locate the phrases, and +discussions of them, consult the index. +</p> + +<list type='simple'> +<item>正 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng</foreign>; right; rectified</item> +<item>主 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chu</foreign>; used as a compound with <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>i</foreign>, below, to make +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chu-i</foreign>: principle, -ism</item> +<item>權 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign>; power</item> +<item>會 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>; society; guild</item> +<item>縣 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>; district (a political subdivision)</item> +<item>義 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>i</foreign>; propriety</item> +<item>仁 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>; humanity; fellow-feeling; benevolence, etc. +[consciousness of social orientation]</item> +<item>禮 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>; rites; ceremonies [ideological conformity]</item> +<item>民 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min</foreign>; people; <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Volk</foreign></item> +<item>名 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ming</foreign>; name [terminology, or, a part of ideology]</item> +<item>能 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign>; capacity</item> +<item>霸 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa</foreign>; violence; violent; tyrant; tyrannous</item> +<item>三 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>san</foreign>; three</item> +<item>生 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>shêng</foreign>; life; regeneration; livelihood</item> +<item>大 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta</foreign>; great</item> +<item>道 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tao</foreign>; path; way; principle</item> +<item>德 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>têh</foreign>; virtue</item> +<item>族 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tsu</foreign>; unity; kinship</item> +<item>同 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>t'ung</foreign>; harmony; concord</item> +<item>王 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang</foreign>; king; kingly</item> +<item>樂 <foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign>; rhythm</item> +</list> + +</div> + +<pb n='275'/><anchor id='Pg275'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Index.</head> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Proper Names and Special Terms</hi> +</p> + +<p> +America (<hi rend='italic'>see also</hi> <ref target='Index-United-States'>United States</ref>), <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref>, <ref target='Pg220'>220</ref> +</p> + +<p> +American Indians, <ref target='Pg124'>124</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Anglo-Saxons, <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Annam, <ref target='Pg127'>127</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Austria, <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Beresford, Lord Charles, <ref target='Pg187'>187</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Bismarck, <ref target='Pg254'>254</ref> ff. +</p> + +<p> +Bolsheviks (<hi rend='italic'>see</hi> <ref target='Index-Russians'>Russians</ref>, <ref target='Index-Marxian'>Marxian philosophy</ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Borodin, <ref target='Pg005'>5</ref>, <ref target='Pg007'>7</ref>, <ref target='Pg161'>161</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Boxer Rebellion, <ref target='Pg078'>78</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-British'/> +British Empire, <ref target='Pg071'>71</ref>, <ref target='Pg199'>199</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Burgess, J. S., <ref target='Pg041'>41.</ref>. +</p> + +<p> +Cantlie, Sir James, <ref target='Pg084'>84</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Canton'/> +Canton, <ref target='Pg007'>7</ref>, <ref target='Pg066'>66</ref>, <ref target='Pg126'>126</ref>, <ref target='Pg233'>233</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Catherine I of Russia, <ref target='Pg243'>243</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Catholic Church, <ref target='Pg054'>54</ref>n., <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Chang Tso (Djang Chu), <ref target='Pg186'>186</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, <ref target='Pg006'>6</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Chen, Eugene, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Chêng, state of, <ref target='Pg027'>27</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chêng ming</foreign>, <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg083'>83</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>, <ref target='Pg114'>114</ref>, <ref target='Pg210'>210</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'i</foreign>, <ref target='Pg110'>110</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Chiang Chieh-shih (Chiang Kai-shek), <ref target='Pg102'>102</ref>n., <ref target='Pg158'>158</ref>n., <ref target='Pg163'>163</ref>n., <ref target='Pg206'>206</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Chien Kuo Fang Lo</hi> (see <ref target='Index-Program-Reconstruction'><hi rend='italic'>The Program of National Reconstruction</hi></ref>) +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</hi> (see <ref target='Index-Outline-Reconstruction'><hi rend='italic'>see The Outline of National Reconstruction</hi></ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Ch'ien Lung, the Emperor, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ch'in dynasty, <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, the, <ref target='Pg026'>26</ref>n., <ref target='Pg037'>37</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Chinese Eastern Railway, the, <ref target='Pg201'>201</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ch'ing dynasty (<hi rend='italic'>see</hi> <ref target='Index-Manchu'>Manchu dynasty</ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Chou dynasty, <ref target='Pg025'>25</ref>, <ref target='Pg028'>28</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Christianity, <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref>, <ref target='Pg067'>67</ref>, <ref target='Pg133'>133</ref>n., <ref target='Pg155'>155</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ch'üan</foreign>, <ref target='Pg107'>107</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref>, <ref target='Pg218'>218</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>chun ch'üan</foreign>, <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Chung Hua, The Republic of, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Cohen, Morris, <ref target='Pg008'>8</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Coker, Francis W., <ref target='Pg147'>147</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Communists, <ref target='Pg010'>10</ref>, <ref target='Pg064'>64</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg066'>66</ref>, <ref target='Pg106'>106</ref>, <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>, <ref target='Pg160'>160</ref>, <ref target='Pg161'>161</ref>, <ref target='Pg163'>163</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg189'>189</ref>, <ref target='Pg205'>205</ref>, <ref target='Pg246'>246</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Confucianism, <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg060'>60</ref>, <ref target='Pg066'>66</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg082'>82</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg090'>90</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg106'>106</ref>, <ref target='Pg109'>109</ref>, <ref target='Pg113'>113</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg210'>210</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Confucius (K'ung Ch'iu), <ref target='Pg025'>25</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg060'>60</ref>, <ref target='Pg076'>76</ref>, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg105'>105</ref>, <ref target='Pg261'>261</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Creel, H. G., <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Cressey, George B., <ref target='Pg127'>127</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Davrout, L., <ref target='Pg032'>32</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +d'Elia, Paschal M., <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Donbas region, <ref target='Pg246'>246</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Douglas, Sir Robert K., <ref target='Pg243'>243</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Dutch, the, <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Empress Dowager, Tzŭ Hsi, the, <ref target='Pg131'>131</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-England'/> +England, <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref>, <ref target='Pg150'>150</ref>n., <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Erdberg, Oskar, <ref target='Pg161'>161</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Fascism, <ref target='Pg054'>54</ref>, <ref target='Pg146'>146</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg244'>244</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ford, Henry, <ref target='Pg132'>132</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Four Books, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg075'>75</ref> +</p> + +<p> +France, <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Gandhi, M. K., <ref target='Pg156'>156</ref>n., <ref target='Pg180'>180</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Genro, the, <ref target='Pg131'>131</ref> +</p> + +<p> +George III of England, <ref target='Pg243'>243</ref> +</p> + +<p> +George, Henry, <ref target='Pg072'>72</ref>, <ref target='Pg136'>136</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg144'>144</ref>, <ref target='Pg256'>256</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Germany, <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref>, <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref>, <ref target='Pg196'>196</ref>, <ref target='Pg254'>254</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Goodnow, Frank J., <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Granet, Marcel, <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Great Britain (<hi rend='italic'>see</hi> <ref target='Index-British'>British Empire</ref>, <ref target='Index-England'>England</ref>) +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Great Learning, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg074'>74</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Greeks, the, <ref target='Pg133'>133</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Hai Ching Kung, the, <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Hamilton, Alexander, <ref target='Pg077'>77</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Han Fei-tzŭ, <ref target='Pg029'>29</ref>, <ref target='Pg093'>93</ref> +</p> + +<pb n='276'/><anchor id='Pg276'/> + +<p> +Harvey, E. D., <ref target='Pg154'>154</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Hawaii, <ref target='Pg061'>61</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Hitler, Adolf, <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Holcombe, Arthur N., <ref target='Pg011'>11</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Hongkong, <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Honolulu, <ref target='Pg126'>126</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hou chih hou chou</foreign>, the, <ref target='Pg105'>105</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Hsieh, Pao-chao, <ref target='Pg045'>45</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien</foreign>, <ref target='Pg045'>45</ref>, <ref target='Pg211'>211</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg230'>230</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hsien chih hsien chou</foreign>, the, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>, <ref target='Pg106'>106</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Hsin dynasty, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Hsü, Leonard Shih-lien, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Hu Han-min, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n., <ref target='Pg186'>186</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hui</foreign>, <ref target='Pg038'>38</ref>, <ref target='Pg041'>41</ref>, <ref target='Pg095'>95</ref>, <ref target='Pg165'>165</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Hulutao port, <ref target='Pg260'>260</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>hung fang</foreign>, <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Hung Jair, <ref target='Pg236'>236</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<q>ideology,</q> <ref target='Pg018'>18</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +India, <ref target='Pg090'>90</ref>, <ref target='Pg181'>181</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>International Development of China, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Isaacs, Harold, <ref target='Pg161'>161</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Japan, <ref target='Pg028'>28</ref>, <ref target='Pg040'>40</ref>, <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref>, <ref target='Pg048'>48</ref>, <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>, <ref target='Pg059'>59</ref>, <ref target='Pg063'>63</ref>, <ref target='Pg090'>90</ref>, <ref target='Pg170'>170</ref>, <ref target='Pg184'>184</ref>, <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref>, <ref target='Pg199'>199</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg240'>240</ref>, <ref target='Pg260'>260</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>jên</foreign>, <ref target='Pg014'>14</ref>, <ref target='Pg030'>30</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg072'>72</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref>, <ref target='Pg142'>142</ref>, <ref target='Pg144'>144</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg154'>154</ref>, <ref target='Pg263'>263</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Jên T'ai, <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Jews, the, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Joffe, Adolf, <ref target='Pg064'>64</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Johnston, Sir Reginald, <ref target='Pg119'>119</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Kailan Mining Administration, The, <ref target='Pg179'>179</ref> +</p> + +<p> +K'ang Hsi, the Emperor, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Kang Têh</q> (<hi rend='italic'>see</hi> <ref target='Index-Pu-Yi'>P'u Yi</ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Koo, V. K. Wellington, <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Korea (Chosen), <ref target='Pg048'>48</ref>, <ref target='Pg059'>59</ref>, <ref target='Pg070'>70</ref>, <ref target='Pg127'>127</ref>, <ref target='Pg200'>200</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Kulp, D. H., <ref target='Pg038'>38</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Ku Hung-ming, <ref target='Pg077'>77</ref> +</p> + +<p> +K'ung family, <ref target='Pg090'>90</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Kung, H. H., <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Kuo Hsing-hua, <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Kuomintang, the, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>, <ref target='Pg158'>158</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg205'>205</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Kwangtung Province (<hi rend='italic'>see</hi> <ref target='Index-Canton'>Canton</ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Kuzbas region, <ref target='Pg246'>246</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Lao Tzŭ, <ref target='Pg025'>25</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Latins, the, <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Latourette, Kenneth Scott, <ref target='Pg091'>91</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Lea, Homer, <ref target='Pg195'>195</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Lee, Frank C., <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Legge translations, the, <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>n., <ref target='Pg075'>75</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Lenin, V. I., <ref target='Pg132'>132</ref>, <ref target='Pg230'>230</ref>n., <ref target='Pg247'>247</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>li</foreign>, <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>, <ref target='Pg115'>115</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Li Chao-wei, <ref target='Pg219'>219</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Li Chi, <ref target='Pg086'>86</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Li Ti-tsun, <ref target='Pg137'>137</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, <ref target='Pg030'>30</ref>, <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Lin Shen, President, <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Lincoln, Abraham, <ref target='Pg262'>262</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth, <ref target='Pg008'>8</ref>n., <ref target='Pg084'>84</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Lotus society, the, <ref target='Pg041'>41</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Lovejoy, Arthur O., <ref target='Pg018'>18</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Lynn, Jermyn Chi-hung, <ref target='Pg221'>221</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Macao, <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli, Niccolò, <ref target='Pg026'>26</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<q>machine state,</q> <ref target='Pg054'>54</ref> +</p> + +<p> +MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, <ref target='Pg011'>11</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Malaysia, <ref target='Pg186'>186</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Manchu'/> +Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, <ref target='Pg022'>22</ref>, <ref target='Pg043'>43</ref>, <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>n., <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref>, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg096'>96</ref>, <ref target='Pg111'>111</ref>, <ref target='Pg119'>119</ref>, <ref target='Pg124'>124</ref>, <ref target='Pg131'>131</ref>, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg167'>167</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg172'>172</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg182'>182</ref>, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref>, <ref target='Pg227'>227</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Manchukuo</q> (<q>Manchoukuo</q>), <ref target='Pg071'>71</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Manchuria, <ref target='Pg002'>2</ref>, <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>, <ref target='Pg201'>201</ref>, <ref target='Pg205'>205</ref>, <ref target='Pg260'>260</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mandarins, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Manifesto</hi> of the first Party congress, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mannheim, Karl, <ref target='Pg018'>18</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Marx, Karl, <ref target='Pg072'>72</ref>n., <ref target='Pg163'>163</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Marxian'/> +Marxian philosophy, <ref target='Pg014'>14</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg052'>52</ref>, <ref target='Pg055'>55</ref>, <ref target='Pg070'>70</ref>, <ref target='Pg072'>72</ref>, <ref target='Pg081'>81</ref>n., <ref target='Pg106'>106</ref>, <ref target='Pg125'>125</ref>, <ref target='Pg134'>134</ref>n., <ref target='Pg137'>137</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg144'>144</ref>, <ref target='Pg192'>192</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg209'>209</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg236'>236</ref>, <ref target='Pg257'>257</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Marxism-Leninism, <ref target='Pg081'>81</ref>, <ref target='Pg136'>136</ref>, <ref target='Pg182'>182</ref>, <ref target='Pg189'>189</ref>, <ref target='Pg192'>192</ref>ff. +</p> + +<pb n='277'/><anchor id='Pg277'/> + +<p> +Mayers, William Frederick, <ref target='Pg045'>45</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Meiji Emperor, the, <ref target='Pg082'>82</ref>, <ref target='Pg131'>131</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mencius (Mêng Tzŭ), <ref target='Pg076'>76</ref>, <ref target='Pg093'>93</ref>, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Miao tribes, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mill, John Stuart, <ref target='Pg098'>98</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Millar, John, <ref target='Pg098'>98</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min</foreign>, <ref target='Pg217'>217</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min ch'üan</foreign>, <ref target='Pg099'>99</ref>, <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref>n., <ref target='Pg209'>209</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Min Ch'üan Ts'u Pu</hi> (see <hi rend='italic'>The Primer of Democracy</hi>) +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min shêng</foreign>, <ref target='Pg012'>12</ref>, <ref target='Pg101'>101</ref>, <ref target='Pg121'>121</ref>, <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref>, <ref target='Pg180'>180</ref>, <ref target='Pg193'>193</ref>, <ref target='Pg236'>236</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>min tsu</foreign>, <ref target='Pg036'>36</ref>, <ref target='Pg099'>99</ref>, <ref target='Pg120'>120</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ming dynasty, <ref target='Pg096'>96</ref>, <ref target='Pg124'>124</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ming T'ai Tsung, the Emperor, <ref target='Pg124'>124</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mo Ti, <ref target='Pg093'>93</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mohammedans, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Mongol'/> +Mongol (Yüan) dynasty, <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mongolia, <ref target='Pg002'>2</ref>, <ref target='Pg087'>87</ref>, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Montesquieu, Charles de S., Baron, <ref target='Pg112'>112</ref>, <ref target='Pg221'>221</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Mussolini, Benito, <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref> +</p> + +<p> +National Government of China, The, <ref target='Pg003'>3</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>nêng</foreign>, <ref target='Pg107'>107</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref>, <ref target='Pg218'>218</ref> +</p> + +<p> +New Deal, the, <ref target='Pg238'>238</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +New Life Movement, the, <ref target='Pg102'>102</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Outline-Reconstruction'/> +<hi rend='italic'>Outline of National Reconstruction, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pa tao</foreign>, <ref target='Pg071'>71</ref>, <ref target='Pg200'>200</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Pan-Asia, <ref target='Pg197'>197</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Pareto, Vilfredo, <ref target='Pg015'>15</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Peffer, Nathaniel, <ref target='Pg010'>10</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Peru, <ref target='Pg165'>165</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Philippines, <ref target='Pg186'>186</ref>, <ref target='Pg187'>187</ref>n., <ref target='Pg200'>200</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of Sun Wên, The</hi> (see <ref target='Index-Sun-Wen'><hi rend='italic'>Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê</hi></ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Piatiletka (The Five-Year Plan), <ref target='Pg132'>132</ref>, <ref target='Pg238'>238</ref>n., <ref target='Pg246'>246</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Plato, <ref target='Pg079'>79</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Poland, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Political Testament, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg002'>2</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Ponce, Mariano, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Portuguese, the, <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Presidency of ancient states, the, <ref target='Pg028'>28</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Price, Frank W., <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Primer of Democracy, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Program-Reconstruction'/> +<hi rend='italic'>Program of National Reconstruction, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>pu chih pu chou</foreign>, the, <ref target='Pg105'>105</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Pu-Yi'/> +P'u Yi, <ref target='Pg119'>119</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., <ref target='Pg091'>91</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Rea, George Bronson, <ref target='Pg183'>183</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Reichwein, Adolf, <ref target='Pg050'>50</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Republic, The</hi>, <ref target='Pg079'>79</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Rome, <ref target='Pg215'>215</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Roy, Manabendra Nath, <ref target='Pg052'>52</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Russians'/> +Russians (<hi rend='italic'>see also</hi> <ref target='Index-Soviet-Union'>Soviet Union</ref>), <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref>, <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>, <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref>, <ref target='Pg103'>103</ref>n., <ref target='Pg137'>137</ref>, <ref target='Pg194'>194</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg240'>240</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-San-Min'/> +<hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Sharman, Lyon, <ref target='Pg001'>1</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Sheean, Vincent, <ref target='Pg161'>161</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>shen ch'üan</foreign>, <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Shih Yeh Chi Hua</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Shryock, John K., <ref target='Pg036'>36</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Shun, the Emperor, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Siam, <ref target='Pg187'>187</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Smith, Adam, <ref target='Pg237'>237</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Smith, Arthur, <ref target='Pg040'>40</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +South Manchuria Railway, The, <ref target='Pg179'>179</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Soviets in China, <ref target='Pg002'>2</ref>, <ref target='Pg212'>212</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Soviet-Union'/> +Soviet Union (U. S. S. R.), <ref target='Pg064'>64</ref>, <ref target='Pg147'>147</ref>, <ref target='Pg155'>155</ref>n., <ref target='Pg184'>184</ref>ff., <ref target='Pg189'>189</ref>, <ref target='Pg199'>199</ref>, <ref target='Pg201'>201</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Spring and Autumn Period, <ref target='Pg027'>27</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Stalin, Joseph, <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref>, <ref target='Pg158'>158</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Starr, Frederick, <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Stoddard, Lothrop, <ref target='Pg197'>197</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Sun-Joffe Manifesto, The, <ref target='Pg064'>64</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-Sun-Wen'/> +<hi rend='italic'>Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê</hi>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Sun Yat-sen, Mme. (née Soong Ching-ling), <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>n., <ref target='Pg158'>158</ref>n., <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>n., <ref target='Pg253'>253</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Sung Chiao-jên, <ref target='Pg138'>138</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Sung dynasty, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta chia</foreign>, <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>ta t'ung</foreign>, <ref target='Pg120'>120</ref>, <ref target='Pg210'>210</ref>, <ref target='Pg261'>261</ref> +</p> + +<pb n='278'/><anchor id='Pg278'/> + +<p> +Tagore, Sir Rabindranath, <ref target='Pg132'>132</ref>, <ref target='Pg156'>156</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Tai Chi-tao, <ref target='Pg069'>69</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tai-p'ing Rebellion, the, <ref target='Pg050'>50</ref>, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref>, <ref target='Pg172'>172</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Taiwan (Formosa), <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>n., <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +T'ang Liang-li (T'ang Leang-li), <ref target='Pg005'>5</ref>n., <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tang pu</foreign>, <ref target='Pg164'>164</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Taoism, <ref target='Pg025'>25</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tao Kuang, the Emperor, <ref target='Pg243'>243</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tawney, R. H., <ref target='Pg045'>45</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>têh</foreign> (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>tê</foreign>), <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Thomas, Elbert Duncan, <ref target='Pg025'>25</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Tibet, <ref target='Pg002'>2</ref>, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Triad Society, the, <ref target='Pg041'>41</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Triple Demism, The</hi> (see <ref target='Index-San-Min'><hi rend='italic'>San Min Chu I</hi></ref>) +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Ts'an Yi Yüan</hi>, the, <ref target='Pg228'>228</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tsao Kun, <ref target='Pg119'>119</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Tsiang Kuen, <ref target='Pg236'>236</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Tsinanfu, <ref target='Pg205'>205</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tsui Shu-chin <ref target='Pg010'>10</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='italic'>Tsung Li</hi>, <ref target='Pg162'>162</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tung Meng Hui, <ref target='Pg136'>136</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Turkey, <ref target='Pg199'>199</ref>, <ref target='Pg201'>201</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Tyau, Minch'ien T. Z., <ref target='Pg005'>5</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Index-United-States'/> +United States of America, The, <ref target='Pg079'>79</ref>, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg112'>112</ref>, <ref target='Pg130'>130</ref>, <ref target='Pg187'>187</ref>n., <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref>, <ref target='Pg199'>199</ref>, <ref target='Pg205'>205</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Versailles Conference, the, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Vinacke, Harold Monk, <ref target='Pg227'>227</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Vladislavich, <ref target='Pg243'>243</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wang An-shih, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wang Ch'ing-wei, <ref target='Pg005'>5</ref>, <ref target='Pg164'>164</ref>, <ref target='Pg206'>206</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wang Mang, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>wang tao</foreign>, <ref target='Pg071'>71</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wang Yang-ming, <ref target='Pg080'>80</ref>n., <ref target='Pg084'>84</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Warring States, the Age of, <ref target='Pg027'>27</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Washington Conference, the, <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Weale, Putnam (B. L. Simpson), <ref target='Pg050'>50</ref>, <ref target='Pg225'>225</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Weber, Max, <ref target='Pg015'>15</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wei Yung, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Wên Wang, the, <ref target='Pg168'>168</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wieger, Leon, <ref target='Pg032'>32</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Wilhelm, Richard, <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>n., <ref target='Pg068'>68</ref> +</p> + +<p> +William, Maurice, <ref target='Pg010'>10</ref>, <ref target='Pg072'>72</ref>, <ref target='Pg142'>142</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Williams, S. Wells, <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>, <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Wilson, Woodrow, <ref target='Pg006'>6</ref>, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Wittfogel, Karl, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Wou Saofong, <ref target='Pg111'>111</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Wu Pei-fu, <ref target='Pg222'>222</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +Yangtze river (the <hi rend='italic'>Ch'ang Chiang</hi>), <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Yao, the Emperor, <ref target='Pg076'>76</ref>, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg219'>219</ref>, <ref target='Pg233'>233</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Yellow river (the <hi rend='italic'>Huang Ho</hi>), <ref target='Pg100'>100</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Yen Shing Kung, the, <ref target='Pg044'>44</ref>n. +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yi</foreign> (<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>i</foreign>), <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref>ff. +</p> + +<p> +Yoshemitsu, the Ashikaga Shogun, <ref target='Pg183'>183</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Yuan, the Five, <ref target='Pg224'>224</ref> +</p> + +<p> +Yüan dynasty (<hi rend='italic'>see</hi> <ref target='Index-Mongol'>Mongol dynasty</ref>) +</p> + +<p> +Yüan Shih-k'ai, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>, <ref target='Pg166'>166</ref>, <ref target='Pg173'>173</ref>, <ref target='Pg183'>183</ref>, <ref target='Pg220'>220</ref>, <ref target='Pg251'>251</ref> +</p> + +<p> +<foreign lang='zh' rend='italic'>yüeh</foreign>, <ref target='Pg091'>91</ref>ff. +</p> + +</div> + +</body> +<back rend="page-break-before: right"> + <div id="footnotes"> + <index index="toc" /> + <index index="pdf" /> + <head>Footnotes</head> + <divGen type="footnotes"/> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: right"> + <divGen type="pgfooter" /> + </div> +</back> +</text> +</TEI.2> |